THE US-CANADIAN DISPUTE OVER THE GEORGES BANK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000800220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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' -IA
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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The US-Canadian Dispute
Over the Georges Bank
An Intelligence Memorandum
GS 81-10157
81-10157
July 1981
Copy 205
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1-011111,1eHtlal
Summary
The US-Canadian Dispute
Over the Georges Bank
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The maritime boundaries between the United States and Canada have been
in dispute for years but did not become a major issue until 1977, when both
countries established 200-mile fishing zones. These zones overlapped, most
notably in the Gulf of Maine, which harbors the Georges Bank?the richest
fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast of North America and the probable
site of large deposits of oil and gas. 25X1
After considerable negotiations, in 1979 both sides came up with two
treaties dealing with the problem in the Gulf of Maine. The first governed
the management and division of fish stocks in the area. The second called for
submission of the boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for arbitration. 25X1
To protect the fishing interests of both sides, the two treaties were linked: the
boundary dispute would not be submitted to the ICJ until both countries had
ratified the fishing treaty. The US Senate, however, deferring to complaints
of New England fishermen that the fishing treaty was unfair to them,
refused to approve this treaty?although it did approve the decision on how
to settle the boundary disagreement. Despite its annoyance over the demise
of the fishing treaty, the Canadian Government will probably agree to
submit the boundary dispute to ICJ arbitration anyway. 25X1
The ICJ is expected to take years to render a decision. Meanwhile, fishing on
the Georges Bank continues under a gentlemen's agreement that must
eventually be superseded by formal agreements over fish management and
catch allocations. The Canadians, reflecting domestic political consider-
ations as well as their irritation over other contentious bilateral issues, will
probably be very tough negotiators. 25X1
This paper was prepared by the Environment and 25x1
Resource Analysis Division, Office of Geographic and Societal Research. It was coordinated
with the Offices of Economic Research and Political Analysis and with the Department of25xi
State. Information available as of 17 July was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries may be directed to the Chief of the Resource Analysis Branch, ERAD
GS 81-10157
July 1981
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UNITED STATES-CANADA: Maritime Claims in the Gulf of Maine
CANADA 70
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uHHuenuaI
The US-Canadian Dispute
Over the Georges Bank
In June 1981 the US Senate approved an agreement reached in 1979
between the United States and Canada whereby the delimitation of the
eastern maritime boundary between the two countries would be submitted to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration. This brings one step
closer to resolution an issue that has abraded relations between the two
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countries for years, but especially since 1977 when both established
200-mile fishing zones. The dispute involves not only the boundry in the Gulf
of Maine where the two zones overlap but also management and division of
the fishery and hydrocarbon resources in the area. 25X1
Origin of the Dispute
Until they established their 200-mile fishing zones, each country had
claimed a 12-mile fishing zone. In addition, each had claimed jurisdiction
over the resources of the continental shelf (and margin), which extends well
beyond 200 miles in this area.
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The United States made its continental-shelf claim in 1945 in the Truman
Proclamation. Until this time, maritime boundaries between states had
seldom been a problem, since most countries had declared only 3-mile limits.
In the determination of where to place a boundary that might extend several
hundred miles from shore, the Truman Proclamation advocated reliance on
a concept of "equitable principles." This concept would take into account
the configurations of the respective coastlines, the presence of special
physical features, the shape and geological structure of the continental shelf,
the nature and extent of the resources, historic uses of the area, and various
other considerations?while nevertheless maintaining a reasonable degree
of proportionality. Using these principles, the United States could justify
drawing a maritime boundary considerably closer to Canadian than to US
territory. In fact, it did not at that time propose a specific boundary. In 1969
the concept of equitable principles was given substantial weight in interna-
tional law when it was used to settle the continental-shelf dispute among the
North Sea littoral states. 25X1
Canada made its claim in 1965, deriving its justification from the 1958 UN
Convention on the Continental Shelf, which codified the exclusive rights of
coastal states over the resources of their continental shelves. The Convention
left the resolution of boundary disputes to the states involved but recom-
mended the "principle of equidistance" be applied when these states could
not agree. (Both the United States and Canada signed the Convention.)
Basing its claim on this principle, Canada drew a boundary line that it
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tontmentiai
The Economic Stake
alleged was everywhere equidistant between the closest shores of Canada
and the United States (taking islands such as Nantucket into account).'
