U.S.S.R. MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000100030002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 176
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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MANUFACTURING and
CONSTRUCTION
DECEMBER 1967
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
This Section 64 supersedes the one dated Jan-
uary 1964, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
A. General .......................................................... 1
1. Introduction ................................................... 1
2. Growth of industry ............................................. 2
3. Importance of the manufacturing and construction industries ........ 4
4. Production .................................................... 5
5. Investment .................................................... 5
6. Management of industry ........................................ 7
7. Foreign trade .................................................. 8
B. Industrial machinery and equipment ................................ 9
1. Agricultural machinery ......................................... 9
a. Introduction ................................................. 9
b. Production .................................................. 10
(1) Location ................................................ 10
(2) Volume and mix ........................................ 10
(3) Facilities ............................................... 11
(4) Major problems ......................................... 11
c. Foreign trade ................................................ 11
2. Tractors ....................................................... 12
a. Introduction ................................................ 12
b. Organization ................................................ 12
c. Production .................................................. 12
d. Raw materials supply ........................................ 13
e. Technology ................................................. 13
3. Machine tools .................................................. 13
a. Introduction ................................................. 13
b. Production and plans ......................................... 14
(1) Production .............................................. 14
(2) Plans ................................................... 15
(3) Investment ............................................. 16
(4) Distribution and inventory .......................... .... 16
(5) Foreign trade ........................................... 16
(6) Quality ................................................. 16
4. Electric power equipment ....................................... 17
a. Introduction ................................................ 17
b. Technology ................................................. 17
c. Turbines .................................................... 18
d. Generators .................................................. 19
e. Boilers ...................................................... 19
f. Electric motors and transformers .............................. 19
g. Electric wire and cable ....................................... 19
h. Foreign trade ................................................ 20
5. Machinery for extraction of fuels ................................ 20
a. Coal mining machinery ...................................... 20
(1) Introduction ............................................ 20
(2) Production ............................................. 20
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(3) Technology ............................................. 21
(4) Foreign trade ........................................... 21
b. Petroleum machinery and equipment .......................... 22
(1) Oilfield equipment ...................................... 22
(2) Refinery equipment ...................................... 24
6. Chemical equipment ............................................ 24
a. Introduction ................................................ 24
b. Organization and location .................................... 24
c. Production .................................................. 25
(1) Volume ................................................ 25
(2) Difficulties .............................................. 25
d. Foreign trade ............................................... 25
7. Locomotives and railroad cars ................................... 25
a. Introduction ................................................ 25
b. Production .................................................. 25
(1) Locomotives ............................................ 25
(a) Diesel .............................................. 26
(b) Electric ............................................ 26
(2) Freight cars ............................................. 27
c. Foreign trade ................................................ 27
(1) Imports ................................................ 27
(2) Exports ................................................ 27
8. Metallurgical equipment ........................................ 27
a. General .................................................... 27
b. Structure of the industry ...................................... 28
c. Production .................................................. 28
d. Technology ................................................. 29
e. Foreign trade ................................................ 30
9. Construction equipment ......................................... 31
a. Introduction ................................................ 31
b. Production .................................................. 31
(1) Volume ................................................ 31
(2) Quality ................................................. 31
(3) Product assortment ...................................... 31
c. Trade ...................................................... 32
10. Electronic computers ........................................... 32
a. General ..................................................... 32
b. Production .................................................. 32
c. Production facilities .......................................... 32
d. Types of computers .......................................... 32
e. Technology ................................................. 33
f. Administration .............................................. 33
g. Application ................................................. 33
h. Application limitations ........................................ 34
i. Trade ...................................................... 34
C. Vehicles ......................................................... 34
1. Introduction ................................................... 34
2. Civilian vehicles ................................................ 34
a. Economics of the industry .................................... 34
(1) Production .............................................. 34
(2) Raw materials ........................................... 35
(3) Components and subassemblies ............................ 35
(4) Mechanization and automation ............................ 35
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(5) Supply and use .......................................... 35
(6) Foreign trade ........................................... 36
b. Principal producers .......................................... 37
3. Specialized military vehicles ..................................... 37
a. Production .................................................. 37
b. Principal producers .......................................... 39
D. Aircraft production ............................................... 39
1. General ....................................................... 39
2. Administration ................................................. 41
3. Production .................................................... 41
a. Bombers .................................................... 41
b. Fighters .................................................... 43
c. Transports .................................................. 44
d. Helicopters ................................................. 45
e. Miscellaneous aircraft ........................................ 46
f. Aircraft engines .............................................. 46
4. Sources of supply ............................................... 47
5. Research and development ...................................... 47
E. Shipbuilding ..................................................... 47
1. General ....................................................... 47
a. Background ................................................. 47
b. Exports ..................................................... 48
c. Imports ..................................................... 48
2. Production and repair .......................................... 48
a. Merchant ships .............................................. 48
b. Naval construction ........................................... 49
c. Repair activities ............................................. 50
3. Economic resources and requirements ............................ 50
a. Components ................................................ 50
b. Manpower .................................................. 50
4. Shipyards ..................................................... 51
5. Prospects for the industry ....................................... 53
F. Explosives (industrial and military) ......' .......................... 53
1. Introduction ................................................... 53
2. Constituent materials ........................................... 53
3. Industrial explosives ............................................ 54
4. Military explosives ............................................... 54
5. Principal producers ............................................ 54
G. Arms and ammunition ............................................ 55
1. Introduction ................................................... 55
2. Production, supply, and use ..................................... 55
3. Raw materials and manufacturing facilities ........................ 56
4. Principal producers ............................................. 57
H. Missiles and space equipment ...................................... 57
1. Introduction ................................................... 57
2. Missiles and engines developed and produced .................... 58
3. Principal production and test facilities ............................ 64
4. Missile propulsion .............................................. 68
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5. Import and export of missiles and components .................... 69
6. Sources of supply .............................................. 69
1. Other military equipment .......................................... 69
1. Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare materiel and
countermateriel .............................................. 69
a. Strategic supply position for finished products .................. 69
(1) General ................................................ 69
(2) Production .............................................. 69
b. Raw materials ............................................... 70
c. Imports and exports .......................................... 70
d. Plants ...................................................... 70
2. Military engineering equipment (bridging and stream-crossing, camou-
flage, infrared, and topographic) .............................. 71
a. General .................................................... 71
b. Strategic supply position of finished products .................. 71
(1) Bridging and stream-crossing equipment .................... 71
(2) Camouflage equipment .................................. 71
(3) Infrared equipment ...................................... 71
(4) Topographic equipment .................................. 72
3. Instruments, gages, and servomotors of special military interest ...... 72
4. Quartermaster supplies .......................................... 72
5. Optical and photographic equipment of military value .............. 73
a. General ................................................... 73
b. Production and supply ........................................ 73
6. Medical supplies and equipment ................................ 73
J. Electronic equipment .............................................. 74
1. General ...................................................... 74
a. Production .................................................. 74
b. Products and principal producers .............................. 75
(1) Radio and television equipment and related components ...... 75
(2) Wire and cable equipment .............................. 76
(3) Other electronic equipment .............................. 76
2. Foreign trade .................................................. 77
K. Chemicals and allied products ...................................... 77
1. Introduction ................................................... 77
a. Importance .................................................. 77
b. Development ................................................ 78
c. Location .................................................. 78
d. Foreign trade ............................................... 80
2. Industrial chemicals ............................................ 80
a. Sulfuric acid ................................................. 80
b. Synthetic ammonia .......................................... 80
c. Nitric acid .................................................. 81
d. Benzol, toluol, and phenol .................................... 81
e. Ethyl alcohol ................................................ 82
f. Chlor-alkali products ......................................... 82
3. Fertilizers and pesticides ........................................ 83
a. Mineral fertilizers ............................................ 83
(1) Introduction ............................................ 83
(2) Production ............................................ 83
(3) Supply ................................................. 84
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b. Pesticides .................................................. 84
(1) Introduction ............................................ 84
(2) Production and supply .................................. 84
4. Rubber ....................................................... 85
a. General ..................................................... 85
b. Production and consumption .................................. 85
(1) Production ............................................ 85
(2) Consumption ........................................... 85
5. Plastics ........................................................ 85
a. Introduction ................................................. 85
b. Production .................................................. 86
c. Consumption ................................................ 86
6. Manmade fibers ................................................ 86
a. Introduction ................................................. 86
b. Production .................................................. 87
(1) Volume ................................................ 87
(2) Mix .................................................... 87
(3) Problems ............................................... 87
(4) Organization and location ................................ 87
L. Processed food products ............................................ 87
1. Introduction ................................................... 87
2. Production .................................................... 88
a. General ..................................................... 88
b. Major processed foods ........................................ 88
(1) Meat ................................................... 88
(2) Dairy products 89
..........................................
(3) Sugar .................................................. 89
(4) Vegetable oil ............................................ 90
(5) Canned foods ........................................... 90
(6) Flour and bread ......................................... 91
3. Capital investment ............................................. 91
M. Consumer goods .................................................. 91
1. Introduction ................................................... 91
a. General ..................................................... 91
b. Labor force ................................................. 92
c. Production and consumption .................................. 93
d. Foreign trade ............................................... 93
2. Textiles ....................................................... 93
a. Cotton cloth ................................................. 93
(1) Introduction ............................................ 93
(2) Production and consumption .............................. 93
...........................................
(3) Foreign trade 94
b. Wool cloth .................................................. 94
(1) Introduction- ............................................ 94
(2) Production and consumption .............................. 95
c. Cloth of manmade fiber and natural silk ...................... 95
(1) General ................................................. 95
/ (2) Production ............................................. 95
d. Linen cloth ................................................. 98
(1) General ................................................ 96
(2) Production .............................................. 96
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3. Apparel ....................................................... 96
a. Knitwear .................................................... 96
b. Sewn garments .............................................. 96
(1) General ................................................ 96
(2) Production and consumption .............................. 97
c. Footwear .................................... 97
...............
(1) Leather footwear ........................................ 97
(2) Rubber footwear ........................................ 97
4. Tires and industrial rubber products ............................. 97
a. Tires ..... 97
b. Miscellaneous rubber goods ................................... 98
5. Paper and paperboard .......................................... 98
a. General ..................................................... 98
b. Production .................................................. 99
c. Consumption ................................................ 99
d. Foreign trade ................................................ 99
6. Durable consumer goods ........................................ 99
a. Introduction ................................................ 99
b. Production and consumption .................................. 100
N. Construction ..................................................... 101
1. Introduction ................................................... 101
2. Organization ................................................... 101
3. Volume of construction work .................................... 103
a. Comparison with the United States ............................. 103
b. Housing .................................................... 103
c. Quality of construction ....................................... 103
4. Industrialization of construction .................................. 104
a. Introduction ................................................. 104
b. Equipment .................................................. 104
c. Use of standard designs ........................ ........ 105
d. Use of precast concrete ................ ...... 105
.................
5. Cost of construction ............................................ 105
6. Labor ......................................................... 106
7. Construction programming ...................................... 107
a. Planning .................................................... 107
b. Materials supply ............................................. 107
c. Unfinished construction projects ............................... 107
8. Current problems .............................................. 107
0. Statistical data ................................................ IOR
Page
Fig. 1 Comparison of Soviet and U.S. output of key heavy industry products (table) ......................................... 1
Fig. 2 Estimated gross national product, by sector of origin (chart) .... 1
Fig. 3 Employment in manufacturing and construction (table) ........ 4
Fig. 4 Major industrial projects under construction, 1967 (map) ...... 6
Fig. 5 Total capital investment in manufacturing industries (table) .... 7
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Fig. 6
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Rates of growth of industrial gross fixed investment, by branch
(table) ..................................................
7
Fig. 7
Percentage distribution of manufactured goods in foreign trade
(chart) .................................................
8
Fig. 8
Production of basic types of agricultural machines (table) ......
10
Fig. 9
Models of Soviet tractors and grain combines (photos) ........
11
Fig. 10
Estimated production of major types of tractors (table) ........
12
Fig. 11
Mass production of lathes (photo) ...........................
14
Fig. 12
Transfer machine in automatic transfer machine tool line (photo)
15
Fig. 13
Production of electric power equipment (table) ................
17
Fig. 14
Total capacity of boilers produced (table) ....................
19
Fig. 15
Production of mainline locomotives, by type (table) ............
26
Fig. 16
Models of mainline locomotives (photos) ....................
26
Fig. 17
Production of freight and passenger cars (table) ..............
27
Fig. 18
Exports and imports of railroad equipment (table) ............
27
Fig. 19
Models of Soviet computers (photos) ........................
33
Fig. 20
Recent models of Soviet motor vehicles (photos) ..............
36
Fig. 21
Exports of Soviet motor vehicles and parts, by type (table) ......
36
Fig. 22
Estimated production of military vehicles (table) ..............
38
Fig. 23
Estimated production of aircraft, by model (table) ............
42
Fig. 24
Location of airframe plants (map) ..........................
43
Fig. 25
Soviet merchant ship completions (table) ..:..................
48
Fig. 26
Newer types of Soviet merchant ships (photos) ................
49
Fig. 27
Newer types of Soviet naval vessels (photos) ..................
51
Fig. 28
Location of shipbuilding and ship-repairing industry (map) ....
52
Fig. 29
Estimated production of ground weapons (table) ..............
56
Fig. 30
Location of missile airframe and rocket engine plants (map) ....
65
Fig. 31
Production of major chemicals and allied products (table) ......
78
Fig. 32
Location of major chemical plants (map) ....................
79
Fig. 33
Raw materials structure of sulfuric acid production (table) ......
80
Fig. 34
Raw materials for the production of ammonia (table) ..........
81
Fig. 35
Production of ethyl alcohol, by source (table) ..................
82
Fig. 36
Production of mineral fertilizers (table) ......................
84
Fig. 37
Production of pesticides (table) .............................
84
Fig. 38
Relative shares of the major branches of the food industry (table)
88
Fig. 39
Comparison of Soviet and U.S. production of selected consumer
goods (table) ............................................
92
Fig. 40
Production of textile fabrics, by type (table) ..................
94
Fig. 41
Production of footwear (table) ..............................
97
Fig. 42
Soviet production of tires (table) ............................
98
Fig. 43
Production of selected durable consumer goods (table) ........
100
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44
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Fig. 45
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U.S. (chart) ............................................. 101
Production of furniture (table) .............................. 101
Fig. 46
Number of independent contract construction firms, according
to subordination (table) ..................................
102
Fig. 47
Central administrative structure of construction industry (chart). .
102
Fig. 48
Volume of construction-installation work (table) ..............
103
Fig. 49
Comparison of value of construction: U.S.S.R. and U.S. (chart) ..
103
Fig. 50
Use of standard designs in construction (table) ..............
105
Fig. 51
Use of precast concrete and concrete structurals (table) ........
106
Fig. 52
Percentage distribution of costs of construction (table) ..........
106
Fig. 53
Value of unfinished construction in state sector (table) ..........
107
Fig. 54
Production of major types of manufactured goods (table) ......
108
Fig. 55
Major producers of agricultural machinery (table) ..............
109
Fig. 56
Exports of agricultural machinery, by value and destination (table)
110
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Fig. 57 Imports of agricultural machinery, by value and origin (table) .. 110
Fig. 58 Major tractor production and assembly plants (table) ........... 111
Fig. 59 Major producers of machine tools (table) ...................... 112
Fig. 60 Production of machine tools (table) .......................... 112
Fig. 61 Major producers of electric power equipment (table) .......... 113
Fig. 62 Producers of coal mining machinery (table) ................... 114
Fig. 63 Production of coal mining equipment (table) .................. 115
Fig. 64 Inventory of underground coal mining machinery and equipment
(table) .................................................. 116
Fig. 65 Exports of coal mining equipment, by destination (table) ....... 116
Fig. 66 Exports of coal mining equipment, by volume and value (table) .. 116
Fig. 67 Major producers of oilfield equipment (table) ................. 117
Fig. 68 Foreign trade in oilfield equipment (table) .................... 118
Fig. 69 Major producers of chemical equipment (table) ................ 119
Fig. 70 Imports of chemical equipment, by value (table) .............. 119
Fig. 71 Major producers of locomotives and railroad cars (table) ....... 120
Fig. 72 Characteristics of major Soviet mainline locomotives (table) .... 120
Fig. 73 Major producers of metallurgical equipment (table) ........... 121
Fig. 74 Exports of metallurgical equipment, by destination (table) ...... 122
Fig. 75 Imports of metallurgical equipment, by origin (table) ........... 122
Fig. 76 Production of construction equipment (table) ................. 123
Fig. 77 Trade in principal categories of construction equipment (table) .. 123
Fig. 78 Exports of Soviet motor vehicles, by type and destination (table) .. 123
Fig. 79 Producers of civilian motor vehicles (table) ................... 124
Fig. 80 Producers of armored and specialized military vehicles (table) .. 126
Fig. 81 Estimated production of aircraft, by type (table) .............. 127
Fig. 82 Estimated production of selected aircraft not in production after
1961 (table) ............................................. 128
Fig. 83 Descriptions of airframe plants (table) ....................... 129
Fig. 84 Descriptions of aircraft engine plants (table) .................. 130
Fig. 85 Merchant vessel completions by other Communist countries for
the U.S.S.R. (table) ...................................... 131
Fig. 86 Principal surface combatant vessel and submarine completions
(table) .................................................. 132
Fig. 87 Estimated production of explosives (table) .................... 133
Fig. 88 Estimated consumption of explosives raw materials (table) ...... 134
Fig. 89 Major producers of intermediates, explosives, and propellants
(table) .................................................. 134
Fig. 90 Producers of ammunition and major components (table) ........ 136
Fig. 91 Producers of infantry weapons (table) ........................ 137
Fig. 92 Producers of artillery (table) ................................ 137
Fig. 93 Production of missiles, by model (table) ...................... 138
Fig. 94 Missile airframe assembly plants (table) ...................... 140
Fig. 95 Missile rocket engine production plants (table) ................ 141
Fig. 96 Soviet exports of missiles (table) ............................ 142
Fig. 97 Producers of infrared, topographic, and military precision optical
and photographic equipment (table) ....................... 143
Fig. 98 Producers of instruments, gages, and servomotors of special mili-
tary interest (table) ...................................... 144
Fig. 99 Principal telecommunications equipment plants (table) ......... 145
Fig. 100 Value of foreign trade in chemicals and allied products (table) ... 147
Fig. 101 Selected producers of sulfuric acid (table) .................... 148
Fig. 102 Major producers of ammonia and nitric acid (table) ............ 148
Fig. 103 Selected producers of chlorine, caustic soda, and soda ash (table) . 149
Fig. 104 Selected fertilizer plants( table) .............................. 150
Fig. 105 Soviet synthetic rubber plants (table) ........................ 151
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Fig. 106 Selected producers of plastics (table) ........................ 152
Fig. 107 Soviet producers of manmade fibers (table) .................... 153
Fig. 108 Production of important types of processed foods (table) ....... 154
Fig. 109 Foreign trade in selected consumer goods (table) .............. 155
Fig. 110 Major combines of the cotton textile industry (table) .......... 156
Fig. 111 Major combines of the wool textile industry (table) ............ 156
Fig. 112 Producers of textiles of manmade fibers and natural silk (table) .. 157
Fig. 113 Major producers of linen textiles (table) ...................... 157
Fig. 114 Major producers of leather footwear (table) ................... 158
Fig. 115 Major plants of the paper industry (table) .................... 158
Fig. 116 Producers of household refrigerators (table) .................. 159
Fig. 117 Producers of household washing machines (table) .............. 159
Fig. 118 Construction of housing (table) ............................. 160
Fig. 119 Mechanization of construction work, by type (table) ............ 160
Fig. 120 Complex mechanization of construction work, by type (table) ... 161
Fig. 121 Average number of workers and employees in construction (table) 161
Fig. 122 Production of wall materials (table) ......................... 161
Fig. 123 Sketches of Soviet aircraft (sketches) ...: ............. follows 163
This section was prepared for the NIS under the general super-
vision of the Central Intelligence Agency. Contributors of subsec-
tions were: A, B (except B2), K, L, M, N, Central Intelligence
Agency; B2, C, D, E (with Navy assistance), F, G, H, I, J, Defense
Intelligence Agency; 0 and P, joint.
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Manufacturing and Construction
A. General
1. Introduction
The U.S.S.R. is an industrial power ranking second
only to the United States, even though it lags far
behind in total output. Soviet gross national product
(GNP) in 1966 was only 47% of that of the United
States. Moreover, the rate of growth of Soviet GNP
has declined somewhat in recent years, falling from
an annual average of 61/2% in the 1950's to less than
5% in the first half of the 1960's. Net industrial out-
put between 1950 and 1966 nearly quadrupled-in-
creasing at an average annual rate of 81/2%.
The U.S.S.R. possesses large supplies of most of the
natural resources needed by an industrial nation. It
has coal, petroleum, and water power in abundance,
as well as large deposits of iron ore, copper, and most
of the leading types of minerals. However, some of
these resources are located in severely cold regions of
the north, far from the industrial centers, so that their
utilization is difficult and extremely costly. FIGURE 1
compares Soviet output of important heavy industry
products with U.S. outputs for selected years.
The industrial sector has continued to increase its
share in the total structure of the Soviet economy.
As depicted graphically in FIGURE 2, the relative im-
portance of industry in the U.S.S.R.'s GNP increased
from 31% in 1955 to 37% in 1966. For the same
period, the share claimed by construction increased
from 8% to 11%.
FIGURE 2. ESTIMATED GROSS NATIONAL PROD-
UCT, BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN
FIGURE 1. COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. OUTPUT OF KEY HEAVY INDUSTRY
PRODUCTS
Metals:
Pig iron and blast furnace
ferroalloys.
Steel-crude ...........
Primary aluminum. - - - .
Copper ................
Energy :
Coal of all types....... .
Petroleum products .... .
Natural gas............
Electric power .........
Of which, hydro..... .
....do ................
Thousand metric tons...
....do ................
Million metric tons .....
....do ................
Billion cubic meters.....
Billion kilowatt hours.. .
....do ................
U.
S. S. R.
P
C
AS
ER-
ENT
OF
U.S.
1
965
54.9 65.3 91.0 119.0
76.5
510.0 630.0 1,025.0 2,499.0
41.0
406.3 490.0 770.0 1,956.8
39.3
493.0 510.0 578.0 478.0
121.0
92.7 116.1 177.0 423.7
41.8
28.0 45.0 128.0 454.0
28.2
235.4 292.3 506.7 1,230.0
41.2
46.5 50.9 81.4 197.0
41.3
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The high rates of growth of industrial production
during the late 1940's and early 1950's were the result
of a number of favorable circumstances. First, re-
covery from wartime disruption made possible rapid
industrial growth during the 1950's. Second, gains in
productivity-the efficiency with which inputs are
used-were high during this period because of im-
provements in production techniques, training of the
Domestic Trade
Transportation
Services 17
Communications
construction
Indus`ry
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labor force, and economies associated with the in-
creasing scale of operation as industry expanded.
Third, industrial technology in the U.S.S.R. was far
behind the advanced countries in the West and there
were rich opportunities for borrowing and catching up.
Important gains thus were made in adopting advanced
processed technology as new plants were built or
reequipped.
A general decline in industrial growth since the late
1950's, attributable primarily to a decline in produc-
tivity gains has been cause for official concern. Out-
put of industrial branches of industry has expanded at
widely differing rates, but almost all branches have
experienced some decline in the rate of growth. The
average annual growth rate of consumer soft goods
(textiles, clothing, and footwear) experienced a
marked decline-from 81% during 1951-60 to 4%
during 1961-66. The decline in the growth of civilian
machinery was somewhat less, but still significant-
from 11%% to 81/2%.
Soviet planners, in spite of overall progress, have
not had sufficient resources to meet the competing re-
quirements of defense, industrial growth, scientific
achievement, and improvements in consumer welfare.
Far from being an affluent society, the U.S.S.R. none-
theless has been able to allocate its resources so that
the high priority goals of the economy could be met.
The manufacturing and construction industries have
made a major contribution to growth of the Soviet
economy. Within manufacturing, the machine build-
ing industries-the producers of civilian machinery
and military end-items-have made especially rapid
advances. Soviet planners accord a high priority to
machine building to ensure self-sufficiency in military
production and in the growth-supporting heavy in-
dustries such as iron and steel and electric power.
The U.S.S.R. has developed a high capability to pro-
duce not only the industrially important machine tools,
but also a highly sophisticated output of military air-
craft, guided missiles and space systems, nuclear power
reactors, and electronic computers. At present, So-
viet production of machine tools, railroad passenger
cars, conventional weapons, mainline locomotives, trac-
tors, and grain combines, surpasses U.S. production of
each of these commodities. In units of metalcutting
machine tools, the U.S.S.R. now outproduces the
United States nearly 3 to 1.
In the production of military end-items and the
development of advanced weapons systems, the
U.S.S.R. has reached perhaps its highest level of per-
formance. At a time when military progress has
brought about many new technical problems involv-
ing the use of new materials, new processes, new
equipment, and new requirements for specialized labor
skills, Soviet industry has demonstrated the ability
to design and produce advanced weapons systems.
Although bomber production is declining, the U.S.S.R.
is presently producing surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles with ranges up to 6,500 nautical miles, as
well as surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air mis-
siles. It is estimated that the U.S.S.R. probably has
produced hundreds of ICBM's, and several thousand
ballistic missiles with ranges less than the ICBM. The
U.S.S.R. exports guided missiles to the Warsaw Pact
countries, Yugoslavia, Cuba, the Communist coun-
tries of the Far East, and some to various non-Com-
munist countries.
The high order of Soviet military production is also
evident in the naval construction program, which now
is concentrating on the production of nuclear sub-
marines, with and without missile capabilities. Fi-
nally, the U.S.S.R. has attained world leadership in
producing conventional weapons.
In other branches of manufacturing, the U.S.S.R.
lags far behind the West in the use of modern pro-
duction techniques. Some Soviet manufacturing proc-
esses are archaic. Foundry and metalforming produc-
tion is especially backward; materials handling equip-
ment is lacking in much of Soviet industry; obsolete
models often remain in production; spare parts pro-
duction is a chronic problem; and antiquated ma-
chinery often continues in use irrespective of cost.
In spite of attempts on the part of the Soviet leader-
ship to raise the priority of manufactured consumer
goods, a wide disparity still exists between industries
manufacturing producer goods and those manufactur-
ing consumer goods. The processed food industries
are especially backward in terms of quality and vari-
ety of product and processing technology. Light in-
dustry has a poor record in terms of the goods pro-
duced and in manufacturing performance. Production
of household appliances is increasing rapidly although
output is still far short of demand. Quality of appli-
ances is such that few would be salable in U.S. mar-
kets. Production of the new plastics, fibers, and petro-
chemical products has lagged far behind achievements
of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Japan.
2. Growth of industry
Soviet industrial production during 1959-66 in-
creased at an average annual rate of about 7% (based
on valued-added weighted indexes of intermediate and
final products), a high rate of growth-even though
substantially below the 10% increase achieved during
1950-58. Within the manufacturing industries, the
chemical industry increased at the highest average an-
nual rate of growth of 12% and light industry at the
lowest rate of 41/2%. Rates of growth of industrial
production, both Soviet official and U.S. estimated, for
J
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all of industry and by branch of manufacturing for
the period 1959-66 are given below (1958=100) :
OFFICIAL SOVIET ESTIMATED VALUE-
GROSS VALUE INDEX ADDED INDEX
INDEX
Industry .............. 200
Machine building and
metalworking ...... 265
Chemical industry .... 277
Light industry ....... 143
Food industry ....... 170
RATE INDEX RATE
9.1 173 7.1
13.1 183 7.8
13.6 248 12.0
4.6 142 4.5
6.8 158 5.9
Whereas the official Soviet index usually shows a
higher rate of increase than the estimated value-added
index, the latter confirms the substantial growth
achieved in Soviet industry.*
The rapid growth in industrial production that char-
acterized the 1950's was not maintained during the first
half of the 1960's, as many of the advantages for rapid
growth began to run out. As the level of technology
rose, the potential gains from borrowing tended to
diminish. Some slowing of growth occurred because
supplies of raw materials in many parts of industry
did not keep pace with requirements. Later, al-
though inputs improved, expected gains were par-
tially offset by a drop in productivity. For example,
the skills of industrial workers, although considerably
higher than in the 1950's, ceased to improve as rapidly
as before. Also, the rate of growth of investment in
industry during the 1960's was much lower than in
the 1950's and could not support as high a rate of
growth of industrial output. The average annual rate
of growth in industrial investment of almost 12% in
1951-60 fell to 6%% in 1961-66; consequently, plant
managers in many cases were obliged to keep obsoles-
cent equipment in operation and thereby further con-
tributed to slowing down the growth of productivity.
Some of the U.S.S.R.'s natural resources of better
quality or more favorable location are gradually be-
coming exhausted, and new industrial growth requires
the exploitation of resources further removed from in-
dustrial centers. For example, Siberia contains four-
fifths of the nation's hydroelectric potential, an equally
large share of its timber reserves, three-fourths of the
known coal reserves, and two-thirds of the oil reserves.
Soviet planners now must turn to these resources de-
spite the difficulties in recruiting labor and the dis-
advantages of higher transportation costs.
Another deterrent to rapid industrial growth is the
expansion of military-space programs that use top-
Western economists are generally agreed that the official
Soviet index based on gross value of industrial output
overstates growth. The estimated index, based on 1960
value-added weights, is an independent measure of Soviet
industrial growth. The official Soviet indexes are in-
cluded, however, to permit future Soviet announcements
to be compared with past trends.
quality materials, complex machinery, and specialized
personnel. These resources would otherwise be used
in civilian industry and would help to maintain former
levels of growth. In addition, Soviet military aid to
Vietnam has been increasing.
Even though the U.S.S.R. has not had sufficient re-
sources to meet all of the competing requirements for
national defense, industrial growth, scientific achieve-
ment, and improvements in consumer welfare, Soviet
planners have tried to maintain a careful balance be-
tween priority goals and less important sectors of the
economy. Thus, the U.S.S.R. has been able, on the
whole, to support large military and space programs,
to maintain a substantial though lower rate of growth
for industry, to modernize and reequip a large share
of industry, and gradually to improve consumer
welfare.
A number of particular obstacles are now making
it difficult for the Soviets to achieve some of their
planned growth. A shortage of steel has been limit-
ing industrial expansion to some extent, a problem
that the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was
seeking to alleviate by boosting sharply investment
in the steel industry. Having previously lost status
as a result of Khrushchev's high priority chemicals
program, the steel industry has risen again on the
scale of national priorities under the Brezhnev-Kosygin
leadership.
The U.S.S.R. has been unable to move ahead as
fast as its planners desire in certain areas of manu-
facturing which are of benefit primarily to the con-
sumer; for example, in the development of synthetic
fibers, plastics, and other synthetic materials; in mod-
ernizing the textile industry; and in providing modern
equipment for laundry and dry cleaning establish-
ments. A subsidiary of Courtaulds, the United King-
dom's largest textile consortium, contracted in 1967
to supply the U.S.S.R. with plant and machinery for
an acrylic fiber factory valued at more than $26
million. This firm supplied five other fiber plants to
the U.S.S.R. in previous years. Two large textile
plants for spinning and weaving blends of wool and
synthetic fiber were being built in 1967 under con-
tracts signed with Italian firms. Commercial laundry
equipment is to be produced in the U.S.S.R. under
a cooperative agreement with Fisher Bendix of the
United Kingdom. Self-service laundries using U.K.
and U.S. equipment are already' operating in several
Soviet cities.
The U.S.S.R. is also looking to Western firms for
help in expanding and modernizing its automotive
industry. The dawn of the automobile era in the
U.S.S.R. has been slow in breaking, but the decision
in 1966 to promote production of passenger cars
brought the country one step nearer the automotive
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age. A plant to be built in the U.S.S.R. at Tol'yatti
(formerly Stavropol) by the Fiat Company of Italy
will be capable of producing 600,000 automobiles a
year when operating at capacity and will be the
single most important addition to the industry as
presently constituted. In addition, the French auto-
motive firm, Renault, will assist in the modernization
of the Moskvich automotive plant in Moscow. U.S.-
built machine tools will be supplied to the plant built
by Fiat, as well as to a new automotive plant to be
built in the Moscow suburban area that will produce
automobiles of the Moskvich type. With the newly
built or expanded and modernized facilities, Soviet
production of automobiles probably could reach
460,000 by 1970, and 1.1 million by 1975. This would
provide the economy with an automobile stock in
1970 equal to that of the United States in 1917, and, on
a per capita basis, about 5% of the current U.S.
inventory. However, it seems unlikely that the 1970
goal of 700,000 to 800,000 automobiles will be reached
before 1972.
In development and production of electronic com-
puters, the U.S.S.R. also has failed to keep pace with
developments in the Industrial West. Obviously, this
lag has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from achieving
spectacular results in its military and space programs.
In the area of economic, business, and industrial ap-
plications of computers, however, the U.S.S.R. has
barely scratched the surface compared with progress
in the United States and other non-Communist
countries.
The lack of electronic data processing equipment
and the rudimentary state of development of this
branch of the computer industry are causing the
Soviet leadership considerable concern. The direc-
tives for the present Five Year Plan (1966-70) place
major emphasis on increasing the production of com-
puters, particularly those capable of handling large
amounts of data as opposed to earlier emphasis on
models designed to perform rapid calculations.
3. Importance of the manufacturing and construc-
tion industries
The manufacturing industries have made a major
contribution to the growth achieved by the Soviet
economy. In 1966, the four major branches of
manufacturing-machine building, food, light, and
chemical-accounted for approximately 54% of
total industrial production. The machine building in-
dustries-the producers of civilian machinery and
military end-items-have made especially rapid ad-
vances. Soviet planners accord a high priority to
such production to ensure maximum support for pro-
duction of military goods and the basic heavy indus-
tries such as the iron and steel and electric power
industries. The following tabulation compares the
relative importance of the branches of manufacturing
in 1966, based on estimated value-added data, shown
in percent of total:
All industry ............................... 100
Of which:
Manufacturing industries ................ 54
Machine building and metalworking .... 31
Light industry ....................... 10
Food industry ....................... 8
Chemical industry ................... 5
The manufacturing sector in 1966 employed about
65% of the industrial workers in Soviet state industry
(FIGURE 3). Employment in manufacturing in recent
years has increased at the same rate as the economy
as a whole. Total employment in Soviet industry in-
creased from approximately 21 million in 1958 to 28
million in 1966, an increase of 35%. During the same
period, total employment in manufacturing increased
from approximately 12 million to 171/2 million, an
increase of more than 40%.
Within industry, the size of the labor force varies
widely from one manufacturing sector to another.
Machine building and metalworking claim a larger
labor force than the other three branches of manufac-
turing combined. The machine building, light, and
food industries all are relatively labor intensive where-
as the chemical industry tends to be capital intensive.
Construction has contributed enormously to the de-
velopment of the productive base of the Soviet econ-
omy, but on the whole its performance has been below
planned levels. Total construction in 1966 was almost
21/2 times that in 1955, although the fastest growth
occurred during 1956-60, when an annual rate of 13%
was achieved. During the early 1960's, the rate of
increase dropped sharply, but by 1966 construction
had risen to an average annual rate of about 7%.
Housing construction has not been adequate to meet
the requirements of increasing urbanization and the
retirement of old housing in the cities and country-
side. In spite of official pledges to alleviate the short-
age, annual plans for housing construction have been
consistently underfulfilled. There has also been a de-
cline in housing built by individuals because of diffi-
culties in acquiring building sites and building
materials.
FIGURE 3. EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING
AND CONSTRUCTION
(Thousand persons)
1958 1
1966
All industry* ...........................
Of which:
20,807
28,100
Manufacturing industries** ..........
12,294
17,600
Machine building and metalworking.
5,951
9,300
Chemicals ........................
609
1,200
Light industry ....................
3,666
4,600
Food industry ....................
2,068
2,500
Construction .......................
4,442
5,760
* Totals.
** Figures for 1966 are estimated.
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The quality of construction also has been under
criticism, and the construction industries collectively
have been beset by problems arising from their un-
wieldy size, inefficiencies in mechanization, insuffi-
cient supply of skilled labor, and shortages of build-
ing materials. In spite of its numerous difficulties, the
industry has registered remarkable growth-especially
in the past 10 to 12 years, attributable mainly to in-
creases in the inventory of heavy construction equip-
ment, greater standardization of building designs,
and greater use of structural components made of
precast reinforced concrete. Growing at an average
annual rate of 8%% between 1955 and 1966, the
volume of construction installation work increased
from 12.8 billion rubles to 31.0 billion rubles. The
relative importance of construction in the Soviet
GNP is illustrated in FIGURE 2. FIGURE 4 shows some
of the major industrial construction projects under
way in the U.S.S.R. during 1967.
4. Production
Soviet industrial production is planned and carried
out according to priorities set by the Communist Party
and state leadership. Traditionally, Soviet policy
has favored production of producer goods, military
equipment, and-in more recent years-equipment
for the space program, all at the expense of con-
sumer goods production. Presently (1967), greater
than usual attention is being paid to the production
and distribution of consumer goods as planners strive
to match the production of goods more closely with
consumer's needs and tastes. The production of
consumer durables is receiving especially strong and
continuing support. FIGURE 54 lists the output of
important types of manufactured goods produced in
the U.S.S.R.
Even though many of the original Seven Year Plan
production goals for 1965 were revised or discarded,
fairly rapid growth was achieved by most of the
manufacturing industries during the 7-year plan for
1959-65. The machine building industry, according
to official pronouncements, overfulfilled its 1965 plan.
Even so, the heavy requirements for military and
space hardware restricted the ability of the machine
building industry to produce important machinery
items needed for industrial expansion. The production
of metalcutting and metalforming machine tools,
trucks, buses, and freight cars increased little or not
at all during the period. An additional strain was
imposed by the regime's determination to promote
unscheduled programs for the consumer. The pro-
duction of household appliances, particularly refrig-
erators and washing machines, increased at exceed-
ingly high rates of growth during 1959-65, and the
high growth rates are continuing.
The chemical industry exceeded by a considerable
margin the average rate of growth of output achieved
by total industry, but there were persistent problems
and specific shortages of production. Output of
plastics, resins, and synthetic fibers reached only a
fraction of the goals set by the original ambitious
7-year plan. Production of mineral fertilizers on the
other hand was relatively close to the planned level.
Growth of output of the food industry averaged
6% during the 7-year period, even though there were
wide fluctuations, caused in large part by adverse
weather conditions. On a per capita basis, however,
increases in total food consumption at around 2%
a year have been low during the 1960's. In 1958,
consumer hopes were high for improvements in the
quality and variety of food, particularly in the greater
availability of meat and dairy products. But because
of periodic setbacks in agriculture, which precluded
such quality improvements in the food supply, these
hopes in the main have not materialized.
The lower growth rate for light industry during
1959-65 was, to some extent, caused by materials
shortages, but a more pressing problem occurred in
the form of consumer resistance. Goods that were
produced but did not sell accumulated in retail and
wholesale networks, causing serious inventory prob-
lems. These included textiles, clothing, and foot-
wear of poor quality, unattractive design, or shoddy
workmanship. To prevent a continuing buildup of
surpluses, production goals had to be cut back for
a number of individual commodities. Some types or
models of light industrial goods were taken out of
production altogether, and the introduction of new
types of goods to replace them or to otherwise im-
prove the assortment tended to slow down produc-
tion rates. As a result, production of clothing and
some types of textiles increased little during the first
half of the 1960's.
5. Investment
Investment in the manufacturing industries has
grown as a share of total capital investments in Soviet
industry, accounting for almost 40% in 1965 com-
pared with only 30% in 1950. The machine building
industry, largest of the manufacturing branches in
terms of output and employment, also has consistently
received the largest share of investment in manu-
facturing, amounting to 16% in 1965. Meanwhile the
share of the chemical industry has almost trebled since
the early 1950's, reaching 11% in 1965. Light in-
dustry's share has remained at 3-4%, and the food
industry's share has ranged between 8% and 11%
since 1950. FIGURE 5 compares the distribution of
capital investment in the Soviet manufacturing indus-
tries in 1950 and 1965.
Large increases made in investment in the chem-
ical industry since the late 1950's reflect an attempt
to overcome the failure of the U.S.S.R. previously
to keep pace with the industrial West in the develop-
ment of chemicals. In spite of their importance to
military and industrial production, the Soviet chemical
industry had made only the most rudimentary begin-
nings in the development of the newer plastics and
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FIGURE 5. TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES*
Billion Percent
rubles of total
Billion Percent
rubles of total
Industry ............... 4.2 100 17.9 100
Manufacturing indus-
tries ............. 1.3 31 6.9 39
Machine building... .6 14 2.8 16
Chemical industry. . .2 5 1.9 11
Food industry...... .4 10 1.5 8
Light industry...... .1 2 0.7 4
* Total capital investment includes both centrally planned
and noncentrally planned investments. Data are in
constant 1955 planning prices, converted to new (1961)
rubles.
synthetic materials used widely abroad. Moreover,
in the Industrial West these new materials were re-
sponsible for dramatic new developments in produc-
tion of consumer goods and in many other industrial
lines. In 1958, the Soviets initiated a program to de-
velop large-scale production of synthetics, primarily
from byproducts of petroleum and natural gas, and
plans were made to obtain from the West new tech-
nology, prototypes of advanced equipment, and, in
some cases, entire plants. In 1963 Khrushchev an-
nounced still another new program to increase rapidly
the output of chemical fertilizers, synthetic fibers,
and plastics. An investment program of about 25
billion rubles was announced for the chemical indus-
try, and another 17 billion rubles for related indus-
tries during the remainder of the decade.
By 1965 the chemical industry, in spite of large
infusions of capital and labor, had fallen far short
of achieving goals set under the ambitious program.
Problems in carrying out the program stemmed mainly
from the complexity of modern chemical technology-
particularly in plastics and synthetic fibers-and the
difficulty which Soviet industry experienced in han-
dling the new technology. The industry has had
relatively less difficulty with its plans for chemical
fertilizers, which involve somewhat simpler produc-
tion processes, but fertilizer production in 1965 also
was below plan. One manifestation of these difficulties
was a decline in output relative to fixed capital. Out-
put more than doubled during the period 1959-65,
but fixed capital more than tripled.
Overall industrial investment during the 1966-70
period is to rise at an average annual rate of 8-87 %,
compared with 7% during 1961-65 (FICuRE 6), but
changes have been made in the planned composition
of this investment. In particular, Khrushchev's pro-
gram for "chemicalization" of the U.S.S.R. has been
reduced in scale. Investment plans for the consumer
industries sector for 1966-70 show that the light and
food industries are expected to get a larger share
of the total than in the preceding 5-year period when
the planned average annual growth rate of about
10% was cut back to about 21/2%. The planned in-
FIGURE 6. AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH
OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY,
BY BRANCH
(Percent)
1951- 11956- 1961- 1966-70
55 60 65 PLAN
Total investment in
industry ......... 12Y2 11 7 8-8%
Machine building ... 12% 9% 9 8%
Chemicals .......... 10% 27 16Y 11 2
Consumer goods .... 12 17 2y 14-16
crease in investment in machine building of 81/2%
represents a slight reduction below the rate of in-
crease in the two previous 5-year periods. By ac-
celerating the growth of investments in metals during
1966-70, the present leadership is attempting to correct
some of the provisions in earlier plans in which it
was erroneously assumed that availability of chemical
substitutes would significantly reduce the demand for
metals. Present shortages of steel reflect such error
of planning.
6. Management of industry
Before 1957, the Soviet Government administered
and directed the operation of enterprises in industries
of national importance (which included most of So-
viet industry) through a series of ministries organized
along functional lines. The activities of all economic
enterprises were coordinated through the State Plan-
ning Committee (Gosplan) and other planning organs.
Management of individual enterprises had little au-
thority over product mix, materials used, composition
of the labor force, or the use of available capital, and
prices and wage rates were fixed at higher administra-
tive levels. Although targets were set for numerous
measures of production, plant management was re-
warded primarily on the basis of gross output. In
1959-60, the system of bonuses for enterprise man-
agers was revised and the importance of another
criterion-cost' per ruble value of output-was en-
hanced. Even so, gross output continued to be the
success indicator of overriding importance.
From 1957 through 1965, most industrial enterprises
were administered and directed from thei center
through a system of economic councils (sovnarkhoz y )
organized on a geographical rather than a functional
basis. This system never worked smoothly and was
revised several times before being abandoned at the
end of 1965. On the whole, the operations of enter-
prises under the sovnarkhozy system had not differed
significantly from the earlier system of central admin-
istration.
