U.S.S.R. GENERAL SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 352
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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U.S.S.R.
GENERAL SURVEY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated Sep-
tember 1968, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
Glossary ............................................................ xi
Chronology ......................................................... xii
1. Introduction ....................................................... 1
2. Geography ........................................................ 5
A. General ....................................................... 5
1. Topography ................................................. 5
2. Climate ..................................................... 7
B. Military geographic regions ..................................... 7
1. Central Plains ............................................... 7
2. Caucasus Mountains .......................................... 10
3. Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands .............................. 11
4. Southern and Eastern Mountains .............................. 11
5. Subarctic Swamp and Forest .................................. 12
6. Arctic Barrens .............................................. 13
7. Insular and Peninsular Far East .............................. 13
C. Strategic areas ................................................. 14
1. Moscow ..................................................... 14
2. Donets ...................................................... 16
3. Volga-Ural .................................................. 16
4. Leningrad .................................................. 19
5. Baku ....................................................... 19
6. Tashkent .................................................... 19
7. Kuznetsk .................................................... 20
8. Baykal ...................................................... 21
9. Far Eastern .................................................. 22
D. Internal routes ................................................. 23
E. Approaches .................................................... 23
1. Land ....................................................... 30
2. Sea ......................................................... 30
3. Air ......................................................... 32
3. Transportation and Telecommunications ............................. 37
A. General ........................................................ 37
C. Highways ..................................................... 38
B. Railroads ...................................................... 40
D. Inland waterways ............................................... 43
E. Pipelines ...................................................... 46
F. Ports ...............................................:.......... 47
G. Merchant marine ............................................... 53
H. Civil air ....................................................... 68
I. Airfields ....................................................... 70
J. Telecommunications ............................................ 79
4. Sociological ....................................................... 85
A. General ...................................................... 85
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B. Population ..................................................... 88
1. Size and geographic distribution ............................... 88
2. Composition ................................................. 89
3. Structure .................................................... 90
4. Dynamics ................................................... 91
5. Problems and policies ........................................ 93
C. Structure and characteristics of the society ........................ 95
1. Ethnic and linguistic divisions ................................ 95
2. The family and the individual ................................ 100
3. Social structure .............................................. 102
4. Social values and attitudes .................................... 105
D. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor relations ................... 108
1. Labor force ................................................. 108
2. Wages, hours, and working conditions .......................... 112
3. Labor organizations .......................................... 114
4. Labor-management relations .................................. 116
E. Health and welfare ............................................. 117
1. Levels of living .............................................. 117
a. Diet ..................................................... 118
b. Consumer goods and services ................................ 118
c. Housing .................................................. 118
d. Attitudes of the people .................................... 119
2. Health and medical care ...................................... 119
a. General level of health and sanitation ...................... 119
b. Incidence of disease ...................................... 120
c. Medical organization and administration .................... 120
d. Medical personnel and hospital facilities .................... 121
e. Voluntary organizations .................................... 122
f. Emergency medical services ................................ 122
3. Social welfare ............................................... 123
4. Social problems ............................................. 125
a. Crime .................................................... 126
b. Vagrancy ...................... .......................... 126
c. Alcoholism and drug abuse ................................. 126
F. Religion ....................................................... 127
1. Government and religion ..................................... 127
a. The legal position of religion ............................... 127
b. Atheism .................................................. 128
2. The Orthodox churches ....................................... 129
a. The Russian Orthodox Church .............................. 129
b. The Georgian Orthodox Church ............................. 131
c. The Old Believers ........................................ 131
3. Other Christian churches ...................................... 132
a. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church .................... 132
b. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and other Protestant groups .. 133
c. The Roman Catholic Church ................................ 133
d. The Armenian Apostolic Church ............................ 134
4. The Jewish question .......................................... 135
5. Other religions .............................................. 136
a. Islam .................................................... 136
b. Buddhism ................................................ 137
G. Education ................. ................................... 137
1. Education in national life .................................... 137
2. Government and education ................................... 140
3. Educational system .......................................... 142
a. Preschool institutions ...................................... 142
b. The 8-year school ......................................... 143
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c. Middle schools ............................................ 145
d. Higher education .......................................... 146
4. Teachers ..................................................... 150
5. Youth organizations .......................................... 153
a. The Octobrists ............................................ 154
b. The Pioneers .............................................. 154
c. The Komsomol ............................................ 155
H. Artistic and cultural expression .................................. 156
1. The regime and culture ...................................... 156
2. Literature ................................................... 158
3. Music and the dance .......................................... 160
4. Art and architecture ......................................... 161
5. Minority cultures ............................................. 164
a. The Ukraine .............................................. 164
b. Belorussia ................................................ 164
c. The Baltic peoples ......................................... 165
d. The Christian Caucasian peoples ............................. 165
e. The Muslim peoples ....................................... 166
I. Public information .............................................. 167
1. The media, the regime, and the public ......................... 167
2. Press, periodicals, and news agencies .......................... 168
3. Books, libraries, and museums .................................. 172
4. Theater and motion pictures ................................ 173
5. Radio and television ......................................... 175
J. Suggestions for further reading .................................. 176
5. Political .......................................................... 183
A. General ....................................................... 183
1. National expansion ........................................... 183
2. Prerevolutionary political history .............................. 184
3. The regime of Lenin and Stalin ................................ 185
4. The Khrushchev era .......................................... 185
5. The Brezhnev-Kosygin "collective leadership" ................... 186
B. Political dynamics .............................................. 186
1. General ..................................................... 186
.2. Communist Party membership and organization ................. 189
3. Top leadership .............................................. 193
C. Structure and functioning of the government ...................... 201
1. General ..................................................... 201
2. Central government .......................................... 202
3. Lower governmental structure ................................. 205
4. Judicial system .............................................. 205
5. Electoral procedures .......................................... 206
D. National policies ................................................ 206
1. Domestic .................................................... 207
2. Foreign ..................................................... 208
a. General .................................................. 208
b. Soviet policy toward the less-developed world .............. 209
c. Soviet policy toward the West and Japan .................... 210
d. The Soviets and the Communist world ...................... 211
3. Defense ..................................................... 213
E. Police and intelligence services ..... :............................ 214
1. Police forces-MVD ......................................... 215
2. Security and intelligence-KGB .............................. 215
3. Military intelligence-GRU ................................... 216
F. Opposition, dissent, and subversion .............................. 216
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G. Propaganda programs ........................................... 217
1. Domestic ................................................... 217
2. Propaganda directed abroad .................................. 219
3. Growing contacts with non-Communist world .................. 219
H. Suggestions for further reading .................................. 219
1. Political history-general works ............................... 219
2. Party and government ........................................ 220
3. Foreign policy ............................................... 221
4. Defense ..................................................... 221
5. Judicial system .............................................. 221
6. Propaganda, intelligence, subversion ........................... 222
6. Economic .......................................................... 225
A. General ....................................................... 225
1. Introduction ................................................. 225
2. Economic growth ............................................ 225
3. Developments affecting economic organization .................. 227
4. Resource position ............................................ 228
5. International economic relations ............................... 229
B. Sectors of the economy .......................................... 230
1. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry .............................. 230
a. Problems and policies in agriculture ........................ 230
b. Main characteristics of Soviet agriculture .................... 231
c. Fisheries ................................................... 237
d. Adequacy of food supply and diet ........................... 238
e. Forest resources and primary forest products .................. 238
2. Fuels and power' ............................................ 239
a. Primary energy ............................................ 239
b. Coal ..................................................... 240
c. Petroleum .................................................. 240
d. Electric power ............................................ 242
3. Minerals and metals .......................................... 244
a. Minerals .................................................. 244
(1) Metallic minerals ...................................... 244
(2) Nonmetallic minerals .................................. 245
b. Metals ................................................... 245
(1) Ferrous metals ....... ................................ 245
(2) Nonferrous metals ..................................... 246
4. Manufacturing, and construction ............................... 247
a. Machinery, equipment, and fabricated metal products ........ 247
(1) General .............................................. 247
(2) Production ............................................ 248
(a) Competition between civilian and military production .. 248
(b) Defense production ............................... 249
(c) Civilian production ................................ 250
b. Chemicals and allied products .............................. 253
c. Textiles and wearing apparel ............................... 255
d. Construction and construction materials ..................... 256
e. Food processing ........................................... 257
C. Government economic policy and finance .......................... 258
1. Goals and policies ........................................... 258
2. Economic control and reform ................................. 258
3. Planning ....... ............................... ........... 260
4. Finance ..................................................... 260
D. Trade ......................................................... 261
1. Domestic trade ......................................... .....261
a. Producer goods ... ........................... . ... ...... 261
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b. Consumer goods ........................................... 262
(1) State-controlled stores .................................. 262
(a) State stores ....................................... 262
(b) Cooperative stores ................................. 262
(2) Collective farm markets ............................... 262
2. International economic relations ............................... 263
a. Introduction .............................................. 263
b. Foreign trade policy, organization, and control ................ 263
c. Geographic distribution of foreign trade .................... 263
d. Commodity composition of foreign trade ..................... 263
e. Exchange rate and international payments position ............ 264
f. Soviet foreign aid .......................................... 265
A. General ........................................................ 267
B. Organization, planning, and financing of research .................. 267
1. Organization ................................................ 267
2. Planning .................................................... 270
3. Financing ................................................... 270
C. Scientific education, manpower, and facilities ...................... 271
D. Major research fields ............................................ 272
1. Air, ground, and naval weapons ............................... 272
a. Aerospace systems ......................................... 272
b. Ground weapons and equipment ............................ 273
c. Naval weapons ............................................ 274
2. Biological, chemical, and radiological warfare .................. 274
3. Atomic energy ............................................... 276
4. Electronics .................................................. 278
5. Medical sciences, including veterinary medicine ................. 280
6. Other sciences ............................................... 282
a. Chemistry, chemical engineering, and metallurgy .............. 282
b. Physics and mathematics ................................... 285
c. Astrogeophysical sciences ................................... 286
(1) Astronomy .............. ............................. 287
(2) Meteorology .......................................... 287
(3) Space and upper atmospheric sciences .................. 288
(4) Terrestrial geophysics . ................................ 289
(5) Geodesy .............................................. 289
(6) Hydrology, hydraulics, and coastal engineering ........... 290
(7) Oceanography ........................................ 290
A. General ....................................................... 293
1. Historical ................................................... 293
2. Defense organization ......................................... 294
a. Joint agencies ............................................. 295
b. Force components ......................................... 296
c. Operational commands ..................................... 297
d. Militarized security forces .................................. 297
3. Military manpower ........................................... 297
4. Strength trends .............................................. 298
5. Training .................................................... 299
6. Economic support and military budget ......................... 300
a. Economic support ......................................... 300
b. Military budget ........................................... 301
7. Logistics .................................................... 301
8. Uniforms and insignia ........................................ 302
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B. Ground forces .................................................. 307
1. Organization ................................................ 308
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 310
3. Training .................................................... 310
4. Logistics .................................................... 311
C. Naval forces ................................................... 311
1. Organization ................................................ 317
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 318
3. Training .................................................... 318
4. Logistics .................................................... 319
5. Naval aviation ............................................... 319
D. Air forces ..................................................... 319
1. Organization ................................................ 322
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 324
3. Training .................................................... 324
a. Preoperational ............................................ 324
b. Operational ............................................... 325
4. Logistics .................................................... 325
E. Air defense forces .............................................. 326
1. Organization ................................................ 326
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 327
3. Training .................................................... 328
4. Logistics .................................................... 328
F. Rocket troops .................................................. 328
1. Organization ................................................ 328
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 330
3. Training .................................................... 330
4. Logistics ..................................................... 331
G. Militarized security forces ....................................... 332
1. Frontier troops .............................................. 332
2. Interior troops ............................................... 333
Area Brief .......................................................... 334
Page
Fig. 1 Arctic tundra (photo) ...................................... 6
Fig. 2 Siberian taiga (photo) ...................................... 6
Fig. 3 Tilled field near Kiyev (photo) .............................. 6
Fig. 4 Karakum desert (photo) .................................... 6
Fig. 5 Cloudiness, precipitation, temperature, and relative humidity
(chart) .................................................. 8
Fig. 6 Military geographic regions and terrain (map) ................. 9
Fig. 7 Caucasus Mountains (photo) ................................ 10
Fig. 8 Tien Shan Mountains (photo) ............................... 12
Fig. 9 Moscow strategic area (map) ................................ 15
Fig. 10 Moscow (photo) ........................................... 17
Fig.. 11 Donets strategic area (map) ................................. 17
Fig. 12 Shaft iron-ore mine at Krivoy Rog (photo) .................... 17
Fig. 13 Volga-Ural strategic area (map) ............................. 18
Fig. 14 Gas-producing field in the Volga-Ural strategic area (photo) .... 18
Fig. 15 Leningrad strategic area (map) .............................. 20
Fig. 16 Baku strategic area (map) ................................... 20
Fig. 17 Offshore oilwells near Baku (photo) ......................... 20
Fig. 18 Tashkent strategic area (map) ............................... 21
Fig. 19 Kuznetsk strategic area (map) ............................... 21
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Fig. 20
Baykal strategic area (map) .................................
21
Fig. 21
Far Eastern strategic area (map) ............................
22
Fig. 22
Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches (map) .........
24
Fig. 23
Internal routes (table) ......................................
25
Fig. 24
Land boundaries (table) ...................................
