U.S.S.R. AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000100040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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l.5. .1{.
AGRICUL'T'URE, FISHERIES,
and FORESTRY
DECEMBER 1968
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
This Section 61 supersedes the one dated Oc-
tober 1963, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
A. General ........................................................... 1
B. Agriculture ........................................................ 3
1. Physical factors affecting agriculture .............................. 3
2. Land utilization ................................................ 6
3. Farm system .................................................... 6
a. Sectors ...................................................... 6
b. Developments in the socialized sector .......................... 7
c. Importance of the private sector ............................... 8
4. Administration and policy ....................................... 9
a. Administration of agriculture .................................. 9
b. Major programs, 1953-64 ...................................... 10
c. The Brezhnev program ....................................... 10
5. Production and supply ........................................... 11
a. Major crops ................................................. 11
(1) Wheat .................................................. 13
(2) Rye ..................................................... 13
(3) Barley ................................................... 13
(4) Corn ..................................................... 14
(5) Miscellaneous grains ...................................... 14
(6) Potatoes and other vegetables ............................. 15
(7) Sugar beets .............................................. 15
(8) Sunflower seed ........................................... 15
(9) Cotton .................................................. 16
(10) Flax .................................................... 16
(11) Miscellaneous crops ...................................... 16
b. Livestock and livestock products ............................... 17
(1) Number and distribution of livestock ....................... 17
(2) Livestock products ....................................... 18
6. Foreign trade in agricultural products ............................. 19
1. Importance to the economy ...................................... 20
2. Catch of fish and other aquatic products ............................ 20
3. Characteristics of major fishing areas .............................. 21
a. High seas fishing areas ........................................ 21
(1) Northeast Atlantic ........................................ 22
(2) Northwest Atlantic ....................................... 22
(3) Central and South Atlantic ................................ 22
(4) North Pacific ............................................ 22
(5) Antarctic area ............................................ 23
(6) Other high seas regions .................................... 24
b. Coastal and inland waters ..................................... 24
(1) Caspian ................................................. 24
(2) Other coastal and inland waters ............................ 24
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4. Fishing operations ............................................... 25
a. Vessels ...................................................... 25
b. Fishing gear and techniques .................................... 26
c. Ports and vessel facilities ...................................... 27
5. Utilization of catch .............................................. 28
6. Foreign trade ................................................... 28
D. Food supply ...................................................... 28
E. Forests and forest products .......................................... 29
1. Forest resources ................................................. 29
2. Primary processing and distribution of forest products .............. 31
a. Development of the timber industry ............................ 31
b. Products and consumption ..................................... 32
(1) Fuelwood ............................................... 32
(2) Industrial wood .......................................... 32
(3) Lumber ................................................. 32
c. Foreign trade ................................................ 33
G. Comments on principal sources ...................................... 41
Page
Fig. 1
Agricultural regions (map) ....................................
4
Fig. 2
Annual precipitation and major soil types (map) ................
5
Fig. 3
Land utilization (chart) ......................................
6
Fig. 4
Distribution of sown area, by sectors (chart) ....................
7
Fig. 5
Trends in sown area (chart) ..................................
12
Fig. 6
Sown area, by crop classes (table) ............................
12
Fig. 7
Grains and pulses: sown area and production (table) ............
12
Fig. 8
Wheat: sown area and production (table) ......................
13
Fig. 9
Potatoes: sown area and production (table) ....................
15
Fig. 10
Sugar beets: sown area and production (table) ..................
15
Fig. 11
Sunflower seeds: sown area and production (table) ..............
16
Fig. 12
Trends in livestock numbers (chart) ............................
18
Fig. 13
Distribution of livestock ownership (chart) ......................
18
Fig. 14
Output of basic livestock products (table) ......................
19
Fig. 15
Net agricultural trade (table) ..................................
19
Fig. 16
Trends in fish and marine animal catch (chart) ..................
20
Fig. 17
Whale catch, by area (chart) ..................................
21
Fig. 18
Soviet fishing grounds in the high seas (map) ....................
21
Fig. 19
Soviet fishing areas off Alaska (map) ..........................
23
Fig. 20
Caspian Sea fishing grounds and processing centers (map) ........
24
Fig. 21
Fish catch percentages, by type of vessel (table) ................
25
Fig. 22
Additions to fleet (table) ......................................
25
Fig. 23
Fish catch percentages, by method used (table) ..................
26
Fig. 24
Fish catch, by Soviet fishing ports (table) ......................
27
Fig. 25
Per capita availability of foods (table) ..........................
29
Fig. 26
Wood products, U.S.S.R. and selected countries (table) ..........
29
Fig. 27
Forest distribution (map) ....................................
30
Fig. 28
Forest resources, industrial logs, sawmilling (table) ..............
31
Fig. 29
Major sawmilling and wood-processing centers (map) ............
33
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Fig. 30
Rye: sown area and production (table) ........................
34
Fig. 31
Barley: sown area and production (table) ......................
34
Fig. 32
Corn: sown area and production (table) ......................
34
Fig. 33
Miscellaneous grains: sown area and production (table) ..........
34
Fig. 34
Other vegetables: sown area and production (table) ............
34
Fig. 35
Raw cotton: sown area and production (table) ..................
34
Fig. 36
Fiber flax: sown area and production (table) ....................
35
Fig. 37
Number of livestock (table) ..................................
35
Fig. 38
Relative value of agricultural exports (table) ....................
35
Fig. 39
Relative value of agricultural imports (table) ...................
35
Fig. 40
Fish and marine animal catch (table) ..........................
36
Fig. 41
Fish catch, by species (table) ..................................
36
Fig. 42
Estimated catch, by major fishing areas (table) ..................
36
Fig. 43
Estimated strength of fishing fleet (table) ......................
37
Fig. 44
Utilization of fish catch (table) ................................
37
Fig. 45
Foreign trade in fish and fish products (table) ..................
38
Fig. 46
End use of industrial logs (table) ..............................
38
Fig. 47
Log removals (table) ........................................
38
Fig. 48
Value of wood and wood products exports (table) ..............
39
Fig. 49
Value of wood and wood products imports (table) ..............
40
Fig. 50
Value of lumber exports (table) ................................
40
Fig. 51
Value of lumber imports (table) ..............................
40
Fig. 52
Distribution of wheat acreage (map) .................. follows 41
Fig. 53
Distribution of rye acreage (map) ............................
do
Fig. 54
Distribution of barley acreage (map) ..........................
do
Fig. 55
Distribution of corn acreage (map) .... . .......................
do
Fig. 56
Distribution of potato acreage (map) ..........................
do
Fig. 57
Distribution of sugar beet acreage (map) ......................
do
Fig. 58
Distribution of industrial crop acreage (map) ..................
do
Fig. 59
Distribution of cattle (map) ..................................
do
Fig. 60
Distribution of swine (map) ..................................
do
Fig. 61
Distribution of sheep and goats (map) ............... :........
do
This section was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
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Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry
A. General
Although the land area of the Soviet Union en-
compasses a vast expanse, only a small proportion
of it is suitable for cultivation, and the possibilities
for agricultural expansion are severely limited by the
climate. In the expansion of the cultivated area in
the mid-1950's, much of the land plowed-up was of
such marginal productivity that it would not be cul-
tivated in the more richly endowed United States.
The total land area of the U.S.S.R. is about 2.2
billion hectares, or about one-sixth of the earth's land
area not permanently covered by ice. The U.S.S.R.
classifies about 27% of its land as agricultural land,
but only about 11% of the total area is actually under
cultivation, compared with 38% in France, 34% in
West Germany and 20% in the United States. The
growing season is relatively short over most of the
U.S.S.R. because of its northern location and its con-
tinental climate. Most of the country is situated north
of 47? latitude (which runs, for example, through
Quebec-Duluth-Tacoma), while most of the United
States lies south of this line. The crucial disadvantage
of the climate of the continental U.S.S.R., however,
is the lack of regional coincidence between the distri-
bution of heat and moisture. The maximum of heat
tends to be accompanied by a minimum of moisture.
Confined by these climatic conditions, most of Soviet
agricultural production takes place within a triangular
area, having as its base a line running between Len-
ingrad and Odessa, with Irkutsk on Lake Baikal in
Eastern Siberia as its apex.
Despite the rapid pace of Soviet industrialization,
agriculture remains a major sector of the economy.
In 1967 agriculture employed about 35% of the civilian
labor force and contributed about one-fourth of the
gross national product (GNP). In comparison, agricul-
ture in the United States employed about 6% of the
labor force and contributed about 4% of the GNP.
During the period 1954-58, the U.S.S.R. achieved
substantial increases in agricultural output by increas-
ing the rate of agricultural investment, by raising
government purchase prices for farm products, by
instituting a number of organizational measures, and
by making some important concessions to the farm
population. Much of the increment in investment
went into the development of new lands, primarily
for the cultivation of wheat. To support expansion of
the livestock industry, a program for a large increase
in the area planted to corn-made possible to some
extent by the eastward expansion of the wheat area-
was inaugurated in 1955.
These measures, aided by better than normal
weather conditions, lifted agriculture out of the stag-
nation Stalin's policies had caused and temporarily
provided a better balance between agricultural and
industrial development. During the subsequent 5-
year period, 1959-63, however, agricultural output
again stagnated. With an increasing population the
deterioration in the food supply became a source of
popular discontent. Soviet prestige suffered a sharp
setback in 1963, when crop failure forced the U.S.S.R.
to purchase grain from the West, a move that pro-
duced a shock to Soviet vanity as well as a drain on
Soviet reserves and foreign exchange. In its efforts
to find a solution to its agricultural problems, the
Soviet leadership adopted in December 1963 a pro-
gram calling for a vast increase in production of agri-
cultural chemicals by 1970 and for a major expansion
in irrigation. Khrushchev's successors since October
1964 have continued to place strong emphasis on
the role of chemical fertilizers and land reclamation,
although there have been several reductions of goals.
In March 1965, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership
outlined a far-reaching program for stabilizing output
and regaining the high growth rates of the 1954-58
period. They charged that Khrushchev, especially in
the latter part of his tenure, established grandiose
objectives for agriculture without providing the nec-
essary economic support measures. The new prescrip-
tion for agriculture included a sharp rate of increase
in agricultural investment, higher prices to producers
for major agricultural products, lower prices on non-
agricultural goods sold to the farms, and an easing
of restrictions on private plots and privately owned
livestock. The new regime also proposed to reduce
the interference of the Party in farming operations.
The average annual rate of growth in net agricultural
production in 1966-67 was almost one-fourth larger
than the average growth rate during 1961-65. The
increase was a result of more favorable weather,
enlarged supplies of fertilizer and other inputs, and
improved financial incentives.
Grain, including pulses, is the most important agri-
cultural commodity in the U.S.S.R. During the 1950's,
major efforts-such as the new lands and corn pro-
grams-were expended toward increasing grain out-
put through expansion of acreage. In more recent
years efforts have been directed, with a fair degree
of success, toward increasing yields per hectare
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through increased application of mineral fertilizer
and other agricultural chemicals, improved varieties,
and improvements in agricultural techniques and
management. Production during 1963-67 averaged
nearly 115 million tons. A record grain crop was
harvested in 1966, estimated at 140 million tons
(although officially reported at 171 million tons on a
bunker-weight basis, which includes trash, immature
grain, excess moisture, etc.). This crop was grown
on an area of 125 million hectares, or about 60% of
the sown area. Another good crop, estimated at 120-
125 million tons, was harvested in 1967. Wheat is the
most important grain and food crop, accounting for
more than one-half of the total grain crop in 1966-67.
Potatoes, the second most important food crop, are
also valuable as livestock feed and for industrial pur-
poses. Production of potatoes averaged about 87 mil-
lion tons during the 1963-67 period; the 1967 produc-
tion was 95 million tons, very close to the record 96
million tons produced in 1956.
Sugar beets constitute practically the only domestic
source of sugar in the U.S.S.R., which is the world's
leading producer of sugar beets. Production of beets
for processing into sugar averaged almost 72 million
tons during 1963-67, an increase of more than 40%
over the annual average of the previous 5-year period.
A record of almost 87 million tons was havested in
1967.
Cotton, the leading fiber crop in the U.S.S.R. and
the principal irrigated crop, has held a favored posi-
tion in Soviet agriculture since World War II. In the
early 1960's cotton yields per hectare declined slightly
but since 1963 have been on an upward trend. Pro-
duction during the last 3 years has been in the range.
of 5.7-6.0 million tons (seed, or unginned, basis).
The U.S.S.R. is the world's largest producer of flax
fiber, producing about two-thirds of the world's output.
During the last three years production has been in
the range of 460-480 thousand tons annually.
Sunflower seed is the principal source of edible
vegetable oil in the U.S.S.R. The sunflower is well
adapted to the climate, especially of the southern
regions of European U.S.S.R., and Soviet plant
breeders have had good success in developing new
varieties with a high oil content. Estimated production
of sunflower seeds in 1967 was about 6.1 million tons
(the official Soviet figure on a bunker weight basis
was 6.6 million tons).
Livestock production contributes about one-half of
the value of net agricultural production in the U.S.S.R.
Official statistics for meat and milk production are
believed to be exaggerated (currently about 10%
and 6%, respectively). Estimated production of live-
stock products in 1967 is as follows: meat, 10 million
metric tons; milk, 74.5 million metric tons; eggs, 33.7
billion units; and wool, 395,000 metric tons. Substan-
tial increases in livestock products occurred in the
1954-67 period: meat, 91%; milk 115%; eggs, 109%;
and wool, 68%.
0
Numbers of livestock on 1 January 1968 in millions
of animals were as follows: all cattle, 97.1, including
cows, 41.6; swine, 50.8; and sheep and goats, 143.9.
Recent trends in livestock numbers and Soviet policy
statements indicate that the growth in livestock num-
bers has been slowed down in favor of a policy of
increasing efficiency of feed utilization through higher
productivity per animal. Western observers have felt
that Soviet livestock numbers were excessive in terms
of available feed supply, resulting in poor efficiency
of livestock production. Trends in livestock numbers
and output of livestock products have generally re-
flected the availability of feed supplies. Despite the
progress which has been made, animal husbandry
remains one of the most backward sectors of the
agricultural economy.
As a means of improving the Soviet diet, especially
by providing more high quality protein, the U.S.S.R.
has become a major fishing country with the largest
and most modern high seas fishing fleet in the world.
The catch has more than doubled since 1959. The
1967 catch was 6.5 million tons, 6.7% larger than the
1966 catch. Annual fish consumption is about 13 kilo-
grams per capita, and fish provides an estimated 13%
of the animal protein consumed in the U.S.S.R.
The average diet of the Soviet people, while monot-
onous, apparently provides adequate nutrition. The
average daily per capita caloric intake, estimated
as 3,180, is about the same as in the United States.
Cereals and potatoes, however, constitute 55%-60%
of the caloric intake, compared with about 25%-30%
in the United States. In the United States animal
products account for about one-third of total caloric
intake, compared with less than one-fourth in the
U.S.S.R. In addition the consumption of livestock
products and especially protective foods such as fruits
and vegetables is affected by a sharp seasonality.
The lack of adequate refrigeration and transport
facilities adversely affects the regional distribution and
ready availability of perishable foods. The per capita
consumption of sugar has increased almost 30% above
the 1960 level, as a result of sharp increases in the
domestic production of sugar beets and the import
of raw cane sugar from Cuba.
Forests cover almost 747,000,000 hectares or one-
third of the U.S.S.R.'s total land area. The country
has about one-fourth of the world's productive forest
land. Forest resources are reportedly so vast that log
production could be doubled without reducing the
annual growth rate of timber.
The U.S.S.R. produces more timber and lumber
than any other country in the world and is on a par
with the United States in the production of industrial
logs. It is a major wood-exporting country, with annual
exports in the period 1964-66 averaging about US$574
million. The logging industry ranks first in terms
of employment among the extractive industries,
and uses a considerable portion of the transportation
system in the movement of wood products.
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Despite enormous timber resources, the U.S.S.R.
has been unable to satisfy its combined wood needs
for home consumption and export, although it is a
net exporter in terms of value. This has been largely
because of the unfavorable geographic location of
forests in relation to centers of wood consumption.
With the depletion of forest resources in the more
densely populated regions of the European U.S.S.R.,
a shift began in the 1950's of logging operations to
the remote and less productive forest areas in the
Dvina-Vycheda and Pechora River basins of the North-
west, to the Urals, and to the West and East Siberian
regions.' After the initial disruptions which accom-
panied the logging shift, industrial wood production
increased significantly with most of the increase being
accounted for by the new areas. Logging in the remote
areas and the geographical separation of logging and
milling, increases the cost of timber products and
presents the Soviets with the problem of allocating
huge investments to shift sawmill capacity to the
principal logging areas. Progress in the relocation of
sawmill capacity has been steady but slow.
B. Agriculture
1. Physical factors affecting agriculture
With a total land area of nearly 2.23 billion hectares,
the U.S.S.R. has an estimated arable area of only 0.24
billion hectares. In 1967 some 206.9 million hectares
where actually sown for crop production. Although this
tillable area exceeds that of the United States, the
overall productive capabilities per hectare are con-
siderably lower.
The prime area of Soviet agriculture may be de-
scribed as a transition zone between the areas which
are either too cold or too dry. This zone resembles
an elongated triangle formed by Leningrad in the
north, Odessa in the south and Irkutsk in the east.