In September 1965, the decision was made to re-
establish administration of industry along functional
rather than geographical lines. By the end of January
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1966, the administration of industry was being carried
out by 23 ministries.* In April 1967, a Ministry of
Medical Industries, an All-Union Ministry, was added
to the administrative system. A more important ad-
ministrative change was the approval of a number of
measures designed to increase the authority of enter-
prise managers and to restructure their incentive pro-
gram to induce them to use their new authority effi-
ciently. These new measures had been tested in more
than 400 enterprises in the months preceding the
change.
The reform gives enterprise managers greater au-
thority over the size and composition of the labor
force, wage and salary payment, and the use of capital.
The enterprises are to initiate and finance certain
investment projects themselves. Over time, managers
are to have greater control over inputs of materials
and over the product mix.
Some of the old success criteria-gross value of out-
put, cost per ruble value of output-and a host of
minor plan targets have been dropped. Still, irregular
supplies of materials, a chronic source of trouble in
the past, also has plagued the enterprises working un-
der the new system. Furthermore, there is little
indication that enterprise managers have yet gained an
appreciable amount of authority over their product mix
or materials inputs. Even so, there are official claims
that the reform has brought about better use of the
capital and other inputs available to the enterprises,
and has induced enterprise officials to improve the
quality of products and to adhere more faithfully to
delivery schedules.
7. Foreign trade
Soviet foreign trade increased from a total value
of about 7.8 billion rubles in 1958 to 14.5 billion
rubles in 1965-a near doubling during the Seven
Year Plan. Trade in manufactured goods has con-
tinued to account for 42-46% of total turnover. Man-
ufactured goods as a share of all exports remained
around 30% during this period (1959-65), whereas
for imports the share of manufactured goods rose
from 54% to 62% (in 1962 the share was as high
as 67%). FIGURE 7 shows the share of each of the
major categories of manufactured goods in total ex-
ports and imports in 1965.
In spite of the large volume of output of its manu-
facturing industries, the U.S.S.R. is a substantial net
importer of manufactured goods. Foreign trade data
' Ten of the new ministries, including all those for machine
building, are All-Union ministries, and 13 are Union-
Republic ministries, i.e., Union ministries with counter-
part ministries in each Republic.
Machinery and
Equipment
Manufactured
Consumer Goods
Pressed
Food Products
Chemical and
Allied Products
All Other
(Row Materials, etc.)
FIGURE 7. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURED GOODS
IN FOREIGN TRADE, 1965
for this sector for 1965, expressed in millions of rubles,
are as follows:
EXPORTS IMPORTS
TRADE
DEFICIT
Total, manufactured goods ..... 2,186
4,439
-2,253
Of which:
Machinery and equipment .. 1,472
2,419
-947
Chemical and allied products 246
450
-204
Processed food products .... 299
547
-248
Manufactured consumer
goods .........
........ 169
1,023
-854
In 1965, nearly 58% of Soviet foreign trade was
with other Soviet bloc countries, 11% with other
socialist countries (Communist China, North Vietnam,
North Korea, Cuba, and Yugoslavia), 12% with the
developing countries, and 19% with the industrialized
countries of the non-Communist world. Trading
partners of the latter group in order of importance
are the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, Italy,
and France. Among the developing countries, Fin-
land, India, and the United Arab Republic are the
major trading partners. The following tabulation
shows Soviet foreign trade with these groups in 1965,
in millions of rubles:
All foreign trade ........................ 14,598
Soviet bloc countries ..................... 8,471
Other socialized countries ................ 1,577
Developing countries .................... 1,744
Industrialized non-Communist countries ..... 2,806
Kosygin, at the 23rd Congress in 1966, recognized
that the scientific-technical level of much of today's
industrial activity calls for a broadening of economic
exchanges among industrialized countries. The
U.S.S.R. would like to increase its trade in manu-
factured goods and to diminish trade in raw ma-
terials with eastern Europe because of competing
demands and dwindling supplies in central and south-
ern U.S.S.R.
Most of the trade between the U.S.S.R. and the non-
Communist industrial countries is centered in western
Europe, where restrictions are relatively fewer than
in the United States, and where long-term credits
are available. Trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union still is small, less than one percent
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of total Soviet foreign trade in 1965. Even though
the U.S.S.R. desires to expand trade with the United
States, and U.S. policy is tending toward an easing
of restrictions, obstacles still remain. A fairly wide
array of goods still are embargoed by the United
States because of "strategic" implications, even though
trade controls on many commodities are being relaxed.
The U.S.S.R. is willing to expand trade only if the
U.S. will import more Soviet goods, but the assortment
of Soviet commodities available for export is limited
and many items cannot compete in U.S. markets.
Soviet needs are largely for U.S. production equip-
ment, especially chemical equipment, but including
machinery for reequipping plants of the clothing, tex-
tile, and furniture industries, food processing equip-
ment, computers, materials handling equipment, and
other items.
Soviet imports of manufactured goods now include
ships and marine equipment; railroad rolling stock;
mining, metallurgical, and oil equipment; food and
light industrial equipment; chemical equipment; and
motor vehicles. On the export side, the U.S.S.R. sup-
plies more raw materials (especially to the eastern
European Communist countries) and fewer manu-
factured goods. In 1965, the U.S.S.R. provide an esti-
mated three-fourths of the raw materials used by the
eastern European Communist countries including iron
ore, oil, and electric power. Presently the supplies of
these materials in the central and southern U.S.S.R.
are beginning to be depleted and Soviet planners must
make available new sources or urge the eastern Eu-
ropean Communist countries to begin drawing on
supples in the West. The U.S.S.R. is anxious to ex-
pand its export of manufactured goods. Exports of
machinery in 1965 made up only 20% of total Soviet
exports, whereas in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
more than half of the exports are machinery. Exports
of manufactured goods presently include mainly trac-
tors, trucks and autos, agricultural equipment, con-
struction equipment, machine tools, and various kinds
of consumer goods.
Soviet exports to the developing countries since 1955
have included fewer manufactured goods such as iron,
steel, and cotton textiles, and more complex items of
machinery and equipment, mainly in the form of com-
plete plants delivered under the Soviet aid program.
However, the total export to these countries is com-
paratively small. For example, in 1965 the value of
Soviet exports of machinery to the developing coun-
tries totaled $360 million, whereas the U.S. supplied
$3 billion worth of comparable goods. Major recipi-
ents of Soviet exports among the developing countries
are India, the United Arab Republic, Afghanistan,
and Iraq.
B. Industrial machinery and equipment
1. Agricultural machinery
a. INTRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R. is by far the
major producer of agricultural machinery among the
Communist countries. East Germany, the second
largest producer, manufactures only a fraction of the
Soviet output of tractor plows, drills, cultivators,
mowers, and grain combines. Soviet production of
agricultural machinery in 1966 reached a peak value
of 1,510 million rubles and included major items in the
following numbers:
Tractor drills .................. 219,000
Tractor plows .................. 177,000
Tractor cultivators .............. 208,000
Grain combines ................ 92,000
Windrowers ................... 88,600
Beet harvesting combines ........ 10,500
Production of several major items declined after 1957
as a result of the deemphasis of agricultural machinery
supply. In 1960, official attention was again directed
toward mechanization of,agriculture, and the produc-
tion of machinery began to increase. In 1966, the
value of output of machinery for agriculture exceeded
the earlier peak in 1957 by about 60%.
The U.S.S.R. produces a complete line of agricul-
tural machinery, ranging from simple types of plows
to complex self-propelled grain combines. A major
deficiency that has persisted since World War II is
the absence of large-scale production of specialized
types of machinery, such as for animal husbandry,
poultry-raising, vegetable-growing, fertilizer-spread-
ing, and the handling of harvested grains and other
crops. At no time during the postwar period has
the U.S.S.R. seriously attempted to fill these gaps
through increased production or through imports.
Consequently, Soviet agriculture continually suffers
from an unbalanced inventory of agricultural ma-
chinery.
The design and quality of Soviet agricultural ma-
chinery is inferior to that produced in the United
States, even though there have been improvements in
recent years. A few U.S. agricultural machines have
been imported, but Soviet institutes have been slow
to adopt the design features of the U.S. machines.
Contrary to earlier practice, U.S.-made machines are
rarely copied outright. Recently the industry has con-
centrated on the development of equipment with
greater working widths and on equipment designed to
work at higher operating speeds. The industry also
is developing some special items of equipment; for
example, grain combines for front-mounting on a self-
propelled chassis, a special type of tractor with the
engine in the rear.
The agricultural machine building industry is a
major branch of the machine building industry and is
one of the largest consumers of metal in the U.S.S.R.
Production of agricultural machinery in 1966, based
on value, reportedly was nearly four times that of
chemical equipment. Soviet agriculture depends al-
most completely upon domestic production for all
types of agricultural machinery. Only small quanti-
ties are exported.
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b. PRODUCTION
(1) Location - Agricultural machinery pro-
duction is concentrated in the European part of the
U.S.S.R., where 20 of the 27 major producers are
located. Major plants producing agricultural ma-
chinery are described in FIGURE 55. Some 700 to 800
widely scattered plants produce spare parts for trac-
tors and agricultural machinery. Generally, the agri-
cultural machinery plants are located in or near major
agricultural areas. Machinery for growing cotton, for
example, is produced at Chirchik and Tashkent in the
cotton growing Uzbek S.S.R., while grain combines
are produced at Rostov near the fertile Kuban' region
and the Ukraine.
(2) Volume and mix - Soviet production of
agricultural machinery (excluding spare parts) has in-
creased substantially since 1955, albeit at a slower
rate in recent years. Yearly percentage increases have
been uneven for the industry; production peaks hav-
ing been reached in 1957 and again in 1966. The fol-
lowing tabulation shows official data on the gross value
of output of agricultural machinery (in millions of
rubles) :
1955 ........... 540
1957 ........... 948
1959 ........... 674
1960 ........... 758
1961 ........... 972
1962 ........... 1,174
1963 ........... 1,371
1964 ........... 1,443
1965 ........... 1,459
1966 ........... 1,510
1967 Plan ....... 1,687
Soviet officials were firmly convinced that the dis-
solution of the machine-tractor-stations (MTS) in 1958
and the sale of equipment to the collective farms would
lessen the need for new equipment; consequently,
production was cut back. By 1960, however, it was
apparent that agricultural machinery inventories could
not be maintained at the reduced rate of deliveries.
To alleviate this strain, the goal of the Seven Year Plan
for the final six years was raised by 1,289 million rubles.
Thereafter, production began to improve rapidly and
by the end of 1965 total production for the 7-year
period was 60% in excess of the original plan. The
production of spare parts, consistently below require-
ments, has increased in most years at lower rates than
the production of complete machines. For example,
the production of spare parts for period 1959-65 was
20% above the level originally planned, but complete
machines were 60% above plan.
Output of basic types of agricultural machines is
shown in FIGURE 8, and recent models of a tractor
and a grain combine are shown in FIGURE 9. Impor-
tant changes in product mix during this period are
reflected by the data on production of combines. Trac-
tor-drawn grain combines, once important in agri-
culture, were produced in small numbers after 1958
and by 1960 production was stopped. The produc-
tion of combines for harvesting beets increased sharply
as the acreage sown to sugar beets increased, and fewer
combines for harvesting corn were produced when
the acreage devoted to mature corn declined. The
increased level of deliveries of mineral fertilizers to
Soviet agriculture was accompanied by increases in
FIGURE 8. PRODUCTION OF BASIC TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINES
(Thousands of units)
1960 1
1962
Grain combines .............................
65.0
59.0
79.8
82.9
83.6
85.8
92.0
Self-propelled grain combines .......... . ... .
35.2
58.9
79.8
82.9
83.6
85.8
92.0
Beet harvesting combines ....................
7.3
4.7
10.1
15.9
18.3
17.5
10.5
Corn harvesting combines ....................
6.1
3.6
26.9
29.0
9.9
na
no
Ensilage harvesting combines .................
38.1
15.0
47.5
58.1
47.0
20.0
na
Potato harvesting combines ..................
0.01
0.05
3.0
4.2
4.1
4.9
na
Cotton pickers ..............................
0.02
3.2
6.1
7.1
7.0
7.7
7.2
Windrowers ................................
96.3
56.9
73.9
89.7
83.9
97.8
88.6
Mineral fertilizer spreaders ...................
na
no
*18.0
*35.0
*61.0
Plows, general-purpose:
Total tractor-powered .....................
164.0
149.1
140.6
178.5
178.4
165.7
177.0
Tractor-drawn ..........................
52.3
57.8
78.7
90.5
94.7
112.3
no
Tractor-mounted .......................
111.7
91.3
61.9
88.0
83.7
53.4
no
Sowing machines:**
Total tractor-powered .....................
186.1
111.9
162.5
200.3
235.1
261.7
219.0
Tractor-drawn ...........................
163.9
40.8
63.8
95.9
185.9
233.4
na
Tractor-mounted .......................
22.2
71.1
98.7
104.4
49.2
28.3
na
Cultivators:
Totaltractor- powered .....................
180.3
84.8
122.1
155.4
193.2
206.1
208.0
Tractor-drawn ..........................
44.7
1.9
0.6
22.5
70.1
125.7
na
Tractor-mounted .......................
135.6
82.9
121.5
132.9
123.1
80.4
na
Mowing machines:
Total tractor-powered .....................
76.5
87.5
97.6
103.5
108.1
121.7
130.0
Tractor-drawn ..........................
50.6
43.8
35.1
53.0
62.4
68.1
na
Tractor-mounted .......................
25.9
43.7
62.5
50.5
45.7
53.6
na
Deliveries to agriculture.
Excluding fertilizing-type, the production of which dropped from 32,200 in 1958 to 15,200 in 1959 and 11,100 in 1960.
Production has increased in recent years, but data are not available.
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FIGURE 9. MODELS OF SOVIET TRACTORS AND GRAIN COMBINES. (left)
Belarus MTZ-52 4-wheel drive tractor of 50-hp. (above) SK-4 self-
propelled grain combine.
the deliveries of mineral fertilizer spreaders-deliv-
eries in 1966 were 3.4 times the level in 1964-but
serious shortages still exist. The interest in tractor-
mounted machines has declined somewhat in recent
years partly because of the trend toward larger and
wider machines which are more easily drawn than
mounted.
(3) Facilities - Many agricultural machinery
plants, including tractor plants, were expanded and
modernized during the Seven Year Plan, at a reported
cost of more than 944 million rubles. By comparison,
1.7 billion rubles is scheduled for investment in these
facilities during 1966-70. However, complaints of
serious lags in construction continued into early
1967. Despite the installation of a considerable
amount of new equipment in agricultural machinery
plants the level of mechanization in many areas is low.
Many of the automatic lines that have been installed
produce items such as nuts, bolts, chain links, and
rake teeth, but the transfer of materials between shops
and working positions requires much hand labor.
During 1966-70, much of the increase in output is
to come from increased labor productivity: only 10%
of the scheduled increase (including tractors) is to
come from new plants, 18% from reconstruction of
existing enterprises, and the remaining 72% is to come
from increased labor productivity.
The Soviet agricultural machinery industry is mak-
ing a relatively rapid transition to specialization in
the production of parts and end-products, but the
progress is not even. For example, 80% or more of
the production of such items as grain combines, cotton
pickers, tractor plows, tractor drills, and tractor culti-
vators is carried out in only one or two large, spe-
cialized plants each, but the production of many other
items (harrows and spare parts, for example) is still
scattered among hundreds of small, nonspecialized
producers, including many outside the agricultural
machinery industry. A major drawback of the non-
specialized producers is their high unit costs of pro-
duction, which often exceed the selling price of the
end-product. A continuing obstacle to increased spe-
cialization is the failure of many subcontractors to
fulfill production commitments and meet contract
deliveries.
(4) Major problems - Problems affecting the
Soviet agricultural machinery industry have not
changed markedly in the past decade and are sum-
marized as follows: 1) Delinquency in deliveries of
semifinished materials and components by subcontract-
ing plants to producing plants; 2) shortage of highly
skilled design and production engineers; 3) lack of
coordination among designers, producers, and users
of agricultural machinery; and 4) the slow pace of
construction work at producing plants. The industry
also is delinquent in the production of an adequate
assortment of spare parts.
c. FOREIGN TRADE - Soviet production of agri-
cultural machinery is geared to the domestic market;
only a small amount is exported. During 1958-65,
about 5% of the grain combines, 4% of the plows,
3% of the drills and grain cleaning machines, and
1% of the cultivators and mowers were exported.
FIGURE 56 shows the value of Soviet exports of agri-
cultural machinery, by country, for the period 1960-65.
Communist countries, including Cuba and Yugoslavia,
received almost all of the agricultural machinery ex-
ported during this period. Exports to Cuba, about
half of which were harvesters for sugar beets, increased
from a negligible quantity in 1960 to over 8% of total
exports of agricultural machinery in 1965.' In spite
of Soviet efforts to expand trade with developing
countries, little progress has been made in establish-
ing permanent and expanding markets for agricultural
machinery in these areas. Lower prices have gained
a few customers, but inferior quality and poor servic-
ing after sale have tended to offset the advantage of
price.
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The value and origin of Soviet agricultural ma-
chinery imported in the period 1960-65 is shown in
FIGURE 57. Imports during this period came almost
entirely from Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czech-
oslovakia; they comprised in large part, mowers, ham-
mer mills, and ensilage harvesting combines from
Bulgaria, and combines (primarily potato), grain-
cleaning machines, and milking machines from East
Germany. Small-scale imports from the United States,
Canada, and West Germany have enabled the U.S.S.R.
to keep abreast of technological developments in the
production of agricultural machinery.
2. Tractors
a. INTRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R. has a highly de-
veloped tractor industry capable of producing on a
large scale many different models of tractors. Soviet
production reached a level of 354,500 units in 1965,
exceeding U.S. production of 272,100 units. During
1961-65, 70% of total production was allocated to
agriculture, 24% to other domestic consumers, and
6% was exported.
The tractor industry includes 14 major producing
and assembly plants (FIGURE 58). Production is fairly
well distributed throughout the major agricultural
areas of the European U.S.S.R. and eastward as far as
western Siberia. One-third of the tractor output is
concentrated in the agriculturally rich Ukrainian S.S.R.
New capacity for the production of tractors has been
created since the mid-1950's through a considerable
expansion of existing plants and through the conversion
of other facilities to tractor production. Tractors are
now being produced at converted facilities at Bryansk,
Didi Lilo (near Tbilisi), Dnepropetrovsk, Kishinev,
Leningrad, Petrozavodsk, Taganrog, and Tashkent-all
representing new capacity, which accounted for an
estimated 16% of total production of tractors in 1965.
The Pavlodar Machine Building Plant is in the process
of conversion to the production of tractors, and a new
plant for producing tractors is under construction at
Cheboksary, east of Gor'kiy.
b. ORGANIZATION - The tractor industry is ad-
ministered and controlled by the Ministry of Tractors
and Agricultural Machine Building and its main ad-
ministrations. The ministry, in cooperation with Gos-
plan, drafts production plans to meet the needs of the
collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms sovkhozes.
The tractor industry is vertically integrated, i.e.,
plants produce a large share of their own parts and
subassemblies, as well as most spare parts. They
depend on other plants primarily for electrical systems,
rubber tires, and specialized components and acces-
sories. This system of integrated plants, however,
gradually is being replaced by a complex of specialized
factories which are to furnish necessary component
parts to tractor plants for assembly. Thus three en-
gine plants now are augmenting the supply of engines
manufactured by tractor producers, and the Khar'kov
Tractor Plant has been able to forego the production
of engines for crawler tractors.
c. PRODUCTION - Soviet tractor production in se-
lected years from 1950 onward was as follows, in units:
1950
........
CRAWLER
85,100
WHEELED
31,600
TOTAL
116,700
J
1956
........
109,200
74,300
183,500
1959
........
103,800
109,700
213,500
1960
........
122,000
116,500
238,500
1961
........
136,600
127,000
263,600
1962
........
137,700
149,300
287,000
1963
........
149,200
176,100
325,300
1964
........
142,700
186,300
329,000
1965
........
157,000
197,500
354,500
Along with increases in output, there has emerged
simultaneously a new pattern of production. All trac-
tors manufactured since 1966 have been diesel-
powered, compared with only 62% in 1950. Row-
crop tractors, both wheeled and crawler, made up
58% of total output in 1965, compared with only
27% in 1950. Estimated production of tractors by
model type is given in FIGURE 10. By 1970 the tractor
industry is to be a highly specialized industry capable
of producing annually between 600,000 and 625,000
tractors.
Because of shortages of repair parts, substantial
numbers of tractors are out of operation. Since the
mid-1950's, the industry has been moving toward a
solution of the problem of spare parts in its program
of greater plant specialization. In 1966-70, there
will be a further effort to increase the degree of
standardization of parts and specialization of plants,
and to increase the amount of mechanization and/or
FIGURE 10. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR
TYPES OF TRACTORS
(Units)
TYPE 1963 1 1964 1 1965
Crawler:
DT-54A .................. 49,200 10,400 13,100
T-75/74 .................. 47,800 47,900 50,000
DT-75 ................... 3,000 34,000 41,000
T-38 ..................... 7,500 7,500 7,500
TD T-40M/75/60........... 13 , 000 13 , 000 11,700
T-4 ...................... 0 0 1,000
S-100/T-100M DET-250... 24,000 24,000 25,100
Other ..................... 4,700 5,900 7,600
Subtotal ................ 149,200 142,700 157,000
Wheeled:
Belarus ................... 90,400 92,100 100,200
T-28M ................... 10,000 15,200 16,800
DT-20 ................... 24,600 25,000 25,300
T-16 ..................... 8,300 11,700 13,000
T-40A .................... 26,300 29,000 32,500
T-28KhZ ................. 16,400 12,300 6,700
K-700 .................... 0 1,000 2,800
Other ..................... 1.00 200 200
Total ....................... 325,300 329,200 354,500
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automation. Some attention also has been given to
improving parts production at existing facilities
through better manufacturing techniques.
d. RAw MATERIALS SUPPLY - The U.S.S.R. is self-
sufficient in raw materials for tractor production; how-
ever, the quality of materials-steel, rubber, electrical
components, and the like-often is less than satisfac-
tory. Failure to deliver materials on schedule and
failure to conform to specifications are a constant
source of irritation to the industry.
e. TECHNOLOGY - The tractor industry already
has achieved a fairly high degree of mechanization and
some automation in the production processes. Greater
specialization of production and standardization of
parts will make possible still more extensive use of
automation. Tractor plants have been equipped with
some automatic lines for several years-for example,
lines for machining engine block and cylinder heads.
However, reluctance of industry officials to invest in
new machine tools has hampered the phasing into
production of some of the new tractor models. More-
over, the machine tool industry has been unable to
furnish all of the necessary equipment on schedule and
thus has caused serious delays.
In design, construction, and performance, Soviet-
built tractors are inferior to those produced in the
United States. Soviet tractors, both the newer and the
older models, tend to be heavy in relation to the power
of the engines. Structural defects, which are not un-
common, often can be traced to the quality of steel
or the precision of the machining in the production of
parts. Engineers and designers are working to im-
prove the basic models to obtain tractors of greater
power and dependability.
The inventory of tractors in Soviet agriculture at
the beginning of 1966 was 1,613,200 units, about two-
thirds of which were row-crop tractors. Row-crop
models, now favored over the general-purpose crawler
types, comprise about two-thirds of the inventory.
Some crawler tractors, chiefly the T-38M, are suitable
for row-crop cultivation, but few tractors of this type
are allocated to agriculture. The goals of the present
plan, 1966-70, are to provide the agricultural sector
with 1,790,000 new tractors, of which 1,010,000 are to
be row-crop tractors.
The U.S.S.R., under the jurisdiction of the state
monopoly, Avtoeksport, exports a sizable number of
tractors and imports relatively few in spite of recur-
rent shortages in the domestic economy. About 6%
of all Soviet tractors produced in 1965 were exported,
mainly to other Communist countries and to India.
The following tabulation shows Soviet exports of trac-
tors and spare parts in recent years (value figures are
in thousands of foreign exchange rubles) :
YEAR
NUMBER
OF UNITS
VALUE OF
TRACTORS
VALUE OF
SPARE PARTS
1962
.........
12,400
43,491
29,403
1963
.........
23,100
74,689
39,428
1964
.........
21,000
68,663
42,366
1965
.........
21,920
65,920
48,370
3. Machine tools
a. INTRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R. continues to
lead the world in the output of machine tools.* In
1966, it produced more machine tools than the rest of
the Communist countries combined. The U.S.S.R. has
exceeded the United States in the output of metal-
cutting machine tools since 1954, but fell behind in
metalforming machine tools in 1963, and may have
lost its lead for these types in 1966. The Soviet ma-
chine tool inventory at present is larger and younger
than that of the United States, however, the technical
quality of the U.S. inventory is superior. Machine
tools built in the United States are generally more
complex, more highly automated, and more productive
than are their Soviet counterparts.
The Soviet machine tool industry holds a high pri-
ority because of its importance to the maintenance of
a high rate of growth of industrial production. For
example, machine tools account for more than 30%
of the total capital stock of the Soviet motor vehicle
industry. In 1965, the machine tool industry ac-
counted for about 2% of the gross value of output
of the machine building and metalworking industries.
Despite a large physical output of machine tools-
191,000 metalcutting and 38,300 metalforming tools in
1966-the U.S.S.R. has been and remains a net im-
porter of machine tools. Imports have been highly
selective, however, consisting primarily of special types
which are not produced in sufficient quantities in the
U.S.S.R.
The recently formed Ministry of Machine Tool
Building and Tool Industry administers 280 machine
tool plants, which in 1965 produced 78% of the total
Soviet output of machine tools. Of these plants, 89
specialize in the production of metalcutting machine
tools. FIGURE 59 lists major producers of machine
tools. The Ministry also controls 12 scientific research
institutes and their 13 affiliates, nine design-technologi-
cal institutes, three designing institutes, and 38 special-
ized design bureaus. These bureaus and institutes
employ about 40,000 people.
The specialization of the plants of the Soviet ma-
chine tool industry, combined with a high degree of
standardization of machine tool components and a
limited number of models, permits mass production
of the more popular models and the use of conveyor
lines for machining parts and assembling finished ma-
chines.
* In this subsection, machine tools are classified as either
metalcutting or metalforming (woodworking machine
tools are not included). Metalcutting machine tools are
designed to remove metal in the form of chips, turnings,
and borings, and include honing machines, lapping ma-
chines, grinders, and electro-erosion and ultrasonic ma-
chines. Metalforming machine tools are designed to
press, forge, emboss, hammer, extrude, blank, spin, shear,
or bend metal into shape.
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b. PRODUCTION AND PLANS
(1) Production-The 191,000 metalcutting
machine tools produced in 1966 represented an in-
crease of 3% over 1965, and the 38,300 metalforming
machine tools, an increase of 10% over 1965. The
Seven Year Plan (1959-65) production goals-planned
to reach 190,000 to 200,000 units for metalcutting and
36,200 units for metalforming machine tools in 1965-
were not fulfilled. The failure to meet these goals is
the result of the greater emphasis on quality rather
than quantity since 1962 and because of continued
lags in the construction program. Production of ma-
chine tools since 1958 and plans for 1970 are set forth
in FIGURE 60.
Although the level of output of general-purpose
metalcutting machine tools is probably adequate, con-
siderable improvement is still necessary in the assort-
ment of product. The machine tool industry has not
been able to produce a sufficient number of high-
precision and specialized machines to satisfy the needs
of other sectors of Soviet industry. To compensate
for shortages, the U.S.S.R. has imported the highly
specialized machine tools that it needs from other
Communist countries and from the industrial non-
Communist world. The planned expansion of the So-
viet automobile industry, for example, requires sub-
stantial imports of specialized equipment. Given
time and the necessary priorities, the Soviet machine
building industry is capable of producing the highly
productive specialized. machine tools required for mass
production of motor vehicles. However, the present
accelerated program for expanding the production of
passenger cars can be carried out economically and
effectively only by importing many of these tools.
Efforts since 1962 to improve the product mix in
machine tools have not been very successful. The
mix still is heavily weighted toward the less produc-
tive, general-purpose types of machine tools. FIGURE
11 shows the mass production of lathes in the U.S.S.R.
The following tabulation compares the percentage dis-
tribution of different types of machine tools in the
United States and in the U.S.S.R. in 1965; it also il-
lustrates the imbalance in the U.S.S.R. which favors
the less productive metalcutting machine tools, such
as lathes and drilling machines:
UNITED STATES
U.S.S.R.
Center lathes .................
15.4
29.5
Automatic and semi-automatic
lathes .....................
5.1
2.5
Milling machines
22.5
12.2
Boring machines ..............
2.7
1.6
Grinding machines ............
22.8
6.6
Drilling machines .............
7.9
15.2
Other .......................
23.6
32.4
Where applicable, the substitution of metalforming
for metalcutting techniques generally results in higher
production rates, lower labor requirements, less metal
waste, and a product with improved structural char-
acteristics. Even so, in the U.S.S.R. the share of metal-
forming machine tools, which amounted to 16% in
1958, had declined by 1% by 1965. The causes of
underfulfillment of plans in the metalforming ma-
chine tool industry are not evident. Except for the
production of spectacularly large pieces of equipment,
such as powerful forging and extrusion presses used
primarily for military purposes, the metalforming
branch of the industry receives relatively little pub-
0
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licity. The metalforming machine tool industry, tra-
ditionally small compared with metalcutting, expanded
little in capacity during 1959-65 and received far less
emphasis and priority from Soviet planners.
The Seven Year Plan goal for the building of auto-
matic transfer machine tool lines was not fulfilled
either. Between 250 and 270 automatic and semi-
automatic lines were to have been built in 1965, but
only 213 were completed-fewer than the 230 built in
1964. A shortage of plant capacity for this special
kind of production appears to have been a limiting
factor. Only three plants in the U.S.S.R. are special-
ized producers of automatic lines, and these are known
to have little available floor space for expanding pro-
duction or to engage in other types of production.
FIGURE 12 shows one of the transfer machines in a
large automatic transfer machine tool line for the
production of cylinder heads for diesel engines for
tractors.
(2) Plans - The U.S.S.R. has announced its
plan to produce 220,000 to 230,000 metalcutting and
50,000 to 52,000 metalforming machine tools annually
by 1970. The goal for metalcutting machine tools
implies an average annual growth rate of 3.5% to
4.4%, a rate similar to that realized during the previous
7-year period. Even though output in 1966 increased
by only about 3%, the goal is still likely to be
reached-particularly if investment in new plant con-
struction is doubled, as official statements indicate.
The 1966-70 plan calls for increased output of the
so-called "highly productive" types of machine tools-
electro-discharge (EDM), electro-erosion, and electro-
chemical (ECM) machines. As presently planned,
enough of these types of machines are to be in opera-
tion to perform 10% of all metalcutting operations by
1970. The U.S.S.R. has done independent and highly
competent developmental work on EDM, but may be
giving it a higher priority than it deserves relative
to its ultimate contribution. Probably less than 10%
of all metalcutting operations are as suitable for
ECM and EDM technique as for conventional metal-
cutting methods.
Production of metalforming machine tools is to in-
crease at 8.2% a year during 1966-70, a much higher
rate than the 3.9% achieved during 1959-65. How-
ever, output increased 10.8% in 1966 over 1965, an
indication that the 1970 target may be realistic. If
achieved, the 1970 plan would increase the share of
metalforming machine tools in the total machine tool
product mix from 15.7% to 18.5%, a moderate im-
provement in the mix. However, it is far behind the
United States, where metalforming machine tools
make up about 38% of total metalworking machines.
New capacity must be created in the metalforming
machine tool industry if the 1970 goal is to be reached.
Construction of a large new facility is underway in
Tiraspol and investment funds for the construction of
plants to produce metalforming machine tools, ac-
cording to some officials, are to double by 1970.
Generally, Soviet metalforming machine tools em-
body a lower level of technology than metalcutting
machine tools, particularly in the degree of auto-
mation and precision. During the Seven Year Plan,
most research and development had been directed to-
wards introducing new models and processes which
directly benefit the aerospace industries, and the de-
velopment of the highly productive, automated stamp-
ing and drawing presses which could support the con-
sumer goods industries was neglected. Although So-
viet officials have announced their intention to boost
production of precision forging presses, casting ma-
chines, and high-speed stamping and drawing presses
FIGURE 12. TRANSFER MACHINE IN AN AUTOMATIC LINE FOR PRODUCTION OF
CYLINDER HEADS FOR TRACTOR DIESELS
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during the present Five Year Plan (1966-70), it is not
yet clear to what extent these tools will be used for
the production of consumers goods.
The present 5-year plan calls for a doubling of the
production of automatic and semi-automatic machine
tool lines over the 1965 level, which would amount
to 426 lines in 1970, and which implies an annual
rate of growth of almost 15%. To meet such an am-
bitious target, a considerable increase in productive
capacity will be required. The Moscow Ordzhoni-
kidze Machine Tool Plant, the U.S.S.R.'s leading pro-
ducer of automatic lines, is being enlarged, and a plant
for producing automatic lines is being built in Kos-
troma.
U.S. producers of automatic lines typically use the
"building block" method-a system of assembling
standardized power heads and other components with
specially designed transfer mechanisms. In contrast,
most Soviet automatic lines have been designed in-
dividually, a process that is expensive and time-con-
suming. The U.S.S.R. is introducing the building
block method during the 1966-70 plan. To the extent
practicable, the Soviets propose to use the modular
or building block technique in the production of in-
dividual metalcutting and metalforming machine tools
in addition to automatic transfer machines. The So-
viet approach involves establishing a number of basic
model designs within each machine tool category, as
well as a limited series of standardized variants of
each particular model. Initially, modular components
will be developed to obtain several different con-
figurations within a particular model with most sub-
assemblies, such as base, gear box, and bed, common
to all variants. Eventually, industry officials hope to
develop standardized components common to several
models and even categories of machine tools.
(3) Investment - Investment during 1959-65
in the machine tool industry was confined largely
to the reconstruction of existing plants. Rebuilding
programs usually provided for some increase in floor
space, modernization of old shops, and often for a full
complement of new machinery. However, reconstruc-
tion during this period was chronically behind sched-
ule. Of the 25 high priority, controlled-environment
shops, only 11 have been completed. A new shop to
produce vertical turret lathes has been under con-
struction for several years at the Moscow Krasnyy
Proletariy Plant and still was not in operation in
1967. A new plant to produce horizontal boring
machines that was begun in Ivanovo before the 7-
year plan was not operating at full capacity as of
mid-1967.
The 25 controlled-environment shops being built
at various machine tool plants are designed to control
temperature, humidity, air contamination, and vibra-
tion, which Soviet engineers consider important for
increasing the output of precision machine tools. U.S.
specialists who have visited these plants stated that
these conditions are not needed except for producing
machines of extremely high precision.
The planned expansion during 1966-70 is to be
achieved by building several new plants, by comple-
tion of projects under construction, and by further
modernization of plants. The new plant at Gomel,
which produces standardized machine tool com-
ponents, was completed in early 1966. The capacity
of the plants in Vitebsk, Minsk, Kirovakan, Yerevan
and Khar'kov are to be expanded. The Tiraspol
"Kirov" Machine Building Plant, when present ex-
pansion is complete, will be one of the largest Soviet
producers of casting machines and forging presses.
(4) Distribution and inventory - Although
little is known about the distribution of the machine
tools, inventory figures within Soviet industry and
agriculture reflect a use pattern. The inventory of
metalcutting machine tools in 1962 was distributed
about as follows (in thousand units) :
Industry ........................ 1,714
Of which:
Machine building ............ 1,100
Other industry .............. 614
Nonindustrial ...................
Of which:
Agricultural equipment repair ..
400
Other ......................
328
(5) Foreign trade - Soviet efforts to market
machine tools in the Industrial West and in the devel-
oping countries have not been very successful. Only
about 1,100 metalcutting machine tools were exported
to non-Communist countries in 1965, including those
sold as parts of complete plants. Some of the ma-
chine tools sold in the Industrial West are "forced
sales," that is, trading partners are forced to buy
them in order to sell other products to the U.S.S.R.
Easy credit terms often are extended the developing
countries to encourage purchases of machine tools.
Even though the U.S.S.R. probably will continue to
export some machine tools to non-Communist coun-
tries in the years ahead, it cannot compete effectively
in world markets until the industry is able to provide
service facilities, to increase the availability of spare
parts, and to make further improvements in quality.
(6) Quality - The Soviet machine tool indus-
try has raised the quality of its product considerably
since the early 1950's. Its machine tools at that time
contained serious faults in design and workmanship
which made them far less productive, less durable,
and less precise than their Western counterparts. Now
this gap is being narrowed. The quality of Soviet ma-
chine tools is considered by U.S. technicians to be
adequate, even though somewhat below the level of
quality of comparable products in the United States
and western Europe. However, quality varies from
plant to plant. For example, the Odessa Radial Drill
Plant, which is crowded and poorly organized, pro-
duces machines that often are defective, whereas the
J
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Yegorevsk Komsomolets Machine Tool Plant, which
is clean, modern, and well-equipped, is noted for high
quality in its gear cutting machinery.
The improvement in quality of machine tools is an
important objective of the 1966-70 plan. The industry
is striving to develop further the technology for build-
ing machine tools and to increase their precision and
lengthen their service life. Soviet officials are aware
that even though their machine tools meet world
standards of productivity, they are below standard in
precision and durability. Machine tools for plants
tend to abbreviate some of the manufacturing proc-
esses, and to use low-quality bearings, electrical com-
ponents, and other components. Soviet officials plan
to produce machine tools during 1966-70 that will com-
pare in service life to those produced in the West,
i.e., tools that will remain in operation for 10 to 15
years before requiring general overhaul.
4. Electric power equipment
a. INTRODUCTION - The production of electric
power equipment has received high priority for
many years in the Soviet manufacturing industry. This
subsection discusses only the major types of equipment
which account for most of the value of the industry's
output. The output of major types of electric power
equipment produced during the Seven Year Plan
(1959-65) and the estimated planned output for 1970
are shown in FIGURE 13.
Plants producing electric power equipment have
steadily improved automation and mechanization of
production processes. Major types of equipment are
produced in specialized plants and the concept of
plant specialization is being extended to producers of
auxiliary equipment and semifinished products. Im-
portant producers of major types of electric power
equipment are described in detail in FIGURE 61.
The current 5-year plan calls for the annual pro-
duction of 22,000-24,000 megawatts of capacity in tur-
bines by 1970, which will require an average annual
growth rate of about 10% during the period. Al-
though specific goals for equipment other than turbines
have not been announced, the output of the other main
types of equipment has been estimated from the prod-
uct mix in the past, e.g., tons of boiler capacity per
kilowatt of steam turbine capacity. The average
annual growth rates required to attain the estimated
1970 output of these other types of equipment are
slightly lower than the growth rates achieved during
the 1959-65 period.
Several plants in the electric power equipment in-
dustry are now operating under the new economic
system, which uses profitability as the main criterion
for success. All plants in the industry are to be con-
verted to the new system by 1968.
b. TECHNOLOGY - Manufacturing methods and
techniques are generally similar to those used in the
United States and other highly industrialized coun-
tries. Soviet technology lags behind the United States
in the production of all types of electric power equip-
ment except hydraulic turbines and high voltage trans-
mission equipment. In the latter two fields, the
U.S.S.R. employs the most advanced technology in the
world. The major technological deficiencies in the
electric equipment industry are the failure to develop
satisfactory equipment for operation at supercritical
steam parameters* and the lack of adequate testing
facilities for large turbines and generators.
In 1960, the U.S.S.R. built its first 300 megawatt
generating unit (consisting of boiler, turbine, and
generator) designed to operate at supercritical steam
parameters. Since then, all generating units of 300
megawatts and higher have been designed to operate
at supercritical parameters. By the end of 1966, how-
ever, none of the 21 units installed had operated at
rated capacity because of recurrent breakdowns caused
primarily by defects in the boiler tubing and in the
welded joints. The successful application of super-
critical technology is dependent on the development
of heat-resistant steel alloys, high-quality fabrication
of alloys, and sophisticated welding techniques. So-
Steam conditions with pressures above 3,206 pounds per
square inch and temperatures above 705? Fahrenheit, the
point at which water flashes into dry steam without
boiling.
COMMODITY I UNIT OF MEASUREMENT 1958 1 1959 1 1960 1 1961 1 1962 1 1963 1 1964 1 1965 I 1966 1 1970 PLAN
Turbines* .............
Generators for turbines.
Boilers ...............
Electric motors, AC over
100 kw.
Electric motors, from
0.25 to 100 kw.
Thousand megawatts. .
....do ...............
Thousands of tons of
steam per hour.
6.6 7.6 9.2 10.7 11.9 11.9 13.3 14.6
5.2 6.5 7.9 9.4 11.0 11.8 12.8 14.4
40.0 41.7 50.3 57.8 66.4 71.0 78.5 82.0
Thousand megavolt- 30.5 40.5 49.4 64.1 75.7 83.9 88.9
amperes.
Thousand megawatts.. 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.4 5.2 5.8 5.6
**15.2 22-24
**13.4 ***20-22
**89.6 ***123-134
**
***
--U ....-.,.. wo v/p v- v..o y.vuuvu.vu vi -iuiuc? U-1-OU0 Vl Uuiuiuca iur purpuae~J ouuer uuau eiecirieai power production,
e.g., marine propulsion and driving mechanical equipment.
Preliminary figures.
Estimates based on announced plan for turbines.
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viet manufacturers have not yet successfully applied
the necessary technology to the production of electric
power equipment, but the industry is concentrating
on the development of supercritical technology and
may be successful in applying it within a few years.
The use of equipment designed to operate at super-
critical steam parameters is important to the U.S.S.R.
because of the economies in operation it affords
through increased efficiency and savings in fuel.
Partly as a result of difficulties encountered with
equipment designed to operate at supercritical steam
parameters, Soviet equipment manufacturers now
plan to build a 500-megawatt turbine for operation at
subcritical steam parameters in low-cost fuel areas
such as eastern Siberia.
Lack of adequate testing facilities at producing
plants has caused numerous operational problems and
has necessitated costly and time-consuming adjust-
ments of equipment after delivery. These problems
have been compounded by the Soviet practice of
beginning serial production of new generating units
before prototypes have proved reliable. Some minor
additions to testing facilities were installed during the
1959-65 period. In 1966, a test bed for turbines
as large as 1,000 megawatts was under construction
at the Leningrad Metal Plant and a test stand for
1,000 megawatt generators was planned at the Elek-
trosila Plant in Leningrad.
Improvements in the efficiency of electric power
equipment have been hindered by several other
factors, including shortages of synthetic insulation
materials for large generators, the substitution of
aluminum for copper in transformers and in electric
wire and cable, and the use of hot-rolled rather than
cold-rolled steel in Soviet transformers.
c. TURBINES - The U.S.S.R. is the world's second
largest producer of turbines. In 1966, Soviet output
of 15.2 thousand megawatts was exceeded only by
U.S. output of 18.6 thousand megawatts.* The pro-
duction of turbines is concentrated in a few specialized
plants in the European U.S.S.R. and in the Urals.
The Leningrad Metal Plant is the oldest and largest
producer of turbines in the Soviet Union. The second
major producer is the Khar'kov Turbine Plant imeni
S. M. Kirov.
Soviet production of turbines increased at an average
annual rate of 12% during 1959-65, even though there
was a marked decline in the growth rate during the
latter half of the period. The product mix of turbines
varies in accordance with the demands of domestic
construction projects and export commitments. The
following tabulation for 1958-63, the latest period for
? The U.S. figure includes turbines with a capacity of 4,000
kw. and larger. Soviet statistics presumably include tur-
bines of all capacities. The comparison between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. thus is biased in favor
of the U.S.S.R.
which data are available, shows the production of
individual types of turbines (in thousand megawatts) :
YEAR
STEAM AND CAS
TURBINES
HYDRAULIC
TURBINES
1958
................
5.4
1.2
1959
................
6.2
1.4
1960
................
7.5
1.7
1961
................
8.4
2.3
1962
................
9.3
2.6
1963
................
10.1
1.8
Most of the increase in output during the 7-year
plan period was achieved by increasing the individual
capacities of the turbines produced, which did not
require significant expansion of production facilities.