30
Fig. 25
Land approaches (table) ...................................
31
Fig. 26
Beaches in amphibious landing area near Odessa (photo) ......
32
Fig. 27
Amphibious landing areas (table) ............................
33
Fig. 28
Air approaches orientation (map) ............................
35
Fig. 29
Air approaches (table) ......................................
36
Fig. 30
Principal rail lines (table) ..................................
39
Fig. 31
Baku-Krasnovodsk railroad ferry (photo) ......................
40
Fig. 32
Diesel-electric locomotive, Series TE-3 (photo) ................
40
Fig. 33
Mountain road (photo) .....................................
41
Fig. 34
Bridge over Volga at Saratov (photo) .........................
42
Fig. 35
Inland waterway system (map) ..............................
43
Fig. 36
Krasnoyarsk port on the Yenisey (photo) ......................
45
Fig. 37
Sormovskiy class river-sea vessel (photo) .....................
46
Fig. 38
The CEMA pipeline (photo) ................................
46
Fig. 39
Selected pipelines (table) ...................................
48
Fig. 40
Major ports (table) ........................................
54
Fig. 41
Ships constructed for the Soviet merchant fleet (table) .........
66
Fig. 42
Merchant fleet strengths by base area (table) .................
67
Fig. 43
Aeroflot CLASSIC (11-62) (photo) ............................
69
Fig. 44
Selected major airfields (table) ..............................
73
Fig. 45
Other important airfelds (table) .............................
76
Fig. 46
Molniya 1 communication satellite (photo) ...................
81
Fig. 47
Total population, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ............
88
Fig. 48
Population and population density, U.S.S.R. and selected
countries (chart) .........................................
89
Fig. 49
Population of union republics (table) ........................
90
Fig. 50
Urban and rural population (chart) ..........................
90
Fig. 51
Estimated age-sex distribution (chart) .......................
91
Fig. 52
Age and sex structure (chart) ................................
91
Fig. 53
Age and sex structure, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) .....
91
Fig. 54
Vital rates (table) ............................. :...........
92
Fig. 55
Vital rates by union republic (table) .........................
92
Fig. 56
Major nationalities and languages (table) .....................
95
Fig. 57
Population of the union republics by nationality (map) ........
96
Fig. 58
Class composition of the population (table) ...................
102
Fig. 59
Manpower resources, labor force, and civilian employment
Fig. 60
(table) ................................................. 108
Labor force by age and sex (chart) .......................... 109
Fig. 61
Women wage and salary earners, by sector of the economy (table) 109
Fig. 62
Labor force participation rates, U.S.S.R. and United States
(chart) .................................................
109
Fig. 63
Civilian labor force by sector of the economy (table) ...........
110
Fig. 64
Occupation by branch of economic activity (table) ............
110
Fig. 65
Specialists with higher and secondary school training (table) ....
111
Fig. 66
Nationality composition of specialists and scientific workers
112
(table) ........................... :......................
Fig. 67
Average earnings of Soviet workers, by economic sector (table) 112
Fig. 68
Soviet trade unions (table) .................................
114
Fig. 69
Trade union structure (chart) ...............................
115
Fig. 70
Levels of living in U.S.S.R. and selected countries (chart) ......
117
Fig. 71
Ownership of selected consumer durables (table) ..............
118
Fig. 72
Incidence of selected diseases (table) ........................
120
Fig. 73
Development of public health services (table) ................
122
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Fig. 74
Social welfare expenditures (table) ..........................
123
Fig. 75
Social welfare budget (chart) .. ............................
124
Fig. 76
Literacy in 9-49 age group (table) ...........................
139
Fig. 77
Level of education attained (table) ..........................
139
Fig. 78
School enrollment rates for first and second levels of education
(table) ..................................................
139
Fig. 79
Education at the third level: students and graduates (table) ....
140
Fig. 80
Higher educational institutions: students and graduates (table) .
140
Fig. 81
Nationality composition of higher education enrollment (table) ..
141
Fig. 82
Soviet educational system (chart) ...........................
142
Fig. 83
Schools, pupils, and teachers in general education (table) ......
144
Fig. 84
Graduate student enrollment and persons graduated (table) .....
151
Fig. 85
Teachers: qualifications, experience, and proportion who
are women (table) .......................................
152
Fig. 86
Principal "creative unions" (table) ...........................
158
Fig. 87
Production of books, periodicals, and newspapers (table) .......
168
Fig. 88
Relative use of languages among population and publications
(table) . ................................................
169
Fig. 89
Principal newspapers (table) ................................
170
Fig. 90
Selected major magazines (table) ............................
171
Fig. 91
Libraries and collections (table) .............................
173
Fig. 92
Interlocking directorate (chart) ..............................
187
Fig. 93
Party echelons and the government (chart) ...................
188
Fig. 94
Growth of the Soviet Communist Party (chart) ................
190
Fig. 95
Social structure of new party candidates (chart) ..............
190
Fig. 96
Length of party membership (table) .........................
191
Fig. 97
Growth of the central party machine (chart) .................
192
Fig. 98
Flow of authority in the party (chart) ........................
192
Fig. 99
Central party machine (chart) ...............................
193
Fig. 100
Republic, regional, and lower party structure (chart) ..........
194
Fig. 101
Seniority on Party Politburo (chart) .........................
195
Fig. 102
Evolution of Party Politburo (chart) .........................
196
Fig. 103
Representation and structure of Supreme Soviet (chart) ........
203
Fig. 104
Council of Ministers (chart) ................................
204
Fig. 105
Police and intelligence services (chart) .......................
214
Fig. 106
Propaganda apparatus and activities (chart) ..................
218
Fig. 107
Indicators of per capita production, U.S.S.R. and United
Fig. 108
States (chart) ............................................ 226
Indicators of economic growth (table) ......................... 226
Fig. 109
Gross national product, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ...... 227
Fig. 110
Factors affecting growth of industrial production (chart) ...... 227
Fig. 111
Strategic supply position (table) ............................. 228
Fig. 112
Distribution of civilian labor force, U.S.S.R. and United
States (chart) ............................................
229
Fig. 113
Economic regions (map) ...................................
232
Fig. 114
Sown area, by crop (table) ..................................
234
Fig. 115
Production of grain, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ........
235
Fig. 116
Average annual production and yields of principal crops (table) ..
235
Fig. 117
Numbers of livestock (table) ................................
236
Fig. 118
Output of principal food products (table) .....................
237
Fig. 119
Comparison of average diets, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) .
238
Fig. 120
Estimated production of primary energy (table) ...............
239
Fig. 121
Production of fuels, by type (table) ..........................
241
Fig. 122
Estimated output of refined petroleum products (table) ........
241
Fig. 123
Production of usable iron ore and ferroalloying materials (table) .
244
Fig. 124
Pig iron and steel production (table) .........................
245
Fig. 125
Estimated supply position of principal nonferrous metals (chart) .
247
Fig. 126
Estimated production of principal nonferrous metals (table) ....
247
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Fig. 127
Durables produced by machine building industry (table) ........
250
Fig. 128
Merchant shipbuilding by and for U.S.S.R. (table) ............
252
Fig. 129
Production of basic chemicals and allied products (table) ......
254
Fig. 130
Production of textiles and wearing apparel (table) ..............
256
Fig. 131
Production of principal construction materials (table) ..........
257
Fig. 132
State budget revenues and expenditures (chart) ...............
261
Fig. 133
State, cooperative, and collective farm market retail sales (table) 262
Fig. 134
Main groups of trading partners (chart) ......................
264
Fig. 135
Value of foreign trade, by geographic area (table) .............
265
Fig. 136
Commodity composition of trade (table) ......................
266
Fig. 137
Organization of Soviet science and technology (chart) ..........
268
Fig. 138
Organization of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (chart) .........
269
Fig. 139
Armed forces high command (chart) ........................
295
Fig. 140
Armed forces personnel strengths (table) ....................
299
Fig. 141
Defense and space expenditures (table) ......................
301
Fig. 142
Estimated defense and space expenditures (table) .............
301
Fig. 143
Estimated percentage of defense and space expenditures (table) 301
Fig. 144
Estimated defense and space expenditures, by category (table) ..
301
Fig. 145
Officers' uniforms and insignia (chart) ........................
303
Fig. 146
Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (chart) ..................
305
Fig. 147
MAZ-537 truck with trailer carrying T-62 tank (photo) ........
308
Fig. 148
GANEF (SA-4) surface-to-air missile system (photo) ...........
309
Fig. 149
Amphibious infantry vehicle (photo) .........................
309
Fig. 150
122-mm. rocket launcher (photo) ............................
309
Fig. 151
ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft weapon (photo) ........................
310
Fig. 152
OSA class patrol boat (photo) ...............................
312
Fig. 153
KRESTA I class guided missile light cruiser (photo) ..............
313
Fig. 154
KRESTA II class guided missile light cruiser (photo) ............
313
Fig. 155
Moskva, a guided missile helicopter ship (photo) ..............
314
Fig. 156
KANIN class guided missile destroyer (photo) .................
314
Fig. 157
NANUCHKA class guided missile patrol gunboat (photos) ........
314
Fig. 158
C Class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (photo) .....
315
Fig. 159
V Class nuclear-powered submarine (photo) ..................
315
Fig. 160
G Class submarine (photo) .................................
316
Fig. 161
Disposition of navy units (table) ............................
318
Fig. 162
Naval aviation BADGER C with KIPPER missile (photo) ..........
320
Fig. 163
BEAGLE used in Soviet Naval and Tactical Aviation (photo) .....
320
Fig. 164
HOUND used in Soviet Naval Aviation and Military Transport
Aviation (photo) .........................................
320
Fig. 165
Long Range Aviation BEAR B (photo) .......................
321
Fig. 166
Long Range Aviation BISON B (photo) ......................
321
Fig. 167
BADGER A used in Long Range Aviation and Soviet Naval
Aviation (photo) .........................................
321
Fig. 168
FISHBED used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ..............
321
Fig. 169
FITTER used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ...............
321
Fig. 170
BREWER used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ..............
321
Fig. 171
Military Transport Aviation CUB (photo) ....................
323
Fig. 172
Military Transport Aviation CAMP (photo) ..................
323
Fig. 173
Military Transport Aviation Coca (photo) ...................
323
Fig. 174
Military Transport Aviation HooK (photo) ...................
323
Fig. 175
Military Transport Aviation Hip (photo) ....................
323
Fig. 176
Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR (photo) ....................
327
Fig. 177
Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON A (photo) .................
327
Fig. 178
FARMER employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet
Tactical Aviation (photo) ................................. 327
Fig. 179
FREsco employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in. Soviet
Tactical Aviation (photo) ................................. 327
Fig. 180
GUIDELINE (SA-2) surface-to-air missile (photo) ............... 328
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Page
Fig. 181 GALOSH (ABM-1) antiballistic missile (photo) ................ 328
Fig. 182 TALL KING early warning radar (photo) ...................... 329
Fig. 183 BAR LocK early warning radar and SIDE NET height-finder
radar (photo) ............................................ 329
Fig. 184 Marshal N. I. Krylov, Commander in Chief, Strategic
Rocket Troops (photo) ................................... 329
Fig. 185 SAVAGE (SS-13) intercontinental ballistic missile (photo) ....... 330
Fig. 186 Summary Map ...................................... follows 334
Fig. 187 Summary Map insets ........................................ do
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ABBREVIATION
APN (or
Novosti)
RUSSIAN ENGLISH
Agentstvo Pechati Novosti .......... News Press Agency
Strany
Vsesoyuznyy Tsentral'nyy
fessional'nykh Soyuzov
shchi
CPSU ....... Kommunisticheskaya
kogo Soyuza
Unions
Council for Economic Mutual Assis-
tance
DOSAAF .... Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo
viya Armii, Aviatsii, Flotu
Sodeyst- Voluntary Society for Cooperation
with the Army, Aviation, and the
Fleet
GKES ....... Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Soveta Min- State Committee of the Council of
istrov SSSR po Vneshnim Ekonomi- Ministers, U.S.S.R., on Foreign
cheskim Svyazam Economic Relations
GKNT ....... Gosudarstvennyy Komitet po Nauki State Committee for Science and
Technik Technology
Gosplan ...... Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet State Planning Committee
GRES ....... Gosudarstvennaya Rayonnaya Elek- State Regional Electric Powerplant
tricheskaya Stantsiya
GRU ........ Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravle- Chief Directorate for Intelligence
niye
GUGK ....... Glavnoye Upravleniye Geodezii i Kar- Main Directorate of Geodesy and
togra f ii Cartography
GUGMS ..... Glavnoye Upravleniye Gidrometeor- Main Directorate for Hydrometeor-
ologicheskoy Sluzhby ological Services
INFLOT ..... Morskoye Agenstvo po Obsluzhivaniyu Maritime Agency for Servicing For-
Inostrannykh Sudov v Portakh SSSR eign Ships in Soviet Ports
JINR ........ Obedinennyy Institut Yadernykh Issle- Joint Institute of Nuclear Research
dovaniy
KGB ........ Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Committee for State Security
LRA ........ Dal'naya Aviatsiya ................. Long Range Aviation
MGA ........ Ministerstvo Grazhdanskoy Aviatsii .... Ministry of Civil Aviation
MOC ........ Ministerstvo Svyazi ................ Ministry of Communications
PVO Strany .. Protivoyozdushnoy Obrony Strany .... Air Defense Forces
R.S.F.S.R. .... Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika Republic
TAC ........ Frontovaya Aviatsiya ............... Tactical Aviation
VLKSM (or Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisti- Communist Youth League
Komsomol) cheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi
VTA ........ Voyenno-transportnaya Aviatsiya ..... Military Transport Aviation
VUZy ....... Vysshiye Uchebnyye Zavedeniya ...... Higher educational institutions
VVS ........ Voyenno-vozdushnyye Sily .......... Soviet Air Forces
ZAGS ........ Byuro Zapisi Aktov Grazhdanskogo So- Government Civil Registry Office
stoyaniya
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Chronology
400-700 Territory of present-day European Russia is settled by East-
ern Slavs.
