THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 1, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
RM-5416-ISA
SEPTEMBER4196 7
THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS'
Dankwart A. Rustow
PREPARED FOR:
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Sc7)241)e- to vs
-74 R-11 n Devootratioot
SANTA MONICA ? CALIFORNIA
M11-11:2 CVGIMIT11T A T _ TTC-G1 (TT
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MEMORANDUM
RM-5416-ISA
SEPTEMBER 1967
THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS
Dankwart A. Rustow
This research is supported by the Department of Defense, under Contract DAHC15 67 C
0158, monitored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
Views or conclusions contained in the Memorandum should not be interpreted as repre-
senting the official opinion or policy of the Department of Defense.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Each transmittal of this document outside the agencies of the U.S. Government must
have prior approval of above sponsoring DoD office or agency.
74R-1111D
e.e
1700 MAIN $T. ? SANTA MONICA ? CALIFORNIA ? 90406
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Published by The RAND Corporation
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PREFACE
This Memorandum is a contribution to RAND's continu-
ing research program, undertaken for the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Affairs), on some of the critical problems
Atlantic Alliance.
The author, Professor Dankwart A. Rustow
of
Security
the North
of Columbia
University, is a RAND consultant and was asked to provide
a general study of the conflict in Cyprus, to analyze the
implications of future conflict in or over Cyprus for U.S.
and NATO strategic postures, and to consider the outlook
for the settlement of outstanding issues. This work was
originally used in draft form to provide background for
RAND work for ISA early in 1966; it has been revised and
brought up to date in order to make its contents more
widely accessible.
Professor Rustow is well known for his contributions
to Western understanding of Turkey's military, political,
and social development. He has lived and traveled in the
Near East; he spent portions of 1953 and 1954 in Istanbul
and Beirut, respectively, as a university lecturer. His
best known works are: Politics of Compromise: A Study of
Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden, Princeton
University Press, 1956, and Politics and Westernization
in the Near East, Princeton University Press, 1956. His
latest book, A World of Nations, is being published by
the Brookings Institution this summer.
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SUMMARY
Communal strife on Cyprus, independent since 1960
under an uneasy constitutional compromise arrangement, is
a constant threat to collaboration between the two nations
on NATO's southern flank, Greece and Turkey. Violence
broke out on the island in December of 1963; a United
Nations force of 6000 was dispatched there in the spring
of 1964; both Turkey and Greece threatened to intervene;
and despite international conferences in Geneva and fre-
quent diplomatic interchanges between the Greek and Turkish
Governments, the essential issues remain unresolved. In
retrospect, it seems clear that negotiations failed
largely because they were conducted between Athens and
Ankara, and any settlement would have had to apply first
and foremost to Cyprus.
After briefly examining some of the history and
issues in contention since 1959, the author turns to an
examination of the strategic and political implications
for the United States and for NATO, with particular refer-
ence to the roles of Greece and Turkey. Three strategic
contingencies are analyzed: thermonuclear war between the
United States and the Soviet Union; limited Soviet oper-
ations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Africa;
limited Western operations in the Middle East, Northeast
Africa, and Southern Asia. Greece and Turkey are found
not only to have significant strategic value to NATO and
the West, but also to exemplify the political values that
the alliance is meant to serve.
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The final portion of the study deals with the possi-
bilities for settlement of the divisive issues. These are
discussed successively from the points of view of Greece,
Turkey, Cyprus, and the United States. Political insta-
bilities in Greece and Turkey both inhibit the possibili-
ties of compromise and divert the attention of their
governments from this unresolved problem. In Cyprus, time
appears to improve the Greek majority's ability to domi-
nate any final solution. Lacking satisfactory resolution
of the issues, there is a prospect of more outbreaks of
violence. One possible solution worthy of exploration is
a communal compromise along "Lebanese" lines, where parlia-
mentary representatives would have both Greek and Turkish
constituents although government offices would be shared
on some proportional basis to secure the rights of the
minority group.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE
SUMMARY
Section
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE CURRENT IMPASSE
iii
1
5
A.
Collapse of the 1959 Settlement
5
B.
Diplomatic Attempts (1964-1965)
8
C.
Nature of the Deadlock
12
III,
AMERICAN INTERESTS AT STAKE
17
A.
Strategic-Military
17
B.
Political
23
IV.
AFTERMATH AND OUTLOOK
27
A.
In Greece
27
B.
In Turkey
29
C.
On Cyprus
33
D.
For the United States
38
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Cyprus conflict that erupted in December 1963
and abated, at least temporarily, in August 1964 is one
of an ever-lengthening list of small-scale conflicts --
including regional wars, border disputes, guerrilla in-
cursions, regional uprisings -- involving the smaller,
newly independent, or developing countries. In the world
at large at least three factors have contributed to this
proliferation of limited conflict, and each of these is
to some extent reflected in the Cyprus crisis:
(1) Since 1945 the number of independent states in
the world has roughly doubled, and each of the newcomers
has asserted its more or less precarious claim to sover-
eignty. Most immediately, the Cyprus dispute is one of
the more awkward legacies of colonialism. In view of the
restrictions imposed by the Zurich and London agreements
of 1959-60 (see below), the country's claim to sovereignty
is more precarious than most.
(2) The nuclear standoff between the United States
and the Soviet Union has shifted much of their rivalry to
less-than-vital areas and to less-than-nuclear levels of
conflict; the partial disengagement of the superpowers, in
turn, has allowed a wider margin for maneuver to medium-
sized and smaller powers. A smouldering dispute involving
two members of NATO such as Greece and Turkey would have
been hard to conceive at a time when Stalin's expansionist
policy was directed alternately at Europe and at the
Middle East and when United States policy was intent on
strengthening the regional forces of resistance.
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(3) Alignments whether within the Soviet-Chinese or
within the Western camp have progressively loosened. The
Cyprus conflict may be seen as an early instance of the
centrifugal tendencies in NATO of which De Gaulle's recent
policy has been the sharpest manifestation.
The political environment of the Cyprus problem is
such that American policy makers cannot by any simple
analogy apply solutions that may have served well enough
in other crises. We cannot side with one of our allies
against Communism, for both Greece and Turkey are our
allies, and Communism has not been an immediate issue.
We cannot side against colonialism in favor of independence,
for the conflict does not array colonial settlers against
indigenous people or former rulers against former subjects.
To condemn the aggressor or insist on the sanctity of
treaties is not enough, for what past treaty provisions
are presently applicable and who is aggressing against
whom are precisely the questions over which the pro-
tagonists divide.
The population of Cyprus is only about half a million,
and its area smaller than Connecticut. There has so far
been no direct Russian-American confrontation on the
island, nor does such a development seem very likely.
Since August 1964, moreover, violence on the island has
abated. It is thus entirely possible that the parties to
the dispute will come to accept, however reluctantly, the
current de facto situation.
There are other factors, however, that might force
the unresolved issues of 1963 and 1964 out into the open
and thus lead to a resumption, or even an intensification,
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of the conflict. The island holds an important strategic
position, roughly midway by air between the Soviet Union
and the Suez Canal and midway also between Europe and the
oil fields around the Persian Gulf. The dispute involves
not only the Greek and Turkish communities on the island
itself but also Greece and Turkey, two of America's closest
allies. For these and other reasons, it would be unwise
to overlook the issues that the Cyprus conflict poses,
immediately or in the future, for United States policy.
The present paper will seek to analyze the nature of
the current impasse (Section II), to identify the larger
American interests that are directly or indirectly at
stake (Section III), and to assess the future prospects
in the dispute, including some alternatives confronting
United States policy (Section IV).
