REPORT ON A VENEZUELAN MAGAZINE ARTICLE ENTITLED WAR WITH COLOMBIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 7, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in
South America, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1938
Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Arreglo de Limites entre la Republica de Colombia y la Republica
de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, Editorial Litografia Colombia,
Bogota, 1943.
Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Limites de la Republica de Colombia (segunda edicion), Litografia
Colombia, Bogota, 1944.
Marchant, Alexander, Office of the Geographer, Department of State,
Boundaries of the Latin American Republics, An Annotated list-of
Documents, 1493-1943, GPO, Washington, 1944.
Aschmann, Homer, Indian Fastoralists of the Guajira Peninsula,
December 1960.
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INTRODUCTION
Last August a responsible Venezuelan magazine ran an
article entitled- 'War with Colombia?" That samemonth the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister, in Bogota for the inauguration
of President Pastrana, said in answer to a reporter's
question that war was absurd and unthinkable. "It would be
a crime against our people," he said. Responsible officials
in both countries were speculating on the possibility of
war and, like the Venezuelan Foreign Ministef, decrying the
very speculation as an absurdity.
An observer, surprised by the need to deny the possibility
of war, could conclude that such talk was indeed mere
absurdity. Yet, the fear was not hysteria. If it did not
come from an immediate threat, it came from certain knowledge
that beneath a surface tranquility deep problems troubled
the relations between Venezuela and Colombia.
In answer to another question from the same reporter,
Foreign Minister Aristides Calvani said: "The word conflict'
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is inappropriate. I use the word. 'difficulties'." The
current round of difficulties between Venezuela and Colombia
-?
--came to-the surface-in-October-19-68-1-when?the ColoMbian
congress debated a proposal to extend Colombian territorial
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waters to a two hundred_mile limit. The proposal was
interpreted by the Venezuelan press as an effort to take
over a group of barren, uninhabited Venezuelan islets called
Los Monjes offthe Colombian part of the Guajira Peninsula.
Colombia soon set Venezuela at ?easd on this-point, reaffirming
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its acknowledgment of the islets as Venezuelan. Out of
this incident, hoWever, came a renewed interest in defining
the boundaries of the continental shelf. Secret negotiations
had been going on since 1965, when Venezuela protested
Colombia's granting concessions for oil exploration in the
Gulf of Venezuela. President Lleras asked congress to
suspend debate on the two hundred mile proposal until the
two countries reached agreement on the continental shelf.
Relations were further strained in May 1969, when
Venezuela refused to join the Andean Pact, a major interest
of Colombia. President Caldera, who had assumed office in
llardh, tried to mend fences by accepting a Colombian invitation
to offer good offices in mediating the Salvadoran-Honduran
border war and by going to Bogota in August for the hundred
and fiftieth anniversary celebration of Colombian independence.
.
Caldera and Il-eras met again in December, this time on-the
border to inaugurate an international bridge.
Underlying tensions were again stirred, however, when
the Capriles chain of periodicals in Caracas began a series
of anti-Colombian articles in February 1970. The articles
asserted that as many as a million Colombians resided
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illegally in Venezuela
smugglers, and military
many of them criminals, prostitutes,
reservists and retired army officers.
These Colombians were said to be ruining the land, taking the
best jobs, stealing cars, illegally importing cattle and
coffee, and spending their Venezuelan money in Colombia.
Most ominously, the reservists and former military officers
were settling in the border areas forming a "Colombian
Sudetenland" and a potential fifth column.
While most thinking Venezuelans rejected these
allegations as commercially-motivated sensationalism,
there was a grain of truth in what the Capriles newspapers
said, enough to focus public attention on the witches brew
of Colombian-Venezuelan difficulties. As discussion continued
President.Caldera once again tried to calm the situation.
He said that the problem of illegal immigration is one of
continuing conversations between the two governments.
Indirectly chastizing the Capriles chain, he said that Venezuela's
relationship with Colombia is based on solid friendship
and mutual interest.