700-800 Prosperous mercantile state with Khazar hegemony over
Slavs is established between lower Volga and Dnepr
rivers.
800-912 Vikings under Rurik use river routes, to penetrate Russia;
Kiyev becomes center of their dominion.
990 Christianity is introduced by Vladimir the Saint.
1237-1240 European Russia is conquered by the Mongol Golden Horde,
beginning two centuries of Tatar rule.
1380 Prince Dmitry of Muscovy inflicts first defeat on Tatars in
Battle of Kulikovo Field, laying basis for rise of Muscovy
in 15th century.
1533-1584 Ivan the Terrible reigns, proclaiming self tsar of the "third
Rome," Muscovy, and beginning settlement east of Urals.
1637 Russian pioneers reach Pacific coast of Siberia.
1689-1725 Peter the Great reigns, embarking on far-reaching reforms
to "Westernize" Russia and founding Saint Petersburg
(now Leningrad).
1762-1796 Catherine the Great continues "Westernization" of Russia,
partitions Poland to increase European Russian territory,
inaugurates Russian drive for warm--water ports by ac-
quiring Crimea.
1801-1825 Alexander I reigns, withstanding Napoleonic invasion which
reaches Moscow and in the wake of which the Russian
army penetrates France.
1825 Revolt of Decembrists, a small group of noblemen favoring
social reform, fails.
1825-1855 Nicholas I institutes reactionary regime based on autocracy
and Russification, inaugurating systematic use of secret
police against the people.
1857-1861 Alexander Herzen's revolutionary thought in the weekly
Kolokol (The Bell) is published abroad with profound
impact on Russian intellectuals.
1861 Serfs are emancipated and commune-type system of peasant
social organization is established.
1876 First Russian revolutionary party, called Land and Liberty
(later People's Will), is formed by Populists.
1881 Mounting revolutionary activity of Populists culminates in
assassination of Alexander II.
1881-1894 Alexander III initiates severe repressions of revolutionaries
and fosters pan-Slavism.
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1898 March First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor
Party (RSDLP), identified by Soviet Communist Party
as its first congress, is held in Minsk.
1903 August Second Congress of the RSDLP is held in Brussels and
London, ending in split into Bolshevik and Menshevik
factions.
1905 October- First Russian Revolution results in a constitutional reform.
December
1914 August Germany declares war on Russia.
1917 March February revolution results in abdication of tsar and forma-
tion of Provisional Government.
November Bolsheviks seize power in October revolution and Lenin
becomes Premier.
1918 March Signing of Treaty of Brest Litovsk removes Russia from
war. Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic
Labor Party renames itself the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks).
1918-1921 Bolsheviks ultimately prevail over foreign intervention and
civil war.
1921 August New Economic Policy (NEP) is introduced.
1922 April Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Communist Party
(Bolsheviks).
December Founding congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (U.S.S.R.) is held.
1924 January Lenin dies.
1928 October NEP is abandoned. First Five Year Economic Plan (1929-
33) goes into effect.
1929
January
Trotsky is exiled from U.S.S.R.
1930 January
Forced collectivization of peasantry begins.
1932-1933
Millions die during serious famine.
1934
December
Kirov, Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, is assassinated; Stalin
starts "great purge" and reign of terror.
1936
December
"Stalin Constitution," which with minor modifications is still
in effect, is adopted.
1939
March
18th Congress of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
is held.
August
Stalin-Hitler Pact is signed.
September
Soviet troops occupy eastern Poland.
November
U.S.S.R. invades Finland.
1940 March
Finns cede territory to U.S.S.R.
August
1941 April
June
1945 February
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are incorporated into
U.S.S.R.
Nonagression pact is signed with Japan.
Germany invades U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R. again attacks Finland.
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin attend Yalta Conference.
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July-August
1947 September
1948 March
June
August
1949 January
February
May
September
October
1950 February
1952 October
1953 January
April
June
July
August
September
December
1954 March
April-July
1955 February
May
July
Truman, Attlee, and Stalin attend Potsdam Conference to
draft World War II peace settlements.
U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan.
Zhdanov's "two camps" speech intensifies opposition to
West and leads to establishment of Cominform.
Allied Control Commission ceases to function in Berlin.
Cominform announces expulsion of Yugoslavia.
Soviet blockade of land access to Berlin by French, U.S.,
and U.K. occupation forces becomes total.
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is
created to promote intrabloc cooperation and to counter-
act Marshall Plan.
Anti-Jewish campaign results in
numerous authors.
Moscow agrees to lift Berlin blockade.
First nuclear explosion takes place in U.S.S.R.
Communist regime is recognized by U.S.S.R. as. sole gov-
ernment of China.
Thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance is concluded.
19th Party Congress (first since 1939) renames party
"Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (CPSU), revises
party rules, and renames Politburo "Presidium."
Soviet doctors, mostly Jewish, are charged with plot to
kill Soviet leaders on orders of Western intelligence.
Stalin dies; Malenkov is named chairman of Council of
Ministers and dropped from Party Secretariat, leaving
Khrushchev the senior
Doctors' Plot is reversed.
Police chief Beriya is arrested for plotting to seize power.
Korean armistice is signed.
First thermonuclear device is detonated in U.S.S.R.
Khrushchev is named First Secretary of CPSU.
Execution of Beriya and top associates is announced.
Central Committee approves increased grain production by
"opening up virgin lands." Committee for State Security
(KGB) is established.
U.S.S.R. participates in Geneva Foreign Ministers Con-
ference on Korea and Indochina, which concludes agree-
ments on Vietnam and Laos.
Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Chairman of Council of
Ministers.
Warsaw Pact establishes joint command over most Soviet
bloc armed forces.
Austrian State Treaty is signed 15 May, ending Allied
occupation.
Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade to patch
up Yugoslav-Soviet feud.
Big Four Summit conference at Geneva attempts to fa-
cilitate solution of East-West problems in Europe.
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1956 February
April
October
October-
November
1957 February
June
1958 March
September
November
1959 January
January-
February
May-August
September
September-
October
1960 January
May
June
July
September-
October
November-
December
20th Party Congress convenes. Khrushchev denounces Stalin
in secret speech.
Dissolution of Cominform is announced.
Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov visit
Poland in effort to reverse Gomulka's liberalization meas-
ures; Soviet leaders accept Gomulka measures upon being
made aware of their need to prevent revolt and when
assured of Poland's continued loyalty to U.S.S.R.
Hungarian revolt is crushed by Soviet troops.
Khrushchev's scheme for reorganization of industrial man-
agement is accepted by Party Central Committee.
Majority in Party Presidium votes to oust Khrushchev, who
turns the tables by appealing to Central Committee. So-
called antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov,
and Shepilov is then expelled from Party Presidium and
Central Committee.
Soviet Union launches first earth satellite.
Central Committee expels Marshal Zhukov from Party
Presidium and calls for tightening. of party controls over
armed forces.
Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Chairman of Council of
Ministers while remaining Party First Secretary.
Khrushchev proposes reform to improve Soviet educational
system by increasing vocational training.
Khrushchev demands termination of Western occupation
rights in West Berlin.
U.S.S.R. launches "cosmic rocket."
21st Congress of CPSU approves Seven Year Plan and
attacks "antiparty" group.
Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva considers problems
of Germany and Berlin.
Soviet moon rocket is successfully launched. Khrushchev
pays official visit to United States.
Khrushchev visits Mao Tse-tung in Peking (Peiping) "to
celebrate 10th anniversary of Chinese People's Republic."
U.S.S.R. announces plan to cut armed forces by 1.2 million.
Khrushchev announces downing of U.S. U-2 plane. Big Four
Summit meeting on Germany, Berlin, and disarmament
canceled.
Sino-Soviet dispute flares at Bucharest blocwide con-
ference and World Federation of Trade Unions General
Council session, Peking.
Soviet fighter shoots down U.S. RB-47 plane over interna-
tional waters; surviving crew is imprisoned.
Khrushchev attends U.N. General Assembly in New York,
caters to African nations, and demands U.N. reorgani-
zation.
Moscow conference of Communist parties attempts to re-
solve Sino-Soviet dispute.
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1961 January New "heavy" ruble, equal to 10 old rubles, is introduced;
new U.S. dollar rate (US$1=0.9 rubles) implies 56%
ruble devaluation.
April First manned space vehicle is orbited.
June Khrushchev meets in Vienna with President Kennedy on
East-West issues.
August Berlin wall is built, stopping refugee flow from East
Germany.
October 22d Party Congress adopts new party program to replace
one adopted in 1919 and revises party rules. Kozlov is
named in second place on Party Secretariat.
1962 March U.S.S.R. participates in 18-nation disarmament talks which
open in Geneva.
October Soviet missiles in Cuba create crisis.
November Party is reorganized into virtually separate organizations for
agricultural and industrial affairs.
1963 March Government is reorganized; Supreme Council of National
Economy is formed.
April Kozlov, heir-apparent to Khrushchev, suffers permanently
disabling stroke.
June Brezhnev and Podgorny are added to Party Secretariat. ,-
U.S.S.R. and United States agree to establish direct teletype
communication link ("hot line") between Moscow and
Washington.
August U.S.S.R. and United States agree to ban all nuclear testing
except underground explosions.
September U.S.S.R. begins purchase of an ultimate 12.5 million tons
of wheat from abroad after disastrous year in grain and
fodder production.
October Khrushchev launches major chemical industry program with
strong accent on chemical support for agriculture.
1964 April U.S.S.R. announces agreement to reduce production of fis-
sionable materials for weapons.
October Three-man vehicle carries pilot, engineer, and medical
doctor into space.
Khrushchev is ousted from party and government jobs, being
replaced as Party First Secretary by Brezhnev and as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Kosygin.
November November 1962 party reorganization is reversed.
December New U.S.S.R. regime postpones-until March 1965-meet-
ing of 26 Communist parties called for December by
Khrushchev to prepare for convocation of world Com-
munist meeting on Sino-Soviet dispute.
1965 February Premier Kosygin visits Hanoi, Peking, and P'yongyang in
effort to heal disunity in Communist movement.
March Nineteen Communist parties attending "26-party meeting"
postponed from December change function from formal
"Editorial Commission" to "consultative" meeting but
disband without agreement on date for world meeting.
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Brezhnev launches massive new program promising gov-
ernment support to agriculture on a scale unprecedented
in Soviet history.
Soviet cosmonaut accomplishes first "walk in space,"
September- Government is reorganized; national and regional councils
October of national economy (Sovnarkhozy) are abolished and
pre-1957 ministerial system is reestablished; role of profit
as measure of economic success is recognized.
December Brezhnev announced separation of party-state control func-
tions; Nikolay Podgomy replaces retiring Anastas Miko-
yan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
1966 February Soviet dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel are im-
prisoned for antistate activities in first such political trial
of intellectuals since Stalin's death.
Unmanned spaceship makes "soft landing" on moon.
March U.S.S.R. achieves first landing of probe on Venus.
April 23d Party Congress approves directives of 1966-70 economic
plan; Party Presidium is renamed Politburo; Brezhnev
receives Stalin's old title of General Secretary.
December Brezhnev reports to Central Committee on deterioration
in Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist Cultural
Revolution; he receives mandate to proceed with plans
for an international Communist conference.
1967 March Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West.
April Brezhnev endorses broad united front tactics for Europe
at Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist
parties.
June Premier Kosygin seeks political settlement of Israeli-
Egyptian military clash in U.N. General Assembly and
in talks with President Johnson at Glassboro, N.J.
October. Soviet Government reveals cutback of agricultural invest-
ment goals approved in March 1965; Deputy Premier
Polyansky publicly dissents.
November Brezhnev presides over Moscow celebrations on 50th anni-
versary of Russian revolution.
Consultative meetings of world's parties is called for Feb-
ruary 1968 in Budapest to discuss future international
Communist conference.
1968 January Leading members of intellectual community protest trials
of young dissidents for "anti-Soviet" activities.
February Budapest consultative meeting of some 60 Communist
parties, without Far Eastern, Albanian, or Cuban repre-
sentation, endorses Soviet call for late 1968 international
conference; Romanian delegation walks out, charging
Soviet use of pressure tactics.
August Soviet troops occupy Czechoslovakia.
1969 January Attempt to assassinate Soviet leaders at Kremlin fails.
March Soviet and Chinese border troops clash on Damansky Island.
June International Conference of Communist. Parties meets in
Moscow.
October Sino-Soviet border talks open in Peking.
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November
December
1970 January
U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations open in
Helsinki.
Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is deposited
at United Nations.
Moscow moves to provide air defense for United Arab
Republic.
March Second essay by physicist Andrei Sakharov details the need
for economic and political reform in the U.S.S.R. if the
Soviets are to keep pace with the West.
April One hundredth anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth is cele-
brated.