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II. THE CURRENT IMPASSE
A. COLLAPSE OF THE 1959 SETTLEMENT
Seventy-nine per cent of the Cypriotes are Greeks
and Orthodox Christians, eighteen per cent Turks and
Muslims, and the remainder mostly Armenians. Between the
two major ethnic communities, the 1959-60 agreements
sought to erect a delicate structure of checks and bal-
ances, buttressed by Greece, Turkey, and Britain as
guarantor powers. The constitution allowed the Greek
Cypriotes to elect the President of the Republic and 35
representatives, the Turkish Cypriotes the Vice-President
and the remaining 15. In the administration, a similar
ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks was to be maintained.
Through its official spokesmen, the Turkish minority
obtained a veto in major issues of foreign affairs, of
defense, and of finance. Each community remained free
to devise its own regulations on education, marriage,
and inheritance. In the cities and towns, separate muni-
cipalities were to be installed by mutual agreement. The
Greek or Turkish flags could be flown along with the newly
adopted flag of Cyprus. Rather pathetically, the design
for the latter was a map of the island in pale yellow on
white -- since blue, red, and green had been preempted by
Greece, Turkey, and Islam, and most pictorial symbols
would have proved divisive. (Not surprisingly, Cypriotes
have made little use of their official flag.) Greece and
Turkey received the right to station military contingents
upon the island; the United Kingdom retained sovereign
rights to two bases on the southern coast at Akrotiri and
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Dhekalia. Major changes in these provisions would require
the concurrence of the two communities on the island as
well as the governments at Athens, Ankara, and London.
Enosis, long the dream of Hellenic nationalists in Greece
and Cyprus, was ruled out.
Archbishop-President Makarios and other Greek Cypriotes
have since implied that this was the best bargain they
could exact from the British and that when Cyprus became
independent and a member of the United Nations there would
be time enough to modify the arrangement. But even if all
sides had accepted the 1959-60 settlement in good faith,
it might well have proved unworkable. It had been an
attempt to solve a political problem by legal finesse.
Perhaps a homogeneous people long practiced in the arts
of self-government might have worked the cumbersome engine
of checks and balances, of reserved rights and reciprocal
vetoes. Two rival communities just released from colonial
rule plainly could not. Nor was there much hope for
greater solidarity in the future: there were no common
symbols, no common education, no joint activities in which
Cypriotes might forget that they were Greek or Turk. The
presence of Greek and Turkish soldiers might prevent some
minor clashes, but it also might render the islanders more
intransigent and embroil their mainland cousins in the
quarrel. It had taken two years to draft the constitution
and the related treaties. In less time than that the
documents proved unworkable, and in three and one half
years the whole fragile structure collapsed.
The details of the collapse are of no great interest.
The Heidelberg law professor who was to preside impartially
over the constitutional court soon resigned in despair.
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Agreement on separate municipalities proved impossible:
the Turks vetoed a major money bill and the Greeks set up
town administrations of their own. Archbishop Makarios
in November 1963 published a thirteen-point program of
constitutional revision; the Turks, in resisting it strenu-
ously, hoped for support from the mainland. Late in
December 1963, the situation had grown so supercharged
that an ordinary street brawl in Nicosia set off a wave
of violence throughout the island. Turkish Cypriotes.,
outnumbered four to one in the population and five to two
in military force, watched some of their more isolated
villages burn to the ground and withdrew into a number of
hastily fortified enclaves. Contrary to the most basic
provisions of the constitution, Greek Cypriote ministers
and representatives henceforth met, and enacted laws and
decrees in the absence of their Turkish colleagues. A
Turkish Cypriote leader who traveled abroad was barred
from re-entering his home country.
A United Nations force
General Assembly resolution
of 6000,1 dispatched under a
of March 4, 1964, found itself
vastly outnumbered by Greeks and Turks and hampered by
ambiguous instructions. Makarios,
for one, insisted that
the task at hand was not one of separating two belligerent
forces and of restoring the constitution but rather one of
suppressing an armed rebellion against his legitimate
government. United Nations units, in effect, could do
1Authority for the force (known as UNFICYP) has been
periodically renewed for three- or six-month periods.
The withdrawal of various national contingents early in
1966 brought the force down to a level of about 4000.
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little more than propose local truce lines, prevent acci-
dental clashes, provide safe-conduct for persons or food
supplies, and return to Greek Cypriote officials the arms
collected from some of their irregular supporters. Nor
could the United Nations mediator, Sakari S. Tuomioja of
Finland, or his successor Gab o Plaza Lasso of Ecuador,
find a successful approach to a diplomatic solution.
B. DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPTS (1964-1965)
It was the threat of Turkish military intervention
that first brought the diplomatic scene to life. In March
1964 there were some signs of Turkish preparations for a
landing on the island. On June 4, 1964, as a small landing
fleet once again assembled ih the Bay of Iskenderun, Prime
Minister Ismet Intinti warned publicly that it was no longer
possible "to protect the rights and security" of the
Turkish Cypriotes by "peaceful means and internationally
adopted measures." The next day President Johnson secret-
ly warned In8nli that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus would
mean a Greek-Turkish war and possibly "direct involvement
by the Soviet Union." "I hope you will understand,"
Johnson continued in his message, "that your NATO allies
have not had a chance to consider whether they have an
obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention
without the full consent and understanding of its NATO
allies."2
Following a hurried trip by Under-Secretary of
2Johnson to InBnli, 5 June 1964; the text of the cor-
respondence was released by the White House, following
disclosures in the Turkish press, on 15 January 1966 and
reprinted in the Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 2nd
Session, Vol.1107, part 5, pp. 304-305.
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State George Ball to Athens and Ankara, Prime Ministers
InBnU of Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece separately
visited President Johnson in Washington (June 22 and 24).
While InBnU readily accepted the suggestion of a meeting
with his Greek colleague at Camp David, Papandreou firmly
declined. Meanwhile, General George Grivas, once the
popular leader of the Cypriote guerrillas of 1954-59,
arrived on Cyprus to take command of the National Guard,
along with several thousand Greek soldiers from the main-
land. Some of these were said to be Cypriotes returning
from their studies on the mainland; others, deserters from
the Greek army. This reinforcement of the mainland Greek
position on the island, it might be expected, would make
it easier to coordinate the policy of Nicosia with that of
Athens.
Serious negotiations began in Geneva in July 1964 as
an American delegation under Dean Acheson met alternately
with Greek and Turkish diplomats. State Department sources
denied that there was an "Acheson Plan." Press reports,
however, indicated that the topics explored included
enosis, autonomy for Turkish Cypriotes in two districts
on the island, cession to Turkey of Castellorizo (a small
barren island off the Southern Turkish coast), and a
Turkish military base (leased or sovereign) on Cyprus
itself. Papandreou at first seemed conciliatory. On a
visit to London he indicated (July 21) that he would
restrain Greek forces on Cyprus if Turkey would undertake
not to invade the island, and that he mighty consider a
NATO base on Cyprus and even territorial concessions to
Turkey. But following a visit by Makarios to Athens
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(July 27-29) the Greek and Cypriote governments declared
that any solution should be sought within the United
Nations framework: it was Makarios who announced that
Greece had rejected as "absolutely unacceptable" proposals
by Mr. Acheson based on the principle of compensation for
Turkish rights. Soon after the Archbishop's return to
Cyprus there was a flare-up on the island as Greek forces
besieged a northwestern Turkish enclave and in turn were
attacked by Turkish jets from the mainland. After one
last attempt to bring the two sides together, Acheson left
on September 2: Whatever hopes there might have been that
Grivas and his mainland soldiers might restrain Makarios,
the outcome at Geneva suggested that Makarios could far,
more effectively restrain Athens.