Steam turbines of 150 and 200 megawatt capacity
were installed for the first time in the early years of
the 7-year plan. The first 300 megawatt steam tur-
bine was produced in 1960 and began operating in
1963. By the end of 1966, the U.S.S.R. had installed
21 units of 300 megawatt capacity, 54 units of 200
megawatt capacity, and 62 units of 150 megawatt
capacity. About 130 large generating units are to be
installed during 1966-70, including three units of
800 megawatt capacity, four units of 500 megawatt
capacity, and about 70 units of 300 megawatt capacity.
The first 500-megawatt single-shaft steam turbine
and the first 800-megawatt double-shaft steam turbine
were produced in 1966 and are to begin operating
before the end of the 1966-70 plan. As a further step
in production of larger turbines, the U.S.S.R. is pres-
ently designing an 800-megawatt single-shaft steam
turbine and a steam turbine of 1,200 megawatt capac-
ity. The following tabulation shows the initial year
of production for various sizes of steam turbines (in
megawatts) :
YEAR
CAPACITY
OF UNIT YEAR
CAPACITY
OF UNIT
1923
..............
2
1958
..............
200
1925
..............
10
1960
..............
300
1938
..............
100
1965
..............
500
1952
..............
150
1966
..............
800
The U.S.S.R. produces the largest and most tech-
nically advanced hydraulic turbine in the world. Two
units of 508 megawatt capacity were to be installed in
1967, and eight more are to be produced by 1970.
Soviet engineers are planning even larger units, how-
ever, and have begun preliminary design work on
hydraulic turbines of 540 megawatt capacity.
Small gas turbines of 6 megawatt and 12 megawatt
capacity have been produced for gas pipeline com-
pressor stations and mechanical drives. In 1960, a
prototype 25-megawatt gas turbine was built for
electric power production and was subsequently in-
stalled in a thermal powerplant in Kiev. Testing
of this turbine has uncovered design deficiencies and
the unit still has not operated at its rated capacity. An
even larger gas turbine of 100-megawatt capacity is
scheduled for completion in 1967.
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d. GENERATORS - Output of generators grew at
an average annual rate of 15.7% during 1959-65, and
amounted to 14,400 megawatts in 1965. However,
preliminary data indicate that production declined
to 13,400 megawatts in 1966.
Generators are produced in four major plants-the
Elektrosila Plant in Leningrad, the Heavy Electrical
Equipment Plant in Khar'kov, the Turbogenerator
Plant in Novosibirsk, and the Ural Electrical Apparatus
Plant in Sverdlovsk. Little expansion of production
facilities was reported during the 7-year plan period
(1959-65), and no major expansion is planned during
1966-70. Most of the increase in output of generators
has been achieved by increasing unit capacity rather
than expansion of production facilities. Increases in
the capacities of generators have paralleled increases
in the capacities of turbines. Mechanization of opera-
tions in the producing plants was increased during the
7-year plan and is continuing.
e. BOILERS - The total capacity of boilers pro-
duced in the U.S.S.R. in 1966 was 89,600 tons of
steam per hour, an increase of 9.3% over that pro-
duced in 1965. During 1959-65, production of boilers
rose at an average annual rate of 10.8%. Three
plants, located in Taganrog, Podol'sk, and Barnaul,
produce most of the medium- and large-capacity
boilers (FIGURE 61).
The U.S.S.R. has produced boilers with an output
of 950 tons of steam per hour for use with 300 mega-
watt turbines, boilers of 1,600 tons of steam per hour
for 500 megawatt turbines, and a boiler of 2,500 tons
of steam per hour for an 800-megawatt turbine. De-
signs are now being worked out for larger boilers for
turbines of more than 1,000 megawatts. In recent
years, large boilers of more than 40 tons of steam per
hour have accounted for more than 60% of the boiler
capacity produced, as is shown in FIGURE 14.
Boilers are produced in a few specialized plants,
but these plants are dependent on many suppliers
for components such as feed water pumps, blowers,
and preheaters. Serious problems in installation and
operation, caused by delayed shipments and defective
materials received from suppliers, have led to plans
FIGURE 14. TOTAL CAPACITY OF BOILERS
PRODUCED
(Thousands of tons of steam per hour)
LAR
(m
GE BOILERS
ore than 40
MEDIUM BOILERS
(10-40
SM
(le
ALL BOILERS
ss than 10
t
ons/hour)
tons/hour)
t
ons/hour)
1958 ........
22.0
2.7
15.3
1959 ........
22.8
3.3
15.6
1960........
30.8
3.7
15.8
1961 ........
37.1
3.1
17.6
1962 .......
44.0
3.7
18.7
1963 ........
*47.7
*3.8
*19.5
1964........
*53.5
*4.1
*20.9
1965........
*56.7
*4.1
*21.2
1966........
*62.9
*4.3
*22.4
to shift production of these components to specialized
manufacturing facilities. Such specialization is in-
tended to reduce the cost and to improve the quality
of auxiliary equipment.
f. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND TRANSFORMERS - In 1965,
Soviet production of electric motors amounted to
26,900 megawatts. Electric motors are produced at
a large number of plants, but major producers are the
Dinamo Electrical Equipment Plant in Moscow, the
Khar'kov Electrical Machinery Plant, and the Baku
Electrical Machinery Plant.
More than 80% of the capacity of electric motors
produced is in motors of less than 100 kilowatts ca-
pacity that are designed for a wide variety of uses.
The 10% average annual rate of growth in production
of electric motors during the 7-year plan period was
achieved mainly by opening up new production facil-
ities and by modernizing existing production lines.
Production of transformers grew at an average an-
nual rate of 17.7% during 1959-65, and amounted to
95,300 megavolt-amperes in 1965. The largest single
producer is the Zaporozh'ye Transformer Plant, which
manufactures almost one-half of all Soviet-made
transformers.
The two major goals in the production of trans-
formers during the 7-year plan were the manufacture
of large power transformers for high voltage trans-
mission over long distances and the building of small-
and medium-sized transformers and transformer sub-
stations for the rural electrification program. To
achieve the first goal, the Zaporozh'ye Transformer
Plant has steadily increased the unit sizes of its trans-
formers, and in 1966 it built a 417-megavolt-ampere
unit intended for use in the prototype 750-kilovolt
transmission line being erected in 1967 from Konakovo
to Moscow. Preliminary design work was started on
1,500 kilovolt transmission lines to be used to transmit
electric power from Siberia to the European part of
the U.S.S.R. The growth in output of small- and
medium-sized transformers has been achieved by the
opening of new production facilities in many locations
throughout the U.S.S.R.
g. ELECTRIC WIRE AND CABLE - The U.S.S.R. pro-
duces all types of power and communications wire
and cable needed by a modern industrialized economy,
including insulated power cable, weatherproof cable,
and coaxial cable. However, some wire and cable
are also imported from various European countries.
The value of Soviet wire and cable of all types pro-
duced in 1965 is estimated at $2.2 billion, which is
about three times the estimated value of production
in 1958. Electric power wire and cable probably
represent about two-thirds of the total. The increase
in output has been achieved through the construction
of new production facilities and further mechaniza-
tion of older plants.
The largest producers are the Moscow Cable Plant,
the Northern Cable Plant in Leningrad, and the Kama
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Cable Plant at Perm, all of which are in the western
part of the U.S.S.R., near the major power-consuming
areas. There are also several large producers serving
local needs in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R.
h. FOREIGN TRADE - The U.S.S.R. is a major ex-
porter of electric power generating and transmission
equipment to other Communist countries and to some
less developed countries in the non-Communist world,
notably India and the U.A.R. Soviet generating sets
with a total combined capacity of nearly 20,000 mega-
watts are either in operation, under construction, or
planned for installation in 125 thermal powerplants
in 18 countries. Almost 9,000 megawatts of capacity
in hydraulic generating sets will have been installed
in hydroelectric powerplants outside the U.S.S.R. by
1970.
The Aswan High Dam project in the U.A.R. is prob-
ably the best known example of Soviet assistance to
another country in the development of electric power
facilities. The U.S.S.R. will have delivered twelve
175-megawatt hydraulic generating sets to this project
by 1970. Three units were delivered in 1966, four
more were to be delivered in 1967, and the rest by
1970. The U.S.S.R. also will deliver six 170-megawatt
hydraulic generating sets to the Iron Gates Hydro-
electric Power project, which is being erected by Ru-
mania and Yugoslavia on the Danube. It will also
furnish design data and technical supervision for pro-
duction of six more units by Rumania and Yugoslavia
for the same project. Five 120-megawatt hydraulic
generating sets were delivered to the Bhakra Hydro-
electric Powerplant in India during 1964-65, as well
as a number of smaller units to other hydroelectric
powerplants. India received almost 1,000 megawatts
of capacity in thermal and hydroelectric powerplants
from the U.S.S.R. in 1964, and 600 megawatts of ca-
pacity in 1965.
The eastern European Communist countries have
been the major buyers of Soviet thermal generating
sets. Poland received seven 200-megawatt thermal
generating sets from 1962 to 1965, and is to receive
four more during 1966-70. Bulgaria is to receive four
200 megawatt sets and a number of smaller units by
1970. Rumania is also to receive at least two of the
200 megawatt sets. East Germany is planning to pur-
chase six 200-megawatt units and six 300 megawatt
units from the U.S.S.R. for the Boxberg powerplant,
which is to be completed by 1974. Two 200-mega-
watt units were also built for Yugoslavia in 1966, and
three more are to be built by 1970. In addition, the
U.S.S.R. has built a number of smaller units for some
of the developing countries, including India, Iran,
Indonesia, Cuba, the U.A.R., and several others.
The U.S.S.R. exports transmission equipment to a
number of the developing countries, including North
Vietnam, Mongolia, Nepal, Cambodia, and the U.A.R.
The U.S.S.R. is helping the U.A.R. to build a complete
transmission system, including transformer substations
and two 500-kv. transmission circuits of 1,575 km.
length, from Aswan to Cairo.
5. Machinery for extraction of fuels
a. COAL MINING MACHINERY
(1) Introduction - The U.S.S.R. produces al-
most all of the mining machinery and equipment
needed by the Soviet coal mining industry, the largest
of its kind in the world. Coal mining machinery is
produced in about 50 plants, 40 of which specialize
in underground equipment.* Underground mining
now accounts for three-fourths of all the coal produced
in the U.S.S.R. By 1970, however, only 72% of the
coal produced will come from underground mines as
strip mining is increased. Major plants producing
underground coal mining machinery are listed in
FIGURE 62.
The 40 plants that produce underground mining
equipment make over 1,000 different type-sizes of ma-
chines and equipment, including a full complement
of development and production equipment. This pro-
liferation of types and sizes has resulted from the effort
to mechanize all phases of coal mining and to develop
equipment specifically for the many different coal
fields of the U.S.S.R. Soviet engineers have shown
great capability in designing special equipment. How-
ever, the machines are not dependable in operation:
frequent breakdowns are caused by the poor quality
of components, and the lack of spare parts may cause
long periods of idleness.
The production of underground coal mining equip-
ment is fairly well dispersed throughout the European
U.S.S.R., the Urals, western Siberia, and Kazakhstan.
In general, there is an important coal mining machinery
plant or group of plants near every major coal basin
in the country. These plants, however, do not produce
a full complement of machinery to make each basin
self-sufficient in equipment. Instead, each plant tends
to specialize in the production of certain end-items
that are distributed throughout the coal mining in-
dustry. The largest single concentration of plants
is found in the Ukrainian S.S.R., and includes major
plants in Gorlovka, Khar'kov, Donetsk, and Lugansk.
(2) Production - The total amount of coal
mining machinery produced in the U.S.S.R. is not
known, data having been published only for selected
types of equipment. The Seven Year Plan provided
for a general increase of 75% to 80%, but the plan
probably was not fulfilled. For example, the produc-
tion of combines in 1965 was only 998 units, whereas
the plan called for 1,260 units. FIGURE 63 shows the
production of selected types of coal mining equipment
for the years 1960-65, and FIGURE 64 shows the inven-
? The rest are heavy machine building plants that produce
limited quantities of coal mining equipment-power
shovels, draglines, heavy-duty dump trucks, etc.-for
strip mining. This subsection is limited mainly to under-
ground coal mining machinery and equipment.
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tory of major types of underground machinery and
equipment.
The industry in recent years has been handicapped
by the lack of investment capital for the building of
new facilities and the modernization of plants. At
the same time, plant managers have been called on to
increase the service life and reliability of their ma-
chines and to reduce costs. The poor quality of com-
ponent parts supplied to the mining machinery plants
is a chronic source of trouble. Such items as safety
valves, electrical switchgears and parts, and oil pump
springs reportedly have been defective. These and
other deficiencies account for the frequent break-
downs, long periods of idleness, and the high cost
of repairs which have been characteristic of Soviet
coal mining machinery in underground mines.
The 5-year plan for 1966-70 calls for increases in
strip mining. Large new strip pits will require ma-
chinery of a size hitherto unknown in the U.S.S.R.
The industry is experienced in the technology of
underground mining but not in the design and manu-
facture of equipment for strip mining. Only since
the late 1950's has the industry produced giant-sized
power shovels, draglines, bucket wheel excavators,
large dump trucks, and tractor-trailer units. Report-
edly it takes up to 10 years to design, test, and pro-
duce the extra large excavators used in overburden
removal, i.e., the clearing away of top layers of rock
and dirt. For example, the design for one such ma-
chine, an 80-cubic meter bucket 100-meter boom walk-
ing dragline, was scheduled for completion in 1964, but
construction of this machine is not to be finished
until 1970. The manufacture of medium-sized drag-
lines (14 and 15 cubic meter buckets and 75 to 90
meter booms) was started at the Ural Heavy Machine
Building Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze (UZTM) at
Sverdlovsk in 1960, and by 1964 output had reached
the level of four units per year. In 1962, UZTM built
a 25-cubic meter dragline; a second one was scheduled
for completion in 1965. No information is available
about the performance of these machines.
(3) Technology - In general, the level of tech-
nology of the Soviet coal mining machinery industry
is below that of its counterparts in the United States
and western Europe. Manufacturing methods and
techniques in many of the plants are outdated and
labor-consuming. The capacity for forging and heat-
treating special parts in many plants is inadequate.
Automatic control and signaling devices are in short
supply and of poor quality. Even though work has
continued since the early 1950's on developing an in-
tegrated unit for automated longwall mining, the best
unit in operation in 1966, the OMKT, still requires
a crew of men at the coal face to operate and service
the equipment. In contrast, during 1961 the United
Kingdom installed 2 ROLF (remotely operated long-
wall face) complexes in which the whole unit is con-
trolled by one man at a control panel away from
the coal face. '
A number of Soviet research and design institutes
are involved with the development of coal mining
machinery. The largest general mining institute is
the "A.A. Skochinsky" Mining Institute at Lyubertsy,
near Moscow. The institute is administered by the
Ministry of the Coal Industry, its work directed by
the Department of Earth Sciences of the Academy of
Sciences. The State Planning, Design, and Experi-
mental Institute for Coal Mining Machinery (Gip-
rouglemash) designs new equipment and builds pro-
totypes at the Malakhov Experimental Plant, bench
tests them, and then sends them to various mines
for field testing. Other research and design institutes
are located near most of the major coal fields. Re-
search and development on a lesser scale also is con-
ducted at some of the manufacturing plants listed
in Ficuin 62. Design and development of strip mining
equipment is conducted at the heavy machinery plant
where the unit is to be constructed.
(4) Foreign trade - In 1965, Soviet export of
combines and coal and rock loaders in terms of value
was almost three times that of 1960. Czechoslovakia
was the biggest importer of Soviet coal mining ma-
chinery during 1960-65. Even though the U.S.S.R.
has advertised mechanized support systems and de-
velopment combines in Western trade journals, none
are known to have been exported to western Europe
since 1959. A breakdown of Soviet exports in this
class by types and destination is shown in FIGURE 65.
FIGURE 66 shows the total of such exports and their
value for the years 1960-65.
Soviet foreign trade data include little information
about imports of coal mining machinery. Some equip-
ment was imported from France and probably from
West Germany in the early 1960's. In 1961, the
U.S.S.R. imported from the United States five con-
tinuous miners, seven shuttle cars, seven roof bolting
drill units, five extendable belt conveyors, and a supply
of spare parts for all machines. The total value of
this import was about $1.9 million, of which $350,000
was for spare parts. Early in 1967, it was announced
that the U.S.S.R. had signed an agreement with East
Germany for the purchase of 10 complete strip mining
installations, consisting of bucket wheel excavators,
loader-transfer conveyors, and belt conveyor systems.
Delivery is to be completed by 1970. Orders for large
amounts of conveyor belting were placed with pro-
ducers in the United Kingdom and in Hungary, prob-
ably for installation in new strip pits.
The U.S.S.R. also imports mining equipment from
Czechoslovakia. By early 1967, some 20 Czechoslovak
strip mining machines and about 30 km. of belt con-
veyors had been imported by the U.S.S.R. In late
1966, the U.S.S.R. contracted to purchase from
Czechoslovakia $14 million worth of machinery and
equipment for the Stoylen strip pit in the R.S.F.S.R.,
including the largest Czechoslovak bucket wheel ex-
cavator, 6.8 km. of belt conveyors, a loader-transfer
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conveyor, mobile repair shops, and auxiliary equip-
ment.
b. PETROLEUM MACFIINERY AND EQUIPMENT
(1) Oilfield equipment
(a) INTRODUCTION - Oilfield equipment in
the U.S.S.R. includes both surface and subsurface in-
stallations utilized in the drilling and equipping of oil
and gas wells. Major types of oilfield equipment are
produced at 44 plants. Total production doubled dur-
ing 1959-65, and is expected to almost double again
during 1966-70. During the present 5-year plan,
about 2,800 new types of equipment are to be intro-
duced for the first time and many obsolete types
discontinued. Emphasis is being placed on the de-
velopment and serial production of deep drilling rigs
(3,000-6,000 meter depths), both conventional and
offshore types; more powerful mud pumps (10:2-20.4
pounds per square inch [psi] ); higher quality drill
pipe and drilling bits; high pressure well-head assem-
blies and blow-out preventors (13.6-68.0 psi); multi-
zone downhole completion equipment; surface and
submersible pumps; automatic control systems for
wells, pipelines and refineries; large diameter linepipe
for oil and gas transmissions systems; and pipeline tur-
bines, compressors, and pumping stations.
Soviet oilfield equipment is generally inferior to
equipment manufactured in industrialized countries of
the West. Soviet equipment tends to be bulky and
heavy, frequently built of low-quality materials, and
does not perform uniformly well under diverse operat-
ing conditions. Transportation of such heavy and
oversized equipment poses a serious problem when
drilling occurs in wilderness or unmapped territory.
The industry plans to modernize and improve the
quality of extraction equipment, a program that will
require considerable time and substantial investment.
(b) LOCATION -Before World War II, most
oilfield equipment was produced in the major oil-
producing regions of Azerbaydzhan (Baku) and
Groznyy. As the center of oil production shifted to
the Urals-Volga area, the center of manufacture of
oilfield equipment also shifted to this area, even
though Baku continued to specialize in the output of
particular types of equipment. Major plants which
manufacture oilfield equipment are listed in FIGURE 67.
(C) PRODUCTION OF MAJOR ITEMS
1) Rigs - The U.S.S.R. produces types of
drilling rigs similar to those used in the United States,
including portable and semiportable light-, medium-,
and heavy-duty models. Production of Soviet rigs of
the heavy-duty, semiportable type amounted to about
350 units in 1958 and increased to 520 units in 1965.
The output of portable rigs approximated 2,000 units
in 1965, but only about one-half were used in the oil
and gas industries.
In many respects Soviet rigs are inferior to their
U.S. counterparts. They are heavier, require a longer
time to assemble and dismantle, and perform less effi-
ciently. Durability of many parts is poor, and spare
parts are in short supply. In recent years, however,
Soviet rigs of advanced design with automatic con-
trols have been seen in operation by industry special-
ists from the West. Such improvements are vital to
raising the efficiency of drilling operations.
The need to drill to greater depths will require
certain improvements in rig design and drilling tech-
nology. These include stronger derricks and substruc-
tures, more powerful drawworks and hoists, mud
pumps with greater circulation capabilities, drill pipe
of lighter weight and higher quality, improved turbo-
drilling techniques, and greater use of rotary drilling.
The U.S.S.R. was scheduled to receive a mobile off-
shore drilling platform from the Netherlands during
1967. This unit, valued at $10 million, would enable
the Soviets to drill in water up to 60 meters deep and
to drill to depths of 6,000 meters. It will supplement
the single Soviet mobile platform in use in the Caspian
Sea that can drill to a depth of 3,000 meters in water
up to 18 meters deep.
In 1965, imports of 33 complete drilling rig as-
semblies (valued at about $10.8 million) from Ru-
mania constituted the largest import item of oilfield
equipment. No heavy-duty rigs were exported from
the U.S.S.R. in 1965, but 269 core drilling rigs valued
at about $4 million were exported. These rigs are
used for drilling shallow exploratory wells to a depth
of 1,000 meters and were shipped primarily to other
Communist countries and to the less developed coun-
tries.
2) Turbodrills - Approximately 80% of
oil and gas well drilling in the U.S.S.R. in 1965 was
achieved by use of the turbodrill.* Soviet production
of turbodrills doubled between 1958 and 1965, as
shown in the following tabulation:
1958 ......... 4,213
1959 ......... 4,898
1960 ......... 6,222
1961 ......... 6,752
1962 ......... 7,656
1963 ......... 8,038
1964 ......... 8,280
1965 ......... 8,439
The turbodrill has an extremely high rate of penetra-
tion (more than twice that of rotary methods) in
shallow, extremely hard, rock formations that are less
than 2,500 meters in depth. Below 2,500 meters, the
turbodrill is much less efficient owing to the limitations
of supporting equipment. The weight of Soviet drill
pipe (which is heavier and about 11/2 times as large
in diameter as U.S. pipe) and the inadequate capacity
of Soviet mud pumps accelerate bit failure and reduce
penetration rates. The net effect-especially below
2,500 meters-is that less time is spent in drilling and
more time is spent in replacing worn-out bits.
* Turbodrilling differs from rotary drilling in that only the
lower section of drill pipe containing the turbodrill itself
rotates, whereas in rotary drilling the entire length of pipe
is rotated from the surface.
/D-
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Attempts to modify the turbodrill technique have
led the Soviets to reduce the diameter and weight of
the drill pipe, and the size of the bit, in order to extend
the useful depth of operation. The need to drill to
greater depths also has revived interest in rotary drill-
ing technology.
3) Electrodrills - Production of the elec-
trodrill began in the U.S.S.R. in 1956, but its use has
increased slowly in spite of claims that it is superior
to the turbodrill and can operate satisfactorily at
depths of 4,000 to 5,000 meters. In 1963, only 25
electrodrills were in operation. This number had in-
creased to only 116 by the end of 1965, although 500
were planned for that year.
The electrodrill method has been plagued by diffi-
culties in transmitting electricity to the drill at the
bottom of the well. Criticism of design and charges
of shoddy workmanship have been leveled at the
Kharkov Electrical Machinery Plant, which produced
the electrodrill. Until some of the problems are
solved, only small increases in use of the electrodrill
are likely during 1966-70.
4) Bits - Soviet production of drill bits
in 1965 reached about 900,000, of which at least 95%
were cone-type bits. Diamond and jet bits used for
coring purposes accounted for most of the remainder.
Recent attempts of the U.S.S.R. to buy diamond bits
from France may indicate that the quantity or qual-
ity of Soviet bits is inadequate. The present Soviet
tri-cone standard bit has been compared with U.S.
bits under similar conditions, and has been found to
be only about one-third as efficient. In wells deeper
than 2,000 meters, Soviet tri-cone bits wear out rapidly
because of the excessive weight of the drill pipe, in-
creased bottom-hole temperature, and bearing failure.
Consequently, the effective speed of Soviet drilling
(meters per rig per month) is only about one-half that
possible with U.S. bits. Attempts are being made,
however, to improve the quality of Soviet bits. A
net importer of drill bits, the U.S.S.R. imported 20,300
tri-cone bits in 1965 (primarily from Rumania), and
exported about 9,200.
5) Pumps - Soviet oilfield pumps are gen-
erally of lower quality than comparable Western types
and are severely limited with respect to filtering,
desanding, and dewaxing devices. They include both
rod-type models activated by a pump jack at the
surface and the downhole electric vortex-type similar
to the Reda pumps manufactured in the United States.
Western observers indicate that the Soviet version of
the Reda pump is about as good as the U.S. model.
However, this type of pump accounts for only a small
percentage of total pump production in the U.S.S.R.
The production of pumps fluctuated during the 7-
year plan. Production in 1965 was only about 5%
above that of 1958. The output of deep well plunger
pumps was as follows, in thousands of units:
1958 .......... 88.0
1959 .......... 95.3
1960 .......... 81.8
1961 .......... 80.3
1962 .......... 77.0
1963 .......... 88.7
1964 .......... 90.4
1965 .......... 92.8
The increase in output during the 7-year plan lagged
behind domestic needs, and many new wells have
been forced to remain shut-in because of the lack of
lifting equipment.
The quality of Soviet mud pumps has become a
limiting factor in turbodrilling efficiency. Frequent
breakdowns and the lack of spare parts have been the
basic difficulties in operation of the present models.
Equally serious is the inability of Soviet manufacturers
to mass-produce pumps capable of generating more
than 2,250 psi, in comparison with U.S. types, which
deliver 3,000-3,750 psi. Greater mud pump capacity
will be necessary to improve bit life and drilling effec-
tiveness.
6) Blow-out Preventors - Although serial
production of a universal type blow-out preventor at
the Leytenant Shmidt Works in Baku was reported
in 1966, this equipment is not universally available
where it is needed. Not only have several recent
drilling disasters been attributed to the lack' of this
item, but the shortage has caused the cessation of
development drilling in several high-pressure oil and
gas deposits located in Krasnodar Kray, the Ukraine,
and in Central Asia. The industry is stepping up
efforts to obtain blow-out preventors abroad, and im-
ports rose from 157 units in 1964 to 226 in 1965.
7) Well Completion and Serving Equip-
ment - Well completion and servicing equipment
comprises a wide assortment, ranging from small tools
to large tractor-mounted units.
Production of oilfield casing and drill pipe report-
edly is adequate. However, shortages have occurred
as a result of diversion to other, less essential uses,
such as shallow-water well casing. Casing and drill
pipe are produced at the same plants and are of iden-
tical quality and weight, the only major difference
being that tool joints are added to the ends of the
casing for drilling purposes. Although Soviet casing
and drill pipe is heavier than that of the United States,
it is rated at only 70 psi compared with 110 psi for
the U.S. product.
High-pressure well head fittings and complete oil
well surface installations ("Christmas trees") with
3,000 to 15,000 psi ratings are in very short supply.
Lack of this equipment caused the cessation of de-
velopment drilling in several high-pressure fields.
Pressures over 10,000 psi in oil and gas fields are rarely
encountered, but high quality is essential when such
pressures are attained. U.S. manufacturers produce
well head assemblies rated up to 20,000 psi, and are
testing equipment for possible 30,000 psi.
Production of well head assemblies in the U.S.S.R.
is estimated at 3,000 to 6,000 units per year, all be-
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lieved to have less than 5,000 psi rating and to be
of inferior design. The industry is attempting to de-
velop well head assemblies capable of operating at
pressures of 7,500 to 10,000 psi. For present needs,
however, the U.S.S.R. is attempting to buy 220 well
head assemblies rated at 5,000 to 15,000 psi from the
United Kingdom and France. Underwater well head
assemblies for diverless completion are also the subject
of Soviet-French technical discussions, possibly for
future offshore operations in the Caspian Sea.
(d) FOREIGN TRADE - Since 1964, the U.S.S.R.
has been a net importer of oilfield equipment. As it
became necessary to increase drilling to find new oil
and gas fields during the latter part of the Seven
Year Plan (1959-65), imports of oilfield equipment,
primarily from Rumania, increased rapidly and the
former position of the U.S.S.R. as a net exporter of
such equipment was reversed. In 1960, about 60%
of total Soviet exports of oilfield equipment were sent
to other Communist countries; by 1965 this share
had risen to about 80%. Concomitantly, shipments
of Soviet oilfield equipment to the less developed non-
Communist countries, mostly in connection with tech-
nical assistance programs, declined from about 37%
of the total in 1960 to about 17% in 1965. Soviet trade
in oilfield equipment, in quantity and value terms,
is shown in FIGURE 68.
(2) Refinery equipment
(a) PRODUCTION AND DEMAND - Production
of refinery equipment almost doubled during the 7-
year plan; the 1970 plan calls for its output to increase
by 50% to 70% above the level of 1965, as the fol-
lowing tabulation shows (in thousands of metric
tons*):
1958 ........... 71 1964 ........... 140
1960 ........... 93 1965 ........... 140
1962 ........... 121 1966 ........... 147
1963 ........... 115 1970 Plan .. 210-240
In fact, the plan for installation of new refining ca-
pacity during 1959-65 was not fulfilled, despite the
growth in output of equipment. A total crude charge
capacity of 250-260 million tons was to be in opera-
tion by 1965, but actual capacity approximated 225
million tons.
The 1970 plan calls for the crude oil charge capacity
to reach 310-330 million tons a year. Special em-
phasis is placed on the construction of secondary
processing facilities-catalytic cracking, catalytic re-
forming, hydrocracking, hydrogen treating-to in-
crease the quantity and upgrade the quality of dis-
tillates. Such a program will require a significant
effort by the petroleum equipment industry to produce
modern types of processing units. If past difficulties
in moving from an established line of output to one of
new and more advanced design continue, the U.S.S.R.
may have to purchase modern refinery equipment and
* Metric tons are used throughout this section.
technology from the industrialized countries of the
West in order to meet its 1970 goals.
(b) FOREIGN TRADE - The U.S.S.R. was a net
importer of refinery equipment during the entire period
of the 7-year plan. The value of imports has risen
since 1960, probably as a result of inability of the
domestic equipment industry to meet the demands
of the refinery construction programs. Rumania and
Czechoslovakia are the major suppliers of this equip-
ment. Rumania supplied about one-half of the 26
million rubles worth of equipment imported in 1965.
Trade in refinery equipment by the U.S.S.R. during
1959-65 was as follows (in thousands of foreign ex-
change rubles) :
IMPORT
EXPORT
1959
..................
3,070
846
1960
..................
1,171
192
1961
....................:9,833
444
1962
..................
18,349
808
1963
..................
20,300
641
1964
..................
20,242
1,068
1965
..................
26,226
284
6. Chemical equipment
a. INTRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R. is a relatively
large producer of chemical equipment,* producing
about as much as the eastern European Communist
countries combined. Nevertheless, output is insuffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the growing domestic
chemical industry, and substantial quantities of this
equipment are imported. Output of chemical equip-
ment in 1965, valued at 386 million rubles, accounted
for less than 1% of the total output of the machine
building and metalworking sector.
During the current 5-year plan, output of chemical
equipment is scheduled approximately to double,
reaching a value level of 780-830 million rubles in 1970.
Specialization is to be emphasized both in the produc-
tion of standard components and in the production of
complete technological lines for manufacture of specific
chemical products. The manufacture of equipment
of large capacity also is being stressed. The product
mix planned for 1970 continues to reflect high priori-
ties for agricultural chemicals, plastics, fibers, and
synthetic rubber. The plan also emphasizes the need
for equipment to produce petrochemical raw materials
and polymeric end-items.
b. ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION - The U.S.S.R.
did not have a unified industry for the manufacture of
chemical equipment until the establishment of the
State Committee for Chemical and Petroleum Machine
Building in May 1963. In October 1965, the State
Committee was changed to an All-Union Ministry,
comprising some 25 to 30 plants that produce chemical
equipment. Chemical equipment also is produced
* Including a wide range of heterogeneous items such as
filters, centrifuges, heat exchangers, evaporators, columns,
driers, reactors, and autoclaves for use in chemical
processes.
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at some 200 plants in other branches of machine build-
ing, although the output of chemical equipment from
these plants is below that of the specialized plants.
Almost two-thirds of the total output of Soviet chem-
ical equipment is produced in the R.S.F.S.R.; most of
the remainder is produced in the Ukraine. The prin-
cipal plants producing chemical equipment are listed
in FIGURE 69. Information is incomplete on Soviet
plans for construction of chemical equipment plants
during 1966-70. Many of the existing plants are to be
expanded or modernized; new plants are to be built
at Perm and Poltava; and a number of general ma-
chine building plants may be converted to the produc-
tion of chemical equipment.
C. PRODUCTION
(1) Volume - The value of chemical equip-
ment produced in 1965-386 million rubles-repre-
sented an increase of 245% over the level of 1958.
Annual increases in production thus averaged about
19% in 1959-65, but the pattern of growth was un-
even, the largest rates of increase having occurred
in 1959-60. Soviet production of chemical equip-
ment * since 1958 and the plan for 1970 are shown
in the following tabulation, in millions of rubles:
YEAR
VALUE
OF OUTPUT
YEAR
VALUE
OF OUTPUT
1958
..........
112
1963
..........
289
1959
..........
173
1964
..........
344
1960
..........
226
1965
..........
386
1961
..........
243
1966
..........
417
1962
..........
266
1970 Plan .. 780-830
Output in 1965 overfulfilled the original 7-year goal
of 350-370 million rubles, but was below the revised
target of 450 million rubles announced in 1963 and
the goal of 420 million rubles set after Khrushchev
was replaced. Shortcomings in the quality of chem-
ical equipment have frequently delayed the operation
of new chemical plants and necessitated larger expend-
itures to remedy deficits resulting from faulty design
and manufacture. In many cases equipment has failed
to reach its planned level of productivity.
(2) Difficulties - Numerous difficulties ham-
pered efforts to expand the production and improve
the quality of chemical equipment in the U.S.S.R.
during the 1959-65 period. An inadequate supply
of labor existed at most levels, engineers, designers,
and technicians being in particularly short supply.
Shortages of materials and equipment were evident
in the construction and operation of chemical ma-
chine building plants. There was a substantial under-
fulfillment of the plan to introduce new chemical
machine building capacity. Delays in production were
caused by shortages of materials such as clad steel,
plastic-coated metal sheets and pipes, and acid re-
sistant materials. The supply organizations failed
to assure prompt delivery of completed items to the
Soviet data on the value of output of chemical equip-
ment excludes pumps and compressors.
chemical industry. Furthermore, the chemical in-
dustry frequently canceled orders for machinery and
equipment that already was in production or had been
completed. Not only was this practice costly, but it
delayed the production of other equipment that was
needed.
d. FOREIGN TRADE - The volume of chemical
equipment imported by the U.S.S.R. from other Com-
munist countries and from the non-Communist world
increased substantially during the 7-year plan. The
value of total imports in 1965 was more than four
times the level in 1958, as FIGURE 70 shows. Chemical
equipment imported from the West, which accounted
for only 38% in 1958, increased to 53% of the total
by 1965. Most of the chemical equipment imported
from other Communist countries has come from Czech-
oslovakia and East Germany.
The U.S.S.R. has continued to export some chemical
equipment in spite of pressing domestic needs. Ex-
ports are mainly in the form of complete plants shipped
to other Communist countries, and, to a lesser extent
to the developing countries. Generally these plants
were for the production of basic chemicals and chem-
ical products. Comprehensive data on exports of
Soviet chemical equipment are not available.
7. Locomotives and railroad cars
a. INTRODUCTION - Although the railroad is the
principal means of transportation in the U.S.S.R.,
domestic production of railroad transport equipment
is inadequate for the basic requirements of the country,
and much railroad equipment must be imported.
In the post-World War II period, the U.S.S.R. con-
sistently has been a net importer of railroad equip-
ment from the eastern European Communist countries.
The Soviet locomotive and railroad car industry has
14 major plants-six for the production of locomotives,
four for freight cars, three for passenger cars and
permanently coupled passenger train sets, and one
for suburban and subway cars. Details on the major
plants are given in FIGURE 71. In general, these plants
are vertically integrated, although in the past few
years the industry has tended toward specialization
in the production of some of the components.
b. PRODUCTION
(1) Locomotives - By 1959, the U.S.S.R., with
a production of some 1,400 locomotives, was producing
more locomotives of all types than the United States.
Production continued to grow rapidly through 1961,
when slightly over 2,000 units were manufactured,
but output then leveled off at about 2,100 units an-
nually in the period 1962-66. Since 1958, diesel loco-
motives consistently have accounted for about 70%
of annual Soviet production of locomotives. FIGURE
15 shows production of mainline locomotives in the
U.S.S.R. in 1959-66.
The last Soviet steam locomotive was produced
in 1956, and railroads are converting rapidly to the
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FIGURE 15. PRODUCTION OF MAINLINE
LOCOMOTIVES, BY TYPE
(Units)
1959 ................
1,002
435
1960 ................
1,303
396
1961 ................
1,455
557
1962 ................
1,483
617
1963 ................
1,519
643
1964 ................
1,484
638
1965 ................
1,485
641
1966 ................
1,529
600
use of diesel and electric locomotives. The U.S.S.R.
plans to use electric locomotives in preference to diesels
on lines with heavy freight density and steep grades,
as well as on sections with commuter traffic. The
large volume of investment in permanent installations
required by electrification, however, is not justified
on lines with light traffic, and the pace of electrifica-
tion is slowing somewhat. The rate at which the
U.S.S.R. is switching from steam to diesel and electric
traction is shown by the following tabulation:
TYPE OF PERCENT OF
LOCOMOTIVE FREIGHT TRAFFIC HANDLED
1960
1966
Steam ..................
56.8
11.2
Diesel ..................
21.4
46.8
Electric ................
21.8
42.0
(a) DIESEL - The TE-3 diesel-electric freight
locomotive is the predominant source of Soviet rail-
road motive power. The TE-3 sections, each of 2,000
h.p., generally are coupled in pairs with multiple unit
control. A variant of the TE-3-the TE-7-is used
for passenger trains. Industry officials; however,
want to phase out production of both the TE-3 and
the TE-7 as soon as possible and replace them with
more powerful units capable of higher speeds. Such
a locomotive is the 2TE-10L, a 2-section locomotive
of 6,000 hp., which has been in series production since
1965. Other mainline diesel locomotives produced
in 1966 were the TEP-10L, the TEP-10, the TEP-60,
and the M-62. The latter unit apparently was manu-
factured solely for export to the east European Com-
munist countries. FIGURE 16 shows typical models
of locomotives-diesel and electric-built in the
U.S.S.R. FIGURE 72 shows the characteristics of the
major locomotives.
Current emphasis in the production of diesel-elec-
tric locomotives is directed toward the building of a
3,000-hp. freight unit, the TE-40. This locomotive
uses a 4-cycle, 16-cylinder engine, the D-70. Progress
has been slow, however, and it is unlikely that pro-
duction of the TE-3 will be stopped completely before
the TE-40 or a comparable unit is brought into series
production. The 2 TE-10L probably also will be re-
placed by the TE-40.
FIGURE 16. MODELS OF MAINLINE LOCOMOTIVES. (top) Diesel-
electric locomotive, TE-3. (bottom) Electric locomotive, VL-60.
Recently the U.S.S.R. started small-scale production
of diesel-powered locomotives with hydraulic trans-
missions. About 150 of these locomotives are now
in service, and more are being built. Soviet planners
presently favor the extensive use of the diesel-hydraulic
locomotive because of the lighter weight of the hy-
draulic transmission compared with the electrical
transmission system, and because of the saving of
copper that results from eliminating the generator and
traction motors. Transportation officials, on the other
hand, prefer the diesel-electric locomotives because
they are more reliable in service. Experimental gas
turbine locomotives also have been built and tested
in regular service, but their production in the near
future is unlikely.
(b) ELECTRIC - The VL-8 is the principal
direct current locomotive in the U.S.S.R., and the
VL-60 is the principal alternating current locomotive.
As is the case with diesel locomotives, electric loco-
motives presently in extensive use fail to satisfy fully
the Soviet requirements for motive power. Thus,
more powerful units are being phased into production.
The VL-10, a more powerful version of the VL-8,
was reported to be in serial production in early 1967,
and production of the VL-80, the most powerful elec-
tric locomotive, probably. has grown significantly in
recent years. In fact, the aggregative electric tractive
power produced in 1966 increased in the face of a
decline in the number of locomotives produced. More
efficient alternating current locomotives, the VL-60K
and the VL-80K, both of which are produced with
J
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FIGURE 17. PRODUCTION OF FREIGHT AND
PASSENGER CARS
(Units)
FREIGHT
1959
..............
38,600
1,790
1960
..............
36,400
1,656
1961
..............
35,000
1,748
1962
..............
35,700
1,727
1963
..............
37,200
1,986
1964
..............
39,500
2,018
1965
..............
39,600
1,991
silicon rectifiers, have also been brought into serial
production.
(2) Freight cars - Following World War II,
the rebuilding of the inventory of Soviet freight cars
received high priority. The main plants for the pro-
duction of freight cars were restored, and in 1950 the
industry reached a peak output of 50,000 cars. Except
for a decline during the Korean war, production con-
tinued through 1965 at a rate of about 35,000 to
40,000 cars a year (FIGURE 17). The present inven-
tory of freight cars in the U.S.S.R. is slightly more
than one million. Production of mainline freight cars
is extensive. There are 12 railway institutes concerned
with the design of rolling stock and track structures.
These institutes work with designers and engineers of
the producing plants in the development and adapta-
tion of new equipment. For especially important
projects, the Institute of Complex Transport Problems
works with the All-Union Scientific Research Insti-
tute of Railroad Transport to establish the desired tech-
nical characteristics of the new equipment. A plant
is then designated to draw up detailed plans and
specifications and, after these are accepted, a proto-
type is produced. Finally, after a period of testing
is successfully completed, the new model is placed
in series or individual production.
c. FOREIGN TRADE
(1) Imports - To supplement its domestic pro-
duction, the U.S.S.R. has imported locomotives and
railroad cars from the eastern European Communist
countries regularly since 1946. Large numbers of
switching and industrial locomotives have been im-
ported, and imports of high-speed electric locomotives
for passenger trains have been increasing. About
800 such units were purchased from Czechoslovakia
in the period 1958-65, and some 1,000 additional loco-
motives are to be received in 1966-70. Imports of
railroad passenger cars, mainly from East Germany,
Hungary, and Poland, rose to a high of 1,545 units
in 1964, then fell to 1,084 in 1965, reflecting the
growth in domestic production. Freight car imports
remained relatively steady through 1964 and 1965.
FIGURE 18 shows Soviet imports and exports of rail-
road equipment.
(2) Exports - Because of domestic require-
ments, Soviet exports of new rolling stock have been
small, with scarcely any exports of freight or passenger
cars being reported. In the period 1959-65, 1,850
mainline locomotives were exported, of which 92%
were surplus steam locomotives. In 1965, no steam
or electric locomotives were exported, but 88 diesel-
electric locomotives were exported, chiefly to Cuba
and Hungary. Hungary was the main recipient, hav-
ing purchased 52 M-62 units.
8. Metallurgical equipment
a. GENERAL. - The metallurgical equipment* in-
dustry of the U.S.S.R. increased its output by 38%
during the Seven Year Plan (1959-65), and reached a
level of 252,200 tons in 1966. Even so the industry
has not been able to meet the full requirements of the
Soviet iron and steel industry; it has been particularly
deficient in producing equipment embodying the latest
technological developments in use in the West. Pro-
duction perennially falls short of assigned goals, and
the level of equipment technology in most sectors of
the iron and steel industry lags behind that of West-
ern producers. The role assumed by the U.S.S.R.
as a major supplier of metallurgical equipment to
other Communist countries and to the developing coun-
tries has further hampered its ability to satisfy the
' Including rolling mills; mechanical equipment for coke
ovens, blast furnaces, open hearth furnaces, oxygen con-
verters, and electric furnaces; mixers; and some types of
materials-handling equipment such as charging machines.
The category excludes blowers, compressors, power equip-
ment, specialized electrical machinery, equipment for
oxygen generating plants, and agglomerating and ore
concentrating equipment.
FIGURE 18. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF RAILROAD EQUIPMENT
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Exports :
Locomotives
Mainline Steam ..............
950
Mainline Electric .............
......
10
19
12
......
Diesel .......................
......
13
13
88
Imports:
Locomotives
Diesel .......................
52
122
147
142
186
146
180
Mainline Electric .............
43
109
102
102
157
166
186
Freight cars ...................
2,225
2,228
2,722
2,998
3,564
3,571
3,129
Passenger cars .................
1,490
1,471
1,377
1,370
1,501
1,545
1,084
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requirement of its own iron and steel industry. The
U.S.S.R. has relied increasingly on imports of metal-
lurgical equipment to offset the heavy export program.