August Soviet-West German Renunciation of Force agreement is
signed in Moscow.
1971 March- 24th Party Congress is held in Moscow.
April
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1. Introduction
Over a span of some 50 years the Soviet Union has
developed from a backward, largely agricultural society
into a modern industrial and military power capable of
challenging the leadership of the United States on a
number of fronts. Successive Soviet regimes have placed
emphasis on enabling Moscow not only to maintain its
domination over east and much of central Europe but
also to extend its military and political influence to
areas as distant from the Soviet heartland as Africa, the
Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
The impressive achievements of the last half-century,
however, have been costly in terms of human suffering
and lives lost-most notably during the purges and the
periods of collectivization and forced industrialization.
Moreover, to achieve and maintain its present position,
economic policy and scientific research have favored
heavy industry and those scientific fields having the
most direct impact on military capability. The result has
been a level of living that continues to lag behind those
of most industrialized nations and an uneven economic
development in which agriculture and light industry fall
short of those in major Western countries.
The extension of Soviet influence abroad has been
adversely affected by a number of factors, chief among
which are the strength and stability of the West as a
whole, the bitter quarrel since 1960 with Communist
China, and the growing self-assertion among Eastern
European Communist nations. Moscow, once the
control center of the entire Communist movement, is
confronted with the erosion of its authority within the
Communist camp, which includes almost 90 national
Communist parties claiming an aggregate membership
of 50 million, supplemented by a network of affiliated
auxiliary or "front" organizations of both national and
international scope. The emergence of China as a
second viable Communist power center has been an
important factor in reducing Soviet influence and
prestige in the Communist movement and has made it
more difficult for the U.S.S.R. to contain the trend
toward autonomy in Eastern Europe and toward
independence of foreign Communist parties elsewhere.
The ability of the U.S.S.R., however, to offer substantial
military, technical, and economic aid gives it an
advantage in the competition with Communist China
and enables it to vigorously challenge Western interests.
Moscow still considers the third world a principal
arena in the contest both with the Chinese and the West
and has deemphasized the creation and use of
indigenous Communist parties in this area-especially
in countries ruled by a one-party nationalist
movement-thus masking the threat of a local
Communist takeover and creating a more friendly
atmosphere for extending Moscow's influence through
state-to-state relations. The U.S.S.R. also encourages
Communist parties in developed countries of the West
to form alliances with social democratic parties and
other groups on local domestic issues in order to gain
greater popular support and to help draw attention
away from their Communist ties with Moscow. To
insure consistency with Soviet interests, Moscow seeks-
with varying success-to align the policies of these
countries and parties with the foreign and domestic
policies of the U.S.S.R., and through these tactics to
extend its influence throughout the world.
Soviet national interests and the Marxist-Leninist
ideology are basic, if not coequal, factors which
determine the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. This
ideology, despite Soviet tactical shifts from belligerence
to detente and from increased pressure to accommoda-
tion, has always held that the Communist and capitalist
systems are essentially irreconcilable and that
communism will eventually triumph, although
conceding that the struggle will continue for some time.
A fundamental concept of Soviet ideology, advanced by
Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's, has been "peaceful
coexistence," which the regime has used to rationalize
its conduct of a policy of cooperation with the West
while continuing the traditional aim of dividing,
subverting, and weakening non-Communist nations by
all means short of war. Development of the U.S. S. R.'s
foreign policy on the basis of even limited collaboration
with the ideological enemy tended, during Khru-
shchev's rule, to increase significantly the antagonism
between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's
Republic, whose leaders insist on uncompromising
hostility toward the West. The present Soviet
leadership, in vying with the militant Chinese
Communists for the support of other Communist
parties, has tried to avoid the taint of charges of
collaboration with "imperialists." As a result, while the
regime continues to take advantage of the ideologically
acceptable idea of "peaceful coexistence" whenever it
serves national interests to do so, the definition of the
term has been narrowed to allow for greater militancy in
the U.S.S.R.'s policy toward the West.
The Soviet Union controls, directly or indirectly, most
of the resources of Eastern Europe and dominates
important strategic areas-the Polish plain and most of
the Danubian basin. The economies of the Eastern
European Communist nations have remained closely
linked to the economy of the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet
Army's harsh suppression of the Hungarian revolt of
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1956 as well as the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia
in 1968 serve as examples to would-be separatists.
Romania, however, cautiously continues its efforts to
pursue a more independent foreign policy and to lessen
its economic dependence o'n the U.S.S.R. and the
Warsaw Pact countries.
The U.S.S.R. has expanded the Soviet system by
imposing it on the Eastern European nations,
principally through military occupation after World
War II, and by supporting regimes of similar
orientation in the Communist-dominated areas of Asia
as well as in Cuba. Although the Soviet system is
ruthless and cumbersome, some leaders in former
colonial areas believe that, to varying degrees, it
provides a model for the planning and authority needed
to catapult an underdeveloped nation into the 20th
century. Soviet economic aid programs are underway in
a number of less developed nations of the non-
Communist world. In many countries in Asia and
Africa, the U.S.S.R., through the extension of long-term
credits and the provision of technical assistance, has
established itself as a major participant in ambitious
plans for economic development. Concomitantly, the
U.S.S.R. has become a primary source of aid for
modernizing and expanding the military establishments
of Afghanistan, Algeria, Syria, the United Arab
Republic (U.A.R.), Iraq, Cuba, and India, and is
maintaining its economic offensive among the newly
independent peoples of Africa and the leftist "national
revolutionary movements" of Latin America. Despite its
interest in extending Soviet influence in the third world,
the present regime has become more cautious in
granting economic aid unless there is some certainty
that the Soviet Union will also reap clear political or
economic benefits. Domestic economic problems plus
the failure in the past of grandiose, Soviet-funded
projects to bring a rapid increase in Soviet political
influence-as for example in Indonesia-probably
account for Moscow's new circumspection with regard
to foreign aid.
An elaborate system of controls has been maintained
to perpetuate within the state the dominant position of
the Soviet Communist Party, to shape public opinion,
and-to neutralize popular discontent. Some of the more
brutal repressive measures which characterized Stalin's
rule have been eliminated by his successors in their
efforts to stimulate individual initiative and to
encourage the people to identify themselves with the
regime. The ameliorative efforts have not been entirely
successful and disaffection and dissidence have
increased among important elements of Soviet society,
most notably among the intelligentsia. The Soviet
leadership has reacted in its domestic policy by a
reemphasis on "orthodoxy."
Despite the immensity and topographic variety of the
U.S.S.R., less than one-eighth of the country is arable
and a great part lies too far north for any but Arctic type
habitation. In many areas where the climate is good the
soil is poor, and some of the most fertile land lies in
regions of inadequate precipitation or where the
growing season is short. Likewise, many of the
abundant and varied raw materials in the U.S.S.R. are
unfavorably located and hard to exploit. Most of the
great rivers run to frozen or land-locked seas, and some
flow in part through regions unsuited to settlement. The
U.S.S.R. covers a large part of Europe and Asia, and its
population has ethnic, religious, and historical ties with
both. It has more people than any Western nation, and
a sizable number are skilled in modern industrial
techniques. Scientific achievements are high, but
administrative and managerial skills are less well
developed.
The virtual abolition of private ownership of the
means of production, the direction of economic
development through a comprehensive and detailed
economic plan, and the collectivization of millions of
peasant farmers have been the foundations of a new
society which its leaders maintain is superior to societies
based on private enterprise. The Soviet economic
system, however, has fallen far short of meeting the
growing needs of the country's people. Although there
has been some improvement in recent years, per capita
production of consumer goods is low compared with that
of Western industrial countries, and the diet is
qualitatively poor by Western standards. Despite
spectacular space accomplishments and high industrial
growth rates, the country has a backward agriculture,
many antiquated factories, underdeveloped services,
and, by Western standards, relatively poor living
conditions. Nevertheless, the leaders of the U.S.S.R.
have created an integrated state which has survived a
number of severe crises and have developed an economy
which has become a tremendous force with worldwide
impact.
The regime regards its military establishment as a
major instrument for sustaining and augmenting its
position in the struggle against the capitalist world and
as an outstanding example of the success and
invincibility of its social system. The number of men
under arms was reduced between 1960 and 1964, but in
the period since the ouster of Khrushchev the downward
trend was halted, and there has been a slight increase in
military manpower. Throughout this period, the Soviet
leadership has had the basic aim of maintaining and
improving balanced military forces able to resist a
Western attack on short notice, as well as to insure
ultimate victory, and the resources needed to implement
this policy are given priority consideration. Since 1965
the regime has significantly expanded its military forces
along the Chinese border and views its military strength
there as an integral element in "containing" China.
The U.S.S.R. sees military power as serving two basic
purposes: defense of the Soviet system and support for
expansion of its influence, making one of the most
important objectives of Soviet military policy the
deterrence of the West while the government conducts
its foreign policy and subversive activities by all means
short of open commitment of Soviet forces. Military
power is sometimes brought into play in direct support
of Soviet political demands through the threat of force,
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through the respect for the Soviet state and its
Communist system engendered by its growing power,
and through the military aid and support rendered to
allies, to neutral but friendly states, and to anti-Western
movements.
Military strategy is also influenced by economic,
technological, and geographic factors. Soviet military
requirements have been a primary motivation for
sustained and strenuous effort to increase economic
strength and for high priorities for technological
developments. Economic and technological advances
have, conversely, influenced military thinking. Recent
economic and technological achievements have
facilitated the development of a more diversified armed
force in place of one that has historically emphasized
ground forces. Ground forces continue to play a vital
role in Soviet armed power, but increased capabilities
for air and naval warfare permit a more flexible military
strategy, as illustrated by the presence of a strong naval
force in the Mediterranean for the first time.
The public Soviet position has long been that the
world balance of forces is shifting in favor of "world
socialism." Undoubtedly the Soviet leaders now see the
advance of Soviet military power-from progress
toward nuclear parity with the United States to global
expansion of the Soviet navy-as a key component of
this process. A measure of greater Soviet assertiveness
may well accompany this growth of power..At the same
time, however, Soviet actions regarding the Vietnam
war, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and in the
Middle East crises of 1967 and 1970 provide solid
evidence that the U.S.S.R. recognizes the grave dangers
posed by a direct confrontation with the United States
and will act to avoid such a confrontation.
Consciousness of Soviet power has by no means
diminished the awareness of the danger of a nuclear
confrontation in the Soviet policymaking outlook,
particularly in view of apprehension over the future
development of mainland China. But the degree of
caution Moscow displays will probably be tied
importantly to the U.S. attitude and capabilities in any
given situation. Unrequited concessions on major East-
West issues are not to be expected from Moscow, even if
urgent domestic requirements for economic and
technological progress impose certain restraints upon
Soviet foreign policy, especially in Europe. The Soviet
response to the U.S. statement of willingness to move
toward an "era of negotiation" remains to be seen; that
response will probably emerge on a case-by-case basis
with differing content in different regions.
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2. Geography
A. General
The U.S.S.R., the largest country in the world,
extends across much of Europe and all of northern Asia
(Summary Map, Figure 186). It is bordered mostly by
the broad North European Plain in the west and by an
almost continuous mountain bulwark in the south; the
Pacific and Arctic Oceans are to the east and north. The
western border of the U.S.S.R. is within 1,000 nautical
miles of all the important manufacturing centers in
Western Europe; the southern border is within 750
nautical miles of the extensive oilfields of the Middle
East; the easternmost extremity is within 750 nautical
miles of the principal U.S. bases in Alaska. Moreover,
within 4,000 nautical miles of the northern coast, across
the Arctic Ocean, are the major industrial regions of
North America-all within range of Soviet jet bombers
and missiles. The country is unfavorably located in
relation to the major sea lanes of the world, and only a
few widely scattered ports are open throughout the year.
One geographic factor overshadows all others in
characterizing the Soviet Union: its enormous size. The
U.S.S.R. is approximately 300,000 square miles larger in
area than the combined land areas of the United States,
Canada, and Greenland (Summary Map inset, Figure
187). Its 8.6 million square miles occupy almost one-
sixth of the land surface of the earth. This vast area
spans 170? of longitude across the northern part of the
Eurasian continent, from the Baltic Sea in the west to
the Bering Strait in the east. Continental North
America, by comparison, spans only 111? of longitude.
This great longitudinal extent of the U.S.S.R. landmass
measures about 5,550 miles' by air from Kaliningrad to
the Bering Strait via Moscow, Tomsk, and Yakutsk.
Between the southernmost point (approximately 35?N.)
of the continental U.S.S.R. on the Afghanistan
boundary and its northernmost point (77?N.) on the
Taymyr peninsula is a spread in latitude comparable to
that from Chattanooga, Tennessee, to Thule,
Greenland. Soviet Arctic insular possessions extend to
82?N. (Franz Josef Land). About 80% of the U.S.S.R. is
north of 50?N., the latitude of Winnipeg, Canada.
About 244 million people, roughly one-sixth more
than the population of the United States, live in this
enormous expanse of land. Approximately three-fourths
of this population is concentrated west of the Ural
Mountains in the European U.S.S.R., where most of the
great urban centers and the best developed transporta-
'Distances are in statute miles unless nautical miles are specifically
stated.
tion networks are located. With the expa 5X1 of
industry and agriculture, the population of the U.S.S.R.
has been increasing in Siberia and in the Arctic.
