SOVIET NONFUEL MINERALS AND METALS: OUTLOOK FOR PRODUCTION AND TRADE

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• Document Page Count: 22
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Production and Trade
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals
and Metals: Outlook for
Secret
ER 81-10270
August 1981
Copy 2 8 2
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Notice to recipients of NFAC document: Soviet Nonfuel
Minerals and Metals: Outlook for Production and Trade,
ER 81-10270, August 1981.
The gold sales figures in the last paragraph on
page 10 are in error. In 1980, the Soviets sold about
40 tons of gold--netting the USSR about $800 million.
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Assessment
Center
Branch, OER
Production and Trade
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals
and Metals: Outlook for
Information available as of 26 June 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Office of Economic
Research. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Industry and Resources
Officer for USSR-Eastern Europe.
This paper was coordinated with the Office of
Geographic and Societal Research, the Office of
Political Analysis, and the National Intelligence
Secret
ER 81-10270
August 1981
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Soviet Nonfuel Minerals
and Metals: Outlook for
Production and Trade
Key Judgments The USSR is nearly self-sufficient in nonfuel minerals and enjoys far
greater security of supply than do the Western industrialized countries.
New mines and processing plants are coming on line, numerous projects
are planned and under construction, and large investments are committed
for geological prospecting and metallurgical development during the
current five-year plan.25X1
The importance of the USSR as a supplier of nonfuel minerals and metals
to the West has generally diminished over the last decade, stemming from
such things as:
? The emergence of alternative suppliers in the case of manganese, nickel,
and chromite.
? Changing technologies in the West that have lowered the need for Soviet
minerals, most notably chromite.
? Sharply higher prices in world markets that allow the USSR to meet its
hard currency needs with substantially lower export volume for gold and
platinum-group metals.
? A slowdown or decline in domestic production of iron ore, chromite, and
manganese.
These trends are expected to continue during the 1980s.F_~ 25X1
The behavior of the USSR as a buyer of nonfuel minerals and metals in
world markets during the 1970s has been marked by:
? Steady increases in purchases of steel products, tin, and
bauxite/alumina.
? A constant volume of purchases of cobalt from Cuba and Africa.
? A reported sharp jump in imports of tungsten and molybdenum, for
reasons we cannot fully explain.
Mainly because of increased steel purchases, the USSR is now a net
importer of nonfuel minerals and metals from the West whereas it was a
net exporter a decade ago. F__1 25X1
The USSR attaches considerable importance to self-sufficiency, both for
reasons of national security and international prestige. Although Soviet
resolve and ability to maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency is unlikely
to weaken for the foreseeable future, Moscow is pragmatic and accepts
some degree of import dependence when:
? Very high costs are encountered, as in the case of tin.
? High-quality domestic resources do not exist, as in the case of bauxite.
? Soviet industry cannot provide the quality or assortment of products
needed, as in the case of steel.
Secret
ER 81-10270
August 1981
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Imports of nonfuel minerals and metals from non-Communist countries are
expected to continue during the 1980s. Purchases of cobalt and molyb-
denum could be reduced or eliminated, however, as a result of increased
production in the USSR and in other Communist countries=
Soviet dependence on imports of tin, bauxite/alumina, tungsten, and
molybdenum is not a critical issue for the West; Soviet purchases generally
are small in terms of world supply and do not threaten the security of Wes-
tern supply. Nor does this limited dependence seem critical from Moscow's
point of view, considering that the Soviets are self-sufficient or soon will be
in strategic commodities such as platinum-group metals, chromite, titan-
ium, manganese, and cobalt. F_~
Overall, the Soviets are likely to continue to run hard currency deficits
with the West in nonfuel minerals and metals trade as the result of
continued large purchases of steel products. The Soviets will still be able to
reduce this deficit sharply, however, by resuming large gold sales to the
West.F___1
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Key Judgments
Introduction
Soviet Resource Base
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals Production
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals and Metals Trade
Minerals
USSR: Production of Nonfuel Minerals and Metals 4
Non-Communist Dependence on the USSR for Selected Nonfuel 7
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Soviet Nonfuel Minerals
and Metals: Outlook for
Production and Trade F
Introduction
The near self-sufficiency of the USSR in nonfuel
minerals and metals, coupled with the paucity of hard
information on Soviet production and trade, has led to
speculation in the West regarding Soviet motives in
world metals trade. Some Western policymakers are
worried that because of declining reserves, increasing
costs, and a mounting inability to cope with produc-
tion problems, Moscow has shifted from its longstand-
ing policy of maximum self-sufficiency toward a
policy of increased dependency on imports, especially
from the mineral-rich countries of central and south-
ern Africa. This view leads to concern that the USSR
will soon be competing with the West for minerals,
using political means, if necessary, to gain access to
supplies, thus touching off a scramble in world mar-
kets.
This paper addresses that issue by assessing Soviet
production and trade in key nonfuel minerals. Those
commodities that are of greatest concern to the West
(the platinum-group metals, chromite, cobalt, and
manganese) receive special attention, both in the main
paper and in an appendix. The West depends almost
totally on imports for these minerals, and, except for
cobalt, the USSR and the potentially politically un-
stable countries of central and southern Africa are the
principal sources of supply. The paper begins with a
discussion of the resource base for nonfuel minerals. It
then examines production trends and closes with an
analysis of the USSR's position in world trade in
these minerals and metals.)
Attention is given to trends in Soviet production and
trade in steel products and to problems in the produc-
tion of iron ore. Neither steel nor iron ore is presently
a source of concern to Western policymakers, but they
are examined because (a) sharply increased Soviet
steel imports are the primary reason the Soviets have
gone from a net exporter to a net importer in nonfuel
minerals and metals with the West during the 1970s
and (b) the widely reported problems in Soviet iron ore
production seem characteristic of problems facing
other ferrous and nonferrous extractive industries as
well. F__1
Soviet Resource Base
The Soviet Union's mineral reserves rank among the
largest in the world. The Soviets claim to have the
world's largest reserves of iron ore, manganese, nickel,
lead, molybdenum, mercury, and antimony.' They
also claim that reserves of chromite, gold, platinum-
group metals, and copper are among the largest in the
world and are sufficient to support Soviet mine pro-
duction for many decades.' Western specialists gener-
ally accept the validity of these claims. There is a
strong possibility, moreover, that the enormous unde-
veloped and virtually unexplored regions of the eas-
tern USSR will provide many of the world's richest
discoveries in the future. For example, the huge Aldan
iron ore deposit in eastern Siberia probably contains
sufficient reserves to support current Soviet produc- 25X1
tion for at least 30 years, and the Udokan copper
deposit in East Siberia probably can support current
Soviet production for at least 25 years.3 The Soviets
claim that vast reserves of nickel and copper exist in
northern Siberia in addition to the giant deposits
already discovered near Noril'sk. Major reserves of
tungsten and gold probably exist in the Bogutin region
of southern Kazakhstan and in the Kyzylkum desert
of Uzbekistan, respectively. There are indications that
large deposits of tin exist near Yam-Alin in Khabar-
ovsk Kray as well as large deposits of low-grade
bauxite in the Kustanay Oblast in Kazakhstan.
