ECUADOR: NEW TRY FOR SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE AMAZON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700120006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 15, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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I NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS I
--ECUADOR: NEW--TRY FOR SOVEREIGN
ACCESS TO THE AMAZON
BURERU Of
IOTEWOHCf
RED RESERRCH
Summary
Ecuador's hopes for gaining sovereign access
to the Amazon River in territory that Peru now
holds took on new life following a US initiative
last September. Surprisingly, Peru at first
appeared willing. to consider Ecuador's historic
claim in return for Ecuadorean recognition of the
Rio Protocol of 1942 (which is the basis for the
de facto border between the countries). Peru's
He-vi attitude clashed with its determination,
strongly held since the War of the Pacific (1879-
83), never to relinquish more national territory.
By November, however, the likelihood of a settle-
ment decreased markedly as Peru backed away from
its earlier apparent willingness to consider the
legitimacy of the Ecuadorean aspiration. The
Ecuadoreans, for their part, are now backpedaling
from their stated willingness to accept the
protocol.
The dispute goes back to post-colonial days.
The Rio Protocol (of which the US is a guarantor
without specific duties) was accepted under some
duress by Ecuador after its defeat by Peru in
1942. In 1960, however, Ecuador denounced the
protocol, which all other signatories continue
to consider valid. Though the issue has often
been dormant, sovereign access to the Amazon is
an Ecuadorean foreign policy goal of the utmost
symbolic importance.
Peru's recent conciliatory posture may be
due to a desire to convince Ecuador (and perhaps
Chile) that Peru's arms purchases are not a
threat to its neighbors. The Peruvian Government
may have planned to persuade its military of the
advantages of settling the dispute with Ecuador
in order to eliminate the threat of a two-front
war in which Chile might ally itself with Ecuador.
_Z~XGDS-l
Report No. 895
December 15, 1977
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It is likely, however, that this argument has failed.
Meanwhile, the Ecuadorean military may not wish to settle
for the narrow corridor to the Amazon that the Peruvians,
at their most generous, might be expected to offer. At
present, the prospects for a settlement seem slight.
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Recent Developments
Ecuador's perennial hopes for sovereign access to
the Amazon in territory now held by Peru were fanned
bright last September when President Carter broached the
matter in bilateral talks with leaders of both countries.
He expressed his interest in the issue while President
Morales Bermudez of Peru and President Poveda of Ecuador
were in Washington to observe the Panama Canal Treaty
signing. The stay produced two signal events: a rare
face-to-face meeting of Peruvian and Ecuadorean Presidents
and the expressed willingness of the Peruvian President to
open discussions on territorial problems that his govern-
ment had said were closed. Poveda was thus able to return
to Ecuador and report that he and Morales Bermudez "had
analyzed all bilateral matters of historical and political
interest, especially those of a more delicate and historic
nature"--meaning Ecuador's hopes for a return to the status
of an Amazonian country.
Several promising developments followed:
--Foreign Ministers de la Puente of Peru and Ayala
of Ecuador had an amicable two and one-half hour
meeting in New York which touched on the issue.
--Both foreign ministers told the US separately that
their countries expected to exchange notes setting
forth the objectives of discussions on border
demarcation and Ecuadorean access to the Amazon.
--The Ecuadoreans indicated that they would honor the
Rio Protocol of 1942, which Peru claims is valid
but which Ecuador denounced in 1960.
.The most surprising development was the apparent will-
ingness of de la Puente (and therefore, possibly Morales
Bermudez) to recognize that the Ecuadoreans seek "sovereign
access" to the Amazon and not simply commercial rights or
some other sort of access not involving territorial conces-
sions. The Peruvian military (since Peru's humiliation by
Chile in the War of the Pacific, 1879-83) generally hold
the conviction that Peru should not give up another square
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inch of territory, as strongly as the Ecuadoreans espouse
their right to sovereign access to the Amazon. If an
exchange of notes acknowledges Ecuador's territorial
aspirations, the Peruvian military leadership is certain
to come under criticism from the Peruvian officer corps.