Much of the land north of latitude 55? (passing south
of Moscow), is tundra waste or dense forest with
unproductive soils and short growing seasons. In the
and lands to the south, productive agriculture is gen-
erally limited to irrigated oases. Thus, at either physi-
cal extreme, efficient agriculture often requires costly
reclamation measures.
The great soil zones of the U.S.S.R. are distributed
in well-defined geographical zones or belts which
reflect the same physical environment so important
to agricultural fertility (Figure 2). The most signifi-
cant of these soil belts is that of the fertile chernozem
(black) soils, on which modern Soviet agriculture has
largely been developed. Outside, but immediately ad-
jacent to the regions of chernozem soils are secondary
agricultural regions. To the north and northwest,
podzolic and gray-brown podzolic soils provide a large,
but less productive, agricultural land base. Much of
' Certain regional designations used in this Section-i.e.,
Northwest, North Caucasus, Central, etc., refer to the agri-
cultural regions designated on the map, Figure 1.
the farmland is swampy and requires extensive drain-
age prior to cropping. Low temperatures limit the
variety of crops that can be grown in this zone. The
soils are relatively shallow and infertile. In the south
the chestnut and desert soils of the and zone are
utilized for important industrial crops as well as gen-
eral field crops. Crop production in the and zone,
however, is largely based upon irrigation which is.
absolutely necessary in the true deserts and which
insures reliable harvests in the less and areas.
No aspect of the climate is so well known as the
long cold winter, but even in the far north the short
days of winter have their counterpart in the long
hours of daylight during the short fairly warm sum-
mer. The use of plant varieties and farm practices
especially adapted to climate and topography has
made possible a limited extension of agriculture into
the far north.
Even in the southern U.S.S.R., the average growing
season is comparatively short. Kharkov (50?N.), in
the northeastern Ukraine, has 150 days, or about
the same as, on the Minnesota-Iowa border. As far
south as Krasnodar (45?N.) an average of 190 days
are frost-free, comparable with Omaha, Nebraska. In
Moscow a frost-free season of 130 days corresponds
to parts of North Dakota. Beyond the Urals the
growing season is still shorter, with a range of 95
to 125 days that is comparable to the prairie provinces
of Canada.
In the better agricultural lands of the Soviet Union,
moisture deficiency limits agricultural production more
than does the short growing season. In the central
and western parts of the country, the mean annual
precipitation ranges from 20 to 25 inches. Precipitation
decreases southward and eastward and is lowest in
the desert steppes which extend from the lower Volga
east across the southern part of Kazakh S.S.R. and
south into Soviet Central Asia (Figure 2).
The seasonality of precipitation in the and zones of
the southeast is unfavorable to crop production. These
areas are characterized by an autumn or winter max-
imum as opposed to a summer maximum in most
of the country. In the northern part of European
U.S.S.R. the highest monthly rainfall occurs in August,
while in the central areas July receives more. This
rainfall pattern is poorly adapted to the production
of small grains and in some years may be detri-
mental to the tuber harvest.
In the semiarid zones June rains can be beneficial,
but their poor dependability is a problem. A good
harvest of small grains in these lands, when dry-farm-
ing techniques are used, can be expected only once
in 5 or 6 years. Even in the years of seemingly
adequate rainfall, the torrential nature of the pre-
cipitation may greatly decrease its value for crop
production.
Because of lower temperatures and the resultant
decrease in evaporation rates for northern European
U.S.S.R., the relatively low precipitation is generally
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adequate for crop production. In general these regions
suffer more from poor seasonal distribution of pre-
cipitation and poor drainage than from deficiency of
moisture. In the south and southeast, however, light
rainfall is accompanied by high summer temperature,
and moisture deficiency is the limiting factor in crop
production.
2. Land utilization
Of the total 2,227.2 million hectare land area of the
U.S.S.R., arable lands in 1966 comprised only 235.7 mil-
lion hectares of which 206.8 million hectares were sown
to crops in that year, more than 17 million were fallow
in rotation, and 4.7 million were in orchards and
vineyards. The remaining area of approximately 6.9
million hectares was primarily unused agricultural
land (Figure 3).
Natural grasslands in the principal agricultural areas
covered 373.2 million hectares. This includes 324.1
million hectares of land used for pasturing grazing
animals, except reindeer, and 49.1 million hectares
of natural haylands. As a unit these forage lands tend
to be poorly utilized. Reindeer pasture, which includes
358.2 million hectares, is considered separately be-
cause of extremely low utility, mainly due to the high
latitudes in which it is located.
The forest-covered lands comprise 747 million
hectares, or one-third of the total land area. Other
lands-comprising 513.1 million hectares or 23% of
the Soviet landmass-include agriculturally unproduc-
tive sections such as deserts, swamps, and barren
mountains, as well as urban areas, transportation
networks, and small inland waters.
There are considerable variations among regions
in the proportion of arable land to total area. In the
Ukrainian S.S.R., with its large tracts of chernozem
soils, 56.2% of the total area was sown in 1965. Al-
together the European part of the U.S.S.R., which
consists roughly of the area to the west of the Ural
TOTAL LAND AREA
2,227.2 Million Hectare
Mountains, accounted for 68.7% of the total sown
area. Conversely, in Kazakh S.S.R., with its vast
stretches of sparse pasture, barren wastes, and desert
sand, only 11% was seeded, and in East Siberia only
1.8% was seeded.
Although the total land area of the U.S.S.R. is im-
pressive, the reserve of suitable agricultural lands is
small. A relatively rapid expansion of the cultivated
area was achieved during 1954-56 by plowing up
pastures and meadowlands in the more favorably lo-
cated regions and by plowing up grasslands in the
semiarid steppes in the eastern regions under the
New Lands program. This has leveled off in recent
years, and the emphasis has shifted from physical
expansion of cultivated area to intensified use of lands
already producing crops. Irrigation of arid lands in
the south and southeast and drainage of bogs in the
north and northwest continue to contribute to ex-
pansion. Most of the expansion between 1958 and
1963 in the area sown to crops was due to a re-
duction in the amount of land sown to cultivated
grass and legumes and land left in clean fallow. These
lands were sown to more intensive crops such as
corn, peas, beans, and sugar beets. Beginning iii 1964
this trend was reversed, due primarily to recognition
of the value of clean fallow in maintaining the pro-
ductivity of land in areas of low and unstable pre-
cipitation.
3. Farm system
a. SECTORS - Soviet agriculture is divided into
three principal sectors: the state sector, the collec-
tivized sector, and the private sector. Since all land
in the U.S.S.R. is nationally owned, the basic dif-
ferences between these sectors lie in the ownership
of other productive assets, in the formation of capi-
tal, in the means of labor payment, and in the mar-
keting of agricultural production.
In the state sector-which includes state fares
(sovkhozes), the subsidiary farms of nonagricultural
state enterprises, and agricultural research facilities-
all productive assets are nationally owned. By far the
most important source of capital investment in the
state sector is the state budget, supplemented by
smaller funds originating in the retained profits of
the enterprise. An experiment in self-support, begun
in 1967 on a few state farms, is described under B,3,a,
Developments in the Socialized Sector. State farm
workers are paid for completing planned daily work
with little regard to quantity or quality of the end
product. State farms market their products almost
entirely through the government purchasing and dis-
tribution networks and rarely dispose of commodities
on the so-called collective farm market-a free mar-
ket at the retail level. State farms are generally re-
garded in Communist ideology as the highest form
of agricultural enterprise. In 1966, the state sector
(including 12,200 state farms, plus other state enter-
prises) contained about 47% of the total sown area
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100
Private
TOTAL
(Millions of 0 146.3 185.8 203.0 206.8
Hectares)
(Figure 4). In addition to producing a significant
portion of total agricultural output, state farms are
regarded by the regime as models for other agricul-
tural enterprises, such as the collective farms, to emu-
late in adopting advanced production methods. Their
production efficiency, however, generally has been
lower and their overall cost of production higher than
collective farms. Because the state farms function as
part of the state budget, the prices paid by the state
for their agricultural products have been lower than
those paid to the collective farms. Direct subsidies
from the state budget, however, more than compen-
sate for this difference in prices.
The collectivized sector is composed entirely of col-
lective farms (kolkhozes) which in 1966 numbered
37,100 and accounted for 50% of the total sown
area. In these collective farms all productive assets,
except the land, are nominally owned collectively by
the members. These collective productive assets are
commonly referred to as the "indivisible fund." Col-
lective farm investment is financed almost entirely
from retained profits and long-term state loans and
relies only to a small degree upon grants from the
state budget. Traditionally, collective farm workers
have shared as residual claimants in the collective
farm income, net of allocations to the indivisible
fund and other financial obligations, but during the
past several years a system of guaranteed minimum
monthly wages has been introduced in the majority
of collective farms.
Thus, in contrast to state farms, the level of both
investment and wages on the collective farms de-
pends to a major degree upon the level of produc-
tion. Collective farm output, in excess of that pro-
cured by the state and consumed on the farm, is
sold primarily on the collective farm market. Collec-
tive farm market prices, although free of controls,
are influenced by state procurement policies and the
government's control of urban wages and retail prices
charged in state stores.
The individual farmers in the private sector-the
majority of whom also work as collective farm mem-
bers, state farm or other agricultural workers, indus-
trial workers, or in other occupations-own their own
livestock and simple agricultural implements. Private
sector agriculture consists of small plots of land,
either as personal plots adjacent to a family's village
dwelling or other small plots of land assigned to their
personal use from collective farm or other agricultural
lands. The greater proportion of the output of the
private sector, if not used as a resource in further
production, is consumed directly in the family house-
hold. Since the abolition in 1958 of procurement
quotas levied against the personal plots in the pri-
vate sector, the market output has been sold largely
on the collective farm market.
From the earliest days of socialized farming, the
collective farm has been the dominant form of or-
ganization in Soviet agriculture. State farms have
become increasingly important since the death of
Stalin, although the process of converting collective
farms to state farms has slowed substantially in the
past several years. The intensively cultivated private
plots, despite their small size, yield a large share of
the total output of potatoes, vegetables, and fruits.
The proportion of livestock products from the private
sector is also high, but livestock feed is provided
mainly by the socialized sector (see B,3,c, Impor-
tance of the Private Sector).
b. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIALIZED SECTOR -
Developments under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leader-
ship have tended to narrow, or portend the narrow-
ing of, differences between the two major organiza-
tional forms of Soviet socialized agriculture-the col-
lective and the state farms. These developments have
affected the systems of labor payment, capital for-
mation, and marketing of agricultural production.
Guaranteed minimum monthly labor payments to col-
lective farmers were recommended, starting in July
1966. Depending on production results, additional
payments are made at the end of the year. Under
this system, guaranteed minimum labor payments are
a primary claimant on the farm's income. All labor
payments previously had been a residual claimant
on the majority of farms, and the amount of money
and other income available for distribution to farmers
was not determined until the year's results were
known. By the latter part of 1967 the majority of
collective farms reportedly were making guaranteed
monthly payments to their members.
An experiment was initiated in July 1967 to de-
termine the feasibility of operating state farms on
a cost accounting, or self-supporting, basis, instead
of financing them primarily from the state budget.
About 400 state farms, or 3% of the total number in
the country, were placed on the experiment. These
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farms were to reinvest profits and were given more
freedom of choice in the allocation of resources. Com-
modity prices were raised to the level of those paid
to collective farms, to enable more profitable opera-
tions. An incentive fund was established out of profits
in order to relate labor payments to production re-
sults achieved by a farm. A decision subsequently
was made to transfer an additional 400 farms to a
self-supporting basis in the second quarter of 1968.
Some easing of marketing restrictions was granted
to state farms in 1967. Initially, the farms on the ex-
periment were given the right to market freely any
perishable produce refused by the designated state
procurement agency. Subsequently, this right was ex-
tended to all state farms and other state agricultural
enterprises.
Some experimentation with land tenure policies
has occurred in recent years, although there has been
little indication of a reversal to, individual private
holdings (other than the small subsidiary private
plots now held by collective farmers and others).
Most experimentation has involved attempts to opti-
mally relate a work team to a given unit of land for
at least the length of a rotation period so as to create
some feeling of direct responsibility for land manage-
ment and production results and at the same time
maintain work teams of adequate size to use effi-
ciently their assigned, highly-mechanized equipment
parks. For example, in Volgograd Oblast, these so-
called mechanized teams, or "links," typically include
about 10 machine operators and work about 2,000
hectares of land.
C. IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - The
small private garden plots and privately held live-
stock are one of the last remnants of legal private
enterprises in the U.S.S.R. These plots, which have
always been ideologically unpalatable in the Soviet
system, have been tolerated for pragmatic reasons.
The intensively cultivated plots, which occupied only
3% of the total sown area in 1966, and the private
livestock contribute a disproportionately large share
of 'the total amount of many important food items.
The following tabulation indicates the share of the
private sector in the production of selected products,
in percent of the total:
1940
1953
1961
1966
Potatoes .........
65
72
64
64
Vegetables .......
48
48
45
43
Meat ............
72
52
45
42
Milk ............
77
67
46
40
Eggs ............
94
84
78
66
The tendency of private output to decline in relative
importance has been a function of growth of output
in the socialized sector rather than a marked decline
in the output of the private sector. The plots provide
a means for individual Soviet citizens toy provide
themselves with many food items that would not
otherwise be available, and furnish farmers, partic-
ularly collective farmers, with a considerable share
of their money income. Much of the feed consumed
by the privately owned livestock comes from the so-
cialized sector, partly as wages in kind. Privately
owned livestock also are permitted to graze on un-
used state or collective farm land.
The private plots compete with the socialized sec-
tor for the labor time of the farmers, and this com-
petition has been of considerable concern to Soviet
officials. Officials recognize, however, that the exist-
ence of private plots permits a better utilization of
labor resources that otherwise would not be fully em-
ployed'(the aged, adolescents, and women). The at-
titude of the government toward these private plots
prescribes that ultimately as socialized agriculture
becomes more profitable and is able to supply the
entire population with food, the private plots should
decrease in importance and eventually die out.
After Stalin's death the regime adopted a rather
lenient attitude toward the private sector. The re-
sponse to these concessions was an increase in pri-
vate holdings of livestock-increases both in absolute
numbers and as a share of total livestock holdings.
In 1956, however, new legislation was passed aimed
at reducing the size of the plots and the private
livestock holdings, both of collective and state farm
members and urban workers. The drive against the
private sector reached a high point in 1958-60. Sown
area in private plots in 1960 was 7% below the 1959
level and private holdings of cattle and hogs dropped
by 14% and 9%, respectively. In 1963 additional re-
strictions were placed on private livestock holdings,
and the penalties for feeding bread to privately
owned animals were made more severe.
After Khrushchev's ouster in late 1964, one of the
first actions of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership was
to lift "the unfounded limitations" on the private plot
sector. Decrees were issued in several republics di-
recting collective farms and local authorities to ease
restrictions on plot size and private livestock hold-
ings and help the peasants buy livestock and feed.
The desirable scope of the private sector continues
to be an important but controversial point of agri-
cultural policy. During 1967 the Soviet press was un-
usually quiet on the subject of private agricultural
production, but a January 1968 Pravda article re-
affirmed much of the party line established after
Khrushchev's ouster. The article stated
"Subsidiary farming under present conditions supple-
ments the income from the communal economy. Pri-
vate subsidiary farming, within statutory norms, ful-
fills also an important function-it assists the better
utilization of labor resources of all family members
(the aged, adolescents, women) ; it also facilitates
the work of state retail trade in providing the popula-
tion with foodstuffs."
Present Soviet policy thus appears to be to encour-
age maximum private plot output within the current
re-defined limits on private plot size and livestock
holdings. Local party authorities, government offi-
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cials, and collective and state farm managers are not
everywhere in agreement with official policy, how-
ever, and there is considerable evidence that extra-
legal restrictions have been applied to private plot
farming in some regions of the country.
4. Administration and policy
a. ADMINISTRATION OF AGRICULTURE - Major or-
ganizational changes in Soviet agriculture during the
decade following Stalin's death gradually shifted the
administration of agriculture out of the governmental
bureaucracy (the managerial-specialist class) and into
the more politically reliable and responsive Party
channels. On the one hand, the dominance of the
Party in agricultural administration led to a waste
of resources and a stifling of local initiative. The
majority of the Party officials knew little of what
could be accomplished on the farm, and the chief
measure of their success was their ability to meet
unrealistic pledges for the delivery of farm: produce
to the state. In many instances these officials ad-
vanced their careers by meeting pledges at any cost-
by misusing farm resources at their disposal or by
falsifying records and achievements.
On the other hand, a responsive, militant Party
apparatus probably was needed to overcome the in-
ertia of the conservative governmental bureaucracy
in implementing such bold measures as the New
Lands program, which, although wasteful, provided
a vital stimulant to Soviet agriculture. This Party-
dominated system of agricultural administration, how-
ever, was not particularly suited to the needs of some
of the subsequent programs such as the fertilizer and
land reclamation programs which are more compli-
cated and require a higher level of technical and
managerial skills.
