THE CYPRUS DEADLOCK: FOREVER OR ANOTHER DAY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110011-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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01:)
C ?1
1981 No. 11
c_urope
9
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THE CYPRUS DEADLOCK:
FOREVER OR ANOTHER DAY?
by Dennison 1. Ausinow
, As the divided Cyprus republic begins its
third decade, political unity, peoace, and
security for both its Greek and Turkish
communities remain elusive. Still, there is
agreement in many areas and anticipated
changes in political line-ups and policies
could make both sides more kiviiting to
cOmpromise.
[DIR-1 -1311
ISSN 0161-0724
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American
Universities
Field Staff
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Staff, Inc., founded in 1951, is a non-
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THE AUTHOR
DENNISON I. RUSINOW has been
reporting for the Field Staff from Bel-
grade, Zagreb, and Vienna since 1963,
maintaining an interest in Adriatic and
Danubian Europe that dates from his first
visits to the region while a Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford University from 1952
to 1954. He returned to the area in 1958,
after service in the United States Navy,
to continue his study of the problems of
Hapsburg Successor States as a Fellow
of the Institute of Current World Affairs,
based successively in Vienna, at St.
Antony's College, Oxford, and in Bel-
grade. He holds a B.A. from Duke
University and an M.A. and D.Phil from
Oxford, where he was also a temporary
lecturer in politics and modern European
history at New College. In addition to his
AUFS Reports, Dr. Rusinow is the author
of The Yugoslav Experiment (published
in 1977 for the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs in London), Italy's
Austrian Heritage, and numerous con-
tributions to collective works, journals,
and newspapers. He served as AUFS
Associate Director from 1973 to 1976.
? 1981, American Universities Field
Staff, Hanover, NH
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1981/No. 11
Europe
by Dennison I. Rusinow THE CYPRUS DEADLOCK:
[DIR-1281]
FOREVER OR ANOTHER DAY?
The Cyprus problem has been around a long
time, even discounting the preface provided by
more than a century during which the evolution
of first Greek and then Turkish national senti-
ments set the stage for its contemporary chapters.
It is now 20 years since the frame of reference was
changed by Cyprus' transformation from a
British Crown Colony into a republic with a
qualified and territorially incomplete sovereignty,
a state that almost no Greek or Turkish Cypriot
then wanted. It is 17 years since the constitu-
tional order written and imposed on that republic
by Britain, Greece, and Turkey was disrupted by
intercommunal violence during the winter of
1963-64, leading to the physical and political
segregation of a large part of the Turkish com-
munity into "enclaves," nearly causing a war
between Greece and Turkey, initiating direct U.S.
involvement, and bringing to Cyprus a United
Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) that is
still there. And it is more than six years since the
structure of the problem was again violently
altered by a coup d'etat directed from Greece,
followed by Turkish military intervention that
divided the island and completed the segregation
of the communities, displacing a. third-9E the
population in the process and leaving,38.posent,
of Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot administration
and mainland Turkish military occupation.
Today, as the divided republic begins its third
decade, the Cyprus problem is as far as ever from
a solution that would provide political unity and
peace and security for both communities. At the
same time, however, it is also so close to such a
solution that it could be had for the reaching out.
Such a solution is still unlikely for several
reasons: because the costs of achieving it, in
terms of unavoidable compromises, seem higher
than the costs of the status quo to almost all con-
cerned, both in Cyprus and abroad; because
mutual distrust is unabated and misinformation
is being enhanced by total separation of the com-
munities; and because key individuals on each
side appear to believe that developments on the
other side or abroad will in time strengthen their
own bargaining position. More energetic efforts
are also impeded by a subtle form of abdication
of responsibility by all the parties. Greek and
Turkish Cypriots eagerly declare, and apparently
believe, that it is not they who hold the key but
outside powers?and the United States in par-
ticular. These outside powers, including the
United States, take shelter in the principle that
the problem is ultimately one for the Cypriots
themselves to solve through intercommunal
negotiations. They are therefore either inactive or
else, for the sake of other interests that currently
seem more important or urgent than Cyprus,
appear to be supporting, rather than putting
pressure on, those in Ankara or in north or south
Nicosia who in someone's view are blocking a
solution.
A solution is also, if paradoxically, close in the
sense that its general outline is clear, and there is
already agreement (albeit revocable and some-
times unrecognized or disbelieved) on broad
principles and many details. What must and can
be done to reach agreement on the remainder,
including hotly disputed intermediate principles,
is also generally clear. In addition, recent or
anticipated changes in political line-ups or
policies on both sides of the divided island, in
Ankara, and perhaps elsewhere may indeed lead
to increased willingness to compromise on one or
both sides.
The restarting of intercommunal talks under
UN auspices in September 1980 has to date
(January 1981) only proved that the oldest
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almost-continuous floating crap game in the
eastern Mediterranean (or, in deference to the
British English spoken in Cyprus, the longest
permanent tea-dance) is still on. Meanwhile,
however, those recent or anticipated changes
within the contesting polities have the potential
to break the impasse that even the Turkish inter-
vention in 1'974 did not break, although it altered
and narrowed the range of possible solutions.
Why this is so, why it may not happen, and some
background to understanding why the problem
has remained so intractable are the subject of
this Report.
Basic Ingredients?Mix and Stir Well!
Cyprus, with 3,572 square miles, about twice
the size of Long Island and the third largest and
easternmost island in the Mediterranean, lies 40
miles south of Turkey, over 599.,nlitsvasf,of the
Gleek?maipland (and 250 miles east of the
nearest Greek-ruled Dodecanese Islands), 100
miles west of Syria and 230 miles north of the
Suez Canal. Of a populatiiiiniV633000 in 1960,
when the most recent census was taken, 80 per-
cent were recorded as Greeks and 18 percent as
Turks (compared to 73% and 25% early in this
century), with minuscule minorities of Arme-
nians, "Latins," expatriate Britons, and others
comprising the remaining 2 percent. Until 1964,
and in lesser measure until 1974, Greek and
Turkish Cypriots cohabited in the four main
towns and many villages, and the purely Greek or
Turkish villages in which the rest of them lived
were interspersed in random fashion across the
island.
The Cyprus question has been compounded
out of these primary geographic and demo-
graphic data by nationalism in Cyprus, Greece,
and Turkey, a history of struggle between Greeks
and Turks that is far older than modern nation-
alism and that profoundly affects the perceptions
and fears of both, and the strategic interests of
more distant Great Powers. The complexity of
the interplay among all these factors, with a
massive assist from multiple political miscalcula-
tions and other human failings in many places,
has made the question so far unanswerable and
has given substance to George Mikes' epigram,
which Cypriots themselves are occasionally fond
of quoting with rueful self-irony: "The Cypriots
know that they cannot become a World Power;
but they have succeeded in becoming a World
Nuisance, which is almost as good."1
The Greek majority generally feel themselves
to be part of the Greek nation and the heirs and
custodians of more than three millennia of Greek
culture on Cyprus, from Mycenean and Classical
to Byzantine and five post-Byzantine centuries of
survival under Lusignan (Crusader), Venetian,
Ottoman, and British rule. These sentiments are
nurtured by a consciousness of common or
similar language, customs, and religion that is
universal and profound, and by archeological
monuments and excavations that are as
ubiquitous, and as treasured by ordinary Greek
Cypriots, as Cyprus' notoriously extensive pan-
theon of Christian saints and Greek gods and
demigods. They are also more deliberately nur-
tured by school syllabuses and textbooks and by
cultural and political propaganda of mainland
Greek as well as Greek Cypriot provenance.
There is little doubt that in 1960 when the re-
public was created most Greek Cypriots, accept-
ing the one-nation/one-state logic of the ideology
of nationalism and the nation-state, desired
union (enosis) with Greece. This emotional and
political urge, which culminated in anticolonial
demonstrations and violence from 1955 until
independence in 1960, has been present among
at least some Greek Cypriots since the Greek
wars of independence in the 1820s?and even
earlier, as a protonationalist self-identification
within the religious one provided by common
membership in the Greek Orthodox millet under
Ottoman rule. The number affected, however,
and the degrees of intensity and thoughtfulness,
even the significance and implications of the
desire, have varied over time and by social class
and other divisions.
Since independence, evidence that is usually
disregarded or disbelieved by Turkish Cypriots
suggests that this "enosist" sentiment has been
fading or at least changing, losing its political
meaning for most Greek Cypriots. At the same
time, however, the nature and content of their
"national consciousness" and the history of their
relations with Turkish Cypriots, reinforced by
numerical preponderance and understanding of
democracy as straightforward majority rule, con-
tinue to determine their attitude toward the
Turkish Cypriots. These are regarded, at best, as
a religious and ethnic minority with communal
rights, deriving from their distinctiveness and
minority status, that should be tolerated and
even protected, as in other "civilized" democ-
racies with similar minorities; but they should
also remember that they are only 18 percent of
the population and originally intruders in an
ancient and profoundly Greek land.
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The Turkish minority similarly feel themselves
to be part of the Turkish nation, although
Turkish Cypriot "national consciousness" de-
veloped later than that of the Greek Cypriots or
that of the Turkish nationalism in Turkey itself,
and in reaction to the former and response to the
latter. Natural supporters of Ottoman rule as
long as it lasted, the Turkish community after-
ward generally supported the continuation of
British rule which provided a barrier to enosis
and protected and in some ways even favored the
Turkish minority as a counterweight to the Greek
Cypriot majority. Then, as it became apparent
that British rule would come to an end after all,
the slogan of taksim?partition between Greece
and Turkey?provided Turkish Cypriots with a
precise and equally gripping counterpart to
Greek Cypriot hankering for enosis. When it was
created in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was
therefore not the preferred solution for either
community; as truly as the Republic of Austria in
1918 (a suggestive analogy!), it was der Staat den
keiner wollte, the state that no one wanted.
Since independence, and again with analogies
to the way enosis sentiment has faded or altered
its meaning for many Greek Cypriots, Turkish
Cypriot preferences have come to include a
broader range of possible solutions, always with
the proviso that they must include a maximum
achievable degree of security against both enosis
and Greek Cypriot domination. Varying with
changing circumstances over time, this range has
run from partition in its original or a modified
version?i.e., with or without "double enosis" of
the fragments to Turkey and Greece as a final
goal?to some combination of constitutional and
external guarantees of Turkish Cypriot security
and equality as a "co-founder" community of a
bi-communal state. The Turkish Cypriot leader-
ship also argues that the prevalent Greek Cypriot
version of the history of intercommunal relations
on the island, as generally peaceful coexistence
only recently and unnecessarily interrupted by
British (and later Turkish) manipulation of
Turkish-Cypriot nationalism in order to block
enosis, is either a romantic or a calculated distor-
tion. The facts, they say, chronicle incompata-
bilities and conflict so ancient and deep-seated?
and so loaded against the minority once it was
deprived of imperial protection?that geographic
segregation and political autonomy have become
prerequisites for co-citizenship in a common
state that would otherwise be characterized by
continuous strife, a constant risk of violence, and
DIR-1-'81/3
permanent economic and social subordination
for the minority.
