THE PROBLEM OF EASTERN GALICIA, 1919-1923

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 4, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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9
T-452
March 4, 1944
THE PR OBLE~": " Or EASTERN G I.-LIC IA, 1919-1923
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA AT THE TIM OF THE PEACE
C0I+1 E ll:,I:CE
A. Location
Eastern Galicia w&s. a part. of the.Austrian Empire
from 1772 to 1918. Under Austrian rule it was administered
as a separate unit only for the brief period between 1849
and 1860; after 1860 it existed as a judicial district but
was administered as a part of the Crowriland of Galicia. The
judicial district included that part of the Crownland situ-
ated east of the western boundaries of the administrative
districts of Jaroslaw,. Przemys1, Brzoz6w and Sanok, roughly
the line of the San River. It was bounded .on the north and
east"by the Russian Empire, and on the south by Hungary and
Bukovina. `
The strategic importance of Eastern Galicia was. obvious.
It had lain on the route of Russia's invasion of Hungary in
1849 and had been the scene of almost continuous fighting
'between the Austrian and Russian armies in, the recent war.
in Polish hands, as in those of Austria, it would serve as
a protective zone for Central Europe against possible
Russian expansion to and across the Carpathians. In the
plans for a cordon against the Bolsheviks- which were then
current in Allied circles ::'astern Galicia was an all-
important territorial link between Poland and Rumania.
B. Area and Population'
Eastern Galicia, with an area of 21,336 square miles,
made up slightly more than two-thirds of the Crownland of
Cralicia. In 1910 its total population was 5,335,821.
According to the Austrian statistics on language of use'
(Um,angssprache'), 40 percent of the inhabitants were
Polish-speaking, 59 percent were Ruthenian-speaking.
These statistics are misleading since some 660,000 Yiddish-
speaking Jews were listed as Polish-speaking. The statis-
tics on religion indicate more clearly the relative strength
of the. Poles and Ruthenians (Ukrainians), with 26 percent
Roman Catholics (Poles) and 62 percent Uniates (Ukrainians).
There were Polish majorities only in the westernmost dis-
tricts, in the city and district of Lemberg (Lwow), and in
three districts in the easternmost part of the province.
Elsewhere the Ukrainians were the more numerous element,
in the Carpathian region in the south their preponderance
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vfas- overwhelming :- LwSw, the principal city of Eastern
Galicia, was strongly Polish with a large Jewish element.
The Ukrainians were for the most part a backward peasant
population, while the Poles were well represented in all
social classes.. For centuries the governing and property-
ovrning classes had been Polish."' In.the half-century - , y
preceding the '.torld `:,ar, thanks to a working. agreement
with the Austrian Emperor, they had a virtual monopoly on Al
government positions and controlled the, Galician Diet.
During this period the process of the "Polonization" of "--,
Eastern Galicia-made fairly-.rapid.- strides,,,aided by the
immigration of ?Poles,"from.. \-Jestern Galicia, the emigration
of . li~'trainiaris--.~.to .America., and the 'assimilation of -
Ukrainians - in .the'- Polish-speaking. cities and 'towns:-,.
Althou-:h.clearly-i-n the minority. the Poles never'ceased
to-look upon-' Eas.tern Galicia-.-as - a Polish land.-
-
C. Economic Resources and Communications .
The-roost .important- mineral-.resources of-Eastern -
Galicia were its deposits of petroleum and of natural gas.
Production of crude tetroleurn reached two million tons in
.1909. ' The principal' oil-f fields- district' , (Drohoby cz-
. Boryslaw) was located in. an..area with- a -Ukrainian. maj.ori'ty,
but the industr.had been developed by Poles and the
engineers and?workers were.nearly.all;Polish. At the Peace
Conference -Galician:. oil was.considered- to be .of great
importance- to the,' new Polish' state, which had no other
sources' of - oil.- . It was -recognized as of :potential value
to- the craine well, ' especially since the future of-the
Caucasus was.:-then. in doubt.
A trunk railway ran from central Poland throuc-h
Eastern Galicia to the new Greater-Rumania, which in 1918
.came into possession of the'former Austrian province of
'Bultovina. - ? As - an alternative to-the uncertain outlet to
the Baltic-, this southern' route-,. promised,;to, be of great
economic and strategic, importance- to Poland. ,~ - -
II. C0N LICTIITry CLAIMS TO. E.'1LTER:; GALICIA..."
A. Projects' for the.Disposition-of Eastern Galicia
1914-1918
During the World War- Eastern Ga-lic ia' was involved in
the various-terri.tor.ial plans conceived by Russia-and by"
the'Central Powers, each-power-being intent-on solving...
the problems of Polish and_Uhrainian nationalism'to-its
own advantage. Meanwhile'both Polish-and Ukrainian leaders,
continuing
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continuing their'bitter and long-standing nationality
conflict, used every means to make capital of the
rapidly-changing military and diplomatic 'developments.