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With respect to claimed reserves, Soviet studies state
that recoverable reserves of iron ore amount to about
60 billion tons-some 40 percent of the world's total.
Reserves of manganese are estimated at 2.5 billion
tons, enough to support current Soviet production for
over two centuries. Reserves of chromite are placed at
' V. A. Boyarskiy, Razvitiye otkrytoi dobychi rud, Moscow: 1975,
p. 14. See also N. P. Banny et al.; Ekonomika chernoi metallurgii
SSSR, Moscow: 1978, pp. 69-70. 25X1
' Sh. Yesenov, et al., Nedra Kaza stana, Alma Ata: 1968, pp.
150-225. 25X1
' See Gormy z urns , no. 12, 1977, pp. 8-11. For details on Siberian
iron ore deposits, see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 27 June 1979, p. 1; for
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Table 1
USSR: Estimated Reserves of Selected Nonfuel Minerals a
Share of World
Reserves (Percent)
Years to Exhaustion
(At 1980 Production)
63.3 billion tons
40
250
Manganese
2.5 billion tons
40
250
Chromite
271.2 million tons
10
80
Copper
40.0 million tons
7
28
Nickel
11.3 million tons d
18
48
Cobalt
100 million tons d
17
Lead
Zinc
Gold
200 million troy ounces
35
20
Platinum-group metals
90 million troy ounces d
25
25
Tungsten
215 thousand tons e
11
24
a Corresponding to Western concepts of proved, probable, and
possible reserves, respectively.
b Principal sources include: V.V. Strishkov, "The Mineral Industry
of the USSR" (unpublished paper) 1981; A. Sutulov, Mineral
Resources and Economy of the USSR, New York: 1973; V. A.
Boyarskiy, Razvitiye otkrytoi dobychi rud, Moscow: 1975; V.N.
Vinogradov, Ekonomicheskaya otsenka kompleksnogo mineral-
nogo syrya, Moscow: 1978.
about 270 million tons, about an 80-year supply.4 The
bulk of these ferrous ores-located in relatively acces-
sible regions of the western USSR and Kazakhstan-
do not pose serious exploitation problems by Soviet
standards in terms of climate or distances to industrial
centers.F_~
Data on reserves of nonferrous minerals are protected
by the Soviet State Secrecy Decree. Nonetheless,
studies by the US Bureau of Mines and other Western
specialists indicate that, at a minimum, Soviet re-
serves of major nonferrous metals (such as copper,
nickel, cobalt, gold, and platinum-group metals) are
sufficient to support current Soviet production for at
least 15 years-in the case of cobalt-to almost 50
years-in the case of nickel (table 1). As in the West,
the Soviets have established prudent policies with
respect to the reserve base that must be available to
justify construction of minerals processing plants.
New copper, nickel, aluminum, and lead/zinc plants
Does not include an estimated 24 million tons of recoverable copper
at the Udokan copper deposit. See Theodore Shabad, Gateway to
Siberian Resources, Washington: 1977, p. 80.
d Does not include recoverable reserves at the Talnakh deposit near
Noril'sk.
e Konrad Kundig, "The Tungsten Market-From Chaos to Stabil-
ity," Journal of Metals, May 1981, p. 42.
must have a reserve base sufficient to support produc-
tion for at least 30 years; tun sten and tin plants, 20
years; gold at least 10 years.'
Unlike the reserves of most ferrous ores, many of the
largest Soviet nonferrous deposits are located in re-
mote and climatically severe regions of the country. In
some cases (nonbauxite ores, for example), the depos-
its would not be considered economically exploitable
by Western standards. Major deposits of copper,
nickel, cobalt, and platinum-group metals are located
near Noril'sk where operating conditions are among
the worst in the world in terms of climate, depth of
mines, and distance from major industrialized centers.
The bulk of the country's reserves of gold, tin,
diamonds, tungsten, and molybdenum are located in
the Far East economic region, where mining opera-
' T. A. Slepneva, et al., Ekonomika tsvetnoy metallurgii, Moscow:
1976, p. 124. See also, S. Ya. Kaganovich, Ekonomika mineral-
nogo syrya, Moscow: 1975, p. 96; N. A. Bykhover, Geologiya
ekonomicheskiye osnovy mineralnikh resursov, Moscow: 1978, p.
204F I
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gold and tin, only during part of the year.
tions are carried out at great cost and, in the case of
Despite difficult geographic conditions, the Soviets
continued to develop and bring new mineral deposits
into commercial production in the 1970s.6 The rich
Talnakh deposit near Noril'sk-now being exploited
after a 10-year development effort-has the potential
to boost Soviet copper and nickel production dramati-
cally, strengthen the USSR's already major role as an
exporter of platinum-group metals, and eliminate
dependence on imports of cobalt.' Another new source
of copper for the USSR and Eastern Europe is the
Erdenets deposit in neighboring Mongolia, which is
now being exploited after a six-year effort by the
USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. A valu-
able byproduct of this development will be molyb-
denum, in short supply both in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. Still another new development is the Vostok-