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, for example, have
provided the U.S.S.R. with increasing amounts of roll-
ing mill equipment, although of less complex types
than that now produced in the U.S.S.R. In order to
procure the more advanced types of equipment now
being used in the iron and steel industries of the West,
the U.S.S.R. is stepping up its efforts to buy from West-
ern firms. The most notable acquisition to date has
been a complete oxygen converter plant from Austria.
The U.S.S.R. continues to demonstrate strong interest
in purchasing large continuous cold rolling mills and
related finishing equipment, such as heat treatment
facilities and continuous galvanizing and tinning
lines-the types of equipment in which the U.S.S.R.
is most deficient. Soviet efforts to buy such equip-
ment have not yet been successful.
b. STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY - The Soviet met-
allurgical equipment industry consists of a diversified
group of machine building plants, of which only a few
are engaged solely in the production of metallurgical
equipment. The major producers of this equipment
are heavy machine building plants with casting, forg-
ing, metalworking, and materials-handling facilities of
adequate size for the manufacture of large and heavy
products. Eight of these plants account for much of
the production of metallurgical equipment, including
virtually all of the production of rolling mill equip-
ment (FIGURE 73). Dozens of other industrial plants
produce various types of metallurgical equipment, in-
cluding cranes, ladles, charging machines, and other
materials-handling equipment, and components for
rolling mills, steelmaking furnaces, blast furnaces, and
coke batteries.
Most of the plants of the metallurgical equipment
industry, including the major producers, are subordi-
nate to the Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport
Machine Building. The remaining plants of the in-
dustry, usually producers of specialized components,
are subordinate to other ministries, including those for
Medium Machine Building and General Machine
Building. All of the metallurgical equipment plants,
however, are subject to a considerable degree of cen-
tralized control by the State Institute for the Design
and Planning of Metallurgical Plants (GIPROMEZ).
GIPROMEZ determines the requirements of the So-
viet steel industry, and thus establishes the basis
for production plans for metallurgical equipment.
Gosplan and the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy issue
directives concerning assignments for production of
metallurgical equipment.
Research and design activities for the metallurgical
equipment industry are carried on by numerous or-
ganizations under the coordination of GIPROMEZ and
its affiliates at republic and local levels. Three major
research and design institutes are located in Moscow:
The All-Union Scientific Research and Planning-De-
sign Institute of Metallurgical Machine Building
(VNIIETMash), the Central Scientific Research In-
stitute of Technology and Machine . Building
(TsNIITMash ), and the Central Scientific Research
Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy (TsNIIChERMET).
c. PRODUCTION - In 1966, the U.S.S.R. produced
252,000 tons of metallurgical equipment. Rolling mills
and related finishing equipment-the major compo-
nent of the total-accounted for about 50% of the
total weight of metallurgical equipment produced in
1961-65.
Aggregate production of metallurgical equipment
during the 7-year plan amounted to 1.6 million tons, a
level about 6% below the planned output of 1.7 mil-
lion tons. Production of rolling mill equipment for the
plan period totaled 0.8 million tons, far short of the
planned level of 1.0 to 1.1 million tons. In 1965, the
final year of the plan, Soviet production of rolling
mill equipment amounted to 111,200 tons, only about
one-half of the goal of 200,000-220,000 tons originally
set for that year. Although aggregate production
of the other types of metallurgical equipment ap-
parently exceeded the planned tonnage, production
of some items, particularly those involving new tech-
nology, fell below planned levels. Production during
1961-66 is shown in the following tabulation, in tons:
TOTAL METAL-
LURGICAL EQUIPMENT
OF WHICH, ROLL-
ING MILL EQUIPMENT
1961
.......
213,300
102,100
1962
.......
240,100
121,200
1963
.......
235,600
112,200
1964
.......
240,600
112,200
1965
.......
242,300
111,200
1966
.......
252,200
na
Failure to achieve output goals was caused in part
by delay in providing production capacity needed to
meet the increasing demands for metallurgical equip-
ment and other types of industrial machinery. Some
progress was made in modernizing production facil-
ities, but in general the construction of new facilities
was behind schedule throughout the industry during
1959-65.
Other factors contributed to the shortfall in quan-
tity and assortment in planned production of metal-
lurgical equipment. For example, new construction
at some of the steel plants often was behind schedule
and the placing of orders for equipment failed to coin-
cide with the planning of production schedules. The
production of new equipment in some cases could not
be undertaken at all because new technological de-
signs were inadequately or incorrectly drawn.
The various difficulties in the design, manufacture,
and installation of metallurgical equipment were re-
sponsible for the failure of the steel industry to add
new productive capacity as planned. Plans for retire-
ment of obsolete and obsolescent equipment were
deferred because it was needed to maintain planned
levels of output of iron and steel during 1959-65.
Equally damaging was the failure of the industry to
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install additional types of rolling and finishing facil-
ities required for the diversification of steel products.
Moreover, programs for the adoption of new tech-
nology in steelmaking, such as continuous casting and
the use of oxygen converters, were only partially im-
plemented.
d. TECHNOLOGY- Soviet capability to produce
efficient metallurgical equipment is demonstrated in
the advanced design and technology of its new blast
furnaces. During 1959-65, the metallurgical equip-
ment industry produced components for blast furnaces
with working volumes of 2,000 and 2,300 cubic
meters and rated annual capacities of one million tons
and more of pig iron. Several furnaces with volumes
of 2,700 cubic meters-greater than the largest now
in use anywhere else-are scheduled for construction
by 1970. The new Soviet blast furnaces will in-
corporate high top pressure and other advanced tech-
nology, and probably will be unsurpassed in design
efficiency by furnaces operating anywhere else in the
world. In many cases, however, the Soviet blast
furnaces have not achieved the production rates ex-
pected, even after lengthy periods of operation.
During the 7-year plan, the U.S.S.R. lagged behind
Western producers technologically in the manufacture
of equipment for steelmaking. Elsewhere in the world
modern producers had been switching almost com-
pletely from the open-hearth furnace to the oxygen
converter, but the U.S.S.R. continued to install equip-
ment for the older method. About two dozen open
hearth furnaces (500-ton and 600-ton) were con-
structed during 1959-65, and in 1962 the U.S.S.R. com-
pleted a 900-ton unit with a rated annual capacity of
about 700,000 tons of steel, the largest of its kind in
the world.
The U.S.S.R. had experimented earlier with the use
of small-scale oxygen converters and had undertaken
a program to adopt this new process but was unable
to solve various technical problems in the design and
construction of large-scale converters of 100-ton and
250-ton capacities. These difficulties led to the So-
viet decision in December 1962 to purchase a Linz-
Donawitz (L-D) oxygen converter plant from the
Austrians, who developed the process. Installation
of this equipment at the Novo Lipetsk Metallurgical
Plant was completed in December 1966. The com-
plete plant includes three 100-ton vessels having an
aggregate annual capacity of 2 million tons, and an
oxygen generating plant. Meanwhile, by the end of
the 7-year plan, the U.S.S.R. had managed to install
several 100-ton converters produced domestically, but
total production of 5 million tons of crude steel by
this method in 1965 was only about one-fourth of the
planned amount.
The U.S.S.R. also has lagged in its program for con-
struction of large electric furnaces. The largest elec-
tric furnaces constructed during the period 1959-66
were 100-ton units, and although the designing of
180-ton and 250-ton furnaces was undertaken as early
as 1956, none has yet been produced. In the United
States, electric furnaces of 180-ton capacity have been
in use for a number of years.
The U.S.S.R. has also lagged in the development of
specialized furnaces for vacuum melting of steel,
particularly in the manufacture of consumable-
electrode, vacuum-arc furnaces. Some progress has
been made in the development of electron-beam fur-
naces, but, for the most part, the U.S.S.R. has relied
heavily on East Germany for this advanced technical
equipment. The U.S.S.R. is recognized as a world
leader, however, in the development of electro-slag
remelting, which is an alternative to vacuum melting
for the production of high-quality steels. The U.S.S.R.
has patterned its rolling mill equipment primarily on
designs developed in the United States and other non-
Communist countries. Thus, rolling mills built in the
U.S.S.R. in recent years generally conform to modern
standards for rolling speed, weight of starting mate-
rial, and the use of continuous lines for rolling and
finishing processes. Long leadtimes characterize the
Soviet industry, however, and the process of design,
construction, and installation of many of the new
rolling mills-particularly large, multistand sheet and
strip mills-requires up to five and in some cases ten
years to complete, as compared to two or three years
in the United States. Such delays have resulted in
the commissioning of rolling mills that were obsoles-
cent in some respects and required early moderni-
zation.
The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated technical ability in
the design and construction of large primary rolling
mills, particularly blooming and slabbing mills and
continuous billet mills. The industry has produced
1,300-mm. blooming mills, reportedly having annual
capacities of 6 million tons. The U.S.S.R. also has pro-
duced 2,500-mm. and 1,700-mm. continuous wide strip
mills, each having a designed annual capacity of 3.5
million tons. The strip mills, however, are not as well
equipped as Western-built mills with automatic gage
controls and other process control features. More-
over, only three such mills were installed during the
7-year plan, and none since 1960. In the design and
manufacture of cold-rolling mills and continuous elec-
trolytic galvanizing and tinning lines, progress has
been even slower, as evidenced by the substantial
shortfall in planned output for 1965 of various types
of flat-rolled steel, including cold-rolled sheet, tin
plate, galvanized sheet, and transformer sheet.
With respect to pipe and tube rolling mills, the in-
dustry has designed and manufactured a wide range
of equipment, enabling the U.S.S.R. to become the
world's largest producer of steel pipes and tubes. Dif-
ficulties have been encountered, however, in the manu-
facture of specialty mills and of auxiliary equipment
for heat treatment and finishing operations. Reliance
is being placed on imports of pipe and tube mill equip-
ment to compensate for such deficiencies.
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The U.S.S.R. has gained recognition as a world
leader in the development of continuous casting tech-
niques, but application of the process is lagging far
behind plan. At least 15 units were in operation at
the end of 1966, generally small-scale units for the
casting of billets and blooms. One impressive, large-
scale unit for the casting of slabs has been constructed
at Novo Lipetsk, but the delay in installing comple-
mentary strip rolling equipment is hampering efforts
to operate this facility at its designed capacity of over
2 million tons of slabs per annum. In the United
States, where acceptance of the new process has been
slower, the tonnage of steel handled by continuous
casting methods in 1966 is estimated to have been
about equal to the 1-2 million tons of output in the
U.S.S.R., and a number of new units are to be ac-
tivated in the near future.
e. FOREIGN TRADE - The U.S.S.R. traditionally has
been a net exporter of metallurgical equipment, but
in recent years imports have increased steadily and may
have exceeded exports in 1964 and 1965. Data on
annual exports of metallurgical equipment are incom-
plete; however, between 1956 and 1965, the U.S.S.R.
exported an estimated 559,000 tons of metallurgical
equipment, more than 80% of which was in the form
of complete plants shipped under technical assistance
programs. Of the remainder, more than half con-
sisted of replacement rolls for rolling mills. Imports,
consisting principally of rolling mill equipment, were
about two-thirds the size of exports for the same period.
Soviet trade in metallurgical equipment during 1961-65
is shown in the following tabulation, in tons:
EXPORTS UNDER
TECHNICAL ASSIST-
ANCE PROGRAMS*
OTHER
EXPORTS
TOTAL
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
1961
.........
46,400
9,573
55,973
26,700
1962
.........
46,400
11,341
57,741
35,325
1963
.........
46,400
12,164
58,564
49,000
1964
.........
46,400
14,319
60,719
62,902
1965
.........
46,400
10,678
57,078
61,622
? Average annual shipments.
Most of the metallurgical equipment exported by
the U.S.S.R. is shipped to Communist countries (Fic-
URE 74). Steel plants which have been equipped
wholly or in part by the U.S.S.R. include the Hune-
doara Metallurgical Combine in Rumania; the Lenin
Metallurgical Plant in Nowa Huta, Poland; the Danube
Metallurgical Combine in Dunaujvaros, Hungary; the
Lenin Metallurgical Plant in Dimitrovo, Bulgaria;
steel plants in Anshan, Wuhan, and Paotow in Com-
munist China; and the Songjin, Hwanghae, and Kang-
son plants in North Korea. Since 1963, the U.S.S.R.
has supplied equipment for new plants under construc-
tion at Galati in Rumania, at Kremikovtsi in Bulgaria,
and at Kosice in Czechoslovakia. In addition, equip-
ment has been shipped to Yugoslavia for the expansion
of the Zelezara Metallurgical Combine in Zenica. The
U.S.S.R. also has assisted Cuba in the expansion of its
largest steel mill, scheduled for completion in 1968.
Significant quantities of metallurgical equipment
have been exported to the less developed countries.
An important recipient is the Bhilai Steel Plant in
India, which by the end of 1961 had an annual
ingot capacity of 2.5 million tons, achieved entirely
with Soviet equipment and technical assistance. The
U.S.S.R. also has supplied several large rolling mills
for the Helwan Steel Plant in the U.A.R., and has
equipped a small rolling mill and wire products plant
in Ceylon. Work on a Soviet project to construct a
steel plant in Indonesia was interrupted in 1966, and
apparently postponed indefinitely because of economic
difficulties in that country. Finland has been another
recipient of Soviet equipment, including components
for a blast furnace and a small oxygen converter shop.
Among steel mills in the less developed countries
currently receiving Soviet equipment and technical
assistance, the most important is the Bokaro Steel
Plant in India, which is to have an initial ingot capacity
of 1.7 million tons. This plant requires equipment
of advanced types not fully mastered by the U.S.S.R.,
including oxygen converters for steelmaking and con-
tinuous cold rolling mills and related finishing equip-
ment for the flat rolled steel products. Other steel
plants are to be built with Soviet assistance in Algeria
and Iran, and at Madras in India.
Soviet imports of metallurgical equipment (FIGURE
75) have been obtained primarily from Communist
countries, mainly Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
Czechoslovakia has supplied blooming mills, billet
mills, and auxiliary equipment for rolling mills; East
Germany has supplied bar and merchant mills, wire-
drawing equipment, and a wide variety of auxiliary
equipment for rolling mills, such as shears, levelers,
roller tables, gears, and spindles. East Germany has
supplied a number of electron beam furnaces for the
vacuum melting of high-quality steel and other metals.
Since 1963, the U.S.S.R. has imported from Hungary
equipment for the modernization and enlargement of
pipe mills and from Poland small quantities of rolling
mill equipment.
Only one major equipment order has been placed
with a Western country-the complete L-D oxygen
converter plant with Austria discussed above-but the
U.S.S.R. has been seeking for at least 7 years to obtain
additional equipment from other suppliers in the West.
Particular interest has been shown in continuous cold-
rolling mills, silicon steel electrical sheet processing
lines, continuous electrolytic tinning and galvanizing
lines, and heat-treatment facilities. Acquisition of
these types of equipment would enable the U.S.S.R.
to expand output of steel products in short supply,
such as cold-rolled sheet, high-quality transformer
sheet, tinplate, and galvanized sheet. The U.S.S.R.
also would benefit from the technical study of im-
ported equipment, enabling it to improve its own
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capabilities for the manufacture of metallurgical
equipment.
9. Construction equipment*
a. INTRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R. produces a large
assortment of construction equipment and ranks sec-
ond only to the United States in volume of output,
yet the needs of the Soviet construction industry in
terms of quantity, quality and assortment are not
met. Increases in production of construction equip-
ment, especially earthmoving equipment, are not
sufficient to keep pace with the growth of construc-
tion activity. Much of the equipment is underpowered
and is susceptible to frequent failure in service.
b. PRODUCTION
(1) Volume - During the recently completed
7-year plan (1959-65), the construction equipment
industry made substantial gains in the annual output
of the principal types of equipment. The value of
aggregate output increased by about 85% during the
period. Nevertheless, it is believed that the industry
failed to achieve in 1965 the production rates which
were initially scheduled in the draft plan. The out-
put of selected, important types of construction equip-
ment is shown in FICuRE 76. These data indicate that
during the 7-year period, the average annual rate of
growth in production of excavators was about 11%,
bulldozers about 9%, motor graders 7%, scrapers
15% and cranes about 4%.
In 1966 the output of construction equipment in-
creased by 11.6%, compared with the planned in-
crease for that year of 9.5%. An increase of 9.4%
is planned for 1967. Although the production plan
for 1966 was overfulfilled in aggregate terms, the prod-
uct mix continued to be unsatisfactory. Among de-
ficiencies of particular concern to the Ministry of
Construction, Road, and Communal Machine Build-
ing is the relatively small output of very heavy self-
propelled cranes able to assemble apartment houses
from individual rooms prefabricated of concrete and
masonry. The continuing absense of scrapers of 25
cubic meter capacity and tractors of 300 hp. and more
to draw them, as well as such powerful tractors to
mount bulldozers and scarifiers, is holding back de-
sired increases in labor productivity in construction.
A further limitation is the continuing inability of the
U.S.S.R. to develop and bring into series production
a family of large high-powered wheel-type tractors for
mounting bulldozers,. loaders, and the like.
(2) Quality - The Soviet construction equip-
ment industry recognizes that in respect to produc-
? The construction equipment industry, commonly referred
to in the U.S.S.R. as the construction and road machine
building industry, manufactures multibucket and single
bucket excavators, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, cranes,
loaders, concrete and asphalt mixing and paving equip-
ment, road rollers, other equipment, and spare parts for
construction equipment. It is also responsible for the
production of construction materials equipment.
tivity, reliability, and service-life, its products are
inferior to the best foreign models. Soviet equipment
tends to have lower power-weight ratios than foreign
equipment because the assortment of available en-
gines is limited and contains few large engines. More-
over, the limited selection of ferrous metals available
to Soviet machine builders requires the use of heavier
sections of lower tensile strength steels than would
be used in machines produced in the Industrial West.
The unreliability and relatively poor quality of Soviet
construction equipment stems in large part from poor
manufacturing practices-e.g., failure to surface-
harden wearing parts, to provide adequate grease seals,
to avoid stress concentrations in structural members,
etc. These problems are exacerbated by the difficult
operating conditions to which Soviet equipment is
subjected. Preventive maintenance schedules are not
adhered to, and operators disregard their instructions.
The extreme cold of the Arctic and the extremely dusty
conditions of the desert regions are both hard on
engines, compressors, and other mechanisms incor-
porating gears and bearings.
(3) Product assortment - The assortment of
earthmoving equipment produced in the U.S.S.R. is
overweight in excavators and deficient in high-speed
wheel-type scrapers. As a consequence, labor pro-
ductivity in the construction industry is low. More-
over, most of the excavators are small to be compatible
with the small dump trucks (3.7-ton average size)
available. The U.S.S.R. has not yet organized large-
scale production of the large diesel engines, power-
shift transmissions, electric wheel drives, large wheel
and tire assemblies, and hydraulic control equipment
necessary for a family of high-speed earthmoving ma-
chines, although development of such machinery has
been in process for years.
The Soviet assortment of tower cranes and high-
lift mobile cranes is quite large. The current trend
toward prefabrication of larger sections of buildings
made of concrete (e.g., the prefabrication of whole
rooms and apartments) requires the production of
many heavy-lift cranes, presently produced in small
numbers.
Although the U.S.S.R. has traditionally favored the
production of tractors of the tracklaying types, these
have been developed primarily for agricultural use.
Their deployment in construction work has been
limited by their small size. Only in the last few
years has the U.S.S.R. produced tracklaying tractors
with more than 100 hp. and these (140, 180, and 250
hp.) are in limited production. The most powerful
wheel-type tractor currently adaptable to construction
work is the K-700, the 220 hp. four-wheel drive tractor
recently put into series production at the "Kirov" plant
in Leningrad. This tractor was designed for use in
agriculture, and although variants for use in con-
struction are being developed they are not yet avail-
able to industry.
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c. TRADE-The U.S.S.R. is a net exporter of earth-
moving equipment, excavators and construction cranes,
but it is a net importer of machinery for manufacturing
building materials. The value of Soviet trade in two
principal categories of construction equipment for
selected years during 1957-65 is shown in FICURE 77.
The foreign customers for Soviet construction equip-
ment are the other Communist countries and some of
the less developed countries. The industrialized coun-
tries of the West do not buy Soviet construction
equipment. The U.S.S.R. imports construction equip-
ment and machinery for manufacturing building ma-
terials principally from East Germany, Hungary, Po-
land and Czechoslovakia. Small amounts have also
been obtained from Austria, West Germany, Canada,
and Sweden. In 1965, the U.S.S.R. received about
three-fourths of its imports of construction equipment
and about two-thirds of its imports of equipment for
manufacturing building materials from East Germany.
10. Electronic computers
a. GENERAL - The computer industry has rapidly
become one of the most significant industries in the
U.S.S.R. The computer has become a dynamic force
in almost every aspect of human endeavor in indus-
trialized countries within the last 10 years, and Soviet
computer developments have immediate significance
for almost every aspect of Soviet life, particularly in
such critical areas as space exploration, antiballistic
missile systems, and economic management. Although
Soviet officials are convinced of the value of com-
puters, they have yet to commit the resources required
for a major entry into the computer age. The exact
status of the Soviet computer industry is unclear, but,
in many respects it is probably at the level of computer
development of the United States in the late 1950's.
Much information about Soviet computers is closely
guarded because of strategic implications. Almost
nothing is known about their special-purpose, military
computers (not further considered in this subsection).
b. PRODUCTION - The production of digital com-
puters in the U.S.S.R., established on a commercial
scale in 1956, has grown rapidly but is neither adequate
for internal demand nor impressive by U.S. standards.
By the end of 1966, the U.S.S.R. had produced an esti-
mated 3,500 or more digital computers. In 1966
alone, value of production of computer and data proc-
essing equipment came to more than $250 million.
Production has been increasing by almost 30% an-
nually in recent years, and present plans call for con-
tinued large increases in output, although no quanti-
tative goals have been announced. Soviet production
of computers for nonmilitary purposes is far short of
demand at present, and is not likely to satisfy require-
ments in the foreseeable future. The United States,
in sharp contrast, had produced more than 35,000
digital computers by the end of 1966, and in 1966 alone
produced more than $2.5 billion worth of computer
and data processing equipment.
C. PRODUCTION FACILITIES - Facilities for the pro-
duction of computers have been expanded rapidly in
recent years, both by the expansion of existing plants
and the building of new ones. More than 30 pro-
ducing plants were known to be associated with the
production of computers in 1966, most of which had
not been producing computers 10 years earlier. Major
producers include the Moscow and Penza Computer
and Analytical Machine (SAM) plants, the Minsk
Computer Plant, the Yerevan Computer Plant, and the
Sigma Complex (a group of small plants in Lithuania).
The labor force at each of these facilities ranges be-
tween 2,000 and 8,000 employees. Other major plants
are located in Kazan, Kiev, Leningrad, Severodonetsk,
and Ulyanovsk. Many specialized one-of-a-kind com-
puters have been built by the research departments of
institutes and industrial organizations for specific ap-
plications. A number of facilities associated with
computer production probably have yet to be identi-
fied.
d. TYPES OF COMPUTERS - Although most Soviet
computers now being produced are better designed
for computational work than for the processing of large
volumes of data, the newly emerging models incorpo-
rate features that enhance their ability to handle data.
In operating characteristics the equipment is roughly
similar to that available in the United States during
the late 1950's and the early 1960's, except that Soviet
equipment is somewhat less capable of handling large
quantities of data. The most powerful Soviet com-
puters known are the M-220, the Ural-16, and the
BESM-6, the latter two being somewhat similar to the
IBM 7030 Stretch and the U.K.'s Atlas. The most com-
mon general purpose computers are the medium-sized
Minsk machines (analogous to the IBM 1400 series),
and the smaller models of the Ural line. FIGURE 19
shows typical models of Soviet digital computers.
Process control computers include the large KVM-1,
the medium-sized Dnepr and VNIIEM series, and the
small UM-1 and UM-1 NKH models. Scientific and
engineering computers include the medium-sized Raz-
dan series and two small models, the Promin and
Nairi. Analog computer types are numerous, par-
ticularly the MN series. Many one-of-a-kind com-
puters are built for scientific work, process control, or
plant automation. Large systems of computers oc-
casionally are built on an experimental basis by link-
ing together a few smaller, serially produced ma-
chines. A great many small, punched-card, unit rec-
ord-type systems, such as the EV-80, have been built.
Much peripheral equipment of slow speed and limited
capability also is produced, but magnetic disk mem-
ories and mass storage devices are not yet in series
production. Because they lack good quality periph-
eral equipment such as printers, card readers, card
punches, tape and tape-handling equipment, disc
memories, and mass-storage devices, Soviet computers
can neither process large amounts of data economically
nor retrieve them quickly.
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e. TECHNOLOGY -The U.S.S.R. lags behind the
West by 1 to 5 years in computer technology. How-
ever, in computer theory and logic design, the U.S.S.R.
is almost on a par with the United States. Currently
produced Soviet computers are transistorized, but they
were made with vacuum tubes as recently as 1963.
The more-advanced integrated circuit components
used in the West are not used in any of the known
Soviet models. Computers are produced by the com-
bined efforts of a number of design institutes and pro-
ducing plants, sometimes without effective coordina-
tion or standardization of parts and components, so
that production processes are inefficient and workman-
ship often poor.
Programing techniques are in the early stages of
development. Until recently, most programing was
done in very low level languages because older Soviet
machines could neither recognize alphanumeric nota-
tion, nor store a large amount of data internally.
Standardized utility programs and shared applications
programs usable on more than one type of computer
are not yet generally available. However, Algol, Fort-
ran, and other more-advanced programing languages
have recently been introduced, and the sharing of pro-
grams among users has started.
f. ADMINISTRATION - Administration of the Soviet
computer industry has been dispersed among the many
organizations involved in the design and production
of computers, but is finally becoming centralized. The
industry at present is controlled by the Ministry of
the Radio Industry, by the Ministry of Instrument
Building, Means of Automation, and Control Systems,
and by several coordinating committees at the national
level, whereas before the reorganization of 1965, oper-
ational control of the industry was divided among sev-
eral regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy). The
design bureaus connected with computer factories, re-
search institutes, or other industry organizations, de-
sign and construct prototypes which are submitted to
an All-Union acceptance committee composed of the
FIGURE 19. MODELS OF SOVIET COMPUTERS. (left) BESM-6
digital computer. (above) Minsk-22 digital computer.
end-users and representatives of the producing plants.
The Ministry of the Radio Industry or the Ministry of
Instrument Building, Means of Automation, and Con-
trol Systems (if the computer is a process control
type) selects a plant under its jurisdiction to produce
the computer in series, and controls its production
until phaseout. Computers are sold outright to the
organizations that use them, and the manufacturer
assumes no responsibility for them after installation.
In the United States, the computer usually is leased
from the manufacturer, who is responsible for main-
tenance of the computer until it is retired. The
Ministries recently have issued directives to extend the
responsibility of the manufacturer, but implementation
of these directives may take several years.
g. APPLICATION - Of the 3,500 digital computers
believed to have been produced in the U.S.S.R. by
the end of 1966, the existence of only about 500 in-
dividual computers has been definitely established.
Certain applications in military and aerospace pro-
grams, about which the U.S.S.R. witholds information,
probably account for much of the total. Typical ap-
plications are traffic control for railroads and steam-
ship lines, planning and control of large construction
projects (using the U.S.-developed PERT system),
and production planning, process control, and busi-
ness data handling within industrial enterprises. The
newest and most powerful models are usually assigned
to research institutes.
The most ambitious application of computers pres-
ently envisioned by the Soviet Government is a na-
tionwide network of computer centers which will
process all economic data, consolidate it at various
administrative levels, and array it for use at the na-
tional level in making rational economic plans. The
completion of this network will require many years,
not only because of the time it will take to produce
the large number of computers required but also be-
cause of the requirement for a large amount of com-
munications equipment to link computer centers.
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h. APPLICATION LIMITATIONS - The use of com-
puters in the U.S.S.R. is not nearly as extensive as in
the United States, and some computers that are mis-
applied stand idle. Relatively few computers have
been allocated for the needs of commerce, banking,
or enterprise management. Where computers are in
use in the U.S.S.R., applications often are elementary,
none being as advanced, for example, as the process
control systems employed by U.S. oil refineries or as
the management information systems employed by
U.S. automobile companies. Efficiency in the use of
computers in the U.S.S.R. is limited by the fact that
producers offer only computer hardware, leaving the
end-user to provide his own maintenance and pro-
graming support.
i. TRADE - Soviet trade in computers is relatively
limited, but both imports from the West and intra-
Soviet bloc trade are increasing. Imports from the
non-Communist countries are significant in spite of
trade controls on advanced computers capable of
military or other strategic applications. In 1966, the
U.S.S.R. imported data processing equipment valued
at $4,000,000 from the non-Communist countries, prin-
cipally from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West
Germany, Japan, and the United States. The U.S.S.R.
is also interested in importing peripheral equipment,
advanced computers, certain components, and produc-
tion technology from the Industrial West. Exports
to other Communist countries also are increasing de-
spite the inability of the Soviet computer industry
to satisfy domestic needs.
C. Vehicles
1. Introduction
The U.S.S.R. ranks seventh in world production
of motor vehicles, with an output in 1965 of 616,300
units, about 62% of which were trucks. However,
the current Five Year Plan (1966-70) calls for a dra-
matic increase in passenger car output. The products
of the Soviet motor vehicle industry include passenger
cars, trucks, truck-tractors, trailers, buses, motorcycles,
motor scooters, specialized vehicles, and a wide range
of military vehicles. Employment in the industry
during 1962 is estimated to have been about 220,000
workers. There is little reason to believe that employ-
ment increased much between 1962 and 1965, but a
considerable augmentation of the labor force is ex-
pected during 1966-70.
To raise output of motor vehicles in accordance
with the current 5-year plan, one new truck plant was
being constructed at Frunze and one at Yerevan, both
to be in production by the end of 1967. A third is to
be built at Chita. Production of the Moskvich pas-
senger car at the MZMA plant in Moscow is to be
greatly expanded, and an additional Moskvich plant
of equal capacity is to be constructed in the Moscow
area. A passenger car plant has been under construc-
tion at Izhevsk, at which the assembly of Moskviches
began in December 1966. Another new passenger car
plant is to be built at Tol'yatti* (formerly Stavropol
near Kuybyshev) with the assistance of FIAT of Italy.
The Tol'yatti plant, valued at about $800 million, is
to have a capacity of 2,000 vehicles per day. More-
over, a number of factories which formerly produced
other types of machinery have been converted to pro-
duction of motor vehicles. Included in the plans for
modernizing the industry is a program to increase
standardization and unification of parts and products
and to provide for greater specialization of production
among the various plants. Substantial increases in
labor productivity are expected to result from this
program.
Although production of motor vehicles is increasing
and their quality improving, the needs of the civilian
economy are not completely satisfied. The existing
assortment of types of vehicles provides insufficient
numbers of light and heavy trucks. Moreover, the
serious and persistent shortages of spare parts keeps
many vehicles out of service. Peacetime military
requirements for motor vehicles probably are being
satisfied.
2. Civilian vehicles
a. ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY
(1) Production - Since 1961, production of
motor vehicles (excluding special-purpose military
vehicles) has increased at an average annual rate
of about 3.5%. According to the 1966-70 plan, pro-
duction in 1970 is supposed to total 1,360,000-1,510,000
motor vehicles, of which 600,000-650,000 are to be
trucks, 700,000-800,000 are to be passenger cars, and
60,000 are to be buses. It is doubtful that these plans
will be fulfilled by 1970. Soviet production of motor
vehicles since 1960 has been as follows (in units
rounded to the nearest hundred) :
YEAR
TRUCKS
PASSEN-
GER CARS
BUSES
TOTAL
1960
...........
362,000
138,800
22,800
523,600
1961
...........
381,600
148,900
24,800
555,300
1962
...........
382,400
165,800
29,200
577,400
1963
...........
382,200
173,100
31,700
587,000
1964
...........
385,000
185,200
32,900
603,100
1965
...........
379,600
201,200
35,500
616
300
1966 (Prelim.) ..
406,500
230,000
38,500
,
675,000
The product mix of the Soviet motor vehicle industry
includes relatively small shares of very heavy or very
light trucks. Some adjustment in the asortment has
been achieved since 1959 (as shown below). Never-
theless, although the number of very light trucks pro-
duced annually will be increased, the production of
heavy trucks will be favored even more, and the pro-
duction of medium-heavy trucks (5-ton class) will be
greatly favored. These trends are reflected in the
plan to increase the average carrying capacity per
Named for Palmiro Togliati, Secretary General of the
Communist Party of Italy, who died in the U.S.S.R.
in 1965.
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vehicle from 3.7 tons in 1965 to 4.9 tons in 1970. The
following tabulation shows the assortment of civilian
motor vehicles in 1965 compared with that of 1959,
in percent of total:
1959
1965
Up to 2 tons ..............
1.0
6.8
From 2 to 5 tons ..........
92.0
78.1
Over 5 tons ...............
5.2
9.5
Heavy dump trucks ........
0.1
0.4
Truck tractors .............
1.7
5.2
Total .................. 100.0
100.0
The program for eliminating presently obsolete
models of motor vehicles from production should be
completed by 1970. The newly designed models now
in production and those scheduled for 1967-70 are
similar to U.S. vehicles in their power-to-weight ratios.
Recent models of civilian motor vehicles built in the
U.S.S.R. are shown in FIGURE 20.
In addition, the U.S.S.R. has developed and placed
in limited serial production 8 x 8 cross-country vehi-
cles at the motor vehicle plants at Minsk and Moscow.
These vehicles have been seen transporting missiles
in the annual May Day parade in Moscow.
Motor vehicle production in 1966 included 753,000
motorcycles and motor scooters, and a small number of
motor bicycles. Nonwheeled vehicles produced in
small numbers include power sleds and special-purpose
tracked vehicles for use on adverse terrain and snow.
(2) Raw materials-The U.S.S.R. enjoys a
high degree of self-sufficiency in the supply of raw
materials for its motor vehicle industry, natural
rubber being the only major item which must be im-
ported; however, the Soviet synthetic rubber indus-
try is capable of satisfying automotive requirements
for rubber. The projected rapid increase in pas-
senger car production will require the enlargement
of the capacity of the Soviet facilities for cold-
rolling steel strip and sheet. Raw materials are
usually allocated to the industry in sufficient amounts,
but poor distribution has sometimes resulted in tem-
porary shortages and in reduced production.
(3) Components and subassemblies - The
production of vehicle components, subassemblies, and
accessories is divided among the primary automotive
producers and supporting plants. The Gor'kiy Motor
Vehicle Plant and the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni
Likhachev in Moscow account for a large percentage
of the total. In general, the primary producers make
their own major subassemblies-i.e., differentials,
steering gears, engines, and transmissions. In addition,
the primary producers also make a few parts and
components, such as pistons, fuel pumps, and oil
filters. Other parts and components, however, such
as bearings, carburators, electrical systems, shock
absorbers and tires, are supplied by specialized
plants.
Lagging production of parts and components con-
tinues to be a chronic problem for the industry. De-
ficiencies in the supply of parts and components
have occasionally delayed the production of new
vehicles and continually idle a large part of the
vehicle park. During the 7-year plan (1959-65),
much emphasis was given to the need to expand
the spare parts industry, but with unsatisfactory re-
sults because of poor planning and shortages of plant
equipment and raw materials. Morever, the low
prices established for spare parts deter the primary
plants from producing more than needed for vehicle
production. The spare parts problem has been greatly
aggravated by the appearance of new models. The
present 5-year plan calls for a renewed effort to
improve production and supply of parts for vehicles
by building new plants and converting others to
specialized production.
(4) Mechanization and automation-The So-
viet automotive industry has attained a high degree
of mechanization. Automation is less-advanced,
but some automatic transfer machine tool lines are
in operation, principally for the manufacture of
engine blocks and pistons. It is planned eventually
to achieve automatic production of all engine blocks,
heads, and gear cases, and probably pistons. In
addition, partial automation is being applied to the
production of other components-crankshafts, con-
necting rods, rear axle housings, and springs.
Many of the machine tools in service are worn or
obsolescent. This situation sometimes necessitates the
excessive use of manual operations to complete the
work. A large number of the machine tools in the
motor vehicle industry are used for the manufacture
of tools, dies, and instruments which could be man-
ufactured more economically in specialized plants.
The Soviet machine tool industry is not yet capable
of supplying sufficient specialized equipment to the
motor vehicle industry, except at the expense of
sectors of the economy which have a higher priority.
(5) Supply and use-By January 1967, the
U.S.S.R. had an estimated total inventory of 5,050,000
motor vehicles, comprising 3,753,000 trucks and
jeeps, 1,096,400 passenger cars, and 200,600 buses.
The total includes some 400,000 to 500,000 trucks of
all types which are in military service. The great
majority of trucks are designed for short-haul oper-
ations, with relatively small numbers suitable for
long hauls. The structure of the civilian truck park
according to cargo capacity in 1962, compared with
the Soviet plan for optimum distribution, is as fol-
lows (in percent of total) :
ACTUAL
OPTIMUM
Up to 1.5 tons .............
8
30
From 2 to 5 tons ...........
90
60
Over 5 tons ................
2
10
Total ................... 100 100
Over 70% of the trucks in use in 1962 had standard
platform bodies, 20% were dump trucks, 9% had
panel or tank bodies, and 1% were tractors for
semitrailers. The structure of the 1965 vehicle park
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is not known, but the distribution by cargo capacity
of output of 1959 and 1965 (discussed above under
Production) indicates that an effort is being made
to bring the vehicle park into balance with the
announced optimum. Continued production of trucks
with four- and six-wheel drive for increased mobility
on unimproved roads can be expected.
Vehicles are distributed as directed by the state.
Industry and agriculture are the principal recipients
of new vehicles, while the armed forces receive an-
nually up to 75,000 vehicles of various types. The
U.S.S.R. exports small numbers of both trucks and
passenger cars. About 25% of passenger car pro-
duction is sold for private use.
The U.S.S.R. makes little use of trucks for intercity
transport, relying on the railroads for long-haul com-
mon carrier service. The average haul-distance of
motor transport has risen slowly from 11.9 km. in
1958 to 13.24 km. in 1965, and 13.3 km. in 1966.
Freight carried by motor transport increased from
about 6.5 billion tons in 1958 to more than 10.8 billion
tons in 1965 and nearly 11.6 billion in 1966..
(6) Foreign trade-Soviet exports of trucks
are small compared to total production. On the other
hand, a large share of the production of passenger
cars is exported: for example, 24% in 1965. Values
for exports of motor vehicles for 1964 and 1965, by
type, are shown in FrcvxE 21.
East Germany and Finland were the largest buyers
of Soviet passenger cars in 1965. Cuba became a
major importer in 1961: in that year, Cuba received
about 37% of Soviet truck exports and about 46%
of Soviet bus exports. Although its share of total
Soviet exports of trucks has since declined, and in
FIGURE 20. RECENT MODELS OF SOVIET MOTOR VEHICLES. (a)
ZIL-130 truck. (b) Moskvitch passenger car. (c) Zaporozhets
passenger car. (d) FIAT 124 passenger car.
FIGURE 21. EXPORTS* OF SOVIET MOTOR
VEHICLES AND PARTS, BY TYPE
(Units, and thousands of foreign exchange rubles)
Trucks ..............
Passenger cars........
Buses ................
Trailers ..............
Special motor ve-
hicles**............
Sets of parts for as-
sembly of complete
trucks .............
Sets of parts for as-
sembly of complete
passenger cars......
Motorcycles..........
Spare parts for trucks,
passenger cars, and
trolley buses ........
Spare parts for motor-
cycles .............
Total ............
Quan-
tity
Quan-
tity
21,200 72,524 15,100 52,548
44,500 46,555 48,600 51,579
742 2,046 597 2,779
5,317 8,067 4,758 6,851
1,358 9,506 854 6,749
......
1,280 423 2,096 798
23,500 5,496 20,900 4,897
...... 77,829 ...... 72,359
...... 1,935 ...... 1,597
...... 224,381 ...... 200,279
_..., -_ Y.,,.,a,,.y uuueiataue expuris oecause tiney
are believed to exclude military shipments, economic
aid programs, and gifts.
Mostly tank trucks but some vehicles for snow re-
moval, mobile machine shops, and other purposes.
1966 amounted to about 18%, the value of Soviet
vehicles and parts imported by Cuba in 1966 was
greater than in 1961. Soviet motorcycle exports are
received mainly by Bulgaria. Motor vehicle exports
by type and destination for the period 1963-65 are
shown in FicuRE 78. The U.S.S.R. imports few ve-
J
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hicles, mainly special types from Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. In 1965, it imported about 1,619
trucks, 1,490 passenger cars, and 602 buses.
b. PRINCIPAL PRODUCERS - Details of Soviet
motor vehicle manufacturers and assemblers are given
in FIGURE 79. Seven of these plants were converted
to the production of motor vehicles during the 7-year
plan.
The Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant (GAZ) is the
country's largest producer of vehicles. Medium
trucks are the most important product. Also built
at this plant are two models of passenger car, the
Volga and the M-13 Chayka, and several military
vehicles. Some of the truck chassis produced there
are made into truck-tractors; others are fitted with
bus bodies by plants at Kurgan and Pavlovo, with
panel truck bodies at the Tartu (Estonian S.S.R.)
Repair Plant No. 3, or with dump bodies at the
Saransk Truck Plant, southeast of Gor'kiy. The
Gor'kiy Plant is highly integrated, manufacturing its
own major components and subassemblies, but de-
pends on other plants for specialized parts. It also
may still supply some components and subassembies
to the Ul'yanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant for the manu-
facture of light trucks derived from GAZ-type vehi-
cles. The present 5-year plan calls for spending 125
million rubles on further expansion of the Gor'kiy
Plant. Production is to be increased 1.5 times by
1970, compared with 1965.
The Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likhachev (ZIL)
in Moscow is second to the Gor'kiy Plant in number
of vehicles produced but first in terms of total value
of output. It builds a few passenger cars but con-
centrates mainly on production of medium trucks.
Chassis are supplied to other plants for completion
as buses, fire trucks, truck cranes, special-purpose vans,
and other vehicles. Large numbers of chassis are
sent to the Mytishchi Machine Building Plant, where
dump-truck bodies are mounted.
Buses are assembled at several plants. The Pavlovo
Bus Plant iineni Zhdanov (PAZ) is closely allied with
the Gor'kiy plant, from which it receives chassis for
buses, vans, and ambulances. The Kurgan Autobus
(KUAZ), similarly allied to the Gor'kiy plant, is sched-
uled to become the largest bus plant in the U.S.S.R.
The Likino Bus Plant (LIAZ), established in 1960
to take over bus production from the Likhachev plant
in Moscow, is producing a 60-passenger bus, and was
preparing to manufacture a 110-passenger bus in 1967.
The L'vov Bus Plant (LAZ) mounts bus bodies on
chassis received from the Likhachev plant. During
the 1966-70 plan, the bus plants located in L'vov,
Likino, and Pavlovo are each to increase bus pro-
duction to 10,000 to 12,000 annually. The Riga Bus
Plant (RAF) in Latvia builds two small buses (10-
and 9-passenger) on Volga chassis received from the
Gor'kiy plant.
Several plants both inside and outside the motor
vehicle industry are engaged in making or modifying
bodies, trailers, and vehicles for special industrial or
agricultural use. These plants have small capaci-
ties, and their operations in this field are intermit-
tent.
In June 1965, according to an official announcement,
there were 637 plants throughout the U.S.S.R. pro-
ducing spare parts for motor vehicles. This number
reportedly comprises 118 main plants, 121 specialized
plants, and 398 cooperating plants. The following are
among the most important manufacturers of motor
vehicle components:
Alma Ata:
Alma Ata Foundry and Engineering Piston pins.
Plant.
Baku Motor Vehicle Parts Plant ...... Shock absorbers and
reduction gears.
Kiev:
Kiev Parts Plant imeni Lepse ......... Aluminum pistons.
Kirov:
Kirov Tire Plant (K'ShZ) ............ Tires.
Kuybyshev:
Katek Plant ....................... Carburetors, voltage
regulators, dis-
tributors, genera-
tors, starters.
Leningrad:
Leningrad Carburetor Plant (LKZ) ... Carburetors.
Melitopol Engine Plant .............. Gasoline engines.
Melitopol Motor Vehicle Spare Parts
Plant.
Moscow:
Automobile and Tractor Electrical Automotive electri-
Equipment Plant (ATE-1). cal systems.