When Russian armies occupied'- Eastern Galicia in
1914-15, the Russian atathorities gave eberi*'indication
that its. permanent incorporation into'the Russian Empire
was envisaged. A campaign of Russification was insti-
tuted; both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists were
persecuted. .1Ioviever, the conquest of Russian Poland and
the reconquest of Galicia by German_ and' Austrian forces
in 1,915 placed the whole Polish question in the lap of
the Central Powers.. Certain influential circles in
Austria favored the "Austrian solution" of this 'question,
namely the union of Galicia and Russian-Poland under the
Habsburgs Germany, however, pushed the` idea of a''
nominally independent Poland under Ge:rman control, exclud-
ing Galicia', which was to remain in Austria.
In November 1916 this German scheme was put into effect
by a' . joint declaration of-the German and Austrian Emperors.
Simultaneously the Austrian Government promised wide
autonomy to the Galician Poles. This autonomy was still
"under consideration" two' years later when the military
front of the Central Powers collapsed. On October 16,
1918, an-Imperial Manifesto declared that Austria was to
become "a federal state in:which every nationality within
its own territory forms its own. commonwealth". This
measure, however,.was "not to prejudice in"any way the union
of the Polish territories of Austria with the independent
Polish State", in accordance with President +ilson's
thirteenth Point, already accepted by Austria-Hungary,
stipulating that "an independent Polish state should.be
erected which should include the territories -inhabited by
indisputably Polish populations".
With the disappearance of Austrian authority in
Galicia, the field eras left open for an open struggle for
power between the Poles, who'inteinded to incorporate. the
`whole of. Galicia 'in the new Poland, and the Ukrainians,
who prepared to assert their claim to national self-
determination in Eastern Galicia." The-elimination of
Russia; and of the Central Powers from the' picture left
the disposition of Eastern Galicia to the victorious
Allied and Associated Powers, before whom the Polish and
Ukrainian leaders came to press their claims.
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B. The Polish Claims
After the Russian armies were ?. driven out of ;all: -but
a fraction of Eastern~Galicia in-x?1915, *the province was ,
placed under,.AustroGerman,militaryj rule and the old
civil administration, which had been largely Polish in
charac.ter:,,, was-.not, restored: j,This development'. and_.the'
failure , of.Austr,ia: to. conver,ti Germany tb:..the ''Austrian
solution', ? of ,,the, Polish? question-weakened- the,.loyalty',of
the Galician Poles;, to- Austri'a-, r. They.-,began to-doubt-the
return to ,-the- pre-_1914-7 systernYahich-had been', s0 favorable
to, them; - and.to, cast-.about?.f,or jother possible solutions.,
The renunciation by.-r.the..1revolutionary-Russian,Government?,
in iiarch~-19.17,,, of;, all.clairns.'to" ethnically Polish,ter-
ritory caused-.many --.of-:.thee.Galician-, Pole s to-look-forward"
to-the )cr.eation,_ of an" Poland-'vrhich--w6uld -
include:,Galicia,--r,althoulsh.,Eastern-?Gal-icia-was-hardly, ethnically-j Polish-. iterr;territoryentirely .free', of,:any-',_con=
nection with-Austria.;; Russia?s:jweakne'ss~,gave-them'c.on-?-
f idence 'that . Poland,could-. expand; to: the east beyond: its.;
er, rea y,'signe ,at?,Dres.t-Litovskrbetween:.Austria-,'
Hungary.: and,~the,;independent,Repu'alic of the- Eastern
Ui.rai.ne, in February.1918 did-not change. the:'status-of:, . -
Eastern Galibia,.,but?,the rce.ssion..to the Ukraine-of the-i;:
district?;of.?,Kholm (Chelm) atipar.t?oft:Congress Poland cdja
oentto Eastern /Galicia,;;and the ?_promi.se later made by
Austria .-that-Eastern. Galicia-and;the,~Ulkrainian=speaking
part of 1:Bukovina -irwould-,.become an autonomous -?Aus trian I -
.provi.nce, inruriated:the-Galician-?oles, who 'wereable:.to
force. the Austrian,government-,not ;to,,fulfill, itsrpr?niise.
in Oc to-,er 1916, rlhen.-; t i:oecart e r,c lear, -,that the .Austrian.