2 tungsten combine in the Soviet Far East area of
Primorskiy Kray. The combine went into operation in
1977 and has since been expanded to take advantage
of additional deposits nearby. The Soviets also have
begun to expand the ore base at Pevek in Magadan
Oblast in the Soviet Far East for its tin, tungsten,
gold, and silver. New underground gold and silver
mines and concentrating plants were put into oper-
ation at Karamken and Dukat in Magadan Oblast,
and major expansion continued at the huge Muruntau
Gold Combine in Uzbekistan. During the 1970s, the
Soviets also added about 1 million tons of new
aluminum production capacity, mainly in Siberia, and
completed the large Achinsk Alumina plant in eastern
Siberia that now provides for about 15 percent of the
USSR's annual alumina requirements! This plant
processes a low-grade nonbauxite ore, nepheline sy-
enite, which cannot be processed economically in the
West. The Soviet decision to build the huge Achinsk
plant to process this complex ore is another indication
6 The projects described represent only a sample of Soviet nonfuel
minerals and metals projects completed during the 1970s. There are
many other examples of older mines that were reconstructed and
existing plants that were either modernized or expanded during the
17 February 1981, p. 1.
the huge Nadezhda copper-nickel smelter, which
will process ore from the Talnakh deposit, started initial operation
in early 1981. See, for example, Sotsialisticheskaya industriya,
of Soviet determination to limit import dependence,
even when some dependence is unavoidable.' The
Soviets also commissioned the first stage of the
Nikolayev alumina plant in the Ukraine to process
imported bauxite from Guinea. More recently, the
Soviets announced commissioning of a new chromite
mine at Molodezhnaya in Kazakhstan and have also
announced the startup of a large manganese mine in
the Georgian SSR.'?I 25X1
In the current five-year plan, the Soviets have sub-
stantially increased funds for intensifying geological
exploration for a variety of nonfuel minerals both in
Siberia and in the western USSR. Because of the long
leadtimes involved in bringing new deposits into com-
mercial operation (10 to 15 years), present Soviet
efforts are aimed at providing adequate nonfuel min-
erals supply during the 1990s and beyond. The actions
already taken to develop new reserves and expand ore-
processing capacity, along with the continuing com-
mitment to exploration, throw considerable doubt on
the notion that the USSR is backing away from its
goal of maximum self-sufficiency and that it plans to
accept (or will be forced to accept) any significant
degree of import dependence for nonfuel minerals and
metals in the foreseeable future. F_~ 25X1
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals Production
Development of a large ferrous and nonferrous metals
industry has been a priority of Soviet planners for over
half a century. The Soviets are acutely aware that a
strong metallurgical sector is vital in supporting al-
most the entire range of military and industrial
programs and-in the case of gold, platinum-group
metals, and diamonds-a major source of hard cur-
rency earnings. After years of sustained effort and
billions of rubles in capital investment, the Soviets
have developed the largest complex of metallurgical
industries in the world. The USSR is the world's
largest producer of iron ore, crude steel, manganese,
nickel, lead/zinc, titanium, tungsten, platinum-group
metals, and a raft of minor metals as well. It is sec25X1
only to South Africa in production of chromite and
The Soviets have also completed the Kirovabad alumina plant in
Azerbaydzhan to process a nonbauxite ore called alunite. This plan25X1
has not lived up to expectations, however, and part of the facility
was converted to process bauxite in the mid-1970s.0 25X1
10 See, for example, Pravda vostoka, 12 November 1980, p. 2;
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 27 November 1980; and BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 18 July 1980. 0 25X1
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Crude steel (million tons)
115.9
131.5
135.2
141.3
144.7
146.7
151.5
149.0
148.0
Iron ore (million tons)
197
216
225
234
241
242
246
242
245.0
Manganese ore (million tons)
6.8
8.2
8.2
8.5
8.6
8.6
9.1
10.2
10.0
Tungsten ore (contained metal;
6.9
7.6
7.8
8.1
8.3
8.5
8.8
9.0
9.2
Chromite (million tons)
3.0
3.3
3.4
Molybdenum (contained metal;
thousand tons)
9.5
10.0
10.3
10.5
10.7
11.0
11.3
11.6
12.0
Bauxite (million tons)
6.7
7.5
7.8
8.0
8.2
8.5
8.8
9.0
9.1
Aluminum (thousand tons)
1,490
1,890
2,020
2,130
2,220
2,270
2,330
2,410
2,530
Copper (thousand tons)
1,015
1,200
1,250
1,320
1,350
1,400
1,460
1,500
1,520
Lead (thousand tons)
470
510
530
540
560
575
580
585
600
Zinc (thousand tons)
690
780
790
820
840
860
875
890
900
Tin (thousand tons)
21.0
23.0
24.0
25.0
26.5
28.5
30.0
32.5
32.5
Nickel (thousand tons)
137
170
180
195
215
220
230
235
235
Cobalt (thousand tons)
3.7
4.5
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
Titanium (thousand tons)
31.6
38.0
43.0
47.4
48.5
50.0
51.3
53.0
56.0
Gold (million troy ounces)
7.0
8.0
8.4
8.3
8.9
9.2
9.5
9.9
10.2
Platinum-group metals
(million troy ounces)
2.5
3.0
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
Data for crude steel, iron ore, manganese ore,
and chromite are based on official Soviet statistics. Data for all other
commodities are estimated.
gold; second only to the United States in primary
aluminum, refined copper, and magnesium; and, even
though partially dependent on imports, second only to
Zaire in cobalt; in third place among world producers
of tin; and in fourth place among world producers of
bauxite (table 2).F---]
Despite its impressive size and great strength, the
Soviet nonfuel minerals industry is facing a series of
mounting problems that in the late 1970s caused a
substantial slowdown in the growth of output of some
commodities and declines in others. Growth of ferrous
metals production slowed to about 1 percent a year
during 1976-80, compared with 4 percent during
1971-75. Over the same periods, growth of nonferrous
production slipped to about 2.5 percent a year from
5.5 percent a year. Some of the problems, notably
increasing depletion of easily accessible reserves and
rising costs of production, are common to all Soviet
extractive industries. Others-shortages of invest-
ment and labor and transportation difficulties-are
typical of the economy as a whole. None can be solved
easily.)
The most serious problems were experienced in fer-
rous metals, both in the mining of the iron, chromite,
and manganese ores and in the manufacture of iron
and steel products. Production of crude steel and
rolled steel products fell slightly in 1979 and again in
1980, marking the first absolute decline in Soviet steel
production since World War II. Soviet crude steel
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production of about 148 million tons in 1980 was
almost 11 percent short of the original plan goal.
Production of iron ore amounted to 245 million tons in
1980, about the same level as 1978, and 30 million
tons short of the 1980 goal. Production of chromite
slipped to about 3.4 million tons in 1980, down
slightly from the 1975-76 peak of 3.5 million tons and
well short of the 4.2 million tons originally planned.