Automobile and Tractor Electrical Do.
Equipment Plant (ATE-2).
Moscow Carburetor Plant (MKZ) .... Carburetors, fuel
pumps, filters.
Moscow Tire Plant (MShZ) .......... Tires.
Podol'sk Automobile Plant (PAZ) .... Batteries.
Ul'yanovsk:
Ul'yanovsk Small Displacement Engine Pistons.
Plant.
Yaroslavl' :
Yaroslavl' Tire Plant (YaShZ) Tires.
Yaroslavl' Diesel Engine Plant ....... Diesel engines.
Zavolzh'ye:
Zavolzh'ye Engine Plant ............. Aluminum engines,
clutch housing.
3. Specialized military vehicles
a. PRODUCTION - The U.S.S.R., with well-devel-
oped military vehicle production facilities, is currently
producing relatively large quantities of tanks, ar-
mored personnel carriers, tracked prime movers, and
special-purpose vehicles. Limited quantities of light
assault guns are also produced.
The U.S.S.R. has always given considerable at-
tention to military vehicle development, with particu-
lar emphasis on armored combat vehicles. Since
World War II, the U.S.S.R. has placed high priority
on the development and production of personnel car-
riers, prime movers, and specialized military vehicles.
This effort originally was directed toward remedying
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gaps in the vehicle inventory which had become
evident during the war. More recently, the emphasis
on military vehicle production has resulted from the
recognized need for mobility and the protection of
troops in either a nuclear or nonnuclear battle. Soviet
military literature refers frequently to the importance
of armored vehicles, and of mobile support vehicles
and personnel carriers. The U.S.S.R. is producing
these vehicles in quantities sufficient for its peacetime
army, as well as for export to other Communist and
non-Communist countries. Estimates of production
of military vehicles are shown in FicuiE 22.
Soviet military vehicles are characterized by simplic-
ity and ruggedness of design, features which con-
tribute to the ease of manufacture, operation, and
maintenance. Soviet tanks are well armored and
have heavy armament, good cross-country mobility,
and extensive operational range.
The Soviet practice of utilizing a few basic chasssis
for the production of different types of military vehi-
cles also contributes to efficiency of production and
maintenance. Thus, medium and heavy tank chassis
are used or have been used as assault gun mounts,
mounts for single-round free rocket launchers, and
for prime movers. A single type of tracked amphibi-
ous chassis is used for the light amphibious tank, the
armored personnel carrier, and a single-round free
rocket launcher. Some armored cars, personnel car-
riers, and wheeled amphibious vehicles use the same
standard truck chassis.
FIGURE 22. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF
MILITARY VEHICLES
(Units)
ITEM
1964
Tanks:
T-55 medium ...................
1,500
1,500
1,500
T-62 medium ...................
1,000
1,000
1,000
PT-76 light, amphibious ..........
400
400
400
Self-propelled weapons* ASU-85.....
95
95
95
Tracked prime movers:
Light AT-L (modified) ...........
1,000
900
500
Medium AT-S59 .................
1,100.
1,200
1,200
Heavy AT-T ....................
400
400
400
Armored AT-P ..................
1,200
1,200
1,200
Specialized military vehicles:
MAV-46 amphibious jeep.........
1,000
1,000
1,000
GAZ-47 tracked amphibious troop/
cargo carrier ...................
400
400
400
BAV-485, 6 x 6 amphibious truck..
700
700
700
K-61 tracked amphibious ferry....
1,000
1,000
1,000
BTR-50p tracked amphibious
armored personnel carrier and
modifications ..................
2,000
2,000
500
BTR-60p, 8 x 8 wheeled amphibi-
ous armored personnel carrier and
modifications ..................
2,000
2,500
2,500
BRDM amphibious armored scout
car and modifications...........
2,000
2,000
2,000
BRDM launch vehicle for antitank
missiles .......................
900
900
900
BRDM with turret ...............
none
none
550
* Production of self-propelled AA guns is shown in Sub-
section G.
Discussions in Soviet literature on military organi-
zation and tactics suggest that the U.S.S.R. is con-
centrating on production of medium tanks. The im-
portance of the medium tank is highlighted by its
constant modification and improvement. Between
1949 and 1959, the T-54 was modified by the installa-
tion of a gyro-stabilized gun with bore evacuator,
at least two variants of turrets, and infrared night-
viewing and night-fighting devices. By 1959, the T-
55 medium tank had been developed; it incorpor-
ated all the modifications of the T-54 and had a
more powerful engine. Shortly thereafter, the U.S.S.R.
began producing the T-62, the chief innovation of
which was the introduction of a smooth-bore 115-mm
gun. This, it is believed, will be followed by a
T-62 modification incorporating a rifled gun to over-
come some of the professed disadvantages of the
smooth-bore, and subsequently by a missile-firing
tank.
Although some heavy tanks were produced in 1962,
production is believed to have terminated during the
year. Estimates of past production show that the
U.S.S.R. has a sufficient number of heavy tanks to
provide for current requirements and for reserves.
There is no indication of Soviet development of new
heavy tanks.
Production of the light amphibious tank is expected
to continue for at least two more years (through
1969). This tank may possibly appear in a modified
version, mounting a higher caliber gun. The modified
version probably will be produced for a short period
at a low rate.
Production of older-style tank-like assault guns using
medium and heavy tank chassis has ceased. The
trend has been toward manufacture of armored air-
transportable guns such as the ASU-85 and the previ-
ous model, the ASU-57. However, the U.S.S.R. may,
in line with its mobility concept, produce a self-
propelled artillery piece incorporating the 115-mm
gun. Production of self-propelled antiaircraft guns
is discussed below under Arms and Ammunition.
In the field of armored cars and personnel carriers,
the U.S.S.R. has experimented with both wheeled and
tracked models. At first the trend was toward tracked
vehicles, but in 1961 and 1962 new wheeled vehicles
were produced. These basic armored personnel car-
riers were further modified by adding overhead cover
and, on one model, by mounting a turret armed with
a 23-mm gun as primary armament and a 7.62-mm
or larger caliber machinegun as secondary armament.
The basic armored scout car also has been produced
in other variants-first as a launch vehicle for antitank
missiles and later mounting a gun turret. If the
present trend continues, it is believed that the U.S.S.R.
will develop and issue an all-purpose armored in-
fantry combat vehicle which would replace the light
amphibious tank and possibly some of the armored
personnel carriers.
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Because the U.S.S.R. had experienced a shortage of
prime movers during World War II, the development
and production of a family of prime movers became
one of the primary objectives in the postwar period.
Models now in production include light, medium,
and heavy prime movers. A fourth version is an ar-
mored light prime mover. In addition to towing ar-
tillery, these vehicles are used to mount ditching
machines, bulldozer blades, and radar vans, and are
also used to tow equipment such as generators. Pro-
duction of current models is likely to continue for
some time, although there probably will be modifi-
cations and improvements.
b. PRINCIPAL PRODUCERS - The U.S.S.R., unlike
many advanced industrial nations, has no facilities
which can be called tank arsenals. Instead, military
vehicles are made in plants which produce a variety
of other items, such as railroad cars, locomotives, and
tractors. The major tank plant and largest producer
of medium tanks is the Ural Railroad Car Plant,
No. 183 in Nizhniy Tagil. Other medium tank plants
are located at Kharkov and Omsk. Heavy tanks
have been built in Chelyabinsk, but production ap-
parently ceased in late 1962. The light amphibious
tank is believed to be produced at the Volgograd
Tractor Plant. Armored personnel carriers are pro-
duced in Leningrad and probably in Kutaisi. Prime
movers are made in Gor'kiy, Khar'kov, Kurgan, and
Yaroslavl'. Amphibious trucks are produced in various
truck plants, principally in Gor'kiy and the Moscow
area. FIGURE 80 lists major producers of specialized
military vehicles.
The tank and assault gun plants are characterized
by a high degree of self-sufficiency. Except for en-
gines, guns, and electrical equipment, most of the
major components are produced by the plants them-
selves. Moreover, supporting factories are generally
located in the same economic region as the plants they
supply-an important factor in view of the trans-
portation difficulties in the country.
Production methods during World War II were
geared to high volume output, and quality was neces-
sarily sacrificed. Peacetime production, however, has
been marked by significant improvements in quality.
Production techniques such as electroslag welding are
being used to reduce the need for large castings.
The U.S.S.R. is also making greater use of ? alloy
steels and other quality materials. Workmanship has
improved as production processes have become more
specialized.
D. Aircraft production
some 23 airframe plants,* 11 engine plants, a con-
siderably larger number of plants that produce
components and accessories, and various research and
development facilities. The Soviet aircraft industry
is a high-priority industry which claims a large in-
vestment in production and research, and the number
of engineering and technical personnel employed con-
stitute a significant group in the nation's supply of
skilled labor. Employment in the industry is esti-
mated at 0.8 to 1.0 million.
The production capacity of the industry is estimated
at about 123 million pounds of airframe weight per
year.** This figure represents a theoretical upper
limit of production capability which, although unlikely
of achievement in practice, is useful for purposes of
comparison. Considering estimated airframe weight
produced versus estimated theoretical capacity, pro-
duction was at its peak in the early mid-1950's while
the large bomber programs were underway. Pro-
duction as a percentage of theoretical capacity ranges
from 15% in 1946 to 52% in 1955 and about 25%
in 1966. This is not a unique situation inasmuch as
the aircraft industries in the United States and the
United Kingdom are currently well under their theo-
retical capacity. Moreover, the weight of the average
airframe produced by the industry has increased
greatly in the last several years. During the next few
years average airframe weight is expected to increase
still further with such aircraft as the large trans-
ports CLASSIC, Cocx, and Tu-154, and the FIDDLER
jet fighter becoming increasingly important in pro-
duction.
As a result of its priority status, the industry has
no apparent long-range bottlenecks. The facilities
which produce airframes, engines, and components
are believed to be sufficiently balanced so that en-
gines and components would be available to support
a maximum production effort in the airframe plants.
Production increases for the aircraft industry are
only a partial indication of the progress made during
the past decade. The industry has been able not
1. General
The aircraft industry of the U.S.S.R. is second in
size only to that of the United States. It comprises
is no longer included. It has not produced aircraft
since 1959 and is believed to be engaged in the space
program.
Since the number of aircraft which can be produced
within a given floorspace varies with the weight of
the aircraft, airframe weight is the most significant
common denominator of aircraft production and ca-
pacity. Airframe weight is defined as the weight of
an empty aircraft less the weight of those items (engines,
for example) not normally fabricated by the airframe
manufacturer. Airframe weight accounts for roughly
two-thirds of the weight of an empty aircraft. Ca-
pacity in terms of airframe pounds is derived by multi-
plying estimated floorspace by an estimate of the number
of pounds of airframes per square foot which could be
produced, assuming maximum effort. Intelligence in-
formation on airframe plant floorspace is superior to
that of the other factors which may be used to calcu-
late capacity.
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only to fulfill civilian and military requirements at
home, but has been able also to sell military aircraft
abroad to both Communist and non-Communist
countries. Moreover, the industry is striving for im-
proved quality of the aircraft being produced. For
example, the fighters produced now are far superior
in performance capability to the FAGOT/FRESCO types
produced in the early 1950's.
Airframe plants in the U.S.S.R. are smaller than
their counterparts in the United States and have an
average of about 2.2 million square feet of floorspace.
Unlike plants in the United States, Soviet airframe
plants are made up of a large number of separate
buildings for forge and foundry shops, assembly,
warehouse buildings, and auxiliary structures, all
within a fenced area. However, most have high-bay
structures for final assembly and usually a test and
flyaway airfield.
Production buildup from the time an order is placed
until full production is achieved involves primarily
the effort devoted to duplicating the development
tooling, acquiring materials, scheduling the produc-
tion of lead items, and the phasing-in of production.
The plant director (appointed by MAP-Ministry
of Aviation Industry) is administratively responsible
for the operation of the plant, but he closely follows
official rules of operation established to regulate ma-
terials, labor, capital, and management.
Soviet officials use technical standards in produc-
tion as a basis for determining manufacturing
techniques, worker productivity, quality control,
standards, and plant layout. Plant programs for
standardization in the aviation industry are the
responsibility of the Scientific Research Institute of
Aviation Technology and Organization for Produc-
tion (NIAT). In addition, NIAT actually designs
advanced equipment used for the manufacture of
aircraft at series plants. Thus NIAT is capable of
exerting considerable influence on plant directors re-
garding the adoption of new or improved production
technology and equipment.
The Soviets rely on extensive use of financial in-
centives in the series production plants, as well as in
all aspects of research and development, as a means
of increasing the productivity (qualitative and quan-
titative) of the workers. In recent years, particular
emphasis has been applied to financial incentives
to stimulate the development and adoption of new
and improved forms of production technology, i.e.,
the qualitative aspect.
The Soviet aircraft industry is beginning to intro-
duce some of the more advanced production tech-
niques, such as the use of heavy presses, modern
methods of welding, bonding and brazing, precision
forging, and advanced extrusion methods including
that of low-alloy steel and titanium. Improvements
also have been made in metal removal techniques
with the use of numerically controlled machine tools
and certain nonconventional processes such as ultra-
sonic machining and electroerosion. The U.S.S.R.
is supporting a devolopment program for metallic
and nonmetallic materials of higher strength and
greater heat resistance.
Until the mid-1950's, the Soviet aircraft industry
tended to use simplified designs for ease of production
and maintenance. Now the emphasis has shifted to
technological advancement, and models of aircraft
now in the development stage will require the use
of newer technologies when they enter series produc-
tion. However, it is believed that the simplest con-
struction methods are still being followed wherever
possible. In this way, requirements for highly skilled
workers and special-purpose machine tools are kept
to a minimum. This does not mean that the Soviets
will not abandon proven technology for new technol-
ogy if the advantages in cost and performance are
sufficiently great. There is also a tendency to em-
phasize the importance of standardization of parts
in aircraft production.
Even though Soviet production technology is less
advanced than that of the United States, the
industry has demonstrated the capability to
design modern aircraft and to develop ad-
vanced weapons systems. Soviet producers of aircraft
tend to emphasize functional quality, i.e., only those
parts that demand close tolerances and exacting work-
manship are given special attention. Parts and com-
ponents not considered critical to performance gen-
erally are below U.S. standards of quality.
Most of the expansion (nearly three-fourths) of the
airframe industry has occurred since 1956, and by
mid-1966 there had been no indication of slackened
effort. In fact, the most rapid rate of increase in
floorspace has been evident since 1964. Not all
of the increase is related to aircraft production how-
ever; some is now being used for missile work. For
example, the Ulan Ude Plant 99, Komsomolsk Plant
126, and Arsenyev Plant 116 are believed to be en-
gaged also in aerodynamic missile production in ad-
dition to the building of aircraft. Space devoted to
missile work is believed to be small, however, com-
pared to that for aircraft production.
Since World War II most of the Soviet airframe and
engine plants have had some capacity devoted to the
manufacture of consumer goods, production of which
helps to provide stability for the labor force of the
aircraft industry, an industry noted for wide fluctua-
tions in output.
The U.S.S.R. has achieved a highly developed man-
ufacturing technology capable of supporting the
development and production of advanced air-breathing
propulsion systems for aerodynamic vehicles. Initia-
tive and native ingenuity, said to have been lacking
in the past, are being shown as the Soviets are
challenged to acquire optimum engine/airframe com-
binations. For the next generation of operational
aircraft, designed for supersonic cruise or extended
Mach 2.5 - 3.0 capabilities, distinct, new engine
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designs will be mandatory. Not only must the engine
be carefully sized but its operating characteristics must
be closely tailored for the intended mission and air-
frame configuration. Responding to the challenge,
supersonic cruise and V/STOL engines, as well as an
SST engine, are currently under development. Efforts
also continue in the development and refinement of
powerplants for subsonic transports and helicopters.
Although the policy of mass production at mini-
mum cost continues to prevail and the rate of engine
production in relation to the number installed remains
higher than is considered economical, Soviet engine
technology can be expected to provide suitable engines
for the new generation of aircraft.
2. Administration
The Soviet aircraft industry is controlled by the
Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP), which is ad-
ministratively and functionally responsible to the
Council of Ministers. MAP exercises complete cen-
tralized authority over all production facilities, aero-
nautical research and development units, flight test
centers, and certain specialized metallurgical, instru-
ment, and electronic equipment plants. MAP has con-
trolled the aircraft industry since World War II,
except for a brief period in 1953 when it was
incorporated into the Ministry of Defense Industry,
and for a longer period-late 1957 to early 1965-
when there was a general decentralization of admin-
istration and control. During the latter period, all
series production facilities were administered on a
territorial basis by local economic councils or
sovnarkhozes. Responsibility for research and de-
velopment facilities during this period was assigned
to the newly created State Committee of Aviation
Technology (GKAT). GKAT, although not adminis-
tratively in control of series production, was in charge
of technical planning, which included the type and
degree of product specialization at the series pro-
duction plants, assignment of production programs
to specific plants, planning and approval of factory
equipment and expansion programs, providing tech-
nical guidance, and setting product design standards.
These responsibilities of the regional sovnarkhozes
and GKAT ended in March 1965 with the reestab-
lishment of MAP.
(For assistance in NATO code identification in the
following discussion, sketches of some Soviet air-
craft-ground attack, reconnaissance, helicopters, and
transport/utility types-are given in FIGURE 123.)
Soviet production of aircraft since World War
II has been characterized by a decline in numbers and
a substantial increase in the airframe weight. Since
1963, production has been below 2,000 aircraft a
year; in 1966 estimated production was only half that
in 1957. FIGURE 81 shows estimated output of Soviet
aircraft by type, and FiGuRE 23 shows estimated out-
put by model.
A number of factors have contributed to the down-
ward trend in the number of aircraft produced. The
long service life of many of the aircraft produced in
earlier years has made fewer replacements neces-
sary. The U.S.S.R. has imported many of the light
aircraft it needs from the eastern European Commu-
nist countries, and the use of new weapons systems
has reduced the need for certain kinds of combat air-
craft. The high cost and longer leadtime needed
to develop and build modem aircraft result in the
production of fewer units, but with improved capabil-
ities and greater efficiency, fewer are needed. Fic-
UBE 82 shows the cumulative totals (estimated) of
certain types of aircraft no longer in production. Air-
frame plants are described in FiGuRE 83 and loca-
tions are plotted on the map, FIGURE 24. FIGURE 84
gives information on the Soviet aircraft engine plants.
a. BOMBERS - During 1966, Soviet bombers were
being produced in these three models: The BEAR
(Tu-95), a turboprop heavy bomber; the BLINDER,
a jet-medium bomber; and the BREWER (Yak-28), a
light bomber. During the 5-year period ending with
1966, production of bombers averaged about 100 units
a year, compared with the estimated output of 1,750
bombers in 1946 and over 1,300 in 1952 and in 1953.
In 1955, nine plants were engaged in bomber pro-
duction, whereas in 1966, only three plants pro-
duced bombers. The BEAR aircraft now being
produced are reconnaissance aircraft rather than
bomb-carrying types.
Light bombers have accounted for slightly over
two-thirds of all bomber production since 1946. At
the end of World War II, the U.S.S.R. was pro-
ducing five different piston engine bombers in this
category: BOB (11-4), BUCK (Pe-2), ER-2, BEAST
(I1-10), and BAT (Tu-2). The BEAGLE (11-28) jet
light bomber which entered production in 1949 pro-
vided significant improvements in performance capa-
bility and was produced in large numbers. Four air-
craft plants produced an estimated total of 5,200
planes of the BEAGLE type, representing nearly one-
half of all light bomber production. Production of a
second jet light bomber, BOSUN (Tu-14), began in
1950, but only a limited number was produced. Out-
put of the BREWER, successor to the BEAGLE, began
in 1960 at Irkutsk Plant 39. More than 300 planes
of the BREWER type, including the trainer variant,
MAESTRO (U-Yak-28 ), are believed to have been pro-
duced. Models "A", "B", and "C" of the BREWER have
been identified.
In the medium bomber category, the Tupolev-
designed BULL (Tu-4), which was similar to the U.S.
B-29, was produced from 1947 to 1953, with an es-
timated cumulative output of nearly 1,800 aircraft.
Assembly of the Tupolev-designed BADGER (Tu-16),
a jet-medium bomber, began in 1953 and ended in
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FIGURE 23. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT, BY MODEL*
CUMULA-
TIVE
TYPE
PRO-
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
TOTAL
DUCTION
THRU
1961
Bombers:
BEAR ..................
110
12
12
12
12
12
170
BLINDER ...............
25
25
45
40
45
45
225
BREWER** ..............
55
30
35
105
60
40
325
MAIL ..................
.......
5
10
15
Fighters:
FISHPOT ................
855
240
15
0
0
0
1,100
FITTER .................
360
160
155
190
145
180
1,200
FISHIIED ................
700
400
480
550
600
600
3,325
FIREBAR ...............
.......
40
150
160
180
530
FIDDLER ................
.......
10
40
50
Transports:
COLT ...................
3,075
100
0
0
20
105
3,300
CLEAT ..................
21
6
5
2
1
0
35
COOT ..................
210
85
55
50
45
45
490
CUB ...................
205
135
155
165
150
80
890
COKE ..................
5
10
35
35
60
130
270
COOKPOT ...............
22
25
20
20
30
3
120
CRUSTY ................
.......
2
1
8
11
CLOD ..................
.......
5
20
75
100
CLASSIC ................
.......
2
1
0
0
6
9
COCK ..................
.......
1
1
2
4
Trainers:
MAX ...................
8,200
200
0
0
0
0
8,400
MONGOL ................
.......
5
15
40
50
50
160
Reconnaissance:
MANGROVE .............
165
50
5
0
0
0
220
MANDRAKE .............
.......
10
20
35
15
0
80
Helicopters:
HOUND .................
2,150
325
300
295
225
130
3,425
HARE ...................
1,680
170
0
0
0
0
1,850
HEN ...................
550
120
0
0
0
0
670
HOOK ..................
120
80
80
70
75
70
500
HIP ....................
.......
5
5
30
40
HARKS .................
.......
1
5
5
10
* To preclude misinterpretation of the degree of accuracy feasible, estimates of selected aircraft
and totals are rounded; as a result the totals may not equal the sum of their components.
** Includes the trainer variant-MAESTRO.
1959. A total of about 1,500 was produced. The
BADGER program at Kazan Plant 22, Kuybyshev Plant
1, and Voronezh Plant 64 was very successful, and
a substantial modification program has been con-
tinued. A large number of BADGERS have been
equipped with air-to-surface missiles, several recon-
naissance variants have been developed, and a few
have been modified for use in anti-submarine war-
fare (ASW).
A follow-on jet medium bomber, the BLINDER, also
designed by Tupolev, entered prototype production
at Kazan Plant 22 in 1957-58, and was put in operation
in 1962. About 225 are believed to have been as-
sembled by the end of 1966. Output of the BLINDER
has been smaller than anticipated; the program ap-
parently has run into difficulty. Both the BLINDER
"A" (the bomb-carrying version), and BLINDER "B"-
which will be equipped with the air-to-surface missile
KrrcHEN-are believed to be in production. Probably
only a relatively small number of the "B" model had
been produced as of the end of 1966; by that time,
increased effort was being placed on the "B" model.
The U.S.S.R. has produced two heavy bombers:
the BISON jet heavy bomber designed by Myasishchev
and the BEAR turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev.
The roll-out of the prototype of the BISON at Moscow
Plant 23 occurred in 1953, and the aircraft was pro-
duced until 1961. A prototype of the BOUNDER was
observed first at Moscow Plant 23 in August 1958,
and was displayed at the Tushino Air Show in 1961.
Two prototypes of this aircraft have been produced,
but there is no evidence that it is to enter series
production.
Series production of the BEAR began at Kuybyshev
Plant 18 in 1955, and an estimated total of 170 air-
craft, including three prototypes, were produced
through 1966. Five BEAR models ("A" through "E")
have been identified to date. The "D" and "E"
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variants are reconnaissance aircraft, first noted in 1965.
Information about the production of the BEAR was
relatively limited in the mid-1960's, and estimating
total production is difficult. Most of the BEARS pro-
duced in the past few years have been in the model
b. FIGHTERS - The Soviet aircraft industry has
produced an impressive number of jet fighter aircraft
since 1948. Peak production occurred during 1951-53,
at the time of the Korean war, when more than 4,000
fighter aircraft a year were built; then production
declined. In the late 1950's, as production of a new
generation of fighters was introduced, output dropped
from 1,700 in 1957 to only 400 in 1959. Although
production has remained relatively low, it reached
1,000 in 1966. As output varied, the number of air-
frame plants directly involved in fighter production
has changed correspondingly. In 1949, eight airframe
plants totaling more than 13.4 million square feet
of floorspace (about 40% of the total) were used for
series production of fighters. In 1959, only three
plants with 6.5 million square feet (15% of the total)
were used, and in 1966, five plants were producing
jet fighter aircraft in series, utilizing about 14 million
square feet of floorspace (about 25% of the total).
FISHBED ' (MiG-21) and FisHPoT (Su-9)-all relatively
inexpensive aircraft capable of high acceleration,
speed, and altitude. However, these fighters have
armament and fire-control systems of limited range
compared with the more sophisticated aircraft of the
West. Design changes have involved mainly the use
of aerodynamic systems with off-the-shelf radar and
weapons packaging as opposed to the more revolu-
tionary weapons systems developed by Western in-
dustries.
Future fighter designs will incorporate advanced
weapons systems. The current FIDDLER program and
the postulated future designs involve aircraft with
longer ranges, higher speeds, and complementary mis-
sile systems. Much greater cost and effort go into
research and development and in series production of
these types of fighters. Aircraft operating in the high
Mach 2.5-Mach 3 range will require advanced tech-
nology such as titanium airframe structuring, and
aircraft operating in the attack mission will probably
employ terrain-avoidance radar and other advance-
ments. Furthermore, production of these more ad-
vanced types of aircraft will require a relatively
greater amount of floorspace.
Since 1947, when the U.S.S.R. began to convert
Historically, the U.S.S.R. has concentrated on the from fighters powered by piston engines to those
producnir- c L'.--- A4.0-10% a L., ao+ er.,:- F^.,. ''T-rent Soviet Design
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Bureaus (OKB's) have contributed to the major
fighter programs. The Mikoyan OKB, during the 1950-
58 period, had a near monopoly in fighter design.
Mikoyan's FAGOT (MiG-15), FRESCO (MiG-17), and
FARMER (MiG-19) accounted for about 26,500 of the
total estimated 28,000 jet fighters produced in this pe-
riod, the first generation of jet fighters. The only other
series of jet fighters at this time were the FLORA
(Yak-23) and FLASHLIGHT (Yak-25) designed by the
Yakovlev OKB. However, since series, production of
the new generation fighters began in 1957-59, other
designers have also achieved impressive results. A
discussion of fighter production by designer follows
below.
The FISHBED, the successor to the FAGOT-FRESCO-
FARMER series of the Mikoyan OKB, and the most
successful design of the new generation types, ac-
counts for one-half, or more than 3,300, of the air-
craft produced since the transitional period of 1957-59.
The FISHBED is a single-place, single engine, turbojet
fighter of the delta-wing type, designed for high-
altitude intercept and ground attack. There are two
basic versions of the FISHBED: The clear-air-mass
interceptor "C" and "E", about 1,000 of which were
produced before phaseout in 1964, and the all-weather
interceptor "D" and "F" now in production at two
airframe plants, the Moscow Airframe Plant 30 and
Gor'kiy Airframe Plant 21. Some 2,200 "D" and "F"
models have been built since the beginning of series
production in 1962 and 1965 respectively. The FISH-
BED "D" total includes the export version-the MiG-21-
FL, a considerable number of which have been
exported. A two-seat trainer variant, the MONGOL
(MiG-21), has evolved in parallel design to the other
variants. MONGOL "A" equates with the FISHBED "D"
(and earlier Flsi-IBEDS) and the MONGOL "B" equates
with the FISHBED "F". The MONGOL has been pro-
duced primarily at Tbilisi Airframe Plant 31, although
a few trainers have been produced at Moscow Air-
frame Plant 30. By mid-1967, an estimated 160
MONGOLS had been produced.
The Sukhoy OKB, with the successful design of
the FITTER/FISHPOT, ranks second among the design
bureaus and accounts for 2,300 or about 30% of
the fighters produced since 1957. The development
of the FITTER (Su-7), a swept-wing parallel to the
delta-wing FISHPOT, probably began in 1952. Both
were designed as single-place interceptors in the
Mach-2 range. The FITTER, however, has been recast
for use in ground support, with a secondary role in
interception. The FITTER entered series production
in 1957 at Komsomolsk Airframe Plant 126, where
some 1,200 are believed to have been produced
through 1966. FITTERS have been exported to the
U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq, and may also go to India.
The Yakovlev OKB, third in terms of production
since 1957, is now producing the FIREBAR/BREWER.
The FIREBAR, a two-place turbojet fighter with twin
engines and swept wings, is designed to counter
manned bombers at low altitudes. It is the end result
of an evolutionary progression from the FLASHLIGHT
fighter through the reconnaissance aircraft MANGROVE
(Yak-27), and the light tactical bomber, BREWER.
The production of FIREBAR, the first Soviet fighter to
enter series production in this decade, began at
Novosibirsk Airframe Plant 153 in 1963, with an
estimated total output of 530 aircraft by the end of
1966. Tupolev, although one of the most important
designers in the Soviet Union, only recently entered
the fighter field with the FIDDLER. This is a two-place,
twin engined turbojet fighter of swept-wing configura-
tion and is the largest fighter the Soviets have pro-
duced. It is thought to have been developed as a
specialized response to the stand-off manned bomber
threat and ranks as an extended range interceptor,
capable of loiter missions 500 nautical miles from
base. The FIDDLER is believed to have entered series
production in 1965 at Voronezh Airframe Plant 64,
with an estimated 50 aircraft produced through
December 1966.
The U.S.S.R. is known to be developing fighters
with improved performance characteristics. The
Mikoyan designed aircraft, the E-266, set three world
records for speed in March 1965. This aircraft is
not known to be in series production, but develop-
ment may be complete and series production could
begin during 1968-69. Other designers probably are
also developing new fighters, and it is likely that the
U.S.S.R. will continue to stress production of fighter
aircraft.
c. TRANSPORTS - Transport aircraft are produced
in the U.S.S.R. to fill military and civil requirements
at home and also to sell abroad. Because of the
increased size and complexity of the more modem
transport aircraft, the industry presently produces
fewer transports than were produced during the late
1950's, when production of high-performance aircraft
began. In 1966 the industry produced about 450
transports, compared with 800 in 1957. Five of the
types produced in 1966 were designed for civil use
and two were for military use. One of the military
types is believed to be phasing out, and two new mod-
els are believed to be in or near the stage of prototype
production. The industry is also developing a super-
sonic transport (SST). The COCK (An-22), only
recently in series production, presently is the world's
largest aircraft. Six airframe plants, representing about
20% of the industry's production capability, are de-
voted to building transports.
The U.S.S.R. has emphasized production of turbo-
prop rather than jet transports since the start of pro-
duction of high-performance transports in 1956. Of
the total number of transports produced so far, about
2,000 are turboprops and about 350 are jet trans-
ports. Production of the turboprop aircraft since
the late 1950's has been relatively stable, with a range
of output of 200 to 250 aircraft a year. Civil jet
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transports will likely increase in importance by 1970
as newer jets come into production.
Since the mid-1950's, the U.S.S.R. has been ex-
panding and modernizing the air transport system.
Before this time, Soviet production of transport air-
craft was neglected in favor of military aircraft. Only
four plants produced the light transports CAB (Li-2),
COACH (11-12), and CRATE (11-14), and the small
transport COLT (An-2). Despite limited floorspace,
considerable numbers of these transports were pro-
duced. The development of the new high-performance
transports brought into production during 1956-57
five new transports. These are described below.
(1) The CAMEL (Tu-104) - The first of the
new generation transports to enter production was
Tupolev's twin-engine medium jet, CAMEL, the only
turbo jet among the group. By 1960 about 200
CAMELS had been produced at three plants-Kharkov
Plant 135, Omsk Plant 166, and Kazan Plant 22.
(2) The CUB (AN-12) - Production of the
CUB, a large military assault turboprop transport, was
begun at Irkutsk Plant 39 in 1957. Later it was pro-
duced also at Tashkent Plant 84 and Voronezh Plant
64. By the end of 1966, about 900 CUBS had been
produced. Production was phased out at Plant 39 in
1961, at Plant 64 in early 1966, and may be phasing
out at Plant 84. CUB is primarily a military aircraft,
but about 75 are known to be in service in Aeroflot,
the civil transport service, and 80 have been exported.
(3) The CAT (AN-10) - More than 100 CATS,
the civil counterpart of the CUB, were produced dur-
ing 1958-60 at Voronezh Plant 64.
(4) The CAMP (AN-8) - The twin-engine
military aircraft, CAMP, another Antonov turboprop,
was produced during 1958-61 at Tashkent Plant 84.
(5) The COOT (11-18) -The four-engine
turboprop CooT, designed by Ilyushin, entered pro-
duction in 1957 at Moscow Plant 30; it proved to be
one of the most successful of the Soviet transports.
By the end of 1966, about 500 had been produced,
about 85 of which were exported. The latest model
to enter production is the long-range version, II-18D,
which carries 122 passengers. Production in the future
may include an ASW version of the 11-18, called
the MAY.
Since 1957 the U.S.S.R. has produced about 35
CLEAT (Tu-114), an adaptation of the Tupolev-de-
signed heavy bomber built for carrying 220 passengers
in tourist-class fashion on long-distances flights. In
1960-61 two more civil transports entered series pro-
duction: the short-haul turbroprops, COKE (An-24)
designed by Antonov, and the turbofan, COOKPOT
(Tu-124). The COKE, an aircraft similar in appear-
ance to the Fokker F-27, began in late 1961 what
appears to be a long and successful production run
at Kiev Plant 473. By January 1967, more than 250
of these high-wing transports had been produced.
The U.S.S.R. is actively promoting export sale of the
COKE in both Communist and non-Communist coun-
tries. Thus far, more than 50 have been exported.
The CooxPOT, the first Soviet turbofan transport,
entered production at Kharkov Plant 135 in 1960,
and probably was phased out in early 1966 after about
120 had been produced. Presumably the problems
with this aircraft, excessive noise and vibration, have
been solved in the follow-on turbofan, CRUSTY (Tu-
134), which entered series production as COOKPOT
was being phased out. Unlike its predecessor CooK-
POT, which had the engines on the wings, CRUSTY has
two rear-mounted engines and a "T"-type tail. The
demand for this aircraft both for domestic use and
for export is sufficient to support a long production run.
In 1964-65, two small aircraft powered by piston
engines entered production. The An-2M, an agricul-
tural version of Antonov's single-engine transport dis-
cussed above, has been in production at the Moscow
plant, Dolgoprudnaya 464, since 1965. Antonov's
CLOD (An-14) entered production at Arsenyev Plant
116 in late 1964. In order to supply a large domestic
need and to provide for export, the U.S.S.R. probably
will continue to produce both of these aircraft.
Two heavy transports now are in the early stages of
series production. The long range CLASSIC (11-62),
powered by four rear-mounted turbofan jet engines
and which resembles the U.K.'s VC-10, is the latest
known design of the Ilyushin Design Bureau. After
numerous delays, series production began at Kazan
Plant 22 in early 1966. Six of these aircraft were
believed to have been built by the end of the year and
production will probably continue at a low but in-
creasing rate.
The heavy transport CocK, now in series production
at Tashkent Plant 84, is a long-range military trans-
port, powered by four turboprop NK-12MV engines.
It carries a maximum payload of 176,000 pounds for
a range of 2,800 nautical miles, and a normal payload
of 99,000 pounds for 5,100 nautical miles. By the end
of 1966 some 4 to 6 CocKS had been built, including
prototypes.
Several transports still are in some stage of devel-
opment. The short-haul light jet, Yak-40 could be
ready for series production in 1968. The new trans-
port known as the Tu-154, a medium-range jet similar
to the U.K.'s Trident (powered by three rear-mounted
engines), has been widely publicized and might have
entered prototype production in 1967. The Soviet
supersonic transport (SST), Tu-144, is powered by
four by-pass jet engines (Kuznetsov NK-144). Its
speed is in the area of Mach 2.2-2.3, its range is 4,000
miles, and it carries 120 passengers. Even though the
first flight may occur in 1968, the Tu-144 will not be
operational before 1972.
d. HELICOPTERS - The production of helicopters
makes up an important part of the Soviet aircraft in-
dustry. Some 7,000 helicopters have been built since
World War II. In 1966, 235 helicopters were pro-
duced at three airframe plants: Kazan 387, Moscow
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23, and Rostov 168. (FIGURE 81 shows production
of helicopters.) The HOUND (Mi-4), a piston-powered
helicopter and three turboshaft helicopters-the HooK
(Mi-6), Hip (Mi-8), and HARKE (Mi-10)-are be-
lieved to be presently in series production. The
HOUND is apparently being phased out in favor of the
Hip. Prototypes of the HOODLUM (Ka-26), HARP
(Ka-20), and HOPLIGHT (Mi-2), and the STOL con-
vertiplane Hoop (Ka-22) have been built and other
new designs are probably being developed. However,
not all of these designs are likely to go into series
production.
The HooK is the world's largest helicopter and one
that has no counterpart in the West. The HARKE is
a flying crane version of the HOOK, combining a modi-
fied HooK fuselage for carrying passengers and a long-
legged quadricycle landing gear for straddling ex-
ternal loads. Since 1964, at least 40 Hips, a turbo-
shaft model capable of carrying 26 passengers, have
been produced at Kazan Plant 387, and about 10
HARKES have been built at Rostov Plant 168. Even
though the HOPLITE was first shown in October 1961
there is still no evidence that it is in series production,
although Poland may be producing it under license
from the U.S.S.R. Series production of the Hoop
is not anticipated but HOODLUM was to enter series
production in 1967. There is no evidence of series
production of the HARP, but a follow-on model, the
HORMONE, has been developed by designer Kamov.
e. MISCELLANEOUS AIRCRAFT - Other types of
Soviet aircraft include flying boat patrol bombers,
communications/utility aircraft, trainers, and recon-
naissance aircraft. The U.S.S.R. has produced three
seaplane patrol bombers designed by Beriyev: The
MADGE (Be-6), the MALLOW (M-10), and the MAIL
(Be-12)-all built at Taganrog Plant 86 in relatively
small numbers. The MAIL appeared in 1961 but series
production did not begin until about 1966.
The CREEK (Yak-12) is the only communications/
utility type of aircraft produced, although the trans-
ports COLT and CLOD discussed above serve also in
this capacity. An estimated 2,000 CREEKS were pro-
duced between 1954 and 1960.
Soviet production of trainer aircraft in recent years
has been restricted to a fairly small number of the
MAESTRO and MONGOL trainers. In earlier years after
World War II as many as 3,000 trainers a year were
produced, but since 1956 production has been below
1,000 a year (FIGURE 81). Production of the MAX
(Yak-18), a primary trainer, has totaled about 8,000;
the heavier and more powerful MoosE (Yak-11), an
intermediate trainer, has totaled some 4,000. The
U.S.S.R. since 1963 has imported the MAYA (L-29),
an intermediate jet trainer from Czechoslovakia. One
Soviet trainer, MAGNUM (Yak-30) apparently has never
entered series production; a test batch of 10 to 20 has
been produced.
Soviet reconnaissance aircraft generally are adapta-
tions of bombers such as the BEAGLE, BADGER, and
BEAR, or fighters such as FISHBED. However, two air-
craft, the MANGROVE and MANDRAKE, appear to have
been designed primarily for aerial reconnaissance.
An estimated 230 MANGROVE types (formerly FLASH-
LIGHT D) were built during 1958-63 at Saratov Plant
292. MANDRAKE, a twin-jet designed by Yakovlev,
is believed to be used primarily as a high-flying tar-
get for fighter interceptor training. MANDRAKE was
phased out at Ulan Ude Plant 99 by the end of 1965,
with an estimated total output of about 80 aircraft.
f. AIRCRAFT ENGINES - The entire range of Soviet
military and civil aircraft is powered by a fairly narrow
range of engine types. In general the industry limits
the number of engine designs produced and makes
extensive use of off-the-shelf engines. New engines
are designed and produced only when one of the
existing engines (or some modification of it) cannot
achieve the level of performance required. Aircraft
engine plants, which have an estimated floorspace of
24 million square feet in all, are believed to be capable
of supporting the airframe industry at peak capacity.
Turbojet engines, recently produced in series, are
Type 31, which powers the FITTER, FISHPOT, and
FIDDLER, and Type 37, various models of which are
fitted to FISHBED, FIREBAR, and BREWER. No new
engines of the turboprop type except the TVD-10F or
the BE-30 are known to have been produced, although
modifications of the AI-24 and NK-12 have been made.
To power the CocK super cargo transport, the industry
used the NK-12MV, a modified and improved version
of the NK-12 and reportedly twice as powerful as the
largest turboprop produced in the West.
The AI-20K (the basic version of the AI-20M) and
the AI-24 (a scaled-down version of the AI-20) are
being produced mainly as replacements. The newest
engines of the turbofan design are the following:
1) The NK-8 designed by Kuznetsov, used in the
CLASSIC, and scheduled also to power the forthcoming
three-engine Tu-154; 2) the NK-144, also by Kuznetsov,
being developed for the SST, Tu-144; and 3) the
AI-25 designed by Ivchenko and being developed for
the Yak-40. Titanium, a light metal with a high
strength-weight ratio, will be used in all three turbofan
models despite the difficulties the industry has experi-
enced in using it.
Progress has been made in increasing the life of
aircraft engines and in extending the time-before-
overhaul (TBO ). The lifespan and the TBO of the
NK-8 is expected to be greater than that of previous
Soviet engines, in part because of the use for the first
time of air-cooled turbine blades. Also, considerable
improvement has been made in the AI-20 series.
Soviet engineers have shown considerable ingenuity
in designing the turboshaft engine for helicopters.
The D25V helicopter engine (TV-25M) used in the
very large helicopters, HOOK and HARKE, is the most
recent model to enter production.
The industry is known to be working on three non-
rotorcraft V/STOL propulsion systems. These are
J
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believed to be a lift/cruise engine, a direct lift engine,
and a lift fan engine, but series production of these
models is not likely to begin very soon.
4. Sources of supply
The Soviet aircraft industry is self-sufficient in ma-
terials and technical expertise. In past years, it has
given major support to the development of aircraft
industries in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and during
the late 1950's established a virtually complete aircraft
industry in Communist China.
Soviet airframe and aircraft engine plants are highly
integrated, and until recently relied very little on
subcontractors for parts and components. Because the
complexity of aircraft construction has increased, the
industry is turning more and more to subcontracting
for many of its parts and components; however, Soviet
plants subcontract to a far lesser extent than do plants
in the West. Most of the airframe components are
made in shops located at the primary plant, including
castings, forgings, stampings, and machined parts,
except for some of the large forgings which are made
elsewhere. The making of ailerons, empennage as-
semblies, and especially landing gears, usually is sub-
contracted. Components such as instruments, elec-
tronic equipment, batteries, tires, and weapons sys-
tems are supplied to the Soviet airframe industry by
specialized producers much the same as in the United
States. Aircraft engine plants subcontract the pro-
duction of generators, magnetos, pumps, carburetors
and switches.
5. Research and development
Under the existing ministerial (MAP) structure,
separate organizational units are responsible for re-
search and development. Several research centers
exist, each with specialized applied research functions.
The most important of these centers is the Central
Institute for Aerohydrodynamics (TsAGI), which is
the backbone of the Soviet aviation industry in terms
of supporting the ability of the industry to design and
develop advanced aircraft. TsAGI provides basic
aerodynamics design data and conducts model tests
and static structural tests for the design bureaus.
Other applied research organizations include the
Central Institute for Aviation Engine Construction
(TsIAM) which conducts applied research on pro-
pulsion, the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials
(VIAM), and the Scientific Research Institute of
Aviation Technology and Organization of Production
(NIAT). The several design bureaus, headed by
such well-known designers as Tupolev, Mikoyan,
Sukhoy, Ilyushin, Antonov, Tumansky, Solovyev, etc.,
are responsible for the development of airframes and
propulsion systems. In a sense, their role is inter-
mediate between research institutes on the one hand
and series plants on the other. Another MAP organi-
zation is the Flight Test Institute (LII) at Moscow/
Ramenskoye Airfield, which has the unique role of
testing the aerodynamic systems development under
MAP.