Empire ?c ould. no -longer. be ,;held *,toge Cher.; . the r:Poli sh . leaders
in CGalicia_cast off?all-=loyalties to the Hab"sburgs..and
proclaimed-,,the -inclusion .of;-:al l,-_Gaalicia ,_in' they new index
pendent Polish state.
T,ieanwhi?le, a, Polish'Nati-ona?1,Committee, Finade- p
chiefly of?Ileaders ,from-Russian -Poland , had-been set Lip.
in -Paris ?-and-,-had been ,rec.ognized by,?the Allies as having
political authority,.-; In,-1917, and, in'-,1918 -it had. presented
several statements of-Poland's ..territorial -claim's-.,to,, the',
leading pdwers of- ,,the Entente,., -These, claims included; they
whole of Eastern -Galicia,. -The ,-Poles'-f.r.eely admi.tted~.the
existence of a ,Ukrt ini-an, ,ma j on ty. in. that ' pr-ovinc e but
said that- _oz- its ,c_ivili ration and%by i.ts- his,tory-it was
''inseparably bound .to- Poland (and c'ould-,no.t be, detached,
from it".. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National
Council,-,presented the Polish claims to the Peace Conference
in a series of memoranda and in an oral statement before the
Heads of Delegations. He admitted that Eastern Galicia was
a "disputed territory" but held that Galicia as a whole was
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
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''essentially Polish , that Poland's historio right- to it `was
buttressed 'by ethnic,. 'economic'; social and political factors.
He maintained. that only the Polish element in the population
was 'capable, of organizing a goveri thent." The Ukraine, :he said,
was in chaos and wholly incapable of existence-as a separate.
..:'.state. He stressed'the necessity'of conceding Poland's ter-'
ritorrial 'claims in the 'east, so that the' new state Would be
able 'to ' perform its mission of Europe's bulwark against
Bolshevism.
C. The Ukrainian Claims
Ukrainian nationalism had made greater progress in
Eastern:'Galicia than-ih? other" Ukrainian-inhabited ' lands
partly because of the relative tolerance of the Austrian as
wi
compared with the Russian and Hungarian regimes. Its leaders
ccail e :from the small group of intellectuals and from the Uniate
clerrly.- The social-and' economic' struggle against the Polish
ruling 'class contributed to the spread of nationalism among
the Ukrainian peasants: Darin- :the last decade before the-
YVorld War their cooperatives and agricultural .associations
made great progress, providing a nucleus 'for the movement for
Ukrainian 'national independecne' which emerged from the break
dov,n of 'Austrian and Lussi~an rule in the m rai.nian-inhabited
lands" in 1917 and 1918
In contrast. to the' Poleshoviever, the Ukrainians of
'Eastern Galicia were not sure of their objective, nor were they
united in.its'pur.'suit. Among the more conservative elements,
pro-Russian feeling was s-tronger'than-U'krainian national feel-
ing. Much of this pro-Russian -sentiment was d i ssipated by
the conduct' of the -Russian authorities 'in' Eastern Galicia in
1914-15. ' However, the idea that the'`Ukrainians'were but a
part of the Russian nation continued: to be held .by a portion
of the Ukrainian population of'Galicia, the' so-called Lemki,
or: Carpatho--Russians, who inhabited the northern slopes of the
Carpathian Mountains. Both Russophils'and Ukrainian'nationa-
lists'r.egarde'd. the Poles as the principal enemy, but their
'disagreement ' on the ultimate' desti_ny of pastern Galicia was to
compromise the Ukrainian case at the Peace Conference'.
In 1915 certain Ukrainian ' leaders' had proposed to the-
Aiu.strian' Government that an autonomous Ukrainian state be; ,
created Out of the Ukrainian-populated, districts of Galicia
and of Bu'kovina. This proposal' Was' 'not -accepted, and all-.
`faith?in Austria was lost when in 1916 the Austrian Govern-
ment commited itself to' autonomy for Galicia as a whole,* which
'to the Ukrainians meant submission 'to'Polish rule. Austria's
bel'a'ted promise, in 1911:3, to give 'a' special status to' the
'"U'ltrai-ni-an--inhabited "regions of the Empire, did. not win over
Ukrainian opinion and was never carried 'out.. On October 19,
1918
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1918 P Ukrainian National Council at Lwow proclaimed the inde-
pendence of a "iVestern Ukrainian Republic" comprising Eastern
.Galicia, Northern Bukbiina and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.