Another assumption underlying earlier American diplo-
macy was soon shaken. The Russian interest in the conflict,
of which Johnson had warned In8nll, became fully apparent
in the fall and winter, but it was not a one-sided phil-
hellene interest. On September 30, 1964, the Soviets
signed a secret agreement for the delivery of a quantity
of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other arms to the
Greek Cypriote government. (The total cost, Nicosia later
revealed, was $28 million, half of it gift and half of it
sale.) But on October 14, the Soviet Union and Turkey
announced plans for jointly developing the Arpacay -- a
truly remarkable project if it is recalled that this rivu-
let flows along one of NATO's land frontiers with Russia
and that Soviet territorial claims beyond this border were
a major reason why Turkey joined the Western defense sys-
tem. After a week's visit to Moscow by Turkish Foreign
Minister Erkin, ,a joint communique urged the "recognition
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of the existence of two national communities" on Cyprus
(November 6, 1964). Later, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in
a statement to Izvestiia, January 21, 1965, specifically
rejected enosis and endorsed a federal solution such as
had long been advocated in Ankara. Like sentiments were
voiced during exchanges of official visits in January and
August 1965.
Meanwhile, the Soviet missiles destined for Cyprus
were being stored in the United Arab Republic, though
some accessory equipment reached the island. On March 28
Pravda denounced American attempts to prevent installation
of the missiles; the State Department subsequently con-
firmed that a Greek freighter destined for Cyprus returned
to the UAR without unloading its cargo.
Soviet motives remained somewhat obscure. Perhaps
the Russians (on Erkin's plea or in consequence of the
transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Kosygin in
mid-October) had shifted their support to Turkey even
though honoring their previous agreement with Makarios.
Conceivably the SAMs had reached Alexandria before Erkin's
visit in November. More likely, in offering missiles to
one side and sympathetic communiques to the other, the
Soviets were doing their part to keep two NATO allies
embroiled while staying on good terms with both.3
3This last interpretation coincides with Thomas W.
Wolfe's persuasive summary of Soviet diplomacy between
December 1963 and October 1964: "The main feature of the
Soviet approach seems to have been to nurse the situation
along ... so.as to enhance its divisive impact on NATO,
while at the same time taking care to keep the pot from
boiling over in order to avoid the unpredictable dangers
of a widening war. In the process, the Soviets also
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Exploratory talks were resumed in Ankara in June 1965
between Foreign Minister IO.k and Greek Ambassador Sgourdeos
but received little publicity. This time Makarios did not
intrude himself. Turkey was willing to consider enosis,
but in return asked for territorial concessions equivalent
to 18 per cent of the land area of Cyprus (or 643 square
miles).4 Greece was willing to talk about a NATO base on
Cyprus and about resettling ethnic Greeks from Istanbul
as well as ethnic Turks from Cyprus, but she would hear
of no cessions of territory except a long-term lease for
Castellorizo or Symi (another small island in the
Dodecanese) or both, or else a border adjustment in Thrace.
What piece of land was small enough to be offered as a
frontier rectification yet large enough to be received in
compensation for two-elevenths of the isle of Cyprus? The
negotiators adjourned without solving the riddle. Soon
their countries were absorbed in other affairs at home,
Turkey in a major election campaign and Greece in a pro-
tracted constitutional crisis.
C. NATURE OF THE DEADLOCK
There was no intrinsic reason why the Cyprus problem
could not be solved in some manner satisfactory to Greeks
and Turks both on Cyprus and the mainland. Many inter-
national problems, of course, are not amenable to short-run
established the point that they considered their security
interests impinged upon by the developments on Cyprus."
Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare, Conventional
Operations and Limited War (RAND Memorandum 4305-PR,
December 1964), pp. 61f.
4See Eleftheria (Athens), June 7, 1965.
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or dramatic solutions. Israel and her Arab neighbors have
been officially at war for nearly two decades, and the
Kashmir dispute after eighteen years erupted into a second
military campaign. But the complexities on Cyprus are
less deep-seated. India and Pakistan have viewed each
other with hostility since their independence; Greece and
Turkey were close allies until the recent dispute and
officially still are. Unlike Israelis and Arabs, Greeks
and Turks have shown that they can live at peace with each
other: they did so under Turkish, under Greek, and under
British rule whenever political authority was clearly
vested in a single group. The Greeks retained their lan
guage, religion, and customs under half a millennium of
Ottoman sway and rebelled only when the Ottoman Empire
began its secular retreat before the rising power of
Europe. The life of the 60,000 Greeks in Istanbul was,
by and large, peaceful until Greece and Turkey became em-
broiled over Cyprus in 1955 and again in 1963. That of
the 150,000 Turks in Western Thrace has continued peaceful
even afterwards. On Cyprus itself, Greeks and Turks lived
in social isolation but with little friction under 300
years of Ottoman and 75 of British government; only the
headlong dissolution of the British Empire (India 1947,
Palestine 1948, Suez 1954) created the setting for the
Greek Cypriote guerrilla movement of 1954-59. More than
anything else, it was uncertainty of political control
that exacerbated Greek-Turkish relations. The crucial
flaw of the Cyprus settlement of 1959 was that it sought
to perpetuate and institutionalize such uncertainty.
Greek and Turkish diplomats in several rounds of con-
versation since 1964 have explored many elements of a
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possible solution. Turkish acceptance of enosis, a mili-
tary base on Cyprus for NATO or for Turkey, regional
autonomy for Cypriote Turks, relocation of Turks from
Cyprus and Greeks from Istanbul, lease of this or that
Greek island to Turkey, frontier adjustments in Thrace
all these were on the agenda. Considering the stark clash
of initial positions -- enosis versus "Partition or
Death" -- the two sides covered more than half the distance
toward compromise. They discussed a far wider range of
issues and showed more flexibility than did the Palestine
or Kashmir negotiators who had to content themselves with
cease-fires and armistice lines. The most serious diffi-
---
julty of recent Cyprus diplomacy has not been the issues
discussed but the identity of the discussants.
It is clear in retrospect that negotiations failed
mainly because they were conducted between Ankara and
Athens, whereas any settlement would have to apply first
and foremost to Cyprus. The choice of the wider Greek-
Turkish context was not at all unreasonable. Greece and
Turkey could offer each other a greater variety of com-
pensations than were available on Cyprus. At Lausanne in
1923, they had solved a far thornier problem: the peace-
ful exchange of more than a million nationals after four
years of war. Had it not been for the exceptional status
of Cyprus as a British possession, the 1923 settlement
would very likely have extended to that island. Nor was
it wholly fanciful to suppose that enosis as worked out
between Athens and Ankara would prove irresistible in
Nicosia, or else that Grivas and 10,000 Greek soldiers
would provide an effective check on Makarios.