The outstanding feature of Soviet aircraft design
philosophy is the practice of designing within the fore-
seeable state of the art. Designs are made to con-
form with proven manufacturing methods and equip-
ment as much as possible and, once an aircraft has
been put into series production, design changes are
kept to a minimum. This does not mean that ad-
vancements in technology do not occur; rather, it
signifies that small steps in technology are made as
opposed to large advancements with each new sys-
tems design. When a new or advanced production
technology is used by a chief designer in designing a
new system, however, it then becomes a stipulated
series production requirement. Another significant So-
viet practice is to restrict the number of designs in
production at a given time. Also, in the past the
same basic design has been made to serve a variety
of purposes, e.g., the civilian transport CAMEL and
the BADGER bomber. Additionally, BADGER is being
used simultaneously in three military roles; strategic,
tactical, and naval.
E. Shipbuilding
1. General
a. BACKGROUND - The U.S.S.R. ranks today as
one of the world's leading producers of naval ships.
The Soviet shipbuilding industry completed more than
563,000 naval standard displacement tons of major
combat ships during 1958-65. The following tabula-
tion shows the number of tons completed per year:*
1958 ........ 30,200
1959 ........ 43,555
1960 ........ 68,635
1961 ........ 65,000
1962 ....... 96,580
1963 ....... 72,450
1964 ....... 110,150
1965 ....... 76,200
In the building of merchant ships, the U.S.S.R. is
less impressive, ranking fifth in the world, but it is
moving ahead rapidly. For its merchant fleet, which
consists mainly of oceangoing tankers, dry cargo ships,
river vessels, and fishing craft, the U.S.S.R. has been
dependent on foreign shipbuilders for certain types
of new vessels and for some repair services. Presently,
however, the shipbuilding industry is being reshaped,
with the goal of becoming less dependent on foreign
shipbuilding for these services. Series production of
a few standard types of merchant ships is continuing,
and production of ship components is being coordi-
nated more closely with the programs of the shipyards.
The industry is too small to support the present rate
of expansion of the merchant fleet, and complete inde-
pendence in the field of shipbuilding and ship repair
must be considered only as a long-term goal. Thus,
the U.S.S.R. will continue to contract with other Com-
? Excludes minor combat ships such as subchasers, motor
torpedo boats, guided missile patrol boats, mine warfare
types, support ships, and other small craft.
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munist countries and with non-Communist countries
for the building of ships.
b. EXPORTS - After World War II, the U.S.S.R.
inaugurated a program of transferring naval vessels
both to other Communist countries and to the less de-
veloped nations of North Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia. In recent years the major non-Communist re-
cipients of this naval aid program have been the
U.A.R., Algeria, Syria, Indonesia, and India. Deliver-
ies have included both major and minor combat surface
ships and attack submarines. In 1966, a large number
of surface-to-surface guided missile patrol boats such
as the Osa and Komar classes were transferred to the
U.A.R., Algeria, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Syria. The
U.S.S.R. supplies most of the naval ships of the east-
ern European Communist countries, except for mine
warfare types and small patrol boats, which are built
by Poland and East Germany.
Most of the commercial ships produced by Soviet
shipyards are for the Soviet fleets, although a small
number of tankers, hydrofoils, and fishing ships have
been exported, both to other Communist countries
and to the less developed non-Communist countries.
In 1966, the U.S.S.R. signed agreements to export sev-
eral tankers to Greece. Other orders include a 12,000-
ton drydock to be delivered to Finland in 1968, several
small fishing craft for Ghana, a tanker for North Viet-
nam, and a trawler for Indonesia. Recently the Satra
Corporation of the United States placed an order with
the U.S.S.R. for the delivery by the end of 1967 of
two passenger-hydrofoil vessels of the seagoing Kometa
type and 10 six-seater hydrofoil motor launches of the
Volga type.
C. IMPORTS - Although the U.S.S.R. imports no
major combat ships, it does, at the present time, im-
port the Polnocny class of landing ship (LSM) and the
Zubov class of hydrographic research ships (AGS)
from Poland. In the early 1950's export restrictions
by the West led the U.S.S.R. to begin producing cer-
tain ships, notably tankers, which it could no longer
purchase. By the beginning of the 1960's, however,
restrictions had been relaxed considerably. Conse-
quently, of the approximately 1,200 merchant ships
imported by the U.S.S.R. since World War II, nearly
half have come from non-Communist countries. Den-
mark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden are
among the largest such shipbuilders for the U.S.S.R.
The Communist countries, on the other hand, between
1946 and 1966 delivered to the U.S.S.R. more than 560
cargo or passenger ships totaling 2,175,183 gross regis-
ter tons (g.r.t.). * In addition, 51 tankers totaling
405,897 g.r.t. were delivered between 1946 and 1966.
FIGURE 85 provides data on significant merchant ship
completions by other Communist countries for the
U.S.S.R.
? Gross register tons: The internal cubic capacity of the
ship expressed in register tons-100 cubic feet to the
ton.
2. Production and repair
a. MERCHANT SHIPS - The shipbuilding industry
has operated primarily in support of naval require-
ments since the end of World War II. About 1950,
however, Soviet planners saw the need for maintaining
a much larger merchant fleet and undertook a program
for acquiring ships. Oceangoing tankers, in particular,
were in short supply. Because trade restrictions pre-
vented purchases from the West, these ships had to
be produced at Soviet shipyards. The lead ship of
the Kazbek class of tankers was completed at the
Nosenko yard at the Black Sea port of Nikolayev in
1951. In all, 70 ships of this type were built, and the
building of other major oceangoing ships soon fol-
lowed.
Between 1951 and 1967 the Soviet shipbuilding in-
dustry completed 1,309 vessels, totaling 3,852,752
g.r.t. (FIGURE 25). In 1966, two classes of tankers
were still in serial production, one of which was the
32,840-g.r.t. Sofiya class (FIGURE 26). In addition, So-
viet shipyards were constructing five types of dry
cargo ships (the Poltava class cargo ship is shown in
FIGURE 26), and were continuing building programs
for refrigerator ships, factory trawlers, port icebreak-
ers, and medium trawlers. With the addition of mer-
chant ship production to the naval ship construction
and conversion programs, Soviet shipyards are work-
ing near capacity. Still, the U.S.S.R. continues to
place large orders for merchant ships abroad.
The shipbuilding industry has now developed its
own techniques for the construction of large modern
oceangoing ships. Several Sofiya class tankers have
been constructed, and large orders for 11,000-12,000
g.r.t. cargo ships have been confirmed. With the ex-
ception of several tankers, hydrofoil passenger ships,
and some fishing ships, nearly all Soviet production
has been for domestic use. Even though the industry
has been reorganized and series production of standard
types of merchant ships is helping to reduce produc-
tion problems and costs, the U.S.S.R. will continue to
import merchant ships in quantity for many years.
The high priority of the naval shipbuilding program
and the inability of the industry to meet completely
FIGURE 25. SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP
COMPLETIONS,* 1951-66
TOTAL
NUM-
BER
COM-
PLETED
TOTAL
GROSS
TONS
TOTAL
DEAD-
WEIGHT
TONS
Tanker .................. 144 1,410,803 2,000,000
Cargo ................... 258 1,119,609 1,389,200
Passenger ................ 11 40,471 12,000
Fishing fleet ships......... 872 1,266,994 675,900
Special types ............. 24 54,875 12,900
Total .................. 1,309 3,892,752 4,090,000
* Excludes tugs, schooners, lighters, barges, passenger
cutters, and other types for the maritime fleet.
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FIGURE 26. NEWER TYPES OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS. (top) Sofiya class
tanker. (bottom) Poltava class cargo ship.
the increased demand for merchant ships will neces-
sitate continued reliance on imports.
b. NAVAL CONSTRUCTION- Immediately follow-
ing World War II, the U.S.S.R. embarked on a pro-
gram to reconstruct and improve war-damaged ship-
yards, to build new facilities, and to construct new
naval ships. The program was unprecedented in size
and effort for a nation not at war. This period can
be divided into four somewhat overlapping stages:
The first corresponding roughly to a decision to build
naval ships and to rebuild shipyards, the second calling
for preparation and execution of plans to replace war-
time losses and to construct a force capable of de-
fending the sea frontiers of the U.S.S.R., the third re-
quiring the introduction of wholly modern units, and
the fourth initiating qualitative refinement of the
present fleet and development of new classes of ships
and weapons.
The first stage, 1946-48, apparently followed a de-
cision to give the navy a priority position in shipbuild-
ing in the postwar period. While the yards were
being rehabilitated and new facilities built, work was
resumed on naval vessels begun before the war.
Some units considered worth completing were finished
and others-including some capital ships-were
scrapped. Design and prototype development of new
classes of naval ships, including W class submarines,
Chapayev class light cruisers, Skoryy class destroyers,
and Kronshtadt class large submarine chasers were
begun in this stage. During this first stage, prepara-
tions already were underway to make the U.S.S.R.
into an important naval power.
In the second stage, 1949-53, deliveries of the first
wave of postwar-built warships were made. This
stage included delivery of Sverdlov and Chapayev
class cruisers, Skoryy class destroyers, and W and Z
class submarines. Production also included Kola and
Riga class escort ships, and P-4 and P-6 class motor
torpedo boats. Designs and equipment of the prin-
cipal surface vessels and W class submarines were not
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radically new; they were basically an improvement
and enlargement of pre-World War II designs. So-
viet planners apparently had ordered that a fleet of
completely conventional vessels be made operational
as quickly as possible, with equipment that could be
acquired easily.
The third stage, 1953-58, was marked by the mass
production of submarines and other naval ships at
peak production rates. A number of major modifica-
tions to several classes of warships also were made,
reflecting a desire to modify and improve combat ca-
pabilities of the navy. The W class submarine pro-
gram was terminated during this period, and these
units subsequently underwent four major alterations.
Ballistic missile tubes were added to a few Z class
submarines during 1955-58, the first Soviet units to be
so equipped. The Riga class escort also was altered
significantly, and its superstructure was virtually re-
built. While later units of the Riga class were built
in accordance with the newer design, an estimated
30 or more were altered. Other new construction
begun in the third stage included Q class submarines,
Kotlin class destroyers, and several other classes of
smaller combatant ships, amphibious and landing craft,
and auxiliary ships. The present, or fourth, stage
began about 1959 and has been marked by a shift
from the production of large numbers of a few types
of conventional naval ships to the production of small
numbers of a larger assortment of naval ships equipped
with the most modern weapons systems. Included
in this shift has been the introduction of nuclear-
powered submarines and surface ships armed with
missiles and propelled by gas turbines. Important
submarine classes produced were the G class ballistic
missile submarine; the N class nuclear-powered tor-
pedo attack submarine; the H class ballistic missile,
nuclear-powered submarine; and the E class cruise
missile, nuclear-powered submarine; the J class cruise
missile, diesel-powered submarine; and the F class
torpedo attack, diesel-powered submarine. Important
new surface ships are the Krupnyy class guided missile
destroyers and the Kynda, Kashin, and Kresta classes
of guided missile frigates. FIGURE 86 identifies prin-
cipal naval ships built during 1959-67, and FIGURE 27
shows some of the newer types of Soviet naval vessels.
During a 5-year construction period (1960-64), Soviet
shipyards produced six missile-equipped destroyers
and more than 100 submarines including nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-powered
guided missile submarines, nuclear-powered attack
submarines, and diesel-powered guided missile and
attack types. Also produced were over 600 minor
surface combat ships such as submarine chasers, motor
torpedo boats, guided missile patrol boats, and over
90 mine warfare types. This fourth phase also in-
cluded a major overhaul and modernization program
(including conversion of selected older ships and some
of the newer classes), and construction of naval aux-
iliaries, particularly submarine support ships.
c. REPAIR AcrlvrTIEs - Almost all Soviet ship-
yards engage to some extent in the repairing of ships,
several important yards being devoted exclusively to
repair work. Repairs to ships of the merchant and
naval fleets are customarily made at domestic ship-
yards, although some merchant ship repair work has
been let to foreign shipyards. Although in recent
years a large number of floating drydocks have been
constructed to meet the increasing need for repair
services, the 5-year plan for 1966-70 calls for additional
increases to ship repair capacity. New ship repair
complexes are being established at Il'ichevsk in the
Black Sea region and at Slavyanka in the Far East.
At the same time extensive work will be conducted
to expand the capacities of the existing facilities at
Odessa, Novorossiysk, Zhdanov, Archangel, Severod-
vinsk, Petrovka, and Kaliningrad.
3. Economic resources and requirements
a. COMPONENTS - Since about 1950 the Soviet
economy has been able to meet nearly all of the re-
quirements of the shipbuilding industry for raw ma-
terials and components. Supplies of diesel engines,
boilers, turbines, and related gear are sufficient, and
batteries, navigation and electrical apparatus, plumb-
ing and galley equipment, and the like also are in ade-
quate supply. Many of these components are manu-
factured at the shipyards or in plants located nearby.
As other Communist countries have developed ship-
building industries, they have increased their purchases
of materials and components from the U.S.S.R. East
Germany, for example, is dependent upon the U.S.S.R.
for more than half of the steel used in hull construction.
Yards in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea areas and
those in the Arctic regions are relatively well-supplied
with components and materials because of the prox-
imity of major industrial centers. Shipyards in the
Pacific area and the remote Arctic ports, however,
have frequent supply difficulties. The U.S.S.R. has
tried to alleviate the supply problems of the Pacific
area by increasing the output of ships parts in the
Far East.
b. MANPOWER - The Soviet shipbuilding industry
employs over 200,000 workers, or a little less than 1%
of the total industrial labor force. A large portion of
the shipbuilding industry's labor force consists of
highly skilled workers, such as engineers, naval archi-
tects, designers, technicians, patternmakers, and ma-
chinists, who enjoy a somewhat higher wage than
does the average industrial worker. The need for
technical skills in shipbuilding is changing in response
to changes in production techniques. Series produc-
tion and greater use of prefabrication, for example,
tend to reduce the number of highly trained ship-
builders needed. On the other hand, nuclear
propulsion and modern strategic weapons systems
with their complex electronics, require other types of
specially trained shipbuilding technicians.
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FIGURE 27. NEWER TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS. (top) Osa class large guided missile
patrol boat. (center) Nuclear-powered guided missile submarine. (bottom) Kresta class
guided missile frigate.
The Soviet training programs for shipbuilding are
carried on at specialized institutes, and apprentice
and on-the-job training programs are offered at almost
every important shipyard in the U.S.S.R. The post-
graduate divisions of some advanced shipbuilding
schools conduct research programs. The principal
institutions for training skilled labor and technical
personnel for the shipbuilding industry are located
at Gor'kiy, Leningrad, Nikolayev, and Odessa.
4. Shipyards
The location of the major Soviet shipyards has been
dictated by the necessity of serving four widely sepa-
rated maritime areas: The North, the Baltic, the Black
Sea, and the Pacific. Increases in the minimum depth
and improvements along the Volga-Baltic-White Sea
Canal System has permitted the passage of certain
types of combat ships between the White, Black,
Caspian, and Baltic Seas. The Northern Sea Route
is used increasingly to transfer newly built vessels
from the Arctic and Baltic yards. to the Pacific area.
The principal shipbuilding centers of the U.S.S.R.
are the Leningrad area on the Baltic Sea and the
Kherson-Nikolayev area on the Black Sea (FIGURE
28). Other important yards are at Severodvinsk in
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the Arctic area, Gor'kiy in the interior, and at Komso-
mol'sk and Khabarovsk in the Far East. In addition
to the principal Soviet shipbuilding facilities, there
are numerous small inland shipyards and boatyards
throughout the U.S.S.R., especially in the European
half of the country around the central Volga region
near Gor'kiy. Besides conducting repairs on local
vessels, these inland yards construct some small naval
craft, river passenger and cargo ships, barges, and
other small craft. The growing importance attached
to inland waterway transportation will in all prob-
ability result in an expansion of these inland ship-
building and repair facilities. For example, the Yaro-
slavl Shipyard has been transformed from an insig-
nificant boatyard to an important inland yard capable
of building medium-sized freighters.
Most of the major yards in the U.S.S.R. use modem
shipbuilding methods and are capable of serial pro-
duction of naval and merchant ships of almost any
type. Year-round production is made possible by
using covered building docks and building ways at
some of the major yards. One of the most important
aspects of modem Soviet shipbuilding is the use of
sectional assembly, in which individual sections as
large as 200 tons can be lifted into position. Produc-
tion methods in shipbuilding have been facilitated by
the use of lightweight alloys, plastics, noncorrosive
materials, and improved methods of welding.
5. Prospects for the industry
The Soviet shipbuilding industry will likely con-
tinue to strive for improvements in quality while
maintaining a steady level of output. Production of
nuclear attack and missile submarines probably will
continue. The J class diesel-powered cruise missile
submarine and F class diesel-powered attack sub-
marine are in production, but these programs probably
will be phased out before 1970. Other construction
probably will consist of guided missile-equipped frig-
ates, mine warfare types, the Mirka class PCE, Komar
and Osa class PTG's, and Shershen class PTF. The
expansion and modernization of naval shipbuilding
and repair yards now under way will continue to have
a high priority over the near future. The industry also
will continue research and design efforts to develop
new or improved types of submarines and surface
ships.
Present plans to expand both the merchant fleet
and the fishing fleet, and to carry on an oceanographic
research program suggest that the Soviet leadership
will strive to produce increasing numbers of nonnaval
ships. Even though the industry has been reorganized
and series production of standard types of merchant
ships is facilitating growth, the higher priority given
to naval shipbuilding will make necessary the con-
tinual import of merchant ships in quantity for many
years.
F. Explosives (industrial and military)
1. Introduction
The U.S.S.R. possesses a large and well-developed
complex for manufacturing explosives and propellants.
The present level of output is sufficient for Soviet
industrial and military requirements and for export.
During World War II, the U.S.S.R. achieved a high
level of output of explosives, almost 900,000 tons a
year. Requirements exceeded this amount, however,
necessitating the annual import of about 220,000 tons,
which came principally from the United States. Since
that time, the capacity for explosives production has
increased considerably; it is believed now to exceed
1.5 million tons annually. Output at this capacity
would be sufficient to meet the requirements of a
sustained major war.
A program of modernizing and relocating some of
the facilities for the production of explosives has been
under way since World War II. Explosives plants and
associated chemical plants were highly vulnerable to
military action in World War II because they were
concentrated in the European U.S.S.R.; as a result,
serious losses were incurred. The buildup of facilities
in the Ural Mountains and in the eastern U.S.S.R.
later in the war reduced this vulnerability. In the
postwar era, the maintenance of these facilities
coupled with the restoration of damaged plants, the
building of new plants, and the transfer of factories
from occupied countries provided a vastly larger
and more dispersed industry for the production of
explosives.
Peacetime production of explosives is planned ac-
cording to the needs of the mining industry, the
civilian construction industry, and the military. To
meet these combined requirements, the U.S.S.R. in
1966 produced an estimated 581,200 tons of explosives.
Detailed information on explosives production is shown
in FIGURE 87.
Explosives production is a segment of the Soviet
chemical industry. It is believed to be under the con-
trol of the All-Union Ministry of Chemical and Oil
Engineering.
2. Constituent materials
The principal constituent materials utilized in So-
viet production of explosives are ammonia, nitric acid,
sulfuric acid, glycerin, toluene (toluol), benzene
(benzol), and cotton linters (for cellulose and nitro-
cellulose). Estimated consumption of these materials
in the production of explosives is given in FicuxE 88.
Certain explosives manufactured from these materials
may also be used as ingredients in other explosives;
these include ammonium nitrate, dinitrobenzene, nitro-
cellulose, nitroglycerin, trinitroxylene, and some tri-
nitrotoluene (TNT).
The Soviet chemical industry is able to supply con-
stituent materials for explosives in quantities sufficient
to meet the present requirements of industrial and
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military production. In fact, new plants built since
World War II have increased capacity far above peace-
time requirements. This extra capacity would be used
in wartime conditions, when requirements for explo-
sives would rise to several times the peacetime level.
Under these conditions, toluene, and to a lesser extent,
nitric acid, would have to be diverted from civilian
users to fulfill military needs. Other materials would
be available in quantities sufficient for both explosives
and other needs.
The most serious limitation on the production of
explosives during World War II was the inadequate
supply of toluene. Substitutes for TNT, such as ama-
tols and ammonals, were used, but because they are
unstable, these materials are not used in peacetime.
Although toluene is now produced in quantities in
excess of current peacetime needs, this level of output
might be insufficient in the event of war. Catalytic
reforming of petroleum feed stocks, however, could
provide the additional supplies needed.
Until recently, the capacity for production of nitric
acid was inadequate to meet wartime requirements
for both explosives and industrial and agricultural
uses. Expansion of the facilities for production of
nitric acid has improved this situation somewhat,
but wartime needs would strain the available supply.
It is doubtful whether the U.S.S.R. places much
reliance on the stockpiling of constituent materials,
probably preferring to concentrate on expansion of
productive capacity. Relatively small quantities of
some strategic materials may be stockpiled, but there
is no evidence of major efforts in this field. Moreover,
while a few chemicals, such as toluene, are fairly
easy to store (requiring only tankage of the type used
for petroleum products), other important constituents
of explosives, such as nitric acid, are difficult to store
because they are corrosive and require specially lined
containers.
3. Industrial explosives
Soviet industrial explosives can be divided into
three major categories: Dynamites, ammonites, and
bellites. Dynamites and ammonites together account
for over 90% of total production (FIGURE 87). Of the
estimated 185,000 tons of industrial explosives con-
sumed in the U.S.S.R. in 1966, an estimated 120,000
tons were used in mining, and 65,000 tons were used
by the construction industry and other consumers.
An increase in the manufacture of industrial explosives
will be required to meet planned increases for coal
extraction. The capital construction program as
planned also will increase requirements for industrial
explosives.
In time of war, only a portion of the explosives
normally consumed by industry could be diverted to
military use. Requirements of the coal mining indus-
try might actually increase under wartime conditions,
because of the added demands of heavy industry for
fuel.
4. Military explosives
Annual requirements for military explosives are de-
termined by the output of ammunition. It is esti-
mated that in 1966 about 339,000 tons of military
explosives were used in Soviet ammunition produc-
tion. The estimated consumption of military explo-
sives by type in 1966 was included in FIGURE 87.
Before and during World War II, the U.S.S.R. made
use of a variety of high explosive fillers such as TNT,
amatol, ammonal, PETN, and picric acid. Technical
assistance furnished by the United States and the
United Kingdom during the war and by German
scientists employed in the postwar Soviet explosives
program helped create a productive capacity for newer
explosives such as cyclonite (RDX).
Postwar production of high explosive fillers has
been limited primarily to TNT, ammonium nitrate,
and small quantities of RDX-base explosives. More
sensitive explosives materials-such as picric acid,
potassium chlorate, mercury fulminate, and lead
azide-are used for initiator, primer, and booster
compositions.
Soviet propellants are of the conventional smokeless
type. Both single- and double-base propellants are
made, but emphasis is on single-base types. Black
powder, used extensively in World War II, is no
longer used in significant quantities as a propellant.
It is believed that the U.S.S.R., like other major
powers, does not store explosives in bulk form, pre-
ferring instead to store filled ammunition. Because
TNT is one of the more stable explosives during
storage, it probably forms a major part of the ex-
plosives used in ammunition to be stored.
5. Principal producers
Information on individual producers of explosives
is given in FIGURE 89. Reliable information on indi-
vidual plants is often fragmentary, and some of the
information dates from World War II or the immediate
postwar period. Some of the Soviet plants manu-
facturing explosives produce intermediates as well,
but many are dependent on chemical and cellulose
plants for such materials. Most of the plants are
served by both road and rail facilities.
At the present time, the U.S.S.R. is believed to have
several large explosives-producing plants comparable
to those in the United States. Plant No. 673 at Kazan',
for example, compares favorably in size with the U.S.
Sunflower Ordnance Plant. Among the largest of
such plants in the U.S.S.R. is Kirov Combine No. K98,
located at Zakamsk in the Ural Region. There are
several other large explosives producers, at widely
dispersed locations; however, the explosives produc-
tion industry continues to consist principally of small
plants.
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G. Arms and ammunition
1. Introduction
The U.S.S.R. has a large munitions industry that is
not only capable of satisfying current requirements
for arms and ammunition, but has the reserve capacity
to supply such items in quantities sufficient to meet
expected wartime needs. It has attained world lead-
ership in developing and producing new conventional
weapons.
Plants of the munitions industry are widely dispersed
throughout the U.S.S.R., although there are concentra-
tions in the Moscow-Leningrad-Gor'kiy area and in
the Urals. Since World War II, the U.S.S.R. has built
no new weapons plants, but has reequipped and mod-
ernized many older ones, keeping in operation more
than enough capacity to meet present requirements.
In this way it has retained a production reserve capa-
ble of rapid mobilization. Soviet defense plants are
required to produce a wide range of nonmilitary items.
Since World War II, an extensive program to de-
velop missiles and nuclear weapons has been imple-
mented. Since about 1960, this has been accom-
plished to some degree at the expense of conventional
artillery. Nonetheless, reliance upon artillery has con-
tinued and a development program for artillery has
led to the introduction since 1962 of new items of
tube artillery, self-propelled multiple-rocket launchers,
self-propelled one-round rocket launchers, and a
quadruple-mount, self-propelled 23-mm antiaircraft
gun. Modern individual and crew-served infantry
weapons with increased firepower have also been de-
veloped and produced. Chief among these are three
types of small arms, all firing the same ammunition,
and a series of recoilless and antitank weapons.
During World War II, the U.S.S.R. relied almost en-
tirely upon optical-mechanical fire-control equipment,
even though domestic production of these items was
inadequate both in quantity and quality. This defi-
ciency has since been overcome. The U.S.S.R. is now
satisfying its own needs for optical-mechanical fire-
control instruments of good quality and for electronic
fire-control equipment.
Since World War II, the effectiveness of domestic
ammunition has been increased by greater care in
manufacture and packaging and by the development
of new ammunition for small arms and artillery. The
U.S.S.R. is known to have produced at least one prox-
imity fuze which was used with the 100-mm antiair-
craft gun. After this weapon was replaced by surface-
to-air missiles, production of the fuze continued for
export to various countries and recently has been re-
introduced in eastern Europe.
Land mine warfare is highly developed, and facili-
ties for production of large numbers of high-grade
mines are available. In this field as well as in the de-
velopment of sea mines and torpedoes, the U.S.S.R.
undoubtedly has benefited from the extensive expertise
of German technicians transferred to the U.S.S.R. after
World War II.
Postwar production of materiel has made possible
a reequipment program which has considerably en-
hanced mobility and firepower of the army. It also
has enabled the U.S.S.R. to equip armies of the east-
ern European Communist countries and to export sub-
stantial quantities of materiel to various non-Commu-
nist countries.
The degree to which new developments in military
doctrine will affect the munitions industry is not clear.
Current publications, statements of leading military
figures, and observed trends within the army, indicate
a continued need for improved infantry weapons, ar-
tillery (except for heavy artillery larger than 203-mm),
mortars, radar, and ammunition of the type now in
use. For the next few years, therefore, the activity
and size of the munitions industry should approximate
its present level.
Overall administration of the Soviet land armament
industry is believed to be assigned to the Ministry of
Defense, created in October 1965. However, all ar-
maments plants produce both military and civilian
goods and, therefore, other ministries may be involved
in administration of the industry.
2. Production, supply, and use
The ability of the U.S.S.R. to produce great quanti-
ties of effective arms and ammunition was demon-
strated in World War II. Under adverse wartime con-
ditions, the output of weapons was increased by at
least 500% over a substantial prewar level, even
though many facilities were captured or damaged dur-
ing the German invasion. After World War II, the
munitions industry expanded the productive capacity
by rebuilding and retooling plants which were de-
stroyed or evacuated, by improving facilities relocated
during the war, and by a general modernization of
manufacturing methods.
Certain ground weapons-for example, antitank ar-
tillery-have been developed and replaced by rock-
etry, but a fairly wide range of conventional items is
still being made (FIGURE 29). Even though produc-
tion of particular types is being decreased, the overall
production of ground weapons is not expected to de-
cline. A number of new weapons have been placed
in production, such as the PK general purpose ma-
chinegun, RPG-7 antitank weapon, ZU-23 dual anti-
aircraft cannon, the 40-round URAL-375 rocket
launcher, the 16-round towed rocket launcher, the
122-mm howitzer D30, and the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled
antiaircraft gun.
Soviet progress in production of electronic fire-con-
trol equipment has been notable. Although the equip-
ment initially put into production was supplied by the
United States and the United Kingdom during World
War II, the fire control radar now being produced is of
Soviet design. At least three antiaircraft gun-laying
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FIGURE 29. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF GROUND
WEAPONS
(Units)
ITEMS
Infantry Weapons:
Machineguns
7.62-mm company ma-
chinegun (R.P-46)......
7.62-mm Goryunov ma-
chinegun (M1943 &
SGM)................
7.62-mm light machinegun
(RPK) ...............
7.62-mm general-purpose
machinegun (PK) ......
7.62-mm assault rifle
(AKM) ................
Artillery:
23-mm antiaircraft gun ZU-
23 (Dual) ...............
40-mm antitank grenade
launcher (RPG-7) .......
Twin 57-mm self-propelled
antiaircraft gun (ZSU-57-
2) ......................
Quad 23-mm self-propelled
antiaircraft gun (ZSU-23-
4) ......................
122-mm howitzer (D30) .....
Field Rocket Launchers:
115-mm rocket launcher (40
rd) URAL-375, M1964...
140-mm rocket launcher (16
rd) towed (Airborne) .....
One-round rocket launcher
on the modified non-
amphibious PT 76 chassis.
One-round rocket launcher
on ZIL-135 .............
1964 1
1965 1
1966
3,000
0
0
6,000
5,000
2,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
2,500
5,000
7,000
230,000
230,000
230,000
400
400
400
6,700
6,700
6,700
1,000
50
75
50
75
75
50
0
0
0
15
30
radars, the SON-4 (WHIFF), SON-9 (FIRE CAN), and
SON-30 (FIRE WHEEL) have been developed and pro-
duced. However, the decline in the deployment of
conventional tube artillery has been accompanied by
a decline in the production of fire-control radar. Four
radars, namely: TRACIMISH, LONG TROUGH, PORK
TROUGH, and SMALL YAWN, have been identified as
being used in conjunction with field artillery. The
FAN SONG surface-to-air missile control and guidance
radar has been produced in quantities sufficient for
wide deployment and for export.
The U.S.S.R. still makes considerable use of optical-
mechanical fire-control devices upon which it de-
pended almost exclusively during World War II.
Little is known of the output of these devices but it is
adequate for all current needs. The optical and pre-
cision-instrument plants were completely modernized
following the war, and personnel were trained by the
large numbers of German specialists forcibly trans-
ferred to the U.S.S.R. after the war. The release of
the German technicians by 1952 indicated that the
program was well advanced. For further information
on production of optical equipment, see Subsection I,
Other Military Equipment.
Ammunition produced in the U.S.S.R. during World
War II was inferior in quality and effectiveness to that
used in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany. Remedial effort resulted in the develop-
ment and production of new kinds of small-arms am-
munition and in improvement of artillery ammunition.
General improvements in metallurgy have led to the
manufacture of ammunition of greatly improved qual-
ity. Other advancements have been made in the pro-
duction of fuzes, high-explosive fillers, and propellants.
Production of artillery and mortar ammunition in
the U.S.S.R. is not an integrated process. Components
are manufactured in separate plants and the final as-
sembly of complete rounds takes place in military de-
pots, where components are stored and then assembled
as needed.
Ammunition production in the U.S.S.R. in 1966 is
estimated as follows (in thousand of rounds) :
Small-arms ............ 303,942
Mortar ................ 275
Rocket ............... 312
Artillery ............. 47,616
Recoilless ............. 350
A wide variety of hand grenades has been pro-
duced since the war, but current output appears to
be limited to one of each of the offensive, defensive,
and antitank types, characterized by comparatively
simple design and good quality. The U.S.S.R. has
given considerable attention to development of land
mines, current production of which is believed to in-
clude three types of antitank mines, three types of
antipersonnel mines, and one dual-purpose mine. The
production of hand grenades and mines in 1966 is
estimated to have been 10 million and one million
units, respectively.
Little information is available concerning new Soviet
underwater ordnance, but the production of a high-
quality magnetic induction mine has been confirmed.
Since World War II, the U.S.S.R. has engaged in the
development and production of mines, torpedoes, and
depth charges.
3. Raw materials and manufacturing facilities
The U.S.S.R. is nearly self-sufficient in raw materials
for conventional munitions production; however, the
country apparently finds it economically desirable to
import these materials from other Communist coun-
tries. For example, such strategic materials as tung-
sten and possibly molybdenum are still imported in
quantity from Communist China.
Soviet munitions plants are adequately equipped.
Substantial amounts of U.S. lend-lease and captured
German special-purpose equipment were installed dur-
ing the years immediately following World War II.
Domestic production of modern machine tools and
equipment for defense plants has been high.
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4. Principal producers
The principal producers of weapons and ammuni-
tion are located primarily in the European U.S.S.R.
and the Urals, although there are a few plants in
eastern and western Siberia. The major plants are
listed in FIGURES 90 through 92. Most of them were
in existence at the end of World War II, but many
have been modernized since that time. Only a small
fraction of the capacity of arms and ammunition plants
is devoted to military production, various types of
civilian products occupying the remainder of the ca-
pacity.
It is believed that at the present only three plants
are manufacturing and/or assembling conventional
artillery pieces, whereas six plants are engaged in the
fabrication of small arms. Little is known about cur-
rent production. programs of armament plants, but ap-
parently some artillery and small-arms plants have
been or are being converted wholly or in part to the
production of missiles and missile components.
Principal producers of antiaircraft fire-control radar
are located in the Moscow area. A number of other
plants produce radar (FIGURE 99), and many contrib-
ute some fire-control equipment.
The largest concentration of optical and precision
instruments producers is in the Leningrad area (Fic-
uRE 97). Other important producers are in the areas
of Moscow and Novosibirsk.
H. Missiles and space equipment
1. Introduction
The foundation for the U.S.S.R.'s present missile
production program is to a considerable degree the
result of successful utilization of German techniques,
materials, and design data-thus saving the Soviets
several years in the development program. Such
assistance was particularly valuable during 1946-48,
when German missiles were reassembled in the
U.S.S.R., and German technicians assisted in the es-
tablishment of production and test facilities. In order
to secure as much technical informatidn from the
Germans as possible, the Soviets permitted them
to work on advanced designs. After about 1949,
Soviet policy restricted the assistance of the Germans
to specific technical problems. This coincided with
a buildup of a native Soviet development program.
The Germans were no longer allowed access to Soviet
production areas, eventually were disassociated from
the missile program, and after a "cooling off' period,
most of them were repatriated in 1952-53. The last
ones returning to Germany in 1957-58.
During this developmental period the Soviets col-
lected and exploited technical intelligence on the
German missile program and directed the Germans
to: 1) restore the missiles, missile research and test
equipment, and associated ground support equipment
which had been used in Germany; 2) improve the
performance characteristics of the basic German V-2
missile (called A-4 by the Soviets) ; and 3) prepare
for the Soviets various advance designs and concept
which had never been translated into reality. This
development work was centered at Moscow Missile
and Space Development Center Kaliningrad 88, which
became the principal missile airframe development
center in the U.S.S.R.; Moscow Missile and Space Pro-
pulsion Development Center Khimki 456, which was
the primary rocket engine development facility; Lavo-
chkin's Special Design Bureau [Lavochkina Opytnoye
Konstruktorskoye Byuro (OKB) ] at Moscow Guided
Missile Research and Development Plant, Khimki 301
(Zavod 301), where development work on aerody-
namic missiles took place; and at the Ivankovskiy
Guided Missile Plant (Perviy Eksperimental'niy
Zavod) at Ivankovo, where air-to-surface missiles
(ASM) were developed.
In the missile field, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated
the same development philosophy which has char-
acterized its other programs-the use of proven de-
signs, evolution-proven production techniques, off-the-
shelf hardware where possible, and the application
of one design in many roles. The original German
V-2, modified by the Germans and Soviets, was the
basis of the first two Soviet surface-to-surface missiles;
the third and fourth were essentially improvements of
the first two. The diameter of these missiles was
5.4 feet, the diameter of the V-2. In air-to-surface
missiles, the first KENNEL (AS-1) model resembled
a scaled-down version of the FAGOT (MiG-15) fighter
airplane. Another, the KANGAROO (AS-3) probably
used the wing of the FARMER (MiG-19) aircraft.
Furthermore, the designs of the SALISH and SAMLET
(SSC-2a and b) are themselves offshoots of the AS-1
design. The first Soviet ICBM used many compo-
nents previously used in the earlier surface-to-surface
missiles. Not until 1959, with the development of the
SKEAN (SS-5), did the U.S.S.R. produce a missile
which was almost entirely of Soviet design and do-
mestically designed components.
As the top governing body of the U.S.S.R., the
Politburo is responsible for reviewing and approving
or disapproving the decision to design, develop, and
produce a new weapon. The Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R., is in charge of overseeing the implementa-
tion of these decisions. As early as 1947 the Council
of Ministers evidently created a strong group within
its body to oversee and control the missile program.
This authority is probably still functioning, and may
be headed by Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, whose
background as a foremost leader in the Soviet defense
setup combined with his current positions as a Sec-
retary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a
candidate member of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the CPSU makes him a logical choice
for this post.
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Functioning under this group within the Council of
Ministers are the All-Union Ministries which are di-
rectly concerned with the administration of the missile
program. The Ministry of Defense sets forth re-
quirements (reviewed by the Politburo) and performs
acceptance tests on new products. The Ministry of
Defense Industry-MOP, headed by S. A. Zverev,
has primary responsibility for the management of bal-
listic missile production. This Ministry was reconsti-
tuted in 1965 from the State Committee for Defense
Technology, which was formerly MOP (1957), which
in turn was composed of the Ministry of General
Machine Building and the Ministry of Armaments
(1955). Several known missile production facilities
are subordinate to MOP. For example, in 1953, Mos-
cow Missile and Space Propulsion Development Cen-
ter Khimki 456 (MMSPDC) was transferred from
the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) to MOP.
The MOP subordination of the leading missile engine
facility in the U.S.S.R. is one of the best indications
that missile production was directly controlled by this
Ministry. MAP has responsibility for aerodynamic
missile production. Other ministries which also par-
ticipate in missile production to a lesser, but equally
essential extent, are 1) the Ministry of Radio Industry,
2) the Ministry of Electronics Industry, 3) the Min-
istry of Shipbuilding Industry, and 4) the Ministry of
Instrument Building, Automation Equipment, and Con-
trol Systems.
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) directs
the financial aspects of the missile program and the
procurement of resources and material. At the factory
level, it is probable that the critical nature of the mis-
sile industry exempts it, in most cases, from the usual
controls. The requisition and distribution of supplies,
then, is believed to be directed by MOP and MAP
with Gosplan. Most significant, however, in the 1965
reorganization which reconstituted the Ministry of
Defense Industry (MOP) was the reappearance of
the Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) *
While it is believed that MOP has responsibility for
ballistic missiles, and that MAP exercises a similar
role for aerodynamic vehicles, it has been thought that
because of the rather rigid and delineated control
exercised by these two ministries, there existed a higher
authority with responsibility for the overall program
as well as supervision of production of space hardware.
These three programs have been expanding through
the years, and the recent emphasis in the U.S.S.R. on
management improvement could well signal that
MOM has been recreated to exercise this function.
It is also interesting to note in considering the role of
MOM that the production facilities for weapons such
as missiles and aircraft are referred to in the open
press as machine building plants.
2. Missiles and engines developed and produced
The Soviets have produced a variety of surface-to-
surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and air-to-air
missiles. FIGURE 93 gives the estimated production of
these missiles.
a. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SS-1 -
12) - The Soviets have developed or produced 12
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges from
150 nautical miles to 6,500 nautical miles for the Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces (SRF). In general, the design
has remained relatively simple and the development
of the more advanced missiles has been based pri-
marily on the earlier models, all with many similarities.
(1) Short range missiles - The first surface-
to-surface ballistic missiles to be test-launched in the
U.S.S.R. were reconditioned captured German V-2's,
which were fired in 1947 to a range of approximately
150 nautical miles. The Soviets have worked with
several nominal 150-nautical mile ballistic missiles of
different designs. The original Soviet version of the
German V-2, called the SCUNNER (SS-1), was the first
to be produced, and probably provided some of the
early operational capability. This missile was replaced
by the ScuD A (SS-1b), a track-mounted missile of
native Soviet design, originally using a lox-alcohol pro-
pellant, but now using storable propellants. A later
improvement with storable propellants was the SCUD
B (SS-1c). Series production of the SCUD A began
at the Dnepropetrovsk Missile Production and Devel-
opment Center. The SCUD B was also produced at
Dnepropetrovsk, but later believed to have been trans-
ferred to the Zlatoust Armaments Plant 66, where it
was still in production in 1966.
The first indication of native development of a
350-nautical mile missile, SIBLING (SS-2), was a
project which apparently began in 1946 in Germany
under the direction of a Soviet officer, then Colonel
S. P. Korolev. German returnees indicated that this
"Korolev" missile was essentially a lengthened V-2.
In 1947, an increased thrust (40 ton) version of
the V-2 power plant was observed in fabrication, and
it is known that two sets of production equipment for
the Korolev missile were assembled at the Kaliningrad
88 facility in Moscow in the fall of 1947. It is be-
lieved that this facility produced the SS-2 missiles that
were tested at Kapustin Yar.
The SS-12, the newest Soviet missile in series pro-
duction, is probably a single-stage ballistic missile,
probably uses a storable liquid propellant, and has a
range believed to be between 300 and 600 nautical
miles. Testing of the vehicle began in 1964, and de-
ployment is believed to be underway or imminent.
Series production is believed to have begun in late
1965 at the Dnepropetrovsk facility; further, it is be-
lieved that the deployed missiles will replace the ob-
solescent SS-2 and SS-3's.
(2) Medium range/intermediate range mis-
siles - The Soviets have developed and produced
three missiles in this category: SHYSTER (SS-3), a 700-
nautical mile missile; SANDAL (SS-4), a 1,100-nautical
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mile missile; and SKEAN (SS-5), a 2,000-nautical mile
missile. Prototype production of the SHYSTER began in
1953 at Kaliningrad 88 (MMSDC), which at that time
was the only missile production installation in the
U.S.S.R. that had a vertical test facility of sufficient
height to make an electronic checkout of a MRBM.
Prototype production of the SHYSTER probably was
continued at MMSDC until the mid-1950's, when a
series production line was established at the Dnepro-
petrovsk center (DMDPC). The second missile in
this category, the SANDAL, was first flight-tested in the
summer of 1957. After the initial batch, there were
no further tests until the spring of 1958-which sug-
gests that the early missiles were hand-tooled, and that
the interruption in the test program represented a
shift in production facilities, also to DMDPC.
In June 1960, the first test-launching of the SKEAN
occurred. Production of this system was undertaken
at DMDPC.
(3) Intercontinental range missiles - The So-
viets have developed and produced six ICBM's: The
SS-6, SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-10, and SS-11. The SS-6
served as both an ICBM and a booster for most of
the space vehicles. It is still the principal space
booster, and the operational models were retrofitted
for space use. Limited production of the SS-6 is still
going on for use as a space booster.
In early 1961 the test program of a new ICBM
designated SADDLER (SS-7) was inaugurated. Telem-
etry intercepts have revealed many similarities in the
instrumentation Of SADDLER and SKEAN, which, along
with other information, suggests that the same design
team and criteria employed for SKEAN were most
probably involved in the development Of SADDLER.
Series production and subsequent variations of the
system took place at Dnepropetrovsk.
Testing of the third ICBM vehicle, SASIN (SS-8),
began in the spring of 1961.
The SS-9 is a third generation, two-stage, tandem
ICBM. It is the largest known Soviet operational
missile, with an overall length of 105 feet and capable
of ranges exceeding 7,000 nautical miles. The system
was estimated to be designed at Dnepropetrovsk,
where the initial batch of R&D missiles was also pro-
duced. Series production is believed to have started
in mid-1965 at Dnepropetrovsk, with deployment at
dispersed hard sites.
