THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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5he Proilem of
5he arhiih Straib
United States Government- Printing Office
Washington : 1947
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?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 2752
Near Eastern Series 5 _
For sale by the 'Superintendent of Documents, .U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D. C: Price 30 cents
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Contenb
Page
The Montreux Convention of the Straits, 1936 1
Principal Treaties and Conventions (1774-1936)
13
Selections from Principal Treaties and Conventions (1774-1936) . . 14
Comparative Charts of the ?Conventions Regulating the Turkish
Straits . . . ..... . . . . .......... . 29
Some Recent Developments, 1945-1946 36
ANNEX: EXCHANGE OF NOTES
I. The American Ambassador in Turkey to the Turkish Minister
of Foreign Affairs 47
II. The Soviet' Charg?t Washington to the Acting Secretary of
State 47
III. The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Charg?t
Washington 49
IV. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Charg?t London 50
V. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy
in Turkey 50
VI. The Soviet Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 55
VII. The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Soviet
Commissar of Foreign Affairs 59
VIII. The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union to? the Soviet
Commissar of Foreign Affairs 59
IX. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy
in Turkey
(m)
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5oreword
During the course of the years 1945 and 1946 the problem of the Turkish
Straits became an important issue in international politics. The Department
of State. is herewith publishing a-series of articles, treaties, and conventions
on this subject together with-the most recent exchange of notes which has
taken place since November 2, 1945. This pamphlet is presented to make
conveniently available to the public the essential principles on which the
interested parties have based their position.
The material in this publication was written and compiled by Harry N.
Howard, Chief of the Near Eastern Branch of the Division of Research for
Near East and Africa, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State.
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THE IVIONTREUX CONVENTION. OF THE STRAITS, 1936
5 HE Montreux Convention regulating the use
of the Turkish Straits was signed at Mon-
treux, Switzerland, on July 20, 1936. It abro-
gated the Lausanne convention of July 24, 1923.1
The Lausanne convention, in general, provided
rules for the passage of commercial vessels and
warships through the region of the Straits, estab-
lished an international Commission of the Straits
under the League of Nations, and demilitarized
the zone. A. system of security, under the League
[1]
of Nations, was provided whereby Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan were to assume special
responsibilities to maintain freedom of the Straits
and to defend the demilitarized region of the
Straits in case of attack. By 1933, when hopes of
1 For the Lausanne convention see Treaty of Peace with
Turkey, and other instruments Signed at Lausanne on July
24, /923; together with Agreements between Greece and
Turkey signed on January 30, 1923 and Subsidiary Docu-
ments forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement (with
map), Great Britain, Foreign Office Treaty Series no. 16
(1923), Command Paper 1929.
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disarmament and of collective security began to
fade, the Turkish Government began to discuss
the problem of the revision of the Lausanne con-
vention, but it was not before April 10, 1936 that
an actual demand to that effect was presented to
the signatories.2 The Turkish demand, coming
as it did at the time of German rearmament and
denunciation of treaties, was well received, al-
though the Italian Government refused to be rep-
resented at the Conference of Montreux, which
met from June 22 to July 20, 1936.8 The conven-
tion entered into force on November 9, 1936 with
the deposit of the necessary ratifications.
II
The Preamble and General Principles
In the preamble of the Montreux Convention,4
the signatories, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia, declar-
ing their resolve to replace the Straits Convention
of Lausanne, express their desire?
"to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits
of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the
Bosphorus comprised under the general term
'Straits' in such manner as to safeguard, within
the framework of Turkish security and of the
security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States,
the principle enshrined in article 23 of the Treaty
of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July,
1923."
Article 23 of the Lausanne treaty recognized and
declared "the principle of freedom of transit and
of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace
as in time of war, in the Strait of the Dardanelles,
the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, as pre-
scribed in the separate Convention?regarding the
regime of the Straits."
Article 1 of the convention states that the high
contracting parties recognize and affirm "the prin-
ciple of freedom of transit and navigation by sea
in the Straits". 6 Exercise of this freedom, how-
ever, is to be in accordance with the regulations of
the convention. Although the Montreux Conven-
tion is scheduled to remain in force for a period of
20 years, according to article 28, "the principle of
freedom of transit and navigation" is to "continue
without limit of time".
Principles Governing the Transit and Navigation of
Merchant Vessels in the Straits
Articles 2 to 7, section I, of the Montreux Con-
vention deal with the transit and navigation of
merchant vessels in the Straits. Merchant vessels
are defined simply as "all vessels which are not
covered by Section II" of the convention, which
deals with warships. The provisions regulate pas-
sage of the Straits in four distinct periods:
IN TIME OF PEACE. In time of peace, merchant
vessels are to enjoy complete freedom of transit
?and of navigation in the Straits, by day or night,
under any flag and with any cargo. Other than
those authorized by annex I to the convention,6 no
taxes or charges are to be levied on merchant ves-
sels "when passing in transit without calling at a
port in the Straits". To facilitate collection of
taxes and charges, merchant vessels passing
through the Straits are to communicate to control
stations at the entrance of the Straits?from either
Stephen Heald and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents
on International Affairs (London, Oxford, 1937), pp.