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Plausible as these assumptions were, they proved
wrong. In Geneva in 1964 and in Ankara in 1965, each side
was thought to hold a proxy, but one of the proxies turned
out to be spurious. Ankara presumably has been able to
speak for the Cypriote Turks: they
wholly dependent
has been some
Turks,
Turks'
on the
mainland in
are
any
a small group
conflict. There
competition for leadership among
notably Fazil Kuchuk and Rauf Denktash.
sense of solidarity and hierarchy tends
Cypriote
Still, the
to draw
them together in crisis. But there is no analogous re-
lation between Greeks and Greek Cypriotes. If Britain and
Turkey had conceded it in 1959, enosis would indeed have
been compelling, and Athens
Cypriote Greeks -- but then
form would not have arisen.
would now represent the
the dispute in its current
As things are, Athens cannot
speak effectively for Cyprus.
prosperous
never been
The Cypriotes are more
than the Greeks of the mainland, and they have
ruled from Athens. Their government, repre-
senting a sovereign state to the world at large and in the
United Nations, is an independent diplomatic agent.
Grivas' arrival was not enough to cancel out those divisive
factors. His reputation as an extreme conservative al-
ready had tarnished his earlier popularity, and his po-
litical skills never equaled his valor as
leader. Governments at Athens, moreover,
brittle. George Papandreou, for example,
largest election victory in Greek history
a guerrilla'
were notoriously
had won the
in 1963,
yet a year later 44 of his Center Union deputies de-
serted him in his fight with the King to form a govern-
ment precariously supported by Papandreou's rightist
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opponents. No cabinet of the sort Greece had between
1963 and 1965 can expect to carry out an unpopular policy
of firmness toward Makarios and conciliation with Turkey.
Greek diplomats at Geneva, therefore, were able to negoti-
ate but not to deliver their side of any potential bargain.
Archbishop Makarios, in contrast to men like
Papandreou and Grivas, showed himself to be a shrewd,
tenacious, and resourceful politician. He has never pub-
licly disavowed enosis, though his policy has consistently
aimed at full independence and unfettered majority rule
for the Greek population of Cyprus. He has known how to
probe and how to retreat without losing sight of long-
range goals. By calculated indiscretions he has been able
to disrupt talks between Athens and Ankara, much as
Adenauer used to disrupt talks between Washington and
Moscow about Berlin and Germany. In addition he has been
able to use the United Nations as a forum for denouncing
colonialism and outside interference in domestic affairs.
As long as Makarios is president of a legally independent
Cyprus and enjoys the political support of the majority
of Cypriote Greeks, there can be no settlement without his
concurrence.
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III. AMERICAN INTERESTS AT STAKE
From its inception in 1963, the Cyprus conflict
created grave risks to the entire Western relationship to
Greece and Turkey. In assessing these risks, it will be
useful to distinguish the strategic-military importance of
1 the two countries from their political-psychological impor-
tance -- although the two are of course intimately con-
nected. Under each heading, some things can be said about
both countries, and others need to be said that differ-
entiate the importance of Greece and that of Turkey.
A. STRATEGIC-MILITARY
For the military strategist, Greece and Turkey are
important in three types of contingency: (1) a thermo-
nuclear war between the United States and Russia; (2) more
limited Soviet operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle
East, or Africa; (3) Western operations in the Middle East,
Northeast Africa, and Southern Asia.
(1) The first strategic aspect was crucial 'when
Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Of all present
members of the Atlantic Alliance, only Norway and Turkey
have a land frontier with Russia. Airfields, radar sites,
and other military installations in Turkey are closer than
those in any other NATO country to centers of Soviet power,
including heavy industry, petroleum production, and testing
sites for nuclear bombs and for missiles. In the 1950's
much of our information about Soviet military progress
and much of our retaliatory power against Russia depended
on the use of installations in Turkey. The U-2 that was
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shot down in the spring of 1960 had been based at a Turkish
airfield. For several years, a number of Jupiterrmissiles
were based in Turkey. But in the late 1960's the impor-
tance of the installations in Turkey has been declining as
global strategy has shifted from manned bombers to missiles
launched from land or submarines, and as photographic recon-
naissance is coming to rely on satellites rather than high-
altitude planes. Within a context of global thermonuclear
strategy, the instrumental value of Greece and Turkey may
be expected to diminish further: even now, little if any
of our nuclear retaliatory power against Russia would be
lost if Turkey or Greece were taken out of the Western
defense system.
As long as strategic thinking was focused on conflicts
arising in Europe (e.g., over Berlin) and on conventional
operations plus nuclear bombers, this first strategic as-
pect of Greece and Turkey was paramount. A detour via
Turkey or Greece could not advance Soviet strategy against
Europe; but just because Greek and Turkish membership in
NATO was an essential part of the American nuclear deterrent,
it became thereby a major cause of Soviet complaint.
(2) It should not be forgotten, however, that for
the Soviets, Greece and Turkey had been a strategic ob-
jective in their own right before NATO was ever formed.
The bid by Communist guerrillas to take over Greece (1945-
49), on Turkey's other flank the Soviet-sponsored Azerbaijan
People's Republic in Iran (1945-47), and direct Soviet de-
mands for "joint defense" of the Turkish straits and for
cession of several Eastern Turkish provinces (1945-46)
were all part of that same strategy. If Greece and Turkey
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were to leave the Western defense system, a broadly anal-
ogous Soviet strategy might be resumed.
The most important gain, from a Soviet perspective,
probably would be the vastly increased possibility of
political-military maneuver in the Middle East and North-
east Africa. In the past there have been regimes temporarily
friendly to the Soviet Union in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the
Sudan, and in view of the endemic instability of Arab govern-
ments, similar pro-Soviet regimes might take power elsewhere.
So far, Russia has tried to secure the friendship of govern-
ments in the region mainly with such unreliable blandish-
ments as economic or military aid. Sooner or later, there-
fore, most of these countries turned away from the Soviets;
Nasser's Egypt has executed a number of tactical shifts
since 1955 between a more pro-Soviet and a more pro-Western
position. If, at any time in the future, the Soviet mili-
tary position in the Eastern Mediterranean becomes greatly
enhanced, Russia could more directly influence or control
such political developments.
(3) The third strategic aspect, like the second, con-
tinues to be of undiminished significance. The Eastern
Mediterranean countries provide an important waystation
for any Western military operation in the Middle East,
South Asia, and Northeast Africa. Considering the likeli-
hood of local conflict in Asia and Africa, this aspect is
of immediate interest. It will be recalled that the British
base on Cyprus was constructed after 1954 as a substitute
for tl-qt on the Suez Canal, and that the ill-starred Anglo-
French operation against Port Said in 1956 was in part
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launched from Cyprus. Two years later, some U.S. forces
stopped in Turkey on their way to Lebanon.5
Access to Turkish airfields enhances America's mili-
tary (and hence diplomatic) potential in an area from
Egypt and Kenya to Iran and Eastern India. This region
is too far east to be reached nonstop by military trans-
port planes from Western Europe and too tar west to be
conveniently reached via the Pacific. (A Pacific route
would require political and technical arrangements for
several intermediate stops. Above all, it would mean
fewer troops and less materiel, or more planes and greater
expense, or delay in reaching final destination -- in
short, a substantial reduction in effective military power.)
Air access via Turkey enables us to meet challenges in this
area with more than paper protests and with less than
thermonuclear rockets, and to meet them promptly enough
to affect delicate diplomatic outcomes. Use of Turkish
airfields therefore allows us to act effectively as a
world power in an area of chronic turbulence.
Situations that might call for our limited military
response in this region are not hard to imagine. There
might be a Soviet intrusion into Iran not massive enough
to bring into play our nuclear umbrella. The Chinese
might launch a new attack along India's Himalayan frontier.
