THE BALKAN STATES AND THE TURKISH STRAITS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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• Publication Date: January 26, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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T-519
January 26, 1945
, THE BALKAN STATES AND THE TURKISH STRAITS
I. STRATVIIC INTERESTS
Like Turkey and the Soviet Union, the States of
Southeastern Europe have strategic interests of the
greatest importance in the region of the Turkish
Straits. Historically, these states--Greece and
Bulgaria. Rumania and Yugoslavia, a* well as Albania
and parts of Hungary?were subject to the Ottoman
Empire. Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia
[Serbia], achieved their independence in the course of
the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.
ta
Land routes from the Balkan region via Belgrade, g
Sofia and Salonica lead to the Straits, as does the _
Y1
Danube route 'to the Black Sea. More particularly the
Balkan routes to the Straits are: 1) The lower course
of the Danube to the Black Sea ,and thence to the Straits
2) The valley of the Mariusa River via Adrianople to the
Straits; 3) The Morava-Vardar valley from Belgrade to
Salonica and thence overseas to the Straits; and 4)
The Via REL_Iatia from Durazzo to Salonica and Adrianople WI
to the Straits, or overseas from Salonica. I/ Over
these land and sea routes the Straits may be attacked ,
from Europe. But over them as well the Balkan region
may be attacked and invaded. Control by a Great Power
over the Balkan routes to the Straits would lead to
domination of the Straits. The basic Turkish strategic
interest in the preservation of the independence of the
Balkan States Is concerned with protection of the
Straits. Control over the Straits by a Great Power, on
the other hand, might well threaten the independence of
the states of Southeastern Euro-re. Indeed, in many
respects
1 See Colonel E. Bakirdzis, "La valeur strat6gique de
, .
la Gree pour le Proche Orient," Affaires Danubiennes,
.No. 5 (1939), 231-48; "Les puissances et la nouvelle
Tureuie," ibid., No. 6 (1940), 315-335; "Les pays du
. Bas-Danube; rifude g6opolitieue, bid., No. 7 (140)?
?
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respects, it may. be.said that the independence -of the
states of Southeastern Europe depends on a rraotical
solution of the problem of the Straits which would at
once preserve the 'freedom of commerce through the
Straits and promote the reace and stability of the.. -
states of the Balkan region.
IL ECONOMIC INTERESTS/OF THE. BALKAN STATES
The economic ?interests of the states of Southeastern.
Europe in the Straits vary, though all are vitally
concerned with freedom of commerce., Bulgaria and
Rumania, .for example, as Black Sea statesa have an
outlet to the open Seas only through the Turkish Straits*
While Bulgarian tonnage passing through the Straits
has never been large, Rumanian tonnage has exceeded an
annual average of 500a000 tons' and in 1239 was about
8500000 tons, sometimes surpassing the tonnage of the
Soviet Union in the, Straits. 2/ Yugoslavia.also
appears little interested cemmercially,-although its
tonnage has?not been negligible,. Ishile that of Hungary
has been even less than that of Yugoslavia a- In Contrasts
Greece has had a very large tonnage passing through the
Straits, averaging about 2,000,000 tons in the ten years
preceding the outbreak of ,the present war, and ranking
among the. first three commercial powers using these
waters, Although Turkish trade, as sucha with the
,countries of Southeastern Europe has been email, Turkish'
tonnage in the-Straits has naturally been very large,
An Analeation of the significance of the Straits to
the various. Balkan countries is shown by the following
table 3/
BALKAN
2/ The Bulgarian tonnage was not listed in 1913, but the
Rumanian tonnage was more than 350.,1000 in that year
3/ This table is compiled from League of Nati:ens,
official Turkish And ether sources. For more
complete tables see T-515. The Problem of the
Turkish Stra4ts,
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BALKAN SHIPING IN THE TURKISH STRAITS
?1
(BlagiE22-qNet, -1-1E-23?oriae.)
666
State ;
1924
Albania 0
Bulgaria
0
Greeoe . 0
0
Hungary
RUmanla 0
Yugoslavia2
87, 183
8279000
719960
364,134
36,173
Total 21,
Percenta
386, 450
3.2122Lo
2
10
1928
1932
r.....????????????????