The most radical change in agricultural organiza-
tion since the collectivization drive of the 1930's
was the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations
(MTS) in the spring of 1958. Almost from the be-
ginning of collectivization, the MTS had controlled
nearly all the machinery used on the collective farms
and had used this monopoly to control the activities
of the collective farms. Under the reorganization the
MTS were stripped of their power and relegated to
the status of repair and supply depots, and the super-
vision of the kolkhozes passed to agricultural inspec-
torates under the rayon executive committees. In
February 1961 the remaining functions of the old
MTS were gathered into an All-Union Farm Ma-
chinery Association which continues to serve as a
middleman between farms and factories in distribut-
ing agricultural capital goods, operates machinery re-
pair workshops and inspects the use of farm ma-
chinery on farms.
The elimination of the MTS precipitated a reform
in the system of state procurement of agricultural
products. Payment-in-kind by the kolkhozes to the
MTS came to an end. The old custom of paying low
prices for compulsory deliveries and much higher
prices for additional deliveries was replaced by a
single procurement price for both compulsory and
above quota deliveries. These unified ' prices, which
were differentiated regionally for variations in costs
of production, were considerably higher than the for-
mer compulsory delivery prices. Further revisions in
the procurement procedure were made in 1965. At
that time delivery quotas for farm commodities were
fixed in advance for the years 1966 to 1970. These
planned deliveries are paid for by a fixed single
price, still differentiated regionally. Farms are en-
couraged to deliver commodities above the set quota,
in fact the state actually plans the above quota de-
liveries. Above plan deliveries are paid for with
bonuses (a fixed portion of the basic purchase price)
in addition to the basic price, much like the two-
price system abolished with the MTS's.
In 1961 the rayon agricultural inspectorates were
abolished, and the Ministry of Agriculture was re-
duced to a body supervising agricultural research
and education; its 'functions were scattered among
several government organizations leaving no clear de-
lineation of primary administrative responsibility.
This reorganization weakened the position of the gov-
ernmental bureaucracy and enhanced the position of
the Party in agricultural administration. A Party
Plenum in March 1962 endorsed another reorganiza-
tion which clarified responsibility and formalized the
dominant position of the Party in the administration
of agriculture. Territorial production directorates
were set up to administer agricultural production
through direct contact of its agents with farms. A
Communist Party organizer of the republic or oblast
Party Committee, which was installed in each terri-
torial production directorate, became the most pow-
erful figure in the directorate with a position anal-
ogous to that of the former MTS political section
heads, with authority over all local agricultural mat-
ters. Another Party Plenum in November 1962 again
altered arrangements somewhat. The Party commit-
tee in each oblast was replaced by two committees,
one to guide industrial production and the other to
guide agricultural production. A bureau for agricul-
ture and a bureau for industry and construction also
were established in each republic Party committee.
Khrushehev's successors removed the agricultural-
industrial split in the local level Party organizations
in November 1964. Then, early in 1965, V. V. Matske
vitch was reappointed to head a revitalized Ministry
of Agriculture. Although certain key functions, such
as planning, procurement, and agricultural supply,
remained outside the Ministry, the reorganization
strengthened centralized control over state and col-
lective farms. First Secretary Brezhnev, in his speech
at the March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee outlining the regime's new agricultural pro-
gram, commented on the "great deficiencies and mis-
takes in agricultural management in recent years."
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He urged that specialists and farm managers be
given a greater role in agriculture with less outside
interference in day-to-day affairs.
b. MAJOR PROGRAMS, 1953-64 - Numerous meas-
ures have been applied to agriculture, with varying
degrees of success, since the death of Stalin in 1953
in an effort to make it more responsive to the needs
of the growing economy. The New Lands program,
which was largely implemented during 1954-56,
resulted in a one-fourth expansion in the sown acre-
age of the U.S.S.R. and significantly altered land use
patterns. Under this program, about 42 million hec-
tares of virgin and long-fallow land were brought
under cultivation, largely in West Siberia and North
Kazakhstan. The latitude, soils, and climate of much
of the new lands area are somewhat analogous to
those of the prairie provinces of Canada-one of
the greatest wheat-producing areas of the world.
The average annual rainfall in the new lands ranges
from about 9-10 inches on their southern boundary
in Kazakhstan to about 16 inches on their northern
edge in Western Siberia. Because of the extreme an-
nual fluctuations in the amount and distribution of
rainfall, the size of the harvest varies sharply in the
new lands, especially in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless,
the new lands have provided a hedge against na-
tional crop failure because poor crops in the tradi-
tional grain area of the European U.S.S.R. frequently
are offset by good ones in the new lands and vice
versa.
Production of wheat in the new lands relieved the
pressure on the traditional agricultural areas for pro-
duction of food grains and permitted the expansion
of the area planted to corn and other feed crops
as well as some technical crops in the more humid
areas of the European U.S.S.R. In January 1955 Khru-
shchev proposed to increase the area planted to corn
from 4.3 million hectares in 1954 to at least 28 mil-
lion hectares in 1960. The program was rapidly im-
plemented, and by 1962 the acreage of corn reached
a peak of 37 million hectares (including corn for
grain, silage, and green feed). Much of this expan-
sion took place in areas where corn had never been
grown and where it was impossible for commonly
grown types of corn to mature as grain. Khrushchev
therefore emphasized production of corn silage and
green feed as well as corn for grain. Because of the
inexperience of Soviet farmers in growing corn, the
lack of locally adapted hybrids, equipment shortages,
and variable weather, the size of the corn crop fluc-
tuated greatly from year to year-from a low of less
than 5 million tons of mature: grain in 1957 to a high
of 17 million tons in 1961. In spite of these sharp
fluctuations in the size of the crop, the corn program
contributed considerably to the feed supply and to
increases in the output of livestock products. In the
fall of 1961, when the push for corn was near its
peak, Khrushchev introduced a "plow-up" program
calling for a drastic reduction of the acreage under
grasses and oats and virtual elimination of clean fal-
lowing2 in order to increase the acreage planted to
cultivated crops such as corn, peas, field beans and
sugar beets. In 1961, 64 million hectares, or almost
30% of the cultivated area, was in sown grass, clean
fallow and oats, but in 1963 this area dropped by 22
million hectares. After Khrushchev's removal from
office his successors repudiated this program. In the
March 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee sev-
eral speakers condemned the plow-up program as
damaging and disrupting to livestock raising because
fodder supplies were depleted both by the reduction
in perennial grasses and by lower crop yields result-
ing from disruption of crop rotations. Corn also has
now lost its special status as queen of the fields
with efforts being made to establish it in its proper
role where conditions are most suitable for its growth.
In the last year or two of his leadership, Khrush-
chev began to push hard on several sound, but ex-
pensive, remedial programs for agriculture. In 1963
he laid out a very ambitious chemical fertilizer pro-
gram calling for production to reach 70 to 80 million
tons (standard units) in 1970. (Production in 1963
was 19.9 million tons.) In February 1964 plans were
also announced calling for an addition of 5.8 mil-
lion hectares of irrigated land in 1964-70. Khrush-
chev's successors have continued to place strong em-
phasis on the role of chemical fertilizers and land re-
clamatioon, although the goals have been scaled down.
c. THE BREZHNEV PROGRAM - At the party
Plenum in March 1965, Brezhnev announced a new
program of economic and administrative measures
designed to overcome the stagnation of agriculture
since 1958 which was adversely affecting the growth
of the economy as a whole. These measures fall into
three main categories: 1) an increase in investment;
2) improvement of agricultural management; and
3) improvement of rural incomes and living stand-
ards. The Brezhnev program was subsequently trans-
lated into more specific goals at the 23rd Party Con-
gress in 1966, when the targets for the Five Year
Plan, 1966-70, were announced. Emphasis was placed
on the intensification of agriculture. Productivity per
hectare is to be raised by greatly increased use of
mineral fertilizer and pesticides, expansion of irri-
gated and drained land, increased mechanization,
and improved seed and agrotechniques. Productivity
in animal husbandry is to be increased through im-
provement in the supply and quality of livestock
feed and also by feeding synthesized protein (urea),
vitamins, and growth stimulants.
The average annual rate of growth in net agri-
cultural production in 1966-67 was almost one-fourth
larger than the average growth rate in 1961-65. The
increase came about as a result of more favorable
Z Land under clean fallowing is not planted and is cultivated
only as needed to prevent weeds growing. The practice also
permits accumulation of moisture in the soil.
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weather, greater supplies of fertilizer and other in-
puts, and improved financial incentives. The relative
successes attained in agriculture during 1966-67,
which coincided with increased demands for defense
expenditures, have led to a cutback in the original
agricultural investment program, however, with the
result that the agricultural sector has been somewhat
downgraded as a priority recipient in the allocation
of resources. Although the proponents of continuing
a high priority for agricultural investment appears
to have suffered a setback, the issue remains a sub-
ject of disagreement and discussion at the highest
level of political authority.
Increased supplies of mineral fertilizer are play-
ing a key role in raising Soviet crop yields. Plans
call for the delivery of 55 million tons of fertilizer
(standard units) 3 to the agricultural sector in 1970
or twice as much as in 1965, although some 10%-15%
underfulfillment of this goal is likely. Nonetheless,
average annual deliveries of fertilizer to agriculture
in 1966-67 increased more than three-fourths over
the average annual deliveries in 1961-65. Increased
applications of lime have supplemented the increased
use of mineral fertilizer.
Production of mineral fertilizer has been as follows
(in thousands of metric tons):
UNITS
CONTENT
1963
..................
19,935
4,647
1964
..................
25,562
6,009
1965
..................
31,253
7,389
1966
..................
35,800
8,400
1967
..................
40,100
9,400
Land reclamation-irrigation in areas of inade-
quate precipitation and drainage of waterlogged lands
in areas Of stable precipitation-also is scheduled to
play an important role in the intensification of agri-
culture. Brezhnev's two-pronged program for land
reclamation represents a more balanced approach to
the problem than Khrushchev's efforts, which were
overly concentrated on irrigation. Current emphasis
on the drainage and development of lands in the
areas of stable precipitation, primarily in the non-
black soil zone, is obvious recognition of the large
potential for increasing agricultural production from
these lands. The 1966 Five Year Plan called for the
addition of about 9 million hectares of reclaimed land
by 1970 (2.5-3.0 million hectares of irrigated land 4
and 6.0-6.5 million hectares of drained land), but in
October 1967 this goal apparently was cut by some
20%-25%. Based on progress through 1967, however,
it seems unlikely that even this reduced goal will
be met.
9In converting mineral fertilizers from nutrient content to
standard units, the U.S.S.R. uses the following factors: nitrogen
20% N; potassium, 41.6% K,O; phosphorous, 18.7% P,O6; and
phosphorite meal, 19% P205-
'Irrigated land in crops 1965 estimated at about 9 million
hectares.
Measures were initiated, starting in 1965, to in-
crease the earnings of farms and of fannworkers, es-
pecially collective farmers. This has resulted, as was
expected, in some improvement in overall farm man-
agement as well as in better economic incentives for
individual agricultural workers. Prices on obligatory
sales of grains and livestock products to the state
were increased, substantial premiums for above-
obligatory sales of grain and several other commodities
were brought into play, while firm and specific plans
were established for several years in advance. Along
with this, income taxes as well as prices on machin-
ery and electricity purchased by farms were low-
ered. At the same time, debts of weak farms were
canceled, and some additional land improvement
costs were assumed by the state.
Although much of the increased farm income was
channeled into investment, some of the increase was
used to augment the incomes of individual farm
workers. Labor payments to collective farmers report-
edly increased by 16% in 1966 and by an additional
6% in 1967. As one important recent innovation, guar-
anteed minimum monthly payments to collective
farmers are being introduced on a current basis, al-
though their total income from communal farming still
depends on the farm's aggregate output. Old-age pen-
sions were established for collective farmers in mid-
1964. More recently some retail price discrimination
in rural areas was eliminated.
5. Production and supply
a. MAJOR CROPS - The U.S.S.R. grows most
crops common to the temperate zone, but grains
dominate the crop pattern and accounted for 59~%
of the total sown area in 1967. Fodder crops ac-
counted for 29% of the 1967 total sown area, indus-
trial crops for 7%, and potatoes and other vegetables
for 5% (Figure 5).
The sown acreage statistics (Figure 6) include:
a) acreages sown to winter crops in the fall for
harvest in the subsequent summer, minus the acre-
age which is found in the spring to have been winter-
killed; and b) acreages sown or resown in the spring
or early summer. Abandonment of acreages after
spring sowing is not reported in Soviet statistics (as
in the United States), and, therefore, is not reflected
in the acreage figures used here. As a result, sown
acreage and harvested acreage are used interchange-
ably. The total sown acreage for each particular year
also includes the acreage under perennial crops, such
as clover and alfalfa, which are harvested in the cur-
rent year, but planted in previous years.
The reliability or accuracy of Soviet agricultural
statistics, particularly since 1958, is open to serious
question. At the January 1961 Party Plenum and dur-
ing the succeeding months much publicity was given
to widespread statistical falsification or irregularities
at the lower administrative levels, including some of
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146.3
14.2 ~.',Zra
%
F j2. k 6.5%
8.3%
28.9 28.8 FODDER CROPS
% %
Goa
6.8%
land devoted to clean fallow has increased, and em-
phasis has shifted to obtaining higher yields per hec-
tare of sown lands.
Between 1950 and 1963, the sown area increased
by almost 50%. Most of this increase was in grain
crops and forage crops area, which increased by
about 25% and 200% respectively; the area sown to
industrial crops increased only slightly during this pe-
riod, and the area of potatoes and other vegetables
did not change. Since 1963 only relatively minor shifts
have occurred in the general cropping pattern.
The production of grains and pulses, which occupy
about three-fifths of the sown area, varies consid-
erably from year to year, largely as a result of weather
(Figure 7). Wheat and rye, the principal food grains
(bread grains), accounted for 65% of the area in
grain crops and pulses in 1967 as compared with
60.4% in 1950. Of the principal feed grains, barley
occupied 15.6% of the acreage sown to all grain and
pulses in 1967; corn harvested as mature grain oc-
cupied 2.9%; oats 7.1%; and pulses 4.5%.
In 1966, grain production in the U.S.S.R. was esti-
mated at approximately 140 million metric tons, from
a sown area of about 125 million hectares. (The So-
viet claim for this record harvest was 171.2 million
metric tons.) The previous record grain crop was an
estimated 120 million metric tons (Soviet claim of
152.1 million metric tons) in 1964 from a slightly
larger area of 133 million hectares.
Very little information is published on the utiliza-
tion of grain in the Soviet Union. No data on carry-
over or stocks are available. Because of the rig-
orous system of government procurement of agricul-
tural products, stocks are held predominately by
the central government. Grain, especially, has been
stockpiled, but statistics on stocks are closely guarded
secrets. A period of relative stagnation in grain pro-
duction after the bumper 1958 harvest, culminating
in the very poor crop in 1963, probably forced a se-
rious depletion of grain reserves. The severe drought
in 1963 and again in 1965 necessitated the importa-
tion of about $1.5 billion worth of grain. Good
grain crops in 1966 and 1967, however, probably per-
mitted substantial replenishment of the grain re-
serves.
POTATOES AND
OTHER VEGETABLES
7.1% INDUSTRIAL
__.~ CROPS
GRAIN
(Including
pulses)
FIGURE 6. SOWN AREA, BY CROP CLASSES
(Million hectares)
1
1950 1
1960 1
1963 1
1967
Grain (including pulses) .... 102.9 115.6
130.0
122.2
Industrial crops............ 12.2 13.1
14.9
14.8
Potatoes and other vegeta-
bles ....................
10.5
11.2
10.5
10.3
Fodder crops ..............
20.7
63.1
63.1
59.6
the republic levels. In general, acreage and livestock
herd data are considered to be more accurate than
yield and production data for crops and livestock.
For example, Soviet grain production figures are given
on a bunker weight basis (i.e. as the grain comes
from the combine) and hence include trash, imma-
ture grain, excess moisture, etc. During the past 8
years official grain figures have been discounted by
Western specialists on Soviet agriculture by
15%-25%.
The total sown area in the U.S.S.R. began to re-
cover immediately after World War II and in 1951
exceeded the previous peak (1940) of 151 million
hectares. Expansion of sown area continued in the
1950's and was particularly rapid during the height
of the new lands program in 1954-56 and during the
campaign to plow up grasslands in the early 1960's.
After 1963, when the sown area reached a record
level of 218.5 million hectares, there was a gradual
decline to 206.9 million hectares in 1967.
The expansion of sown area between 1950 and
1963 occurred partly as a result of the plowing up of
natural meadows and the so-called long-fallow and
idle lands and partly because the amount of area
tilled as clean fallow was reduced. Since 1963, the
tilled land area has stabilized, the amount of tilled
FIGURE 7. GRAINS AND PULSES: SOWN AREA
AND PRODUCTION
SOWN AREA I
YIELD
HECTARE
PROD
UCTION
Million M
illion
hectares Quintals metr
ic tons
1950
..............
102.9
7.9
81
1955
..............
123.5
8.4
104
1960
..............
115.6
8.0
93
1963
..............
130.0
6.2
92
1964
..............
133.3
8.5
120
1965
..............
128.0
7.8
100
1966
..............
124.8
11.2
140
1967
..............
122.2
9.9
122
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SOWN AREA
YIELD PER
HECTARE
ESTI
PROD
MATED
UCTION
Million M
illion
hectares Quintals metr
ic tons
1950
..............