But Ecuador will accept nothing less and will be most
wary of any attempt by Peru to modify the word-"access".
with any adjective other than "sovereign."
Not surprisingly, the Peruvians have been concerned
since September. about the obvious, and probably unwarranted,
euphoria in Quito. This euphoria includes'an unusually favor-
able:di,s.position.,toward the'US, resulting in US-Ecuadorean
relations that are almost unrealistically cordial.
Developments in November suggest that Peru's (arid
our):.concern about Ecuador's mood is warranted. Both
sides .are resuming. traditional postures:
--In a.November,.10 letter to President Carter,
President Morales Bermudez said Peru will soon
make proposals allowing Ecuador to "take advantage
of its, Amazonian potential"-.but added the signif_
icant caveat that "this Peruvian effort'should not
necessarily be limited to the Ecuadorean desire
for a sovereign outlet to the. Amazon."
--On November 17 de la Puente told the US Ambassador
that the countries were unable to agree on language
to'be used in the notes because--contrary to`earlier
indications, noted above--Ecuador refused to recog-
nize the.Rio Treaty and would.admit only that the
.. two. countries maintain contrasting. positions.
De la Puente left unsaid the language Peru suggested
on Ecuadorean access to the Amazon. It is virtually
certain, however, that the proposed language did not
reflect-earlier statements by de la Puente which had
encouraged the Ecuadoreans to believe that Peru now
considered Ecuador's desire for sovereign access to
the Amazon to be negotiable.
The, unfolding events suggest that. in preliminary talks
.the respective foreign ministries were more forthcoming
than;. their military regime masters subsequently approved.
,Historical Background
Ecuadorean-produced maps all show the country's east-
ern border lying along the Maranon branch of the Amazon
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- 3 -
and including Iquitos, the Peruvian port above which most
ocean-going vessels cannot proceed. In contrast, the
de facto border (which at no point touches the Amazon) is
170 to 250 miles west of Iquitos along markers agreed'to
while, Ecuador still adhered to the Rio Protocol. Along
the unmarked portion of the border, Peruvian and Ecuadorean
military-patrols have a tacit agreement to stay on opposite
sides of the Cordillera del Condor.
Nevertheless, the Ecuadoreans base their,claim to the
north bank of the Maranon on (1)'the departure in 1542 from
Quito of the expedition under Francisco de'Orrellano that
discovered the Amazon; and (2) the Pedemonte-Mosquera Pro-
tocol of 1830. The latter provided that the border between
the countries was the same as that between the colonial
audiencias of Peru and Ecuador, which was along the Maranon.
Ecuador claims that this protocol is still valid, but'Peru
holds that since Ecuador withdrew from the Gran Colombia
federation in 1830, Ecuador forfeited its rights.
The border problems have aroused great passion. Media-
tion by the King of Spain from 1895 to 1910 failed and war
was averted only by the intervention of the US, Argentina,
and Brazil. US arbitration was-fruitless during the 1930's.
The US, Argentina, and Brazil offered to arbitrate once
again.in 1941, but Peru invaded Ecuador on July 5 of that
year and occupied all of'the southernmost (El Oro).province.
Peru then presented an ultimatum requiring Ecuador to cede
some 70,000 square miles of eastern territory in exchange
for the return of El Oro. The US; Argentina, Brazil`, and
Chile became guarantors of the Protocol of Peace, Friend-
ship and Boundaries between Ecuador and Peru signed at Rio
on January 29, 1942, under which Ecuador relinquished its'
eastern territories.
Rio Protocol
The.Rio Protocol established the procedure under
which the boundary would be marked.
--Article V states that the US and other guarantors
shall continue their activity (which is 'not
specified) until definite demarcation of the,
border is accomplished.