In these conflicting attitudes and aspirations,
which have profound psychological as well as
political and social dimensions, both Greek and
Turkish Cypriots have at different moments and
sometimes simultaneously enjoyed, suffered, and
resented the solicited and unsolicited support,
intervention, control, and disengagement of their
respective "mother countries," Greece and
Turkey. Who (or what) has been the manipulator
and who (or what) the manipulated?nationalism
by politicians and other public figures; Nicosia
by Athens and Ankara; or vice versa in each
case?has at many points been disputed or un-
clear, even to the actors themselves. Either way,
the consequences have made the Cyprus question
a major aggravating issue in Greco-Turkish rela-
tions, already sufficiently burdened by the two
nations' memories of ancient conflict, mutual
historic grievances, and plenty of other contem-
porary bilateral problems and irritants. In the
process the Cyprus problem has periodically dis-
rupted "the southeastern flank of NATO' and
on three occasions in a ten-year period has nearly
led to war between the two protecting powers.
The even wider international importance of the
island's strategic location also antedates by cen-
turies and in various forms Cyprus' contem-
porary potential to be someone's mammoth air-
craft carrier cum troopship, anchored beside sea
routes to the Middle East that are vital to both
West and East and within striking distance of
everything from southern Russia and Turkey
to Egypt and the oil fields of the Arab and Gulf
states. Such importance guarantees the interest,
and potentially the intervention, of Great Powers
and their alliances, either to secure or to deny to
others such use or potential use of the island.
This, of course, is why the dangers inherent in the
Cyprus question reach far beyond the shores of
the island and those of Greece and Turkey,
making it a "World Nuisance" with literally
explosive potential. It also means that a solution
has not been, and will not be, left to the Cypriots
to work out for themselves alone, so there is some
truth in handwashing Cypriot assertions that the
key to unlock the problem is not in their posses-
sion.
Earlier chapters in the story of how this volatile
and complex combination of domestic and
external factors produced "the Cyprus question"
are well documented, if usually with a partisan
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bias, and so the details can for present purposes
be omitted. The dramatic developments of
summer 1974, although also frequently described
elsewhere and fresher in memory, mark the
beginning of the current chapter and change the
rules of the game for subsequent and contempo-
rary innings; on both counts a brief review of
those developments and their impact is in order.
Changing the Framework: the "Events of 1974"
On July 15, 1974, a coup d'etat executed by
the Greek-officered Cypriot National Guard and
planned by the military junta then ruling in
Greece overthrew the government of Cyprus. The
coup consummated five years of intrigues,
attempted assassinations, and guerrilla opera-
tions directed against Archbishop Makarios III,
the President of the Republic, by a "disloyal
opposition" of pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, main-
land Greek officers, and others, including the
junta, who variously accused him of betraying
enosis and Greece, flirting with the Cypriot
Communist Party (AKEL) and the Soviet Union,
and plotting against the junta. In the deep sus-
picions of most Cypriots, these efforts to over-
throw, murder, or at least discipline Makarios
also enjoyed the blessing, and perhaps more than
that, of the American government or some of its
agencies, including National Security Adviser
and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
the CIA, who were widely regarded as beholden
to the Athens junta for its staunch anticommu-
nism and convinced that Makarios must be pre-
vented from becoming a "Mediterranean
Castro." 2
Makarios himself made a dramatic escape
from his presidential palace while it was under
tank and artillery attack and fled to the British
Sovereign Base Areas on the southern coast,
whence he was flown to exile in Britain. In his
place the "coupists" (as they are quaintly called
in Cypriot English) installed Nicos Sampson, a
veteran of the EOK A guerrilla movement that
had fought the British in the name of enosis in
the 1950s, when he had acquired an unsavory
reputation as a ruthless killer of Britons and
Turks.
The Turkish government and Army reacted as
everyone, presumably excepting the Greek junta,
had known they would react under such circum-
stances. On July 20 a Turkish expeditionary force
landed near Kyrenia, on the north coast of the
island. In the face of stubborn resistance and
numerous casualties on both sides, they soon
established a substantial bridgehead and a land
corridor connecting it to the Turkish Cypriot
quarter in Nicosia, beyond the Kyrenia Range.
As tales of pillage, murder, and rape spread
ahead of the Turkish advance?whether they
were true, exaggerated, or invented is a separate
subject on which Greek and Turkish opinions
naturally differ?the Greek Cypriot population
of threatened villages fled southward, the first of
many who would still be refugees more than six
years later. In the south Greek Cypriot forces
occupied or besieged Turkish Cypriot villages
and fortified "enclaves," generating a counter-
part set of atrocity stories, and many Turkish
Cypriots sought sanctuary, as Makarios had
done, on the British Sovereign Bases at Akrotiri
and Dhekelia.
The Turks claimed a legal justification for
their intervention, in addition to a moral and
strategic duty to protect their conationals on
Cyprus from the Sampson regime and Turkey
itself from Greek "encirclement" through enosis,
by citing the Anglo-Greek-Turkish Treaty of
Guarantee that had been part of the settlement
creating the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The
treaty granted the three guarantor powers "the
right to take action," jointly or singly, to re-
establish a status quo defined as including the
republic's "independence, territorial integrity
and security, as well as respect for its Constitu-
tion" (articles 1 and 4). Prime Minister Billent
Ecevit flew to London to consult the British as a
coguarantor, as the treaty required, before
unleashing the expeditionary force; the British
declined his invitation to participate in a joint
military operation, but do not appear to have
challenged the legal and other justifications the
Turks were citing. Ecevit also delayed the order
to start the landing while Joseph Sisco, U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs dis-
patched as Kissinger's special envoy, rushed
from London to Athens, Ankara, and again
Athens in a vain attempt to repeat Cyrus Vance's
success in using such urgent "shuttle diplomacy"
to defuse a similar Cyprus crisis in 1967.
Whether the American failure to deter the Turks
this time and in the following days signified a
lack of skill, of will, or of means is much dis-
puted.
By July 23 a provisional cease-fire had been
arranged and both the military dictatorship in
Athens and the "coupist" regime in Nicosia had
collapsed. The former was replaced by a civilian
regime headed by Constantine Karamanlis and
pledged to restore parliamentary democracy, the
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latter by the precoup government but with
Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of
Representatives, as Acting President in the
absence of Makarios?an order of succession
prescribed by the 1960 Constitution.
Two days later the foreign ministers of Britain,
Turkey, and Greece met in Geneva under the
terms of the Treaty of Guaranty and in compli-
ance with a United Nations Security Council
resolution adopted in response to the Turkish
intervention. In a declaration issued when they
adjourned on July 30 the foreign ministers called
for additional emergency measures to maintain
the cease-fire, separate the combatants, and pre-
vent further changes in the situation on the
ground, and for the urgent commencement of
negotiations to restore peace and constitutional
government. They also "noted the existence in
practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autono-
mous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot
Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot
Community"?a sentence that alarmed the newly
restored Greek Cypriot authorities in Nicosia, for
whom any form of international recognition for
their Turkish Cypriot rivals was then and still is
considered a slippery slope to permanent par-
tition.
Meanwhile and in defiance of both the cease-
fire and the Geneva declaration, Turkish forces
continued to widen their Kyrenia-Nicosia
corridor through nibbling advances that sent
more refugees streaming southward. In the south
Greek Cypriot forces similarly defied orders from
Geneva to withdraw from the Turkish Cypriot
villages they had occupied.
The foreign ministers of the guarantor powers
reassembled in Geneva on August 8 for the
promised negotiations. On August 10 they were
joined by Clerides and Rauf Denkta?, old dueling
partners from the UN-sponsored intercommunal
talks of 1968-1974 invited to Geneva as spokes-
man for their respective communities. That they
were received in this capacity, at Turkish insis-
tence, rather than in their official roles as the
Cyprus Republic's Acting President and its
elected but nonfunctioning Vice-President under
the 1960 Constitution, was in order at this stage
to evade the question of the present status of the
1960 Constitution and the legitimacy of Clerides'
government. (The functions of Vice-President
had been de facto suspended since Turkish
Cypriots walked out of bi-communal central
government organs during the crisis and violence
DIR-1-'81/5
of 1964 and set up their own separate adminis-
tration in their enclaves.)
The second Geneva conference broke up in
acrimony at 3 A.M. on August 14, after three
days of intensive informal negotiations and only
two plenary sessions. The end came when the
Turkish Foreign Minister refused to agree to
Clerides' request, supported by the British and
Greek Foreign Ministers, for a 36-hour adjourn-
ment to allow him to consider and seek advice in
Nicosia before responding to Turkish and
Turkish Cypriot demands that the conference
pronounce in favor of a federal solution based on
geographic separation, which implied at least
limited population exchanges. Within two hours
the Turkish forces on Cyprus had recommenced
military operations and were advancing rapidly
southward. When they stopped again, and
finally, 38 percent of the island was under their
coritial, to a line running f134,7:61
orphote
N1iwestt]iii iiiiitY5rFamagusta
on the east coas1,-1-ndialudin-rthFUN?Gieen
Line that had divided the Turkish from the
Greek parts of Nicosia since 1964. As the Greek
Cypriots have tirelessly pointed out ever since,
this line was nearly identical to those appearing
in Turkish proposals for partition of the island
dating back ten years and in Denkt4's proposals
for a federal solution presented to the Geneva
meeting on the day before the renewed Turkish
advance began.
When it was all over some 170,000 Greek
Cypriots (according to UN figures) were refugees
south of that Turkish held territory, and only
20,000 had stayed behind. In the south a similar
process of flight and expulsion from Turkish
villages swelled the ranks of the Turkish Cypriots
encamped under British protection on the
Akrotiri and Dhekelia Sovereign Base Areas and
subsequently resettled in the north. After others
had followed the same route, on the basis of a
Clerides-Denkta? agreement on further volun-
tary population exchanges concluded in summer
1975, the total of uprooted and resettled Turkish
Cypriots stood (according to Turkish Cypriot
figures) at 65,000, half the pre-1974 Turkish
population of the island. By late 1979, according
to a report by the UN Secretary General, only
1,482 Greek Cypriots remained in the north (in
11 villages on the Karpass peninsula) and 206
Turkish Cypriots in the south.*
The "events of 1974"?a noncommittal label
currently favored by UN officials and others
*See map, p. 23.
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wishing to avoid the appearance of bias asso-
ciated with either "Turkish invasion" or
"Turkish peacekeeping operation"?funda-
mentally altered the framework within which a
solution to the Cyprus question must henceforth
be sought and narrowed the range of possible
solutions.
As the Turks quickly made clear, in the new
situation shaped by their intervention it was too
late to turn the clock back. The 1960 settlement
had sought to protect the Turkish Cypriot
minority, while establishing the republic as a
basically unitary and centrally administered
state, through the Treaty of Guarantee, which, in
effect, legitimized Turkish interventions on their
behalf, and through the traditional device of
communal safeguards, rights, and privileges
"entrenched" in the Constitution. The latter
included language rights, communal autonomy
in matters like religion and family law, a 30 per-
cent quota of participants in central state organs,
police, and civil service (for a minority com-
prising 18% of the population) and a right of
veto, vested in the Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presi-
dent of the republic and members of the House of
Representatives, in specified matters affecting
their communal interests. It was the unaccepta-
bility to the Greek Cypriots of several of these
provisions, which they considered unworkable or
violations of majority rule and equality of citizen-
ship, that led to the constitutional crisis and
intercommunal violence of 1963-64 and the with-
drawal of many Turkish Cypriots and their
leadership?involuntarily according to them,
voluntarily according to the Greeks?into self-
administered, armed, and beleaguered enclaves.