38.5
8.1
31
1955
..............
60.5
7.8
47
1960
..............
60.4
7.6
46
1963
..............
64.6
7.1
40
1964
..............
67.9
6.2
58
1965
..............
70.2
6.8
48
1966
..............
70.0
11.7
82
1967
..............
67.0
9.4
63
(1) Wheat - The leading crop in the
U.S.S.R., wheat accounted for 32.4% of the total
sown area in 1967 as compared with 26.3% in 1950.
Production data are given in Figure 8. Although
wheat acreages are scattered through the European
U.S.S.R., they tend to be concentrated in the fertile
black soils, extending in a belt from the Moldavian
S.S.R. in an easterly direction to the Ural mountains
and eastward through the southern oblasts of West-
ern Siberia and the northern oblasts of Kazakh S.S.R.
(Figure 52). There are also small pockets of pro-
duction in Central Asia, the southern portions of
Eastern Siberia and the Far East.
In the U.S.S.R., as in the United States, both win-
ter wheat and spring wheat are grown. In the United
States, winter wheat predominates at about 79%,
while in the U.S.S.R., spring wheat is the more im-
portant, accounting for 71% of wheat acreage in
1967. Winter wheat is concentrated mainly' in the
southern areas of the European U.S.S.R., where the
climate is sufficiently mild for its development and
where it returns higher yields than spring wheat. The
average yield of winter wheat in the U.S.S.R. is al-
most double the yield of spring wheat. Spring wheat
is grown principally in the Volga region, the Urals
region, the southern oblasts of Western Siberia, and
the northern ablasts of Kazakh S.S.R., as well as in
Eastern Siberia. Most of these regions are typically
semiarid,. and spring wheat frequently suffers from
drought.
Wheat acreage, particularly that of spring wheat,
increased sharply during the mid-fifties. Most of this
increase was brought about by bringing under culti-
vation virgin and fallow land east of the Volga, mainly
in Western Siberia and Kazakh S.S.R. Because of un-
favorable soil and climatic conditions much of the
new lands area may generally be expected to pro-
duce relatively low and variable yields. However,
poor spring wheat crops east of the Volga frequently
have been accompanied by good winter wheat crops
in the European U.S.S.R. and vice versa, thus pro-
viding some hedge against national crop failure.
Yields of spring wheat, especially in the new lands
area, are restricted primarily by the weather but
also by the depletion of initial soil fertility in the
virgin lands, and serious weed infestation caused by
poor tillage practices and continuous cropping of
wheat. Some progress is being made in overcoming
these problems by increased use of such practices
as clean fallowing, stubble mulch tillage methods,
better varieties, and increased use of agricultural
chemicals.
(2) Rye - Rye, along with wheat is impor-
tant as a breadgrain, particularly for the inhabitants
of the European U.S.S.R., where most of the rye
acreage is located. It now follows barley as the third
ranking grain in area sown. Rye is generally a winter
crop, seeded in the fall and harvested the following
summer. Although it is sensitive to excessive heat
and is not grown too, far south, it withstands drought
better than spring-sown grains and is a valuable in-
surance crop in such semiarid regions as the Middle
and Lower Volga. Also, weeds are easier to control
when rye is grown, a highly important factor in the
U.S.S.R., where weeds have been a serious problem.
The distribution of rye acreage and production data
are given in Figures 53 and 30, respectively.
Rye predominates over wheat in the whole north-
ern and central European U.S.S.R., as well as in the
Baltic republics and the former Polish territory, but
its acreage is exceeded by that of wheat in the south-
ern and eastern regions. Just as wheat is the typical
grain in the black (chernozem) soil zone, rye is the
leading grain in the nonblack soil zones to the north
for which it is better adapted. During the last 18
years, however, rye acreage has declined while that
of wheat has increased. Rye is more resistant to low
winter temperatures than any other cereal. The
yields of winter wheat, however, are generally higher
than rye yields in areas where both crops can be
grown successfully. The 1967 acreage of rye was
only 52% of the 23.7 million hectares sown to that
crop in 1950 (Figure 30). Rye production has also
been declining since 1950 although not quite as much
as acreage. Production of rye in 1966 and 1967 was
11 million tons, or about 60% of the 1950 level. The
acreage and production of rye may decline further
as new wheat varieties with improved winter-hardi-
ness become available and as consumption of wheat
bread increases at the expense of rye. In some areas,
however, rye may be used more extensively as a feed
for livestock, as is the practice in some Western Eu-
ropean countries.
(3) Barley - Barley became a more impor-
tant crop than rye in terms of production in 1962
and in acreage in 1963. By 1967 the area of barley
exceeded that of rye by 54%; in 1950 the barley area
was only 36% of the rye area. The acreage sown to
barley increased rapidly from 1961 to 1964 as a re-
sult of the campaign to shift acreage from low yield-
ing sown grasses and oats to higher yielding crops.
Barley acreage declined from the 21.7 million hec-
tares 1964 peak to 19.1 million hectares in 1967 in
line with the overall decrease in the total grain area
(Figure 31). Although grown mostly in the south of
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the European U.S.S.R. and predominately a spring
sown crop, barley's adaptability permits it to be
grown from the Black Sea littoral to the far north
(Figure 54).
Barley is primarily a feed grain, and a valuable
one because of the high protein content that char-
acterizes most of the varieties. In some of the north-
ern districts, however, it is used extensively as a
source of kasha (grits or porridge), and in the north
and northwest, as barley flour to be mixed, some-
times, with rye and oats for breadmaking. Barley
is also used industrially, chiefly as a source of malt
for distilleries and in beermaking. The variety grown
in the western districts of the Ukraine, former Polish
territory, and the Baltic Republics is best suited for
these uses. The expansion in barley acreage was ac-
companied by an increase in output. Increased use
of fertilizer and use of improved varieties of seed
have contributed to greater barley yields.
(4) Corn - The total acreage devoted to corn
in 1967 was 23.1 million hectares or about 11% of
the total sown area. Of this total, 3.5 million hectares
produced fully mature corn for grain. From the re-
mainder, corn was harvested in various stages of im-
maturity for silage and green feed. Although corn is
a staple in the diet of the people of Moldavia and
parts of the Caucasus, it is primarily a feed grain.
The heaviest concentration of acreage is in the
Ukraine (Figure 55).
Corn acreage began to expand in 1955 under
Khrushchev's influence and reached a peak in 1962.
Much of this expansion took place in regions where
soil and climatic conditions were not best suited to
corngrowing. However, there is no major area in the
U.S.S.R. where conditions for growing corn are equiv-
alent to those of Illinois and Iowa in the United
States corn belt. Under Khrushchev's successors, corn
acreage has shown a gradual decreasing trend, stabi-
lizing at about 3 million hectares of corn for grain
and 20 million hectares for silage and green feed.
The overemphasis on corn during the Khrushchev
era led to a practice of reporting the mature grain
equivalent of corn harvested for silage at the so-
called "milk-wax" stage of maturity, a practice which
was discontinued by Khrushchev's successors. Produc-
tion of mature corn grain since 1950 has varied with
acreage, but yields are now higher (Figure 32). Pro-
duction in 1966-67 averaged 7.5 million tons, com-
pared with a peak production of 14 million tons in
1961. Yields of corn exceed those of other grains,
partly because of the more favorable locations in
which it is grown and the relatively high levels of
fertilizer applied to the crop.
(5) Miscellaneous grains - Among the other
grains grown in the U.S.S.R., pulses furnish additional
protein both for the diets of humans and the rations
of livestock. Oats have decreased sharply in impor-
tance, but millet and buckwheat remain as signifi-
cant sources of porridge kasha. Rice is of local but
increasing importance under present plans to meet
rice needs through indigenous production. In the 8-
year period 1960-67, the total acreage of grains in
the miscellaneous category averaged 21.5 million hec-
tares, or about one-sixth of the total grain acreage.
On the other hand, the production of these grains
represented about one-seventh of total grain produc-
tion or an average of 15.5 million tons annually. The
acreage and production of miscellaneous grains in
1967 were about 20 million hectares and 20 million
tons, respectively (Figure 33).
(a) PULSES - Pulses, such as beans, peas,
and lentils, are included in Soviet statistics with
grain crops. These crops provide a valuable food and
feed source rich in protein. Acreage devoted to these
crops reached a high of 10.8 million hectares in 1963,
but had diminished to 5.5 million hectares by 1967.
(b) OATS - The importance of oats has been
decreasing. This spring sown crop is used predom-
inately as a feed grain and is widely distributed over
the U.S.S.R., except in the more southern and drier
regions, where it is replaced by the more drought-
resistant barley.
Oats acreage descreased sharply in 1962 after hav-
ing declined gradually over the past several decades
as horse numbers decreased. As a result of the clas-
sification of oats as a low-yielding crop in the cam-
paign to shift land into more productive crops, the
average of 7.5 million hectares sown to this crop in
1965-67 was about one-half of the average of 14.9
million hectares sown in 1954-58.
(C) MILLET AND BUCKWHEAT - Millet is
drought-resistant and an excellent insurance crop in
the semiarid zone. Buckwheat, which has modest
soil requirements and a short period of vegetation
but is sensitive to drought, can be cultivated far
north. The annual average sown area of these two
crops in 1963-67 was 5.3 million hectares, with mil-
let occupying about two-thirds of the total. The acre-
age devoted to these crops has remained compar-
atively constant in recent years.
(d) RICE - Normally, the U.S.S.R. supple-
ments its production of rice, which is a crop of only
local importance, with imports. At the March 1965
plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev reported
that in the previous 5-year period the U.S.S.R. had
imported 1.5 million metric tons of rice, "for which
we had to pay a great deal of money." He recom-
mended that measures be taken to ensure that by
1970 domestic rice production would fully satisfy re-
quirements. Rice is grown principally in the irrigated
regions of Central Asia and Transcaucasus, where it
is an important item in the diet. The total acreage
under rice in the U.S.S.R. declined in the late 1950's
from 148,000 hectares in 1956 to 95,000 hectares in
1960. Acreage subsequently increased gradually to
276,000 hectares in 1967 and additional rice produc-
ing areas are being prepared. Production of rice has
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increased from 190,000 tons in 1960 to 890,000 tons
in 1967, attributable to more intensive production
techniques as well as the larger area.
(6) Potatoes and other vegetables - Next
to wheat and rye, potatoes constitute the most im-
portant food crop in the U.S.S.R. This crop is more
important in the western and central regions of the
European U.S.S.R. than in the east and south or in the
Asiatic U.S.S.R. (Figure 56). In Belorussia about one-
sixth of the sown acreage was devoted to potatoes in
1965, with the proportion being slightly more than
one-tenth in the southwestern region of the Ukraine,
the central and northwestern regions of the R.S.F.S.R.
and the Baltic Republics.
The acreage of potatoes has declined almost stead-
ily during the past decade, from 9.8 million hectares
in 1957 to 8.3 million hectares in 1967. A postwar
record crop of 96 million tons was harvested in 1956
and the smallest crop in more than a decade, only
about 69 million metric tons, was produced in 1962.
Following poor crops in 1962 and 1963, four succes-
sively good crops were produced in 1964-67 (Figure
9).
The acreage planted to other vegetables has re-
mained relatively stable at about 1.4 million hectares
in recent years (Figure 34). Production during
1960-67 averaged 17.4 million tons annually and
reached a record level of 19.8 million tons of 1967,
more than double the 1950 production. Cabbage, cu-
cumbers, and tomatoes account for about three-fourths
of production, with onions, beets, and carrots ac-
counting for most of the remainder.
(7) Sugar beets - Sugar beets constitute
practically the only domestic source of sugar. The
Soviet Union is the leading producer of sugar beets,
producing about 35%-40% of the world output and
3 to 4 times as much as the United States, the second
largest producer. The principal area of production
encompasses the western and the north-central prov-
inces of the Ukraine and the adjoining black soil
areas of the R.S.F.S.R., which accounts for about 80%
of total production. Another area of increasing impor-
tance in production (over 8%) is located in the
North Caucasus region just east of the Sea of Azov.
FIGURE 9. POTATOES: SOWN AREA AND
PRODUCTION
SOW
N AREA
YIELD PER
HECTARE
ES
PRO
TIMATED
DUCTION
M
illion M
illion
he
ctares Quintals me
tric tons
1950
..............
8.6
104
88.6
1955
..............
9.1
79
71.8
1960
..............
9.1
92
84.4
1963
..............
8.5
84
71.8
1964
..............
8.5
110
93.6
1965
..............
8.6
103
88.7
1966
..............
8.4
105
87.9
1967
..............
8.3
114
95.0
FIGURE 10. SUGAR BEETS:* SOWN AREA
AND PRODUCTION
SOWN AREA I YIELD PER I PRODUCTION
HECTARE
Million Million
hectares Quintals metric tons
1950 .............. 1.31 159 20.8
1955 .............. 1.76 176 31.0
1960 .............. 3.04 191 57.7
1963 .............. 3.75 120 44.1
1964 .............. 4.11 199 81.2
1965 .............. 3.88 188 72.3
1966 .............. 3.80 195 74.0
1967 .............. 3.80 229 86.8
*Not including sugar beets sown for and used as livestock
feed.
The distribution, sown area, and production of sugar
beets are given in Figures 57 and 10.
The acreage of sugar beets for processing into
sugar, which had been steadily increasing, reached
a peak of 4.11 million hectares in 1964. In 1967, a total
of 3.8 million hectares of sugar beets were planted
for processing into sugar, an area almost triple the
acreage planted in 1950. The production of sugar
beets also has increased, due both to expansion of
acreage and increased yields. An annual average of
79 million tons of sugar beets for processing into
sugar was produced in the period 1964-67 compared
with 50 million tons average during 1960-63. The out-
put of cane sugar in Cuba and the stability of raw
sugar exports to the U.S.S.R. will likely be a factor
in Soviet decisionmaking with regard to sugar beet
acreage, but the Soviets do not need Cuban sugar to
meet their own domestic needs. Sugar beets have
been a heavily fertilized crop in the Soviet Union,
but some increase in average yields may be pos-
sible. A record yield of 229 quintals per hectare was
achieved in 1967, compared with the previous rec-
ord level of 218 quintals per hectare in 1958. The
Soviets consider the sugar content of their beets to be
unnecessarily low because of delays in processing the
harvested beets and because payment to the agricul-
tural enterprises is on the basis of gross weight of
the beets without consideration of the sugar content
of the beets.
In 1959 the U.S.S.R. began to grow sugar beets
instead of feed beets as livestock feed, presumably
as a hedge against a shortfall in production of sugar
beets for processing. Production of these beets
reached 24.4 million tons in 1962, but since that year
official reporting on this category of beets has been
discontinued.
(8) Sunflower seed - Oil from sunflower seed
is the basic edible vegetable oil in the U.S.S.R., ac-
counting for 73% of the vegetable oil produced
in the state industrial enterprises in 1967. In addi-
tion to their use as a source of vegetable oil, roasted
sunflower seeds are eaten like peanuts and constitute
a popular delicacy in the Soviet Union. The main
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areas of sunflower production are in the southern
half of the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and into
the Volga region (Figure 58). Hardy and drought
resistant, the sunflower plant is well suited to the
climate, especially that of the southern regions of Eu-
ropean U.S.S.R.
The acreage planted to sunflowers trended upward
during the period 1960-67, from 3.9 million hectares
in 1959 to a record high of 5.0 million hectares in
1966. Production of sunflower seeds was at a record
level of 6.0'6 million tons in 1967 (Figure 11). Yields
of sunflower seeds averaged 10.5 quintals per hec-
tare during the period 1960-67, compared with 7.8
quintals per hectare in the prior 8-year period. This
increase in yields is attributable largely to the de-
velopment of new varieties which also have a higher
oil content. Monetary premiums are paid on high-oil
varieties. During the 10-year period 1955-64, the aver-
age growth in oil content was 0.95% per year; dur-
ing 1960-64 increase in oil content averaged 1.05%
annually. The oil content of seeds received for proc-
essing in 1966 averaged 44%, as compared to 28.5%
in 1940.
(9) Cotton - Cotton is the leading fiber crop
and is also the principal irrigated crop. The Soviet
Central Asian republics, southern Kazakh S.S.R., and
the eastern part of the Transcaucasus are the prin-
cipal cotton growing regions (Figure 58). Uzbekis-
tan accounts for about two-thirds of annual Soviet
cotton production of almost 6 million tons. The
United States is the only country in the world that
produces more cotton than the U.S.S.R., although the
United States suppresses expansion of cotton acre-
age while the Soviets are striving to boost cotton
output. For many years Soviet cotton has been a
priority recipient of the limited supply of fertilizer.
Cottonseed is a valuable source of vegetable oil, con-
tributing about 19% of vegetable oil production. The
U.S.S.R. imports cotton from Egypt and other coun-
tries in the Middle East but is a net exporter of cot-
ton, most of which goes to the European satellites.
Some of the cotton shipped to the satellites is in ex-
change for finished goods manufactured from Soviet
cotton. Cotton production data reported by the So-
viet Union are raw, or unginned, cotton. The figures
FIGURE 11. SUNFLOWER SEED: SOWN AREA
AND PRODUCTION
SOWN AREA I
YIELD
HE TARE
PRO
DUCTION
Million M
illion
hectares Quintals me
tric tons
1950
..............