Output of manganese stagnated at about 8.5 million
tons per annum during 1975-77 but rebounded to
about 10 million tons in 1979-80, the result of the
commissioning of new mines in the Georgian SSR.F_
In the case of nonferrous metals, overall performance
was mixed. The Soviets continued to post impressive
gains in production of titanium/magnesium and nick-
el, but output of aluminum and copper fell consider-
ably short of hoped-for levels and only small increases
were achieved in boosting production of lead and zinc.
The Soviets advance a number of reasons for the
slowdown in production of nonfuel minerals. A major
difficulty in steel production has been the inability of
the industry to meet the growing needs of the econ-
omy for a broader assortment of high-quality steel
products. Projects to add capacity have raised capital
costs, overtaxed equipment manufacturers, and forced
increased reliance on foreign steel. Ferrous metals
production has also been hurt by the spot shortages of
coking coal and transportation bottlenecks that be-
came more severe in the late 1970s. Shortages of
labor and capital, together with declining growth in
labor productivity, hampered ferrous metals along-]
with other Soviet industries across the board.
As in Soviet extractive industries, delays in commis-
sioning new mine capacity and accelerating mine
depletion" are also holding back production of nonfuel
minerals. Gross annual commissionings of new iron
ore capacity, for example, remained unchanged at
about 26 million tons during the 1970s. At the same
time, annual depletion rose to about 24 million tons
during 1976-79, compared with about 19 million tons
in 1971-75. Looked at in a different way, the Soviet
" We are defining depletion as the amount of capacity lost due to
mine exhaustion and the lower productivity of older mines that are
still operatingF_~
data suggest that about 90 percent of gross annual
commissionings during 1976-79 were simply to offset
depletion. Timelags in bringing new mines up to rated
capacity and unusually large commissionings can
introduce aberrations in annual comparisons, but over
time there is little question that growing shares of new
commissionings are needed to offset depletion. Frag-
mentary information suggests that chromite deposits
were depleting at about 100,000 tons a year in 1971-
75, and this rate probably increased during the latter
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Another long-term problem is the continuing decline
in the average grade of the ores being mined. This is
certainly true in the case of iron ore and some
nonferrous ores, and apparently true for chromite and
manganese.'2 For example, almost 87 percent of the
USSR's output of iron ore in the late 1970s required
concentration, compared with only 37 percent in
1950. Moreover, only 50 percent of raw iron ore 25X1
output in 1980 was usable, compared with 64 percent
in 1965 and 82 percent in 1950. As a result, the
Soviets have had to devote increasing investments in
ore-beneficiating facilities-raising production costs
and capital investment requirements. According to
Soviet studies, real capital investment per ton of raw
ore rose steadily from about 20 rubles per ton in 1965
to almost 25 rubles per ton in 1980." The Soviets have
reported that the average grade of copper and zinc
ores has dropped by about 50 percent since the mid-
1960s; the average grade of lead ore fell by about 40
percent during the same period." Ore grades at
chromite deposits are declining as well, forcing the
Soviets to utilize more expensive underground mining
techniques. Because of the steady drop in the averag25X1
grade of gold at surface mines in Magadan Oblast,
the Soviets have had to construct underground mines
and processing plants to process the more complex
ores. The Soviets have reported that the amount of ore
'Z The average iron contents at Soviet deposits declined as follows:
1950-50.0 percent; 1960-44.5 percent; 1970-37.3 percent;
1980-35.1 percent. For details see Politicheskoye samoobrazo-
vaniye, no. 4, 1981, p. 13, and Gorniy zhurnal, no. 1, 1981, pp. 3-7.25X1
14 A. Bunyni, Tekhniko ekonomicheskaya otsenka dobychi i izpol-
zovaniya rud, Moscow: 1978, p. 179. See also S. Ya. Kaganovich,25X1
op. cit., p. 151, for additional details.F_~ LZDR I
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that must be processed to obtain an ounce of gold in
the Kolyma and Chukotka regions of Magadan
Oblast has been increased by about 33 percent since
1976 alone." Depending on a variety of factors,
production costs at underground mines can be as
much as three to four times greater than surface
operations. 16F-]
As in many other industries, delays in bringing new
capacity on stream resulted in a sharp rise in the
backlog of unfinished construction. The value of the
backlog in ferrous metals rose to about 5 billion rubles
in 1979, more than double the value of the backlog in
1970. Despite repeated urging by top Soviet officials,
the industry continues to spread investments over too
many new projects instead of concentrating on com-
pleting those already under construction. As a result,
the backlog of unfinished construction is likely to get
worse before it gets better. Although data are not
available, it is reasonable to assume that the problem
of unfinished construction also plagues the Soviet
nonferrous metals industry.
Outlook for Production. Mounting difficulties in
nonfuel minerals production are reflected in the com-
paratively modest goals set for the industry during
1981-85. Output of rolled steel is scheduled to in-
crease to a range of 117-120 million tons by 1985-
equivalent to about 165-170 million tons of crude steel
in that year. The Soviets had planned to produce this
amount of crude steel in 1980. Despite current prob-
lems, achievement of at least the lower end of the
range for crude steel production does not appear
beyond reach given the long-term Soviet track rec-
ord." Of course, the Soviets would have to break the
current logjam in production and take tough measures
to assure that the industry has adequate amounts of
coking coal, fuel, iron ore, and labor for relatively
trouble-free operation. Failure in any one of these
areas probably would bring 1985 production below
the range we are presently projecting. Production of
chromite will increase to about 3.8 million tons by
1985, as a result of the commissioning of a new mine
Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 2 October 1979, p. 2I
T. A. Slepneva, op. cit., p. 2430
"The Soviets would have to boost annual steel production by about
4 million tons per year during 1981-85 to meet the goal, not an
unrealistic expectation considering that annual gains in output
in Kazakhstan. Production of manganese will increase
to about 12 million tons by 1985 (see the appendix for
details). F
During 1981-85, aluminum output is scheduled to
increase by 15 to 20 percent and copper output by 25
to 30 percent, a somewhat slower pace than in the
previous five-year plan." These goals also appear
reasonable in view of the steady progress the Soviets
are making in adding aluminum capacity in Siberia
and the big increase in copper production that will
result from the new copper-nickel smelter near Nor-
il'sk. Small increases are likely for lead and zinc, tin,
tungsten, and molybdenum, but details are not avail-
able.