Canada had taken its action after seismic surveys had indicated the possibil-
ity of hydrocarbon deposits in the Georges Bank. Its boundary line put the
northeastern third of the Bank under Canadian jurisdiction, whereas the
United States wanted the entire Bank under US jurisdiction. After Canada
began issuing permits to explore for oil and gas in its third of the region, the
United States challenged its boundary claim and called for negotiations.
These began in 1970 but were eclipsed by the global talks then getting under
way that eventually led to the ongoing Third UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea (LOS), which is currently in its Tenth Session.
No further bilateral negotiations were held until after the 1977 declarations
of 200-mile fishing zones. Those declarations brought under national juris-
diction rich fishing grounds?especially the Georges Bank?that until then
had been in international waters and were being managed by the 18-nation
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Canada
used the previous, disputed boundary of its continental shelf as the boundary
of its new fishing zone. Again, the United States objected. Because the
International Commission was no longer responsible for the management of
the fishing grounds, it became necessary for the two countries to decide
themselves how the harvest should be allocated and the fishery protected.
This necessitated coming to an agreement over the boundary, and to that
end negotiations began anew.
The Georges Bank harbors the richest fishery off the Atlantic coast of North
America. In 1976 Canadian fishermen took 87,800 tons of fish from the
Bank, 10 percent of their Atlantic catch, while US fishermen took 7 percent
of their slightly larger Atlantic catch. Scallops, cod, and haddock accounted
for most of the harvests.
The US Geological Survey estimates, moreover, that recoverable hydrocar-
bon reserves in the Georges Bank amount to some 900 million barrels of oil
and 4.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas-3 percent of the oil and 4 percent
of the gas estimated to be recoverable from the whole US outer continental
shelf.' These amounts are small in comparison with US and Canadian
'The Convention did not affect the international status of the waters above the continental
shelf and even guaranteed other nations certain rights on the shelf, such as the right to lay
cables and pipelines. Thus, neither the United States nor Canada had made any claims to
jurisdiction over the waters above their continental shelves, although the United States had
separately asserted its right to manage certain fish stocks there.
The US Geological Survey estimates are based on inferences from geologic structure rather
than extensive exploratory drilling.
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The Negotiations
consumption levels?the United States, for example, would go through
900 million barrels of oil in some two months?but large enough to be
commercially very attractive.
In 1977 the two sides entered into negotiations with the goal of producing
two treaties, one to delimit their mutual eastern fishing-zone and continen-
tal-shelf boundary, the other to deal with managing the fishery and allocat-
ing catch quotas. Several interim agreements allowed fishermen from each
country to continue fishing in the other's zone during the negotiations,
except briefly in 1978 when Canada closed its zone to US fishermen,
because of their alleged overfishing. Ottawa may also have wanted to show
displeasure over the slow pace of the negotiations. Canada backed down,
however, after the United States responded in kind by banning Canadian
fishermen from its waters?including the Great Lakes.
In 1979 the two negotiating teams produced a long-term fishing treaty that
established catch quotas and provided for the joint management of fish
stocks in the Gulf of Maine, including those on the Georges Bank. The
fishing industries in both countries grumbled, especially about the allocation
plan for scallops, the most valuable species on the Bank. The proposed treaty
gave Canadian fishermen 73 percent of the total allowable scallop catch, but
they demanded more, pointing to their 1971-76 average of 85.5 percent. For
their part, the US fishermen objected to their 23 percent, pointing out that
until 1950 they had dominated the scallop fishery. The proposed treaty
allocated 83 percent of the cod fishery and 79 percent of the haddock fishery
to the United States, with the rest going to Canada, but these allocations
aroused no complaint from either side because they merely reflected the
status quo.
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The boundary negotiations were another story. Canada continues to insist
that the boundary be drawn according to the principle of equidistance,
which would give it jurisdiction over the northeastern third of the Georges
Bank. Moreover, probably to increase its bargaining room as well as to
highlight its determination, in 1978 it increased the size of its claim by
publishing a new boundary southwest of its 1965 line. Ottawa arrived at this
new boundary by discounting the existence of Nantucket and Cape Cod
(which it called a geographic "aberration") and using instead the coastline of
Massachusetts as the closest US territory. 25X1
The United States continued to demand that the boundary be drawn
according to the concept of equitable principles, which it interpreted to
justify US jurisdiction over the entire Bank. Specifically, the United States
recommended that the boundary follow the Northeast Channel, which
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Outlook
passes just riorth of the Georges Bank. The United States made the follow-
ing assertions in support of its position:
? The Northeast Channel, which separates the Georges Bank from the Nova
Scotia shelf, is a natural break in the continental shelf; thus, the Bank is a
natural prolongation of US territory.