3.59
5.0
1.80
1955
..............
4.24
9.0
3.80
1960
..............
4.19
8.7
3.65
1963
..............
4.39
8.9
3.94
1964
..............
4.61
12.1
5.58
1965
..............
4.87
10.3
5.01
1966
..............
5.00
11.3
5.65
1967
..............
4.77
12.7
6.06
include approximately two-thirds cottonseed, linters,
and foreign matter, and one-third lint cotton
(ginned), which is the raw material of the textile
industry.
The acreage planted to cotton has been holding
rather steady since 1963, with slight yearly fluctua-
tions, but averaging slightly less than 2.5 million hec-
tares during 1963-67 (Figure 35). Cotton acreage
averaged 2.78 million hectares in 1951-52, when ir-
rigation facilities were less developed, but declined
sharply in 1953 when an attempt to grow nonirri-
gated cotton, primarily in the southern Ukraine and
North Caucasus, was discontinued.
(10) Flax - The U.S.S.R. is the world's larg-
est producer of flax fiber, producing an average of
60% of world output in the period 1961-65. Relative
importance in the production of linseed, however, is
much less, an average of 13% of world production
during 1961-65. The stalk of the flax plant furnishes
fiber for linen fabrics, and the seed furnishes linseed
oil, which is used as a drying oil or, after refining,
as an edible oil or for making margarine. The oilcake
is a valuable feed concentrate, especially for rumi-
nants.
Different varieties of flax are planted in various
regions of the U.S.S.R., depending on whether it is
grown primarily for fiber or for seed. Varieties grown
for fiber do not yield much seed. Fiber varieties re-
quire a humid climate with moderate summer tem-
perature, while the oilseed types grow better in a
warmer and drier climate. Fiber flax is grown chiefly
in the western and northern regions of the European
U.S.S.R. (Figure 58). Fiber varieties also pre-
dominate in the Urals and West Siberian regions.
The Lower Volga and the southern regions of the
European U.S.S.R. lead in seed flax acreage.
Flax fiber production levels in 1965-67 were well
above previous years, but acreages sown have been
decreasing gradually (Figure 36). The latter trend
has been attributed to a decline of population in flax
growing regions and a need for more advanced mech-
anization which has been intensified by a shortage
of the machines that have been developed. During
1966-67, an average of 1.4 million hectares were sown
to fiber flax, while flax sown primarily for seed has
occupied only about one-fifth to one-fourth as large
an area. Production of fiber flax was 460,000 tons in
both 1966 and 1967. Linseed production including
seed output of fiber varieties amounted to approx-
imately 250,000 tons in 1966.
(11) Miscellaneous crops - Numerous other
crops are grown in the U.S.S.R. Hemp is the third-
ranking fiber crop, following cotton and flax. The fiber
is used in making rope and durable cloth such as
canvas, bagging, and sailcloth. Acreage devoted to
hemp has shown a continuing downward trend in
recent years. Sown area in 1965 was only about 77%
of that sown in 1960. The principal hemp growing
areas are the central black soil zone and the Ukraine.
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Two kinds of tobacco are grown. In recent years
approximately 141,000 hectares have been planted to
so-called yellow tobacco, which is predominately a
cigarette leaf of the oriental type. The acreage de-
voted to makhorka, a low-grade, coarse, strong to-
bacco high in nicotine content, which declined
rapidly in the late fifties to only 50,000 hectares in
1959, had declined to 22,600 hectares by 1966.
Several types of oil-bearing plants, such as soy-
beans, castor beans, sesame seed, peanuts, and perilla
were introduced into the U.S.S.R. between World
War I and World War II. Of these, only soybeans
remain significant, having occupied 855,000 hectares
in 1966. Mustard, an oil-bearing and spice crop that
long has been grown in the U.S.S.R., was grown on
261,000 hectares in 1966. The principal oilseed,
sunflower, is discussed separately.
Forage-type crops grown specifically for livestock
feed occupied 59.6 million hectares, or 28.8% of the
total sown area, in 1967. The area of these crops
showed a steady increase from 20.7 million hectares
in 1950 to a record 63.1 million hectares in 1960
and again in 1963. Corn planted for harvest as silage
or green feed occupied about 20 million hectares in
1967. This use of corn began in the U.S.S.R. in 1955
and reached a peak area of 30 million hectares in
1962, after which it began to decline. A number of
other annual crops are grown for forage. The so-
called annual grasses, including such crops as Sudan
grass and millet and also cereal crops used as forage,
occupied about 19 million hectares in 1967, which
is about the same area as in 1960 but almost double
the 1955 level. Perennial grasses and legumes cut
for hay occupied 16.5 million hectares in 1967. The
area devoted to these crops since 1950 has ranged
between 11.2 million hectares in 1950 and 19.4 mil-
lion hectares in 1961. Feed roots and feed melons
together, including sugar beets grown for feed, oc-
cupied 1.7 million hectares in 1967, having declined
from the peak level of 3.3 million hectares in 1962.
Silage crops other than corn were grown on about
3 million hectares. These feed crops supplement the
forage produced on natural meadows and pastures.
Other roughage feeds include straw residues from
grain crops and sugar beet tops.
b. LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS - Live-
stock production contributes about one-half of the
value of net agricultural production in the U.S.S.R.
The value of annual livestock production in 1966-67
was about twice the 1950 level. Livestock products
have been a principal source of the postwar improve-
ment in the quality of the Soviet diet. Increased out-
put of livestock products is directly reflected in food
consumption patterns since Soviet foreign trade in
livestock products is relatively minor.
(1) Number and distribution of livestock -
Fluctuations in feed supplies and agricultural policy
have had varying effects on numbers in the different
categories of livestock. (Figures 37 and 12). Geo-
graphical distribution of cattle, swine, and sheep
and goats are shown in Figures 59 thru 61. Owner-
ship of livestock by type of farm enterprise is shown
in Figure 13.
Despite attempts by the government to rebuild
herds depleted as a consequence of collectivization
and huge wartime losses, livestock numbers in 1953,
except hogs, were significantly below the precollec-
tivization level of January 1928. Measures taken after
1953 resulted in a rapid increase in stock, and by
1958 herds equaled or exceeded the 1928 level, ex-
cept for cows, which reached the 1928 level in the
following year. (Horses are discussed separately.) A
relatively steady and rapid growth of livestock num-
bers after 1958 was interrupted by a severe down-
turn in feed supplies as a result of widespread
drought in 1963. All livestock numbers, except cows,
declined in 1963, but the 42% drop in hog numbers
was by far the most severe. A relatively poor crop
year again in 1965 moderated the expansion of live-
stock numbers after the 1963 decline, and institu-
tional factors caused sheep and goat numbers to de-
cline further. More recently, following good crop pro-
duction in 1966 and 1967, increases in livestock num-
bers appear to have been purposely restricted in line
with a policy of stressing more rapid growth and
heavier slaughter weights of animals as a means of
expanding output of livestock products.
In the opinion of Western observers, the buildup
of herds after 1958 had proceeded without due re-
gard to the number of animals that could be properly
maintained with the available feed base. This view
has been supported by recent Soviet statements indi-
cating dissatisfaction with productivity per animal.
The 12% decline in hog numbers in 1967 and little
or no increase in cattle, sheep and goats may thus
reflect a Soviet effort to bring about a more favor-
able balance of livestock numbers and feed supplies.
The possibility that disease may have been a con-
tributing factor to the 1967 decline in hog numbers
and the lack of increase in cattle numbers cannot
be discounted. Outbreaks of foot and mouth disease,
which is endemic to the U.S.S.R., were widespread
during the 1965/66 season. A decline in the produc-
tion of piglets in the socialized sector, partly as a
result of increasing specialization of farms in live-
stock raising, was cited as a reason for a 1967 decline
in hog numbers in the private sector. Production of
livestock in the private sector, although officially ap-
proved by the present leadership, is being squeezed
economically, however, by such factors as higher feed
prices and government subsidy to meat production
from the socialized sector.
Possibilities of increasing meat production through
more rapid growth of animals probably are greatest
in hog production; in the U.S.S.R. more than a year
frequently is required to grow hogs to market weight,
in contrast to 6 months or less in the United States.
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150
50.8
41.6
Private 21%
Holdings
State 37%
Farms
31% 30% 42% 84%
Collectiv
e 42%
Farms
NOTE: Census date is I January
" Present 6a mdGr~.g
In cattle breeding the Soviets are anxious to con-
tinue an upward trend in milk production per cow
and to fatten more properly cattle for slaughter. Ef-
forts are underway to develop more beef-type cattle
for better utilization of the extensive, sparse grass,
natural pastures. Soviet purchases of purebred cattle
from abroad show an awareness of the value of high-
producing stock. However, much remains to be
done with respect to staffing, equipping, and spe-
cializing breeding farms. Expansion of sheep num-
bers is being encouraged, although goats, largely held
by the private sector, may decline further in num-
bers.
Horse numbers have stabilized at about 8 million
head in recent years, after having declined almost
steadily since 1928. As a result of mechanization,
horses no longer account for a significant share of
Soviet farm draft power. In 1966, they accounted
for only about 1.4% of total farm draft power in the
U.S.S.R.
(2) Livestock products - In September 1953,
Khrushchev singled out the livestock sector as the
most backward segment of Soviet agriculture, reveal-
ing that the numbers of cows and of all cattle were
less than in 1916 and that only small increases had
been achieved in the number of hogs, sheep, and
goats. Increases in procurement prices during 1953-56,
however, and record grain and potato harvests in
1956 resulted in a significant improvement in the
livestock sector, and in May 1957 Khrushchev
launched a program to catch up to the United States
in per capita production of milk and meat. In June
he boasted that the U.S.S.R. would produce 62 mil-
FIGURE 1.3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LIVESTOCK
OWNERSHIP, 1 JANUARY 1966
lion tons of milk in 1958 and about 14 million tons
of meat by 1960 or 1961. Khrushchev admitted that
some Soviet economists had calculated that Soviet
per capita production of milk and meat could not be
raised to United States levels until 1975; however,
this advice was ignored. Although the Party Central
Committee continued to refer to the "catch-up" cam-
paign in its official May Day Slogans until 1960, the
meat production goal was lowered to 11 million tons
by 1965. In May 1961 the "catch-up" campaign post-
ers were replaced by fresh pledges to surpass the
United States in per capita milk output in 1963 and
in per capita meat output in 1970. Output actually
achieved is shown in Figure 14. Official Soviet statis-
tics for meat and milk production are discounted
(currently 6% for milk and 12% for meat) to re-
move the combined effects of a deliberate upward
bias and of valid errors in estimation. Even with
these discounts, the increases in production of live-
stock products, since 1953, have been substantial. In-
creases in the output of livestock products during
the 1954-67 period were: meat, 91%; milk, 115%;
eggs, 109%; and wool 68%. Population of the U.S.S:R.
increased by 24% during this 14-year period. Al-
though the "catch-up" campaign goals were not
achieved, the Soviets now have surpassed the United
States in total and per capita production of milk,
but are still far behind in meat production, as the
following 1966 tabulation shows:
UNITED
U.S.S.R. STATES
Milk production
Total (million tons) .......... 71.2 54.5
Kilograms per capita .......... 305.3 276.8
Meat production
Total (million tons) ......... 9.46 19.1
Kilograms per capita ......... 40.6 97.0
Population, midyear (millions) ... 233.2 196.9
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FIGURE 14. ESTIMATED OUTPUT OF BASIC
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS
MEAT* I MILK** I EGGS I WOOL
Million metric Billion Million metric
tons units tons
1928*** ..........
4.90
31.0
10.8
1953 .............
5.24
34.7
16.1
1958 .............
6.78
54.6
23.0
1959 .............
7.67
56.1
25.6
1960 .............
7.38
55.5
27.5
1961 .............
7.40
56.3
29.3
1962 .............
8.14
58.1
30.1
1963 .............
8.87
56.3
28.8
1964 .............
7.29
59.5
26.7
1965 .............
8.67
68.2
29.1
1966 .............
9.46
71.2
31.7
1967 .............
10.00
74.5
33.7
0.182
0.235
0.322
0.356
0.357
0.366
0.371
0.373
0.341
0.357
0.371
0.395
*Carcass weight, bone-in basis, including slaughter fats.
Meat from cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, poultry, rabbit, horse,
camel, and deer. Official production data for the 1953-67
period have been discounted 10%-15%.
**Whole milk. Official production data for the 1953-67
period have been discounted 5%-10%.
***1928 boundaries.
In making comparisons between the United States
and the U.S.S.R. it is important to note that United
States production is being restricted through national
agricultural programs, whereas the U.S.S.R. strives
for maximum output. In the United States, milk pro-
duction declined 4% in 1966 to the level produced
in 1953, but with 34.5% fewer dairy cows. Less than
one-third of United States cows are kept for dairy
purposes whereas practically all cows in the U.S.S.R.
are milked.
In 1966, the output of meat by major categories
was as follows: beef and veal, 39%; pork, 41%;
lamb and mutton (including goat meat), 10%; poul-
try, 7%; other, 3%. About 75% of total meat pro-
duction in 1966 was produced in the Ukraine and the
R.S.F.S.R., with the latter republic accounting for
52% of the total. Meat production in the R.S.F.S.R.
is concentrated primarily in the Urals, the North
Caucasus, the Volga, and the Central regions (Fig-
ure 1). The regional production of milk follows the
same general pattern as for meat, with the Ukraine
and the R.S.F.S.R. accounting for 78% of milk pro-
duction in 1966, the R.S.F.S.R. producing 55% of
total.
Poultry production has shown substantial gains in
the last three years, after having suffered serious
setbacks after the 1963 harvest failure. In 1965, 80%
of the poultry in the Soviet Union were in the
R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine.
The U.S.S.R. is an important wool-producing coun-
try. Production rose from 180,000 tons in 1950 to
395,000 tons in 1967. The majority of wool production
is concentrated in the R.S.F.S.R. and Kazakhstan,
with these two regions accounting for 70% of
total production in 1966. In 1965, 55% of the wool
produced was of the fine grade.
Facilities for transporting, processing, and distrib-
uting livestock products to consumers are grossly in-
adequate in design and capacity. The efficiency in
utilizing milk for consumption is low. A government
decree issued in 1967 called for expanded construc-
tion of meat and dairy processing facilities.
Continued gains in Soviet livestock production will
be primarily influenced by the level of feed sup-
plies but also by improvements in efficiency in util-
ization of feed. Livestock numbers probably will con-
tinue to expand but at a slow rate. National goals
call for 86.9 million tons of milk and 12.9 million
tons of meat (83.4 million tons and 11.4 million tons,
respectively, on a discounted basis) to be produced
in 1970.
6. Foreign trade in agricultural products
The commodity structure of agricultural exports
and imports for 1962-66 is outlined in Figures 38
and 39. During this period, the U.S.S.R. was a net
exporter of agricultural commodities (chiefly cotton
and grain) to East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo-
vakia, and a net importer of agricultural commod-
ities from the rest of the world (Figure 15).
Imports of agricultural products from Communist
China declined sharply during 1959-61, becoming al-
most negligible in 1961, but have increased slightly
in recent years. Livestock products and vegetables
make up the bulk of the agricultural products im-
ported from Communist China.
EAST GERMANY,
POLAND AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
COMMUNIST
CHINA
OTHER
COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES**
NON-
COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
NET
AGRICULTURAL
TRADE
------------- MillionU.S.dollars -------------
1962 .............
+657
-34
-267
-323
+33
1963 .............
+653
-31
-278
-560
-216
1964 .............
+476
-62
-439
-1,057
-1,082
1965 .............
+485
-88
-494
-1,036
-1,133
1966 .............
+590
- 64
-452
-1,007
-933
*Plus indicates net exports; minus indicates net imports.
**Includes Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia, North Vietnam, North Korea, Rumania,
and Yugoslavia.
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The principal commodity affecting the agricultural
trade balance during 1963-66 was grain and grain
products. In 1964 alone, following the very poor grain
harvest in the fall of 1963, the Soviets imported grain
and grain products valued at US$628 million. Sugar
is imported almost exclusively from Cuba as raw
sugar. Malaysia is the U.S.S.R.'s chief supplier of raw
rubber and Egypt is the main source of its cotton
imports. Livestock and livestock products are im-
ported from a number of countries, primarily from
Communist China.
Exports of grain and grain products, which in
1962 accounted for 44% of Soviet agricultural ex-
ports, fell off to 21% of the total in 1966. The share
of exports of oilseeds, on the other hand, increased
from 7% to 15% of total agricultural exports. The
growth of exports of oilseeds and oilseed products
reflects the large increase in domestic production of
oilseeds.
ing activities in the coastal waters of much of the
U.S.S.R. are handicapped by the prevalence of fog
and ice for a large part of the year.
2. Catch of fish and other aquatic products
From the standpoint of volume of catch, which
reached 6.5 million tons in 1967, the Soviet fishing
industry has been remarkably successful (Figure 16).
During the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) the annual rate
of increase of the catch was about 10%, increasing
from 2.9 million tons in 1958 to 5.8 million tons in
1965. In 1965, the U.S.S.R. was responsible for 9.5% of
the world's fish catch and 33% of the world's whale
catch. The Soviets plan to catch 8,500,000 tons of fish
and marine animals by 1970 (Figure 40).