Rapid expansion is foreseen for several of the metals
during the 1980s. The Soviets are planning to increase
the production of nickel and cobalt by at least 30
percent, all of which will be attributable to increased
output from Noril'sk. We believe that these goals will
be met and possibly overfulfilled by a wide margin.
Perhaps as early as 1985 and probably no later than
1990:
? Soviet nickel production will increase to about
350,000 tons a year, compared with 235,000 tons in
1980.
? Cobalt production will about double to 13,000 to
14,000 tons, compared with 6,000 to 7,000 tons in
1980.
? Platinum-group metals production (mainly palla-
dium), could jump to a range of 4.5 to 5.0 million
troy ounces compared with 3.7 million ounces in
1980._
Production of titanium probably will continue to
increase rapidly as a result of additions to capacity at
the titanium-magnesium combines at Ust'-Kameno-
gorsk and Berezniki. Completion of new capacity of
these plants could increase annual titanium produc-
tion to about 75,000 tons by 1985, compared with
56,000 tons in 1980. Similarly, major increases in
gold production are likely as a result of the completion
of plants at Muruntau and Mardzhambulak in Uzbe-
kistan, the Zod/Ararat Combine in Armenia, and the
Darasun-Aginskoye plant in Chita Oblast. F__1
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averaged 5 million tons during 1960-77.
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19 16 16
2
NA
a USSR as a percent of total non-Communist imports.
b USSR as a percent of non-Communist apparent consumption.
NEGL NEGL NEGL
Soviet Nonfuel Minerals and Metals Trade
The Soviets are major exporters and importers of
many nonfuel minerals and metals. But the bulk of
Soviet exports-with the exception of gold, platinum-
group metals, and diamonds-go to other Communist
countries, primarily East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. During the 1970s, the relative impor-
tance of the USSR as a supplier of nonfuel minerals
and metals to the West either remained constant or
declined slightly (table 3). The Soviets maintained a
large share of the platinum-group metals moving in
world trade, but their share of world chromite trade
dropped from 25 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 1979.
In all other cases, the Soviet share of nonfuel minerals
trade remained comparatively small. With the excep-
tion of platinum-group metals, the West presently
depends on the USSR for only a small part of its
nonfuel minerals and metals requirements. Expansion
projects now under way in non-Communist coun-
tries-especially for chromite and nickel-suggest
that Western dependence on the USSR will continue
to diminish during the 1980s. F__1
Critical Nonferrous Metal. With respect to metals
trade in those commodities of greatest concern to
Western policymakers-platinum-group metals, chro-
mite, cobalt, manganese, nickel, titanium-the USSR
is a net exporter by a wide margin. Earnings from
platinum-group metals, nickel, chromite, and titan-
ium netted the USSR about $750 million in 1980,
with platinum-group metals accounting for about two-
thirds of these earnings. Cobalt imports were compar-
atively minor-about $30 million in 1980. Given
major increases in Soviet production, the USSR will
continue to run a large exportable surplus in its trade
of these metals during the 1980s. 25X1
Soviet exports of chromite fell from about 1.2 million
tons in 1970 to about 700,000 tons in 1980. Exports to
Eastern Europe were maintained at about 400,000
tons, while sales to the West dropped from about
800,000 tons to 300,000 tons. Exports of manganese
were held at an average of 1.3 million tons per annum
during the 1970s, but exports to the West ceased
completely in the late 1970s, the result of increased
availability of manganese from Africa. During the
1980s, Soviet exports of chromite to the West prob-
ably will continue to fall and we expect no resumption
in manganese sales (see the appendix for details).
During the 1970s, the Soviets maintained a strong
export position in some nonfuel minerals. Combined
sales of gold, platinum-group metals, and diamonds
earned the USSR over $20 billion during the 1970s,
and in 1976-78 when sales were heavy accounted for
as much as 15 percent of total annual Soviet hard
currency earnings. If Soviet production of gold and
25X1
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platinum-group metals increases as we expect, poten-
tial earnings could be as much as $6-7 billion per
annum by the mid-1980s.19F-l
In other nonfuel minerals, Soviet trade varied during
the past decade, with no clearly defined trend emerg-
ing. The available trade data do not support the view
that there has been an across-the-board cut in Soviet
exports and surge in Soviet imports (table 4).F--]
Increased internal needs-including substantial
amounts for the titanium submarine program-as
well as weak demand in the West apparently caused a
drop-off in Soviet titanium exports in the latter part of
the 1970s.
titanium-hulled submarines,
each requiring several thousand tons of special alloy,
high-purity metal that can be produced only from
high-quality titanium sponge.20 Soviet exports of high-
quality titanium sponge needed to produce this high-
purity metal have virtually ceased since the mid-
1970s. In recent years, the bulk of Soviet exports has
consisted of titanium scrap and other waste products.
We believe that the commitment to titanium submar-
ines will continue and possibly accelerate during the
1980s. The Soviets are expanding both domestic
titanium sponge production capacity and metal fabri-
cating capacity substantially, but it seems that most
of the increase is earmarked for domestic use. F_
Aluminum, Nickel, Lead, and Zinc. Exports of alu-
minum reached annual levels of about 600,000 tons in
the late 1970s, about on a par with that of Canada
and Norway, two other major producers geared to the
export market. Steady increases in exports are likely
as the industry expands, but the bulk of Soviet sales
will continue to go to Eastern Europe.F_~
Although domestic production accounts for over one-
half of domestic requirements, the USSR is a major
importer of bauxite and alumina. Its dependence on
imports continued to increase steadily during the
1970s, and, in 1980, imports amounted to about 4
million tons of bauxite equivalent, with Guinea sup-
plying about half. Because of the rapid depletion of its
reserves of high-quality bauxite and less than hoped-
for gains in the exploitation of nonbauxite ores, the
USSR will continue to import large amounts of
bauxite and alumina.)
Exports of nickel dropped from a peak of 28,000 tons
in 1974 to about 11,000 tons in 1977, then rebounded
to about 22,000 tons in 1980 and are continuing at
high rates in 1981. The USSR should have an annual
exportable surplus of 60,000 to 80,000 tons of nickel
by the mid-to-late 1980s-some $500-700 million in
potential hard currency earnings at present market
prices.F_~
The USSR has both exported and imported lead and
zinc during the 1970s. Since the mid-1970s, however,
the Soviets have become net importers because of lags
in bringing new capacity onstream and a continuing
drop in the average grade of ores being mined. Zinc
exports have been trimmed to meet rising domestic
needs, while lead imports have risen, in part, to meet
rising needs in Eastern Europe. Net Soviet imports of
lead from Canada, Peru, and Yugoslavia peaked at
about 67,000 tons in 1979, falling to about 20,000
tons in 1980. Net imports of zinc have remained
steady at about 20,000 tons per annum since 1976.
