VENEZUELA/COLOMBIA: GULF OF VENEZUELA NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 16, 1970
• Content Type: CABLE

ORIGIN/0, Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/21 : CIA-RDP08001297R000700060020-9
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Amembassy CARACAS DATE:October 16, 1970
VENEZUELA/COLOMBIA: Gulf /of Venezuela N tiations
BOGOTA A-383, CARACAS A-3901 Aug. 7/70; A-447, Aug 21/70;
A-383, Jul. 31, 1970; A-404, Oct. 3/69 and A-130, March 20/7
Introductory Note: This is the first in a series of messages
dealing withiVenezuelan relations with Colombia. Others will
deal with Venezuelan policy toward illegal immigrants and
populating its borders, with the military position and with the
policy implications for the United States.
Summary. The Venezuelan and Colombian negotiating positions
on the definition of the continental shelf and territorial waters
in the Gulf of Venezuela appear too far apart to augur well for
an early resolution to the dispute. The complex legal, historical,
political and economic factors involved suggest that there is
little likelihood that the November meeting in Rome of the
negotiating teams of both Governments will make much progress.
Furthermore, in view of the domestic political ,storm that greeted
the Caldera Government's decision to sign .dhe Protocol of Port-
of-Spain to suspend the border dispute with Guyana for twelve
years, it is unlikely that the GOV will be in any hurry to sign
an agreement with Colombia.
c,
Another factor making Venezuela somewhat less anxious than -0
0
Colombia to reach an early agreement is the fact that with -<
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the opening of the South Lake oflitaracallol: ervice contract4;
%., .,..
Venezuela does not have as urgenYneed/tO e ..3fIts oil reserves.
Since the disputed portion of the shelf in the Gulf is thought. 1:
6,7En closures:
FORM
10-640S-323
1. Positions on Continental Shelf (Maps).
2. Positions on Territorial Seas (Maps).
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.
Drafting Date:
kr ECON:R res 10/14/70
DAO: Capt. Wearc)
Phone No.:
For Department Use Only
cp Inc; Out
Contents and Classification Approved by:
CHARGE:FJDevine
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CARACAS A-; 565
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to contain significant petroleum deposits, Colombia, which may be facing
shortages of petroleum soon, might want to press ahead on the Gulf
negotiations so the drilling can commence. While GOV officials say the
negotiations must be kept separate from the subject of oil, there is
little doubt that oil is a central and vital issue.
We estimate that the Caldera Government will pursue its desire to reach
a bilateral, diplomatic agreement with Colombia. And we seriously doubt
that the present government will have any interest in bringing in third
parties, in agreeing to arbitration or in submitting the dispute to the
World Court.
End of Summary.
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Venezuela's Position on Gulf. On the basis of informal conversationa
with officials of the foreign Ministry, the following points emerge as
the basis for Venezuela's negotiations with Colombia on the questions of
continental shelf and territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela (see
map enclosure 1 for the two positions on the shelf and enclosure 2 for
the two positions on territorial waters):
,Venezuela maintains that
a. Historic Gulf. /the Gulf of Venezuela is not an international
body of water but a gulf that has historically been Venezuelan; therefore,
special legal arrangements must be worked out bilaterally with Colombia
which is the only other state involved. Venezuela argues that the Gulf
has historically been a thoroughfare for shipping to Maracaibo ,and the
fishing grounds for Venezuelan fishermen. Venezuela, whichwutrols
90% of the shores of the Gulf, accepts Colombia's right to a12 miles
of territorial seas ofritsdputAng,,44 iweigned to dWcuss granting to
Colombia a portion of theicontlhentirshaf-Msed on Colombia's propor-
tion of land bordering on the Gulf.
b. "Equidistant Line" Rejected. Venezuela holds that the line
extending into the Gulf from Colombia's border should be an extension
of the land frontier. Venezuela rejects the "equidistant line" concept
which would, because of the peculiar coastline, result in a dividing
line extending southward into the center of the Gulf. Venezuela cites
the ICJ decision in the North Sea which ruled that the "equidistant line"
need not be the only means of determining sea and continental shelf
boundaries.
c. Median Line. Venezuela rejects the "median line" as the means
of determining the continental shelf and did so at the 1958 Geneva
Convention. For determining her territorial seas, Colombia can claim
only 12 miles frOm_its coast line beginning at the extension point of -
the land. bawadary and moving around tpoint. To determine the
continental shelf there is room for negotiation beyond the 12 miles but ,/
only including a portion of the disputed continental shelf between the
median line (claimed by Colombia) and the 12 miles. In any case Venezuela
does not consider that Colombia can seriously claim that the median line
_
would become a "Boggsline," that i; extend directly out into the open
seas between the two points of land (Point Espada and Point Macolla)
defining the Gulf. Venezuela considers that even as a negotiating
position Colombia will eventually agree to draw the median line bending
around to the West to pass midway between the islands of Los Monjes and
the Colombian coast.
d. Los Monjes. The Islands of Los Monies are Venezuelan as
ratified by an exchange of notes between Venezuelan Ambassador Luis
GerOnimo PIETRI and Colombian Foreign Minister Juan URIBE Holguin in
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in Bogota on November 22, 1952. Los Monjes give Venezuela a claim to
12 miles of territorial seas around them and to the continental shelf
up to a middle line between the islands and the Colombian coast. Los
Monje; therefore, determine that a line defining the continental shelf
and territorial seas between the two countries must bend around to the
West between the islands and Colombia. Since there are about 20 nautical
miles between Los Monjes and Colombia (at Cabo Falso), the Venezuelans
expect to negotiate a median line at 10 miles to define both the terri-
torial waters and the continental shelf.