There is the possibility of a conflict between two states
5Yet it should be remembered that the use of any of
these facilities as waystations requires overflight rights
all the way to the ultimate destination. The British bases
on Cyprus, for example, would be of little use in any local
conflict in the Persian Gulf unless British planes would
fly over Syria and Iraq or some alternative route.
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in which we might be called upon to intervene alone, or
in concert with others, or as agent of the United Nations.
(In the past two decades, wars in Palestine, on the Sinai
Peninsula, in Yemen, and in Kashmir have actively involved
American diplomacy; and there have been lesser conflicts
between almost any two states in the region that one might
care to name.) There are likely to be many more internal
upheavals, and in some of these a threatened government
might invoke our help -- say in one of the oil-rich states
surrounding the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, challenges of
the Communist, the intraregional, and the domestic variety
would be sure to multiply vastly as our ability to meet
them declined. By its very ability to apply military
power in graduated doses, the United States exercises a
stabilizing influence throughout the non-Communist world.
In the region around the Indian Ocean, use of the Turkish
airfields is an essential ingredient in this graduated
power.
It is worth dwelling a moment longer on the Communist
threat to Iran. A direct Soviet attack comparable to that
on Finland in 1939 is quite unlikely -- not just because of
our guarantee but even more because it is in the Soviets'
interest to prove such guarantees unnecessary. But recent
Iranian history suggests many other, more delicate contin-
gencies. If a Mossadegh-type government, supported by the
intellectuals and the urban masses, were to overthrow the
Shah, the Communists could try to take it over through
popular-front tactics. If a military coup deposed him,
they could join any guerrilla resistance that might develop.
Once local Communists had proclaimed an Iranian People's
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Republic, the Soviet Union could move in quickly to con-
solidate it -- and such an expansion of the Communist
orbit would constitute a major victory in the Soviet con-
test with the Chinese. Here might be concrete proof that
the Russians rather than the Chinese actually are speeding
history on its inevitable march toward global Communism --
and this might be an important step in reasserting Russian
leadership among Communist parties throughout the world.
Gradualist tactics such as the Communists might apply
in Iran would afford no opportunities for American threats
of nuclear retaliation. The only sound, long-run defense
against them, of course, is political rather than military:
more economic progress, popular organization in support of
the Shah's reform policies, less reliance on courts-martial
and secret police, and an eventual reconciliation between
the present regime and the dissatisfied urban educated
class. In the meantime, American conventional forces
might at crucial junctures come to the aid of a threatened
friendly government.
For some strategic purposes, Greece and Turkey are
interchangeable. For example, most destinations in Russia
and the Middle East that can currently be reached from
Turkey could also be reached from alternative facilities
that might be constructed in Greece. Similarly, Russian
naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean would gain
equally from access to bases in either country, Greece
being slightly preferable because it has many more harbors
and because it is the more forward position. The West,
therefore, needs to maintain access to at least one of the
countries but to deny both of them to the Soviets.
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If a choice had to be made, the West would find Turkey
to be of greater military value than is Greece. A take-off
from Turkey extends the range of any given plane six or
seven hundred miles eastward, and the air facilities and
other special installations are already in existence.
Turkish territory, moreover, is immediately adjacent to
two perennially unstable Middle Eastern countries -- Syria
and Iraq -- and to a third -- Iran -- that is perhaps the
most vulnerable pro-Western position along the entire
Soviet periphery. Turkey, finally, has the larger popu-
lation and territory, including larger armed forces and
natural resources.
B. POLITICAL
In the situations considered thus far, Turkey and
Greece have a significant instrumental value to the West --
as bases in a thermonuclear or conventional war with Russia
and for transport and staging in local wars in the Middle
East-Indian Ocean region, and as naval bases to be denied
to the Soviets. But beyond this, Greece and Turkey hold
political significance for the United States.
Greece and Turkey were the scene of the first major
East-West confrontation immediately after the Second World
War. They did not reluctantly join the common defense
against Communist expansionism in response to diplomatic
pleas or in return for economic aid. They were already
struggling against Communist absorption when American
diplomats were still pursuing the elusive dream of "Big
Three Unity." The need for military aid to Greece and
Turkey prompted President Truman to proclaim our policy
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of containing Communism, and in both countries that policy
proved a striking success. Since 1947, Greece and Turkey
have been recipients of large amounts of American aid --
military, economic, and technical. Greek-American and
Turkish-American cooperation has not, of course, been free
from frictions, but it has been close and wide-ranging.
And despite evident shortcomings and temporary setbacks,
the results have compared very favorably with those in
other aid-receiving countries. In fact, if we look at
concrete results and disregard recent psychological cross-
currents, Greece and Turkey come as close to being "show-
cases" of American aid as we are likely to find in this
imperfect world. Turkey and Greece provide a demonstration
that American policy can be positive as well as negative,
that Americans can not only display effective strength but
also cooperate with others -- and encourage them to coop-
erate among themselves -- for constructive peaceful tasks.
The developments which support such broad judgments
(i.e., the individual items in the "showcase") may be
briefly detailed. Greece along with Malaya and the
Philippines remains the only country where a major Com-
munist guerrilla operation was defeated. Similarly,
Turkey's diplomatic firmness and military buildup would
appear to have contributed to a reversal of Soviet policy:
one of the first foreign policy measures of the post-Stalin
regime in 1953 was to renounce the earlier territorial
claim in Eastern Turkey.
Both countries since the beginning of the large-scale
American aid program have maintained creditable rates of
economic growth. Turkey went through a period of chaotic
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overexpansion in the fifties and faces a threat of rapid
population growth, but since the monetary stabilization
of 1958 and the political stabilization of 1960-61 has
made reasonably rapid and more balanced progress. The
?recent acceptance of Greece and Turkey as associates of
the European Common Market both acknowledges and reinforces
their economic progress.
Politically, both countries have been, for most of
the last two decades, elective democracies. Here, too,
there are important qualifications. Turkey's first demo-
cratic experiment miscarried in 1960, but the military coup
of that year restored civilian rule after seventeen months
(a unique record among Middle Eastern juntas) and meanwhile
established a better foundation for democracy in consti-
tutional and social legislation. In Greece, a two-party
system emerged after 1952, although the conflict of the
summer of 1965 between Prime Minister Papandreou and King
Constantine created a constitutional crisis that reached
its climax in the military coup of April 1967. Greece and
Turkey are among the few developing countries to have had
a series of free elections, and among the very few where
governments have changed as a result of such elections.
The Turkish record is marred by Menderes' repressive poli-
cies and the military coup that overthrew him: yet Turkey
remains one of the few countries that made the transition
from dictatorship to democracy by the voluntary decision
of the dictator (InBnU in 1945). In Greece, the coup of
April 1967 has set aside democratic procedures for the
time being. Turkey is also the only country of non-Christian
and non-European cultural background which, after a period
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of intense Westernization, has thus been received into the
Council of Europe and other organizations of the European
community. Along with Japan she provides an important
demonstration that Western institutions, even in the ab-
sence of European settlement, can be successfully exported
and adapted in the world at large. Turkey, in short, is
an important part of the West's answer to the Russian and
Chinese claim that only Communism has the requisite dynamism
to transform backward countries into full-fledged members
of the modern world.
The United States has had close relations with Greece
and Turkey only for the last twenty years. Relations be-
tween Greeks and Turks themselves have been intimate,
though certainly not always happy, for seven centuries.