645-48.
a For the minutes of the Montreux Conference see Actes
de la Conference de Montreux concernamt le regime des
Detroit& 22 juin-20 juillet 1936. Compte-rendu des
seances plenieres et de proas-verbal des debats du comit6
technique (Liege, Belgium, 1936), 310 pp.
For text of convention, see Turkey no. 1 (1936), Con-
vention regarding the Regime of the Straits with Corre-
spondence relating thereto (Montreux, July 20, 1936).
Cmd. 5249.
Italics are the author's. Cf. articles 1 and 2 of the
Lausanne convention, which covered both sea and air.
There was considerable discussion of the various
charges which could be levied (Actes de la Conference de
Montreux, pp. 59-68, 189-95, 220-27.) The British Delega?
[2]
tion, together with the various Balkan delegations, took a
leading part in this discussion, but the Soviet Delegation
took no part whatsoever in it.
Annex I laid down a schedule of charges and taxes
which could be collected in French gold francs per ton
of net registered tonnage as follows: (1) Sanitary Control
Stations, 0.075; (2) Lighthouses, Buoys, 0.42 (up to 800
tons), 0.21 (above 800 tons) ; (3) Life Saving Services,
0.10. No reductions in these charges could be made which
discriminated as to flag of vessel. These taxes and
charges were to apply "in respect of a return voyage
through the Straits", i.e. from the Aegean Sea to the Black
Sea or vice versa. Nevertheless, if a merchant vessel
re-entered the Straits on a return trip, after more than
six months, it would have to pay the charges again,
"provided no distinction is made based on the flag of the
vessel". If on its outward trip the merchant vessel indi-
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the Aegean or the Black Sea?the name, national-
ity, tonnage, destination, and last port of call.
Pilotage and towage remain optional.
The problem of sanitary inspection was the
subject of considerable discussion at the Mon-
treux Conference."' In the end, as provided in
article 3, all ships entering the Straits, whether
from the Aegean or the Black Sea, were to stop at
a sanitary station for sanitary inspection as "pre-
scribed by Turkish law within the framework of
international sanitary regulations". For vessels
which possessed a clean bill of health, or which
presented a declaration of health indicating that
they had no cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever,
exanthematic typhus, or smallpox on board, or
which had not had such cases during the previous
seven days, or had not left an infected port "within
less than five times twenty-four hours", inspec-
tion was to be carried out by day and by night,
"with all possible speed", and the vessels were
not to be required to make any other stop during
their transit. On the other hand, vessels which
had on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever,
exanthematic typhus, or smallpox, or which had
had such cases within seven days, and vessels
which had left an infected port within "less than
five times twenty-four hours", were required to
stop at sanitary control stations at the entrance of
the Straits, Aegean or Black Sea, to embark "such
sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may
direct". But no tax or charge was to be levied for
this purpose and the guards were to be disem-
barked at the sanitary control station on the de-
parture of the ship from the Straits.
IN TIME OF WAR, TuRKEY NON-BELLIGERENT.
In time of war, when Turkey is not a belligerent,
cates it is not returning to the Straits, it is to pay half
the charge indicated. The taxes and charges provided
In the annex were not to be greater than necessary to
cover the cost of maintenance of the services rendered,
together with a reasonable reserve, and were not to be
Increased except in accordance with the provisions for
the revision of the convention as stipulated in article 29.
They were payable "in gold francs or in Turkish currency
at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment".
Merchant ships might be required to pay taxes or charges
for optional services like pilotage or towage, when ren-
dered by Turkish authorities at the request of the master
or agent of the vessel. The Turkish Government was to
publish the rate of such charges. The schedule of such
charges was not to be increased in the event of these
services' becoming obligatory.
7 Loc. cit.
[3]
article 4 stipulates that merchant vessels, under
any flag or with any cargo, are to "enjoy freedom
of transit and navigation" subject to the provisions
of articles 2 and 3 as in time of peace. Pilotage
and towage remain optional as in time of peace.8
IN TIME OF WAR, TURKEY BELLIGERENT. In
time of war, when Turkey is a belligerent, mer-
chant vessels which do not belong to a country at
war with Turkey are to "enjoy freedom of transit
and navigation in the Straits on condition that
they do not in any way assist the enemy." Such
ships, however, must enter the Straits by day, and
their transit through the Straits is to be effected
by a route indicated by the Turkish authorities,
according to article 5.