The central features of the proposed way out of
this singularly unsatisfactory and violence-prone
situation that gradually took shape in the
Clerides-Denktal negotiations of 1968-1974 were
based on Turkish concessions in the area of
central powers (for example, the veto was to go
and the 30% quota reduced to 20%) in return for
Greek concessions in the area of expanded
_ autonomy for separate Greek and Turkish local
governments as well as in communal matters.
Both the 1960 arrangement and the draft of
revisions to it that was taking shape by the end of
1973 were based on the premise of a mixed popu-
lation?Greek villages, Turkish villages, and
mixed villages and towns scattered in random
pattern across the island, as had been the case
ever since the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in
1571. Such a pattern, the Greek side argued, pre-
cluded the federal solution periodically proposed
by the Turkish side. This and other Greek posi-
tions acquired additional negotiating strength
from a second premise: that the Greek Cypriots
were in a somewhat stronger bargaining position
than the Turkish Cypriots, whose disadvantages
of fewer numbers and forces and presumably
more urgent need for a solution (to release them
from the permanent physical insecurity and eco-
nomic, social, and political disabilities deriving
from semi-isolation in "enclaves") were only
partly counterbalanced by mainland Turkish
support, which was in turn supposedly inhibited
by mainland Greek support for the majority
community and American ability to restrain
Turkey, as in 1967, from using force as an ulti-
mate sanction.
These two premises had indeed been invali-
dated by "the events," as the Turkish side pointed
out, and could be revalidated only by a change of
heart or loss of will in Ankara. As a result of the
violent redistribution of population during "the
events" and its semivoluntary completing the
following year, the two communities (except for a
few stay-behinds on each side) now live totally
separated in two distinct geographic regions, and
the Turks and their Turkish Cypriot prot?s
have so far shown no sign of countenancing any
solution that would bring about more than mar-
ginal changes in this new pattern. In addition, as
a Greek Cypriot has put it, "The events of 1974
proved that in a crisis Turkey will come to the aid
of the Turkish Cypriots, but Greece will not come
to the aid of the Greek Cypriots," a lesson that
may be one reason for the relative disengagement
that has characterized Greece's Cyprus policy
since 1974. Subsequent events have also
produced little evidence of serious American or
British interest in intervening against this
reversal of Greek and Turkish negotiating
strengths. These observations serve to heighten
both Greek and Turkish Cypriot awareness that
the geographic proximity of Turkey, whose
coastal mountains are plainly visible from
Kyrenia on a clear day, by itself reduces the
Greek Cypriots from an overwhelming island
majority to a minuscule regional minority. The
consequences, for the Greek Cypriots, include a
sense of powerlessness, isolation, frustration, ...
and further disillusionment with Mother Greece,
and hence with enosis, which contributes another
dimension discussed in more detail later.
In these circumstances, there would appear to
be only two alternatives to a bicommunal and
biregional federal solution with a distribution of
powers (and territory) at least somewhat closer to
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what the Turkish side has proposed than to what
the Greek side has so far been willing to accept.
The first is for the Greek Cypriots to persevere in
unwillingness to agree to such a tilted compro-
mise, which they purport to believe would be
tantamount to "disguised partition." In this case
the post-1974 status quo of a divided island with
"two autonomous administrations" would pre-
sumably continue until it gradually acquired
some form of international recognition and
legality, leaving the world with two formally
independent and ethnically homogeneous Cypriot
ministates ... or until the dependence of the
smaller and weaker of these units on its "mother
country" for economic aid and security leads to
the formal annexation of northern Cyprus as the
68th province of Turkey. ("Actually the 69th," a
Turkish Cypriot wryly corrected this scenario
during a recent conversation, "since West Ger-
many has so many Turkish migrant workers that
Munich is already the 68th!") The second is for
the Turks to decide?or for someone else, usually
meaning the United States, to persuade
them?to withdraw their military and political
engagement before there is an agreed solution,
thereby fulfilling a frequently heard Greek
Cypriot hope that "they will go away and leave us
and our Turkish Cypriot brothers to resolve
things between us, in mutual good will, and all
return to our lost homes and villages."
Many and perhaps most Greek Cypriots go on
hoping that the second of these alternatives to
the "disguised partition" of loose federation will
somehow come to pass, and their hopes are rein-
forced before each American election by Presi-
dential and other candidates wooing Greek-
American voters with promises or what the
Greek Cypriot press can construe as promises.
Waiting for this particular Godot then becomes
one reason why permanent and undisguised par-
tition in one form or another, as the result of a
failure to achieve a negotiated solution, continues
to seem the most probable outcome. It is an out-
come that almost all Greek and Turkish Cypriots
fervently declare is as unwanted as the Republic
of Cyprus was unwanted in 1960, but in summer
1980 almost all thought that it was indeed the
most likely one.3 In this potentially self-fulfilling
prophecy there is disagreement only concerning
ultimate responsibility for such a solution
through nonsolution: one's own or the other
Cypriots' political leaders; the other Cypriot
community in general or in strategic parts; the
Turkish government or Army; the American
DIR-1-'81/7
government or some agencies of it; or all of the
above.
Back to the Drawing-Board
and on with the Tea-Dance
In December 1974 Makarios returned from
exile and reassumed his functions as Cyprus'
President. His government's writ now ran to only
60 percent of the republic's territory. In the other
40 percent its legitimacy as well as authority was
unrecognized. Power there was in the hands of
the Turkish Army and Denkta5' "Provisional
Turkish Cypriot Administration," heretofore the
de facto rulers of Turkish north Nicosia and the
other Turkish enclaves that had comprised 5
percent of the island from their establishment in
1964 until the Turkish intervention. In these cir-
cumstances, the Greek Cypriot administration
was already engaged in an agonizing reappraisal
of its situation and how to save the savable.
Meetings between Clerides and Denkta? had
been restarted that same month, in compliance
with another UN resolution. In an initial agree-
ment concluded by January 8, 1975, the Greek
side conceded the principle of federation that
Denkta? and the Turks had demanded at Geneva
II. At this stage, however, the concession was
qualified by insistence on a multiregional
arrangement that would permit the return of all
the refugees of both sides to their homes, which
was then and later another Greek Cypriot de-
mand. These qualifications, communicated to
Denkta? in early February, were unacceptable to
the Turkish side, for whom it would mean that
their community would again be scattered, en-
circled, and cut off from the direct access to
Turkey in all but one of the proposed regions (the
exception being the Nicosia-Kyrenia triangle).
The lesson of 1963-1974, the Turks argued then
and continue to insist today, was that Greek and
Turkish Cypriots cannot live together in peace
and security, and that the geographic segregation
into two viable and autonomous regions brought
about by the Turkish intervention must therefore
be maintained in any final solution, although
territorial and constitutional details are nego-
tiable.
Denkta?' immediate response to Greek will-
ingness to concede only a multiregional fed-
eration was to proclaim, on February 15, 1975,
establishment of a Turkish Federated State
of Cyprus (TFSC, later more commonly spelled
Kibris, the Turkish name for the island, and also
abbreviated TFSK in its English version). Its con-
stitution, like its name, was written to anticipate
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later incorporation in the bi-regional Federal
Republic that the Turkish side was demanding.
Denkta? himself was elected President of the
TFSC/TFSK. The former residence of the
island's British Governors-General, just inside
the Venetian city wall of old Nicosia and resi-
dence of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of
the disunited republic during the decade of
Turkish-Cypriot "enclavement," became his
presidential palace ... although some disrespect-
ful Turkish Cypriots refer to the nearby Turkish
Embassy?the only one in the north?as "our
real presidential palace."
The Greek Cypriot government in south
Nicosia in its turn responded to the proclamation
of the TFSC/TFSK by again appealing to the
UN. The result was another Security Council
resolution that "regretted" the Turkish Cypriot
move and once more called for implementation
of earlier resolutions.
Nearly five years have passed since these
inauspicious new beginnings. Intercommunal
talks and other forms of negotiation under and
outside UN auspices have continued spasmodi-
cally, with long interruptions, sequential dead-
locks, some progress and some retreats to earlier
positions ... and no sign of an end. With official
intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish
Cypriot "interlocutors" on again since Septem-
ber 1980, after a 15-month interruption, a brief
review of the intervening phases?sparing the
reader details and comment not essential to
understanding the current situation?may be
useful.
1. The Vienna Waltz I. Clerides and Denkta?
came together to continue the revival of their
1968-1974 tea-dance on five occasions between
April 1975 and February 1976?four times in
Vienna and once at the UN in New York?with
varying agendas including missing and displaced
persons and other "humanitarian" issues, the
territorial question, etc. Expert committees were
formed and met; proposals, "observations" on
proposals, and mutual accusations of bad faith
were ground out. The mountain labored and gave
birth, with the Special Representative of UN
Secretary General Waldheim as indefatigable
midwife, to a few mice: an agreement "in
principle" to reopen Nicosia International Air-
port (never carried out); an agreement that
Turkish Cypriots still in the south should be per-
mitted to move north and Greek Cypriots still in
the north should be permitted to move south on
the basis of individual desires (implemented),
and that Greek Cypriots remaining in enclaves in
the north should "be given every help to lead a
normal life ... " (implementation disputed); and
sometimes merely a blunt communique: "In the
absence of concrete proposals, the talks were
adjourned...."
Shortly after his fifth new round with Denkta?,
in Vienna in February 1976, Clerides fell out of
favor with Archbishop Makarios and was re-
moved from the scene of action to a political
limbo which he was later to turn into a mustering
place for opposition to Makarios' successors.4 He
was succeeded as the Greek Cypriot "interlocu-
tor" in the intercommunal talks by Tassos Papa-
dopoulos and later George Ioannides; their
Turkish Cypriot counterpart was to be Umit
Suleyman Onan in place of Denktal, a corre-
sponding downgrading in rank consistent with
Turkish insistence on the status equality of the
two negotiating parties.
2. The Makarios-Denktal "Guidelines." Early
in January 1977 Denkta? wrote to Archbishop
Makarios and proposed a personal meeting "to
give you my views on... matters relating to the
Cyprus problem in the hope that we may thus
reach some understanding...." Makarios con-
curred, and the two men met on January 27 and
again on February 12 at the Ledra Palace, once
Nicosia's leading hotel and since summer 1974 a
battle-scarred semi-ruin inside the neutral zone
of the United Nations "Green Line" where
Canadian soldiers with the UN Peacekeeping
Force hang their washing from windows of once-
luxurious bedrooms. At their second meeting
Makarios and Denkta? agreed that the inter-
communal talks should be reconvened in Vienna
"at the end of March" and should be governed
by four "guidelines" which have become the
basis for all subsequent negotiations (and mutual
accusations of reneging):
"1. We are seeking an independent, non-
aligned, bicommunal, Federal Republic.
"2. The territory under the administration of
each community should be discussed in the light
of economic viability or productivity and land
ownership.
"3. Questions of principle like freedom of
movement, freedom of settlement, the right of
property and other specific matters, are open for
discussion taking into consideration the funda-
mental basis of a bicommunal federal system and
certain practical difficulties which may arise for
the Turkish Cypriot community.