C
0
1937
1039509 .2 9191.43
7799950 g ?46936
4689183 g ,643,038
22,780 g 1249841
180, 379
64S f, 211
1099.'5'36
579 438
374, 422
2 3289418 2 20 5-95 564
0
14 o o 2 1.2.,s1L_D 2(122Z o
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??=ColIMIP
1939
1940
1941
? iYan,4110)
.139163
179?798 2
181,482
2
930442 2
526682
2 225,454
15,998 2.
13,153,
2
2 .
845,135
546,816
2 175,100
2.
79,,977
30,170
59570
o o
c. a ?
2
%C.) 51?0 51 2
19298, 303
42439?
0
2
26 .
4___Q9Lo
Li2 pfin
III. POLICIES
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III.. POLICIES OF THE BALKAN STATES
CONCERNING THE STRAITS
A. The Balkan States and the Straits
The policies of the states of Southeastern Europe
with respect to the Straits and Turkey have varied
Aceording to their position and their interests. In
the period of 1919-19229 Greece, under British aegis,
sought to gain a position on the coast of Asia Minor
and even aspired to hold Constantinople. With the ?
exceptions of Hungary and Bulgaria, they all approved
the Straits Convention of Ayres in 1920 and that of
Lausanne in 1923. On the other hand, Turkeys Rumania
and Bulgaria rejected a Soviet proposal at Lausanne
whereby the Black Sea was to become a "mare clausum of
the littoral Powers," since Soviet Russia would clearly
be the dominant naval power in the Black Sea. 4/
In the years which followed the Lausanne TreatY9
Turkey's relations with the Balkan States underwent
a fundamenta! 4'ransformation. Turkey signed a treaty
of friendshir with Yugoslalria in 1925 and renewed it in
the.rall-df 1933. Turkey and Bulgaria were bound by
a treaty of neutrality, arbitration and conciliation in
1929 and renewed it in the fall of 1933. Commercial
treaties with the Balkan countries were signed with
Bulgaria (1930), Greece (1930, 1934)9 Rumania (1930),
and Yugoslavia. (1933). Greek-Turkish relations had
so far improved by October 1930 that a treaty of neutrality,
conciliation, arbitration and friendship was concluded.
By September 13, 1933 these two ancient enemies signed
a treaty guaranteeing their common frontiers and providing
for common re7resentation at certain international
conferences. 5/
Partly
4/ See Cmd. 1814 (2,g1Q, 250-53, 2639275-76. A so-called
"Black Sea-Pact" for control of the Straits by the
riverain powers has been proposed a number of times.
The American Government, like Great Britain, has
consistently taken the position that the Straits and
the Black Sea are not solely the concern of the riverain
powere. See Gabriel Hanotaux, La c7:ierre des Balkans
et l'Eurore, 1912-1913 (Paris, 1.1-Nourrit, 1914),
19Z-200; N. Dan3ovici, Lace.:eetity-: lu Besphore et des
Dardanelles (Oeneva ?GeorE,,, .299-300. H.N.Howard
The Em1111211 of Turkey, tr,W
g For text see R,J.Kerner The Balkan Con-
ferences and the Balkan EnterAte., 19=-1=5 (Berkely,
University of California, i-;;27-0 Document XIII, p. 231.
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Partly in the interest of the security of the
Straits as well as in that of its general political
security, the Turkish Government was much concerned
with prflzr-7-cr 31n?r14?-nor f,,deration. Both
Turkish and Greek political leaders played a sicnificant
role in the organization and direction of the sani-official
Balkan Conferences (1930-1934) in which unofficial
representative. of Albania, Bulgaria, Greoce, umania,
Turkey and Yugoslavia took part. On February 9 1934,
Turtey0 Srt..-50a, Yugoclavia and Rumania?the 'latter 4L7-!:
being members of the Little Entente with Czechoslovakia
signedthe Balkan Pact by which the signatories were
pledged to defend each other against attack by another
Balkan State (Bulgaria or Albania). 6/
? The Turkish Government submitted a formal request
for revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention to the
Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments
at Geneva on March 240 1933. 7/ The next year, fear-
ful of the possible designs of Fascist Italy in the
Near East, ani2articularly in the region of the Straits,
the Turkish Government informally communicated to the
Balkan.States its desire for obtaining the right to
fortify the zone of the Straits. 8/ On June le 1934,
the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfix /Ideal Aram, submitted
a resolution to the Conference asking it "to enter
without delay upon an exhaustive study of the problem
of security," for the purpose of arriving, especially
in
6/ For text see ibid.$ Documents XIV, XV, pp. 2327-37.