The increase in the Soviet fish catch since World
War II is a result primarily, of expansion in fishing on
the high seas. The high seas catch as a percentage of
the total catch has increased as follows:
C. Fisheries
1. Importance to the economy
The U.S.S.R.'s extensive and rapidly developing
fisheries are important for both economic and strate-
gic reasons. In 1965, the fishing industry provided
about 9.7% of the output of the food industry, or about
1% of gross industrial output. In the same year, about
323,500 workers were employed in the fishing indus-
try, or about 17.4% of the food industry labor force.
Capital investment in the fishing industry during
1959-65 was 2.3 billion rubles, including 1.8 billion
rubles investment in the fishing fleet. The fishing in-
dustry employs 28.5% of the fixed capital of the food
industry.
The U.S.S.R., since the early 1960's, has ranked 4th
after Japan, Peru, and Communist China among the
world's fishing nations. The consumption of fish has
been increasing steadily from 9.9 kilograms per capita
in 1960 to about 12.6 kilograms in 1965. An estimated
13% of the animal protein consumed in the U.S.S.R.
comes from fish. In addition, the U.S.S.R. since 1959
has been a net exporter of fish and fish products, with
1965 exports exceeding imports in value by more than
US$42 million.
The U.S.S.R. has the largest and most modern fish-
ing fleet in the world. In addition to the obvious eco-
nomic successes of Soviet fishing activities, the fishing
fleet serves as a cover for intelligence operations dur-
ing peacetime, and in the event of war could be con-
verted to an augmentation force in support of opera-
tions of a more direct military nature. In recent years,
the Soviets have been exploiting their fishing and
scientific research fleets to gain respect and influence
in strategic underdeveloped countries. In the event of
hostilities, however, the fishing industry would be very
vulnerable because more than 80% of the fish catch is
obtained from international waters, and almost all of
the most productive fishing grounds ,lie adjacent to
foreign coasts. Even under normal conditions, fish-
1940
......................
40
1946
............. :.........
45
1958
......................
72
1960
......................
79
1962
......................
81
1965
......................
82
The shift of fishing to the high seas has led to a shift
in the composition of the catch (Figure 41). Since
1940, herring, ocean perch, cod, flounder, and other
sea fish have contributed heavily to the growth of the
catch. Herring alone increased from 191,000 tons in
1940 to 940,000 tons in 1965. Of the cod and related
species, the catches of walleye pollock and silver hake
in 1966 amounted to 425,200 tons and 224,600 tons,
respectively. In 1966, herring-type species and cod-
type species accounted for 64% of the fish catch. So-
viet officials are concerned over the decrease in the
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22.2
17.7 16.8
TOTAL U.S.S.R.
(In thousands)
21.2
19.7 20.2
19.4
12.3 NORTH
PACIFIC
6.8 7.1 4.2 946 toe to.$ 7./ ANTARCTIC
catch of traditionally valuable fish-sturgeon, salmon,
and white fish-as well as freshwater and semi-
migratory fish such as European pike perch, carp,
bream, and Caspian roach. Fishing grounds for these
fish, except for salmon, frequently do not provide an
adequate food supply or spawning grounds. Nonethe-
less, the U.S.S.R. catches about 90% of the world's stur-
geon, maintains first place in the catch of large net
fish (chastik), and is one of the leaders in salmon
catch. The catch of mollusks and crustaceans remains
relatively small, although the potential of these non-
fish products is large. The single major fishery for
shellfish is for the king, or karnchatka, crab, which is
a major export product.
The whale is the most important of the marine mam-
mals caught. Whaling operations take place in the
Antarctic and North Pacific (Figure 17). During the
1966-70 Five Year Plan the Soviet whale catch will be
decreasing as a result of the decreasing whale popu-
lation.
3. Characteristics of major fishing areas
a. HIGH SEAS FISHING AREAS - In 1913, Russia
fished predominately from internal waters. Fishing on
the high seas represented only 17.3% of the catch.
In 1965, the situation had been reversed to the point
where 82% of the catch was obtained from interna-
tional waters and almost all of the most productive
fishing grounds lay adjacent to foreign coasts (Figure
18).
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In the interim period, Soviet fishing on the high seas
developed by stages. The first stage was the near
shore fishing of the regions of the North Arctic and
Pacific Oceans-the Barents Sea, the north part of the
Sea of Japan, Okhotsk Sea and the offshore regions
of the western Bering Sea. The second stage has been
the fishing of waters more distant from shore, includ-
ing the Northwest Atlantic, Equatorial and South
Atlantic, North Sea, Eastern Bering Sea, and northeast
Pacific Ocean. The introduction of large vessels with
refrigeration and canning capabilities and floating
bases has been largely instrumental in the extension
of fishing operations.
As shown by the data in Figure 42, the Atlantic
Ocean is the basic fishing ground of the U.S.S.R. In
1965, 2.4 million tons of fish, or 42% of the total catch
was obtained from Atlantic waters.
(1) Northeast Atlantic - During the past 15
years, development of Soviet fishing in the Atlantic has
been concentrated in the northeastern region-the
Barents, the North, the Norwegian, and the Baltic Seas,
and fisheries near the Faeroe Islands and Iceland. In
recent years, the U.S.S.R. has begun to fish in the
English Channel and along the shores of East Green-
land.
The Soviet catch of fish and marine animals in the
Northeast Atlantic in 1964, illustrating the relative
importance of its component fishing grounds in recent
years, was as follows:
THOUSAND TONS
PERCENT
Barents Sea ..............
317.2
29.3
Iceland .................
11.3
1.0
Faeroe Islands ...........
7.6
0.6
Norwegian Sea ..........
402.6
37.2
North Sea ...............
144.5
13.4
English Channel ..........
9.2
0.9
Baltic Sea ...............
190.1
17.6
Total ................. 1,082.5 100.0
Herring is the most important single species, with
catch amounting to 566,000 tons in 1965 (54% of
catch). The Norwegian Sea and the North Sea are
fished almost exclusively for herring. The Baltic Sea
yields about 70,000 tons of Baltic herring and about
65,000 tons of cod, while in the Barents Sea, about
80% of the Soviet catch is cod and haddock. The
planned 1970 catch for these areas is as follows:
Barents Sea-300,000 tons, with the catch of codfish
down from recent years; Norwegian Sea-300,000-
400,000 tons, almost exclusively herring; North Sea-
150,000 tons of herring, 30,000-50,000 tons of other
fish; Baltic Sea-190,000 tons of fish including 65,000
tons of cod, 70,000 tons of Baltic herring. Through
1970, therefore, the Soviet fish catch in the Northeast
Atlantic apparently is planned to remain at approxi-
mately the 1965 level. During the winter months 500-
700 fishing vessels are active, and during the summer
months, their number drops to about 200 vessels.
(2) Northwest Atlantic - Since 1959, the
Northwest Atlantic has become a significant fishing
ground for the U.S.S.R. Through aggressive expansion
of fishing near Western Greenland, Labrador, New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, and the New England states,
the Soviets have increased this catch from about
109,000 tons in 1958 to about 853,000 tons in 1965.
More than half the 1965 catch was from off the New
England states, as shown as follows:
THOUSAND TONS
PERCENT
West Greenland ...........
1.5
0.2
Labrador .................
67.0
7.9
Newfoundland ............
144.0
16.8
Subtotal ................
212.5
24.9
Nova Scotia ..............
140.0
16.4
New England states ........
500.6
58.7
In the New England and Nova Scotia fishing grounds,
herring and silver hake made up the bulk of the 19'65
catch, although in other years there have been signif-
icant catches of haddock, cod, pollock, and flounder.
Annual catch is planned to remain at about 600,000
tons through 1970, including 200,000 tons of Atlantic
herring and 250,000 tons of silver hake.
West Greenland, Labrador and Newfoundland are
primarily sources of cod, sea perch, and herring. The
planned 1970 catch for this area is 420,000 tons, in-
cluding 320,000 tons of cod.
Since the Northwest Atlantic is a primary U.S. fish-
ing ground, Soviet fishing interests have been in con-
flict with those of the United States at times. In recent
years there have been over 400 Soviet vessels fishing
at peak fishing periods.
(3) Central and South Atlantic - Although
the catch of fish in these regions was 490,000 tons in
1965, the Central and South Atlantic fishing grounds
have been fished by the Soviets only since 1954 and
are viewed as potential areas for increased catch.
Horse mackerel and sardines are the basic catch. The
1970 planned catch for this region amounts to 470,000
tons of horse mackerel, Atlantic mackerel, and sar-
,dines, and for the tropical zone of the East Atlantic
(near Guinea) 25,000 tons of sardines, Atlantic mack-
erel and horse mackerel. Tuna fishing is expected to
increase significantly with the increased use of trawlers
specifically equipped for tuna fishing. Since 1965, the
number of vessels operating in western African waters
has increased rapidly to the point where some 130
and 70 vessels are in operation in the peak and
slack periods, respectively. Many of the vessels are
based at ports along the Black Sea.
(4) North Pacific - The North Pacific, the
second most productive fishing ground of the U.S.S.R.,
encompasses the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan,
the Tatar Straits which connect them, the delta of
the Amur River, the Bering Sea and the North Pacific
Ocean.
During the last decade, Soviet Pacific fisheries have
undergone a significant transformation. Up to 1950
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the Soviet Pacific fishing industry caught about
300,000 tons of fish per year, principally along the
shores of Kamchatka and Primorskiy Kray. Herring,
sardines, and salmon were the principally species
caught. By 1965 the catch in the North Pacific had
increased to 1,826,000 tons. The use of powerful fishing
vessels has led to fishing a considerable distance from
shore. Now 75%-80% of the Far East catch is
from the open sea and Pacific Ocean. In recent years,
the U.S.S.R. has operated a large fleet of vessels in
the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska (Figure 19) and
has progressively shifted operations southward as far
as California. At peak periods during the past 5 years,
the Soviets have had as many as 400 vessels fishing
in these waters. During the past 10 years, sea perch,
sayra,5 tuna, and hake have appeared, and the signifi-
cance of flat fish has increased in the composition of
the North Pacific catch. According to the Five Year
Plan, in 1970, the total catch of fish, crustaceans,
mammals, and seaweed is to reach 3 million tons, or
about one-third of the Soviet catch.
Herring and sea perch are quantitatively the most
important catch of the Far East, amounting to 330,000
to 390,000 tons, respectively, in 1965. Herring are
caught near the northeast shore of Kamchatka and
since 1960, near the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea.
The catch of sayra in 1965 was 42,500 tons, but plans
call for annual catch to reach 250,000 tons in 1970.
Pacific hake, in the amount of 140,000 tons were
caught near the coast of Washington and Oregon in
1966; the tuna catch, although currently insignificant,
B Cololabis sajra, member of mackerel family.
St. Lawrence 1.
is expected to increase as the Soviets expand fishing
into the southern Pacific Ocean. The most valuable
commercial fish are the Pacific salmon, including the
pink salmon, chum salmon, and sockeye salmon. How-
ever in recent years, the supply of salmon has been
decreasing. Salmon are taken mostly off the shore of
Kamchatka. In 1966, 62,000 tons of salmon were caught
in the North Pacific.
The crab catch in the Far East, the center for Soviet
crab fishing, increased sharply from about 15,000 tons
in 1948 to 39,000 tons in 1961 and 46,000 tons in
1966. Crabbing operations are conducted in both in-
shore and offshore waters. Land based facilities as
well as large cannery ships, which operate in con-
junction with flotillas of small fishing vessels, are used.
Whaling operations also are conducted off Kam-
chatka, the Kuril Islands, and Sakhalin. As early as
1932, the whaling factory ship Aleut and attendant
catcher vessels began to operate in the Far East. Since
1963, the whale bases Vladivostok and Dalniy Vostok
have begun to work in this region, at times conducting
whaling operations as far 'as the Gulf of Alaska. In
addition, whaling operations from land stations are
conducted in the waters off the Kuril Islands and
Sakhalin. It is estimated that in 1965, these flotillas
caught more than 10,000 whales of all types in this
region.
(5) Antarctic area - The Antarctic is the
principal whaling area exploited by the Soviets, pro-
viding about 50% of the whale catch in 1965. Soviet
whaling operations in this area have developed since
1946, when operations were begun with only a single
floating base, the Slava, and several attendant catchers.
M Whaling
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Subsequently 3 more factory ships built during 1959-
60, the Sovetskaya Rossiya, Sovetskaya Ukraina,
and the Yuri Dolgorukiy, as well as about 75 catchers,
were added.
Antarctic whaling is conducted within seasonal
limits and in areas established by the International
Whaling Commission (IWC). From 1958 until 1966,
the U.S.S.R. was allocated 20% of the total Antarctic
catch, in terms of blue whale equivalents. Since the
1958/59 season, the Soviet catch has ranged from
17% to 24% of the total actual Antarctic catch. In
1966, the IWC allotted the U.S.S.R. 30% of the Ant-
arctic catch, in terms of blue whale units. In view
of the diminishing Antarctic whale population and
the decrease in total catch sanctioned by the IWC
from 4,500 to 3,500 blue whale units for 1966/67,
and to 3,200 for 1967/68, the Soviet whale catch in
the Antarctic will be decreasing in the 1966-70 Five
Year Plan period.
(6) Other high seas regions - Soviet fishing
operations in other high seas regions are of little im-
portance at the present, but the U.S.S.R. is actively
engaged in developing new fisheries. With the devel-
opment of fishing port facilities in the Havana (Cuba)
harbor, the Soviets have gained an excellent base for
expanding their operations in Caribbean waters, the
Gulf of Mexico, and along the east coast of the United
States and Brazil. In 1965, 69,000 tons of fish were
caught in these waters. Hake is quantitatively the
most important species of the area. In recent years,
the Soviets have extensively studied the Patagonian
Shelf as a potential fishing ground. About 15 vessels
operate near Cuba, and as many as 70 vessels have
operated near South America.
The Indian Ocean currently is of little importance
to Soviet fishing. The U.S.S.R. began fishing operations
here only in the early 1960's. The catch in 1965 was
34,700, 40% of which was sparidae and horse mackerel.
The tuna catch, which the Soviets plan to develop,
was about 4,500 tons. The 1970 plan for the Indian
Ocean calls for a fish catch of 190,000 tons, or 2%
of the total Soviet catch. The Soviets have devoted
considerable research to the Indian Ocean and have
also initiated fishing agreements with countries having
access to the waters of the Indian Ocean, including
Ceylon, Egypt, Somalia, and India. Several of the
agreements include provisions for building port facil-
ities, which will provide bases for the Soviet fleet.
b. COASTAL AND INLAND WATERS
(1) Caspian - The historical center of Russian
fishing, the Caspian area (Figure 20) produced' an
estimated 448,000 tons in 1965, which was about
8% of the total Soviet catch. Since 1930, the relative
importance of the Caspian catch has declined sharply.
The decreasing depth of the Caspian, in particular,
has posed a major threat to the fishing industry. In
recent years, the Caspian catch has stabilized at
350,000-450,000 tons, as a result of kilka (Caspian
Gan Zhilaya
Astrakhan Kosa
Trudfront
U.S.S.R.
For
Shevchi
FIGURE 20. CASPIAN SEA FISHING GROUNDS
AND PROCESSING CENTERS
sprat) fishing. Kilka, a herring fish, which is about
75% of the Caspian catch, is caught mainly along
the western shore. Roach, second to kilka, in terms
of quantity, are taken in the Volga delta during migra-
tion and in the open Caspian south of the delta.
The sturgeon catch is only about 3% of the Caspian
tonnage, but ranks as one of the most valuable species
primarily because of caviar production (sturgeon
roughly 3% roe). As a result of conservation practices,
the sturgeon catch in 1966 reached 14,000 tons, a
quantity which is to be sustained through the Five
Year Plan. The most important sturgeon fisheries are
in the delta of the Volga and lower reaches of the
Kura River.
(2) Other coastal and inland waters - Like
the Caspian, the catch from the Azov-Black Sea
region has been declining due, in part, to a poorer
food supply for the fish and to a reduction of spawn-
ing grounds. The fish catch in the Azov and Black
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Seas in 1965 was 226,000 tons (3.9% of the Soviet
catch), including about 46,000 tons of gobies, 125,000
tons of anchovies, and 17,000 tons of bream.
The catch of the Aral Sea has been declining. The
1958 catch was 49,000 tons of fish, while in 1965,
the catch was 30,560 tons, 50% of which was carp.
Fishing is concentrated mainly along the southern,
eastern and northern shores.
Many Soviet lakes, reservoirs, rivers, and streams
have commercial fisheries. The river systems of the
Volga, Don, Kuban, Ob, Yenisey, and others have
extensive tributary networks which serve as fishing
grounds, as well as spawning grounds for migratory
fish, thus playing a large role in the reproduction of
the fish supplies of the Caspian, Azov and other seas.
Lakes Ladoga, Onega, Baikal, Il'men, and others are
inhabited by valuable fish such as salmon, white fish,
and cyprinoids, but the catch is small.