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"4. The powers and functions of the Central
Federal Government will be such as to safeguard
the unity of the country, having regard to the
bicommunal character of the State."
3. Vienna Waltz II. The "interlocutors" and
their teams duly began their new Vienna round,
in the presence of Secretary-General Waldheim
himself, on March 31, 1979. By prior agreement
the Greek side presented a map showing its terri-
torial proposals and the Turkish side submitted
constitutional proposals, both supposedly as a
basis for substantive negotiations. These did not
take place. Perhaps one or both sides never
meant that they should. It is equally possible,
however, and the opinion of this observer of the
1977 Vienna round, that the talks were in any
case doomed by the intense publicity, incarnate
in the TV cameras and mob of journalists with
cassette tape recorders jamming the corridors
and staircases of the conference site in Vienna's
Diplomatic Academy, and the premature state-
ments forced out of Papadopolous and Onan at
the end of each meeting. All of this precluded the
flexibility and abandonment of initial positions
that are essential to success in such negotiations,
and provided another reminder that open
covenants secretly arrived at are often better than
open covenants openly arrived at.
The Greek map presented at Vienna conceded,
for the first time, that the proposed bicommunal
federation should also be biregional rather than
multiregional, a concession that was to prove
definitive although presented as conditional. On
the other hand, the border between the regions
proposed by the Greek side reduced the Turkish
Cypriot area to 20 percent of the island and
meandered across the map in such a fashion that
the Turks called it "a snake." They also noted
that it created semi-enclaves on both sides, barely
connected to the main parts of the two regions,
and was therefore really a disguised form of
multiregionalism. If the border was a snake, the
regions it defined were definitely relations of that
remarkable cartographical beast, invented for
party-political rather than ethnopolitical reasons
in early nineteenth-century Massachusetts, that
Americans call a "Gerrymander." The Greek
map was summarily rejected by the Turkish
negotiators, who argued that it violated point 2 of
the Guidelines and the principle of "security" for
the Turkish Cypriots that they claimed was
implicit?although the term itself was not used?
in point 3 and had been explicit in the Makarios-
Denkta? discussions that led to its adoption.
DIR-1-'81/9
(Recalling those discussions during a conver-
sation in July 1980, Denkta? told me that the
wording of point 3 was a result of Makarios'
"sympathetic and genuine understanding" of
Denkta?' fears for the security of the Turkish
community, and for peace between the commu-
nities, if a settlement should permit immediate
and unfettered freedom of movement and settle-
ment across regional boundaries.)
Turkish proposals on the constitutional aspect
of the problem, based on a principle that Onan
labeled "evolutionary federalism," were similarly
rejected by the Greek side, which claimed that
they were insufficiently specific, "federal" in
name only, and in fact a transparent disguise for
permanent partition into two loosely associated
but essentially sovereign states. They were also
unacceptable because they would in effect
legitimize the fait accompli of the TFSC/TFSK,
which was mentioned by name. This, for the
Greek Cypriots, was another Turkish maneuver
designed to elevate this illegal entity to equality
of status with the regime in south Nicosia,
thereby depriving the latter of its internationally
recognized position as the legal government of
the entire republic, which the Greek side con-
sidered their strongest remaining bargaining
card.
In these circumstances the Vienna meeting
could only produce grandstanding postures and a
new impasse. It was ended on April 7, after eight
futile days. The final communique noted that "It
has not been possible to bridge the considerable
gap between the views of the two sides," but
promised that the talks would resume in Nicosia
"about the middle of May 1977." This, too, did
not happen, and the interlocutors were not in fact
to meet again until June 1979, even more briefly
and once more in vain.
4. In the meantime... Archbishop Makarios
died in July 1977, a few days after addressing a
mass rally commemorating the fourth anniver-
sary of the Turkish intervention. One Greek
Cypriot has suggested to me that he died of a
broken heart, the result of the "great concessions
of principle and national interest" (Greek or
Cypriot?) and reversals of personal position that
he had made in his last months?conceding first
federalism and then biregionalism, still without
achieving a solution. Others, told of this
suggestion but sharing the widespread outside
view of Makarios as "the master of Byzantine
maneuvering," thought the image of a broken
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heart was out of character but agreed that he,
and perhaps only he, had had the political
strength to hazard such concessions when they
seemed to him necessary. His successor as Presi-
dent of the Republic of Cyprus was Spyros
Kyprianou, Clerides' successor as President of
the House of Representatives and a former
Foreign Minister. 5 The new president's lack of
Makarios' massive and loyal political following
and "charisma"?enhanced, according to his
political opponents, by his own indecisiveness
and lack of leadership qualities generally?soon
became important factors in the further develop-
ment of both the Cyprus question and internal
Greek Cypriot politics.
Further Turkish Cypriot "proposals" sub-
mitted to the UN Special Representative in April
1978 and Greek Cypriot "observations" on them
brought no progress. In November 1978 the
United States government sent the two parties a
proposal, subsequently known as "the Western
framework" or unofficially but more accurately
as "the American framework," designed to serve
as a basis for reconvening the intercommunal
talks. After some internal and private debate that
is now the subject of public dispute in Cyprus,
Kyprianou rejected the "framework" on the
grounds that it departed too far from the
Makarios-Denkta? Guidelines (in the direction of
Turkish positions) and relegated UN resolutions
on Cyprus to a secondary place as a basis for the
negotiations. In all this period the only direct
encounter recorded between Greek andTurkish
Cypriots concerned with the Cyprus problem was
an unofficial and informal academic seminar
devoted to constitutional aspects and organized
by the AUFS Center for Mediterranean Studies
in Rome in November 1977.6
5. The Kyprianou-Denktq "Ten Points" and
After. Continuing efforts by UN Special Repre-
sentatives Perez de Cuellar and later Galindo
Pohl to break the renewed impasse and bring the
parties back to the negotiating table finally bore
momentarily promising fruit: a meeting between
Kyprianou and Denkta? on May 19, 1979,
resulting in a 10-point agreement that called for
open-ended intercommunal negotiations dealing
with "all territorial and constitutional aspects'
to resume on June 15. The most important of the
10 points, in the light of later developments, were
points 2 and 5. Point 2 declared that the renewed
talks should be based on the Makarios-Denkta?
"Guidelines" of February 1977 and UN resolu-
tions on Cyprus (no mention of the "Western
framework"); and point 5 stipulated that
"priority" should be given to the resettlement of
Varosha?the Greek Cypriot southern section of
Famagusta and formerly the island's principal
tourist resort, abandoned by its Greek Cypriot
inhabitants and hoteliers during the fighting in
August 1974 and since then a ghost town barri-
caded by the Turkish Army as a kind of hostage
or bargaining chip to be played at the most
propitious moment. (Hotels in Kyrenia and on
the beaches north of Turkish-Cypriot-inhabited
old Famagusta have, like Greek-owned homes
and businesses elsewhere in the north, been
turned over to Turkish Cypriots resettled from
the south and Turkish settlers from Anatolia
whose numbers and status are disputed.) The re-
settlement of Varosha, it was stated in point 5,
should be carried out as soon as agreed and
without waiting for agreement on other issues
under negotiation. Both of these provisions were
in effect concessions by the Turkish side.
The talks were resumed as scheduled at the
Ledra Palace, Hotel and in the presence of Perez
we'Ciiellar, &mei UN Special Representative,
now back in Cyprus in a more senior capacity as
UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Polit-
ical Affairs. They were "recessed" without results
and with mutual accusations of bad faith after
one week, on June 22. The problem this time, in
the words of Secretary General Waldheim's sub-
sequent report to the UN General Assembly:
The Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. George
Ioannides, took the position that in accordance
with point 5 of the 19 May accord, the talks
should give priority to reaching agreement on the
resettlement of Varosha under United Nations
auspices. The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, Mr.
Umit Suleyman Onan, considered that before
taking up point 5 the interlocutors should engage
in a comprehensive discussion of point 2.... In
this connection, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor
asked the Greek Cypriot interlocutor to acknowl-
edge that the agreement on the 1977 guidelines,
in addition to their published text, comprised
also the concepts of "bi-zonality" and of the
"security of the Turkish Cypriot community."
Both of these demands were unacceptable to
the Greek side, for whom their a priori accep-
tance (as it was stated in a Greek Cypriot aide
memoire handed to the UN Special Representa-
tive on August 2, 1979) "would nullify the Ten-
Point Agreement of 19.5.1979 as a whole, includ-
ing the Makarios-Denktash Guidelines." More-
over, it was claimed, the term "bi-zonal,"
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although in the past also occasionally used by
Greek Cypriot officials as a synonym for
"biregional," now had unacceptable connota-
tions in Turkish usage?where it was said to
recall the evolution of postwar Germany's
Western and Soviet occupation "zones" into two
totally separate states?which would "destroy the
basic notion of 'federation' ... [and] enable the
Turkish side to promote its avowed objective to
create two separate states, legalizing the existing
military occupation of Cyprus." If the Turkish
side wished to raise the issues of "bi-zonality"
and "security" during the negotiations, Greek
Cypriot spokesmen said, they were free to do so,
but they could not make their acceptance a pre-
condition for resuming talks.
The Turkish side responded that "bi-zonal"
had for them none of the connotations imputed
by the Greek side, whose rejection of the term
was instead an attempt to renege on their earlier
agreement to a bi- rather than multi-whatever-
you-want-to-call-them federation. They also
argued that in refusing to accept the importance
Turkish Cypriots ascribed to "security" for the
minority community, the Greek Cypriot side had
failed a litmus paper test of Greek sincerity in
general, since this had always been the central
issue for the Turkish community. Each side
accused the other of merely indulging in a public
relations trick by signing the 10 Points with no
intention of engaging in good-faith negotiations.
This time and on these issues the suspension of
direct intercommunal negotiations was to last 15
months, until September 1980. In a random
opinion poll that summer most outside observers
keeping scorecards for intransigence and stone-
walling (a diplomatic and journalistic game to
which Kyprianou, Denkta?, and governments in
Ankara and Athens must pay concerned atten-
tion) awarded most of the blame for this latest
renewal of the impasse to the Greek side, which
seemed to be nitpicking about connotations of
words and fine points of agendas, however good
its formal case, and thus fiddling while the
Cyprus question burned on endlessly. As
described below, this judgment has generally
been seconded by Kyprianou's political oppo-
nents and critics within the Greek Cypriot com-
munity, whose numbers and vociferousness grew
as the stalemate dragged on, inserting a new
factor into the equation.
Meanwhile, Denktal raised his own score in
the negative competition for the title of chief
spoiler by appearing to be at fault, in June 1980,
DIR-1-'81/11
for the failure of another attempt by Perez de
Cuellar to restart the stalled negotiations through
personal "shuttle diplomacy" between north and
south Nicosia. The details, although basically
unimportant in view of the failure of the mission,
preoccupied political Cypriots (meaning almost
all Cypriots) and the Nicosia diplomatic and
journalistic communities for several weeks and
are illustrative of the day-to-day vicissitudes and
"Byzantine" speculations that have beset the
Cyprus question these many years. In brief,
Denkta? was reported by UN and other sources
to have said "yes" on Friday afternoon to a
formula for reopening the talks presented to him
by Perez de Cuellar and "no" on Saturday
morning to the same formula, which had in the
meanwhile been accepted by Kyprianou at a
midnight meeting with the UN official following
an emergency session of the Greek Cypriot
government. Denkta? has a different version, in
which he never said 'yes" on Friday ("proved,"
he told a visitor in July, "by two independent sets
of notes taken at the meeting and a subsequent
apology from Mr. Perez de Cuellar"), but the
first version was widely accepted south of the
Green Line and gave rise to the usual kind of
embassy, bar, and coffee house second-guessing.