Earlipr.governments had taken a leisurely attitude
toward the two countries' problems with each other; but
Presidents Caldera and Lleras agreed that a more vigorous
approach was necessary. Venezuelan and Colombian representatives
sat down in March to begin serious discussion of the continental
shelf problem. They quickly agreed on the_terms of reference
for a future meeting, which they scheduled for June.
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Meanwhile, tension increased in Venezuela as a result of
the attention focused on Colombia by the continuing Capriles
attacks and the uncertainty of the April election in Colombia
and the .disturbances following them. The Venezuelan
National Guard was put on alert in border areas and ranking
Venezuelans, including the president, expressed serious
doubts about the maintenance of order and the durability of
democracy in Colombia.
Negotiators at the June session of the continental
shelf talks were unable to reconcile the widely divergent
claims of Colombia and Venezuela, and the two delegations
were able to agree only on another meeting, which they
scheduled for September.. The June meeting _apparently ended
with a hardening of positions on both sides.
Underlying the Venezuelan position was Venezuela's other
border problem, Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo region
of Guyana. Less than a week after the continental shelf
talks ended, Venezuela signed an agreement with Guyana that
in effect put a twelve-year moratorium on Venezuela's claims
against GUyana. That, in addition to the fact that in past
negotiations with Colombia the latter had won large areas
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claimed by Venezuela, made it politically necessary for
Caldera to appear to be a staunch defender of Venezuela's
interests on the continental shelf. The probability of
rich oil deposits in:the'Gulf of Venezuela further stiffened
Venezuela's position.
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The Capriles press continued its campaign with reports
of Venezuelan children in the border area being taught by-
Colombian teachers using Colombian textbooks of Colombian
"troops patrolling within Venezuela, and of the Colombian
flag being flown in Venezuelan border towns. The reports
led to widespread4eeling that Colombia is dominant in much
of the border area. For their part, Colombians viewed such
charges with alarm, seeing in them evidence of Venezuelan
aggressiveness and a threat to their compatriots on the
Venezuelan side of the border.
The military in both countries were caught up in the
tension and began giving seriotil thought to the defense of
their national territory. Both sides made studies, wrote
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contingency papers and took preliminary steps toward
improving their military posture on the border.
After the inauguration of Colombian president Pastrana
in August, Colombia asked for a delay in the continental
shelf talks to permit the new government to familiarize
itself with the problem. The delay, coupled with efforts
by both sides to quiet the issue has resulted in a
slackening of interest for the time being. With the renewal
of talks in late October, however, feeling is sure to regain
at least the heat of last summer, as Colombia and Venezuela
once more try to come to grips with the issues.
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THE ISSUES
Definition of the Border
From 1550 until_1777 Venezuela and Colombia formed the
Kingdom of New Granada. In the latter year Venezuela was
separated to form.the Captaincy General of Venezuela. In
ILLEGIB
1820, following the War of Independence the two countries
were once again joined, together with Ecuador, to form New
Granada. That arrangement lasted only ten years. In 1830
it was agreed that the boundary between the two countries
would be the line where administration had stopped before
1820. Since much of the border area was unsettled, however,
little of it effectively administered, and none of it
demarcated, it was often difficult to draw precise lines
between the two countries. In 1833 the Michelena-Pombo
Treaty was drawn up. The treaty was rejected by the Venezuelan
congress, however, because the northern terminus of the
C 5-bo ILLEGIB
frontier ended atAChichibacoa, on the Guajira Peninsula,
CSODcl a.- (1)
instead of at La Vela, where the Venezuelan congress believed
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it ought to end.
The boundary was not specifically delimited until 1891,
when the king of Spain acted as arbiter. In 1941 Colombia
and Venezuela signed a treaty settling a boundary dispute
arising from differing interpretations of the 1891 award.
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Since then the land boundary has been considered
settled, except for an area in the Perija mountain chain
west of Maracaibo. Venezuela recently raised this dispute
on the basis that a supposedly single mountain crest defining
the boundary was actually-divided. Discussion of this-problem
has so far been confined to diplomatic channels and is not
yet public knowledge.