At the Peace Conference the "Delegation of the Ukrainian
Republic" presented claims to all territories having Ukrainian
majorities, including all Eastern Galicia. On the other hand
the "Carpatho-Russian Committee", claiming to represent the
four and one-half million Ruthenians (Ukrainians) of former
Austria-Hungary, asked for the union of Eastern, Galicia;
Northern Bukovina and Subc,,arpathian Ruthenia with "the re-
stored Russian state". Both factions bitterly opposed Poland's
claim to Eastern Galio-ra.
D. The Conflict
between Poles
and
Ukrainians
in Galicia
in 1918-19
Fighting broke out between
the
Pole's and
the
Ukrainians
in Eastern Galicia even before
the
evacuation
of
German and
Austrian troops-6 Long-smouldering social discontent broke
out in attacks of Ukrainian peasants on the persons and proper-
ties of their Polish landlords. Out of the general chaos of
unorganized fighting there developed a discernible battle
front between the army of Poland, attempting. to enter Eastern
Galicia from the west, and the newly-organized forces of the
East em Ukrainian Republic. The Poles soon took Przemysl and
the capital city, Lwow. The Ukrainians, unable to stand alone
against the Poles, joined forces with the armies of the
"Eastern Ukrainian.Republic", which had been set up at Kiev,
and in January 1919 the two states were declared united in
one "Ukrainian National Republic"'.
The Polish-Ukrainian-conflict in Eastern Galicia continued
throughout the first half of 1919 despite the efforts of the
Peace Conference to arrange an armistice. These military
events had an obvious influence upon the decisions taken at
Paris on the question of the disposition of Eastern Galicia.
The Ukrainian cause was compromised in the eyes of the Allied
statesmen by virtue of the fact that some Ukrainian leaders
had accepted the support of Germany and of Austria in combat-
ing the Poles, and. also because the armies of the. independent
Ukraine had been unable successfully to resist the Bolsheviks.
The delegates to the Peace Conference could hardly devote
much time to seeking an "ideal" solution to the problem of-
Eastern Galicia when constantly pressed by the necessity of
making decisions with respect to the changing military situa-
tion in that area. The most immediate needs, in their view,
were 1) the cessation of hostilities between Poles and
Ukrainians, and 2)-the strengthening of all forces resisting
the advance of Bolshevism. Attempts to arrange an armistice
between the Poles and Ukrainians through the instrumentality
of an armistice commission.functioning in Paris during April
and May.broke down when both sides refused to accept its draft
convention. The anarchy and confusion prevailing in the
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to raine and the need for strengthening Poland both against
the Germans and against the Bolsheviks lod the. Conference
to take 'certa'in steps rhich 'prejudiced its final terri-
torial decisions. Action by the Conference helped to save
Lw6w from falling into Ukrainian hands in the spring . of
1919. The Supreme Council arranged the sending of
General caller's Polish army from France to Poland, greatly
strengthening the Polish position against the Ukrainians.
In May the latter were driven almost entirely ou.t of
Eastern Galicia, and in June the Supreme Council. authorized
Poland to occupy militarily the whole province, explaining
the action as a precaution against the "Bolshevik menace",
which the Mcrainians were not considered strong enough to
combat and were actually aiding through their struggle
against anti-Bolshevik Poland. Although this decision. was
not intended to prejudice the ultimate disposition of
Eastern Galicia, it was a blown from which the Ukrainian
cause never recovered. The union of the province with
Poland; in one form. or another, became almost certain.
III. THE AMERICAN POSITS CT'd ! T THE PE, C ~:. CONFERENCE
The study of Eastern Galicia prepared for "The Inquiry"
by Dr. Robert IT. Lord in the spring of 1918 envisaged five
possible solutions of. the problem. Three of them (a. main=tenance of the existing status quo b. Austro-.Polish solu
ti,on, c. Austro--Ukrainiann solution) were later eliminated .
from consideration. by the disappearance of the Habsburg
Empire. The two remainin4; alternatives were; d, partition
of -,astern Galicia between Poland and the U'lkraine, .and e.
union of Eastern Galicia with Poland. Lord's conclusion
was that if ethnic consideration alone were to decide the
issue, all but the western fringe of Eastern Galicia should
go to the Ukraine... but that, if other factors were to be
considered, (the historic unity of all Galicia, the impossi-
bility of drawing an accurate ethnic line, ,the advanced
cultural and economic status of the Poles in Eastern
Galicia as compared to the Ukrainians, and~the economic
gravitation of Eastern Galicia toward Poland rather than
toward the Ukraine), the balance-would swing to the side
of the assisnment of the whole province to Poland. In
addition, Dr. Lord concluded that from the standpoint of
expediency "it would seem desirable that the Poles should
have Eastern Galicia", since the future of the new Ukrainian
state was problematical and since "it could hardly be
desirable to bring the Russian frontier to the Carpathians."