17 League of Nations .4=aras. .tila aparri.teilaa
BpdmatiOD. rAnd 44.1.2,11,215.1M.D.t.iUMALUanta. Berieg B.
Minutes of the General Commission. Volume II. December
14th, 1932--June 20thi 1933, Section 92.
R/ See Tevfik OgfW Aras, 10 aria sur les traces de
Lausanne (Istanbul, Akpam Matbaasi,, 1935), 248-53.
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in Europe, "by-general or regional agreements based on
the principles set down in the Treaty of Locarno and that
of the Balkan Entente, at such solutions as might be
best calculated to make it possible to conclude Lagree-
ments) for the reduction and limitation of armaments."
When Italy began its march into Ethioria in 1933,
Turkey, considering itself threatened at least by
implication, followed the lead of Great Britain An
applying economic sanctions against Italy and in
supporting the system of collective security under the
Covenant of the League or Nations0 In, the fall of
1935 Great 9ritain asked the several Balkan States along
.the shores of the Mediterranean if they -Would place
their post s at the disposal of a Great Power acting
under the authority of the League of Nations. In
December 1935 the Turkish Government, along with Greece
and Yugoslavia, and "in concert with .its Balkan allies,
replied that in the contingency contemplated it would
fulfil the obligations under the Covenant." 9/
Subsequently the Ankara government asked the British,
Government to furnish it with reciprocal assurances,
"which were duly conveyed." Similar assurances were
also given to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments.
Perhaps the Turkish Government felt that Great
Britain?6 attitude toward revision of the Convention
of the Straits would be altered in Turkey's favor. It
was not until April 10, 1936after the German forces
had entered the Rhineland?that Turkey made a formal
request for revision of the Lausanne Convention, however,
with a genuine possibility of 'success. 10/ There is
evidence that the Turkish Government, In the Interest
of its own eecurity, was p:separed to act alone if its
reouest were opposed by 'he Pewers, although it followed
the policy of pacific procedure in :revision of the
Lausanne Convention, The, British and Soviet Governments
hastened_ to accede to thecalling of a conference to
consider the problem of revision, the French Government
wassomehat reluctant, the Japanese Government was -
relatively disinterested, and Italy was not at all
sympathetic with the idea Of revision.
- With
--57-fiErc7f7-No. 2 (12t36. Disjute between' Ethioria and
Correspondence in eonnection ,it the apallapAr
? tion of Article 16 of the Convenant of the? .14.tagRe
of Nations. Iaermaty 1936. jmd. 5072.
10/ Sterhen Heald and J.W.Wheaer-Rennett, Documents on
International Affairs (London, Oxford, 1W7)7--
6457,48.
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With the exception of Rumania, the Balkan States
received the Turkish request with favor. Provided-the
Greek islands In the Aegean Sea were permitted to
refortify, Greece was not opposed to the Turkish move. .
Yugoslavia favored the Turkish reouest, and was especially
impressed that the. Turkish Government had chosen the
regular channels of diplomacy and the organs of the
League of Nations through which to press its desires.
The Bulgarian Government announced its agreement,
making known that it would "not oppose the Turkish
request for remilitarization" of the Straits. The
Bulgarian rress and the government, no doubt, felt that
a useful rrecedent might be set for peaceful revision .
of the Treaty of Neuilly. The Rumanian Government,
hovever? was fearful that the entire question of treaty
revision would be raised in the Balkan region and especially
that the act of Turkey would "sooner or later have very .
Important conseouences for the fate of the Balkan
Entente and for the entire policy of southeastern Europe.
The Turkish Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Numan Menemencioglu, had to make a special trip to
Bucharest to clear up any Rumano-Turkish misunderstandings.
When the Balkan Entente met on May 4, 1936, it appears
that Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Turkey, acting
together, agreed on the terms whereby Turkey would be
supported in its reouest to refortify the region of
the Straits. Greece was to have the right to refortify
the Aegean Islands, while Rumania received a Turkish
guarantee that the members of the Balkan Entente would
be consulted prior to the undertaking of any action.
The Convention of Montreux, signed on July 20, 19369 11/
restored Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, with the
full right of remilitarization of the region. Freedom
of commerce In both peace and war was affirmed, even If
Turkey were a belligerent, provided the commercial
vessels committed no hostile acts within the Straits.