The remaining dispute is over the definition of the
territorial sea and continental shelf boundaries in the
Gulf of Venezuela. Discussion between the two countries
has been carried out since 1965 with added impetus in 1970.
The point at issue is what principle, among the several
recognized by international law, should be used to delimit
the extension of the land boundary between Colombia and
Venezuela into the territorial ?sea area and the continental
shelf. Each country expouses the principle that would be
most advantageous to itself. Colombia bases its claim on
the median line principle. In applying that principle,
Colombia would draw an equidistant line -- a line equally
distant at all points from the shores ot the two countries --
t ? ? ?
extending twelve miles out for delimitation of territorial
sea and going half way to the closest point on the Venezuelan
side of the Gulf. The half-way mark is twenty-seven miles
from each shore. From that point a line would be drawn to
the open sea, defining the continental shelf boundary as
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being equidistant from ,the eastern and western shores of
the Gulf. Colombia discounts Los Monjes Islands, assetting
that the insignificance of the islets precludes considering
them as an entity with a twelve-mile territorial sea.
Instead, Colombia maintains that each islet should be
treated individually, each with its own minimum of territorial
sea.
The Colombian claim would give Colombia a considerable
portion of the Gulf of Maracaibo, both as territorial ?sea
and as continental shelf. Venezuela stoutly resists the
Colombian claim, maintaining that the principle to be applied
is the principle of Historic Bays. Venezuela asserts that
this principle is applicable because the Gulf of Venezuela
is an internal sea bounded by Venezuelan shoreline in
uninterrupted, undisputed use by Venezuela since the
discovery of the country. Venezuela maintains that the
sea boundary should be determined by a direct linear
extension of the land boundary between the two countries in-
the Guajira Peninsula. The Monjes Islands should be treated
as an enti,ty.wih.their own territorial sea, and a median
line should be drawn between the islands and the Colombian
shoreline. Thus, except for a twelve-mile strip off the.
Colombian
Colombian coast, all of the Gulf of Venezuela would be
Venezuelan territorial sea and Venezuela's continental
shelf would stretch east and north of the Monjes Islands.
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The juridical positions are taken, of course, in
defense of national interests. The national interests
involved are nationalistic pride and economic considerations.
For their part Colombians feel that international law is on
their side and that it would not be proper to give up a
justified legal claim. Venezuelan nationalism is more complex
and more emotional. Venezuelans feel that in the 1891 award
and the 1941 treaty they lost or gave away largeparts of
what were truly Venezuelan territory. They point to the
Michelena-Pombo Treaty as proof of Colombia's acceptance
of the entire coastline of the Gulf of Venezuela and of
half of the Guajira Peninsula as rightly Venezuelan. As
they demonstrated in their negotiations with Guyana,
Venezuela maintains that in international' disputes equity
overrides purely juridical considerations. On this basis,
many argue that the matter is already settled and that
there should be no negotiations at all. The June agreement
with Guyana reinforces the sentiment that there must be no
more surrender of national territory.
Econdmia cdrisiderations strengthen nationalistic
feeling. Not only is the Gulf of Venezuela essential to
the shipment of Venezuelan oil but it is also rich in
shrimp. Venezuela's economic interest in the gulf is greatly
sharpened by the probability that the floor of the gulf is
rich in oil. Venezuelan officials estimate that in an area-
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south of a straight line from the Venezuelan-Colombian
border on the Guajira Peninsula to the northern tip of the
Paraguana Peninsula there are 126 billion barrels of oil,
three times the estimate for the rich Bolivar Coastal Field
in Lake Maracaibo.
Nor is Colombia immune to the lure of oil. While Colombian
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domestic demand for petroleum products is increasing, oil
production is expected to decrease, and there is little
exploration activity at present. The Colombian state oil
company estimates that Colombia will be a net importer of
oil by 1975. The Colombian officials have noted that loss
of potential petroleum areas in negotiations with Venezuela
would have a severe economic impact on Colombia. The loss
of export revenue and the use of foreign exchange for the
purchase of oil would be compounded by the Colombian
government's policy.o.fsupplying the domestic market with
low-cost oil products. Texaco-Gulf, the most important
foreign oil company operating in Colombia, is even more
pessimistic than the state oil company. Texaco-Gulf
estimates that Colombia will have to begin importing oil in
1971 and that it will be a net importer by 1974.