The SS-10 has never been put into series production,
and the program has been discontinued. The exact
role of SS-10, which underwent a limited testing pro-
gram in 1964, has not been determined. This vehicle
has been assessed to be a two-stage tandem missile
with a separating reentry vehicle. It is estimated that
the Soviets used the booster as a test vehicle for either
a third generation ICBM, a test bed for subsystems, or
possibly an interim step to a new space booster. All
production, which never exceeded R&D quantities,
was believed to have taken place at Moscow/Kalinin-
grad 88.
The SS-11, the newest operational storable liquid
ICBM, is a relatively small two-stage vehicle with a
75-foot length. Series production probably began in
late 1965. The missile is now being deployed at
dispersed single silo hard sites.
b. NAVAL MISSILES - The Soviet Navy began a
developmental program for missiles in the mid-1950's.
The earliest developments covered both ballistic and
aerodynamic systems. These missiles were evolved
from the aerodynamic V-1 or were adaptations of bal-
listic systems designed for the ground forces. In ad-
dition, the surface-to-air missiles (SAM'S) of the PVO
(air defense forces) have also been adapted to naval
use. To date, the Soviet Navy has deployed three
cruise and three* ballistic surface-to-surface missiles
and one-possibly two-SAM's.
(1) SS-N-1 - The first missile to be opera-
tional was the SS-N-1, a short-range, turbojet powered,
RATO-boosted, aerodynamic missile with a range of
about 100 nautical miles.** It is carried by two
classes of destroyers (Kildin and Krupnyy), and was
believed to be operational about 1958. While the
system is still operational, production is believed to
have been phased out in 1964 after more than 500
missiles were produced. Being an aerodynamic ve-
hicle, it probably was produced at a Ministry of Avia-
tion Industry plant, although the specific installation
has not been identified.
(2) STYX (SS-N-2) - The next missile to be-
come operational was the STYX. This is a short-range
(12 to 30 nautical mile), aerodynamic missile. It has
a RATO booster and liquid-rocket sustainer engine.
The missile is fired from the Komar and Osa classes
of patrol boats, with two missiles carried on the former
and four on the latter. This system became opera-
tional about 1959.
Production of the STYX, believed to be centered at
one plant, Arsenyev Aircraft Plant 116 (Zavod 116),
is one of the most active programs of the Soviet
missile effort. Series production probably got under-
way in 1958-59; cumulative estimated production
through 1966 amounts to some 2,000-2,500 missiles.
This seemingly large total production rate is required
to meet the needs of the Soviet Navy, with between
150 to 200 patrol boats equipped with the STYX, plus
the fairly sizable numbers of the Komar and Osa craft
transferred to eastern European Communist country
navies as well as such other countries as Cuba, Indo-
nesia, and the U.A.R.
The first of the naval ballistic missiles, a version of the
150-nm.-range Scun, probably was retired in about
1960-61; hence, it will not be discussed further.
It is believed that the designed maximum range of the
SS-N-1 is 150 km. (81 nm.). Few firings have ex-
ceeded 45 nm., and probably none have gone to 150 nm.
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(3) SS-N-3 and variants - The most recent of
the surface-to-surface cruise missiles introduced into
the Soviet Navy is also probably one of the most
versatile-the SS-N-3. This missile is a RATO-
boosted, turbojet-propelled weapon with a range of up
to 450 nautical miles, and is believed to have become
operational in 1961. The missile is launched from
three classes of submarines-the conventional-powered
W and J, and the nuclear-powered E. The W class
is a conversion carrying from one to four missiles.
The J class is a new class of submarine, carrying four
missiles. The E class has two variations-the E-I
carrying six missiles and E-II carrying eight missiles.
In addition to these submarines there are the Kynda
class and Kresta class guided missile cruisers
(DLGM). The Kynda carries two quadruple launch-
ers of SS-N-3's. In addition, it is equipped with one
SA-N-1 (SAM) battery. The Kresta carries two twin
SSM launchers (probably for SS-N-3, and two SA-N-1
launchers). Aside from its naval use, the SS-N-3 has
also been identified as the SHADDOCK (SSC-1), used
by ground forces coastal defense units.
The SS-N-3 was probably designed by Vladimir
Nikolayevich Chelomey, possibly a first assistant to
S. A. Lavochkin, who headed the aerodynamic cruise
missile development until his death in 1960. Che-
lomey succeeded Lavochkin as Chief Designer; his de-
sign bureau is located in the Reutovo suburb of Mos-
cow, probably at Plant 67 (Zavod 67). Initial produc-
tion of the missile took place at Plant 67, but series
production is believed to have been undertaken at
three other plants. Total production of the SS-N-3/
SS-C-1 is estimated to be about 2,000 missiles.
(4) SS-N-4-There are two ballistic missiles
now operational in the Soviet Navy. One of these,
the SS-N-4 was operational in late 1960. It is carried
in tubes. on three classes of submarines: the Z-V car-
ried two and the G carries three. Both of these are
conventionally powered. The H-I class, a nuclear-
powered submarine, carries three SS-N-4; however,
this class is being converted to the H-II in order tQ
carry the longer-range SS-N-5. The SS-N-4 is a stor-
able, liquid-propellant missile with a maximum range
of 350 nautical miles. Production of the SS-N-4 is
estimated to have taken place at Leningrad Arms and
Tank Plant Bolshevik 232 (Leningrad-Voenniy Zavod
imeni Bol'shevika 232). Total production is estimated
at about 500 missiles, with production now phased out.
(5) SS-N-5-The most recently developed
naval missile is the SS-N-5, primarily intended for the
H-II class of nuclear-powered submarines. It is a
storable, liquid-propellant system, with a range of
about 650 nautical miles. Each submarine is equipped
with three missiles. The IOC (initial operational capa-
bility) for the missile system was 1963. Although the
location of production is unknown, it might be a fol-
low-on missile to the SS-N-4, and as such, produced
at Plant 232. Production so far has been quite limited,
with less than 200 produced.
(6) SARK (SS-NX-1) and SERB (SS-NX-2) -
Two other possible naval missiles are of interest. In
November 1962, the SARK was paraded in Moscow.
The size of the missile precluded its being placed in
any known naval missile tube. The vehicle has since
become regarded as a dummy or early prototype. In
November 1964 the SERB was displayed; its sizing was
such that it was estimated to be a model of a second
generation missile. It has not yet been firmly estab-
lished whether this is the SS-N-5, which would make
the SERB a liquid missile, or whether it is a new missile
and probably a solid propellant. Nothing is known
of production sites and quantities for either of these
missiles.
(7) SA-N-1 - The Soviet Navy has one active
adaptation and possibly a second of the SAM's. The
Kynda class DLGM is equipped with one battery of
SA-N-1's, which appears to be a version of the GOA
(SA-3). In addition to the Kynda class, there is the
Kashin class DLG (frigate), which has two dual
SA-N-1 launchers. The GUIDELINE (SA-2) has a naval
version called SA-N-2, seen on the cruiser Derzhinskiy.
(8) New class vessels - A new class of frigates
called Kresta is now under construction. Its missile
armament is not yet determined, but it has been sug-
gested that it could be equipped with both the SA-N-1
and a surface-to-surface cruise missile, probably the
SS-N-3. There have also been reports of a new missile
submarine class under construction; this would prob-
ably be equipped with a new missile system.
C. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE AERODYNAMIC MISSILES -
Soviet cruise missiles allocated to the military forces
are somewhat unique in that they serve a dual purpose.
The apparent same missile system, or one very closely
related to the family, is used in the ground forces and
naval forces/air forces. There are two basic systems
deployed: The SSC-1, a 150- to 300-nautical mile-
range system, and the SSC-2 (a and b), a 35- to 150-
nautical mile-range system.
(1) SHADDOCK (SSC-1) - The SSC-1 was first
seen in the Moscow Parade of November 1961, when it
was given the NATO codename SHADDOCK. Studies of
the system led to belief that the SSC-1, which achieved
IOC in 1964, was a direct outgrowth of the Soviet
developments of the SS-N-3, a naval cruise missile. A
second role has been attributed to the SSC-1; namely,
with the coastal defense forces as separate from the
ground forces equipment seen in the Moscow parades.
The coastal defense version of SSC-1 may also be
slightly modified. For production information see the
SS-N-3 write-up.
(2) SAMLET (SSC-2b) - The Soviet SAMLET-
formerly designated as the SSCD-1 KENNEL S, a sub-
sonic, surface-to-surface cruise missile-was first visu-
ally observed in a Cuban military parade on 2 January
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1963. This missile, of Soviet origin, is a modified ver-
sion of the KENNEL (AS-1), and is deployed as a coastal
defense system. The SAMLET differs from the ASM
KENNEL in that there are modifications of the vertical
tail design and the guidance antenna.
The German scientists deported to the U.S.S.R. after
World War II reported Soviet activity in developing a
coastal defense system. A launching of such a missile
was reported to have taken place as early as 1953.
There is some deployment Of SAMLET in the coastal
defense of the U.S.S.R. In addition, the Soviets have
provided the system to Cuba, Communist China, North
Korea, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Poland.
(3) SALISH (SSC-2a) -Another version of the
KENNEL air-to-surface missile was seen in the Cuban
parade in January 1965. This is the SALISH, which
differs from the KENNEL and the SAMLET in that it
has a larger antenna system on the vertical stabilizer.
The SALISH antenna has a different configuration than
SAMLET, while the missile has a longer, more pointed
nose.
The existence Of SALISH has been traced back to
1961. Shipping crates now identified as KENNEL-type
appeared on flat cars along with other army vehicles.
Information is very limited on the deployment of the
system; however, the SALISH is known to be in Cuba
and East Germany, as well as the U.S.S.R.
The production site for the SSC-2a and b has not
been identified, but has been estimated that in addition
to the KENNEL (AS-1), the Ivankovskiy Guided Mis-
sile Plant also produced these surface-to-surface
variants.
d. ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILES (ATGM) - The
U.S.S.R. has produced three antitank guided missile
systems (ATGM's) which have been deployed. They
are the SNAPPER (AT-1), SWATTER (AT-2), and the
SAGGER (AT-3). All three systems are two-stage,
solid propellant missiles, with a shaped charge high
explosive warhead, though there are some variations
among them.
(1) SNAPPER - The SNAPPER was first seen in
the May Day 1962 Moscow Parade; it is still be-
lieved to be deployed, although considered obsolete.
In addition, it has been sold to the eastern European
Communist countries, and to the U.A.R., Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, Cuba, and Indonesia. This wire-guided,
manually operated system has an effective range of
from 600 to 2,000 meters. It has been mounted on
two vehicles-a modified BRDM, a lightly armored,
highly mobile, wheeled combat vehicle with three
missiles; and the UAZ-69, an unarmored, light, wheeled
vehicle mounting three missiles. It is estimated to
have been operational in 1960. Series production
would have begun about 1958 or 1959, although
R&D and prototype production would have begun
several years sooner. The missile weighs about 53
pounds, is 45.3 inches long, and 5.35 inches in diam-
eter.
(2) SWATTER - The SWATTER first appeared in
the 7 November 1962 Moscow Parade. It was prob-
ably operational in 1961 and has been gradually re-
placing the SNAPPER. It is mounted on the standard
BRDM, which mounts four missiles. The guidance
appears to be by manual command through a radio
frequency link; it is overall more effective than
SNAPPER, with its increased maximum range (up to
2,500 meters), velocity, lethality, and azimuth cov-
erage. The missile weighs 42 pounds, and is 49
inches long and 5.2 inches in diameter.
(3) SAGGER - The SAGGER, publicly displayed
in the May 1965 Moscow Parade, has been sighted
deployed in East Germany. SAGGER appears to be
a supplement to SWATTER, to increase Soviet ATGM
firepower and to improve coverage at minimum dis-
tances. Its effective range is from 200 to 2,500
meters. Six missiles are mounted on the BRDM,
manually controlled through a wire link. SAGGER
was estimated to be operational at the time it was
first paraded in 1965. It is a little over 31 inches
long and has a diameter of 4.5 inches and weighs 24
pounds.
About the time that SNAPPER was first seen, 1962 or
thereabouts, its production is estimated to have be-
gun phase-out. The SWATTER is currently in series
production. SAGGER production is estimated to have
begun in 1964 but has not yet reached its peak.
As yet, no production facilities for ATGM's have
been identified. Suspect plants would be those pro-
ducing general armaments, electronics, and/or solid
propellants. Of these three types of facilities, the
most likely to be engaged in production of ATGM's-
based on the experience of the French, Germans, and
Swiss-would be a general armaments or aero-
space-type facility. It is estimated that the solid
propellant motors in all three ATGM systems, based
on previous knowledge of Soviet development of
similar small missiles-AAM's, would be a double-
base extruded propellant. A prime suspect area for
an integrated ATGM production site is Gor'kiy, where
are located the Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant/Molotov,
which is thought to produce the BRDM; Gor'kiy
Arms Plant Novoye Sormovo 92 (Zavod 92) ; Gor'kiy
Communications Equipment Plant Lenin 197-Frunze
326, which is part of the radio-electronics industry;
and the Gor'kiy Fuse Plant 956 (Zavod 956). In
addition, there is a firing range (polygon) near
Gor'kiy which has been identified with ATGM's for
the Chief Rocket and Artillery Directorate (Glavnoye
Raket'noyei Artilleriyskoye Upravaleniye - GRAU).
Another possible producer of ATGM's is the Kovrov
Machine Tool and Arms Plant Kirkish 2.
e. AIR-To-SURFACE MISSILES (ASM's) - The Sovi-
ets displayed an arsenal of four air-to-surface missiles
for the first time during military and naval parades
in July 1961. These were designated as the KENNEL
(AS-1), KIPPER (AS-2), KANGAROO (AS-3), and
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KITCHEN (AS-4). New ASM's and/or variants of the
existing missiles may be under development. Little
information is available on ASM production, hence,
the estimates given below are only approximate.
(1) KENNEL - The KENNEL, with an IOC date
of 1956, is a subsonic air-to-surface missile with
a range of 55 nautical miles, and was first displayed
during the Leningrad Navy Day Parade in July 1961.
Soviet Naval Air Force BADGERS (Tu-16) were ob-
served each carrying 2 KENNELS under their wings.
The missile is similar in appearance to the MiG-15
fighter, and is believed to be a product of the Mikoyan-
Gurevich Design Bureau.
The guidance system of the KENNEL was developed
by German scientists at the Moscow Guided Missile
Research Center KB-1 (Konstruktovskoye Byuro 1).
Production of the airframe and final assembly of the
AS-1 took place at the Ivankovskiy Guided Missile
Plant. German technicians working at this facility
reported that in 1953, Soviet workers were engaged
in assembly of missiles designated "KS." Evidence
that the AS-1 is referred to as the "KS" was obtained
from Indonesian reports referring to the Tu-16 "KS"
missiles. The Soviets gave the BADGER/KENNEL weap-
on system to the Indonesians, and it was displayed
by them in October 1962. The U.A.R. was also
given the KENNEL by the U.S.S.R.; it was shown by
them in July 1966.
Although the Germans reported "KS" missile pro-
duction in 1953, it is believed that full series pro-
duction of the KENNEL did not occur until 1955. An
improved variant of the AS-1 may have been developed
in the early 1960's to replace the KENNEL missiles
assigned to the Naval Air forces, and possibly for
use by Long-Range Aviation as well. Total produc-
tion of the AS-1 and the possible follow-on is esti-
mated to be 800 to 1,000.
(2) KIPPER - The KIPPER was observed at the
Tushino Air Show in July 1961, partially retracted
into the lower portion of the fuselage of the BADGER.
This aerodynamic missile with a range of 100 nautical
miles is believed to have reached operational status
in late 1960. Analysis of this missile shows that it
is an original airframe design and does not equate
to any known Soviet aircraft. The KIPPER probably
was developed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich design
team. The production facility for the KIPPER may
be Tbilisi Airframe Plant 31 (Zavod 31) ; Ufa Plant
26 (Zavod 26) is believed to be producing the RD-9b
as the propulsion unit for the KIPPER. A production
run of 600-800 missiles has been estimated for this
air-to-surface missile.
(3) KANGAROO - The KANGAROO was also seen
for the first time at the Tushino Air Show, retracted
into the fuselage of a BEAR (Tu-95). This aerody-
namic missile, which became operational in late 1960,
has a range of 350 nautical miles and probably uses
some components of the FARMER (MiG-19). Its
propulsion system is believed to be the Type 31 engine,
which was in production at Moscow Aircraft Engine
Plant 45 (Zavod 45). Evidence is lacking on the pro-
duction facility for the KANGAROO, but Tbilisi Plant
31 is viewed as the probable producer. It is es-
timated that approximately 300 AS-3 missiles have
been produced.
(4) KITCHEN - Although the fourth air-to-sur-
face missile, the KITCHEN, was first seen by Tushino
Air Show observers in 1961, it still had not reached
operational status as of mid-1967. The KITCHEN was
observed carried semisubmerged in the fuselage of
the BLINDER B aircraft; it has been assessed to be a
liquid rocket-propelled boost-glide vehicle, with a
maximum range of 280 miles. No evidence is available
concerning the design authority or a production site
for this missile, nor have production estimates been
developed.
(5) Recent developments - A fifth air-to-sur-
face missile is viewed as a possibility. The sighting of
an aerodynamic object carried under the left wing
of a BADGER occurred in July 1966. Unfortunately,
the sighting did not provide enough detail concerning
the propulsion or guidance system to determine if
the vehicle was actually an ASM, a decoy or target
drone, etc. In the event that this vehicle is an air-to-
surface missile, it is speculated that it may be a
follow-on missile for the obsolescent KENNEL.
f. AIR DEFENSE MISSILES - The U.S.S.R. has,
since the early days of its missile program, shown a
deep concern for developing, producing, and deploy-
ing air defense missiles. The GUIDELINE is the most
widely deployed air defense missile system in the
world, indicating a long production run at a fairly
high rate. Since the GUIDELINE appeared, the Soviets
have publicly displayed newer, larger air defense
missiles, demonstrating firstly a continuing interest
in SAM's, and secondly, a determined effort to develop
a defense against missiles as well as aircraft.
(1) GUILD (SA-1) - The development of the
first Soviet surface-to-air missile, GUILD, began in
1947 under the direction of General S. A. Lavochkin
at his special design bureau in Khimki. The system
was designated V-301, and the defense concept from
which its characteristics were generated was the desire
for protection of large cities-especially Moscow-
from massive bomber attacks. The design and de-
velopment effort was based on German technology
which the Soviets had acquired after World War II.
Although the Germans had had several SAM'S in the
developmental stage at the conclusion of the war,
the Soviets centered their efforts on the WASSERFALL
and SCHMETTERLING vehicles. While experimental
work was taking place on the airframe, research was
undertaken on the development of a propulsion sys-
tem at Moscow Missile and Space Development Center
Kaliningrad 88 and at Moscow Missile and Space
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Propulsion Development Center Khimki 456. As they
had done for the airframe, the Soviets capitalized on
German achievements in propulsion. The V-301 used
the engine from the German WASSERFALL, but the
Soviets adapted it to burn kerosene as a fuel and red
fuming nitric acid (also known as RFNA or AZOT)
for the oxidizer.
The B-200 guidance system intended for use with
the V-301 materialized in about 1949. It was devel-
oped at Moscow Guided Missile Research Center
KB-1 (also known as Leningradskoye Shosse Institut-
LSI ). Several teams of the top German scientists in
the U.S.S.R. were brought to the institute to assist
in the perfection of the guidance and control system
which would be incorporated into the V-301 missile
system. Problems with the guidance system were
overcome by 1951, and initial R&D production of the
V-301 began. The flight test program at the Kapustin
Yar Missile Test Range began in July 1951 and con-
tinued for approximately one year, during which time
about 100 vehicles were tested.
Series production of the V-301 may have begun in
1952 at Moscow Guided Missile Plant Tushino 82
(Zavod 82), with some production also taking place at
Moscow Guided Missile Research and Development
Plant Khimki 301. Information suggests other plants
were probably associated with component develop-
ment and production of the V-301.
Initial deployment of the V-301 system occurred
at the end of 1954; it has been estimated that the
V-301 Moscow defense system became operational
by the end of 1955. A total of some 18,000 mis-
siles were produced before production was phased
out, probably in 1958.
(2) 32-B surface-to-air missile - The Germans
in 1951 began work at Moscow Guided Missile Re-
search Center KB-1 on a guidance system for a new
missile called 32-B. Work on the design of the air-
frame was probably conducted at Moscow Guided
Missile Research and Development Plant Khimki 301.
It has been estimated that the flight test program for
the 32-B began as early as 1952. Although this mis-
sile probably never reached series production, its
value lay in the fact that it contributed greatly to
the successful development of the V-750, GUIDELINE.
(3) GUIDELINE (SA-2) - Information on the
development of the GUIDELINE is rather sparse: some
of the facilities for the development of the GUILD and
32-B SAM's may also have contributed to the GUIDE-
LINE program. A new contributor to this SAM pro-
gram might have been Scientific Research Institute 24
and Dyat'lov's Institute, which conducted R&D work
on the German RHEINTOCHTER, an unguided solid-
fueled SAM. It is possible that the GUIDELINE booster
might have been tested at NII 24's Sofrino Engine Test
Facility, northeast of Moscow. Preliminary R&D
studies on the GUIDELINE probably began as early as
1951. Flight tests occurred during 1954-57, with series
production beginning in late 1957 or early 1958. The
facilities which may have participated in the produc-
tion program include Moscow Guided Missile Plant
Tushino 82, Saratov Airframe Plant 292, and the Dolgo-
prudnaya Airframe Plant 464 (Zavod 464).
The GUIDELINE was first displayed on 7 November
1957; deployment began late in 1958. Since then,
the system has been extensively deployed not only
throughout the U.S.S.R. and in eastern Europe and
Asia, but also in Cuba, the U.A.R., India, Afghanistan,
and Indonesia. There are four versions of the GUIDE-
LINE missile, each succeeding model having improved
capabilities. These have been in production from
about 1957 to date (mid-1967). The first two ver-
sions are used with an S-Band radar, FAN SONG A
or B, which was produced from about 1957 to 1960.
The last two variations are used with a C-Band radar,
FAN SONG C or E, which was produced from about
1960 to 1966. The S-Band models (missiles and
radars) have been phased out and replaced by the
C-Band models in the U.S.S.R., although the S-Band
models are in use elsewhere.
(4) GOA (SA-3) - The GOA was designed
to fill the low-level intercept gap in the Soviet air
defense. Development work probably began about
1957, with the flight test program possibly beginning
late in 1959 or early 1960. What is believed to be
a GOA test area in the final stages of construction
was seen at Kapustin Yar late in 1959. Series produc-
tion of the GOA probably began by 1960; the weapon
was displayed publicly in November 1964. Although
there is no information on development and produc-
tion facilities, it seems reasonable to assume that the
facilities active in the GUILD and GUIDELINE programs
continued in the same role for the GOA. Production
figures for GOA (FIGURE 93) includes the SA-N-1
naval missile, which is a GOA.
(5) GRIFFON - A fourth in the family of sur-
face-to-air missiles was displayed in November 1963.
The role of this weapon, designated GRIFFON, has not
been determined; however, its physical characteris-
tics imply it could serve in an antiaircraft or anti-
cruise missile role, or even with limited capability
in an antiballistic missile role. The GRIFFON obvi-
ously drew heavily from the design of the GUIDELINE;
it might be assumed, since there is no evidence to
the contrary, that the same research and develop-
ment facilities were associated with both weapons.
The GRIFFON was to be deployed at elaborate air de-
fense missile sites in the Leningrad area. Since 1963,
these sites have been modified and the GRIFFON mis-
sile has probably been abandoned in favor of a new
long-range SAM system. Although no production
facility has been positively identified with the GRIFFON,
NII Leningrad probably was directly involved in the
design of the casing for the solid motor booster.
(6) TALLINN System - This new long-range
SAM system has been under development since about
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1964. Extensive deployment is expected to continue
through about 1970. Series production of the TALLINN
missile probably began in 1965, with some units of
the system estimated to have become operational in
1967.
(7) GALOSH (ABM-X-2) - Little is known
about the GALOSH system except for some deductions
obtained from parade photography. This missile in
a canister-which was first seen in November 1964-
has been associated with deployment of an ABM
system around Moscow. Production was estimated to
have begun in 1966, although the facilities are un-
known. If the four GALOSH engines are used by
GRIFFON, then an association may exist relating NII
13 in Leningrad to at least the development phase
of both of these systems. GALOSH is believed capable
of exo-atmospheric intercept. A Soviet newsreel has
shown GALOSH being fired, but nothing related to
a test program is known.
(8) GANEF (SA-4) - The GANEF is a tac-
tical SAM used in conjunction with ground forces
operations at the Soviet front. The missile is char-
acterized by four solid boosters and a ramjet sus-
tainer. Maximum intercept altitude is estimated to
be about 70,000 feet. It has an estimated effective
range of 25 to 30 nautical miles.
g. AIR-To-AIR MISSILES - Soviet fighter aircraft
were observed carrying five different types of air-to-
air missiles at the Tushino Air Show in July 1961.
These missiles have been nicknamed ALKALI, ATOLL,
ANAB, AwL, and ASH.
(1) ALKALI - Soviet activity in developing air-
to-air missiles as armament for advanced aircraft
dates back to the early 1950's. At that time, German
scientists and technicians assigned to the Moscow
Guided Missile Research Center KB-1 reported that
the Soviets were working on a radar beam-rider air-
to-air missile designated ShM-a weapon later iden-
tified as ALKALI. The Germans were required to assist
in some design components of the various elements
of the receiver, accelerometer stabilizing and control
units, gyros, pneumatic servovalves, torque motors, and
coupling rods. By the end of 1953, the Germans were
informed that successful flight tests had been achieved;
it is believed that the missile became operational in
1957. The Germans were unable to identify any So-
viet designer associated with the ALKALI, nor could
they pinpoint any production facilities for this missile.
(2) ATOLL - The ATOLL is an infrared homing
missile almost identical in shape to the U.S. infrared
SIDEWINDER. It became operational in 1959. While
it is believed that the Soviets had access to U.S. plans
of the SIDEWINDER 1 or 1A, or an actually spent mis-
sile, any information gained from these would seem
to have proven beneficial to revised or later models,
e.g., ATOLL A, etc. When the Soviets seized most of
the German infrared personnel and facilities after
World War II, they thereby acquired infrared homing
systems suitable for air-to-air missiles. In 1958, the
Soviets announced the development of an infrared
homing missile. Recent information indicates that
ATOLL production takes place at Bryansk Ammunition
and Agricultural Machinery Plant Seltso 121. The
design team of this missile is unknown. It is known
that infrared work was conducted in several plants
in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.
(3) ANAB, AWL, and ASH - Early development
of the ANAB, a semiactive radar homing missile, was
noted by the Germans in the Moscow Guided Missile
Research Center KB-1. Further intelligence on this
or the ANAB A (an infrared homing missile), the long-
range air-to-air missiles the AwL (a probable semi-
active radar homing missile), and the ASH, a semi-
active radar homing missile, is not available.
h. SPACE BOOSTER AND VEHICLE PRODUCTION -
Over the nine year period since the launching of
SPUTNIK I, a simply instrumented aluminum sphere,
the Soviets have attempted more than 230 launchings,
ranging from small astrogeophysical and interplanetary
probes up to large multimanned space vehicles. To
date more than 14 different types of space vehicles
of varying weight, size, configuration, and complexity
have been produced and expended. This includes
LUNA moon probes-several of which circled and
photographed the moon's surface, and two of which
soft-landed on the moon; the sophisticated MOLNIYA
communications satellites, which can transmit color
television signals; the VosKhOD multimanned space
capsules; and the various interplanetary probes to
Mars and Venus. Space vehicles of lesser conse-
quence include the ZOND interplanetary probes, the
two POLYOT maneuverable satellites, and the ELEK-
TRON radiation-measuring satellites. More than 80
of these vehicles, including 11 VOSTOK's, two VOSKHOD's,
and almost 70 Cosmos military-reconnaissance satel-
lites, have been identified as heavy-weight vehicles-
ranging from 10,000 pounds to over 14,000 pounds.
In mid-July 1965, the Soviets successfully launched
PROTON I, a new space vehicle weighing about 27,000
pounds and employing a new and more powerful
space booster. In addition to the more than 230
space vehicles launched, an additional 90 to 100 were
probably expended in static ground tests, wind tunnel
tests, launch failures, etc. Production of these space
vehicles is being carried out in Moscow.
3. Principal production and test facilities
a. MOSCOW MISSILE AND SPACE DEVELOPMENT
CENTER KALININGRAD 88 (MMSDC) - MMSDC
[Moskva/Podlipki Nauchno-Issledovateliskiy Institut
(NII) i Zavod 881 is the principal Soviet research and
development center for ballistic missiles, space boost-
ers, and space capsules. (Identifying details on pro-
duction facilities are set forth in FIGURE 94. Locations
of missile airframe and rocket engine plants are plotted
J
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
J
FIGURE 94. MISSILE AIRFRAME ASSEMBLY PLANTS
O 'N.
0
'E.
Arsenyev Airframe Plant 116... .
44
08
133
15
STYX (SS-N-2) ...............
Dnepropetrovsk Missile Develop-
48
26
34
59
ScuD A (SS-lb), SCUD B (SS-
ment and Production Center
1C), SHYSTER (SS-3), SANDAL
(DMDPC).
(SS-4), SKEAN (SS-5), SAD-
DLER (SS-7), SS-9, SS-12,
and possibly SS-11.
Ivankovskiy Guided Missile
56
45
37
07
KENNEL (AS-1), possibly SALISH
Plant.
(SSC-2a), possibly SAMLET
(SSC-2b).
Komsomolsk Airframe Plant.. .
Ordzhonikidze 126
50
35
137
05
SS-N-3/SHADDOCK (SSC-1)...
Leningrad Arms and Tank Plant.
Bolshevik 232
59
51
30
28
Possibly SS-N-4, and SS-N-5.
Moscow Airframe Plant ........
Dolgoprudnaya 464
55
55
37
31
Possibly GUIDELINE (SA-2) ....
Moscow Guided Missile Plant ...
55
50
37
27
GUILD (SA-1), GUIDELINE (SA-
Tushino 82
2), GOA (SA-3/SA-N-1).
Moscow Guided Missile Plant ...
Reutovo 67
55
45
37
52
SS-N-3/SHADDOCK (SSC-1) ...
Moscow Missile and Space Devel-
55
55
37
48
SCUNNER (SS-1), SIBLING (SS-
opment Center.
Kaliningrad 88 (MMSDC).
2), SS-6, SS-8, and SS-10.
Saratov Airframe Plant 292.....
51
29
45
57
GUIDELINE (SA-2), GOA (SA-3/
SA-N-1), SS-N-3/SHADDOCK
(SSC-1).
Tbilisi Airframe Plant 31 .......
41
39
44
52
KIPPER (AS-2), probably KAN-
GAROO (AS-3).
Also engaged in aircraft production.
Main series production facility for
ballistic missiles in U.S.S.R. Acts
as "lead plant" to farm out series
production.
Probable leading design authority
for ASMs.
Product association is a tentative
assessment.
Also engaged in aircraft production.
If it produced missiles, that pro-
duction has now ceased.
Probably the major production facility
for SAMs.
Probable design center for aerody-
namic systems. May be engaged
in advanced weapons research and
design.
The principal design center for all
ballistic missiles. Also design cen-
ter for space boosters and vehicles.
Limited production of all ballistic
missiles designed there, as well as
series production on those in
Column 4.
Also engaged in aircraft production.
Also engaged in aircraft production.
It is unknown if any missile pro-
duction is still carried on at this
facility.
Acted as a subsidiary of DMDPC on
series production of SS-lc and
now sole source of supply, if still
in production.
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Liquid engine plants:
Dnepropetrovsk Missile Develop-
34
59
ScuD A (SS-lb), SCUD B (SS-
ment and Production Center
1C), SHYSTER (SS-3), SANDAL
(DMDPC).
(SS-4), SKEAN (SS-5), SAD-
DLER (SS-7), SS-9, possibly
SS-11, and SS-12.
Moscow Aircraft Engine Plant 45.. .
55
46
37
43
KANGAROO (AS-3) ............
Moscow Missile and Space Develop-
55
55
37
48
SCUNNER (SS-la), SCUD A (SS-
ment Center Kaliningrad 88
lb), SIBLING (SS-2), GUILD
(MMSDC).
(SA-1).
Moscow Aircraft Engine Experimen-
37
34
SS-N-3/SHADDOCK, (SSC-1)
tal Plant Luznetskaya 300.
and variants.
Moscow Missile and Space Propul-
37
26
SCUD A (SS-lb), SCUD B (SS-
sion Development Center Khimki
456 (MMSPDC).
lc), R&D on most newer sys-
tems.
Solid propellant production plants:
Biysk Solid Motor Production Plant.
53
31
85
04
Unknown ....................
Bryansk Ammunition and Agricul-
53
23
34
07
ATOLL (AA-2) motors .........
tural Machinery Plant Seltso 121.
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy Solid Motor
48
18
40
12
Solid propellant motors/boosters
Production Plant.
for unspecified missile sys-
Kemerovo Solid Motor Production
55
26
85
57
tems.
....do ......................
Plant.
Krasnoyarsk Solid Motor Produc-
tion Plant.
Perm Solid Motor Production Plant.
57
58
55
52
....do ......................
Sterlitamak Solid Motor Production
53
42
55
57
....do ......................
Plant.
Unidentified propulsion facilities:
Faustovo Rocket Engine Test Facil-
ity.
Krasnoarmeysk Solid Motor De-
velopment Facility.
Krasnoyarsk Rocket Engine Test
56
06
93
25
Facility.
Kurumoch Rocket Engine Test Facil-
53
32
49
51
ity.
Leningrad Solid Motor Test Eacility..
60
12
30
42
Nizhnyaya Salda Rocket Engine Test
58
09
60
56
Facility.
Omsk Rocket Engine Test Facility,
55
25
73
16
Gornaya Bitiya.
Perm Rocket Engine Test Facility. .
58
00
56
34
............................
Ufa Rocket Engine Test Facility....
54
59
56
04
............................
Voronezh Rocket Engine Test Facil-
51
34
39
09
............................
ity.
Zagorsk Rocket Engine Test Facil-
ity, Krasnozavodsk.
Only about 1,000,000 sq. ft. of
the total floorspace is estimated
to be used for rocket engine
production.
Limited production for models in
Column 4. None known since
mid-1950's.
Floorspace for missile engine pro-
duction is only a portion of
total and cannot be deter-
mined.
Limited production for early
models of Column 4 items.
Current production believed to
be all R&D.
Floorspace is for both Plants A
and B; Plant B occupies ap-
proximately half the total area.
* All production plants have test facilities colocated with them. Those facilities appearing as unidentified facilities are differ-
ent and not necessarily associated with entries in liquid engine plants or solid propellant plants.
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East Germany
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SALISH (SSC-2a)
SAMLET (SSC-2b)
SCUD (SS-1)
STYX (SS-N-2)
Antitank**
Hungary
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SCUD (SS-1)
Antitank**
Albania
GUIDELINE
Bulgaria
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE
Antitank**
Communist China
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SHYSTER/SANDAL (SS-3/4)
SAMLET (SSC-2b)
Cuba
ATOLL (AA-2)
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SALISH (SSC-2a)
SAMLET (SSC-2b)
STYX (SS-N-2)
SNAPPER (AT-1)
Czechoslovakia
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SCUD (SS-1)
SAGGER (AT-3)
Other antitank**
Rumania
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE (SA-
2)
Antitank**
Mongolia
GUIDELINE
North Korea
GUIDELINE
(SA-2)
SAMLET (SSC-2b)
Poland
Air-to-air*
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SCUD (SS-1)
STYX (SS-N-2)
Antitank**
North Vietnam Yugoslavia
GUIDELINE (SA- GUIDELINE
2) 2)
SAMLET (SSG- SNAPPER (AT-1)
2b)
Afghanistan
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SNAPPER (AT-1)
Algeria
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
STYX (SS-N-2)
Finland
ATOLL (AA-2)
India
ATOLL (AA-2)
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
Syria
GUIDELINE (SA-2) (possible)
STYX (SS-N-2)
Indonesia
ATOLL (AA-2)
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
KENNEL (AS-1)
STYX (SS-N-2)
Iraq
ATOLL (AA-2)
SNAPPER (AT-1)
United Arab Republic
ATOLL (AA-2)
KENNEL (AS-1)
GUIDELINE (SA-2)
SAMLET (SSC-2b)
STYX (SS-N-2)
SNAPPER (AT-1)
East Germany) have all probably received the ATOLL
(AA-2) ; earlier deliveries of air-to-air missiles were
probably ALKALI (AA-1).
The SNAPPER (AT-1) was the antitank missile prob-
ably delivered by the U.S.S.R., but possibly the
SWATTER (AT-2) could also have been sent.
J
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FIGURE 97. PRODUCERS OF INFRARED, TOPOGRAPHIC, AND MILITARY PRECISION OPTICAL AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT, 1965
LOCATION I PLANT NAME I PRODUCTS I REMARKS
Derbyshki .......... Derbyshki Optical Plant No.
55?51'N.; 49?12'E. 237. Also known as Kazan
Optical Plant No. 237.
Kiev ............... Lenin Arsenal Optical Machin-
50?26'N.; 30?31'E. ery Plant No. 784. Formerly
known as Kiev Arsenal No. 1.
(Opticheskiy Zavod imeni I.
Lenin No. 784).
Krasnogorsk ........ Krasnogorsk Optical Equipment
55?50'N.; 37?20'E. Plant No. 393. Also called
Lenin Optical Works. Form-
erly known as "Bolshevik"
optical Instrument Factory.
Leningrad ........... State Optical Machinery Plant,
59?55'N.; 30?15'E. No.:349, GOMZ. Also called
OGPU Plant. (Gosudarstven-
nyy Optichesko-Mekhaniche-
skiy Zavod 349).
Prism binoculars, rangefinders,
tank periscopes, battery com-
mander telescopes, and aerial
gun cameras.
Prism binoculars, gunsights, cam-
eras; surveying instruments in-
cluding theodolites.
Field glasses, telescopes, range-
finders, and periscopes; theodo-
lites; photogrammetric equip-
ment; photographic equipment;
night-driving devices, meta-
scopes, alarm devices, sniper-
scopes, and infrared missile and
fire control systems.
Periscopes, telescopes, bombsights,
gunsights, and rangefinders;
cameras for ground and aerial
use; transits, stereographs, and
aerial mapping equipment. In-
frared devices.
Minsk .............. Vavilov Optical-Mechanical Field glasses, gunsights, and tele-
53?54'N.; 27?34'E. Plant. scopes.
Moscow ............ Geophysical Optical Instruments
55?45'N.; 37?35'E. Plant No. 589. Also called
Prisma Optical Instrument
Plant. (Zavod "Geofizika").
Novosibirsk ......... Lenin Optical Instrument Plant
55?02'N.; 82?55'E. No. 69.
Zagorsk ............. Optical and Mechanical Plant,
56?18'N.; 38?08'E. ZOMZ, No. 355 (Optichesko
Mehanicheskiy Zavod 355).
Telescopes, field glasses, rifle and
bomb sights; theodolites, trans-
its, automatic altimeters, aerial
cameras, vehicle- and head-
mounted infrared night-driving
devices.
Artillery rangefinders, artillery
sights, telescopic gunsights, and
field glasses; lens systems; photo-
theodolites.
Field glasses, panoramic telescopes,
artillery rangefinders and gun
sights, periscopes including sub-
marine devices. Infrared night-
driving and airborne detecting
equipment.
Has produced optical glass, lenses,
and prisms. Also produces
microscopes, motion picture
equipment and color film.
May support Soviet missile pro-
gram. Probably makes cine-
theodolites and infrared de-
vices. Products include non-
military equipment.
One of the largest optical equip-
ment producers; an important
research, development, and
production center for infrared
equipment. Employment
about 13,700 in 1960, including
about 4,000 in research and
development. Probably pro-
duces cinetheodolites.
Associated with the State Optical
Institute (GOI). One of the
largest Soviet optical equip-
ment works. May be partially
housed in Leningrad Progress
Optical Instrument Plant No.
357. Labor force about 12,000.
Plant supports space program.
Also makes civilian scientific
and industrial items.
Plant constructed during 1956-
57. Also makes civilian cam-
eras.
Also makes precision lenses, mi-
croscopes and motion picture
projectors. Estimated labor
force 3,000 to 4,000.
Production probably includes
cinetheodolites. Labor force
about 3,000.
Probably supports the missile and
space program. Estimated
labor force 6,000.
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FIGURE 98. MAJOR PRODUCERS OF INSTRUMENTS, GAGES, AND SERVOMOTORS OF SPECIAL MILITARY
INTEREST, 1965
Chelyabinsk ......... Electrical Equipment Plant No.
55?10'N.; 61?24'E. 255.
Kemerovo .......... Electric Machinery Plant No.
55?20'N.; 86?05'E. 652. Also called Kuzbas
Electro-Motor Plant.
Kiev ............... Electrical Precision Instrument
50?26'N.;30?31'E. Plant.
Leningrad ........... Measuring Equipment Manu-
59?55'N.; 30015'E. facturing Plant.
Do........... Optical Instrument Plant No.
218. Also called Pyrometer
Plant (Zavod "Pirometr").
Do ........... Vibrator Plant (Zavod "Vibra-
tor").
Do........... Hydro-Meteorological Instru-
ment Plant (Gidrometpribor).
Do ........... Kirov "Electric Power" Ma-
chine Building Plant No. 38.
Moscow ............ Caliber Precision Equipment
55?45'N.;37?35'E. Plant.
Produces generators, starters, and
other electrical components for
tanks and aircraft.
Produces electric motors for the
mining industry, motors for tank
turret traverse, traverse of heavy
coastal fortifications, and subma-
rine use.
Complex electrical measuring and
high precision instruments.
Measuring instruments and gages...
Electro-optical pyrometers, potenti-
ometers, periscopes, and aircraft
instruments.
Electric meters, gages, measuring in-
struments, fire-control equipment,
electrical steering devices, and test-
ing equipment.
Meteorological instruments, aircraft
compasses, altimeters, horizon in-
dicators, ship compasses, gyro-
compasses, and depth-sounding
devices.
Synchronous motors, transformers,
switches, measuring instruments,
regulators, rheostats, and relay
boxes. Produces turbogenerators,
nautical electric motors, and high-
speed synchronous and asynchron-
ous motors.
Automatic control equipment, aim-
ing devices, micrometers, gages,
calipers, beam compasses, and
other precision instruments.
Makes about 400 different
items. Labor force about
2,000 (1963).
Probably most important
meter plant in the U.S.S.R.
Estimated factory area
about 35,000 square meters;
labor force about 4,000
(1963).
Reported to be a modern and
well-equipped plant.
Foremost producer of gener-
ators in the U.S.S.R. Labor
force 13,000.
One of the largest precision
equipment plants in the
U.S.S.R. Also makes sur-
veying instruments including
theodolites. Labor force,
about 8,000.
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FIGURE 99. PRINCIPAL TELECOM EQUIPMENT PLANTS, 1965
LOCATION PLANT NAME CHIEF PRODUCTS REMARKS
Aleksandrov ......... Aleksandrov Radio Plant Radiocommunication equipment,
56?24'N.; 38?43'E. (ARZ). radiobroadcast and television
receivers.
Fryazino ............ Scientific Research Institute No. Electron tubes, special-purpose
55?58'N.; 33?04'E. 160. tubes and semiconductor de-
vices.
Gor'kiy ............. Gor'kiy Communication Equip- Radar, including vehicular units:
56?20'N.; 44?00'E. ment Plant Lenin 197-Frunze early warning, target acquisi-
326. tion, and undetermined types.
Krasnoyarsk........ Krasnoyarsk Television Plant.. Military radiocommunication
56?01'N.; 92?50'E. equipment, radio and television
receivers.
Kuchino ............ Kuchino Electronic Research Radio relay equipment, missile
55?45'N.; 37?58'E. Laboratory. guidance radar, direction finders,
infrared communication devices
(ortiphones).
Kuntsevo ........... Moscow Radar Plant No. 304.. Fire-control radar and compo-
55?44'N.; 37?26'E. nents for ground guidance sys-
tems.
Leningrad ........... Electric Instrument Plant No. Radiocommunication equipment
59?55'N.;30?15'E. 212. for ground, shipborne and air-
borne use.
Do ........... Leningrad Plant imeni Kozitskiy Radiocommunication equipment,
No. 616. radiobroadcast and television re-
ceivers, radar and navigational
equipment.