TURKEY UNDER THREAT OF WAR. Unlike the
Convention of Lausanne, the Montreux Convention
made provision for Turkish action, under article 6,
for a situation in which Turkey considered itself
"threatened with imminent danger of war."
There was considerable discussion of this situation
at the Conference, with respect both to commercial
vessels and to warships. In the end it was decided
that, if and when Turkey considered itself threat-
ened with imminence of war, the ordinary provi-
sions of article 2 with respect to passage in time
of peace would continue to be applied, except that
merchant ships must enter the Straits by day and
that their transit of the Straits must be by a route
indicated by the Turkish authorities. Although
pilotage could be made obligatory, no charge
could be levied for such services.
Principles Governing the Transit and Navigation of
Warships in the Straits
Passage of warships into and through the
Straits, involving as it did the security of both
Turkey and the riparian states of the Black Sea,
was discussed at great length at the Montreux
There was considerable discussion of this problem
during the war, the most notable case having to do with
the passage of certain German vessels through the Straits
in the spring of 1944. There were two types: (1) K.T.
vessels of about 800 tons, with normal armament of 3.7-
inch guns and machine guns; (2) E.M.S. vessels, about
40 to 50 tons, with normal armament of one three-pounder,
machine guns, and depth charges. The former could
transport troops and supplies; the latter could be used
for various purposes. See Mr. Eden's statement,
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol. 400, no. 90,
Wednesday, 14th June, 1944, cols. 1986-88.
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Conference. In general, there were two funda-
mentally opposed theses presented to the Confer-
ence which had a direct bearing on the solutions
finally attained: Great Britain wanted the Straits
and the Black Sea to be treated as open waters,
while the Soviet Union desired the right to send
naval units through the Straits without granting
the reciprocal right of non - Black Sea powers to
send their fleets into the Black Sea.
Articles 8 to 22, section II, outline the provisions
with respect to the transit and navigation of war-
ships through the Straits.
Categories of "Warships. Article 8 provides that
the definitions of warships and of their specifi-
cations are to be as set forth in annex II of the
convention, the wording of which is taken from
the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936.9
Warships are classified as follows for the pur-
poses of the convention:
Capital vessels are surface vessels of war be-
longing to one of the two following sub-cate-
gories: (a) surface warships, other than aircraft
carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-
category (b) the standard displacement of which
exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or which
carry a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches
(203 mm.) ; (c) surface warships, other than air-
craft carriers, standard displacement of which
does not exceed 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) and
which carry a gun with a caliber exceeding 8
inches (203 mm.).
Aircraft carriers are surface vessels of war,
whatever their displacement, designed or adapted
primarily for the purpose of carrying and operat-
9 For the Naval Treaty of London see Treaty Between
His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, Canada,
Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and India,
The President of the United States of America, and
the President of the French Republic for the Limitation
of Naval Armaments (Miscellaneous no. 1, London,
March 25, 1936). Cmd. 5136. Reprinted in Stephen
Heald and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on
International Affairs (1936), pp. 616-33. As to displace-
ment, annex 11 (A) declared that the standard dis-
placement of a surface vessel is its displacement "com-
plete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea,
including all armament and ammunition, equipment, out-
fit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous
stores and implements of every description that are in-
tended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve
feed and water on board." Standard displacement for
submarines is similarly defined as "the surface displace-
ment of the vessel complete".
[4]
ing aircraft at sea. Fitting of landing-on or
flying-off deck of war vessel, not designed or
adapted primarily for such purpose, is no cause
of classifying ship as aircraft carrier. Category
of-aircraft carriers is divided into sub-categories:
(a) vessels fitted with flight deck, from which
aircraft can take off and land; (b) vessels not
fitted with flight deck.
Light surface vessels are surface vessels of war
other than aircraft carriers, minor war vessels, or
auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of
which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does
not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and
which do not carry a gun with a caliber exceeding
8 inches (203 mm.). Category includes: (a) ves-
sels with gun exceeding caliber 6.1 inches (155
mm.) ; (b) vessels not carrying gun exceeding
6.1 inches and standard displacement of which
exceeds 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) ; (c) ves-
sels not carrying gun exceeding 6.1 inches and
standard displacement of which does not exceed
3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons).
Submarines are all vessels designed to operate
below the surface of the sea.
Minor war vessels are surface warships the
standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons
(102 metric tons) and does not exceed 2,000 tons
(2,032 metric tons), provided they do not have
the following characteristics: (a) mount a gun
with a caliber exceeding 6.1 inches; (b) are de-
signed or fitted to launch torpedoes ? (c) are de-
signed for a speed greater than 20 knots.