He was of the opinion that, since the roles had announced
their willingness to grant the Ukrainians "extensive autonomy"
within Poland, "such. concessions, if placed under proper
international guarantee, might be the best solution of the
problem, as safeguarding the essential needs of the
Ukrainians
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Ukrainians and the vital interests of Poland.'' Dr. Lord's
opinions are of some importance, since he was later to
represent the United States on several international com-
missions set up by the Peace Conference to deal with Polish
affairs.
The Cobb-L.ippmann ''Interpretat.ion" of the Fourteen
Points, which was submitted to President "ilson at the end of
October 1918, stated that -7estern Galicia was "clearly Polish"
and that Eastern Galicia was ''in large measure Ukrainian and
did not of right belong to Poland. The Intelligence Section
of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, in its report
to President ','Viilson on JanuarYT 21, 1919 made the following
recommendations concerning Eastern Galicia:
The proposed Poland might include on the southeast
the hotly disputed and very puzzling territory and
population of Eastern Galicia...The region should be
assigned to Poland only if the Ukraine is-in its
present state of chaos, and then only-as a self-
governing province, guaranteed by the League of
Nations the right to decide on its own allegiance
at a later 'date. If at the time of, decision by. the
Peace Conference the Ukraine should give evidences
of vitality, the disputed belt should be assigned
to it, because in that region the Ukrainians
(although very backward in culture) outnumber the
Poles two to one.
This recommendation gave definite precedence to the
ethnic claims of the Ukrainians over the historical and eco-
nomic-arguments put forward by the Poles. The important
proviso concerning the "present state of chaos in the
Ukraine", however, left the door open for the incorporation
of Eastern. Galicia, with guarantees of autonomy, into Poland,
the solution previously recommended by Dr. Lord, with the
,additional stipulation that at some future date the inhabit-
ants would be allowed to exercise the ri,.ht of self-
determination.
In the negotiations at the Peace Conference the American
Delegation supported these recommendations at first but
gradually approached a position more favorable to the Polish
claims. A partial reason for the change was that Dr. Lord
who acted as adviser to Secretary Lansing on Polish matters
and served as American representative on the Commission on
Polish Affairs and on its Sub-Commission for the Study of
the Eastern Frontier of Poland, was sympathetic towards the
Polish claims. Both Lloyd George and Harold licolson have
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described the American experts on Poland, referring.
especially to Lord, as extremely pro-Polish. Also,
the course of events in the Ukraine seemed to elimi-
nate the possibility that any independent Ukrainian
state would be established. After the military col-
lapse, of the Ukrainians in May and June, the American
Delegation adopted' the position that the most satis-'
factory and only practical solution was "to entrust
:eastern Galicia to Poland, with the understanding that
no change should be made if this should prove sati.s .
factory" .: After. it appeared inevitable that . Eastern
Galicia would go to Poland, the American Delegation
was reluctant to restrict Polish sovereignty either
by placing a time limit on it or ley hedging it about
with guarantees to the Ukrainians. The final, decision'
of the Conference in Novethber 1919, which stipulated.that
Poland should have a 25-y=ear mandate over.-Eastern Galicia,
was accepted with reluctance by the :Amor.i?can Delegation.
IV. POLICIES OF THE OTHER ALLIED POWERS
A. -France
The French position on the question of?Easter.n
Galicia was clear. The French were in,erested in making.
the new Poland as strong as possible, both against Gerrnaniy
in the west-and against the Bolsheviks in the east. They
wanted to see Poland and Rumania establish a common fron-
tier and thus to act as a cord'n sanitaire protecting
Europe against Bolshevism. Such a common frontier, imply-
ing the annexat on of Eastern Galicia by Poland and of
Rukovi'na by Eu.riania, could be established only at the
expense of the Ukrain._.ans 4 desire for national unification.