They are the only two peoples in the world who fought their
respective "wars of independence" against each other, the
Greeks in 1821-30, the Turks in 1919-23. These violent en-
counters have alternated with periods of peaceful relations
after major issues were settled -- e.g., for a generation
after the recognition of Greek independence and again after
the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-23 and the subsequent popu-
lation exchange. The historical record thus suggests that
Turks and Greeks can live peacefully side by side or fight
each other fiercely, but that they cannot ignore each
other. Whether in the next decade or two there will be
peaceful relations between them or fierce animosity depends
very largely on the outcome of the present Cyprus crisis.
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IV. AFTERMATH AND OUTLOOK
A. IN GREECE
Conversations between representatives of the Athens
and Ankara governments have taken place 1.7n one form or an-
other every summer or spring since 1964 without so far re-
sulting in any settlement for Cyprus. These efforts toward
a solution must be assessed in part in the light of domes-
tic political developments in each country.
The official Greek position on Cyprus became somewhat
more conciliatory between 1964 and 1967, and General Grivas'
command of the Greek Cypriote National Guard since the
summer of 1964 appeared to give the Athens government, in
effect, a veto on military operations on the island -- al-
though Makarios has tried to shake off this control (see
below). Nonetheless, a standstill in the fighting is not
in itself enough to settle the Cyprus problem, and govern-
ments in Athens have been too weak and too beset by domes-
tic political problems to take more decisive steps toward
a settlement. It seems unlikely, for example, that any
government with marginal electoral support or with a pre-/
carious military base would be able either to grant Turkey
any significant territorial compensation for its interests
on Cyprus, or to impose enosis or other aspects of a global
settlement on a reluctant Makarios. Cyprus has not in fact
been the prime issue in Greek politics of late, so that
potential alignments on Cyprus cut across other political
divisions. Any decisive action with regard to Cyprus might
therefore antagonize enough supporters of any given govern-
ment to bring it down.
atte-
-141-47
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George Papandreou, leader of the Center Union, prom-
ised in his victorious election campaigns of 1963 and 1964
to seek enosis, which was assumed to be Makarios goal as
well, and from which Papandreou hoped for further gains in
his own popularity. But events of 1964 and 1965 showed
that Makarios was unenthusiastic about enosis -- at least
in any form likely to be worked out between Athens and
Ankara and that even the mainland Greek electorate was
somewhat unconcerned. At any rate, the Papandreou govern-
ment fell in the summer of 1965 and the resulting constitu-
tional crisis soon overshadowed any concern for Cyprus or
enosis.
The crisis had its origin in a c?ntest between Premier
Papandreou and King Constantine for control of the Greek
armed forces, and it involved mutual Oarges that the palace
or that the Premier's son, Andreas Papandreou, had been
trying to politicize the officer corp
late summer of 1965, various dissiden
s. Throughout the
ts from Papandreou's
Center Union vainly tried to carry out the King's mandate
to form a parliamentary cabinet. On
tempt, Stephanos
with the backing
the Center Union
only four votes.
the fourth such at-
Stephanopoulos was installed as premier
of the conservative
National Radical Union,
dissidents, and others -- by a margin of
For several months the new premier kept
the parliament adjourned; later his majority on occasion
dwindled to two votes or even a single vote. Stephanopoulos
resigned
after fifteen months in office (September 1965 to
December 1966), a caretaker cabinet was installed with the
backing of George Papandreou and of Nationa,1 Radical Union
leader Panayotis Kanellopoulos, and elections announced
for May 1967. Sharp protests against this arrangement by
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Andreas Papandreou and a confrontation between father and
son within the Center Union party added to the uncertainty
of the situation.
Before the elections could be held, a military coup
on April 21, 1967, led to the dissolution of parliament
and parties, to the arrest of both Papandreous and of many
other leftist and left-of-center figures, and to a general
curtailment of political freedoms. King Constantine, who
seemed to have been caught by surprise, reluctantly acqui-
esced in the new regime. i/V
The military rulers appeared to lack both prominent cOmm
101
leadership and a clear program. With regard to Cyprus,
there was some speculation that the soldier-rulers might I--
wish to bring about the same kind of fait accompli in
Nicosia that brought them to power in Athens and then pro-
claim enosis. A major question in such a contingency would
be Ankara's reaction. Conceivably, generous concessions
proclaimed along with enosis might ward off Turkish inter-
vention. Yet it was hard to see how there could be any
coordination in advance, even secret, let alone overt.
Any uncertainty, or any prolonged intra-Greek fighting on
Cyprus, on the other hand, might invite Turkish military
action. Furthermore, the same domestic tensions that might
make the Athens junta wish for enosis as a major patriotic
success might prevent its accomplishment.
B. IN TURKEY
Turkey has recently overcome a period of political
instability such as Greece is currently undergoing. After
several years of mounting tension, a military junta in
1960 deposed Premier Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party,
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and stayed in office until Menderes was tried and executed
and a new, democratic constitution enacted. In October
1961, the junta's leader, General dirsel, was elected to
the largely ceremonial post of President under the new
constitution. For the next three and a half years, Ismet
tt
Inonu, Menderes' long-time antagonist and leader of the
Republican People's Party, formed a series of coalition
cabinets. The military commanders remained in the back-
ground except when it proved necessary to protect the
civilian governments from renewed attempts at coups by
middle-ranking officers.
By late 1964, the military and the Justice Party
(successors to Menderes' Democrats) were becoming reconciled.
Suleyman Demirel, a professional engineer and head of the
moderate wing, assumed the party leadership. A cabinet,
headed by a nonpartisan with Justice Party support, suc-
ceeded in the spring. Following a Justice Party landslide
in the elections of the fall of 1965, Demirel himself
assumed the premiership. When President Gursel died in
the spring of 1966, he was followed by another military
figure, former Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay.
Meanwhile, Turkish-American relations, which had been
extremely close in the nineteen-fifties, were becoming
strained. Turkey was experiencing the dislocations of
rapid and uneven economic development and an even more
rapid population increase. The zigzag political course of
the nineteen-fifties and early sixties by turns aroused
and disappointed the political expectations of farmers,
businessmen, industrial workers, and urban intellectuals.
Turkey's heavy reliance on American military and economic
aid and a sizable American presence (military and AID
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missions in Ankara, air installations near Adana, etc.)
made it natural that some of this frustration should be
vented in anti-American sentiment. American policy on
the Cyprus question focused this reaction and increased
its fury.
Inevitably, too, both the Cyttas question and Turkish-
American relations became the objects of partisan recrimina-
tion. In the 1965 election campaign Demirel had been able
to ignore widespread insinuations that, as Turkish repre-
sentative of the Morrison Knudsen engineering firm, he was
an American puppet. Soon after Demirel's accession to the
premiership, a vociferous debate on the Cyprus question
began in parliament and the press. For a while it looked
as if the Demirel administration might be readying itself
for military intervention in Cyprus. Instead, the Cyprus
debate took a dramatic turn with the publication in mid-
January 1966 of the exchange of letters between President
I
Johnson and Premier InIonu two years earlier. (The Johnson
letter was printed in the January 13 issue of the Istanbul
daily HUrriyet. The Turkish government had that issue
confiscated but at once requested Washington to release
the correspondence; this the White House did on January 15.)
The immediate popular reaction was one of sharpened frustra-
tion and anti-American resentment. In the Turkish political
debate, however, each side sought to turn the Johnson letter
to its own interest. Republicans cited the events of June
1964 as avidence that they would have defended Turkish
rights on Cyprus by force if the United States had not
interfered. Followers of the Justice Party blamed Repub-
licans for having given in to such pressure and thereby
missing the opportune moment for intervention.