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Colombians residing illegally in Venezuela
By most estimates there are from 200,000 to 400,000
indocumentados--Colombians residing illegally in Venezuela.
This is in addition to- a 3,arge _number -of legal immigrants -
and a large number of visitors. Colombians go to Venezuela
to seek work, lately as farm laborers, urban workers, or
domestic servants. Many fail in that and turn to- crime or
prostitution.
The most serious problems stemming from the indocumentados
are in the economically poor Andes region of the States of
Tachira, Merida, and Trujillo and in parts of Zulia.
q,aLLEGIB
Colombians create burdens on public and health services,
add to unemployment problems, and participate in contraband
across the border. In some areas Colombians outnumber
Venezuelans four to one. Venezuelans also believe that
in certain areas, especially in sparsely populated parts of
Zulia, Colombian influence is dominant on Venezuelan soil.
Venezuelan dislike of the Colombians is aggravated by
the fear that in the event of war the ihdocumentados would
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form a potential fifth column. Indeed there is some
evidence that Colombian strategic thinking takes the
indocumentados into account for just that purpose in the event
of a Venezuelan invasion.
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The problem. is as serious for Colombia as it is for.
- Venezuela.:-Both-sides remember-that-the-Salvadoran-HOnduran.-
conflict?of 1969 hingedlargely on the of
SalvadOrans:intliOnduraS.:. Col0Mbia.fears:fOr-theTmellbein4_
- --of -its-nationals-in Venezuela. The .threat. Of_maSS..expiirSion -
hangs over Colomb.i..a's head, and alleged cases of mistreatment-.
of .Colombians by Venezuelan national guardsmen ?or landowners
. receives considerable publicity in the Colombian press.
.Because Of the long border, MU-di of it isolated and
-.sparsely populated it-is -impOssible for 'either country tb--
control the migration. So long as Colombians believe they ,
can raise their standard of living by going to Venezuela
they will go. So long as Venezuelans find in them a source
of cheap labor they will be admitted. ?For example, many
land-owners in Western VenezUela advertise for them. Coffee
growers, in particular, point out that Colombian labor.
does not compete with Venezuelan in harvesting the annual
.ctiffee crop and that without the Colombians the coffee
crop would be lost.
The circumstances differ somewhat on the najira Peninsula.
This arid region is inhabited primarily by nomadic Indian tribes
who pasture flocks of goats and scrawny cattle. The Guajira
Indians have traditionally moved freely about the peninsula, with
little regard for the international boundary.
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Smuggling
Contraband is a continual source of friction, but it
is not a serious problem because it is beneficial to many
persons-on both sides of the border. For example, although
the Venezuelan Cattlemen's Federation and the Colombian
government protest the illegal and large-scale shipment
of large numbers of Colombian cattle to Venezuela, no
serious efforts have been made to stop this contraband
because it lowers the price of beef in Venezuela and is an
important source of revenue for Colombian cattlemen.
Similarly, the economy of many border towns depends on
contraband. Venezuelans buy inexpensive farm products,
clothing, and processed food from Colombia, and Colombians
buy appliances, electrical equipment, and wheat flour from
Venezuela. Colombian coffee is illegally imported in
large quantities but still not enough to permit Venezuela
to fill its export quota.
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The Paper War
An irritant in the troubled relations between Colombia
and Venezuela has been the campaign carried out by the
Capriles press chain in Venezuela. Fifty-five year old
Miguel Angel Capriles has boosted his group of newspapers
and magazines into a powerful political force and the most
influential press force in national politics through
sensationalism, sex and crime and high-powered crusades in
the best tradition of yellow journalism.
Since early February 1970 the Capriles chain has been
carrying. on an intense anti-Colombian campaign. Although
much of the campaign consists of gross distortion and
most thinking Venezuelans consider it self-serving sensationalism,
many of the press accusations touch sensitive Venezuelan nerves.