In 1965, the total catch of fresh water fish was about
330,000 tons, of which more than 50% were roach,
perch and striped bass. Due to pollution of streams
and limitation of water flow by hydrostations, fish
catch in internal waters has been falling. Sturgeon
particularly have suffered. Artificial reproduction of
fish stocks in inland seas and stocking of reservoirs
and lakes as well as intensive development of pond
fisheries are the measures being taken to raise the
catch of valuable fish. Planned 1970 catch from fresh
water fisheries is as follows (in thousands of tons):
Reservoirs ......................... 69-70
Lake and river waters ............... 200-205
Ponds of State fish farms ............ 140
Total ........................... 409-415
4. Fishing operations
a. VESSELS - The current status of the Soviet
fishing industry has largely been achieved by building
the largest and most modern fishing fleet in the world.
The fleet is responsible for 87% of the total Soviet
catch. Large refrigerated trawlers, designated as
BMRT's, account for more than 20% of the total
fleet catch (Figure 21). In 1964, the fishing fleet of
self-propelled vessels numbered some 20,000, which
a total of 4 million gross register tons (GRT) and
FIGURE 21. FISH CATCH, BY TYPE OF VESSEL
(Percent of total fleet catch*)
1960 1 1965
BMRT ...........
RTM .............
RT ...............
SRTM ...........
Other large vessels..
SO, RS-300 .......
Small vessels ......
Fish factory trawlers.. 9.0 20.9
....do .............. 0 5.1
Refrigerated/freezing 14.9 7.1
fishing trawlers.
....do .............. 30.4 22.7
... 22.1 18.5
Seiners .............. 6.3 9.3
... 17.3 16.4
.................... 100.0 100.0
... Not pertinent.
*Total fleet catch in 1960 and 1965 amounted to 2.78
million tons and 5.11 million tons, respectively.
3.5 million horsepower. Included in this number were
an estimated 3,266 trawlers and support ships (100
GRT and above), with about 3 million tons total GRT.
Figure 43 illustrates the Soviet emphasis on acquisi-
tion of large fishing craft suitable for high seas fishing.
Concurrent with the addition of large fishing vessels
to the fleet, the Soviets have also begun to phase out
many small, less efficient vessels. In the period
1959-64, the number of vessels in the fishing fleet
decreased by 12%, while the total horsepower and
total GRT increased 50% and 46%, respectively.
During the current Five Year Plan period, the
Soviets plan to add about 1,500 vessels, nearly all of
which are seagoing vessels. They include 150 large re-
frigerated trawlers, almost 100 Atlantik class vessels,
145 ordinary refrigerated vessels, and floating bases
and seiners. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets
have expanded their fleet through domestic construc-
tion as well as through purchases from abroad. Thus,
they have gained the advantage of foreign technology
in vessel contruction and equipment which can be
copied. As shown in Figure 22, about 42% of the
gross registered tonnage in vessels of 100 GRT and
above, added to the fishing fleet in 1965 was from
Soviet shipyards. The most important foreign suppliers
of fishing vessels have been East Germany, Poland,
West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, United
Kingdom, Netherlands, and recently, Japan and
France.
The most important specialty in modern develop-
ment of fishing has been the combining of processing
with fishing on the vessels. As a consequence, since
1955, the construction of trawlers has been dominated
by the fish-factory trawler program. The large freezing-
canning trawlers, designed as BMRT's, catch and
mechanically process the fish into frozen fillets, canned
products, fishmeal, and oil. These large stern trawlers
are in the Pushkin, Mayakovskiy, and Leskov series.
Powered by at least 1,900 horsepower engines, they
have endurances of over 2 months and capacities of
about 600 tons of frozen fish and 100,000 cans of
tinned products as well as storage facilities for fish
oil and meal. The average catch of each of these
vessels is about 7,300 tons of fish per year. The vessels
are equipped with slipdecks and the most modern
nautical and fishing equipment, including hydroacous-
tical devices for seeking out fish shoals.
FIGURE 22. ADDITIONS TO FLEET OF VESSELS 100
GRT AND ABOVE
(Gross register tons)
1965 1
1966
Vessels 1,000 GRT and above ..........
446.300
499,000
From U.S.S.R. shipyards .............
173,700
145,750
From other Communist shipyards.....
113,600
107,000
From rest of world shipyards .........
159,000
246,250
Vessels 100 to 1,000 GRT (from U.S.S.R.
shipyards) .........................
24,700
95,000
Total additions ................... 471,000
594,000
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The Natalya Kovskova, the first of the new canning
and freezing trawlers designed to operate in temper-
ate or tropical regions, could supersede the Mayak-
ovskiy and Leskov class trawlers. The Tropik and the
more modern Atlantik are smaller versions of the fish-
factory trawler.
There is also a large fishing fleet of medium
sized vessels, which operate in conjunction with
base and factory ships and other vessels. The
SRT's, or medium sized trawlers, were originally de-
signed to catch herring in the North Atlantic; more
recently, they have been employed on the Newfound-
land banks, as well as in the Far East for trawl fishing
of sea perch. Since SRI'S lack refrigerated holds nec-
essary for autonomous voyages and sufficient motor
power for extensive trawling, they have been super-
seded by the SRTR, Okean class, which has a refrig-
erated hold, and the SRTM, Mayak, which has freezing
equipment.
Seiners are second in importance, after trawlers in
the ranking of fish catching ships. In the Azov, Black,
and Caspian seas, the large seiners (RS-300), equipped
with purse nets, drifter nets, trawls, and electric lights,
are employed. The RS-300's are used in fishing for
kilka, grey mullet, horse mackerel, and belted bonita.
The Soviets use smaller seiners for catching sayra in
the Far East waters.
To facilitate fishing in remote fishing grounds, the
expedition method of fishing is practiced. The func-
tions of catching, processing and transport of fish
are divided among fishing vessels, floating bases, and
transport ships. The floating bases are an integral
part of the expedition operation. The use of the Severo
Divinsk and similar herring bases marked the begin-
ning of modern fishing bases. Since 1960, there have
been constructed new classes of floating bases-the
Pionersk, Rybatskaya Slava, and Spassk. These new
classes are designed for serving fishing ships in the
open sea. The floating bases are highly mechanized
and are equipped to freeze fish as well as to process
waste products into meal and oil. The Andrey Zak-
harov class of factory base ships is used for canning
crab and the Lenin Luch and Krasniy Luch are used
for canning tuna. The Vostok, a 43,000 GRT fishing
base, to be launched in 1968, is equipped with 14 sub-
ordinate fishing boats and is designed for tropical
fishing. This factory ship will be able to stay at sea for
125 days and freeze 10,000 tons of fish, as well as
process 10 million cans of fish and several thousand
tons of fishmeal per trip. This vessel could become
the model for future fishing bases and alter the whole
pattern for current fishing expeditions. With the adop-
tion of the expedition method of fishing, many new
processing refrigerated fish transports have been built.
Since 1960, such new classes as the Rembrandt, Skry-
plev, Sibir, and Yantarnyy, processing vessels with
trawling capabilities, and Bratsk and Tavriya, process-
ing transport vessels, have begun to operate in the
fishing expeditions.
The Soviet whaling fleet has remained static since
1963. The 7 whale factory ships in the Soviet whaling
fleet include the Aleut, Yuri Dolgorukiy, and Slava,
which were built in the 1920's, as well as the
Sovetskaya Ukraina and Sovetskaya Rossiya, 32,024
GRT vessels built in 1955, which operate in the Ant-
arctic whaling region. The Vladivostok and Dalniy,
Vostok, each 17,000 GRT, were built in 1962 and 1963,
respectively, to operate in the Far East as whale-
factory/fish-factory vessels. The Soviets do not plan
to build any additional whaling vessels and plan to
alter existing whale factory ships for processing fish,
since prospects for whale catches are declining.
b. FISHING GEAR AND TECHNIQUES - As shown in
Figure 23, modernization of the fleet has been re-
flected in a shift of fishing methods with 88% of the
catch resulting from "active" fishing in 1965 com-
pared with only 36% in 1950. The types of gear most
often used for fisheries in the high seas are trawls,
drift nets, and purse seines. Trawling, which is mainly
used for catching bottomfish such as cod, redfish,
etc., accounted for nearly half of the 1965 catch.
Drift net fishing, the second most important method,
is widely used in the North Atlantic and in the Far
East. The lifting of the drift nets has been mech-
anized and special machines for shaking out the fish
from nets have been introduced. Purse seines, for
the catch in the upper water layers, are widely used
in the Far East and in the Black Sea. Coastal fishing
is done mainly by means of set gill nets and drag
seines.
The use of underwater electric light attraction in
fishing has been developed by the Soviets, Fish pumps
are the main type of gear for transferring the fish
attracted by underwater lights directly into the ship.
This method is used extensively in the kilka (herring
family) fishery of the Caspian Sea. About 90% of
the kilka tonnage is caught with the use of electric
lights.
More than 90% of ocean fishing vessels are
equipped with fish finding equipment. The number
of completely mechanized lines for fishing and proc-
essing of fish on fishing vessels has increased rapidly
FIGURE 23. FISH CATCH, BY METHOD USED
(Percent)
1940 1
1950 1
1955 1
1963
1965
Active fishing............
26.3
35.8
57.5
77.4
88.3
Trawling ..............
15.6
19.2
32.6
36.7
49.9
Drift netting ..........
6.2
5.1
8.8
11.6
10.3
Purse seining..........
3.2
4.2
3.1
5.9
5.8
Use of electric lights....
0
0.1
4.2
6.6
6.7
Catching whales and sea
animals .............
1.3
7.2
8.8
16.6
15.6
Passive fishing...........
73.7
64.2
42.5
22.6
11.7
Beach seine ...........
18.7
16.4
9.7
5.9
na
Trap net ..............
26.2
22.4
15.5
5.2
na
Fixed gill net..........
12.0
11.1
12.1
5.2
na
Other .................
16.8
14.3
6.2
6.3
na
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to the point that a majority of the oceangoing ves-
sels have this equipment. Airplanes and helicopters
are used in the search for fish shoals.
Despite the considerable growth in the fishing
industry since World War II, the Soviets have been
highly critical of the overall performance of the fish-
ing fleet. The growth in the fish catch has been due
primarily to the expanded fleet and not to its better
utilization. As recently as 1965, the large fish factory
trawlers (BMRT) and the medium trawlers (SRT)
were occupied in fishing operations for only 44%
and 38%, respectively, of the calendar year. Idle
time, spent chiefly under repair or waiting for repair,
took up 25%-30% of the total time. Also, consider-
able unproductive time is spent waiting to transfer
fish catches to transport or base ships, a shortage of
which has handicapped the industry.
C. PORTS AND VESSEL FACILITIES . - . Soviet fishing
is centered on about 20 ports, the most important
of which are listed in Figure 24. The Far East's larg-
est ports, Vladivostok and nearby Nakhoda in Pri-
morskiy Kray, combined are the largest port in the
whole U.S.S.R.; 1,023,000 tons of the Far East catch
was caught by their fishermen in 1965, an amount
3 times their 1958 catch. The Far Eastern refrigerator
fleet, which serves the entire Soviet Far East, and
the crab and Pacific whaling fleets are based at Vladi-
vostok. A majority of their fishermen work in the
Bering Sea.
Murmansk is the principal port of the North At-
lantic. Ice free Murmansk, with its superior trans-
portation and port facilities is home port for virtually
all northern trawlers, the principal means of catching
herring and cod. Murmansk fishermen caught 884,000
metric tons of fish in 1965. Kaliningrad is the second
largest base, after Murmansk, on the western side of
the Eurasian continent. It controls fleets in the Baltic,
North, and South Atlantic, and a whaling flotilla in
the Antarctic. About 625,000 tons of fish were caught
by the Kaliningrad fleets in 1965.
FIGURE 24. FISH CATCH,* BY SOVIET FISHING PORTS
(Thousand metric tons)
1958 1965 11970
PLAN
Total U.S.S.R .....................
Of which:
Murmansk ....................
Kaliningrad ...................
Estonia: Tallin and others ......
Latvia: Riga and others ........
Lithuania: Klaipeda and others..
Leningrad .....................
Primorskiy Kray: Vladivostok
and Nakhodka ...............
Kamchatka: Petropavlovsk and
others .......................
Sakhalin: Rybnovsk and others..
no Data not available.
2,936 5,774 8,500
509 884 1,200
140 625 850
59 178 no
95 291 no
93 238 400
45 62 no
340 1,023 1,400
204 418 900
179 370 640
*Includes whales and sea animals, crustaceans, and aquatic
plants.
Odessa and Ilichevsk on the Black Sea are major
ports for Central and South Atlantic fishing opera-
tions, while Sevastopol is home port for much of
the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean fishing. The
parent ship Vostok is to be based at Sevastopol, as
are many of the tuna fishing vessels.
Lack of adequate port facilities, greatly neglected
in the past, has been a distinct handicap to the So-
viet fishing industry. In fact, the inadequacy of port
facilities was an important factor in the decision to
operate large fish factory trawlers and large factory
ships which require fewer shore facilities. To accom-
modate the needs of the large trawlers and factory
ships, however, the Soviets have found it expedient
to improve virtually all of their ports in the 1960's.
Large mechanized harbors with the associated can-
ning factories, refrigeration and processing plants,
and ship repair yards are being built.
All U.S.S.R. fishing ports are under the administra-
tive control of the Ministry of Fisheries, and the min-
istry delegates authority to 5 directorates. These in-
clude the Directorate of the Far Eastern Fisheries,
the Directorate of the Caspian Sea, Directorate of the
Azov and Black Seas, Directorate for Western Fish-
eries, and Directorate for Northern Fisheries. The
Directorate of the Far Eastern Fisheries, Dalryba,
with headquarters in Vladivostok, administers the
fisheries in the Pacific and freshwater fisheries in Si-
beria and Kamchatka. The ports of Kamchatka
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands,
Primorskiy Kray, and Khaborovsk Kray are subordi-
nate to Dalryba. This includes about 35% of the So-
viet fish catch, 17% of the units, and 34% of the
horsepower of the fishing fleet.
The Directorate for Northern Fisheries, Sevryba,
with headquarters at Murmansk, covers the fisheries
in the Barents Sea, part of the herring fisheries in
the Norwegian Sea, as well as the Western Atlantic,
White Sea, and northern Russian freshwater fisheries.
Sevryba in 1965 was responsible for 17% of the catch
of fish and sea animals, 8% of the units, and 17% of
the horsepower of the fishing fleet.
Riga is headquarters for Zapryba, or the Director-
ate for Western Fisheries, which covers fisheries
in the Baltic, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean. The
ports of Kaliningrad and Klaipeda are subordinate
to Zapryba. Zapryba is responsible for about 24% of
the catch, 21% of the units, and 28% of the horse-
power of the fleet.
The Directorate of the Caspian Sea, Caspryba of
Astrakhan, covers the fisheries in the Caspian Sea,
the Aral Sea, the Volga and Ural Rivers, which are
the main producers of caviar. Caspryba is respon-
sible for 8% of the catch, 17% of the units, and 6%
of the horsepower of the fishing fleet.
Fisheries in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea,
and the Indian Ocean, are under the Directorate of
the Azov and Black Seas, Azcherryba, located in
Sevastopol. Azcherryba is responsible for 12% of the
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catch, 10% of the units, and 12% of the horsepower
of the fishing fleet.
5. Utilization of catch
The fish catch of the U.S.S.R. is marketed as fresh
whole fish, fresh and frozen fillets, salted, pickled,
smoked, and canned products (Figure 44). Among
nonfood products derived from fishing are whale oil,
sperm oil, fishmeal, fish body oils, and furs. In recent
years the growth in numbers of fish-factory trawlers
and factory ships has been such that today over 60%
of the Soviet catch is processed at sea. This has led
to a considerable change in the proportions of the
components of the processed fish products, as well as
a general upgrading of edible fish products in recent
years. In 1965, nearly 3 million tons of edible fish
products were produced, 1.4 million tons of which
were frozen fish. The 1970 plan calls for the produc-
tion of 4.3 million tons of edible fish products, 2.5
million tons of which will be frozen. At present, only
a small amount of fish is processed into fresh and
frozen fillets. The Soviets plan to increase fillet pro-
duction to 150,000 tons by 1970, or, 18 times in com-
parison to 1965. The differential in marketing price
lbetween fish in the round and fish fillet is the im-
petus for developing this product.
The processing of canned fish has expanded in re-
cent years. The Soviets processed 959.8 million stand-
ard cans of fish in 1965, as compared to 761.1 million
standard cans in 1961. The fish canneries offer a
wide assortment of canned fish, including fish au nat-
urel, fish in tomato sauce, and fish in oil. The tradi-
tional species such as herring, sprat, sardines, salmon,
tuna, and mackerel are canned, as well as other spe-
cies which other countries usually do not can.
With the emphasis on fresh, frozen, and canned
products, the share of salted fish, excluding salted
herring, decreased to about 8% of the output of
edible fish products by 1965, in comparison to 17%
in 1961. Salted herring, a delicacy to the Soviets,
represents about 19% of the edible fish products.
To increase the palatibility of salted fish, and
herring in particular, the Soviets have been shifting
from heavily salted to lightly and medium salted
fish. According to Soviet plans, the output of slightly
and medium salted herring will be at least 80% of
the total volume of production of salted herring
by 1970.
Production of inedible fish products has doubled
in recent years and should continue to increase. Fish
and whale meal production alone has increased from
100,600 tons in 1961 to 264,500 tons in 1966.