Had Denkta? gambled on a "no" from
Kyprianou that would have left Denkta? looking
conciliatory and Kyprianou still and again a
spoiler, or had his first "yes" been counter-
manded by Ankara or the Turkish Army? In any
case, since general circumstances made the
moment highly unpropitious for substantive
negotiations, why had Perez de Cuellar, a skilled
and respected diplomat with long Cyprus expe-
rience, come at this particular time? Was it
because Hugo Gobbi, recently arrived to replace
Galindo Pohl as UN Special Representative in
Cyprus and eager to record an early success, had
been overoptimistic in his reports to Secretary-
General Waldheim? Because Waldheim himself
had attributed too much significance, as an
indication of greater Turkish flexibility, to a con-
versation he had had with Turkish Prime
Minister Suleyman Demirel in Belgrade at the
beginning of May, when both were attending the
funeral of Yugoslav President Tito? (As reported
at the time in usually well-informed Belgrade
circles, Demirel had replied affirmatively when
Waldheim asked him whether a new UN initia-
tive on the Cyprus question would be welcomed
by Ankara.) Or merely because, with Cyprus
likely to be on the agenda for the UN General
Assembly meeting in the autumn (it was removed
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at the last minute, in December 1980), the Secre-
tariat wished to have more activity on its part to
report? Everyone had an opinion, and the best-
informed ones were contradictory.
Other initiatives and diplomatic games were
not lacking in this period. There was a UN pro-
posal to "internationalize" the question further,
if intercommunal talks were not on again and
making progress by March 1980, by appointing a
multinational commission of mediators that none
of the parties really wanted, which is why the
deadline was quietly disregarded when it passed
with the talks still suspended.There was also, to
general embarrassment, an offer of personal
mediation from Libya's Moamer Qadhafi.7 Both
Cypriot sides were constrained to give it official
welcome, whatever their true feelings, because
while Kyprianou was engaged in a campaign to
muster more support for his cause from the non-
aligned movement, Denkta? had discovered an
exciting new source of potential support for his in
the spirit of Islamic revival and militancy sweep-
ing the Muslim world (therefore his now numer-
ous forays out of Nicosia to attend Islamic confer-
ences and to visit a series of Muslim states), and
Qadhafi aspires to an active and pugnacious role
in both. In these circumstances the principle that
all mediation of the Cyprus question should take
place under UN auspices provided a convenient
diplomatic excuse for passing the Libyan buck to
a presumably equally unenthusiastic Waldheim.
Meanwhile, Denkta? periodically repeated
earlier threats to issue a Rhodesian-style uni-
lateral declaration of independence for the
TFSC/TFSK (" 'UDI' is the wrong term," he says,
"because we are already independent, but the
press is used to it"), accompanied by hints that
only a Turkish veto had prevented him from
already doing so. He also offered?under
Turkish pressure, according to some sources?to
permit immediate resettlement of 65,000 Greek
Cypriots in Varosha, without waiting for agree-
ment on jurisdiction in the area. The offer was
rejected by the Kyprianou government on the
grounds that the jurisdiction question must be
decided first, and Varosha returned to southern
control, in order to avoid making Turkish hos-
tages of the 65,000 and their entrepreneurship.
On the international scorecard this exchange was
a draw, but the divided reactions it inspired
among Famagusta-Varosha refugees in the
south, many of them wealthy and influential per-
sons, further complicated the political picture
there and Kyprianou's position in it.
In the end, intercommunal talks under the
chairmanship of UN Special Representative
Gobbi were resumed at the Ledra Palace in Sep-
tember 1980 ... and are continuing on a (usually)
weekly basis, accompanied by communiques
reporting a "positive" and "friendly" atmos-
phere but no actual agreement on anything, as
this Report goes to press. The formula, ironically,
was originally proposed by Waldheim more than
a year earlier, in August 1979, as a way of
evading the issues that had brought about the
immediate breakdown of the June 1979 talks. It
was rejected by both sides when first proposed,
then accepted by Denkta? but not by the Greek
Cypriots in October 1979. Surfacing again during
Perez de Cuellar's ill-fated shuttle diplomacy of
June 1980, it was now rejected by Denkta? (as
described above), but in September its time had
come. As finally accepted and essentially as first
proposed, Waldheim's formula provided that
four basic topics distilled from the `Ten Points"
of May 1979?"the resettlement of Varosha
under United Nations auspices," "initial practi-
cal measures by both sides to promote good will,
mutual confidence, and the return to normal
conditions," "constitutional aspects," and "terri-
torial aspects"?should be considered "concur-
rently," although for practical reasons they
would be taken up sequentially, in the order
stated, at successive meetings in a cycle to be
repeated until agreement could be reached on all
four. Thus the meeting that started the new year
on January 7, 1981, after a one-month recess,
began the fourth such cycle by considering?for
the fourth time?the Varosha question.
"Where there's a "?
This chronicle of deadlock periodically inter-
rupted by apparently half-hearted negotiations
suggests two possibilities: lack of sufficient will
for a solution, or a range and depth of conflict,
suspicion and fear greater than or different from
those formally recognized in the agendas and
diplomacy of 'the Cyprus question.' In fact, it
will be argued in this section, both are true and
they are interconnected.
The suspicion that none of the parties, at least
as presently represented, wants the kind of nego-
tiated compromise solution that might be
achieved at this time badly enough to pay the
price of unavoidable concessions is reinforced by
the observation, based on public positions
assumed to date, that there are already broad
areas of agreement or near-agreement (albeit
conditional and revocable, as noted earlier in
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this Report), and that what must and could be
done to achieve agreement on most other subjects
is also generally clear.
On constitutional and related issues, one sur-
vey of official and other nonbinding but public
positions, compiled three years ago with the
cooperation of unofficial but qualified Cypriots
of both communities,8 catalogued seven broad
"areas of apparent agreement" concerning ulti-
mate goals and matters of principle and a longer
list of specific subjects, involving matters such as
the division of powers within a federal structure,
checks and balances, and guarantees, on which
there seemed to be "agreement or similarity of
views." The first category began with the "ulti-
mate objective" that both communities have
officially defined as an independent, sovereign,
nonaligned, united, bicommunal, and bi-
regional (or bi-zonal!) Federal Republic of
Cyprus; its institutions and symbols should be
conducive to gradual evolution toward a unified
(or unitary?) Cyprus whose citizens will feel
themselves to be Cypriots first and Greeks or
Turks as a secondary cultural or ethnic self-
identification. The second category recorded
agreement, near-agreement, or differences that
should be susceptible to negotiation on impor-
tant subjects like the federal or regional attribu-
tion or division of power and responsibility for
foreign policy, defense, money and banking,
taxation and budgets, public health, education,
commerce, industry, agriculture, natural re-
sources, the courts, the police, and others. Closer
analysis of these lists also suggested that an
imaginative search for nonconventional solu-
tions, perhaps drawing on precedents found in
federations like Yugoslavia, Switzerland, West
Germany, and even the Hapsburg Dual
Monarchy, might reveal ways of making an end
run around remaining differences.
In brief, these lists and subsequent develop-
ments suggest that on a broad range of constitu-
tional and related issues a compromise solu-
tion?in which, as an example of major impor-
tance, the two regions would enjoy somewhat
more competencies and autonomy than the
Greek side has been willing to contemplate and
somewhat less than the Turkish side has
demanded?is within easy reach if the will for it
exists and other issues in the total "package" can
also be resolved.
Among these other issues the territorial ques-
tion and the question of freedom of movement
DIR-1-'81/13
and settlement, which together include the ques-
tion of whether, when, and how many refugees
will be free to return to their homes and property,
are the thorniest. It is here, and in the super-
ficially symbolic question of sovereignty and
legitimacy described below, that conflicting
values, immediate and important conflicts of
individual as well as communal economic and
emotive interests, and (perhaps most intractable
of all) deep-seated mutual distrust and fear are
most "real" and hard to reconcile. Here too,
however, the general outline of potentially en-
durable solutions based on difficult but not im-
possible mutual concessions and sacrifices is also
clear to neutral observers, if not to those who
must make them:
- As early as the first months after "the
events" of 1974 the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
side was signaling readiness to settle for "signifi-
cantly" less than the 38 ercent of the island
currently under Turk's contro , in re urn for
commensurate concessions on other matters by
the other side. What they would accept would
presumably never be as little as the 20 percent
offered by the Greek side at Vienna in 1977, but
some northern sources have hinted that they
might be induced to consider something around
25 percent. Greek Cypriot officials, noting that
phrases like "significant geographical adjust-
ments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side" (this
one from the "Western framework" of 1978) are
ominously vague, have been disbelieving or have
argued that even 25 percent, if regarded as a
minimum claim, is too much for 18 percent of the
population. However, ultimate Turkish inten-
tions and Greek expectations have never been
put to the test of serious negotiations and quid
pro quo bargaining (unless this is happening
during the current round, which is happily being
characterized by more secrecy than earlier ones.)
- On the question of freedom of movement
and settlement across the future interregional
boundary both sides have so far been publicly
inflexible. The Greek side has argued that there
is no precedent for a federation without such
freedoms (which is not quite true for freedom of
settlement, e.g., in Switzerland) and noted, as an
instructive irony, that the European Community,
which now includes Greece and in principle will
some day include Turkey, has come to recognize
them even across the frontiers of its sovereign
member states. How, they ask, could a federal
Cyprus be called a single and united country, and
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14/DIR-1-'81
how could economic and a degree of social inte-
gration benefiting both communities be achieved,
if citizens of one region cannot settle or even
travel freely in the other? What hope would exist
for the refugees (one-third of their voters)
deprived of their homes and property? For the
Turkish Cypriots, however, some restriction of
both freedoms, at least for a period of some
years, is the sine qua non of their security, which
is their primary concern. How, they ask, could
they remain a majority in their own region?their
principal ultimate guarantee against renewed
Greek Cypriot economic, social, and political
domination?if freedom of settlement were un-
fettered and most of the former Greek Cypriot
inhabitants of the future Turkish Cypriot region
were to choose to come home? And how, as long
as there are even a few hotheads in both commu-
nities, could a return to intercommunal tensions
and violence be prevented if (as Denkta? himself
has put it) "Nicos Sampson and his friends were
free to come to picnic and hunt in the Kyrenia
Range, bringing their weapons"?
Freedom of movement and settlement is there-
fore likely to prove the most difficult of all issues,
even with good will on both sides. Even here,
however, there is a chink of light. As noted above,
Denkta? claims that the wording of the third of
the Makarios-Denkta? "Guidelines" of 1977?
"Questions of principle like freedom of move-
ment, freedom of settlement, the right of prop-
erty and other specific matters, are open for dis-
cussion taking into consideration the funda-
mental basis of a bicommunal federal system and
certain practical dculties which may arise
for the Turkish Cypriot Community" (emphasis
added)?reflected Makarios' understanding and
sympathy for real Turkish Cypriot concerns.