Jules Carbon eras chairman of the Commission.on Polish
Affairs and. General Le Mond chairman of the `ub-Commission
for the Study of the. Eastern Frontier of .'Poland. These
men, in their statements and in their guidance of commit-
tee discussions, revealed. a tendency. to favor the Polish
claim to-Eastern Galicia,' but they were willing to accept.
such limitations of Polish sovereignty in favor of the
Ukrainian population as the Allied and Associated Powers
should agree to impose. French military men, like Foch,
continued to press. or full military support of the Poles
against the Ukrainians and for satisfaction of Polish
territorial claims, so that the Polish state could be
strong. Clemenceau held the same view.
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B. Great Britain
The British Delegation to the Peace Conference was
the'-least favorably inclined toward Poland's claim to
Eastern Galicia. The British opposed the sending of
military aid to the Poles for use against the Ukrainians.
They held that the Ukrainians' of Eastern Galicia should be
allowed to decide their own political 'allegiance at some
later date, since to consult them at the time of the Peace
Conference seemed impossible. The British regarded the
inclusion within Poland of three million Ukrainians, who
at that time were engaged in a bitter war with the Poles,
as a solution unlikely to increase Poland's strength or to
promote stability in eastern Europe. In the committee
discussions the British were generally in a minority of one
in defending the interests of the Ukrainians against the
tendency on the part of the other delegations to favor the
Poles. Since the issue was not one of vital interest to
Great Britain, the British representatives found themselves
making one compromise after another in the interests of
Allied harmony. In the end Lloyd George allowed himself
to be convinced by Clemenceau that the powers should retire
gracefully from the whole affairs, thus postponing the
final settlement and leaving the Poles in de facto posses-
sion of Eastern Galicia.
C. Italy
The Italian Delegation remained favorably disposed
toward the Polish claims to Eastern Galicia throughout the
negotiations. aonnino argued that the assignment of that
province to Poland should be adopted as an immediate and
final solution. He opposed all proposals for a plebiscite,
for a temporary international administration, or for a
mandate. The Italian position was understandable in view
of the parallels between the Polish claims in Eastern
Galicia and the Italian claims in the Adriatic area. The
Italian representatives on the commissions which dealt with
Polish questions took little part in the discussions. They
generally sided with the French and the Americans against
the British, often forcing the latter to abandon their
original proposals and. to accept the majority view.
Ve DETERMINATION OF T BOUNDARIES OF EASIER? GALICIA`
A. The Western Boundary
That Western ^al.icia, the solidly Polish-speaking part
of the old Austrian Crownland, would go to Poland was not
questioned by the Peace Conference. It was assumed that,
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even if Eastern Galicia ,:should also be.as.signed to Poland,
it would retain- a special status with internati onal guar-
antees. It was therefore thought necessary to.draw a
boundary between `;estern and Eastern Galicia based prima-
rily on ethnic considerations. This boundary, as part of
the?eastern boundary of indisputably Polish-populated ter-
r. tory, was to ne a continuation of the provisional m
mum eastern Polish frontier which the,Conf erence intended
to draw through former Russian territory.
The Supreme Council decided on March 19, 1919 that
Polish and Ukrainian representatives should not be allowed
to present their claims until after the cessation of hos-
tilities in Eastern Galicia. The Commission on Polish
Affairs delayed its consideration of. the boundary for that
reason and because it came to the conclusion that no valid
recommendation regarding the boundary could be made until
the political status of Eastern Galicia hS.d been more
definitely settled. If ,'~aste.rn Galicia -was to. he joined
in some way to Poland, probabilities favored the establish-
ment of a boundary running to the west of the city. of Lwow'
alon- the line of separation between overwhelmin-'ly Polish-
speakinp territory and. mixed Ukrainian-Polish territory;
whereas, if Eastern Galicia was to be left outside Poland,
an alternative-boundary passing to the east'of Lwow; leaving
that city and a part of, the mixed territory within Poland,
was almost certain to be -.1-van serious consideration.
Either line could be justified on ethnic `rounds.
In its Third Report, submitted on June 17, 1919 the
Commission on Polish Affairs presented for the considera-
tion of the Supreme Council two hypothetical' boundaries.
Line 'UA", which separated solidly Polish from mixed Polish-
Ukrainian territory, ran from the town of Belzec, on the
old Russian-Austrian frontier, southwards along the eastern
boundaries of the political --districts of Ciesz.a.now
(Lubaczow), Jaroslaw, trzemy 1, Dobromil and Lesko, leaving
all those districts to Poland. Under this solution Poland
would' 'have 'obtained- all territory up to the San River and
a few districts lying east of the San. Line "B" ran along
the Bug River, from the point where it met the former
Russian-Austrian frontier, upstream to I