? The inward curve of the New England coastline and the outward bulge of
the Nova Scotia coastline would push an equidistant line inequitably close
to the United States.
? The US coastline along the Gulf of Maine is four times as long as the
Canadian coastline.
? The fish stocks of the Georges Bank are biologically more closely related
to fish stocks farther south than to those farther north.
At the conclusion of the 1979 round of negotiations the two sides agreed to
disagree. They drew up a treaty binding themselves to send the boundary
dispute to the ICJ for resolution?but only after both parties had ratified the
fishing treaty. By linking the two treaties in this way, each side sought to
preserve its historic fishing rights in the area regardless of the court's ruling
on the boundary.
The two treaties were sent to the US Senate in 1979. The boundary
agreement encountered no difficulty, but the fishing treaty ran into stiff
opposition from New England Senators, to whom the aggrieved US fisher-
men had appealed. These senators charged that the draft fishing treaty gives
US fishermen unfairly low catch allocations, that the management mecha-
nism established by the treaty is too cumbersome, and that the treaty
provides only minimal opportunities for change, since it has no termination
date. Their proposed amendments were unacceptable to Canada, so the
fishing treaty languished until the administration withdrew it from Senate
consideration on the eve of President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister
Trudeau in March 1981. At the President's request, however, the Senate did
approve the boundary treaty.
Despite its annoyance over the US Senate's refusal to approve the fishing
treaty, and although this refusal frees it from its obligation to do so, the
Canadian Government will probably submit the boundary treaty to Par-
liament anyway. Approval seems assured. Subsequently, the issue will go to
the ICJ for adjudication by a specially selected chamber of five judges
acceptable to both Canada and the United States. Even after the chamber
begins its hearings and deliberations, years may pass before it renders a
decision. The court took two years to decide the North Sea case and five
years to render a decision in the dispute between Argentina and Chile over
the Beagle Channel.
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Judging by its decisions in similar recent cases, the ICJ is likely to impose a
compromise. Because of its well-established history of fishing in the area,
Canada will probably be granted jurisdiction over part of the Georges Bank.
Nevertheless, the court is likely to bow to the concept of equitable principles
by establishing a boundary farther northeast then either of the Canadian-
drawn "equidistant" boundaries?if not as far northeast as the United
States would prefer.
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Meanwhile, fishing continues on the Georges Bank according to a gentle-
men's agreement that allows fishermen from both countries to operate in the
disputed area where the 1965 Canadian claim and the US claim overlap.
Canada will probably continue to charge that US fishermen are
overharvesting the scallop stock until the United States comes up with at
least an interim scallop management plan. Once the ICJ renders a decision,
however, formal fishing agreements will be required to provide for joint
management and reciprocal fishing rights. 25X1
Canada will continue to hang tough in any new fishing negotiations. The
government is under pressure from powerful political interests that speak for
Canada's fishing industry, and it must accommodate these interests to get
their support for other controversial government policies. Furthermore, with
one of the longest coastlines in the world, Canada is among the most ardent
advocates of strong coastal state control of marine resources, including those
extending beyond its claimed maritime zone. At the current LOS Con-
ference, for example, Canada is pushing for increased coastal state jurisdic-
tion over fish stocks that straddle the seaward boundary of the coastal
fishing zone, a proposal the United States firmly opposes.
Finally, this and the other maritime boundary disputes with the United
States 'constitute but one among a substantial array of contentious bilateral
issues. It is probably inevitable that annoyance on the part of one side or the
other over a lack of progress in resolving one issue will lead to recalcitrance
in addressing other, essentially unrelated issues. In other words the resolu-
tion of the dispute in the Gulf of Maine will depend partly on the general
state of relations between the two countries as influenced by the status of
other mutual problems.
All but forgotten in the row over the eastern maritime boundary has been the fact that the
western maritime boundaries between the United States and Canada are also in dispute. The
boundaries off the Strait of Juan de Fuca northwest of Washington, in the waters off the
southern tip of the Alaskan panhandle, and in the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska have yet to be
agreed on. Meanwhile, the waters in these areas are the subjects of overlapping claims just
like those in the Gulf of Maine. 25X1
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