Implicit in such understanding and sympathy is a
willingness to be flexible about the limits and
timing of freedom and movement and the prin-
ciple of freedom of settlement.
Makarios is gone, which makes verification of
his attitude and its endorsement by his successors
more difficult, but there are other Greek Cypriots
who share the views attributed to their great
authority figure by Denkta?. It is also unclear,
incidentally, how many of the Greek Cypriot
refugees from northern districts to be included in
a future Turkish Cypriot region would actually
go back if they were free to do so?not counting
those who could automatically return to districts
like Varosha, part of Morphou, et al., that would
either certainly or probably be "ceded" to the
Greek Cypriot region in a final settlement. Greek
Cypriots, including spokesmen for the refugees,
usually claim that 90 percent would. Some
Turkish Cypriot leaders (one of them even citing
Makarios as the source of his estimate) put the
figure as low as 10 percent, although if they really
believed this they would presumably not be
objecting so strongly to an unfettered right of
return.
No one really knows. On the one hand, a great
many of the refugees have in the past six years
created satisfying new lives, often including local
marriages and families, and successful busi-
nesses in the south; even most erstwhile refugee
"camps," now outfitted with solid and decent
houses and shops and lovingly tended gardens,
have an appearance of prosperity and perma-
nence that is only partly deceptive because it is
or was subsidized. For such people, integrated
into the southern Cypriot economy if not fully
into its clannish society, a return would be a
second uprooting. On the other hand, many have
not made this adjustment, and most with new
businesses and interests in the south would pre-
sumably not be averse to recovering old ones in
the north as well, although they may now feel no
urgency about it.
In addition, there is the painful, nostalgic
longing that almost all former northerners dis-
play when they beg foreign friends, who can cross
the "Green Line" they cannot cross, for news and
impressions of their lost homes, villages, and
familiar hills ... leaving the foreign friends feeling
vaguely guilty at being able, with less right, and
an indecent detachment, to make such a visit.
Thus the same passionate attachment to one's
own people and physical environment that
inhibits full social acceptance and integration in
their new homes?the localism that the Italians,
another Mediterranean people, aptly call cam-
panilismo (from campanile, the parish church
tower)?also draws refugees back to their old
haunts. Still, some of them add that they merely
want to be able to revisit the old homestead or
village, and deeply resent being prohibited, but
would not want to live there again; a sentiment
echoed, by the way, by Turkish Cypriots trans-
planted to the north after 1974 and equally cut
off from their birthplaces. To reiterate, no one
knows how many Greek (or Turkish) Cypriots
would go back if they could; or how many of the
former would be prepared to understand and
accept Turkish Cypriot reasons for insisting that
the right to do so must at least be restricted and
postponed.
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- The last among those difficult issues is one
that is at first glance highly abstract and there-
fore oddly important: the nature of sovereignty
and legitimacy in the proposed Federal Republic.
Would these derive from the (sovereign) peoples
of two communities previously organized in polit-
ical entities (states) of their own? Or would
sovereignty and legitimacy derive from the united
(sovereign) peoples of Cyprus, being directly
vested in their common and federal state, from
which they are again and in part devolved upon
the two separate communities organized in
regions? Capable of being phrased in a variety of
ways, of which this is deliberately and provoca-
tively the most abstract and philosophical, this
question can give rise to more passionate dis-
agreement between members of the two commu-
nities than any other constitutional issue before
them. Such passion is in turn a signal that more
is involved here than a modern Cypriot reversion
to classic arguments, now generally regarded as
sterile and unnecessary, over the concepts of
sovereignty and statehood in federal states. That
signal is worth pursuing, and at three levels.
The first of these is clearer in one alternative
way of phrasing the question: will the govern-
ment of a future Federal Republic of Cyprus be
the successor of the two communal administra-
tions that now exist de facto on the island, or of
the regime that was created for a unitary, bi-
communal Cyprus in 1960 and that still exists de
jure in the treaties and Constitution of 1960 and
as a member of the United Nations, where it is
now represented by the government led by Spyros
Kyprianou? For the Greek Cypriot side, accept-
ing the first of these formulations, as their
Turkish counterparts have insisted, would be to
abandon the strongest bargaining card left in
their hands since 1974, viz., international recog-
nition of their government as the one and only
legitimate government of all Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots maintain with equal fervor that there
can be no genuine equality of status for the two
communities in negotiating a settlement now, or
as co-founders of a Federal Republic later, as
long as this condition pertains. In other words, it
has been essential to one side and anathema to
the other that the exclusively Greek Cypriot
administration in south Nicosia should regard
itself and be regarded internationally as the gov-
ernment of Cyprus, engaged in negotiating with
spokesmen for some of its citizens, who comprise
a minority community with some legitimate
rights and desires, about a devolution of its
--legitimate and heretofore unitary powers that will
DIR-1-'81/15
only then give that community a legal
autonomous political status.
The second appears as a hidden premise in
arguments used at the first level, but is also
openly expressed on other occasions. Many
Cypriots in each community profoundly suspect
and therefore fear that the other side, through its
attitude to the definition of sovereignty as in
some other matters, is betraying an undimin-
ished but now secret adherence to an ultimate
goal that has been publicly renounced for tem-
porary tactical reasons. These suspected secret
goals are still partition (taksim) for the Turkish
Cypriots, and for the Greek Cypriots a Greek
island (and therefore, when possible, enosis?)
with a Turkish minority as second-class citizens.
At a third and subtler level, Greek and
Turkish Cypriots are actually arguing about what
would become the "founding myth" of the
federal state and regime they propose to create,
and it is reasonable to assume that their passion
on the subject derives at least in part from an
awareness?conscious or otherwise?of the great
symbolic and thereby political and psychological
importance that tends to accrue to such myths in
any human society. In accordance with one
definition of its origins and sovereignty, the
Federal Republic would be regarded as the crea-
tion of separate and equal Greek and Turkish
communities, who had determined to come
together in this way in order "to form a more
perfect union" without sacrificing their separate-
ness and much of their sovereignty. In accord-
ance with the other it would be regarded as the
creation of the once and still de jure united
Cyprus, whose citizens had decided that their
union could be sustained only through devolution
of powers in a bicommunal federation. Which of
these versions became established and accepted
could be expected to have a significant impact on
self-identity and sense of community (as Cypriots
and/or as Greeks and Turks, and in what rank-
order), on loyalties and attitudes toward the fed-
eration, its subunits, and the relative degrees of
legitimacy to be accorded to their respective
organs and leaders, and on other fundamental
psychological states that affect political and
social behavior, including interpersonal and
intercommunal relations.
The same issue also surfaces in arguments
concerning the office, function, and election of
the Federal President. The Greek side wants a
powerful President (and Vice-President) elected
by communally undifferentiated universal suf-
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16/DIR-1-'81
frage (with the Vice-President to be a Turkish
Cypriot if the President is a Greek Cypriot and
vice versa). The Turkish side has called for a
Federal Presidency with purely ceremonial func-
tions, to be rotated annually between the presi-
dents of the two regions, each elected by and
from his own community. While questions of
power are also obviously involved, the symbolic
aspect of this issue, which once again concerns
the relative primacy of pan-Cypriot or of Greek
and Turkish communal symbols and allegiances
has been described as equally important by sev-
eral Cypriots from both communities.9
In negotiating a federal solution the super-
ficially abstract question of the derivation and
nature of the federation's sovereignty will for all
these reasons be hard to evade, for example
through a neutrally worded constitutional pre-
amble that avoids specifying them (i.e., no "We
the people of... ?). However, evading it may also
prove to be the only solution, at least for the time
being.
The conclusion suggested by this incomplete
and schematic analysis of negotiating issues and
differences has already been stated at the be-
ginning of this section and in the introduction to
this Report. No solution to the Cyprus question
in its post-1974 context has been found, although
the outline of a potentially durable one can be
defined, because the will to pay the price and to
take the risks that are inherent in that outline has
been lacking on all sides. This lack of will is in
turn, but only partly, because these risks, as
defined by each side's deep-seated mistrust and
fear of the other, have seemed greater than the
costs of muddling on with a divided island, a
game of waiting (like Dickens' Mr. Macawber)
"in case anything turns up."
Why Bother?
And why not the status quo as a (non-) solution
that is at least more comfortable for most of
those concerned than the circumstances they
lived with at any time between 1963 and 1974?
To general surprise, including their own, the
Greek Cypriots on their 60 percent of the island
have recovered and often surpassed the 1973 level
of prosperity, the highest in the Eastern
Mediterranean, that they once wailed was de-
stroyed forever by the division of the island, the
creation of 200,000 homeless and jobless refu-
gees, and the alienation of their purportedly
richest lands, resources, and capital investments
in tourism and agriculture.
The Turkish Cypriots are poorer by more than
half, and their economic prospects are blighted
by semi-isolation from the world (through the
Greek Cypriot "blockade" that is one of their
major gnevances?although only partly effec-
tive?and that the Greek Cypriots justify, inter
alia, on the grounds that northern trade and
tourism are based on "stolen" and illegally
operated hotels, farms, and factories), by linkage
with Turkey's chronic economic crisis, and by
historic deficiencies in social structure. However,
they are demonstrably better off, economically as -
well as in other respects, and less isolated ("at
least out prison is now much larger," one re-
marked) than in their "enclaves" before 1974,
and this comparison?according to their
leaders?is the one they make and from which
they draw conclusions. It is true that Greek
Cypriots from the north have their largely legiti-
mate grievances and longings, and that Turkish
Cypriots generally resent their economic depen-
dence and political subordination to crisis-ridden
Turkey and have little love for the "primitive"
Anatolian Turks who have come to live among
them. But the former, with some exceptions, are
not really suffering, the latter have more control
over their individual and communal destinies
than ever before, or at least since 1963, and (of
special importance) all are relieved of the incubus
of intercommunal strife, tension, terrorization,
and occasional murder that burdened their lives
before 1974.
As for governments in the outside world with
an interest in the matter, Athens appears ready
to be satisfied (and relieved) by anything the
Greek Cypriots will accept, and Ankara has little
reason (apart from the costs of occupying and
subsidizing the north) to dislike a status quo that
protects Turkey's southern flank and Turkish
kinsmen on the island. Britain's sovereignty over
the Akrotiri and Dhekelia Base Areas is not seri-
ously challenged, nor are Washington's primary
interests if these are defined as limited to peace
today within and on NATO's southeastern flank,
the security of British bases and communications
centers that reinforce NATO capabilities al-
though they are outside NATO, and anything
that keeps the Turks happy and the Russians
out. For their part, the Soviet government seems
to be content with anything that keeps Cyprus
nonaligned and friendly and NATO out.
It is surely legitimate to weigh these things,
including the instinctive preference for the evil
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one knows against the uncertainties inherent in
the kind of compromise solution that could
presently be achieved.
There are, of course, other risks of an indi-
vidual and political nature for those currently in
a position to move toward a negotiated solution:
their political survival or at least the power and
perquisites of present office are at stake. The first
of these risks is equally incurred by Kyprianou
and Denkta? and by their senior officials and
advisers. Their repeated warning that any agree-
ment they sign must be acceptable to their re-
spective constituencies is true, and concerns their
survival, as well as a canny negotiating ploy and
an evasion of what they might do to prepare
their peoples to accept unpopular concessions.