It is likely that the campaign has added to the tension
in both countries by arousing deep-seated fears and resentments
among Venezuelans and by creating resentment among Colombians
and doubt as to what the Venezuelans are up to. By raising
these fears and,doubts it is possible that Capriles is
contributing to a hardening of positions on both sides.
There is little likelihood that the campaign will be
called off. The Capriles chain is too powerful to yield
to government pressure, and freedom of the press is too
touchy a subject in Venezuela to permit strong-handed
government efforts to restrain the campaign. Further,
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President Caldera is to a degree obligated to Capriles.
The two made a deal during the 1968 election campaign of
1968 by which Capriles supported Caldera in exchange for
a number of positions on Calclera's party ticket. Capriles!
- -support probebly-played a significant-role in Caldera's
narrow victory. In addition Capriles parliamentary group
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still supports Caldera on most iSalle8 in congress.
_
Although Capriles' campaign is in abeyance at the moment,
there is little doubt that it will pick up again when
Colombia and Venezuela resume negotiations on the continental
shelf. As long as the campaign sells newspapers and furthers
the ambitions of Miguel Angel Capriles it will be carried on.
The military
Neither the Venezuelan nor the Colombian military harbor
aggressive designs against the other, but both are highly
conscious of their responsibility to defend their nation's
frontiers.
The immediate concern of the Venezuelan military is to
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strengthen the frontier by establishing effective socio-
economic sovereignty over the area. The Colombian military,
on the other hand, fear a Venezuelan attack through the
Guajira Peninsula on the Maicao-Riohacha axis. The
Colombians reason that the attack would be facilitated by
the high-speed macadam-surfaced highway between the two
Colombian cities-and that it would bring all of the Guajira
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Peninsula under Venezuelan control.
Both sides have carried out studies, and to a limited
extent reconnaissance, of the border area and both have
convinced themselves that they are?in a weak defensive ?
position. Neither so far has carried out a troop buildup-
along the frontier. Colombia has given serious thought to
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defending its frontiers and apparently has come to the conclusion
that it is too weak in materiel and in logistics to defend
the frontier successfully. For its part, the Venezuelan
military are frustrated by their lack of resources for
maintaining an effective Venezuelan presence along the
frontier, and they doubt their ability to cope with the
large number of Colombians.
Thus, psychological factors are present which could
result in a limited arms race and troop buildup on both
sides of the border. For over a year Colombia has been
considering purchasing more modern aircraft to replace the
T-33's that now comprise its fighter inventory. If the
Colombians go ahead with their plans there will certainly
be strong pressures in Venezuela to purchase new aircraft
to maintain air superiority. Colombians are also considering- --
means of offsetting Venezuela's superiority in tanks.
Both countries have attempted to limit military spending,
but if tension continues to rise defense-spending will- --
likely receive increased attention in both Venezuela and
Colombia.
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Economics
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The two countries are not seriously economic competitors.
The most important economiC problems bretwpan them are the
previously discussed issues of the Gulf. of Venezuela? and-
smuggling along the border.
Since 1966 V&lezuela and Colombia have carried out
efforts at economic integration of the border. Two bridges
have been built and roads improved. Radio and telephone
communications have been improved. Maicao, in Colombia,
.has been supplied with electricity from Venezuela. , Irrigation
projects have been carried out, and complementation
agreements such as for a chemical fertilizer installation
at Barranquilla, have been signed. In general, economic
integration of the border has been carried forth smoothly,
if piecemeal and slowly, and without serious friction.
A residue of bitterness does remain, however, over
Venezuela's failure to join the Andean pact, a prime interest
of Colombia. In May 1970 Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and
Colombia qigned,an Accord for Subregional Economic Integration
within the framework of the Latin American Free-Trade
Association. Venezuela refused to join because-of high
production costs in Venezuela and because of the opposition -
of Venezuela's powerful Federation of Chambers of Commerce,
which was reluctant to relinquish a comfortable status q.110._
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Venezuela's reluctance, after nearly three years-of:discussi011*e,
was looked at by the Colombians with considerable displeasure.