e. Fishing and Navigation. Venezuela would find it intolerable
to accept Colombia's maximum claim of continental shelf based on its
view of the "equidistant line" extending nearly to the virtual center
of Gulf. The exercise of Colombian sovereignty over such a shelf (oil
rigs) would interfere with the direct line of navigation into Lake
Maracaibo. Furthermore, the Gulf has traditionally been Venezuela's
fishing grounds which are rich in shrimp and Venezuela does not intend
to relinquish them.
f. Extension of Territorial Seas. Venezuela stands firmly
opposed to recognizing that other nations have the right unilaterally
to extend their territorial seas (see A-447 of August 21, 1970, for
GOV position at Lima Conference on LOS) precisely because it is worried
that if Colombia were to extend its claim (as the Colombian Congress
has proposed) it would claim territorial waters extending into the very
center of the Gulf of Venezuela.
Colombia's Position as Seen from Caracas. Briefly; as described by
Venezuelan diplomats (and as reported by Embassy Bogotdsvery helpful
A-383) Colombia, claims that the "equidistant line" determines both
he sea boundary and the continental shelf boundaryi_uses thelan
line for_the_purpose_of determining the continental shelf; claims 12
miles of territoriaLsea Dut views ihe iEfers hAund the iWeiire-mile
cstaa..as ..j.punul.'ternationalwaters since in Colombia's
view the Gulf is an international body of water; and does not recognize
any significant claim to territorial seas or to continental shelf
stemming from Venezuela's title to Los Monjes Islands, since the islands
are insignificant.
Negotiations. Negotiations between the two countries over these
questions have gone on for years. They were suspended in the Spring of
1968 because of the Venezuelan elections. They were resumed in Bogota
on March 14, 1970, at which time a new modus operandi was agreed on.
The first substantive talks under the new terms of reference were held
in Caracas June 8 - 13*A70. The second round, originally set for
September 7 in Bogota/put off to allow time for the Pastrana Government
to prepare its position and brief its new delegation. The GOV delegation
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(headed by Ambassador Carlos SOSA Rodriguez) ad the new Colombian
delegation (headed by ex-Foreign Minister Germgn ZEA Herngndez) now
is planning to meet on neutral ground in Rome in November 1970.
Venezuelan View of Negotiations. The Venezuelan Government is in no
hurry to reach an agreement on these negotiations with Colombia. Several
top members of the Foreign Ministry have said that they expect the
negotiations to continue for a long time. Foreign Ministry Foreign
Policy Director Marcial PEREZ Chiriboga recently told an Embassy officer
that in view of past weaknesses demonstrated by Venezuela in negotiations
with Colombia on border questions and particularly in view of the GOV
decision to sign the controversial Protocol of Port-of-Spain with Guyana,
the Foreign Ministry has no intention of pushing for an early agreement
with Colombia. Dr. Perez said that virtually any agreement reached
with Colombia, no matterhcw favorable to Venezuela, would be viewed
by large segments of Venezuelan society as a sell out.
Dr. Luis HERRERA Marcano, a Foreign Ministry consultant and Dr. Perez'
predecessor as Foreign Policy Director, spoke more frankly. He predicted
Venezuela would drag on the negotiations for years. If the Government
were to reach a favorable agreement from its point of view the military
particularly would be furious. Dr. Herrera said that for decades the
Venezuelan military have been working only on military plans against
Colombia, and the military must be satisfied before the Venezuelan
Government can come to an agreementcn such a major border issue as the
Gulf of Venezuela. Foreign Ministry officials have also told us that
Venezuela intends to begin negotiations on outstanding continental shelf
and territorial sea questions with the Netherlands Antilles and Trinidad-
Tobago only after agreement has been reached with Colombia.
The Oil Issue. While GOV officials say negotiations must be kept
separate from the subject of petroleum, this is hardly realistic. From
geological information available, the Venezuelans believe there are
42 structures in the Gulf with over 25 billion barrels in recoverable
oil (A-480, October 4, 1970). The Colombians may also believe a great
deal of petroleum exists through exchange of seismic information with
the Venezuelan State Petroleum Corporation (A-404, October 3, 1970).
Moreover, Colombia is soon expected to be in a difficult situation with
respect to petroleum availabilities. By the beginning of next year,
Colombia will begin to import crude oil and is expected to be a net
crude importer in 1974 (4-5211 September 28, 1970).
Accordingly, in terms of real national interest, what the two parties
will be negotiating are potentially vast oil resources. Under the
circumstances, for some time to come there may be little give in the
position of both parties. Venezuela, however, may have the advantage:
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it can for some years forego access to oil reserves in the Gulf since
Venezuela is just opening southern Lake Maracaibo for petroleum
development. Moreover, in addition to South Lake, Venezuela probably
has more attractive new areas to look for oil than does Colombia.
This may explain their view that they will not permit drilling in the
Gulf, even in areas undisputedly Venezuelan, to avoid any prejudice
to their claim.
Arbitration or ICJ Not Likely. Venezuela, from present reading, is
not likely to agree to arbitration on this dispute with Colombia and
the Caldera Government has placed great stress on the importance of
finding a diplomatic bilateral solution with its neighbor Colombia.
Given the flury that raged here over the GOV effort to shelve the
border dispute with Guyana for 12 years by signing the Pa4of-Spain
Protocol and the still uncertain fate of that Protocol, we doubt very
much that the Venezuelan Government will move ahead very rapidly on
the negotiations. Indeed, we expect a "solution" to the Gulf problem
is a long way in the future.
DEVINE
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SECRET CARACAS A- 565 "
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