The second applies to civil servants and elected
officials of both communities in existing dual and
often bloated bureaucracies, many of which
ought to be combined and the rest slimmed down
if Cyprus is reunited. (A Turkish Cypriot,
pointing to the coloniaher,arbuildinwon,Atattirk
..S.guare in north Nicosia that-houses part of the
government of the TFSC/TFSK, remarked:
"Just imagine, in British times the whole island
was governed from that one building, but now it
houses only some of the offices to run 38 percent
of it! What will happen to all this if we become a
region and no longer have to fulfill all the func-
tions of an independent state?") It also applies in
a special way, or so it is frequently said, to
Denkta?, who clearly enjoys the perquisites of
being a head-of-state, even if the state is
minuscule and unrecognized, and would have to
exchange these for at best those of president of a
federal region if the negotiations succeed. (On
the other hand, would he not in fact enjoy more
power and independence in that formally lesser
status, if Turkish Cypriot demands for regional
autonomy are even largely met, than he does
now, when he cannot make any significant move
without checking Turkish government or Army
views on the matter?)
Finally there is the case to be made for avoid-
ing agreement now in the hope of an improve-
ment in one's own or a deterioration in the other
side's bargaining position. Perhaps a new
American President?expectations focused on
campaign statements by Jimmy Carter and other
Democrats in 1976 and by Ronald Reagan and
other Republicans in 1980?will see that justice
and American interests demand effective Ameri-
can pressure on Turkey to yield and withdraw.
DIR-1-'81/17
Perhaps the Greek Cypriots will finally under-
stand that this will never happen, because
Turkey is more important to the U.S. and NATO
than Greece or Greek Cyprus, and will become
more amenable. Perhaps economic hardship and
bitter experience with Turkish overlordship, the
Turkish economy, Turkish colonization, and
political extremism imported from Turkey will
finally soften Denkta? and his gang. Perhaps
growing Greek Cypriot opposition to Kyprianou
and his failure to produce results will force him
to make concessions or to give way to those who
will. Perhaps, in the minds of those many who are
convinced that the United States and the United
Kingdom also secretly prefer the status quo for
reasons suggested above, these powers will finally
realize that a united, peaceful, genuinely inde-
pendent, prosperous, and nonaligned but funda-
mentally pro-Western Cyprus would serve their
interest even better, and will act to achieve it.
Perhaps....
Answers to many of these arguments for
accepting the status quo as the least likely of all
likely evils are provided, more in hope than in
faith, by Cypriots of both communities who
would prefer a reunited Cyprus, recognizing the
need to make concessions and assume risks, and
who would prefer it now. The present partition,
they argue, is economically and politically
irrational, fragmenting an already small and
naturally complementary economy, leaving one
part hopelessly nonviable and dependent on a
foreign and crisis-ridden state and the other
without essential resources, and producing two
absurdly small and dangerously weak states
(never mind that several UN members are still
smaller) in places of one that was already small
enough. It condemns the two to eternal enmity
and a costly fortified frontier probably only tem-
porarily reinforced by UNFICYP, and these are
in the longer run more threatening to the peace
and security of both communities and the wider
region, beginning with Greece and Turkey, than
the risk of intercommunal tensions in a
biregional federal state. And for all these reasons
and their destabilizing potential in an
unstable part of the world it should also be less
desirable to outside powers, primarily Western
but also Eastern, than a reunited federal and
nonaligned Cyprus.
As for the arguments in favor of a waiting
game, the answer offered here is that each
passing year further entrenches partition in its
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present form, making its undoing and an
enduring peaceful reunification more difficult.
Each year more young Cypriots grow up with no
personal acquaintance and knowledge of the
other side as a counterbalance to nationalist
propaganda and ethnic stereotypes portraying
their own community as entirely virtuous, the
other as entirely vicious. Each year brings further
expansion and entrenchment of enterprises and
economic sectors with a vested interest in the
preservation of partition, such as those engaged
in smuggling and "gray market" activities across
the Green Line or otherwise profiting from the
barriers to commerce and human contact it
creates. Each year the fragile flower of "Cypriot
consciousness," which advocates of a reunited
Cyprus believe was beginning to take root and to
cast a healthy shadow over centrifugal and
mutually hostile Greek and Turkish national-
isms, withers more in this unhealthy climate. "It
is already five minutes to twelve," they are fond
of saying, "and soon it will be altogether too
late."
Finally, and underlying all of the above, there
is the conviction that such a "Cypriot conscious-
ness"?capable of pacifying differences, gener-
ating loyalty to a common Cypriot homeland,
and thereby of clear and universal benefit?is
possible, as well as desirable, because it is based
on a cultural fact. Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, the argument goes, actually have more
in common with one another, as a result of a
shared history and environment (in which the
influence of British culture on both native cul-
tures after 1878 is often cited as an important
mediating factor) and despite religious and lin-
guistic differences, than Greek Cypriots have
with mainland Greeks or Turkish Cypriots with
mainland Turks. It is further argued that this
"fact," formerly obscured from view by the
islanders' limited personal acquaintance with
mainland Greeks and Turks and by rival nation-
alist sentiments feeding on intercommunal socio-
economic differences and conflicts of interest, is
being perceived, and conclusions are being
drawn, by a growing number of Cypriots that is
proportionate to the growth of contacts and
experience with the two "motherlands" since
1960 (for Greek Cypriots) and 1974 (for Turkish
Cypriots). These experiences have generally been
both culturally and politically disillusioning:
"They are a different people" and "They have
been pursuing their own interests in Cyprus,
which are not ours" are said and in fact seem to
be the usual conclusions.10
In political terms, the argument continues, the
consequences have not yet included much per-
ceptible further growth of nascent "Cypriot con-
sciousness," which would be difficult under
present circumstances, but they do include an
increased sense of separate identity and interests
and with these the demise, or near demise, of
enosis sentiment among Greek Cypriots and of
taksim-with-annexation sentiment among Turk-
ish Cypriots. Unfortunately, total lack of com-
munication between the two communities since
1974, and its almost total lack in the preceding
decade, have prevented each from seeing and
believing that this change has also taken place in
the other's sense of identity and political aspira-
tions. Most Turkish Cypriots (including their
leaders) therefore go on believing that most
Greek Cypriots secretly continue to hanker after
enosis and will try for it again when there is an
opportunity, and most Greek Cypriots (including
their leaders) harbor corresponding beliefs about
Turkish Cypriot aspirations and intentions. The
vicious circle of mutual suspicion and fear is un-
broken, and can be broken only by the restora-
tion of communication and personal contact
between the two communities?either through or
in anticipation of a political settlement.
Eppur si muove
Arguments and counterarguments of all
these kinds can affect the course and outcome of
negotiations and the Cyprus question only in-
directly, as they affect the negotiators and those
who instruct them. It is precisely here, however,
that some signs of a change in the weather have
lately been appearing, like distant end-of-
summer lightning over the Troodos or Kyrenia
ranges, beyond the edges of the dull unending
drama of the intercommunal 'tea-dance" and the
feverish tactical maneuvers of Kyprianou and
Denktal. Fears for political survival if unpopular
concessions were to be made and a settlement
appeared to renege on proud promises or to
compromise vital communal interests are giving
way, or may soon do so, to fears for political sur-
vival (and hopes for political power in other
quarters) if intransigence or lack of desire,
imagination, or courage on one or both sides,
seem to be the chief impediments to a solution
that would be imperfect but widely regarded as
better than none.
This phenomenon assumes different forms on
the two sides of the Green Line.
In the south open political rebellion against
Krypianou's alleged incompetence and manifest
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immobility has been stalking the land since the
early summer of 1980, ending the uneasy political
truce that had encompassed all parties except
Clerides' after Makarios' death. Clerides himself
and his Democratic Rally?the only party
formally in opposition but excluded from the
House of Representatives by the workings of a
post-Makarios electoral pact among the rest?
have raised the volume on their long-standing
demand that Kyprianou resign or at least call
early new elections. On the left the Communist
AKEL?the best organized and traditionally
strongest Cypriot party, enjoying the largest
share of popular support (around 35% in most
current estimates) of any Communist party in a
country with free contested elections, and here-
tofore backers of the government?publicly pro-
claimed its "distance" from Kyprianou in June,
then "withdrew its support" without formally
going into opposition, and is calling with
increasing stridency for new initiatives and
greater empathy in negotiating with the north.
Kyprianou's own Democratic Party (Deko), never
well organized or coherent, showed signs of
shaking apart during the summer and in
October, while Kyprianou was on an official visit
to Yugoslavia. It began to suffer defections that
quickly reduced its earlier 21 seats in the 35-
member House to 12?still the largest contingent
but only 3 more than AKEL's 9. Among the de-
fectors were Alexis Michaelides, the party's co-
founder and President of the House, former
"interlocutor" Tassos Papadopolous, and other
pretenders to future leadership. Then EDEK, the
small but sometimes pivotal socialist party (4
seats in the House and support estimated
between 5% and 8% of the voters) led by Vassos
Lyssarides, once Makarios' personal physician,
and taking the hardest line on negotiations
(federation still revocable and no more conces-
sions until someone makes Turkey bend), joined
the call for early elections. That the crisis was not
pushed to a conclusion before the end of 1980
was primarily because all the parties, except
Clerides' Rally, would really prefer to wait for the
center of the political spectrum to sort itself out
and produce a new "third force" capable of re-
pulsing the challenge from Clerides on the right,
restoring Makarios' tacit alliance with AKEL on
the left, and on this basis putting together a gov-
ernment that could take new initiatives on "the
Cyprus question."
The political outcome cannot be predicted
with any degree of confidence. This is partly be-
cause of the complex motives, goals, and possible
DIR-1-'81/19
new combinations of parties and individual
politicians that characterize a singularly fluid
situation. Furthermore, if and when elections are
finally held (the mandate of the present House of
Representatives expires in September 1981), past
performance tells us little: the results last time
were skewed by pre-electoral party deals; nearly a
quarter of the electorate stayed away from the
polls (in protest?) but will not be able to do so
again, the electoral law having been changed to
make voting compulsory, and no one knows how
they will vote. It is also uncertain how Kyprianou,
if still in office as he seems determined to be (his
mandate runs until 1982), will respond if
confronted by a hostile majority in a new House.
In these circumstances only one thing, but a
vital one, does seem predictable: the political
constellation that emerges from the present con-
fusion and the House that will reflect it will be
more interested in a bicommunally negotiated
solution to the Cyprus question, and therefore
more willing to do what seems necessary to
achieve one, than has lately been the case. The
reasoning here: AKEL and Clerides' Rally are
the Greek Cypriot parties most committed, and
perhaps the only ones genuinely committed, to
such a solution (that they have nothing else in
common is what prevents an AKEL-Clerides
coalition forming on this issue: "We agree only
on tactics and methods for solving the Cyprus
question," an AKEL spokesman told me in June
1980, "but not on starting and finishing points.")