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It should be emphasized that despite the sharp Turkish-
American differences over Cyprus in 1964, official Turkish
policy remained quite moderate. Even after the limited
Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and the exchange of official
visits in the winter of 1964-65, for example, Turkey went
no further than to disassociate herself from plans for a
NATO multilateral force (13 January 1965) -- a project not
very actively pushed by Washington at that time -- and to
reject NATO requests for increased force levels (statement
by Defense Minister Sancar, 26 January 1965) -- which many
other allies had done before. A year later, the news of an
arms deal between the Czech government and President Makarios
(see below) created a chilly atmosphere during Premier
Kosygin's visit to Ankara. At the level of popular senti-
ment, however, Turkish-American relations are likely to
remain strained. Just as the Cyprus problem was only one
contributing factor to that strain, so a solution -- even
one acceptable to Turkey and promoted through American
diplomatic efforts -- would relieve the tension only partly.
With regard to Cyprus itself, the Turkish attitude may
be characterized as one of watchful waiting and of recurrent
efforts to work out a settlement with Athens. The occasion
for military intervention would seem to have passed in the
summer of 1964 or at the latest by early 1966 and will not
recur unless there should be major new incidents on the
island. The situation still is essentially as Dean Acheson
described it sometime after his return from Geneva: "If
[Makarios] is foolish enough to push the Turks too far,
no one will restrain him again. If not, prescriptive
rights from time's grant will accrue from Turkish inaction."6
6Address before the Chicago Bar Association, 24 March
1965.
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C. ON CYPRUS
On the island itself, time indeed seemed to be working
in favor of Makarios and his Greek Cypriote supporters.
The final report of the United Nations mediator, Gab o Plaza
Lasso, submitted on 26 March 1965, supplied them with a
number of potent additional arguments. Plaza discounted
not only a return to the status quo ante, but also such
solutions as enosis, geographic separation of Greeks and
Turks on the island (which, he predicted, would create a
"highly provocative frontier"), or territorial compensation
for Turkish rights under the 1959-60 agreements. His plea
for demilitarization of the island presumably was directed
against present British bases as well as future ones con-
trolled by Turkey or NATO and accorded well with Makarios'
bid for neutralist and Communist support in the United
Nations and in the world at large. Plaza further suggested
that Turkish Cypriotes receive assurances of minority rights
(presumably in verbal enactments by a Greek Cypriote govern-
ment), and that "any Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in
them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of
things would have the right to be resettled in Turkey...."
In view of recent Greek-Turkish relations on the island,
few Turks were likely to feel such confidence; this, indeed,
had been the reason for calling in a mediator in the first
place. Understandably the Plaza report was firmly rejected
by the Turkish government and widely denounced in the
Istanbul and Ankara press. A year later, in March 1966,
Secretary-General U Thant designated Carlos A. Bernardi
as his personal representative with instructions to bring
about discussions in any form or any level suitable -- and
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in doing so studiously avoided the term "mediation." By
June 1966, Bernardi, too, reported the failure of his efforts.
Makarios' own policy took clearer shape in the summer
and fall of 1965. In late July the Greek rump of the House
of Representatives passed a series of bills abolishing the
Greek and Turkish communal chambers, merging the separate
Greek and Turkish rolls for national elections, declaring
the Vice-Presidency and the Turkish seats in the Council
of Ministers vacant -- in short, setting aside all the
essential provisions of the constitution -- and prolonging
its own term of office and that of President Makarios (which
were to have expired on August 15, 1965). The service of
Greek Cypriote conscripts, extended previously from six to
twelve months, was extended once more to eighteen, which
meant a tripling of the legal strength of the Greek Cypriote
forces, not counting the regulars infiltrated from Greece
and irregulars armed among the island population. On
11 October 1965, the Greek Cypriote Foreign Minister,
Spyros Kyprianou, submitted to Secretary-General U Thant
two documents that would implement some of Plaza's recom-
mendations, including a declaration of rights for Cypriotes
patterned on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
a statute giving autonomy to Greeks and Turks in matters
of education, religion, and personal status. (How this
autonomy was to be implemented in the absence of the com-
munal chambers, dissolved by the July laws, was not made
clear.) In December 1965, a resolution by the General
Assembly gave further support to Plaza's and Makarios'
view of the conflict as essentially an internal matter to
be resolved within Cyprus.
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No internal solution can take full effect, however,
unless peace can henceforth be maintained without external
help, and this in turn presupposes a basic agreement between
the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. There
have been few outbreaks of violence on the island since
August 1964. This lull has been due in part to the pres-
ence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). But
because this force was inadequate to prevent fighting in
the spring and summer of 1964 and since then has been re-
duced from about 6000 to about 4500 men, it seems reason-
able to look for two other explanations. One of these is
the control of the Greek Cypriote National Guard by General
Grivas and other officers who have taken their instructions
from Athens. The other is the possibility of military
retaliation from the Turkish mainland, as demonstrated in
August 1964. By the end of 1966, moreover, there were
clear indications that Archbishop-President Makarios was
doing his best to break this stalemate as upheld by Grivas'
National Guard, UNFICYP, and the latent Turkish threat.
In late November, the Makarios government decided to cut
the budget for the National Guard by $1 million and to
increase that for the police forces (which were under
Makarios direct control). A week later it was learned
that the Makarios government had ordered a quantity of
Czech arms to equip this enlarged police force. While the
Greek government insisted that a first shipment of these
arms be turned over to its officers on the island, Turkish
naval units were reported to be steaming off "for a month
of maneuvers" in an apparent attempt to prevent the delivery
of a second.
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If the Makarios government at any future time gains
control of the National Guard or of sizable fighting forces
of its own, or if the United Nations forces are withdrawn,
the precarious peace on Cyprus might suddenly cease. A
second round of Greek-Turkish fighting might well assume
larger proportions than in 1964 and almost certainly would
bring into play renewed threats of Turkish intervention by
air or through landings.
Meanwhile, even without any fighting, the economy of
the island suffers -- from a lack of tourist income (nor-
mally a major item in the foreign exchange balance), from
disruption of internal production, trade, and government
services, and from the wholesale conscription of young men.
The hardship is obviously greatest on the Turkish community
of whom more than half are crowded together in various
enclaves. But there are indications that the government
of Cyprus, too, is feeling the financial pinch of this
economic disruption.7
Peace on the island might perhaps result from a new
agreement between the Greek and Turkish communities on
Cyprus approved by the other signatories of the London-
Zurich treaties, but with the Makarios and the Ankara
governments playing the leading role in direct negotiations.
It would seem unlikely that such an agreement could be
7It may be taken as a symptom of this that the Times
of London reported (November 11, 1966): "Some surprise
in official and diplomatic quarters in Nicosia" at the
prospect of early British withdrawal from the base at
Dhekalia. In 1965 the two bases together had brought
Cyprus a foreign exchange income of about $40 million,
compensating for more than half of the island's trade
deficit.
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based on one side's accepting the substance of the other's
demands (i.e., Makarios' accepting full autonomy for a
Turkish community resettled in a suitable portion of the
island, or the Turks' agreeing to majority rule on Cyprus
with only conventional guarantees of minority rights).
Perhaps a more hopeful approach would be a revision of
the constitutional system in line with principles long
applied in Lebanon.
In Lebanon, as in Cyprus under the 1960 constitution,
high government offices are divided among the two major
communities, with the president a Maronite Christian, the
prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and other offices divided
among Christians and Muslims in a ratio of six to five.