1. Topography
The surface of the U.S.S.R. is dominated by interior
plains and plateaus drained by great rivers, the largest
of which flow south in the European U.S.S.R. and north
in Siberia. The area is rimmed on the south and east by
a succession of mountain systems. Plains, broken at
wide intervals by hills and low mountains, predominate
in the western half of the country. These plains comprise
four major zones from north to south: tundra, forested
swampy plains, cultivated plains, and grass- and scrub-
covered plains and deserts.
The first, along the shores of the Arctic Ocean, is a
zone of desolate tundra (Figure 1), characterized by
arctic vegetation and permanently frozen subsoil
(permafrost). Along its southern margin, where the
tundra supports some tree growth, it merges with a
second zone, a broad belt of densely forested swampy
plains (taiga) (Figure 2). These forested plains extend
from near the Arctic Circle southward to about 55?N.
Movement is extremely difficult through these immense
forested swamps, which is an important reason for the
sparsity of urban centers in the zone. Natural openings
and clearings prevalent near the southern boundary of
the forest zone are outliers of the third zone-well-
drained cultivated plains (Figure 3) and widely
scattered forests of mixed evergreen and deciduous
trees. These plains extend westward beyond the borders
of the U.S.S.R. along the Baltic and North Sea coasts to
France and have been the obvious and traditional
avenue for military movement during the last thousand
years. Most of the Soviet population, the most
productive industries and agricultural areas, and the
best developed transportation net are concentrated in
these plains. South of the cultivated plains is the fourth
zone, grass- and scrub-covered plains and deserts
(Figure 4), which occupies an area more than half as
large as the United States. Most of this zone is east of
the Caspian Sea and south of about 50?N. Centers of
population in these plains and deserts are widely
scattered and linked by a sparse network of railroads
and mostly poor roads.
A plateau area cut by deeply incised river valleys is
between the Yenisey and the Lena rivers. The surface of
the plateau, although higher than the swampy plains in
the west, resembles them in the relatively uninterrupted
expanses of dense, swampy coniferous forest. Movement
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FIGURE 1. Sandy knolls and peat bogs of the
Arctic tundra 25X1
FIGURE 2. The densely forested swampy
Siberian. taig 25X1
Kiyev
FIGURE 4. Sand dunes and scrub
vegetation in the Karakum desert
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in this area is severely restricted. Surface transportation
routes north of the Trans-Siberian railroad are very
sparse except for trails and inland waterways. This part
of Siberia has one of the lowest population densities in
the U.S.S.R. The largest concentration of people is
around Irkutsk near Lake Baykal.
The U.S.S.R., in general, has a continental climate.
The predominant influences on the climate are the vast
Eurasian landmass and the adjacent or nearby oceans
and seas. Winters (principally December through
February) vary from cool in some Black Sea regions to
extremely cold in much of Siberia, where an absolute
minimum near -95?F. has been recorded. Summers
(June through August) vary from cool on the Arctic coast
to hot in the southern desert regions, where absolute
maximums near 115?F. have occurred (Figure 5).
Annual precipitation averages less than 20 inches over
most of the U.S.S.R. and ranges locally from less than 5
inches to more than 40 inches. Winter precipitation is
mostly in the form of frequent light snows which cover
most of the surface throughout this season. Occasional
blizzards last for several days and disrupt most
operations. Showers account for the greatest monthly
amounts of' summer precipitation at most places.
Thunderstorms occur predominantly in summer; they
are most frequent in June and July, when they occur on
6 to 12 days per month in the southern mountains and 4
to 6 days per month elsewhere, except. in the Arctic
regions where they are infrequent.
Relative humidity varies from extremely high along
the Arctic coast all year to low in the southern desert
regions during the summer. Except along the Arctic
coast diurnal and seasonal variations are significant,
and most locations have high early morning values and
lower afternoon values. Seasonal maximums of relative
humidity normally occur in summer along the Pacific
coast and at some locations near large lakes. By
contrast, most interior locations have winter maximums.
Cloudiness is generally at a maximum in summer and
early autumn and at a minimum in winter and early
spring over much of Siberia and the Arctic regions of the
European U.S.S.R. The opposite is true over much of the
remainder of the country. Greatest cloudiness, generally
65% to 90% in summer and 45% to 65% in winter,
occurs along the Arctic and Pacific coasts; least
cloudiness, generally 40% to 60% in winter and 10% to
40% in summer, occurs in the southern deserts and
semidesert areas.
In general, poorest visibilities occur during the colder
months and best visibilities during the warmer months.
However, along the Arctic and Pacific coasts, visibilities
during summer may be poor because of fog. Chief
restrictions during the colder months are falling and
blowing snow, fog, ice fog in northern sections, and haze
and smoke near cities and industrial areas. Summer
restrictions are fog, heavy rain, and, in southern desert
regions, duststorms.
Surface winds over most of the U.S.S.R. normally are
directed away from central Siberia in winter and toward
southern Asia in summer. Winds are generally strongest
in winter, when gales (wind speed equal to or greater
than 28 knots) occur on 10 or more days per month on
the Arctic coast and only 1 or 2 days per month in parts
of the Caucasus.
B. Military geographic regions
The U.S.S.R. contains such a wide range of
environmental conditions that broad generalizations
have been used in defining military geographic regions
for the country. Significant factors used to distinguish
the various military geographic regions are relief,
drainage, vegetation, climate, and coastal influences.
Differences in these factors in the Soviet Union are
sufficiently marked to provide a basis for dividing the
country into seven military geographic regions: the
Central Plains, the Caucasus Mountains, the Caspian-
Central Asian Lowlands, the Southern and Eastern
Mountains, the Subarctic Swamp and Forest, the Arctic
Barrens, and the Insular and Peninsular Far East
(Figure 6). The most important region, both
economically and strategically, and the most favorable
for sustained large-scale military operations, is the
Central Plains region.
1. Central Plains
This region, which contains most of the population,
industry, and transportation network of the U.S.S.R.,
extends from the western borders of the Soviet Union
eastward for about 2,700 miles into Siberia. The region
is composed mostly of sparsely forested plains which are
dissected by major north- or south-flowing rivers. The
plains are interrupted in their central section by the
narrow, relatively low Ural Mountains. Relatively small
mountainous areas are also located in the southwest on
the border with Romania and near Sevastopol' on the
Black Sea.
Because of its physical characteristics and its
industrial and cultural development, this region is the
part of the Soviet Union most generally suited for large-
scale conventional ground operations. Cross-country
movement is difficult in parts of the west and northwest
because of extensive marsh and forest areas, and in the
relatively small mountainous areas where vehicles
would be confined to existing lines of transportation.
Movement in the remaining parts of the Central Plains
is fair to good but is greatly influenced by several
seasonal factors.
Heavy rains and melting snow from as early as late
February in the south and lasting until mid-May in the
north cause the ground to become deep mud, making
cross-country movement very difficult. Severe cold and
snowfall from late October to mid-April impose great
hardships on troops. Mean daily minimum tempera-
tures of -50?F. and snow as deep as 3 feet have been
recorded in this region. Although winter may force a
marked slowdown in military operations, it may
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0
JFMAM/JASOND
D J FMAMJ JASON
D J FMA M
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RUSSKO.UST'INSKOYE
101r.- r. .I. I
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-
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0 !--r-m- ~1- 1 1
JFMAMJ JASONDJ
JFMAMJ JASOND
FIGURE 5. Cloudiness, precipitation, temperature, and relative , humidity
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120
120--
100
100
?
100-
so-
80
80-
?
60-
60
?
ABSOLUT
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60-
AD-
40
MEAN D
MAXIMU
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AD-
20-
MEAN D
MINIMU
AILY
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0
20-
0
0--
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-20
-40
 7
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. JBERIA.N
SEA
BERING
SEA
01590 sppteuret-0-) Milian GapRreppic Region ppun0e
?Ditlerenns in.leretipn petween taps Rnp 0otumR el aplxenl upppreppic laeuree.
0 540 IDOD St-n. ee
p . . 50 1 1000 . 500 Rilometen
FIGURE 6. Generalized military geographic regions and terrain
facilitate movement in one important respect: rivers
generally freeze to sufficient depth to support light
vehicles and, in some places, tanks.
Military operations would be facilitated by the best
developed highway and railroad network in the Soviet
Union. This road and rail system is supplemented by a
system of navigable rivers and canals. Construction of
new roads would encounter major problems throughout
much of this region.
Concealment and some cover would be available in
the fairly extensive forested areas in the northern part of
the region and on the forested slopes of mountainous
areas. Elsewhere, natural cover and concealment for
large numbers of mechanized forces are sparse, though
small villages throughout the region could provide cover
and concealment for small numbers of troops. Extremely
dry periods during summer months make vegetation
and grasses readily combustible. The region is
moderately well suited for bunker-type construction
except in large, poorly drained areas in parts of the west
and northwest and in western Siberia.
The Central Plains region is well suited for airmobile
and airborne operations during the months of June
through September. Numerous sites are available for
parachute, helicopter, and assault-type aircraft
landings, which would require little or no site
nF
JAPAN
preparation. Several reservoirs and large rivers would
also be suitable for landing water-based aircraft.
Construction of airfields would be relatively easy on the
plains except in parts of the west and northwest, where
sites are limited in size, number, and alignments by
numerous marshes, swamps, and lakes. In many places,
little grading would be required and runway lengths
and alignments would be unrestricted. Construction
material, except hard rock suitable for crushing, is
generally available. Miry ground or extreme cold during
much of the rest of the year would adversely affect the
performance of men and equipment.
The coast is mostly unsuitable for amphibious
operations because of partly obstructed nearshore
approaches, rugged coastal terrain, areas of marsh, and
poor exits. Although there are numerous landing
beaches along the coasts of the Baltic and Black Seas,
the most suitable areas for large-scale landings are in
the vicinity of Riga on the Baltic Sea and near Odessa,
Yevpatoriya, and Feodosiya on the Black Sea. In winter,
however, these beaches are generally obstructed by ice
from late November through April in the Baltic Sea and
early December to late March in the northern part of
the Black Sea. In the Baltic Sea, offshore approaches are
generally clear, but nearshore approaches are partially
obstructed by rocks or shoals. Nearshore bottom slopes
off the beaches range from flat to steep but are mostly
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flat. Bottom materials generally are sand and mud, with
rocks and clay off several beach areas: Beaches range
from 1,200 yards to 193/a miles (the majority are up to 4
miles) in length, and beach material is sand which is
firm when wet and soft when dry. Exit inland is mainly
by tracks and trails to nearby surfaced or unsurfaced
roads. In the Black Sea, offshore approaches are
generally clear, but nearshore approaches are partly
obstructed by shoals, rocks, and reefs except off the
south coast of the Crimean Peninsula where they are
clear. Nearshore bottom slopes off the beaches range
from flat to steep, but the majority are gentle. Bottom
materials generally are sand and mud, with gravel and
shell off several beach areas. Beaches average about 1
mile in length and are composed of sand and gravel
which is firm when wet and soft when dry. Exits from
beaches are by tracks and trails to nearby surfaced and
unsurfaced roads. The most feasible landing areas are
shown on the Summary Map, Figure 186.
The Central Plains region is fair to poor for irregular
force operations. The relatively flat nonforested plains
would offer little to no cover or concealment, but the
forested slopes of the Ural and Carpathian Mountains
would provide cover and concealment for small groups.
Bogs and swamps in the west and northwest make
movement on foot difficult but do offer some cover and
concealment for small groups. Conventional force
operations would be very difficult in the bogs and
swamps. The relatively well developed road network
would aid the movement of conventional forces, to the
detriment of irregular force operations. Sustenance
would be available on the cultivated plains but scarce in
mountain regions.
This region is composed mostly of two northwest-
southeast-trending mountain ranges which contain
many peaks over 15,000 feet above sea level (Figure 7).
These high, rugged, partially forested, sparsely
populated mountains are drained by north- or south-
oriented, deeply incised, rapidly flowing streams and
are divided by relatively narrow, densely populated,
cultivated valleys. .
The Caucasus Mountains region is, for the most part,
unsuited for large-scale conventional ground opera-
tions. Steep mountain slopes would preclude vehicular
cross-country movement except in the valleys between.
the two major mountain ranges. Operations could be
conducted best by troops trained in mountain warfare.
Cold weather during winter months would be an
additional handicap to troops operating in the
mountains; January mean daily minimum temperatures
as low as 6?F. have been reported. Snow cover generally
lasts from late October to early April.
The principal roads in the region follow the coasts
and extend east-west via the valleys which separate the
two major ranges. Several roads, which can be easily
blocked, traverse the mountains from north to south.
Although construction materials are plentiful; the
construction of new roads would be extremely difficult
in most places because of steep slopes.
Forests, most extensive in the west and on lower
slopes, and surface irregularities would afford cover and
concealment for troops operating in the mountains.
However, in the valleys which separate the major
ranges, natural cover and concealment are generally
poor. Much of the region is well suited for the
construction of tunnel-type installations, but access to
sites is difficult. Most parts of the valleys are favorable
for bunker-type installations.
The region is not suited for airmobile and airborne
operations. High, rugged relief would be an obstacle for
low-level air approaches to most parachute drop and
helicopter landing sites except in the valleys separating
the two major mountain ranges. Steep slopes also
preclude airfield construction in most of the area.
However, there are some sites suitable for airfields in
the valleys separating the two mountain ranges;
approaches and runway orientations would be generally
unrestricted.