--Article VI says that Ecuador shall "enjoy, for the
purposes of'navigation" the same concessions as'Brazil
and Colombia for commerce and navigation on the Amazon
(but it says nothing about "sovereign" access).
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U JJ %_ 1%JJ 1
--Article VIII indicates the general contour of the
boundary.
The discovery in 1946 of the upper reaches of the,
Cenepa River made impossible the demarcation of the-border
along the watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers,
as had been called for in Article VIII. The Ecuadoreans
used this situation to renew their hopes for Amazon;access.
In 1951, President Galo Plaza said that no settlement with
Peru was possible without access to the Amazon. In 1960
President Velasco Ibarra declared the Rio Protocol void,
leading to a four-year break in relations with Peru. Des-,
pite Ecuador's unilateral declarations, however, the
.guarantors and Peru continued to_uphold the protocol.
The issue, while often dormant, has been subject to
periodic. Ecuadorean agitation. Peruvian unwillingness to
discuss it led to Ecuador's withdrawal last December of an
invitation to Morales Bermudez to stop in Ecuador en route?
to Venezuela.
Ecuador':s Aspirations
Access to the Maranon is Ecuador's most fundamental
foreign policy objective, and even the receipt of a note
from the Peruvians opening the question of the legitimacy
of this claim would be an,important advance. Ecuador's
Foreign Ministry. stresses the overriding importance of the
symbolism attached to the flying of the Ecuadorean flag on
the Maranon in contrast to the limited economic and strate-
gic value of sovereign access.
If the Ecuadoreans concede the validity of the Rio
Protocol, they will focus their hopes for access on the
portion of the Peru-Ecuador border that has not been marked,
a 60-mile stretch west of the Cenepa. The Ecuadoreans claim
that the area has no important natural resources, despite
.rumors of possible petroleum reserves. Small boats are
navigable to the rapids on the Maranon known as the Pongo
de Marisereche. Consequently, the Ecuadoreans would like
to have access to the Maranon below this point, which is
just-above the Maranon's confluence with the Santiago.
Although Ecuador reportedly has access to the Amazon
system via the Napo and Cururay Rivers, to the northeast,
national mythology will accept only'the Maranon. as access
to the Amazon proper.
If.Ecuadorean aspirations are confined to the undemar-
cated area:
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--the minimum Ecuador might accept is a narrow
corridor, perhaps no more than a few kilometers
wide, stretching some 100 kilometers to the
Amazon-Santiago confluence; but
--it would try to obtain a large chunk of territory
encompassing both ends of the undemarcated border
and forming a triangle of.perhaps 10,000 square
kilometers with a point at the rivers' confluence.
The Ecuadoreans would expect the Peruvians to.offer,
at most, the former. The Ecuadorean Government, in press-
ing for the larger concession, will be responding in part
to the designs of military men who, in some cases,.feel
that Peru's concessions should also include territory east
of the border demarcated under the Rio Protocol.
Peruvian Aspirations
Peru's sincerity in entering discussions is naturally
open to question. The Ecuadoreans say, however, that even
before the meeting with President Carter, Peru showed some
slight softening in its attitude. President Carter's initiative
appears to have moved Morales Bermudez to be forthcoming to
the Ecuadoreans, at least temporarily. The most credible
reason for Peru's present posture is that it wishes to
deflect hostility from international observers, including
the US and border countries, who have expressed concern
about Peru! s arms build-up. The Peruvians may believe that
negotiations can be conducted for a long period with an
inconclusive end, while serving as an international
earnest of good intentions.
The reasons that Peru might wish to-be genuinely.
forthcoming, or at least appear to be so,.include:..
--a desire to secure Peru's northern frontier in case
of hostilities with Chile, the. No. 1 potential enemy;
--the possibility that international lenders will be
more generous in alleviating Peru's significant
.financial problems if the country appears to be
seeking Andean peace;
--a genuine hope of decreasing Andean tensions and
solving ever-troublesome border disputes, including
those in the north and the south.