But in sharp contrast to the Cyprus constitution of 1960,
the laws of Lebanon use the electoral process to unite
rather than to set apart the various communities. Under
the old Cypriote system, Greek voters chose among Greek
candidates for the Greek setas in the House, Turks among
Turkish condidates for Turkish seats. Under the system
enacted by the Makarios government in July 1965, all
ethnic distinctions would disappear, so that with the nor-
mal operation of majority elections no Turks would sit in
the legislature at all. Under a "Lebanese" system, parlia-
mentary seats would still be reserved for Greeks and Turks
in a set proportion as in 1960, but there would be a single
electoral roll as in 1965. The island would be divided
into a number of large, ethnically mixed constituencies,
which would send a fixed number of Greek and Turkish rep-
resentatives to Nicosia -- say, two Greeks and one Turk or
five Greeks and two Turks, depending on population ratios.
But every voter -- Greek and Turk -- would exercise his
vote for every one of the seats in his constituency,
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choosing among Greek candidates for the Greek seats and
among Turkish candidates for the Turkish seats. Under the
1960 system, every parliamentarian was accountable only
to constituents of his own ethnic community, and Greek
and Turkish legislators faced each other in two hostile
phalanxes. Under a "Lebanese" system, every member of
parliament would have both Greek and Turkish constituents.
Since "balanced tickets" (to use the New York expression)
would be required by law, success in election campaigns
would depend on alliances across ethnic lines. There would
be a premium on moderate and conciliatory attitudes rather
than on divisiveness and antagonism. At the same time,
the legislature could act by majority votes without dis-
tinction among Greek and Turkish members: there would be
no need and no place for the communal vetoes of the 1960
constitution. Only such a new set of institutions can be
expected to provide in time that "basis,Jor reasonable
confidence in the new order of things" that Senor Plaza
vainly sought in verbal declarations.
D. FOR THE UNITED STATES
The United States in June 1964 stopped Turkey from
landing troops on Cyprus -- a right Turkey claimed under
-;
the Treaty of Guarantee. The United States did not, how-
ever, prevent the arrival of an entire division of Greek
soldiers in clear contravention of the 1960 treaties. In
August 1964, the United States did not prevent the Turkish
air force attack on Mansoura and Kokkina, but the following
spring American pressure prevented the delivery of Russian
SAMs to Cyprus. Meanwhile, since 1964, the United States
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has paid about 40 percent of the cost of the United Nations
force on Cyprus.
United States action was consistently aimed at pre-
venting military encounters or at reducing their intensity.
We deterred the Turks from landing troops on a hostile shore,
but did not prevent the arrival of the Greek soldiers in
friendly ports. We did not stop the Turkish air strikes
and perhaps could not have done so short of attacking Turkey's
American-built jets with our own jets. But we dissuaded
Greece from delivering the Russian missiles which, in an
extreme situation, we could have intercepted by naval force.
United States policymakers presumably did not intend
any partiality in intervening in various phases of the
Cyprus dispute -- but then it is not easy, even with the
best of intentions, to intervene impartially in a two-way
fight. The United States in fact has played a quiet but
decisive role in determining the current situation on
Cyprus. We allowed a sharp increase in the superiority of
Greek land forces on the island while preserving Turkish
superiority in the air. Meanwhile, since 1964 the United
States has paid a subsidy without which UNFICYP probably
would not have come into existence. With some oversimplifi-
cation, it may be said that United States policy has helped
determine the level of military forces on either side and
then paid for a third military force to patrol the result-
ing deadlock.
The military situation, moreover, has had important
political implications. The Greek ground troops which we
permitted to land and the Turkish air threat which we have
allowed to be maintained have contributed to restraining
Makarios activism. But as the situation shaped up in early
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1964 and as it has since evolved, Makarios has been much
closer to reaching his maximal goals than have his Turkish
antagonists. Time, moreover, may well seem to be on the
Archbishop's side. Politically, therefore, the indirect
beneficiary of our policy has been Makarios, in whom few
American officials reposed any trust, and the most serious
loser Turkey, traditionally our closest ally in the East-
ern Miditerranean.
By preventing a military showdown, we staked our
policy on the assumption that diplomacy could solve the
crisis. The course of diplomatic conversations to date --
whether with participation by Americans or United Nations
representatives or directly between Greeks and Turks --
has not borne out that assumption. This impasse of United
States policy, with regard to Cyprus may be attributed to
two main reasons. First, we have exerted ourselves more
to restrain means than to promote ends. We were more con-
cerned not to have the Cyprus dispute solved by fighting
than to have it solved in any particular way -- or indeed
to have it solved at all. Second, in helping explore the
possibilities of a diplomatic solution at the time of the
Acheson mission in the summer of 1964 we concentrated on
Ankara and Athens rather than Ankara and Nicosia.
In the foreseeable future, the Cyprus situation may
be expected to develop along one of three lines -- continua-
tion of the present deadlock, a military showdown, or a
political solution.
A continuation of the present deadlock is desired by
no one and in no one's interest. Nonetheless, the experi-
ence in Kashmir and along Israel's frontiers shows that
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provisional arrangements of this sort can endure for many
years (even the United Nations forces at Gaza and Sharm
el Sheikh retained their stations for fully ten years).
And no matter how undesirable in itself, such a lingering
provisional arrangement would seem preferable, from a point
of view of global peace and of United States interest, to
a full-scale local war that might well spread beyond the
region.
It seems doubtful, however, whether the present dead-
lock can continue indefinitely. In contrast to Palestine
and Kashmir, there is no geographic separation of the
antagonists. The current stalemate may be upset almost
instantly by a number of developments -- if Makarios man-
ages to gain control of substantial Greek forces, if Grivas
or his successor should receive different instructions
from a new government at Athens, if fighting breaks out
spontaneously, or if Ankara shifts to a more militant
attitude.
A second round of fighting is almost certain to assume
larger proportions than did the first in 1964. There are
many more arms and men now on the island, and it seems
less likely that Turkey would once again allow its forces
to be restrained. While a new major military clash would
thus almost certainly involve Turkish mainland forces, it
seems less likely that Greece (which is much further away)
could effectively intervene, except with its_forces already
on Cyprus. Nor is there any reason to assume (as did the
Johnson letter of 5 June 1964) that Russia would be in-
volved -- especially if American policy concentrated on
warning Russia rather than Turkey against such intervention.
Warfare on the island therefore need not spread beyond its
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immediate region of origin, but it would inevitably take a
heavy toll of lives and property among the Cypriote Greek
and especially the Cypriote Turkish communities -- about
whose rights the conflict first erupted.
A permanent political solution would seem a far more
hopeful way of forestalling a second military round than
does the present stalemate. American diplomatic efforts
so far have concentrated on encouraging the Athens and
Ankara governments to find such a solution. Since Greek-
Turkish conversations have yielded no tangible result, it
would seem preferable now to encourage direct contacts
between Ankara and Nicosia. Although an enormous amount
of distrust and animosity would have to be overcome, any
solution arrived at by such direct contacts could be
readily implemented -- as a solution endorsed by Athens
rather than Nicosia could not. A "Lebanese" plan of rep-
resentation, as outlined above, might provide a tangible
basis for discussions between the Makarios and the Ankara
governments. Such a solution would have the virtue of
reconciling rather than compromising the two interests in-
volved. A United Nations force and a guarantee by outside
powers still might be required for a number of years to
ensure a transition to the new system, but their efforts
would be directed less at preventing war than at building
peace.
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"WYE? fIMIWITI1T A T _ TTC1G1 nivrr v
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