Rugged terrain along much of the Black Sea coast
makes most of this region unsuitable for large-scale
amphibious operations. There are, however, amphib-
ious landing areas on the eastern part of the Black Sea
coast. Approaches are clear, beaches long, and exits
inland to coastal roads and railroads favorable.
The Caucasus Mountains region is well suited for
irregular force 'operations. Rugged, densely forested
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slopes offer cover and concealment for small groups.
Developed transportation facilities are poor, and the
existing roads can be easily blocked. The valleys are
cultivated and more densely populated, and may afford
some food, clothing, and shelter. Natural cover and fuel
would be available in the mountains. In winter, low
temperatures would hinder irregular force operations.
3. Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands
This lowland region is mostly east of the Caspian Sea
and extends eastward for a maximum distance of about
1,800 miles. The region consists of and and simiarid
sparsely populated plains where only six major rivers, in
an area covering over 1 million square miles, have
sufficient supplies of water to sustain flow throughout
the year.
The Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands are unsuited
for large-scale conventional ground operations in almost
every aspect except cross-country movement. The
greatest problem would be overcoming the almost
complete absence of an adequate water supply
throughout most of the region. Only in the southeast,
adjacent to the Southern and Eastern Mountains region,
is sufficient water available through the year. Ample
supplies are also available from mid-March to mid-June
in the extreme north. The paucity of roads and railroads
for movement of men and materiel would add to the
problems of military operations. Only five railroads
cross the region from north to south, and paved roads
are almost nonexistent. The insufficiency of both water
and construction materials would make construction of
transportation facilities difficult. Troops operating in
the region would also be handicapped by the scarcity of
natural cover and concealment. Other natural
conditions, however, favor the construction of bunker-
type installations except in the areas of sand dunes in
the south and in hilly areas in the northeast. In the hilly
areas, natural conditions are moderately well suited for
the construction of tunnel-type installations.
Troops operating in the area would be subject to a
wide variation in temperature between summer and
winter. Mean daily maximum temperatures in July
range from the low 80's to the upper 90's. In January,
mean daily minimum temperatures range from slightly
below zero to the lower 30's.
Although the terrain of most of the Caspian-Central
Asian Lowlands favors airmobile and airborne
operations and contains numerous sites for landing of
assault-type aircraft, troops dropped in the area would
experience the same unfavorable conditions that would
be encountered by large-scale ground operations.
Construction of airfields throughout most of the area
would be seriously handicapped by the lack of water,
construction materials, and good natural foundations.
The region is unsuited for large-scale amphibious
operations because it has no approaches from the open
sea.
The Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands are poorly
suited for irregular force operations. The flat,. semiarid,
sparsely populated plains offer little to no cover or
concealment, and the scarcity of water would be a
constant problem. There are very few roads and
railroads, but the good conditions for cross-country
movement of conventional forces would be detrimental
to operations of irregular forces. Natural cover, fuel, and
sustenance would be scarce.
This region, the largest in the U.S.S.R., extends for
6,000 miles from the Caspian Sea in the southwest to the
Bering Strait in the extreme northeast. This sparsely
populated region consists, for the most part, of rugged
mountains (Figure 8), which contain a variety of terrain
features. The mountains along the Iran border in the
west are arid and barren. Those along the Afghanistan
border are sparsely forested and are drained by
numerous rapidly flowing, deeply incised streams.
These mountains contain the highest peaks in the
U.S.S.R. and are the site of extensive glaciers and
snowfields. Farther east, along the Mongolia border
west of Lake Baykal, the mountains are more densely
forested and peaks are lower. The region east of Lake
Baykal is less rugged; mountain ranges there present
varied patterns of shape, height, and direction and are
more frequently separated by broad, nearly level valleys
than are the ranges in the west.
This region is mostly unsuited for large-scale
conventional ground operations. Steep slopes preclude
vehicular cross-country movement. East of Lake Baykal,
the region is crossed by the vital Trans-Siberian
railroad, which connects the Central Plains region to
important population centers on the Pacific coast and
along which most of the region's population is located;
however, operations would be handicapped by the
almost complete absence of a road and railroad
network. Steep slopes in most of the region would make
construction of transportation facilities very difficult.
Good cover from small arms fire and concealment from
observation is afforded by the forests; irregularities in
relief may give good cover from flat-trajectory fire. Most
of the region is moderately to well suited for the
construction of tunnel-type installations. Many valleys
and basins are poorly suited for bunker-type
installations because of poor drainage. In addition to
rugged relief and the paucity of roads and railroads,
troops operating in this area would be subject to
extremely cold winter temperatures. Temperatures in
the interior are among the coldest in the world. At
Verkhoyansk a low of -94?F. has been recorded; in the
mountains west of Lake Baykal a low of -59?F. has
been recorded.
The region is unsuited for airmobile and airborne
operations. Steep slopes preclude parachute drops and
landing of helicopter and assault-type aircraft in most
localities. Marshy terrain is a hindrance in the larger
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FIGURE 8. Rugged, partially forested slopes in the Tien Shan Mountains
valleys and basins. The surrounding high relief is an
obstacle for low-level approaches to these valleys and
basins. Steep slopes preclude airfield construction in
most of the region, and, in many basins and valleys,
airfield construction would be hindered by poor
drainage.
The rugged relief which extends along most of the
Pacific coast is generally not suitable for amphibious
operations. There are, however, suitable landing areas
that afford access to Vladivostok and Nakhodka.
Approaches are generally clear with the exception of
rocks in the nearshore approach. The beaches are
composed of sand and gravel and are firm. Exits inland
are by tracks and unsurfaced roads to a nearby surfaced
coastal road.
The Southern and Eastern Mountains region is well
suited for irregular force operations. The rugged,
densely forested mountains in the south offer good cover
and concealment. Mountains in the east are less rugged
but also offer good possibilities for undetected
movement and cover. This region is characterized by
extremely cold temperatures and by an almost complete
absence of a road and railroad network. Cultivated and
natural foods are very scarce, and supplying irregular
forces by sea or air would be difficult.
5. Subarctic Swamp and Forest
This sparsely populated region, which stretches
eastward about 3,500 miles from the border of Finland
to the mountains east of the Lena river, consists of
heavily forested, poorly drained plains and highlands
which are dissected by large, north-flowing rivers. That
part of the region west of the Yenisey river consists
almost entirely of plains except for a relatively small
area of hills in the northwest and the Ural Mountains,
which bisect the region in the vicinity of the 60th
meridian. East of the Yenisey river the Central Siberian
Plateau is hilly with a large flat to dissected plain near
the Lena river. A large area of mountains is located just
east of the Yenisey river.
The Subarctic Swamp and Forest region is poorly
suited for large-scale conventional ground operations.
Though much of this region is relatively flat, movement
of troops and vehicles is either highly restricted and
channelized or is practically impossible because of
flooded or soft ground, marshes, deep streams, and
locally rugged terrain. From mid-October through
April, frozen water features and ground may aid .
movement provided snow cover is not greater than 11/2
feet deep. Steep slopes are additional obstacles. to cross-
country movement in the Ural Mountains and the hilly
to mountainous Central Siberian Plateau.
Another deterrent to military operations is the almost
complete absence of a road and rail network. Three
railroads cross this region from north to south, west of
the Urals. These run from Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk,
and Vorkuta southward into the Central Plains region.
Construction of additional transportation facilities
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would require extensive clearing and drainage, and
alignments would be restricted by steep slopes in the
Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau.
Good cover from small arms fire and concealment
from observation is afforded by the dense forests; steep
slopes and rugged terrain in the hilly and mountainous
areas give good cover from flat-trajectory fire. The poor
drainage makes much of this region unsuited for the
construction of underground installations.
The severe subarctic climate compounds the
handicaps imposed by the swampy, forested terrain.
The extremely low temperatures would severely reduce
the efficiency of troops. Yakutsk on the Lena river has a
January mean daily minimum temperature of -53?F.
West of the Yenisey river, temperatures, although less
extreme, are near or below 0?F. for long periods.
This region, for the most part, is unsuited for
airmobile and airborne operations. Although air
approaches are generally unrestricted, except from the
east, the dense forests and extensive swamps would be
extremely hazardous for troops dropped into the area.
Construction of airfields would be difficult and would
require extensive clearing and drainage.
The region borders the White Sea for a short distance
in the northwest, but conditions there do not favor
large-scale amphibious operations. The shores are
normally blocked by ice between mid-November and
mid-May. -
The Subarctic Swamps and Forests region affords
good to fair conditions for irregular force operations.
Dense forests throughout this region afford good
concealment and cover from small arms fire; the more
rugged terrain in the Ural Mountains and the Central
Siberian Plateau affords good concealment and very
good cover from flat-trajectory fire for small groups.
Sustenance, such as cultivated or natural foods, shelter,
and clothing would be very scarce. The severe subarctic
climate would be a hindrance to irregular force
operations.
This region, which lies mostly north of the Arctic
Circle, extends approximately 3,500 miles along the
coast of the Arctic Ocean from the borders of Finland
and Norway in the west to the Kolyma river in the east.
Most of the Soviet islands in the Arctic Ocean are
included in the region. The mainland part of the region
is a sparsely populated plain drained by large north-
flowing rivers and is covered for the most part by tundra
vegetation. However, the plains are interrupted in the
west by the Ural Mountains and by scattered hilly and
mountainous areas. Many of the islands in the Arctic
Ocean are also hilly, and glaciers and snowfields cover
about half their areas.
This region is poorly suited for large-scale
conventional ground operations. Troops would be
subjected to the climatic extremes characteristic of high
latitudes. Conditions are especially severe during the
long, extremely cold winters, which last from early
October through March. Winter darkness and frequent
storms make visibility extremely poor. Winter
temperatures usually remain below 0?F., and
temperatures as low as -75?F. have been recorded in
the east. In summer, when mean daily minimum
temperatures in July and August range mostly between
40? and 60?F., the ground thaws and makes vehicular
movement extremely difficult. Another handicap to
ground operations is the almost complete absence of
improved roads or railroads to facilitate the movement
of troops and supplies. Although relief presents few
problems to road or railroad construction, the presence'
of permafrost in most of the region and the poor
drainage during the summer make construction of these
facilities very difficult. The low-growing vegetation
affords no cover and little concealment. The presence of
permafrost would be a handicap in the construction of
bunker- and tunnel-type installations.
Although the relief and vegetation of the region favor
airmobile and airborne operations, such operations
would encounter the same severe arctic climate factors
that would adversely affect ground operations.
Similarly, airfield construction would be hindered by
the same problems encountered in railroad and road
construction, principally permafrost and poor summer
drainage.
The region is not suited for amphibious operations.
Except along the coast of the Kola Peninsula on the
Barents Sea, which is generally ice-free throughout the
year, shores are ice-free only from August through
September or mid-October. There is, one landing area
northeast of Murmansk suitable for large-scale
amphibious operations. Offshore approaches are clear;
nearshore approaches are partly obstructed by sandbars.
The beach material is sand, which is firm when wet and
soft when dry. Exits inland are cross-country or by trails
to a minor port.
The Arctic Barrens offer fair conditions for irregular
force operations. The flat, sparsely vegetated plains
offer little to no cover or concealment. Long, dark
winters, deep snow, and extreme cold would present
difficulties to irregular forces. Miry conditions in the
summer months would practically preclude the
movement of conventional forces on the ground. This
barren land offers little or no sustenance, but the flat
plains would allow supplies to be brought in by air.
This region consists of the Kamchatka Peninsula,
Sakhalin island, and the Kuril Islands. The Kamchatka
Peninsula and Sakhalin each have two generally
parallel forested mountain ranges drained by short,
rapidly flowing, incised streams. These mountain
ranges are separated by marshy or swampy plains.
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Marshy plains are also common along the coasts and on
northern Sakhalin. Most of the Kuril Islands are
mountainous.
The rugged relief that comprises most of this region is
unsuited for large-scale conventional ground opera-
tions. Steep slopes preclude vehicular cross-country
movement in most of the region. In the plains, marshes
and swamps are the principal deterrents to vehicular
movement. Military operations could be conducted best
by troops trained in mountain warfare. The paucity of
roads and railroads would add to the difficulties of
troops operating in the region. Hard-surfaced roads are
few and there are only two major railroad lines (3'6"
gage) in Sakhalin. Construction of additional
transportation facilities would be extremely difficult on
steep mountain slopes and on the poorly drained areas
that cover most of the plains. The forests and
irregularities of relief afford cover and concealment in
mountainous areas. Natural cover and concealment
would be generally lacking on the plains. The region is
well suited for the construction of tunnel-type
installations in the mountains; most of the plains are
unsuited for bunker-type installations because of poor
drainage. An additional factor that would handicap
ground operations is severe winter weather. Tempera-
tures remain below freezing during the period late
October through March, and minimums slightly below
-50?F. have been recorded on the Kamchatka
Peninsula and Sakhalin. Minimums near -20?F. have
been recorded in the Kuril Islands. Depth of snow cover
ranges from 1 to 6 feet throughout the winter and is
greatest in the southern parts of the Kamchatka
Peninsula and on the higher parts of Sakhalin.
The region is unsuited for airmobile and airborne
operations. High relief precludes the landing of troops
in most of the area and is an obstacle to low-level air
approaches. The steep, rugged relief also precludes
airfield construction in most of the area. Poor drainage
presents major construction problems in the plains.
The coastline of this region is unsuited for
amphibious operations, and the numerous beaches do
not afford access to selected internal routes or strategic
areas.
