ARGENTINA-CHILE: DISPUTE AT THE END OF THE EARTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000800090009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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111111011211 IUMII 111441
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Argentina-Chile:
Dispute at the End of the Earth
A Research Paper
Confidential
GC 78-10220
November 1978
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CONFIDENTIAL
Argentina-Chile: Dispute at the End of the Earth
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
November 1978
The current dispute between Argentina and Chile
over the Beagle Channel and related territorial
claims has a long and complex history. It is typical of
many other South American boundary problems
that stem from early, ambiguously worded agree-
ments and treaties that were formulated before
accurate maps were available. This paper addresses
the major issues in the Argentina-Chile dispute.
The Beagle Channel lies near the southern tip of
South America and serves as an alternate route
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Strait
of Magellan and to the course around Cape Horn. A
treaty negotiated in 1881 stipulates that the bound-
ary between Argentina and Chile should run north-
south through Tierra del Fuego, dividing Isla Grande
into two parts, with Argentina getting the eastern
part and Chile the western part. All islands along the
Atlantic coast were to belong to Argentina; those
south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn
and all along the Pacific coast were to belong to
Chile.
Differing interpretations of the treaty soon arose.
The Chileans claimed that the north-south line divid-
ing Isla Grande was to stop at the northern shore of
the Beagle Channel, so that the channel itself as well
as all territory to the south belonged to Chile. The
Argentines countered that the north-south line
reached midchannel and that a portion of the chan-
nel belonged to them. The Chileans also held that
the channel extends eastward as far as Cabo San
Pio, making the small islands of Picton, Lennox, and
Note: This paper was prepared by
Office of Geo-
graphic and Cartographic Research.(
CONFIDENTIAL
Nueva theirs; whereas the Argentines claimed that
the channel turns southward to the west of Picton
and Lennox, and the islands are therefore Argentine.
Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, ownership of which
has become a matter of national pride to both
countries, have no more than a dozen or so
permanent or seasonal Chilean residents and no
Argentines;' gold placers once exploited on them
have long since played out, and with the possible
exception of some nitrate deposits, they contain no
known mineral or other resources of significance. In
recent years, however, the importance of Tierra del
Fuego as a whole has grown, both economically and
strategically. Oilfields and enormous sheep ranches
occupy the northern part of the region. In the south,
Ushuaia, Argentina, has grown from a mere outpost
to a town of 6,000 inhabitants. It has an airfield, a
naval base, port and petroleum storage facilities, a
radio station, a hydroelectric plant, and a road that
allows overland communication with the north. Chile
maintains a small naval base at Puerto Williams,
south of the Beagle Channel on Isla Navarino.
Puerto Williams has an airstrip, a 'radio station, a
hotel, and a civilian population of about 700.
A series of incidents, including one in which a
Chilean PT boat entered Ushuaia Bay and was fired
at by an Argentine patrol ship in 1967, led Chile to
unilaterally seek British arbitration. Argentina re-
jected the idea at the time, but signed a treaty in
1972 whereby the International Court of Justice
would study the problem and sutmnit its verdict to
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MAGELLAN
AREA OF MAIN MAP-.1
???Falkland Islands
.Adrbinistered by
U.K., claimed by
Argentina)
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
S UAIA
EAGLE
ISLA NAVARINO
San Pio
ISLA PICTON
eISLA NUEVA
Bahia Orange
IS LENNOX
,ISLAS EVOUT
PACIFIC
OCEAN
57776211.78
Crf' ISLAS BARNEVELT
ISLA HORNOS
Cape Horn
Cape Horn Meridian'
V Islands and appurtenant islets and rocks awarded to Chile
by International Arbitration Court in May 1977.
+ Airfield
it Naval Station
Kilometers 100
DRAKE PASSAGE
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Figure 1. Potato field and houses of Isla Nueva
the British Crown for approval or disapproval. In
May 1977 the Court decided that the Beagle Chan-
nel should be divided between the two countries and
the disputed islands awarded to Chile; implementa-
tion of the decision, which was accepted by the
British, was set for 2 February of the following year.
But in December 1977, Argentina, which had al-
ready indicated it would not accept the Court's
ruling, began a press campaign and a number of
economic and military moves to prompt concessions
from Chile. Presidents Videla of Argentina and
Pinochet of Chile met in Mendoza, Argentina, in
January 1978, and in Puerto Montt, Chile, in Febru-
ary, and signed agreements creating a joint commis-
sion and outlining a phased negotiation process.
The first phase ended in April without any significant
progress.
As the second phase of negotiations proceeded,
the focus of attention shifted away from the islands
in the mouth of the Beagle Channel to a number of
smaller islands to the south, including Evout,
Barnevelt, and Hornos. Argentina wants a boundary
that would link these islands before it turns south
along the Cape Horn meridian, or, better yet, an
alignment that would place one or more of the
islands entirely in Argentine territory. Intrusion of the
Chileans into the Atlantic is resented by the Argen-
tines, who feel that it breaks a gentleman's agree-
ment between the two countries that Argentina
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 2. Isla Lennox viewed from the northwest
should be an Atlantic power and Chile exclusively a
Pacific power.
Argentina is also concerned about the affect the
Court's awards to Chile might have on control of
ocean resources; both countries claim sovereignty
over resources within 200 miles of the coast. Owner-
ship of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva may bear on the
location of the boundary between the two respective
200-mile zones and could give Chile a sizable slice
of the South Atlantic. Continental shelf petroleum
and coastal fisheries are the resources of greatest
interest, but the value and the extent of these in the
area are unknown. The shelf east of Nueva Island,
however, is quite narrow, about 15 miles wide,
beyond which the bottom drops rapidly to abyssal
depths. It is, therefore, much less attractive for
development than Argentina's broad shelf on the
northeastern side of Tierra del Fuego, which has
rich, relatively untapped fish resources and potential
oil deposits that may rival those of the North
Sea?although the latter will take many years of
exploration to determine.
An additional Argentine concern is that the Inter-
national Court ruling will adversely affect their
Antarctic claim which overlaps that of Chile. Pre-
sumably, they fear that any extension of Chilean
territory eastward into the Atlantic will lend weight to
Chilean claims to territory directly to the south on
the Antarctic Peninsula.
3
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1=1 Chilean claim
t=1 Argentine claim
FA General ocean area in dispute
- 200 n.m.limit
577763 11.78
4
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Figure 3. Chilean settlement on Isla Picton
Figure 4. Port of Ushuaia, Argentina
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CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 5. Freighter and naval vessel in the
Beagle Channel (prior to 1977)
1 _0\
S:141.k.v,
? "???;"--
Figure 7. Puerto Williams, Chilean naval base
on the Beagle Channel
7
, \?`
- -
-
Figure 6. Beagle Channel with snow-covered
mountains of Isla Hoste in background
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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I;
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