Do........... Leningrad Aircraft Radio and Television, military radio trans-
Instrument Plant No. 287. mitters and receivers, airborne
intercept equipment, radio-
broadcast receivers and radar
navigational equipment.
Do ........... Radio Plant No. 619.......... Radio receivers and transmitters
for ground and airborne use;
radiobroadcast and television
receivers; radar and navigational
equipment for ships, aircraft for
ships, aircraft and space ve-
hicles; electronic countermeas-
ure equipment.
Do ........... "Red Dawn" Plant........... Telephone and telegraph equip-
ment, switchboards, carrier
equipment, teleprinters, and
telephone handsets.
Do........... Svetlana Tube and Lamp Plant Electron tubes, special-purpose
No. 211. tubes, and semiconductor de-
vices.
Do ........... "Komintern" Radio Plant.... Radiocommunication equipment,
radio transmitters, and radar
and navigational equipment, in-
cluding radio direction-finders.
Major producer of television re-
ceivers. Produces civilian and
some military radio equipment.
A major electron tube plant de-
velopment center, producing
standard, miniature and sub-
miniature tubes. Also pro-
duces electronic devices used
in missile guidance systems.
One of the most important mili-
tary plants. Has produced
various electronic devices, but
believed now to be specializing
in manufacture of radar. La-
bor force about 14,000 in 1960.
Modern plant with conveyor-
line production. Has military
section. Labor force, 1,800.
Military production and research
and development. Developed
and carried out initial produc-
tion of Krug radio direction-
finding equipment, and prob-
ably YO-YO radar.
Closely associated with Research
Institute NII-20. Produced
FIRE CAN fire-control radar
and YO-YO radar for tracking
and control of surface-to-air
missiles.
Important producer of military
equipment. Is one of the
largest Soviet precision instru-
ment plants. Has produced
navigational and fire-control
radar and electronic devices for
guided missiles.
Has produced military equip-
ment for ground, shipborne
and airborne use.
Produces mainly for the military.
Probably produces Krug DF
equipment.
Produced both military and civil-
ian telephone equipment. Has
automatic production lines.
Labor force of approximately
10,000 persons in 1965.
Leading developer and producer
of tubes and semiconductor de-
vices, both military and civil-
ian. Labor force exceeded
10,000 in 1963.
Primarily military producer of
radar and radiocommunication
equipment including R-series.
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FIGURE 99. PRINCIPAL TELECOM EQUIPMENT PLANTS (Continued)
LOCATION PLANT NAME I CHIEF PRODUCTS I REMARKS
phone equipment, navigational
equipment, radar, and sonar.
L'vov ..............
49?50'N.;24?00'E.
Minsk ..............
53054'N.; 27034'E.
Moscow ............
55?45'N.;37?35'E.
Novosibirsk .........
55?02'N.;82?55'E.
Omsk ..............
55?00'N.;73?24'E.
Riga ...............
56?57'N.; 24?06'E.
Rostov .............
47'14'N.; 39'42'E.
Sarapul .............
56?28'N.;53?48'E.
Minsk Radio Plant ...........
Plant Post Box No. 32 ........
Moscow Order of Lenin Radio
Plant No. 528.
Moscow Order of Lenin Electric
Lamp Plant No. 632.
Moscow Television Equipment
Plant.
Radar Plant No. 703. Also
known as Electrical Institute
and Special Design Bureau
(OKB) 703.
Novosibirsk Radio Plant No.
590. Also known as "Eleck-
trosignal" Plant.
Svetlana Tube and Lamp Plant
No. 617.
and ground radar for military
use.
Radiocommunication equipment
(fixed and mobile) ; radiobroad-
cast and television receivers.
Marine radio equipment, naviga-
tional radar, sonar.
Radiocommunication equipment,
both fixed and mobile, and ra-
diobroadcast and television re-
ceivers.
Electron tubes (standard, minia-
ture and subminiature), wide-
angle television tubes, special-
purpose tubes, and wire (tung-
sten, molybdenum, and platinite).
Television receivers and trans-
mitters.
Radar equipment (search and fire-
control) for ground, shipborne,
and airborne use.
Radiocommunication equipment
(vehicular stations, light weight
tube-transistor sets) ; radio-
broadcast receivers.
Electron tubes, including metal-
ceramic types, special-purpose
miniature and subminiature
tubes, semiconductor devices.
208....... Radiocommunication equipment,
radiobroadcast receivers, and
radar (IFF).
Kozitsky Radio and Instrument Radiocommunication equipment
Plant No. 210. for railroads, agricultural trac-
tor stations and military vehi-
cles; public address systems.
Electrical Equipment Plant Telephone and telegraph equip-
(VEF). ment, radio-communication
equipment, radiobroadcast and
television receivers.
Radio Equipment Plant imeni
A. S. Popov.
Radar Instrument Plant. Also
known as Plant "LA."
Ordzhonikidze Electrical Plant
No. 203.
Radiobroadcast and television re-
ceivers.
Shipborne navigational radar; ra-
dar mapreading devices.
Radio signal equipment, radio-
broadcast receivers (transistor-
ized), and radio direction-finding
equipment.
Large plant, with about one-half
of output consisting of telecom
and related electronic items.
Produces vehicular types in-
cluding radar for early warn-
ing, surveillance, height finding
and missile tracking.
Produces instruments for guided
missiles and probably some
radar equipment; also produces
electric items.
Produces both military and civil-
ian items.
Production includes shipboard
emergency communication de-
vices.
Military radio equipment in-
cludes shipborne, airborne,
army signal, and tank equip-
ment.
A principal tube and electric bulb
plant. Produces wide range
of tubes for military use. La-
bor force over 10,000.
Equipped with machinery from
Czechoslovakia. Mass-pro-
duces television receivers.
Has modern equipment and may
be engaged in missile guidance
work.
Produces military electronic
equipment mainly for aircraft.
Estimated labor force, 5,000
in 1961.
One of the largest tube producers
in the U.S.S.R. Production is
primarily for military use.
Has produced naval transmitter-
receivers, and radio transmit-
ter and receiver units for signal
trucks, military aircraft, and
tanks.
Plant produces transceivers for
tanks and also produces com-
ponents.
One of the largest electronics
equipment plants; has a mili-
tary section and has local
branch plants. Is equipped
with modern machinery and
has been scheduled for auto-
mation. Labor force of 10,000
in 1965.
Plant mass-produces transistor-
ized radio receivers and pocket-
type receivers. About 8,000
workers in 1965.
Important producer of shipborne
radar for merchant marine.
Produces both military and civil-
ian equipment. Produces ra-
dios for tanks and aircraft.
J
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FIGURE 99. PRINCIPAL TELECOM EQUIPMENT PLANTS (Continued)
LOCATION PLANT NAME CHIEF PRODUCTS REMARKS
Sverdlovsk .......... Ural Radio Plant No. 626.....
56?51'N.; 60?36'E.
Tallinn .............
59?25'N.;24?45'E.
Semiconductor Plant imeni Kh.
Pegelman.
Vilnius .............
54?41'N.;25?19'E.
Vladivostok .........
43?08'N.; 131?54'E.
Voronezh ...........
51?46'N.;33?28'E.
Zelenodol'sk .........
55?51'N.;48?33'E.
(standard miniature and sub-
miniature).
Radiocommunication equipment,
radiobroadcast and television
in the early 1960's.
Semiconductor devices (transis-
tors, resistors).
Radiocommunication equipment
for ground, shipborne, and air-
borne use; radar for aircraft and
radar parts for anticollision
units.
Telegraph equipment and radio-
communication equipment.
Radiocommunication equipment,
radiobroadcast and television
receivers.
Radio relay equipment, marine
radar equipment, sonar, and
components and accessory parts
including loudspeakers.
Electrical Instrument Plant, No.
555.
Voronezh Electro-Signal Plant
No. 728.
Radar Plant No. 708. Also
known as Kazan Radar Plant
708.
FIGURE 100. VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE IN CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
(Millions of foreign exchange rubles)
Plant has highly mechanized pro-
duction lines. Produces tubes
for military and civilian use.
Labor force about 10,000 in
the early 1960's.
Labor force approximately 5,000
receivers.
Began production in 1959. Esti-
mated labor force, 1,500 in
early 1960's.
Also makes test and measuring
equipment including oscillo-
graphs. Employs several thou-
sand workers.
Produces radio equipment for
the navy.
Produces military and civilian
equipment. Produces units of
R-100 series for portable and
vehicular use.
Plant also is engaged in develop-
ment of electronic equipment
for guided missiles. Labor
force 3,000.
1964
1965
Basic and coke chemicals, plastics and inter-
mediates. . ............................. 45.1
60.5
77.9
87.9 47.4
79.4
148.9
173.1
Dyes, paints, varnishes, and tanning materials. 6.3
5.9
10.6
11.0 18.0
21.9
36.5
44.7
Photographic chemicals .................... 1.9
1.4
2.3
2.5 12.7
16.1
13.9
14.1
Fertilizers and pesticides ................... 45.8
57.2
76.5
93.9 9.4
9.1
52.8
38.6
Rubber and rubber products ............... 32.4
41.8
48.3
51.1 163.9
176.3
130.5
179.0
Essential oils, etc ......................... 2.1
4.0
4.7
5.7 6.3
5.9
7.2
6.8
Manmade staple fiber ..................... Insig
Insig
Insig
Insig 25.8
24.8
27.1
29.2
Rayon and synthetic yarn ................. Insig
Insig
Insig
Insig 13.1
13.4
5.6
9.5
Medicines, soap, perfumes, etc .............. 10.7
12.1
18.1
17.7 22.5
27.5
99.3
1.11.0
374.4
521.8
606.0
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FIGURE 101. SELECTED PRODUCERS OF SULFURIC
ACID
Alaverdi .............
41'08'N.; 44039'E.
Chardzhou...........
39?06'N.;63?34'E.
Chimkent............
42?18'N.;69?36'E.
Dzhambul ...........
42?52'N.;71?23'E.
Gomel ...............
52?25'N.;31?00'E.
Kedainiai............
55?17'N.;23?58'E.
Kokand ..............
40'30'N.; 70'57'E.
Konstantinovka......
48'32'N.; 37043'E.
Lipetsk ..............
52?35'N.;39?37'E.
Salavat ..............
53?21'N.; 55?55'E.
Samarkand ...........
39?40'N.; 66?58'E.
Sumy ................
50'54'N.; 340481E.
Ufa .................
54?44'N.;55?56'E.
Volkhov .............
59?55'N.;32?20'E.
Voskresensk ..........
55019'N.; 38042'E.
Alaverdi Copper and Chemical
Plant.
Chardzhou Superphosphate Plant
Chimkent Lead Plant
Dzhambul Superphosphate Plant
Gomel Superphosphate Plant
Kedainiai Chemical Combine
Kokand Superphosphate Plant
Konstantinovka Chemical Plant
Novolipetsk Metallurgical Works
Salavat Petrochemical Combine
Samarkand Superphosphate Plant
Sumy Superphosphate Plant
Ufa Oil Refinery
Volkhov Aluminum Plant
Voskresensk Chemical Combine
imeni Kuybyshev.
FIGURE 102. MAJOR PRODUCERS OF AMMONIA AND
NITRIC ACID, 1965
Berezniki ............ Berezniki Chemical Combine
59?24'N.;56?46'E.
Chirchik ............. Chirchik Electrochemical Combine
41?29'N.; 69?35'E.
Dneprodzerzhinsk..... Dneprodzerzhinsk Nitrogen Fertil-
48?30'N.; 34?37'E. izer Plant.
Fergana ............. Fergana Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
40?23'N.;71?46'E.
Grodno .............. Grodno Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
53'41'N.; 23'50'E.
Kemerovo ............ Kemerovo Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
55?20'N.;86?05'E.
Do ............ Novokemerovo Chemical Combine
Kirovakan ........... Kirovakan Chemical Combine
40?48'N.;44?30'E. imeni Myasnikyan.
Nevinnomyssk ........ Nevinnomyssk Chemical Combine
44?38'N.;41?57'E.
Novomoskovsk ....... Novomoskovsk Chemical Combine
54'05'N.; 38'13'E.
Rustavi .............. Rustavi Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
42?17'N.;43?51'E.
Salavat .............. Salavat Petrochemical Combine
53?21'N.;55?55'E.
Severodonetsk ........ Lisichansk Chemical Combine
48'55'N.; 38'26'E.
Shchekino............ Shchekino Chemical Combine
54?00'N.; 37?31'E.
Tol'yatti ............. Tol'yatti Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant
53?31'N.;49?20'E.
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
FIGURE 103. SELECTED PRODUCERS OF CHLORINE, CAUSTIC SODA, AND SODA ASH
CITY I NAME AND LOCATION I PRODUCTS
Beketovka ......................
48?35'N.;44?25'E.
Berezniki .......................
59?24'N.;56?46'E.
Chapayevsk .....................
52?58'N.; 49?41'E.
Chirchik ........................
41?29'N.;69?35'E.
Dzerzhinsk ......................
56?15'N.; 43?24'E.
Do .......................
Kemerovo ......................
55?20'N.;86?05'E.
Mikhaylovka ....................
51?49'N.;79?45'E.
Novomoskovsk ..................
54?05'N.;38?13'E.
Shchelkovo ......................
55?55'N.; 38?00'E.
Slavyansk .......................
48?52'N.;37?37'E.
Sterlitamak .....................
53?37'N. ; 55?58'E.
Sumgait ........................
40?37'N.;49?37'E.
Ufa ............................
54?44'N.;55?56'E.
Usol'ye .........................
52?45'N.;82?40'E.
Ust Kamenogorsk ................
49?58'N.;82?40'E.
Verkhneye ......................
48?53'N.;38?28'E.
Yerevan ........................
40?11'N.;44?30'E.
Beketovka Chemical Plant No. 91 ........ Chlorine, caustic soda.
Berezniki Chemical Combine ............. Chlorine, caustic soda, soda ash.
Chapayevsk Chemical Plant No. 102 ...... Chlorine, caustic soda.
Chirchik Electrochemical Combine ....... Do.
Chernorech'ye Chemical Plant imeni
Kalinin.
Chemical Plant No. 96 ..................
Kemerovo Chemical Plant No. 510 .......
Do.
Do.
Mikhaylovka Soda Combine .............
Novomoskovsk Chemical Combine....... .
Shchelkovo Chemical Plant ..............
Slavyansk Soda Plant ...................
Sterlitamak Soda Combine ..............
Sumgait Chemical Plant No. 142 .........
Ufa Chemical Works ....................
Chemical Plant No. 97 ..................
Titanium Magnesium Combines ..........
Donets Soda Plant .....................
Yerevan Synthetic Rubber Plant........ .
Soda ash.
Chlorine, caustic soda.
Do.
Chlorine, caustic soda, soda ash.
Do.
Chlorine, caustic soda.
Chlorine.
Chlorine, caustic soda.
Chlorine.
Chlorine, caustic soda, soda ash.
Chlorine, caustic soda.
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
LOCATION I PLANT I PRODUCT
Angarsk ....................
52?34'N.;103?54'E.
Berezniki ...................
59?24'N.; 56?46'E.
Chirchik ....................
41?29'N.;69?35'E.
Dorogobuzh .................
54?55'N.;33?18'E.
Dneprodzerzhinsk............
48'30'N.; 34'37'E.
Dzhamhul ..................
42'52'N.; 7023T.
Gorlovka ............ ......
48'18'N.; 38103'E.
Iona.va .....................
55?05'N.; 24.?17'E.
Kalush .....................
49?01'N.;24:?22'E.
Kirovakan ..................
40?4.S'N.; 44?30'E.
Kokand ....................
40?30'N.;70?57'E.
Konstantinovka .............
48'32'N.; 37043'E.
Maardu ....................
59025'N.; 25'01'E.
Navoi ......................
40?09'N.;65?22'E.
Nevinuom yssk ...............
44?38'N.;41?57'E.
Novokemerovo ..............
55?20'N.;86?05'E.
Novomoskovsk ..............
54?05'N.; 38?13'E.
Salava.t .....................
53?21'N.; 55?55'E.
Sverodonetsk ................
48'55'N.; 38'26'E.
She hekino ...................
54?00'N.; 37?31'E.
Soligorsk ....................
52?44'N.; 27?28'E.
Solikamsk.................. .
59?39'N.;56?49'E.
Stebnik .....................
49?.1S'N.;23?34'E.
Sumgait ....................
40?36'N.; 49?38'E.
Sumy ......................
50?54'N.;34?48'E.
Tol'yatti ....................
53?31'N.;49?20'E.
Vinnitsa ....................
49?14'N.;28?29'E.
Voskresensk .................
55?19'N.;38O42'E.
Berezniki Chemical Combine .................
Berezniki Potassium Combine.
Chirchik Electrochemical Combine ...........
Do.
Potassium fertilizer.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Dorogobuzh Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant........ .
Dneprodzerzhinsk Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant... .
Dzhambul Superphosphate Plant .............
Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant i.naeni Sergo.
lonava Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant .............
Kalush Chemicometallurgical Combine....... .
Kirovakan Chemical Combine imeni Myasnik-
yan.
Kokand Superphosphate Plant ...............
Konstantinovka Chemical Plant ..............
Maardu Chemical Combine ..................
Navoi Chemical Combine ...................
Nevinnomyssk Chemical Combine........... .
Novokemerovo Chemical Combine........... .
Novomoskovsk Chemical Combine ...........
Salavat Petrochemical Combine ..............
Sverodonetsk Chemical Combine (Lisichansk). .
Shchekino Chemical Combine ................
Soligorsk Potassium Combines 1 and 2 ........
Solikamsk Potassium Plant ..................
Stebuik Potassium Combine .................
Sumgait Superphosphate Plant ...............
Sumy Superphosphate Plant .................
Tol'yatti Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant........... .
Vinnitsa Chemical Combine .................
Voskresensk Chemical Combine ..............
Superphosphate and ammoniated super-
phosphate.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Do.
Potassium fertilizer.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Superphosphate and ammoniated super-
phosphate.
Do.
Phosphate fertilizer.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Do.
Do.
Nitrogen and mixed fertilizers.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Nitrogen, phosphate, complex.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Potassium fertilizer.
Do.
Do.
Superphosphate.
Phosphate fertilizer.
Nitrogen fertilizer.
Superphosphate and triple superphosphate.
Phosphates, Complex fertilizer.
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Chaykovskiy ................
56?47'N.;54?09'E.
Gudermes ...................
43?21'N.;46?06'E.
Kazan' .....................
55?45'N.; 49?08'E.
Krasnoyarsk ................
56?01'N.;92?50'E.
Nizhne Kamsk ..............
55?40'N.; 51?52'E.
Omsk ......................
55?00'N.;73?24'E.
Sterlitamak .................
53?37'N.; 55?58'E.
Sumgait ....................
40?37'N.;49?37'E.
Temir Tau ..................
50?05'N.;72?56'E.
Tol'yatti ....................
53?31'N.; 49?20'E.
Volzhskiy ...................
48?49'N.;44?44'E.
Voronezh ...................
51?38'N.;39?12'E.
Yaroslavl' ...................
57?37'N.;39?52'E.
Yavan ......................
38?19'N.;69?02'E.
Yef re mov ...................
53?09'N.;38?07'E.
Yerevan ....................
40?11'N.;44?30'E.
Sodium polymerized butadiene rubber
(SKB).
SKB, nitrite (SKN), oil-extended butadiene-
styrene rubber.
Polyisoprene ...........................
Butadiene, methylstyrene, styrene-buta-
diene latex, methyl pyridine latexes and
rubber.
Oil-extended copolymer rubber based on
butane, polyisoprene, latex.
Oil-extended copolymer rubber, butyl
rubber, styrene-butadiene.
Butadiene rubber, new type of frost-resist-
ant rubber.
Styrene-butadiene, polyisoprene..........
SKB, oil-extended copolymer latex, experi-
mental output of polyisoprene rubber.
SKB, nitrile rubber, butyl rubber, oil-
extended, frost-resistant rubber, poly-
butadiene (experimental).
Chloroprene and other types of rubber
(planned).
SKB, polyisobutylene, butyl rubber, poly-
butadiene.
Chloroprene rubber and latex............
Construction started late in 1965. Initial pro-
duction planned before end of Five Year Plan
(1966-70).
Production of synthetic rubber planned in the
Angaro-Usole' petrochemical complex.
Production of polybutadiene planned.
Plant under construction. First stage was sched-
uled to start up in 1966 but may have been
delayed.
Initial output reported in 1962.
Initial operation 1960. Experimental output of
polyisoprene started in 1964.
Production scheduled to increase by 64% during
1966-70. Production of styrene-butadiene was
expanded in 1965. Nitrile rubbers are planned
for production.
Future production may include chloroprene
rubber.
Initial operation began in 1961. Production of
polyisoprene began in late 1964. Output of
polybutadiene and chloroprene rubber is
planned.
Production of polyisoprene began in late 1964.
Plant is being expanded.
Capacity was planned to almost double in 1964-
66. Commercial-scale output of polybutadiene
and polyisoprene is planned.
Production of synthetic rubber was planned to
double during 1959-65.
This synthetic rubber plant will be built as part
of a major chemical combine on which con-
struction began in 1965.
Production of polybutadiene began in 1965.
Polyisoprene planned.
Production was scheduled to double in 1959-65.
Actual increase was 73%.
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
FIGURE 106. SELECTED PRODUCERS OF PLASTICS, 1966
LOCATION PLANT NAME I TYPE
Dankov ........................
53?15'N.;39?08'E.
Dzerzhinsk ......................
56'15'N.; 43'24'E.
Do .......................
Fergana ............. ..........
40?23'N.; 17?46'E.
Gorlovka .......................
48'1.8'N.; 38'03'E.
Gur'yev ........................
47?07'N.; 51?53'E.
Kazan' .........................
55?45'N.;49?08'E.
Kemerovo ......................
55?20'N.; 86?05'E.
Kuskovo ........................
55?44'N.;37?49'E.
Leningrad .......................
59?55'N.;30?15'E.
Moscow ........................
55?45'N.;37?35'E.
Nizhniy-Tagil ...................
57?55'N.; 59?57'E.
Novokuybyshevsk ...............
53?07'N.; 48?58'E.
Novomoskovsk ..................
54?05'N.; 38?13'E.
Orekhovo-Zuyevo ................
55?49'N.; 38?59'E.
Salavat .........................
53?21'N.; 55?55'E.
Sverdlovsk ......................
56?51'N.; 60?36'E.
Ufa ............................
54'44'N.; 55156'E.
Yerevan ........... ............
40?11'N.; 44?30'E.
Chemical Plant Zavodstroy ............. .
Chemical Plant Zarya ...................
Fergana Hydrolytic Plant ...............
Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant .......
Gur'yev Polyethylene Plant .............
Organic Synthesis Plant .................
Plant "Karbolit" ...................... .
Kuskovo Chemical Plant ................
Okhta Chemical Combine ...............
Moscow Oil Refinery ....................
Nizhniy-Tagil Plastics Plant .............
Novokuybyshevsk Chemical Plant....... .
Novomoskovsk Chemical Combine .......
Orekhovo-Zuvevo Plant "Karbolit"...... .
Salavat Petrochemical Combine ..........
Sverdlovsk Plastic Plant ................
Ufa Synthetic Alcohol Plant .............
Yerevan Polyvinyl Acetate Plant........ .
Polycarbonate (experimental).
Furan resins.
Polystyrene.
Low-pressure polyethylene.
Polyethylene.
Phenolics, ion-exchange, polyurethane.
Polystyrene, polyvinyl butyral, amino, sili-
cone, polyvinyl, acetate.
Epoxy, polyethylene, polystyrene, polyvinyl
butyral, ethyl cellulose, cellulose acetate.
Polypropylene.
Fluoroplastics, phenolic, ion-exchange resins.
Low-pressure polyethylene.
Polyvinyl chloride.
Phenolic, amino.
High-pressure polyethylene.
Polyamide, polyethylene, cellulose acetate.
Polyethylene.
Cellulose acetate, polyvinyl acetate, poly-
vinyl butyral.
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FIGURE 107. SOVIET PRODUCERS OF MANMADE
FIBERS
Balakovo ............
52?02'N.;47?47'E.
Barnaul ..............
53?22'N.; 83?45'E.
Cherkassy............
49?26'N.;32?04'E.
Chernigov............
51?30'N.;31?18'E.
Daugavpils ...........
55?53'N.; 26?32'E.
Engel's ..............
51?30'N.;46?07'E.
Kalinin ..............
56?52'N.;35?55'E.
Kaunus ..............
54?54'N.;23?54'E.
Kemerovo ............
55?20'N.; 86?05'E.
Kiev ................
50?26'N.;30?31'E.
Kirovakan ...........
40?48'N.; 44?30'E.
Klin .................
56?20'N.;36?44'E.
Krasnoyarsk .........
56?01'N.;92?50'E.
Kursk ...............
51?42'N.;36?12'E.
Kustanay ............
53?10'N.;63?35'E.
Leningrad............
59?55'N.;30?15'E.
Lisichansk ...........
48?55'N.;38?26'E.
Mogilev .............
53?54'N.;30?21'E.
Viscose cord, staple, cellophane,
nylon 6.
Viscose staple and filament.
Nylon 6, nylon 66.
Nylon 6.
Nylon 6, cellulose acetate.
Viscose staple, filament, cord; poly-
acrylonitrile fiber; nylon 6 cord.
Cellulose triacetate.
Caprolactam.
Viscose rayon.
Cellulose acetate.
Viscose rayon, nylon 6, nylon 66.
Viscose rayon.
Polyester fiber, polypropylene,
nylon 6.
Viscose and cuprammonium rayon,
polyvinyl chloride fiber (planned).
Viscose rayon, polyvinyl alcohol
fiber.
Vinyl acetate, caprolactam.
Viscose rayon. A second plant is
under construction and will pro-
duce polyester fiber.
Under construction. Large-scale
production of polyacrylonitrile
fiber planned.
Nylon 6.
Polotsk ..............
55?29'N.;28?47'E.
Rustavi ..............
41?33'N.; 45?03'E.
Ryazan' .............
54?38'N.;39?44'E.
Saratov ..............
51?34'N.;46?02'E.
Svetlogorsk ..........
54?37'N.;20?10'E.
Volzhskiy ............
48?49'N.;44?44'E.
Viscose rayon.
Polyacrylonitrile fiber.
Viscose rayon.
Nylon 6.
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FIGURE 108. PRODUCTION OF IMPORTANT TYPES OF PROCESSED FOODS
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)
Meat ......................................
3,372
4,251
4,808
5,440
4,148
5
245
5
724
Sausage products ...........................
1,049
1,321
1,369
1,492
1,490
,
1
600
,
1
760
Milk products ..............................
22,095
27,541
29,215
28,541
31,397
,
38
692
,
40
100
Butter .....................................
659
781
830
777
846
,
1
073
,
1
042
Cheese ....................................
*
150
185
208
222
256
,
288
,
324
Sugar
....................................
5,433
8,376
7,800
6,219
8,209
11
037
9
740
Confections ................................
1,676
1,806
1,950
2,061
2,306
,
2
314
,
2
242
Vegetable oil ...............................
1,465
1,815
2,114
2,195
2,249.
,
2
770
,
2
730
Margarine and margarine compounds......... .
395
474
515
566
606
,
670
,
595
Canned foods (million 400 g cans) .............
4,073
5,550
5,914
6,470
7,452
7
078
7
410
Flour (million metric tons) ...................
Bread and bakery products (million metric tons).
15
na
na
no
no
,
20
,
na
Macaroni products (1,000 metric tons) .........
V
950
999
1,054
1,134
1,264
1
251
no
odka (million dkl.) .........................
145
146
162
169
177
,
no
no
Beer (million dkl.) ..........................
199
267
282
281
283
317
no
Grape wine (million dkl.) ....................
62
85
98
119
127
134
162
Cigarettes (billion cigarettes) .................
232
248
230
258
280
no
Fish (100 metric tons) .......................
2,936
3,724
4,167
4,681
5,171
5,770
6,049
NOTE-The sugar and margarine series cover total production. The milk products series is equivalent to state procurements
of milk. The butter, vegetable oil, and grape wine series exclude household production. The meat and cheese series
exclude household and collective farm production. The bread and bakery products series exclude household, collective
farm, and industrial cooperative production (cooperatives became part of state industry in 1959). Fish production is
given by landed weight.
* Sugar from sugar beets only.
0
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00030002-2
FIGURE 110. MAJOR COMBINES OF THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY, 1966
LOCATION PLANT REMARKS
Dushanbe .............
38'33'N.; 68'48'E.
Gori ..................
41?58'N.; 44?07'E.
Kamyshin ............
50?06'N.;45?24'E.
Kherson ..............
46'38'N.; 32036'E.
Tashkent .............
41?20'N.; 69?18'E.
Bryansk ..............
40?23'N.;49?51'E.
Chernigov ............
51?30'N.;31?18'E.
Frunze ...............
42'54'N.; 74"36'E.
Kansk ................
56?13'N.;95?41'E.
Krasnodar ............
45'02'N.: 39000'E.
Ivanovo ..............
57'14'N.; 30'20'E.
Minsk ................
53?54'N.;27?34'E.
Sverdlovsk............
56?51'N.; 60?36'E.
Tbilisi ................
41?42'N.;44?45'E.
Gori Cotton Textile Combine ............
Kamyshin Cotton Textile Combine .......
Kherson Cotton Textile Combine........ .
Tashkent Cotton Textile Combine....... .
One of the largest cotton textile combines in Siberia.
Estimated annual production of 100 million linear
meters.
Began production during World War II. Has under-
gone expansion which has raised annual output to 120
million linear meters.
Employs over 7,000 workers to produce an estimated 100
million linear meters yearly.
Began production in 1955. Reportedly the largest
cotton combine in the U.S.S.R.
Undergoing expansion. Estimated annual production of
150 million linear meters.
One of the largest cotton textile mills in Central Asia
producing more than 200 million linear meters
annually.
FIGURE 111. MAJOR COMBINES OF THE WOOL TEXTILE INDUSTRY, 1966
PLANT
Frunze Worsted and Woolen Cloth Com-
bine.
Tbilisi Worsted Spinning and Weaving
Mill.
Second stage has been commissioned and produces wool
yarn for the knitwear industry. With full capacity it
will produce 14 million linear meters of worsted and
thin fabric cloth.
Production began in 1962. Full production capacity of
9 million linear meters a year will make it the largest
woolen mill in Central Asia.
Built during World War II and modernized in 1962.
Produces heavy woolens.
Production of more than 12 million linear meters yearly
is used mainly for suits and coats. To be recon-
structed during 1966-68.
Built during the Seven Year Plan. When in full produc-
tion, will be one of the country's major worsted com-
bines, with a yearly output of 17.5 million linear
meters.
Built during the Seven Year Plan. To be reconstructed
during 1966-68.
Built during the Seven Year Plan. Is the largest textile
undertaking in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R. Con-
struction is continuing through 1966-68.
Put into operation in 1963. Has a planned capacity of
11 million linear meters of worsted fabric yearly.
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FIGURE 112. MAJOR PRODUCERS OF TEXTILES OF MANMADE FIBERS AND NATURAL SILK, U.S.S.R., 1966
LOCATION I PLANT I REMARKS
Bendery ..............
46?49'N.;29?29'E.
Chaykovskiy ..........
56?47'N.; 54?09'E.
Kalinin ...............
56?52'N.;35?55'E.
Kaunas ...............
54?54'N.;23?54'E.
Kiev .................
50'26'N.; 30'31'E.
Klin ..................
56?20'N.;36?44'E.
Korablino .............
53?55'N.;40?01'E.
Leninabad ............
40?17'N.;69?37'E.
Orenburg .............
51?45'N.;55?06'E.
Grodno ...............
53'41'N.; 23'50'E.
Kostroma .............
57?46'N.;40?55'E.
Orsha ................
54?31'N.;30?26'E.
Panevezhis............
55?44'N.;24?21'E.
Rovno ................
50?37'N.;26?15'E.
Zhitomi r ..............
50?1.5'N.;28?40'E.
Bendery Silk Combine .................. Chief products are silk and rayon. Completed during
the Seven Year Plan.
Chaykovskiy Combine For Silk Fabrics ... Put into operation in 1965. Expected to produce 90
million linear meters of material from articial fiber by
the end of 1970.
Kalinin Synthetic Fiber ................. Chief products are textiles of rayon and synthetic fiber.
Began production in 1954 as part of the Kalinin
Textile Combine, which is principally a cotton com-
bine.
Kaunas Artificial Fiber Plant ............ Put into operation in the Seven Year Plan. To be one
of the largest acetate silk mills in the world. Equip-
ment supplied by the British firm, Courtaulds.
Darnitsa Silk Combine .................. Chief products are rayon and synthetic fiber. Began
production in 1940 and was expanded during the
Seven Year Plan.
Klin Synthetic Fiber Plant .............. Chief products are textiles of rayon and synthetic fiber.
Began production in 1920 and has an estimated labor
force of 10,000 persons.
Korablino Cloth and Fiber Combine...... Built during Seven Year Plan. To be the largest of its
kind in the R.S.F.S.R.
Leninabad Silk Combine ................ Has been undergoing expansion since 1962. Is a large
processor of silk cocoons, in addition to producing
more than 20 million linear meters of artificial silk
fabric yearly.
Orenburg Silk Combine ................. Began production in 1964 and is to be the largest
producer of silk fabrics in the U.S.S.R.
I PLANT
Grodno Linen Combine ...........
Linen Combine imeni V.I. Lenin ...
Orsha Linen Combine .............
Panevezhis Linen Combine ........
Rovno Linen Combine ............
Built in Seven Year Plan. Estimated capacity of 15 million
linear meters a year.
Produces 50 million linear meters of linen, linen-lavsan, and
line-nylon blends yearly.
Built in Seven Year Plan. Planned yearly production of over
7.5 million linear meters of fine linen fabric.
Completed in 1961. The largest undertaking of its kind in the
Baltic region.
Began to produce consumer fabrics in 1965 in addition to its
previous production of industrial linens. Reached a capacity
of 8 million linear meters in 1966.
Estimated production of 23 million linear meters.
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FIGURE 114. MAJOR PRODUCERS OF LEATHER FOOTWEAR, 1966
LOCATION PLANT I REMARKS
Alma Ata .............
43?15'N.;76?57'E.
Dzhambul ............
42?54'N.;71?22'E.
Kiev .................
50?26'N.;30?31'E.
Kishinev ..............
47?00'N.; 28?50'E.
Lugansk ..............
47?22'N.; 37?06'E.
49'50'N.; 24100'E.
Tbilisi ................
41?42'N.;44?45'E.
Ussuriysk .............
43?48'N.; 131?59'E.
Yerevan ..............
40'11'N.; 44'30'E.
Archangel ...........
64?34'N.; 40?32'E.
Balakhna ...........
53?47'N.;38?14'E.
Bratsk ..............
56?05'N.;101?48'E.
Kondopoga .........
62?12'N.;34?17'E.
Koryazhma ..........
61?18'N.;47?11'E.
Segezha .............
63'44'N.; 34'19'E.
Solikamsk ...........
59?39'N.; 56?47'E.
Syas ...............
60?09'N.;32?30'E.
Dzambul Leather Footwear Com-
bine.
Podolska Footwear Factory Number
4.
Kishinev Model Footwear Factory. .
L'vov Footwear Firm "Progress"...
"Isani" Firm ....................
Ussuriysk Leather and Footwear
Combine.
The "Masis" Firm ................
Completed in 1965. Has annual capacity of 5.5 million pairs
of footwear.
The largest footwear factory in the Ukraine, with an annual
production of over 8 million pairs.
One of the largest enterprises in Moldavia. Recently com-
bined with several other factories to form the firm "Avan-
gard."
Is to have an eventual annual capacity of 12 million pairs of
footwear.
Was the first of the footwear firms. Comprises the L'vov Foot-
wear Factory Number 3 and four other factories in the area.
Will have an eventual capacity of 8 million pairs annually.
Part of the Tbilisi Footwear Production Association. Special-
izes in footwear made from synthetic leather. Estimated
production of more than 5 million pairs yearly.
Largest industrial combine of its kind in the Far East and
Siberia. Will be the first fully automated footwear enter-
prise in the U.S.S.R. and should deliver 3 million pairs of
footwear annually.
Annual production of about 8 million pairs of footwear.
FIGURE 115. MAJOR PLANTS OF THE PAPER INDUSTRY, 1965
Archangel Celulose and Pulp, paper, viscose, alco-
Paper Combine. hol, wood fiber panels.
Bratsk Wood Processing
Complex.
Kraft pulp, paperboard,
turpentine, and oil prod-
ucts.
Sulfite pulp, newsprint, and
composition board.
Kotlas Cellulose and Paper
Combine.
Segezha Cellulose and
Paper Combine.
Syas Cellulose and Paper
Combine.
Sulfate cellulose, packaging
board, paper bags, card-
board.
Kraft pulp and wrapping
and bag paper.
Will eventually have a capacity in excess of
800,000 metric tons of pulp and paper per
year.
One of the three largest producers of news-
print.
Only partially completed. Will eventually
produce a million metric tons of various
products a year.
One of the three largest producers of news-
print. Contains a paper mill which is
reportedly the largest plant of its kind in
the world.
Annual production of 400,000 metric tons of
bleached sulfite pulp, kraft bag papers
and liner, and corrugating medium.
Capacity reported at 40,000 metric tons in
1962 but has since undergone moderniza-
tion.
The country's largest supplier of newsprint.
Is one of the largest producers of cellulose,
paper, alcohol, and insulation board in the
U.S.S.R.
158 SECRET
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Alma Ata............
43?15'N.;76?57'E.
Dnepropetrovsk ......
48'27'N.; 34'59'E.
Donetsk .............
48?00'N.;37?48'E.
Leninakan ...........
40?48'N.;43?50'E.
Moscow .............
55?45'N.;37?35'E.
Murom ..............
55?34'N.;42?02'E.
Orenburg ............
51?45'N.;55?06'E.
Rostov ..............
47?14'N.;39?42'E.
Alma Ata Low Voltage Equipment Plant.
Machine Building Plant Number 192.. .
Refrigerator plant ....................
Domestic refrigerator plant........... .
Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likh-
achev (ZIL).
Refrigeration Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze.
Sarotov .............. Machine Building Plant Number 105...
51?34'N.;46?02'E.
Vasilkov ............. Vasilkovskiy Works Refrigeration Plant.
50?11.'N.;30?19'E.
ESTIMATED
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
Alma Ata............
43?15'N.;76?57'E.
Batumi ..............
41?38'N.;41?38'E.
Frunze ..............
42?54'N.;74?36'E.
Kharkov .............
50?00'N.;36?15'E.
Kishinev .............
47?00'N.;28?50'E.
Moscow .............
55?45'N.;37?35'E.
Do ............
Omsk ...............
55?00'N.;73?24'E.
Riga ................
56?57'N.;24?06'E.
Sverdlovsk...........
56?51'N.;60?36'E.
Tula ................
54?12'N.;37?37'E.
Alma Ata Low Voltage Equipment Plant..... .
Electrical Engineering Plant .................
Krasnyy Mettalist ...........................
Kharkov Galvanized Ware Plant .............
Electrical machinery plant imeni Kotovskiy....
Electromechanical plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich..
Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likhachev (ZIL) ...
Omsk Washing Machine Plant ...............
Electrical Machine Building Plant............
Ural Electric Appliance Plant ................
Shtamp Plant ..............................
ESTIMATED
ANNUAL
OUTPUT
75,000 Eventual capacity of 100,000. Also produces
washing machines.
120,000 Also engaged in production of missiles.
150,000 Also produces bicycles, air-conditioners, and
electric fans.
150,000 Primarily a motor vehicle plant. Also pro-
duces bicycles and washing machines.
100,000
85,000 Basic products are refrigerators and washing
machines but also produces various other
consumer goods.
100,000 Also produces aircraft accessories.
75,000 Also produces refrigerators and vacuum
cleaners.
150,000
250,000
150,000
60,000
70,000 Primarily a motor vehicle plant; also
produces bicycles.
75,000
400,000
60,000
300,000 Also produces sewing machines.
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FIGURE 118. CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING
(Millions of square meters total space)
RURAL
Constructed
by state
Con
structed
by
Co
nstructed
by
Con
structed
by
Con
by
structed
collective
and
cooperative
w
orkers
and
o
state
rgani-
w
orkers
and
f
an
armers
d rural
organizations
em
ployees*
z
ations
em
ployees*
intell
igentsia**
1959 ...... 107.4
44.0
15.4
9.5
11.8
26.7
1960...... 103.4
44.6
14.4
11.2
12.6
20.6
1961 ...... 96.9
43.7
12.4
12.9
11.2
16.7
1962 ...... 94.9
47.5
11.4
12.3
9.3
14.4
1963 ...... 92.8
48.6
9.8
13.3
7.6
13.5
1964...... 87.9
48.3
9.2
10.6
7.0
12.8
1965 ...... 91.6
52.6
8.0
10.5
8.1
12.4
* At their own expense or with the help of state credit.
** Based on number of houses, converted to total area (average size house is 33.3 square meters).
FIGURE 119. MECHANIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION WORK, BY TYPE*
(Volume of mechanized work in percent of total volume of work)
195
9 1
1960 1
1961 1 196
2 I
1963
Earthwork .......................
Loading and unloading rock prod-
nets .......................... 86.
9
89.5
90.2 92.
2
.92.5
94.1
92.8
Loading and unloading metals, lum-
ber, metallic, concrete, and rein-
forced concrete structurals....... 85.
3
89.4
90.6 92.
3
93.1
94.3
94.0
Loading and unloading cement..... 45.
9
52.4
59.4 61.
0
65.4
70.1
64.6
Plastering ....................... 53.
6
57.6
58.2 58.
7
58.1
59.2
59.5
Painting ......................... 63.
3
61.5
64.1 64.
2
64.7
67.4
67.0
* For 1959-64, the data cover contract organizations with an annual volume of work of 0.5 million
or more rubles and projects built by the economic method at an estimate cost of 2.5 million or
more rubles. For 1965, the data cover all contract construction organizations.
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FIGURE 120. COMPLEX MECHANIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION WORK, BY TYPE*
(Volume of complex mechanized work in percent of total volume of work)
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964 I
Earthwork .......................
Installation of concrete and rein-
forced concrete structurals.......
85.3
86.6
91.0
92.5
92.5
95.3
94.6
Preparation of concrete ...........
78.1
79.0
81.8
84.0
86.4
88.2
79.7
Preparation of mortar .............
59.9
61.5
62.2
66.5
68.0
72.0
62.8
Concrete work ...................
70.0
72.1
74.1
75.4
77.6
81.3
82.1
* For 1959-64, the data cover contract organizations with an annual volume of work of 0.5 million
or more rubles and projects built by the economic method at an estimated cost of 2.5 million or
more rubles. For 1965, the data cover all contract construction organizations.
FIGURE 121. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN CONSTRUCTION*
(Thousand persons)
1950
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Persons engaged in construction
(total) ........................
4,087
5,933
6,208
6,555
6,642
6,596
6,723
6,896
7,217
Persons engaged in construction-
installation work ...............
2,603
4,442
4,800
5,143
5,270
5,172
5,237
5,370
5,617
Workers (including apprentices)..
2,297
3,921
4,238
4,544
4,638
4,502
4,544
4,640
4,813
Engineer-technical workers......
156
311
355
385
416
443
461
492
549
Employees ....................
150
210
207
204
216
227
232
238
255
Persons engaged in support indus-
tries and services ..............
1,484
1,491
1,408
1,412
1,372
1,424
1,486
1,526
1,600
* The data include personnel engaged in repair-construction offices, machine rental bases, intercollective farm construction
organizations, and industries servicing construction.
FIGURE 122. PRODUCTION OF WALL MATERIALS
(Millions of standard bricks)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Construction bricks ...............
28,689
33,143
35,500
36,694
35,979
35,183
35,939
36,923
Natural stone ....................
3,804
4,275
4,666
4,744
4,135
3,911
4,195
4,495
Large blocks .....................
984
1,145
1,327
1,508
1,614
1,602
1,521
1,632
Other blocks .....................
3,610
3,448
3,014
2,480
2,326
2,162
1,984
1,949
W 11 materials excluding precast re-
a ,
inforced wall panels .............
37,087
42,011
44,507
45,426
44,054
42,858
43,639
44,999
Precast reinforced concrete wall
panels .........................
72
182
477
941
1,478
1,935
2,580
3,162
Total all types of wall materials ....
37,159
42,193
44,984
46,367
45,532
44,793
46,219
48,161
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