Belligerents were prohibited from using the Straits in
war time, except when Acting under the provisions of he
Covenant of the League of Nations, or under the terms of
a regional--the Balkan Entente--pact? to which Turkey
was an adherent and which was registered with the
League
11/1101u No. 1 (1936). Convention regarding the
Realm of the Straits with Correspondence Relating
thereto. Montreux, IRly 20, 1936. Cmd. 5249.
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League of Nations. 12/ The Convention was a signal
victory for Turkey, for the members of the Balkan
Entente, and for the Peaceful revision of treaties
Under the procedure of the League of Nations. At the
time, it also seemed to offer the prospect of collaboration
between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France
against any threat to peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.
B, Turkey, the Balkans, theatila and the IlL41:
The Baikan Entente held together during the Munich
crisis of 35'38, although there was little prospect of
its being effective if and when a genuine test should
come. Although the Balkan Entente had achieved some
regional economic and cultural agreements, it fell short
of a common foreign and military policy which could be
applied beyond the common Balkan neighborhood.
On the -eve of the:outbreak of the war, Turkey
was moving cautiously in the orbit of Great.Pritain and
France, while Great Britain, following the destruction
of CzechOslovakia0 offered to support Greece and Rumania,
and communicated this declaration to Turkey, At the
same time, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
MaximaLitvinov, appeared to be trying to organize a
Turco-Balkan group for the preservation of tha afturity
of the region of the Straits and the Black Sea. 1.;g
A few
12/ Article .XIX declared: "Vessels of war belonging to
belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through
the Straits except in cases arising out of the
application of article 25 of the present Convention,
and in cases of assistance rendered to a State Victim
of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual
assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the
framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
and registered and published in accordance with the
, provisions of article 18 of the Covenant."
13/ See New York Times, February 8, 1939? At the closing
session of thl?FVUtreux Conference, July 200 19360
Litvinov acknowledged the positive accomplishments
of the Conference: "The Conference has recognized,
although in an insufficient way, the special rights
of the riverain states in the Plack'Sea in connection
with the passage of the Straits, as well,as the
special
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A few weeks after the beginning of the war, on the
occasion Of the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister,
M. Saraceglu, to Moscow, the Soviet Government proposed
a'similar uBlack Sea Pact" concerning the Straits. V.
M. Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, .
explained the Soviet position eoncerning the Straits in
an address to the Supreme Soviet on November 12 1939, 11/
In which he denied any suggestion of altering the
Montreux Convention for the purpose of establishing a
"privileged position as regards the Straits", but did
declare that "the subject at issue was the conclusion
of a bilateral 'pact of mutual assistance limited to
the regions of the Black Sea and the Straits." Such a
mutual assistance pact, Molotov argued, would help to
prevent armed conflict with Germany and the U.S.S.R.
would have a guarantee that Turkey would not allow the
warships of a non-Black Sea power into the Black Sea.
Turkey rejected these proposals and on October 19, 1939
signed a pact eith Great Britain and France.
The Balkan region did not become a scene of war
until October 1940. At the last meeting of the Council
of
13/ Con't. special geographical situation of the Black
Sea in which the general conceptions of the absolute
freedom of the seas could not be entirely aTated."
A.,NoMandelstam, LA roliticue rUsse d'accbs a la
Mediterranie aux )ff;71-117:-(Paris, 1934), 796-982
wrote: "It is now legitimate to envisage the future
for a 'national Russia reborn in an inoomrletely
pacified world....It will not'perhaps be too bold
to suppose that the new Russia, renouncing the dream
of :;onstantinorle will unite with ,Turkey and the
other riverain states of the Black Sea by lines
powerful enough to defend their common right to a
special situation in the Straits, a situation guarantee-
ing to all the riverains of the Pont-Euxine the full
security of the measures which they have constructed
on the enchanting shores."
11/ For text of Molotov's address see the New York Times,
November 1, 1939. See also D.J.Dallin, Soviet
Russia's Foreign ,FelicY, 1939-1942 (New Haven., Yale
U12)7705-111; Ernest Jackh, The Risintrl Crese,ent
(New York, 1944), 228 ff.
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of the:Balkan Entente at Belgrade, In February 1940,
the Turkish Foreign Minister suggested that the members'
of the Balkan Entente act tcgether in regional solidarity
under any threat of aggression, although it was generally
admitted that there was little prospect of success of
any such action. 15/ Until the German Attack or Yugo-
slavia and Greece in April 1941, the Turkish Government
continued to urge concerted Balkan action.