It is likely, that the Peruvian Government is not
entirely unified on its motives and objectives. In.
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discussions with the US Ambassador on November 2, Foreign
Minister de la Puente said he would have difficulty sell-
ing the advantages of a settlement with Ecuador to the
Peruvian military, given their deep-seated repugnance to
ceding national territory. Moreover, there is a widespread
popular, though unsubstantiated, belief that petroleum
exists in the territory under consideration. In July '1976
the Peruvians opened to bidding a concession for oil explor-
ation cutting across the area coveted by Ecuador. Thus far,
however, apparently no oil company has responded.
De la Puente's strongest argument for internal con-
sumption probably is that concessions could secure the
northern border in case of hostilities in the south. The
success of such an argument will be influenced by two
highly uncertain factors:
--the Peruvian military's intentions toward Chile, and
their perception of Chilean intentions toward Peru;
--the Chile-Bolivia-Peru discussions on the Bolivian
corridor to the sea.
If the Peruvian military, in fact, intend to pursue
their revanchist aspirations in the south, they may genu-
inely wish to secure Peru's northern border, perhaps
speeding a settlement with Ecuador. Interestingly, the
Peruvians have blamed the Chileans for encouraging
the Ecuadoreans to be unreasonable in their territorial
demands in order to frustrate a settlement. On the other
hand, even the remote possibility of successful corridor
discussions, including a land buffer between Peru and Chile,
could decrease the war threat in the Andean region and
Peru's perception of the urgency of a northern settlement.
Timing
If negotiations are started, both sides will expect
them to last at least several years. Next year, the
Ecuadorean military propose to turn over the government to
civilians. The Peruvian military, similarly, have promised
elections for a constituent assembly in 1978 and presiden-
tial elections by 1980. The opening of a national political
dialogue in both countries could subject the border talks
to new pressures. For instance, the possibility of petro-
leum in the area would appear to be a major rallying point
for Peruvian opponents of concessions. Civilians, if and
when they take control of the government, will be wary of
alienating the military establishments and opening them-
selves to criticism from members of opposition parties.
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Consequently, the optimum time for making an agreement may
be before the military leaders in both countries return to
the barracks. It should be noted, however, that this
timing would open the arrangements to questions of consti-
tutional legitimacy.
Prospects
Until recently, the foreign ministries in both countries
seemed to feel that there were grounds for negotiations. The
outcome of the situation, however, is in the hands of the
two military establishments. It is unlikely that either one
will agree to the major concessions required to put negotia-
tions on a fruitful course. The most probable scenario
includes a.period, perhaps even now coming-to an end, during
which Peru and Ecuador will rebuff each other's major demand.
After that, negotiations are likely either to collapse or to
stagnate. It is unlikely, that notes will be exchanged.
A breakdown on the current rather tentative dialogue,
either full or partial, will add another measure of dis-
trust to the Andean situation, in which Peru already is
regarded suspiciously by its neighbors, particularly Chile
and Ecuador. In the absence of convincing evidence that
Peru does not have aggressive intentions, Ecuador and Chile
are likely to increase purchases of sophisticated arms (to
the extent this is possible) and to lay the basis for
further cooperation (i.e., against Peru). In turn, the
Peruvians can be expected to react uneasily to their
neighbors' activities.
US Participation
Whatever official. position the US might take, the Ecua-
doreans probably believe that we have a role to play in the
negotiations. If negotiations break down, the Ecuadoreans
will hope for US pressure on Peru. Failure of the US to
respond sympathetically could create some bitterness in
Quito, though a measure of gratitude would. still be felt
toward President Carter for trying to get negotiations
under way. The recent fillip to amicable US-Ecuadorean
relations will probably end as the main determinant of
the Ecuadorean attitude once again becomes US willingness.
to transfer arms to Ecuador to counter the "Peruvian threat."
Prepared by Louis F. Licht, III
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EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 5B-1
(Classified by M. Packman).
Approved by Hunter L. Estep
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