The Insular and Peninsular Far East region is well
suited for irregular force operations. The densely
forested, rugged mountains offer good cover and
concealment for small groups. Natural cover and
concealment are generally lacking in the plains. Snow,
ranging from 1 to 6 feet in depth, and severe cold would
be problems to irregular forces in winter. Natural
sustenance would be scarce in this region, and it would
be difficult to supply troops by sea or air.
C. Strategic area
Nine strategic areas (Moscow, Donets, Volga-Ural,
Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent, Kuznetsk, Baykal and Far
Eastern) are of primary importance to the military
potential of the Soviet Union. These vary considerably
in size and in the reasons for their importance. Four
important areas are located west of 50?E. and are
centered on the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku
and on the industrial area of the Donets Basin. Moscow
is the political, and military center of the Soviet Union
as well as a major industrial and communication center.
Leningrad is an industrial city and port, and Baku is
one of the most important petroleum centers in the
nation. The Donets Basin is the most important mining
and industrial district of the country. Another important
area is the roughly triangular-shaped petroleum-
producing, mining, and industrial district which extends
from the Volga river, in the vicinity of Kuybyshev and
Kazan', eastward to include the central and southern
Ural Mountains. In south-central U.S.S.R., an
important but relatively isolated industrial center is in
the vicinity of Tashkent. East of the Ural Mountains
and north of Tashkent are three widely separated areas
of major strategic significance. 'Located on the Trans-
Siberian railroad, they are the mining, manufacturing,
and communication complexes of the Kuznetsk and
Baykal strategic areas and the rail terminus and port of
Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan in the Far Eastern
strategic area.
The Soviet Arctic also is of strategic importance.
Because of its location in relation to transpolar air
routes, the Soviet Arctic affords advanced sites for
defensive installations such as early warning systems
and interceptor bases, and for offensive bases for
launching Soviet air power and missiles. The Soviet
Arctic acquires additional importance because of the
Northern Sea Route, which, despite severe physical
limitations and the short navigation season (about 2
months), has strategic importance as the shortest route
between Atlantic and Pacific Soviet ports. During a war
it would become an important consideration in Soviet
efforts to maintain two-ocean naval mobility. The only
major Soviet port north of the Black Sea that is entirely
ice free and that has year-round access to the Atlantic is
Murmansk.
1. Moscow
Situated on a nearly flat plain in the European
U.S.S.R., the Moscow strategic area (Figure 9) is both
the political and military capital of the country.
Moscow (Figure 10) is the largest (population
6,942,000 in 1970) and most important urban area in the
Soviet Union. The city has the largest concentration of
diversified industry in the country and is a major center
for scientific and industrial research. There are
numerous industrial installations within the urban area
which produce a wide range of products, including
munitions, heavy and light machinery, electronic
equipment, chemicals, guided missiles and components,
airframes and jet engines, motor vehicles, and ball 25X1
bearings. The city is the site of Moscow State University
and the national headquarters of the Academy of
Sciences and numerous scientific institutes. In addition,
Moscow is the largest telecommunication center in the
country, a hub of the gas pipeline system, and the focal
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point of the transportation systems. The river port areas
are among the largest inland harbors in the country.
The Moscow area is the principal domestic and
international air communication center with many
important civil and military airfields. It is also the
central headquarters of the Soviet military forces, a
center of advanced military training, and the site of
extensive and varied storage facilities.
2. Donets
The most important mining and basic metallurgical
district in the U.S.S.R., the Donets strategic area
(Figure 11), contains extensive coal and iron-ore mines
(Figure 12), numerous centers of heavy industry, well-
developed electric power facilities, and a dense railroad
network. This strategic area is about 400 miles south of
Moscow, north of the Black Sea.
The Donets strategic area is a major producer of pig
iron (about 50% in 1965) and steel. Nowhere else in the
Soviet Union is such an abundance of good coal, iron
ore, limestone, and manganese found in such close
proximity. The coal mines are concentrated in the
eastern part of the area, about 200 miles east of the iron-
ore deposits at Krivoy Rog. A major natural gas
producing area is centered just south of Khar'kov, and
important gas pipelines extend from the region. Rich
manganese deposits are located near Nikopol'.
Important industrial centers within the strategic area
include Khar'kov, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov,
Zaporozh'ye, and Voroshilovgrad. Khar'kov (population
1,223,000 in 1970) is a leading producer of heavy
industrial machinery and equipment; important
products include aircraft, locomotives, tractors, tanks,
turbines, heavy electrical equipment, machine tools,
agricultural and mining machinery, radios, and ball
bearings. Donetsk (population 879,000 in 1970) and the
neighboring area is an important center of iron and
steel production, coal mining, and chemical manufac-
turing, particularly explosives and fertilizers. Dneprope-
trovsk (population 863,000 in 1970) is one of the most
important centers for the production of guided missiles,
ingot steel and finished steel products, and heavy
industrial equipment and machinery. Powerplants, an
important coke-chemical plant, and a large rubber-tire
factory are located in and near the city. Rostov
(population 789,000 in 1970), a nationally important
industrial center, is a leading producer of agricultural
machinery. It also produces diversified industrial
machinery, helicopters, and chemicals. The city is also a
primary telecommunications switching center in the
national network. Zaporozh'ye (population 658,000 in
1970) is one of the principal metalworking centers of the
U.S.S.R. It is a producer of aluminum and an
outstanding producer of high-quality steel for missile
tubing, jet-engine turbine blades, and armor plate. The
city al?o contains an important aircraft-engine plant, a
major electric transformer plant, and is the site of a
large hydroelectric powerplant. Voroshilovgrad
(population 382,000 in 1970) is the site of a large
thermal powerplant and is the leading producer of
locomotives in the country.
A dense transportation network and a power-
transmission grid serve the area. Most transportation is
by rail; highways are used only for short hauls. The
rivers near the eastern and western margins of the
strategic area are of little importance for intra-area
movement. Important transportation centers are Rostov
and Khar'kov. Rostov, near the mouth of the Don river,
is a transshipment point between railroads and the
inland water route to the Volga river. Khar'kov is the
main rail junction of lines leading from the Donets
Basin directly to Moscow.
3. Volga-Ural
The Volga-Ural strategic area (Figure 13) is the most
important petroleum-producing and refining area and
the second most important mining and metallurgical
district in the Soviet Union. The large reserves of
metallic ore and crude petroleum have promoted the
rapid industrial development of the area. This strategic
area extends from east of the Ural Mountains to west of
the Volga river, a distance of approximately 570 miles,
and from Kuybyshev and Magnitogorsk northward
about 500 miles to Berezniki.
The chief assets of the Volga-Ural strategic area are
its large supplies of petroleum and gas (Figure 14) and
an abundance and great variety of mineral resources. In
1968 approximately 70% of the country's total crude oil
production came from this region. Numerous crude oil
and refined product pipelines as well as refineries and
petrochemical plants are in the area. Iron ore is the
principal metallic resource, and the richest deposits are
on the eastern slopes of the central and southern Urals.
Nickel and titanium are also mined. The local supply of
good-quality iron ore and alloy minerals, in addition to
coal brought in from Karaganda, has made the Ural
Mountains especially important in the production of
high-grade steel.
Nine cities in the strategic area each have a
population exceeding 250,000. Kuybyshev (population
1,047,000 in 1970), a major port on the Volga river, is
the largest producer of refined petroleum products in
the U.S.S.R. and ranks second as a producer of roller
and ball bearings. The city is important as a center for
telecommunications, the integrated aircraft industry,
guided-missile production, the aerospace industry, and
the manufacture of machine tools, armaments,
electrical equipment, and motor vehicles. A major
rocket-engine testing complex is in the northwest
environs, and one of the country's largest hydroelectric
powerplants is near the city. Sverdlovsk (population
1,026,000 in 1970) is one of the leading industrial,
transportation, and telecommunication centers in the
U.S.S.R. The city is the second largest producer of
refined copper and is a major producer of metallurgical
and oilfield equipment, heavy machinery, steel,
armaments, electrical equipment, and chemicals.
Situated in a natural gateway through the Ural
Mountains, the city is a focal point for rail and highway
traffic between the European U.S.S.R. and Siberia.
Chelyabinsk (population 874,000 in 1970) has industrial
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FIGURE 10. Central Moscow viewed from the Ukraina Hotel d
area
FIGURE 12. A shaft iron-ore mine at Krivoy Rog I 25X1
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FIGURE 13. Volga-Ural strategic area
FIGURE 14. Gas-producing field in the
Volga-Ural strategic area F__1 25X1
plants that specialize in metallurgy, machine building,
and armaments. It also has a large iron and steel plant
and is a major railroad center. Kazan' (population
869,000 in 1970) is a nationally significant industrial
center and transshipment point on the Volga river. It is
the largest producer of polyethylene in the U.S.S.R. and
is a major producer of airplanes, turbine engines, and
phenol. One of the largest shipyards on the Volga is near
the city. Perm' (population 850,000 in 1970) is a
nationally significant producer of war materiel; one of
the U. S. S. R.'s largest munitions plants and a large
armaments plant are located there. Other important
installations produce aircraft engines, refined
petroleum products, chemicals, and heavy machinery. It
is also a major inland port. Ufa (population. 773,000 in
1970) is mainly an oil-refining center but also contains
two aircraft engine plants. One of the engine plants is
also engaged in the production of guided missile
propulsion equipment. Izhevsk (population 422,000 in
1970) is the largest producer of small arms and
automatic weapons in the U.S.S.R. It also produces
motor vehicles, machinery, and construction materials.
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Nizhniy Tagil (population 378,000 in 1970) contains a
large steel mill, a railroad freight-car plant, and
factories producing tanks and artillery shells.
Magnitogorsk (population 364,000 in 1970) is the site of
the largest steel mill in the country and has numerous
iron mines in the vicinity. Throughout the strategic
area, smaller industrial towns are engaged principally
in the manufacture of products connected with the iron,
steel, and petroleum industries. A large chemical plant
at Berezniki, which also contains a magnesium refinery,
utilizes local potash deposits. This chemical plant and
another at Krasnotur'insk (outside the area at 59?46'N.,
60?12'E.) are producing heavy water for the atomic
energy program. A plutonium production plant and a
uranium isotope separation plant are at Kyshtym and
Verkh-Neyvinskiy, respectively. Production of electric
power in the strategic area utilizes coal, oil, and gas
from local fields and coal from northeastern
Kazakhstan. Some powerplants also use gas from
Central Asian and West Siberian gasfields. There are
large hydroelectric stations on the Kama and Volga
rivers.
Most of the transportation lines that link the
European U.S.S.R. with Siberia pass through the Volga-
Ural strategic area. These lines consist mainly of
railroads, which are also the most important means of
transportation within the strategic area, and a few less
important highways and navigable rivers.
4. Leningrad
The Leningrad strategic area (Figure 15) is an
important transportation, industrial, and cultural center
located at the head of the Gulf of Finland, a narrow arm
of the Baltic Sea. The area can be approached from the
west through the Gulf of Finland, but this relatively
narrow water approach is guarded by numerous Soviet
defensive installations.
Leningrad is the second largest city in the U.S.S.R.
(population 3,513,000 in 1970). It has the most extensive
port facilities in the country and is the Baltic Sea
terminus of an inland waterway system which links it
with the White, Black, and Caspian Seas. Manufactur-
ing in the city consists of the production of precision
instruments, optical and electrical equipment, heavy
industrial machinery, machine tools, and armaments.
Leningrad is also a nationally important center of the
chemical industry and produces basic chemicals,
mineral fertilizers, plastics, synthetic rubber, and
pharmaceuticals. The city is one of the two largest
centers of scientific, technological, and educational
facilities in the U.S.S.R. Leningrad is the foremost
shipbuilding center of the country; the shipyards
produce many types of ships, including cargo vessels,
submarines, tankers, destroyers, and minesweepers, and
have built an atomic icebreaker. A civil airfield and
many military airfields are dispersed around the city.
About 15 miles west of Leningrad is the fortress of
Kronshtadt, which is located on an island that serves as
an operational base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The
naval base has extensive storage facilities, including
several ordnance depots. The island has the largest ship-
repair facility and most extensive drydocking facilities
in the country.
5. Baku
An important petroleum area, the Baku strategic area
(Figure 16) is situated on the west coast of the Caspian
Sea and has had a nationally significant role as a
supplier of fuel for the Soviet economy. More recently
the area has played a greater role in refining and
processing crude oil from other regions.
Baku (population 847,000 in 1970), the most
important city in the strategic area, is one of the largest
petroleum-refining centers and a leading producer of
heavy oilfield equipment in the Soviet Union. One of
the largest concentrations of refined petroleum products
and crude oil storage facilities in the country is located
in Baku and its environs. Offshore oilfields (Figure 17)
supply over half of Azerbaijan crude oil production.
Chemical plants, closely associated with the petroleum
industry, produce sulfuric acid, oxygen, acetylene,
synthetic rubber, caustic soda, iodine, and pharmaceu-
tical products. The city is the main port and naval base
on the Caspian Sea. The shipyards within the port
provide the most complete shipbuilding and repair
facilities on the Caspian Sea coast. The Baku strategic
area is the terminus of a double-track Transcaucasia
railroad line, controls the railroad and highway
connections to Iran, and is the eastern terminus of
pipelines and a railroad that lead from Baku to the
Black Sea port of Batumi. Four military airfields and a
seaplane station are located in or near the city.