Nevertheless; on February 17, 1941, Turkey signed an
agreement with Bulgaria, referring to the "inviolable
peace and sincere and perpetual friendship ofthe two
countries," and indicated that "Turkey and Bulgaria
considered as the immutable foundation of their foreign
policy to abstain from aggression." There was no reference
to the possibility of German occupation of Bulgaria
--
which occurred in March,--for an attack on Greece. Toward
the end of February, the British Foreign Minister,
Yr. Eden, tried to reconstitute a Balkan pact, ccmrosed
of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, but failed because
of Yugoslav and Turkish reluctance, although Turkey
had warned that it would not be indifferent "to foreign
activities that might occur in her security zone."
Turkey felt unable to move when Yugoslavia and Greece:
were attacked by Germany in April 1941, and by the late
spring of 1941, Crete and Tany of the Aegean islands
in the neighborhood of the Dardanelles and the Turkish
coast of Asia Minor were in German hands. Shortly
thereafter came the German attack, on June 22, 1941,
on the Soviet Union. By the Summer of 1941 the Balkan
region was entirely under German control.
Turkey remained a nonbelligerent ally of Great
Britain, but did not venture to break off relations
with 'Germany until August 2, 1944. Meanwhile the
Turkish Government, partly in the interest of its position
as guardian of the Straits and of securing the approaches
to those waters, continued to express its desire for
the constitution of some kind of Balkan Union within
the framework of a general wo-dd seeUrity organization. 16/
Although -
15/ See L'Entente halkanioue du 9 avrier 1939 au 8
fivrier 1940 (Bucharest, 1940), 109 ppo
16/ The London Times, October 14, 1943; New York Times,
October 150 1943. See also T-356 11161]. The Greek
-
Yugoslav Lmatat for Balkan Union. On August 10 1944
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Although the unity of the Balkan Entente was broken
under German and Italian pressure in 1940-1941a and. none
of the members seemed to live up to its obligations., the
Turkish Government has recently looked with favor eon
a revival of Balkan unity, in which it would again play
an active Ale.' Turkey would probably be opposed to a
Balkan union of which it would not be a member, as it
apparently considers participation in such a union an
essential element in its Ownsecurity. It is not
unlikely that such a union, with Turkey as a member,
might contribute constructively to a solution of the
problem of the Straits, provided it sought no exclusive
control of the area0 Straits:
circles aee said to believe
that the achievement of a general world organization for
the maintenance of peace would not render unnecessary
a Balkan union, although it would relieve such a union
of apprehensions_zoneerning the security of its members
and would make superfluous common militaTy precautions,
except those arising from their limited obligations under
a regional union.
On the other hand, in the 'event of the formation
of a South Slav Union, to which Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
would belong to the exclusion of other states of the
Balkan region, it is probable that Greece and Turkey
might form an alliance, or even closer union. Despite
difficulties during the present war, Greek?Turkish
friendship has been so well founded that it has stood
the strain, and Turkey has voiced no objection to the
Greek desire toacquire the Dodecanese Islands. Although
commercial relations between the two countries were very
limited during the inter?war period, Greece.has a rrimary
interest in the problem of the Straits in view of the
Greek carrying trade which goes through those waters.
Greek and Turkish statesmen have both expressed their
hopes of close collaboration in the future, in view of
their common interests as Balkan and Mediterranean
Powers. Turkish leaders apparently believe that Turkish
Greek friendship will greatly facilitate achievement
of plans vhich allegedly being formulated by Great
Britain and the Soviet Union, and especially the Plan
for a South Slav union as suggested by the Yugoslav
Committee of National Liberation, so that the nerthern
and
16/ Oon'ta it was announced that the Bulgarian Government
had officially advised the Turkish Government through
its minister. to-Ankara,.Mr. Nicholas Balabanoffa that
Bulgaria-WoUld dbaits utmosteto oppose any German
military action against Turkey through an Axis
Balkan satellite. See,Ilew York,Times, August 190 1944.
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and southern Balkan countries would not be rivals but
form A Balkan union vith the assistance of both Great
Britain and the Soviet Union. Otherwise:, it would teem.
likely that a, Greek,-Turkish Alliance, with the possible
addition of Albania, under the auspices of Great Britain
might become a make?weight In a Balkan and Near Eastern
balelCe of power.
Prepared
TS:
Reviewed
TS:
NE:
by:
HNHoward
by:
PWIreland
GLJones? Jr.
ONFI DENT' AL
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