They are also generally considered likely to come
in first and second in a general election. The
"third force" that may emerge from the
shambles around Kyprianou has a less describ-
able profile and prospects, but its likeliest pro-
tagonists tend at least to be more flexible, less
bound by past stances, and less unsure of them-
selves than Kyprianou has been; moreover, they
would need allies and early successes on the
Cyprus question in order to hold the balance of
power and political middle ground to which they
would aspire, and this would make them
attentive to terms for support from AKEL and
the I-could-do-it-better challenge of Clerides.
And Kyprianou himself, if he survives, is likely to
do so only by paying the same attention.
In brief, the political scene in the south is in
movement, and the omens for those who want a
negotiated solution are on balance positive.
In the north there is also grumbling, the polit-
ical scene is in motion, and elections that are
likely to diminish Denkta?' National Unity
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Party's control of the TFSC/TFSK legislature are
due in 1981. Many, especially in educated and
otherwise politicized social groups, are critical of
at least some of his tactics in negotiating with the
south and dealing with Turkey, and his social
conservatism on domestic issues angers the
political left while his secularism alienates the
mullahs and lay religious conservatives on the
Islamic right. Many more from all classes irri-
tably hold him responsible for post-1974 immi-
gration from Turkey, which he initially encour-
aged on the ground that the immigrants were
needed to bolster the size of the island's Turkish
community. Mostly peasants from backward
southeastern Anatolia, they do not "fit in"
among the far better educated and more "cul-
tured" Turkish Cypriots and are almost univer-
sally unpopular?although, granted TFSC/TFSK
citizenship, they also supply Denkta?' party with
a solid bloc of beholden voters.
On the other hand, Denkta?' personal popu-
larity is still great, his position almost unassail-
able. He is the so far indispensable symbol of his
community, whose ordinary members regard him
as a kind of ghazi; the warrior-hero of the
Osmanlis, bearing sword and shield against his
people's enemies. At a more mundane level he
knows almost all of them by their first names,
listens and caters to their personal problems, and
kisses their babies?"like the perfect political
boss of a south Chicago ward," an American
observer remarked, "and that, remember, is the
size of his constituency."
The formal political opposition is in any case
fragmented and constantly subject to further
fragmentation on the basis of individual follow-
ings, combinations and jealousies as well as some
ideological differentiation. Five parties, three of
them splinters from the National Unity Party, are
represented in the present parliament of the
TFSC/TFSK, and at least two more?one Mus-
lim clericalist, the other primarily Anatolian?
are expected to join them in contesting the next
elections. The present line-up: 23 deputies from
the NUP, 6 from the People's Salvation Party
(also translated as Communal Salvation Party), 5
from the Democratic People's Party, 2 from the
Turkish Republican Party, and one from the
People's Party. The Turkish Republican Party is
undeniably Marxist and generally regarded as
also Leninist. The People's Salvation Party, cre-
ated by Alpay Durduran and other defectors
from Alper Orhon's People's Party, itself
originally formed by defectors from the NUP,
displayed growing popularity by taking36 percent
of the vote in the local elections of 1980 and
therefore appears to pose the most serious threat
to the NUP, but the situation is too fluid for con-
fident predictions. In addition to this fragmenta-
tion, all the opposition parties claim that their
opposition is confined to domestic issues and that
Denkta? has their backing, at least as long as he
informs and consults them as he apparently is
careful to do, on the Cyprus question.
While a northern analogue to the internal
political pressures favoring a more flexible ne-
gotiating stance in south Nicosia is therefore
more potential than actual at this time, there is
another place from which such pressures could in
principle originate. The Turkish government and
Army?since September at least temporarily
synonymous?must approve and can veto
Denktay initiatives in dealing with the south
and in other matters. Here he now faces new un-
certainties. He may know, although the rest of
the world is still uninformed, whether the new
rulers of Turkey want to clear the slate of the
Cyprus question, and are eager enough to
demand more Turkish Cypriot flexibility and
concessions for the sake of a solution. It is at least
clear that they are in a better position to do so, if
this is their wish, than the civilian government of
Suleyman Demirel that they replaced, a minority
government dependent for its survival on the
National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan,
who is generally viewed as intransigent on the
Cyprus question as in other "Islamic" matters.
Erbakan remained under arrest (along with
Alparslan Tiirke5, head of the National Action
Party and even more chauvinist and unbending
on the Cyprus question) when Demirel and Ecevit
were released in October 1980.
The net result is that Denkta?, like Kyprianou
or his successors but in lesser, different, and
more speculative degrees, may find himself under
new and additional pressure to be more forth-
coming in the search for a negotiated solution to
the Cyprus question. If so, and if other develop-
ments on both sides of the Green Line have the
significance and direction described in these
pages, the negotiating balance may be restruc-
tured at a lower threshhold of mutual resistance
to concessions. And if and when that happens?
which is not likely to be before scheduled
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elections in the north and south have clarified the
situation or Ankara has taken a strong stand?a
Federal Republic of Cyprus that is not quite what
either community wanted, but that both com-
munities can live with, may yet come into exis-
tence.
This conclusion is full of "ifs." If these "ifs,"
or any key ones among them, are answered in the
NOTES
1. George Mikes, Eureka! Rummaging in Greece (Lon-
don: Andre Deutsch, 1965), p. 107.
2. The studies by Theodore Coulombis (ed.), Laurence
Stern, and Michael Attalides cited in the bibliographical
note at the end of this Report provide critical and at times
quasi-demoniacal interpretations of the American role
(using many of the same sources and in fact building on
one another) by, respectively, American scholars of
Greek Cypriot origins (Van Coufoudakis of Indiana Uni-
versity etal.), an American investigative journalist, and a
Greek Cypriot scholar-politician.
3. One should specify one's sample: "almost all" and
"many" or "most" in the preceding sentences and else-
where in this Report refer to a wide range but limited
number of Cypriots of both communities interviewed or
otherwise encountered by this observer and a research
assistant in recent months, and with less certainty to a
far larger number whose views these Cypriots and other
outside observers of the Cypriot scene claimed to know.
4. Various motives for Makarios' dismissal of his long-
time heir apparent have been cited by usually well-
informed sources, including the victim himself. Makarios
had convinced himself that Clerides was "pro-NATO" or a
"NATO tool" and not merely "pro-Western"; insinuations
that Clerides was moving, or being moved, to push him
aside and take the presidency sooner rather than later;
suspicions of Clerides' friendly personal relationship with
Denkta? and readiness to compromise; or all of these and
others.
5. Kyprianou ran unopposed after Clerides withdrew
his candidacy in the emotional atmosphere created by the
kidnapping, or purported kidnapping, of Kyprianou's son
as the campaign was getting under way. The son later
reappeared as mysteriously as he had disappeared.
6. See Dennison I. Rusinow, The Institutional Frame-
work of a Federally Structured Cyprus ?An International
DIR-1-'81/21
negative, the world and the Cypriots will pre-
sumably go on living with an inconclusively
divided Cyprus for a long time to come. Which
might or might not matter much, for the Cypriots
or the world. This observer happens to think that
it would be a pity for the Cypriots and, in the
longer run, for regional stability and therefore
the world.
(January 1981)
Seminar Report (published with restricted distribution
by CMS/AUFS, Rome, 1978).
7. The Qadhafi offer, according to a senior, well-
informed, but possibly self-serving Turkish Cypriot
source, was not the result of a Denkta? initiative, as
widely believed. It actually developed out of approaches
made to the Libyans at and during preparations for the
Havana nonaligned summit meeting in September 1979
by Kyprianou, who was trying to kill two birds with one
Libyan stone: to flatter and thereby gain the support of a
nonaligned but previously pro-Turkish influential leader
and at the same time to undermine Denkta?'s campaign
for worldwide Muslim recognition of his as a Muslim
cause. Reportedly ignoring (and resenting) Turkish
Cypriot warnings about Kyprianou's motives, Qadhafi
took the bit between his teeth. Perhaps he sensed an
opportunity to compensate for his loss of Malta as a client
state, which was then brewing but not yet common
knowledge outside Tripoli and Valetta, by establishing
influence over another, larger, and equally strategic
Mediterranean island.
8. See note 6.
9. A similar recognition of the importance of symbols
can also be discerned in the "regret," expressed to this
observer by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot partisans of
a united Cyprus, that the flag chosen for the Republic in
1960?a pale orange map of the island on a white back-
ground, deliberately eschewing Hellenic blue, Turkish
red, and Muslim green for a color representing an impor-
tant export commodity!?was so "insipid" it was
incapable of inspiring the excitement and loyalty of either
community. "The map is so pale," one of them said, "that
the thing looks more like a white flag of surrender!"
10. More on this subject, including the present writer's
own impressions of "Kebab-with-chips" Cypriotism, will
be found in a later and more "personal" Report.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
(The books listed below have been selected, from the ex-
tensive literature on the subject, for the general reader
seeking more background and details about "the Cyprus
question," particularly in the 1960-1974 period. Even
major works focusing on earlier history, economics,
sociology, etc., are therefore not included.)
Attalides, Michael. Cyprus?Nationalism and interna-
tional politics. Edinburgh: the Q Press, 1979. A thought-
ful and very useful analysis, with occasional partisan or
polemical touches, by a leading Greek Cypriot social
scientist and politician. A very helpful and detailed bib-
liography.
Couloumbis, Theodore A., and Hicks, Sallie M., eds. U.S.
Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus. Washington,
D.C.: Center for Mediterranean Studies and American
Hellenic Institute, 1975. Conference proceedings, in gen-
eral highly critical of U.S. policy; see esp. Van Coufou-
dakis' paper on Cyprus and "Discussants' Comments."
Crawshaw, Nancy. The Cyprus Revolt. London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1978. A detailed Account of the Struggle
for Union with Greece (the subtitle), with only a 30-page
"Postscript" on the post-1960 period, but included here
as the latest complete study (with good bibliography) of
the enosis movement.
Kyriakides, Stanley. Cyprus: Constitutionalism and
Crisis Government. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1968. A standard work on the
subject described in the title and the period up to the
mid-1960s.
Loizos, Peter. The Greek Gift: politics in a Cypriot
village. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975. Standard and
often-cited work, social anthropology with emphasis on
political aspects.
Markides, Kyriacos. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Re-
public. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977.
By an American social scientist of Greek Cypriot origins,
particularly useful for internal Greek Cypriot politics and
their dynamics.
Partick, Richard A. Political Geography and the Cyprus
Conflict: 1963-1971. Waterloo, Ontario: Department of
Geography, University of Waterloo, 1976. As per title.
Polyviou, Polyvios G. Cyprus?The Tragedy and the
Challenge. England: John Swain & Son, 1975. An early
attempt, compiled in haste after the "events of 1974" by a
Greek Cypriot lawyer and Fellow of Lincoln College,
Oxford, to review the years of crisis and make recom-
mendations.
Cyprus in Search of a Constitution. Nicosia: Chr.
Nicolaou & Sons, 1976. A detailed, informed, and gener-
ally objective study of constitutional negotiations and
proposals, 1960-1975, set in political context.
Stephens, Robert. Cyprus: A Place of Arms. London:
Pall Mall Press, 1966. An early and often-cited account of
the early crisis years.
Stern, Laurence, The Wrong Horse. Subtitled The
Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American
Diplomacy. New York: The NYTimes Book Company,
1977. A well-informed Washington Post correspondent's
j'accuse, with Kissinger and the CIA as chief villains;
lively, at times overdone, convincing.
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