The Soviets are continuing to buy zinc concentrates
primarily in Western Europe but have almost stopped
importing lead. The USSR probably will continue to
be in and out of the lead and zinc markets during the
1980s, but their purchases are not expected to be
more than a small fraction of world trade.)
Tin, Tungsten, and Molybdenum. Despite being the
world's third largest producer of tin, the USSR will
remain a large importer of tin for the foreseeable
future. The Soviets have been importing tin for over a
quarter of a century, primarily from Malaysia, Boli-
via, and Singapore. Imports averaged about 8,000
tons annually during the 1970s, generally accounting
25X1
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25X1
"This estimate assumes that the Soviets sell 330 tons of gold at
$500 per troy ounce and 4 million ounces of platinum-group metals
at $400 per troy ounce. To convert metric tons to troy ounces,
multiply by 32,151.
titanium metal.
21 Metals Week, 6 April 1981, p. 1, and 22 June 1981, p. 8; and
Journal of Metals, June 1981, p. 70
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Chrome ore (thousand tons) b
1,200
1,100
1,112
1,210
1,139
1,171
975
673
738
775
700
Manganese ore (thousand tons) b
1,200
1,400
1,300
1,300
1,482
1,411
1,342
1,352
1,186
1,317
1,300
Platinum-group metals
(thousand troy ounces)
1,535
1,704
2,634
2,947
2,613
1,361
2,036
1,954
1,878
2,145
2,000
Titanium (tons) d
4.3
3.6
2.1
Aluminum (thousand tons) e
Total
368.9
405.6
455.4
518.3
528.7
502.4
530.0
550.0
500.0
600.0
600.0
OECD
75.8
69.8
93.6
106.8
108.9
96.4
156.6
182.4
210.8
154.5
175.0
Nickel (thousand tons) t
18.6
21.8
11.7
19.3
28.0
12.5
11.4
11.1
22.1
26.1
22.2
Lead (thousand tons) s
53.6
50.2
42.2
37.7
18.3
42.2
25.0
0
0
0
0
Zinc (thousand tons) s
41.8
87.2
82.4
101.6
102.2
56.1
21.0
0
0
0
0
Iron ore (million tons) h
36.1
36.5
38.4
41.4
43.3
43.6
43.1
40.9
40.6
39.0
40.0
Asbestos (thousand tons) i
199.3
228.7
210.3
215.8
282.7
322.0
311.2
313.4
176.8
132.4
NA
Net imports
Bauxite and alumina
(thousand tons) i
2,065.3
2,168.5
2,412.6
2,375.6
2,509.4
4,505.8
4,204.6
4,363.9
3,984.5
4,224.4
4,300.0
Tin (thousand tons) k
8.3
4.4
4.2
4.0
5.2
9.7
10.0
9.6
14.1
13.3
11.5
Lead (million tons) 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
32.5
59.2
67.1
20.0
Zinc (million tons) 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23.5
16.6
18.3
21.0
Cobalt (tons) m
500
500
500
500
500
500
475
480
480
503
483
a Preliminary.
b Vneshnyaya torgovlya (annual issues). Data for 1980 are estimated.
Based on official import statistics of Japan, West Germany, and the
United States. These countries normally account for 90 percent of
total Soviet exports.
d UN trade data for OECD. Includes titanium sponge, waste, and
scrap. The total is probably understated because of lack of data for
Sweden, Belgium, and Italy.
e Data for 1970-75 taken from annual issues of Vneshnyaya
torgovlya. Data for 1976-80 taken from World Metals Statistics,
January 1981, p. 14.
r UN trade data for OECD and World Metal Statistics, January
1981, p. 88.
g Data for 1970-75 taken from Vneshnyaya torgovlya. Data for
1976-77 from Lead and Zinc Statistics, December 1980. Data for
1976-80 are understated because they do not include Soviet exports
to other Communist countries.
h Vneshnyaya torgovlya (annual issues). Does not include exports of
pellets.
i UN trade data for OECD.
i Data for 1970-75 taken from annual issues of Vneshnyaya
torgovlya. Data for 1976-79 taken from UN trade data and
Hungarian export statistics, and include 2.5 million tons of bauxite
imported from Guinea under a long-term agreement. Data for 1980
are estimated.
k Data for 1970-75 taken from annual issues of Vneshnyaya
torgovlya. Data for 1976-79 taken from UN trade tapes and The
Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the International Tin Council. Data
for 1980 estimate based on first-quarter statistics.
I Based on Lead and Zinc Statistics, monthly bulletin of the
International Lead and Zinc Study Group.
m Estimated. Does not include imports of cobalt concentrate from
Cuba.
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for about one-fourth of Soviet requirements. The
Soviets have recently stepped up joint development
efforts with Bolivia to assure future supplies.
Soviet purchases of tungsten and molybdenum aver-
jumped to 5,800 tons in 1979 and about 14,500 tons in
1980. Similarly, imports of molybdenum rose to about
5,000 tons in 1979 and slightly more than 13,000 tons
in 1980. The Soviets were buying tungsten through
East European countries, some directly from China,
and some through Western metals dealers. More
recently, the Soviets have attempted to buy substan-
tial amounts of tungsten concentrate from Bolivia.
The Soviets purchased molybdenum mainly from the
The reason for the reported sharp rise in Soviet
purchases of tungsten and molybdenum is unknown.
Soviet domestic production may be stagnating, but
output
is continuing to rise. In the case of tungsten, we know
of no new military or civilian programs that would
require abnormally large amounts. Increased require-
ments for oil drilling (tungsten carbide drill bits) and
armaments programs might increase tungsten im-
ports, but by only 2,000 to 4,000 tons per year. The
Soviets could be adding to strategic reserves. In-
creased Soviet purchases of molybdenum could be
tied to the construction of natural gas pipelines from
Siberia to Western Europe. The building of a dual
pipeline would need about 7 million tons of steel pipe.