6. Tashkent
The Tashkent strategic area (Figure 18) is an
important industrial, petroleum-producing, and mining
area in south-central U.S.S.R. Only 70 miles from the
Communist China border, this strategic area is isolated
from other parts of the U.S.S.R. by deserts to the west
and north. It is bounded on the east and south by the
rugged Tien Shan. The industrial significance of this
area has increased greatly since World War II.
There are oilfields near Fergana, and oil and natural
gas fields near Andizhan. Coal is mined near Angren.
Other mineral deposits have been exploited, including
sulfur, zinc, copper, tungsten, and molybdenum.
Mercury and uranium ores are mined in the mountains
south of Fergana.
Tashkent (population 1,385,000 in 1970) is the largest
city in the strategic area. The city contains a nuclear
research center, an aircraft plant, an electron-tube
plant, and a storage-battery plant. Tractors, excavators,
paper, and cotton textiles are produced in the city.
Chimkent (population 247,000 in 1970) is the largest
lead smelting and refining center in the U.S.S.R. and
one of the most important industrial and commercial
centers of the Kazakh S.S.R. It produces machinery,
construction materials, textiles, processed agricultural
products, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. It is also an
important junction of national transportation lines and
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FIGURE 15. Leningrad strategic area
is the site of a very important military airfield. It
contains several colleges and administrative and
cultural centers.
Other significant industries in the strategic area
include a metallurgical plant in Bekabad, construction
machinery plants at Andizhan, a superphosphate plant
at Kokand, and petroleum refineries at Fergana.
The major railroad in the area connects Krasnovodsk,
on the Caspian Sea, and Tashkent with the Kuznetsk
strategic area. The rail connection from central
European U.S.S.R., extending through Kuybyshev, joins
this line at Tashkent.
7. Kuznetsk
The Kuznetsk strategic area (Figure 19) is the most
important mining and manufacturing district east of the
Volga-Ural strategic area. Its industrial development is
based primarily on the coal deposits around Kemerovo
and Novokuznetsk. In addition to the Kuznetsk Basin,
the strategic area includes the adjacent Novosibirsk-
Barnaul manufacturing belt and the city of Tomsk. The
most important industry in the strategic area is the
manufacture of iron and steel, but nonferrous
metallurgical industries such as zinc, tin, and aluminum
are also significant. The iron mines near Tashtagol have
increased the significance of this strategic area. Coke
production, based on the coalfields centered around
Prokop'yevsk, Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Leninsk-Kuznetskiy,
and Kiselevsk, is the basis of gas, chemical, and
fertilizer production in the area.
There are six towns in the strategic area with
populations exceeding 250,000. Novosibirsk (population
1,161,000 in 1970) is one of the largest cities in the
U.S.S.R. and the largest producer of refined uranium
and tin. It is a major machine-building and'
metalworking center; factories also produce electronic
and optical equipment. The city contains textile mills,
extensive stockyards and slaughterhouses, and large
flour mills. It is a major telecommunication center and
the headquarters for the Siberian military district. The
Trans-Siberian railroad crosses the north-flowing Ob'
river at Novosibirsk. The city is also an important river
port and the northern terminus of the railroad from the
Tashkent strategic area. A large scientific center, one of
the largest in the world, is located south of the city.
Barnaul (population 439,000 in 1970), a port on the Ob'
river, is one of the largest producers of diesel engines
and high-pressure boilers in the U.S.S.R. The city also
contains plants that manufacture railroad cars, small
arms ammunition, and textiles. Novokuznetsk
(population 499,000 in 1970) is a major producer of iron,
steel, aluminum, and coke. Kemerovo (population
385,000 in 1970) is an important center of the Soviet
coke-chemical industry, and a manufacturer of
munitions, high explosives, chlorine, nitric acid, and
caprolactam. Tomsk (population 339,000 in 1970)
contains a plutonium production plant and a uranium
isotope separation plant. The city has the only large
ball-bearing plant outside the European U.S.S.R.
FIGURE 16. Baku strategic area
FIGURE 17. Offshore oilwells in the Caspian Sea near Baku
20
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7
-Anzhero-
Sudzhensk
Road
Railroad
} Airfield
0 25 50
Statute miles
Prokop'yevsk (population 275,000 in 1970) is a major
coal center, producing about 40% of the annual coal
yield in the Kuznetsk Basin. A large zinc smelter is
located at Belovo.
8. Baykal
The Baykal strategic area (Figure 20), which extends
along the Trans-Siberian railroad for about 625 miles,
derives its importance from its few but significant
transportation junctions and from-the Soviet industrial
policy of locating plants along this route.
Seven centers-Cheremkhovo, Usol'ye Sibirskoye,
Angarsk, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Petrovsk-Zabaykal'skiy,
and Chita-are served directly by the Trans-Siberian
railroad; Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Chita, and Angarsk are the
most important. Irkutsk (population 451,000 in 1970) is
a major railroad classification and repair center, a hub
of domestic and international air routes, and the
leading port on the Angara river. It is also an important
industrial center, whose products include aircraft,
metallurgical and mining equipment, and radio
equipment. A large aluminum refinery is located near
the city. Irkutsk is also the site of two major airfields,
many barracks, and military supply depots. Ulan-Ude
(population 254,000 in 1970) is a major transportation
and industrial center. It is at a strategic junction of the
Trans-Siberian railroad and an important railroad and
highway extending to the U.S.S.R.-Mongolia border.
The city is also the site of many barracks, storage
facilities, a major locomotive and railroad-car repair
plant, an aircraft-assembly plant, and several large
plants producing consumer goods. Chita (population
242,000 in 1970) is a large military center. The city
FIGURE 20. Baykal strategic area
LLeninsk-Ku tskiy
Belovo
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contains extensive troop-billeting facilities and military
supply depots, an air defense sector headquarters, and
two military airfields. The city also contains a large
railroad repair center and is the terminus of roads from
the U.S.S.R.-Mongolia border. Angarsk (population
204,000 in 1970) is the site of a uranium isotope
separation plant, a large petroleum refinery, a plastics
plant, a nitrogenous fertilizer plant, and several
important construction materials plants. Cheremkhovo
is the site of a large battery plant. Petrovsk-
Zabaykal'skiy is the site of the largest steel plant in
central Siberia..A chemical plant is located at Usol'ye-
Sibirskoye.
Effective exploitation of the coal mines between
Cheremkhovo and Irkutsk is dependent on uninter-
rupted operation of the Trans-Siberian railroad. This
consideration is equally pertinent to the tungsten and
molybdenum mines near Ulan-Ude, the uranium mines
north of Petrovsk-Zabaykal'skiy, and the other rich
mines, chiefly lead, zinc, and rare metal ores, near
Chita. Several railroad tunnels near the southern end of
Lake Baykal are critical bottlenecks.
The Bratsk hydroelectric powerplant, located about
225 miles north of the strategic area, is the second
largest powerplant in the world and supplies much of
the electric power used in the strategic area.
9. Far Eastern
The Far Eastern strategic area (Figure 21) fronts on
the Sea of Japan, partly parallels the Communist China
border, and extends about 600 miles from the coast near
Vladivostok in the south to Komsomol'sk in the north.
Vladivostok (population 442,000 in 1970) is the most
important naval base, the largest ship-repair center,
and the second largest commercial port in the eastern
U.S.S.R. The excellently equipped port, which is kept
open in winter by icebreakers, is the eastern terminus of
the Trans-Siberian railroad. The city contains extensive
storage facilities for refined petroleum products,
munitions, and general stores, several naval training
installations, and many billeting facilities. Air facilities
include seaplane bases and many fighter bases. Major
industries in the Vladivostok area are shipbuilding and
repair, food canning, and numerous light industries,
largely connected with fishing enterprises. In addition,
there are industries producing electrical equipment and
munitions.
Nakhodka (population 105,000 in 1970) is the largest
commercial port on the Pacific coast of the U.S.S.R. It
has extensive wharfage, mechanized cargo-handling
facilities, and a military port capacity of 36,000 long
tons of general cargo per day. It is also a naval base for
patrol craft. The city contains extensive storage
facilities for refined petroleum products, general stores,
munitions, and torpedoes, and numerous billeting
facilities. Major industries include shipbuilding and
repair, fishing, fish processing, sawmills, and a tin can
factory.
Khabarovsk (population 437,000 in 1970) is a major
transportation center on the Trans-Siberian railroad
Road
-~F Railroad
1 Airfield
Wlliillillllilllllll Landing
beach
o 20 40 60 80
FIGURE 21. Far Eastern strategic area
and the principal industrial, oil-distribution, telecom-
munication, and commercial center in the Soviet Far
East; the port facilities are the largest on the Amur
river. Industries of national significance include the
manufacture of diesel engines, agricultural machinery,
and electric wire and cable. The city also produces
machine tools, power machinery, heating equipment,
and refined petroleum products. Komsomol'sk
(population 218,000 in 1970) is one of the major urban
areas in the Soviet Far East. Situated on the Amur river,
it contains the largest shipyard in eastern Siberia. Other
nationally significant installations include the second
largest manufacturer of submarine batteries and the
third largest producer of jet fighter planes. The city
derives additional importance as a producer of foundry
equipment and as the site of the only steel plant and one
of the two petroleum refineries in eastern Siberia..
Other important centers are scattered throughout the
strategic area and include Ussuriysk, at the junction of
the Trans-Siberian railroad and the line that extends
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across Communist China to Chita, and the coal mining
areas around Suchan and Artem.
Although of less significance than the strategic areas
discussed above, the following urban areas are
important:
NAME LOCATION
o IN. ? 'E.
Alma-Ata .. 43 15 76 57 Population 730,000 in 1970. Sec-
ond largest city in Soviet Cen-
tral Asia and third largest pro-
ducer of torpedoes in U.S.S.R.
National industrial center pro-
ducing heavy machinery, mu-
nitions, electrical and telecom-
munication equipment, and
construction materials.
Gor'kiy ... 56 20 44 00 Population 1,170,000 in 1970.
Together with satellite city of
Dzerzhinsk, third largest indus-
trial center, ranking first in
production of motor vehicles,
rivercraft, chemicals, and large-
caliber guns. Major Volga river
port and river-railroad trans-
shipment point.
Kiyev ..... 50 26 30 31 Population 1,632,000 in 1970.
Third largest city in U.S.S.R.
Prominent cultural, military,
transportation, and telecom-
munication center. Produces a
wide variety of industrial prod-
ucts, such as aircraft, ma-
chinery, machine tools, and
construction materials.
Krasnoyarsk 56 01 92 50 Population 648,000 in 1970.
Major producer of armaments
and site of one of the largest
aluminum plants in U.S.S.R.
Uranium isotope separation and
plutonium production plants in
vicinity, each the largest of
its kind in country. Also pro-
duces synthetic rubber, heavy
machinery, and agricultural
machinery. Water and rail
transshipment site for much of
Yenisey river basin. Site of
largest powerplant in world
(on Yenisey river). Headquar-
ters for Trans-Siberian railroad.
Odessa .... 46 28 30 43 Population 892,000 in 1970. Ma-
jor commercial port (including.
Il'ichevsk) on the Black Sea.
Contains the country's largest
maritime passenger terminal
and handles the second largest
volume of cargo. Center for
shipbuilding, ship repair, metal
processing, machine building,
and food processing.
NAME LOCATION
? 'N. 0 'E.
Saratov ... 51 34 46 02 Population 758,000 in 1970. Cen-
ter for oil and gas production,
petroleum refining, the inte-
grated aircraft industry, and
manufacture and assembly of
guided missiles. Nationally im-
portant production center for
industrial machinery, machine
tools, electric equipment, chem-
icals, trolley buses, tractor
parts, and bearings. A major
transportation hub on the
Volga river.
Tula ...... 54 12 37 37 Population 462,000 in 1970. In-
dustrial center near large coal
and iron-ore deposits. Major
industrial activities include
production of armaments,-am-
munition, and agricultural ma-
chinery.
Volgograd. . 48 45 44 25 Population 818,000 in 1970. Na-
tionally significant producer of
guns, ammunition, explosives,
and chemical-warfare agents.
Other industrial products in-
clude steel, tractors, chemicals,
machinery, and rivercraft.
Large aluminum and ball-
bearing plants and petroleum
refinery. Site of one of largest
hydroelectric powerplants in
U.S.S.R. (on Volga river).
Major transportation center,
river port, and water-rail trans-
shipment point.
Yaroslavl' .. 57 37 39 52 Population 517,000 in 1970. In-
dustrial center, nationally im-
portant in production of syn-
thetic chemicals, petrochem-
icals, tires, and diesel engines.
Major rail center and water-
rail, transshipment point.
D. Internal routes (C)
The selected internal routes (Figure 22) are the
easiest avenues of movement between strategic areas,
from land and sea approaches to strategic areas, and
between internal routes. Most of the roads considered
are improved and are accompanied by railroads over
most of their lengths. Roads and railroads are greatly
influenced by seasonal conditions.
Offroad dispersal and cross-country movement are
also greatly influenced by seasonal factors such as snow
during the winter months and flooding during spring
thaw. Conditions vary from good to fair in the plains
regions to poor in the mountain and hill regions which
are heavily forested and extremely rugged in places.
Detailed information on internal routes is given in
Figure 23.
E. Approaches
The perimeter of the U.S.S.R. consists of about 12,600
miles of land boundaries and approximately 29,000
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