SAUDI-OMANI BORDER SETTLEMENT: SAUDI INTEREST IN CORRIDOR TO ARABIAN SEA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP08C01297R000600120004-1
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 14, 2012
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 19, 1976
Content Type: 
CABLE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP08C01297R000600120004-1.pdf136.02 KB
Body: 
. .? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1 ?a. a. . _ 4?es PI Department of State TELEGRAM 'PAGE 01 STATE' 143639 to 'ORIGIN NEAw10 INFO OCTP.01 ISO 00 EUR?12 CIAEN00 DODE(.00 3310' Hi42 L-03 NSAEw00 NSC...05 PA?01 PRS...01 SP..02 SSw1.5 USIA-'06 10.10 OMB-01 SAM.01 SAJw01 ACDA..05 EB.07. AIDP05 OES003 FEAr01 /NT?05 TRSE..00 /107 R DRAFTED BY NEA/ARPIFMD/CKMANORW APPROVED BY NEA:MR.ATHERTON INR/RNAIMR.JONFS INR/DDR/RGE1MR.HODGSON NEAIMR.SOBER FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 'INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY SANA STATE 143639 E110, 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR S 092202 SUBJEli- SAUDI..0MANI BORDER-SJTTLEMENTI SAUDI INTEREST IN ck_talPtio_ REF: JIDDA 4334 111 EMBASSY SHOULD TELL PRINCE SAUD THAT USG DOES NOT FEEL, IT CAN TAKE ANY OFFICIAL. POSITION ON SAUDI INTEREST IN HAVING CORRIDOR CUTTING THROUGH DHOFAR AND HADRAMAUT SINCE sEcRET; Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/1.1/16 : CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1 . --- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1 ?-?.s.0"1":* ? 4 , ? A Depa.rtment of State roloRAhvi lECRET TAGE:12 :STATE i4369 !THIS,ISESSENTIALLY..ATENINSU-LA MATTERa .AS FRIENDS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 'HOWEVER, FOLLOWING GUEs. OCCUR 'TO US AS RESULT OF PRINCE 'SAUDIS GOING TO AM.- isAssADOR? WE THINK SAUDIS MIGHT .HAVE 'THESE :IN MIND AS THEY ,IWEIGH IMPLICATIONS OF WHETHER TO SEEK ILI,OBTAIN 'CORRIDOR. CP ARABIAN .SEA1 ?A, MOULD OMAN BE WILLING TO SURRENDER ANY ,LARGE PORT/QN ;OF WESTERN .0H0FAR, 'FOR WHICH IT .HAS DEVOTED SO MANY RE0. ISOURCES-TOITS RECOVERY AND :CONTROL, UNLESS POSSIBLY IT' WAS tA RELATIVELY NARROW STRIP OF IAND SEPARATING OMAN FROM PDRY ;AND'OMAN RECEIVED SOMETHING OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN RETURN .(SUCH AS A .SETTLEMENT IN THE NORTH WHERE THE OMANI, 'UAE AND ;SAUDI 'BOUNDARY MEET)? .B? :COULD TORY BEIEXCLUDED.FROM PICTURE EVEN IF-CORRIDOR/ :CUT",IHROUGH.'OMANIIERRITORY? EVEN IF SAG HAD IN MIND ?IHAT'.C.ORR/DOR WOULD SEPARATE OMAN AND PDRY AND THEREBY ? ;BRING:AN'END TO DHOFAR INSURGENCY, WE DOUBT 'THAT PDRy iWOULD ACCEPT THIS AND STOP ITS SUPPORT OF INSURGENTS, IN -kALLLLIKELIHOOD, 'CORRIDOR WOULD SIMPLY 'CREATE .A NEW,INSUR-. ;GENCY SITUATION WHERE SAUDIS WOULD HAVE TO PROTECT HIGHLY' 'VULNERABLE STRIP, OF LAND AND PIPELINE, IF' ONE IS spo, 17140M INFILTRATORS, :c,. .WOULD A SAUDI'CORR/DOR NOT GIVE PDRY A .GOLDEN OPR /PORTUNITY TO I/E DOWN SIGNIFICANT SAUDI' MILITARYRESOURCES %AT MINIMAL 'COST TO PDR-Y? .GIVEN SAUDI ARABIA'S LIMITED 'MILITARY RESOURCES, THESE WOULD PROBABLY BE STRETCHED VERY 'THIN ELSEWHERE IF IT HAD TO SEND SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS TO 'PROTECT CORRIDOR IF ONLY,LiMITED MILITARY FORCE ASSIGNED "TO PROTECTIVE DUTY, CORRIDOR COULD BECOME AN EASIER AREA ;OF OPERATION FOR.PDRY.aSUPPORTED INSURGENCY THAT IS CASE'lN IDHOFAR AT-PRESENT'IIMEa WHAT INTERNATIONALrLEGALTRROBLEMS.MIGHT'DEVELOP? IT ISAUR UNDERSTANDINGYTHAT PDRY-OMANBOUNDARY HAS NEVER ;SEEN DEMARCATED AND IS SUBJECT D/SPUTE, SHOULD OMAN- ;AGREE TO RELINQUISH. TO SAUDIS A SLICE OF.WESTERN.DHOFAR? ;SAG MIGHT'WELL.FIND ITSELF' WITH ADDITIONAL PROBLEM OF . - 'SECRET ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1 - Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1 A ? .41.29 ol Department of State TELEGR SECRET 'PAGE 03* STATE 143639 GAINING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION FOR CORRIDOR BORDER ON 'PORy SIDE, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT To SHOW ANY HISTORIC' OR ETHNIC SAUDI TIES TO AREA, E,FINALLY, .IF SAUDI NEED FOR PIPELINE SOUTH TO ARABIAN SEA IS ECONOMICALLY AND TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, COULD SAG Nor EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT WITH OMAN GOV.T UNDER WHICH LATTER WOULD NOT BE ASKED To SURRENDER SOVEREIGNTY 10 A CORRIDOR TO THE SEA? HAS SAG THOUGHT OF ARRANGEMENT- sIMILIAR To THAT IN EFFECT FOR TApLINE? AFTER PRESENTING THESE QUESTIONS, YOU SHOULD RE. ITERATE THAT THESE ARE NOTHING MORE THAN QUESTIONS THAT HAVE OCCURRED TO US AND WHICH WE ARE PASSING ON To PRINCE SAUD IN AS MUcA AS HE RAISED SUBJECT WITH uS? WE SEE 'THIS ASS?MATTER TO BE DEALT WITH By THE COUNTRIES IN 'THE AREA, INGERsoLL SECALT____ 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16 : CIA-RDP08001297R000600120004-1