6. Foreign trade
Soviet trade in fish and fish products, which shifted
in 1959 from net imports to net exports, had re-
mained rather stable during the 1960's until 1965,
when net exports rose from the 1961-64 average of
$28 million to $35.9 million, increasing to $55.5 mil-
lion in 1966 (Figure 45). In 1965, the Soviets be-
came net exporters of fresh, chilled and frozen fish.
Japan alone imported 43,000 tons of fresh, frozen,
and chilled fish. Ghana and Cuba imported 20,000
and 12,500 tons, respectively, of this product.
Imports of fresh, chilled and frozen fish are nearly
up to the levels of the late 1950's. Over 50% of the
fresh, chilled and frozen fish imported are filleted.
Iceland and Norway are the principal exporters, each
having exported 10,000 tons of filleted fish to the
U.S.S.R. in 1965. Continued imports of fish fillet are
likely as long as domestic production fails to provide
this highly desirable product in sufficient quantities.
Since 1964, the Soviets have shifted from net im-
porters to net exporters of oil from aquatic animal
sources. Net whale oil exports, 3,400 tons in 1964,
reached 41,700 tons in 1966. Exports of whale oil to
Holland alone have increased from negligible in
1962 to 35,900 tons in 1965. Canned crab, caviar
and salmon are the most important individual fish
product exports, and, combined, amounted to over
30% of fish export value in 1965.
D. Food supply
The average daily per capita caloric intake in the
U.S.S.R. during 1966 is estimated to have been about
3,180 calories, which approximates the United States
level of 3,160. The percent of total caloric intake sup-
plied by the different foods in the U.S.S.R. and U.S.
during 1966 was as follows:
U.S.S.R.
U.S.A
Meat and poultry ............
6.0
18.6
Slaughter fats ...............
2.4
..4.0
Milk and milk products .......
13.1
11.5
Fish .......................
.5
.3
Vegetable oil ...............
5.0
13.7
Potatoes ....................
8.2
2.8
Sugar ......................
10.6
16.3
Vegetables ..................
1.0
2.7
Grains and pulses ............
48.2
24.0
Other ......................
5.0
6.1
In 1966 over one-half of the calories in the aver-
age Soviet diet were supplied by grains, potatoes
and pulses, compared to about one-fourth in the U.S.
Livestock products-meat, slaughter fats, and milk-
and fish supplied 22% of the calories in the U.S.S.R.
compared to over 34% in the U.S. Per capita con-
sumption of vegetable oil and sugar in the U.S.S.R.
is considerably below U.S. levels. The estimated quan-
tities of principal foods consumed per capita in 1966
in the U.S.S.R. and the calories supplied by these
foods are shown in Figure 25.
The absence of any sizable area climatically suit-
able for winter production of fruits and vegetables,
plus the lack of refrigeration and rapid transport fa-
cilities, imposes a monotony in the diet during
the winter season since fresh or frozen fruits and
vegetables are practically absent. The lack of ade-
quate refrigeration, transport and distribution facil-
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FIGURE 25. PER CAPITA* AVAILABILITY OF FOODS,
1966
KIL
PE
OGRAMS I
R YEAR
C
P
ALORIES
ER DAY
Flour ...........................
165
1,535
Potatoes ........................
136
260
Sugar ...........................
35
335
Fats and oils** ..................
10
230
Vegetables ......................
57
35
Meat and poultry ................
35
190
Milk ...........................
253
415
Fish ............................
13
20
Other foods*** ..................
na
160
na Data not available.
... Not pertinent.
*Based on a population count of 232.2 million.
**Includes vegetable oils and edible animal body fats but
excludes butter.
***Other foods are estimated to account for 5% of the total
available calories.
ities also adversely affect the regional distribution
and ready availability of meat, fish and milk through-
out the year.
The average diet of the Soviet people, while quite
monotonous particularly in some of the less developed
areas, is adequate in terms of calories and apparently
is not grossly lacking in the other elements of ade-
quate nutrition. There is no evidence of widespread
nutritional deficiency diseases. The diet is, however,
much lower in the proportion of the more desirable
foods such as meat, sugar, vegetable oil, fruits and
vegetables, than are the diets of other industrial coun-
tries of similar climate. No significant change in daily
per capita caloric intake is expected during the next
several years, but the quality of diet will probably
continue to improve slowly.
E. Forests and forest products
The U.S.S.R. logs more timber and provides more
lumber than any other country in the world; it is on
a par with the United States in the production of
industrial logs (Figure 26). From 1933 to 1937, the
U.S.S.R. accounted for 20% of world wood exports,
in terms of volume, and since 1956, has again ranked
FIGURE 26. PRODUCTION OF BASIC WOOD PROD-
UCTS, U.S.S.R., AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1966
(Million cubic meters)
TO
MO
TAL
VALS
IN
TR
L
DUS-
IAL
OGS
U.S.S.R.........
373
272
107
1.77
United States....
324
293
*86
12.81
Canada.........
114
108
24
1.80
Europe .........
321
234
72
3.32
Other countries. .
875
222
82
5.61
as one of the principal wood-exporting countries of
the world. The value of annual wood exports (includ-
ing paper and paper products) in the period 1964-66
averaged about US$573,500,000, an increase of about
44% compared with the 1961-63 annual average.
The logging, wood processing, and paper industries
employed about 10% of the Soviet industrial labor
force in 1965 compared with about 12% in 1960.
Logging ranks first in terms of employment among
the labor-consuming extractive industries and is there-
fore a primary target of the Soviet program to raise
labor productivity in these industries. However, the
12% increase in labor productivity in logging in the
period 1961-65 is significantly less than the 20% and
52% increases achieved in the same period in coal
mining and petroleum. extracting, respectively.
The movement of wood products involves a con-
siderable portion of the Soviet transportation system.
In terms of ton-kilometers, 12% of the total rail
freight in 1965 was timber; and this commodity ac-
counted for about 36% of the tonnage moved over
the U.S.S.R. waterways. As a result of the relocation
of the logging industry to more remote areas, the
average rail haul for a ton of wood freight increased
from 998 kilometers in 1950 to 1,519 kilometers in
1961 to 1,616 kilometers in 1965.
1. Forest resources
Forests cover almost 747,000,000 hectares, or one-
third of the U.S.S.R.'s total land area. No other na-
tion possesses forest resources approaching these in
extent. Nearly one-fourth of the world's productive
forest land capable of producing crops of industrial
wood is in the Soviet Union. About one-half of the
coniferous portion of the world's productive forests
lies within the Soviet boundaries. This tremendous
forest wealth has contributed substantially to the in-
dustrialization and overall economic development of
the country. In broader ' perspective, the forests are
of even greater importance by reason of their ge-
ographic position between the densely populated
and timber deficient countries of Western Europe and
the Far East.
The forest resources of the Soviet Union are so
vast that log production could be doubled without
damaging growing stock. Despite this enormous vol-
ume of standing timber, the country has not been able
to satisfy its combined wood needs for home con-
sumption and export. This failure is largely due to the
unfavorable geographic location of the forests in rela-
tion to centers of wood consumption. Forests which
contain the highest volume of timber he in a belt
from the northwest border to the southeast border
(Figure 27). The major high-volume forests-in order
of importance-are concentrated in the following river
basins: The Angara-Yenisey in the Irkutsk region and
in the southern part of the Krasnoyarsk region, the
Ob' in the Tomsk region and in the central part of
the Tyumen' region, the Bureya in the southern part
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of the Khabarovsk region, the Upper Kama in the
Urals, and the Northern Dvina-Vychegda and the
Pechora in the northwest. Karelia also has a high
concentration of valuable timber.
Despite the large land area of the Soviet Union,
forest types are relatively few and with the excep-
tion of those in the Caucasus mountains, simple in
species composition. In forests of state significance,
conifers occupy 74% of the total forest area (larch,
38%; pine, 16%; cedar, 6%; spruce, 12%; and other
species, 2%). The principal broadleaf species are
birch (13%) and aspen (3%). Spruce and Scotch
pine are the dominant species in Karelia and in the
Northern Dvina-Vychegda, Pechora, and Kama
basins. Fir becomes more important in the Kama
basin. Pine and birch are the primary species in the
Ob' basin, and larch and pine in the Angara-Yenisey
basin. In the Bureya basin, larch, spruce, and fir are
the dominant species.
Of the mountain forests, only those of the Caucasus
are at present of great economic importance, although
the roughness of the terrain and water conservation
considerations impede their exploitation. In these pre-
dominantly broadleaf forests the principal species are
oaks at the lower elevations and oriental beech at
the higher elevations.
2. Primary processing and distribution of forest
products
a. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIMBER INDUSTRY - The
19th Party Congress in 1952 decreed a relocation of
logging operations to the remote forest surplus
areas of the North, Urals, and East and West Si-
beria. In spite of great difficulties, this relocation was
accomplished. New areas accounted for 92% of the
total increase in industrial wood production during
1951-65. The greatest production expansion took place
in the Northwest, already the leading producer (Fig-
ure 28). The shift caused serious dislocations in trans-
port, labor, and equipment distribution which, cou-
pled with a decline in the production of logging trac-
tors, were responsible for a temporary leveling-off
of production and worker productivity in the
early 1950's.
The relocation of the logging industry to remote
areas required a vast resettlement of labor; inade-
quate housing caused almost continuous disruption of
the worker resettlement program; and poor living
conditions depressed labor morale and promoted in-
efficiency. Labor productivity also suffered from the
use of seasonal labor as well as from inadequate
equipment repair facilities in the areas of expanded
operations. These problems continue to plague the
logging industry, 15 years after the relocation began.
During the period 1960-62, the production of in-
dustrial wood leveled off at 5%-6% below the 1959
peak and leveled off again in the period 1964-66 at
1%-3% above 1959 production. These periods of
slump and stagnation apparently were caused by a
decline in labor productivity which, in turn, was the
result of high labor turnover and inadequate and
fluctuating investments in logging activities. Only
40% of the total investment funds allocated to the
timber industry for the period 1959-65 was assigned
to the logging sector compared to 70% for the pre-
FIGURE 28. FOREST RESOURCES, REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL LOGS, AND
SAWMILLING, BY ECONOMIC REGIONS
(Million cubic meters)
Forest surplus areas:
East Siberia .................. 27,400
Far East ..................... 21,400
Urals ........................ 2,980
Northwest .................... 7,600
West Siberia .................. 8,740
Total ...................... 68,120
Sparsely forested areas:
Central ...................... 1,570
Volga-Vyatsk ................. 1,280
Volga ........................ 950
Ukraine ...................... 650
Belorussia .................... 430
Baltic Republics ............... 450
Other areas ................... 1,390
Total ...................... 6,720
Total U.S.S.R ................... 74,840
REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL
LOGS
SAWMILLING
(LUMBER)
1950 1
1960
1960 1
1965
16.3
35.5
44.4 11.6
15.0
9.2
14.8
16.5 5.1
5.5
25.4
46.1
45.2 12.8
13.3
34.5
69.2
73.1 16.6
18.3
11.4
17.0
20.8 7.2
8.2
14.5
19.6
18.1 9.9
9.6
18.4
25.9
22.2 8.4
8.2
4.2
6.8
7.4 7.6
7.4
11.2
10.2
9.7 10.5
9.0
5.7
5.0
4.9 3.0
2.8
4.9
4.8
5.1 3.0
3.0
5.2
6.6
6.2 9.8
10.5
64.2
78.9
73.6 52.3
50.5
161.0
261.5
273.6 105.6
110.8
FOREST
RESOURCES*
*Forest resources of state significance. Total forest resources, including the resources on land set
aside for long-term utilization, amount to about 79 billion cubic meters.
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vious 7-year period. Average annual investment in
forestry as a whole follows (in millions of rubles):
1947-50
..................
27.1
1951-55
..................
23.9
1956-60
..................
15.4
1961-65
..................
37.1
1966-70 plan .............
58.6
The bulk of forestry investment in recent years
(60% in 1959-65) has been allocated to the wood
processing industries and has been spent primarily in
the forest surplus areas. Thus, the wood processing
industries are following the logging activities, which
had previously been shifted in part to the forest sur-
plus areas. These new wood processing centers are
large integrated combines-primarily in the Ob', Yeni-
sey, and Angara river basins. The construction of these
combines has gradually increased total sawmill pro-
duction as well as shifting a larger share of sawmilling
to the forest surplus areas-54% in 1965 compared
with 51% in 1960.
Although about two-thirds of the Soviet forest re-
sources are located in East Siberia and the Far East,
these areas accounted for only 22% of the industrial
log removals and only 18% of the lumber produced
in 1965. On the other hand, the sparsely forested
areas, with only about 9% of the forest resources,
produced almost 27% of the industrial wood and
about 46% of the lumber. Many of the sawmills in the
sparsely forested areas continue to rely heavily upon
the forest surplus areas for their supply of sawlogs.
A comparison of the removal of industrial logs and
sawmilling in 1965 and 1960 in the forest surplus and
sparsely forested areas is included in Figure 28.
b. PRODUCTS AND CONSUMPTION
(1) Fuewwood - The reported production of
fuelwood 6 increased after World War II to a peak of
about 128 million cubic meters in 1959 (20% above
1945), but fluctuated within a narrow range of 97
million to 108 million cubic meters in the period
1960-66 (Figure 47). In the same period, the share
of fuelwood in total wood removals from government
forests has remained rather constant. However, the
relative importance of fuelwood in the total energy
balance declined from 18% in 1950 to an estimated
8%-10% in 1966. In Soviet industry, the share of
fuelwood in the energy balance declined from 9% in
1950 to 3% in 1966.
The bulk of the fuelwood removed from govern-
ment forests originated in the European U.S.S.R., the
'Total fuelwood production is roughly divided at about one-
third as removals from government forests (centrally planned,
controlled and reported cuttings) and about two-thirds as re-
movals from nongovernmental forests (self-suppliers, collective
farm forests). Soviet forestry officials estimate total fuelwood
production at roughly 300 million cubic meters annually, of
which nearly 102 million cubic meters were from government
forests in 1966.
Central and Urals regions being the most important
producing areas.
(2) Industrial wood - Figure 46 gives the
major end use categories of industrial wood removed
from government forests.7 Sawiog removals, the raw
wood used for the manufacture of lumber, is the
most important category of industrial wood. In the
period 1960-65, roughly 60% of total industrial
wood removals was accounted for by sawlogs, the
share of the latter decreasing from about 62%-63%
in 1960-62 to about 59% in 1964-65 as other cate-
gories of end uses increased in importance.
Construction timber is the second largest category
of industrial wood. Since most of the lumber pro-
duced from sawlogs is used in the construction in-
dustry, this industry is the principal consumer of in-
dustrial wood. The remainder of the sawlogs are
processed for containers.
Pitprops and pulpwood are the next two most im-
portant categories of industrial wood. The production
of pitprops has remained relatively constant. This
has been accompanied by a reduction in the amount
of pitprops used per 1,000 tons of coal mined by the
coal industry (the coal industry accounts for about
three-quarters of the total consumption of pitprops).
The production of pulpwood has increased from ap-
proximately 10 million cubic meters in 1955 to ap-
proximately 21 million cubic meters in 1965. In recent
years, the Soviet authorities have stressed the im-
portance of increasing the production of pulpwood
products (paper, cardboard, etc.). As a result, com-
bined production of paper and cardboard increased
from about 2.4 million metric tons in 1955 to about
4.7 million metric tons in 1965 and a further increase
to about 8.6 million metric tons is scheduled for 1970.
The pulp and paper industry has developed in closer
proximity to the raw material base than has the saw-
milling industry.
Railroad tie production accounts for the other im-
portant category of industrial wood; removals for this
item have remained relatively constant in recent years.
The railroad ties industry also has developed in closer
proximity to the source of raw material than has the
sawmilling industry. Most of the railroad ties in the
U.S.S.R. are fabricated from conifers.
(3) Lumber - Lumber is the most important
wood product. The U.S.S.R. ranks fifth behind the
United States, Canada, Finland, and Sweden in per
capita consumption of lumber and first in total lumber
production-nearly one-third of the world total. Co-
niferous lumber accounts for 85% of the total pro-
'There are no estimates of the quantity of industrial wood
removed from nongovernmental forests, i.e., collective farm
forests, since World War H. About 25 million cubic meters
were removed from nongovernmental forests in 1928.
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duction. Annual production of lumber has been as
follows (in millions of cubic meters):
1950
...................
49.5
1955
...................
75.6
1958
...................
93.7
1960
...................
105.6
1961
...................
104.3
1962
...................
104.6
1963
...................
106.4
1964
...................
110.9
1965
...................
110.8
1966
...................
107.0
Fluctuations in industrial log output (Figure 47) gen-
erally are reflected in the production of lumber. For
example, declines in the output of industrial logs in
1961 and 1965-66 resulted in declines also in the
production of lumber in those years.
Figure 28 indicates the regional production of lum-
ber and Figure 29 shows principal sawmilling and
wood-processing centers. Actually, sawmilling and
wood-processing facilities are much more widely dis-
tributed than indicated by the map of the major
centers. For example, in 1962 there were 41,600 saw-
mills scattered throughout the U.S.S.R. employing
336,000 workers. Only 300 of the total, however, were
considered major enterprises. These 300 sawmills
employed 20% of the labor force, produced 30%
of the lumber, and averaged 105,000 cubic meters of
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