Assuming a 1-percent molybdenum content in the
pipe, this would require about 70,000 tons of molyb-
denum to complete the project.n
We do not know if Soviet purchases of tungsten will
continue at present high rates or if they will fall back
to the levels prevailing through most of the 1970s. In
the case of molybdenum, the Soviets have taken steps
to acquire new supplies from Mongolia and may
22 Tungsten is a critical alloying element in the manufacture of
drilling equipment, armaments, and superhard steels. Among other
applications, molybdenum is essential in the manufacture of large-
diameter steel pipe suitable for use in Arctic conditions.F--]
ultimately be able to reduce or eliminate their de-
pendence on the West. F__1
Steel Products. In terms of the hard currency value of
its total nonfuel minerals and metals trade with the
West, the USSR switched from a net export position
to a net import position in the mid-1970s. We esti-
mate that the USSR ran a deficit of about $3 billion
in total nonfuel mineral trade with the West in 1980.
the turnaround in the
Soviet trade position stems from an across-the-board
surge in Soviet imports of nonfuel minerals and
metals. This view is inaccurate. The change in the
Soviet trade position with the West from being a net
exporter to a net importer is directly attributable to
the sharp rise in Soviet imports of steel products from
the West. In 1970, the USSR was a net exporter of
steel, but by the late 1970s imports and exports
volume were roughly in balance at about 7 million
tons on each side. As a result of buying comparatively
expensive types of steel from the West and selling less
expensive types to other Communist countries and the
LDCs, the USSR's annual steel import bills rose from
about $2.5 billion during 1974-78 to about $4.5 billion
in 1979-80. Soviet imports of all other nonfuel miner-
als amounted to about $1 billion in 1980. During the
1980s, Moscow will need large quantities of large-
diameter steel pipe for its ambitious gas pipeline
program and for the proposed Siberia to Europe line.
Continuing problems in the domestic steel industry
will also lead to large imports of other steel products.
Outlook. Soviet planners probably were not unduly
concerned with the emergence of a hard currency
deficit in nonfuel minerals trade. The USSR ran a
hard currency current account surplus of about $2.5
billion in 1980, largely as a result of higher prices for
exported oil and large arms sales. The Soviets could
have sharply reduced the hard currency deficit in
nonfuel minerals trade with the West had there been
any overriding reason to do so. Moscow could simply
have sold substantially more gold. In 1980, Soviet
gold sales to the West amounted to about 60 tons-
the lowest level in almost a decade-netting the
USSR about $600 million. The USSR presently can
25X1
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Nickel
Chromite
Steel
Copper
Lead and zinc
Tin
Gold
Manganese
Bauxite-alumina
sell about 275 tons of gold per annum-about $4.4
billion at $500 per troy ounce-without drawing down
its gold reserves. By 1985, Moscow will be able to sell
about 330 tons of gold per annum and not have to
draw down stocks.
On balance, therefore, the broad pattern of Soviet
trade in nonfuel minerals during the 1970s does not
reflect a fundamental weakening of the Soviet com-
mitment to self-sufficiency. The Soviet dependence on
imports of steel, tin, bauxite, tungsten, and molyb-
denum does not appear to be a critical issue for the
West; these purchases generally are small in terms of
world supply and do not threaten the security of
Western supply. Nor does this limited dependence
seem critical from Moscow's point of view considering
that the Soviets are self-sufficient or soon will be in
strategic commodities, such as platinum-group met-
als, chromite, titanium, manganese, and cobalt.=
ports of molybdenum from the West probably will be
reduced or eliminated entirely (table 5).0 25X1
In terms of hard currency trade for nonfuel minerals,
the USSR may continue to run deficits with the We.25X1
the result of continued large purchases of steel pro-
ducts. The Soviets will, however, continue to have the
capability to reduce these deficits, the major swing
factor being the future of Soviet exports of gold, and,
to a lesser extent, platinum-group metals. Moscow
also has the option over the next few years of relying
somewhat more on imports to avoid the high marginal
costs of extracting and transporting some minerals.
We believe, however, that a deteriorating energy
position will deprive the USSR by the mid-1980s of
the hard currency necessary to adopt such a policy on
a wide scale. 25X1
We expect that during the 1980s Soviet capability to
export gold, platinum-group metals, nickel, copper,
and aluminum will increase. At the same time, ex-
ports of chromite, manganese, and lead and zinc will
at best remain steady but more than likely fall. On the
import side, Soviet purchases of steel, tin, bauxite,
and alumina will continue to increase, and large
purchases of tungsten are possible as well. Imports of
cobalt from African sources could be eliminated, but
some small purchases could continue as a result of
long-term agreements or simply Soviet intent to main-
tain an economic foothold in African countries. Im-
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Appendix
Review of Selected
Nonfuel Minerals
Platinum-Group Metals
The USSR produced about half of the world's plati-
num-group metals during the 1970s, South Africa
about 40 percent, and Canada most of the remainder.
Soviet production of these metals is estimated at 3.7
million troy ounces in 1980, compared with South
African production of about 3.1 million ounces that
year.F_~
The USSR obtains virtually all of its platinum-group
metals as a byproduct from the exploitation of copper-
nickel ores. Soviet production consists mainly of palla-
dium-three times as much palladium as platinum-
whereas South African production is mainly plati-
num.23 In most industrial uses, platinum and palla-
dium are not readily substitutableF_~
The USSR exports most of its output of platinum-
group metals. In terms of volume, Soviet exports to
non-Communist countries during 1970-80 amounted
to almost 23 million ounces, or about three-fourths of
total estimated Soviet production during that period.