For their part, the Venezuelansfelt that the Colombians were
unreasonable and that they Were shabbily treated at the.
final conference in May. The received-
. .
prompted President Caldera to say: "If this is courtship,
what would marria4e be like?" The Venezuelan government
has also had to face domestic repercussions atits failure
to join the Andean Pact, including recriminations about
losing important commercial opportunities and questions
about the negotiating ability of the government.
Conclusions
Colombian and Venezuelan presidents have met seven
times in the Past five Years, including one visit by Lleras
to Caracas before his election and one between his election.
and inauguration. Such traveling back and forth is indicative
of the .continuing interest at the highest level on both sides
- of maintaining good relations. This interest is reflected
throughol4 the governments of Venezuela and Colombia. Even
the two countries congresses,-often-a_platfarm for self-serving -
nationalism have tried to keep relations on an-even-keel.
In July the two congresses passed conciliatory resolutions
extolling Colombian-Venezuelan friendship and urging a
peaceful solution to their problems.
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Yet, despite the bonds of. the shared language, religion,
-racial, origins,-.and_the.common-Bolivarian background,
despite the efforts of leaders of the two countries to
keep the differences in diplomatic channels, the underlying.
problems are never far fromthe surface and the gOvernments ?
of the two countries are responsive to forces beyond their
control. When President Lleras felt obliged to say in July
that Venezuela has never before claimednor could it claim
that-the.Gulf cE Venezuela is an interior sea, President
-Caldera had no Choice but .to reassert- Venezuela's claim.
Thus, although Colombia and Venezuela certainly want
cordial' relations with each other, their maneuverability
is severely circumscribed by deep-rooted, powerful, and
emotional nationalistic and economic pressures.
-The-differences between-Colombia- and Venezuela will
.not yield easily to sblution, even with the greatest
.good will on both sides. As the continental shelf
negotiations, drag on, as Capriles keeps up his sniping,
'tempers may become frayed and.a-high degree of 'tact and'
84-reguired to substantiate a statement made ?
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by President Caldera last.February: "Relations between
Venezuela_and.Colombia?are as.they_should be: Excellent,.
cordial, cooperative, fraternal."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060021-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060021-8
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Colombia and Venezuela - Territorial Conflicts
12
CARIBBEAN
CABO OE
LA VELA
SEA
72 COLOMBIAN
.."-CONTINENTAL
VENEZUELAN
ICONTINENTAL
CLUMI. 1A
SHELF SHELF,
TO\
)1" VEA ockl- S-
j EBB\19
-OHL
BW-
GULF OF
VENEZUELA
Ne)
? GU AJIR A
PENINSULA
Riohacha
NET HERE
ARUBA A S
69
4N r,
liEs
CURAEA0
CONAIRE
12
Moicao
Paraquaipoo
(INTERNAL SEA)
Maracaibo
abirelos
41)
Machiques
? LA KE
MARACA 1130
Barquisime
t
TERRITORIAL WATERS
? ',,,kWeIleZUeian Claim
41:4'
NOT NECE ARILV AUTHORITATIVE
ISROUNOARVEPRESENTATION IS
CARIBBEAN
CABS DE
LA VELA
SEA
Riohacha
COLOMBIAN
CONTINENTAL
SHELF
LOisS. if
CO/Q3-
AA, MONJESj
45" SI\
r-- ,
- '
EtC)
I,
2,5 up
g0 180 Kilometers
190 Nautical Miles
NET
CURAQA0
BONAIRE
PARAGUAN
PENINSULA
Punto
12-
Morocoibo
abimas
500023 10-70 CIA
Mochiques
SOUNOA It REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NEC SARILV AUTHORITATIVE
LA KE
MA NA CA IRO
.Valero
I,
Barquisimeto
r
TERRITORIAL WATERS
" ": Colombian Claim -
--ValenCia
2r5
215 50 100 Kilometers
5p 19.0NautIcal Miles
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060021-8