Some additional, although small, amounts probably
were exported to other Communist countries. During
1970-80, Soviet exports normally accounted for 50 to
60 percent of the platinum-group metals moving in
annual world trade.F_~
Annual exports peaked during 1972-74, averaging
over 2.7 million ounces annually, then declined to
about 2 million ounces in 1976-80. The heavy sales of
the early 1970s may have been supported by a
drawdown of stocks. Although we have no evidence
with respect to platinum-group metals, we know that,
in the case of gold, Soviet planners were concerned
that stocks had fallen to uncomfortably low levels
following heavy gold sales in the mid-1970s, and that
they took steps to rebuild stocks in the subsequent
period. Moreover, sharply higher prices in world
Z3 This estimate is based on the pattern of Soviet platinum-group
metals exports to the West along with Soviet geological studies on
the composition of ores at major Soviet platinum-group metals
deposits. See, for example, V. I. Smirnov, Rudniye mestorozhden-
markets reduced the need for Moscow to sell the
volumes it had sold in the past in order to achieve its
hard currency objectives. For example, the peak sales
of 2.9 million ounces in 1973 netted the USSR about
$380 million; sales of about 2 million ounces in 1980
earned roughly $600 million.F__1 25X1
The USSR is assured of large increases in production
of platinum-group metals in the 1980s as progress is
made to expand production of copper and nickel in
northern Siberia. Soviet production of these metals
(mainly palladium) could easily increase to about 4.5
million ounces by 1985 and as much as 5 million
ounces by 1990, of which perhaps 4 million ounce-
would be available for export.0
25X1
Chromite
The USSR is the world's second largest producer of
chromite after South Africa. Soviet production
peaked at 3.5 million tons a year in 1975-76, declined
to about 3.2 million tons in 1979, and rebounded to
3.4 million tons in 1980. Output in 1980 was, how-
ever, about 20 percent short of the 4.2 million-ton
target for that year-the largest percenta e shortfall
known for any Soviet extractive industry. 25X1
25X1
The stagnation in production is due primarily to the
rapid depletion of easily accessible open-pit deposits
and the slow pace of construction and commissioning
new underground capacity. Many of the southern
Ural deposits are depleted of economically recover-
able reserves, and several of the open-pit mines in the
Donskoye deposits of Kazakhstan are being converted
to underground operations.F_~ 25X1
annual chro-25X1
mite mine depletion was running at about 100,000
tons per year in the early 1970s and may have
increased in the last half of the 1970s. The Soviets
recently announced the commissioning of a new
800,000-ton-per-year mine at Molodezhnaya in Ka-
zakhstan. We believe that this mine will not reach its
rated capacity until 1985. If our estimate of mine
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depletion is reasonably accurate, Soviet chromite pro-
duction could, at most, reach about 3.8 million tons by
l985.F___1
Domestic production problems, increased availability
from other sources (southern Africa), and the effects
of recession on Western demand have contributed to
weakening of Soviet chromite exports in the past few
years. Total Soviet exports of chromite have declined
substantially, from 1.2 million tons in 1970 to 775,000
tons in 1979. Exports to other Communist countries
remained stable at about 400,000 to 500,000 tons per
annum during the decade. Exports to the West fell
from a peak of 775,000 tons in 1970 to 300,000 tons
in 1980-a drop of about 60 percent (see table 4). The
Soviet share of total Western chromite supply fell
from about 25 percent in 1970 to about 8 percent in
1979. Chromite exports to the West have never been a
significant factor in terms of Soviet hard currency
earnings. Peak Soviet sales to the West of about
775,000 tons in 1970 earned about $25 million-less
than 1 percent of total Soviet hard currency earnings
in that year. F_~
Cobalt
Soviet cobalt is obtained as a byproduct in nickel
production. Soviet production, about 6,000 tons in
1980, ranks second only to that of Zaire. Although
the USSR has exported some cobalt in the past,
Soviet production has not kept pace with domestic
demand, and Moscow has been a net importer for the
last 10 years. The Soviets have been importing about
1,000 tons of cobalt equivalent from Cuba since 1970
and will continue purchasing cobalt from Cuba for
some time. Whether the Soviets use the Cuban cobalt
domestically or export it to Eastern Europe is not
known.
The Soviets have been buying some cobalt from Zaire
and small amounts from Zambia. Cobalt is the only
strategic mineral that the Soviets import from Africa.
These purchases have ranged between 475 and 500
tons annually since 1975. There is no basis to widely
reported charges that the Soviets sharply increased
cobalt purchases immediately prior to the May 1978
The outlook for Soviet exports of chromite in the
1980s is uncertain. Although the quality of the ore
exported has decreased in recent years, the USSR still
exports primarily high-grade chromite. However, re-
cent technological advances have weakened market
preference for high-grade Soviet ore. New processes
in the manufacture of stainless steel permit greater
use of less expensive, high-carbon ferrochrome, which
can be produced from abundant low-grade chromite.
Another uncertainty is whether the USSR, even with
adequate production, will continue to export chromite.
The Soviets have given strong indications that they
may seek to enhance the value of their exports by
shifting to ferrochrome as others with chromite re-
sources are doing. The Soviets have shown interest in
obtaining Western participation in ventures to pro-
duce ferrochrome, but, as yet, no such arrangements
have been made.l
invasion of Shaba Province (Zaire) and have been 25X1
buying unusually large amounts since.
total annual Soviet imports of cobalt
from all African sources averaged about 500 tons
since 1975. Moreover, the plunge in world cobalt
prices on the spot market from a peak of about $50 a
pound in 1978 to about $18 in 1981 and the mounting
glut of unsold producer inventories make it extremely
difficult to believe that recent Soviet cobalt purchases
could be inordinately large.F__1
The Soviets are assured of a huge jump in domestic
cobalt production during the 1980s as new processing
facilities near Noril'sk are completed. Noril'sk will
account for all of the increase in Soviet cobalt during
the 1980s; its projected capacity is equivalent to
roughly 40 percent of total world output in 1979.
The Soviets probably will have to continue importing
cobalt from Africa for several more years. When the
Noril'sk plant is completed, total Soviet cobalt pro-
duction will increase to a range of 13,000 to 14,000
tons per annum. This amount should be more than
adequate to meet Soviet domestic needs and provide a
comfortable exportable surplus. F__1
25X1
25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000200420001-9
Secret
Manganese
The USSR is the world's largest producer of manga-
nese. Production amounted to about 10 million tons in
1980, roughly double the output of South Africa, the
world's second largest producer.F__1
The Soviets have exported manganese for many years
but never have sent significant amounts to the West.
Annual Soviet exports averaged about 1.3 million tons
during the 1970s. Sales to non-Communist countries
fell from about 375,000 tons in 1970 to about 100,000
tons in 1977 and have been eliminated completely
since. In no year have the Soviets ever accounted for
more than 2 percent of non-Communist countries'
imports of manganese. Moreover, non-Communist
demand for Soviet manganese weakened during the
1970s because of sharply increased availability of the
metal at more attractive prices, most notably from
South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Gabon.F_~
A recently commissioned manganese mine in the
Georgian SSR is slated to reach full capacity of 2
million tons per year by 1985, and another manganese
mine was recently commissioned near Zaporozh'ye.
Soviet output probably will increase to at least 12
million tons by the mid-1980s, an amount that should
be adequate to meet domestic needs and provide for
growing exports to Eastern Europe.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000200420001-9
OVILI C1
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/07: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000200420001-9