Auxiliary vessels are naval surface vessels the
standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons
(102 metric tons), which are normally employed
on fleet duties or as transports, but not as fighting
ships, not specifically built as fighting ships, pro-
vided they do not have the following characteris-
tics: (a) mount a gun with a caliber exceeding
6.1 inches; (b) mount more than eight guns with
a caliber exceeding 3 inches (76 mm.); (c) are
designed or fitted to launch torpedoes; (d) are de-
signed for protection by armorplate; (e) are de-
signed for a speed greater than 28 knots; (f) are
designed or adapted primarily for operating air-
craft at sea; (g) mount more than two aircraft-
launching apparatus.
Over-age warships are so classified when the
following number of years have passed since com-
pletion: (a) capital ships, 26 years; (b) aircraft
carriers, 20 years; (c) light surface vessels, 16
years; (d) submarines, 13 years.
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Article 9, which was included specifically at the
request of the French Delegation." to cover the
case of French oil vessels carrying oil for the
French fleet from the region of Batum, provided
that naval auxiliary vessels "specifically designed
for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid" were
not to be subject to the provisions of article 13 re-
garding notification of passage of the Straits.
Neither were such vessels to be included for the
purpose of calculating the tonnage of warships,
which was subject to the limitations of articles 14
and 18, on condition that they make transit singly.
They were, however, subject to the same regula-
tions as other warships for the remaining provi-
sions regulating transit of the Straits. Auxiliary
vessels, as defined in annex II of the convention,
however, were to be entitled to benefit by their ex-
ceptional status provided their armament did not
include more than two guns of a maximum caliber
of 105 millimeters for use against floating mines,
and more than two guns of a maximum caliber of
75 millimeters for use against aerial targets.
IN TIME OF PEACE. Light surface vessels, minor
war vessels, and auxiliary vessels, whatever their
flag, whether belonging to Black Sea or non -
Black Sea powers, enjoy freedom of transit, with-
out charge or tax, subject to the provisions of
articles 13 to 18, which regulate the transit and
navigation of warships in the Straits. Vessels
of war other than light surface vessels, minor war
vessels, and auxiliaries (art. 10) enjoy "a right
of transit under the special conditions provided
by articles 11 and 12". These two articles, which
entailed considerable discussion at the Confer-
ence, provided (art. 11) that Black Sea powers
could send through the Straits capital ships of a
greater tonnage than 15,000 tons, as stipulated
in the first paragraph of article 14, provided these
warships "pass through the Straits singly, escorted
by not more than two destroyers". Moreover, ac-
cording to article 12, Black Sea powers would
have the right to send through the Straits, to re-
join their bases, submarines constructed or pur-
chased outside the Black Sea, provided adequate
notice of laying down or purchase of such sub-
marines had been given to Turkey. Likewise,
submarines belonging to Black Sea powers were
entitled to pass through the Straits for repairs
outside Black Sea ports, provided detailed infor-
mation regarding the matter were given to Tur-
key. In any case, the submarines must travel by
730988-47-2
[5]
day, on the surface, and pass through the Straits
singly.
General Rules for Transit and Navigation in the
Straits. (a) Notification. According to article
13, transit of warships through the Straits is to
be preceded by notification to the Turkish Gov-
ernment through diplomatic channels, the nor-
mal period being 8 days, although it was desirable
that it be 15 days in the case of non - Black Sea
powers! n The notification is to specify destina-
tion, name, type, and number of ships, and date
of entry for outward passage and if necessary for
the return journey through the Straits. Any
change of date is subject to three days' notice.
Entry into the Straits for the outward passage is
to take place within a period of five days from
the date given in the original notification. After
the expiry of the period, the new notification is
to be given under the same conditions as provided
for the original notification. When effecting tran-
sit of the Straits, the commander of the force,
without stopping, is to communicate the exact
composition of the force under his command to
the signal station at the entrance to the Darda-
nelles or the Bosphorus, as the case might be.
(b) Maximum tonnage. The maximum ton-
nage of all foreign naval forces in transit through
the Straits, according to the prevailing rule, is not
to exceed 15,000 tons (art. 14).12 There are two
"Actes de la Conference de Montreux, pp. 269-71.
11 The original Turkish project provided for a notifica-
tion 'of one month (article 6, paragraph (a) ). The
British objected to such a long period and suggested a
period of 15 days. The Soviet Delegation offered an
amendment to the British project providing a 15 day
notification for non-riverain powers of the Black Sea,
but only a three day notification for Black Sea powers.
Hence the compromise. (Ibid., pp. 68-77, 285-87, 287-
95.)
12 The original Turkish project suggested a limitation of
14,000 tons, as one half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet.
The British desired a limitation of 16,000 tons to permit
passage of two light cruisers with six-inch guns. (Ibid.,
pp. 200-05.) Mr. Litvinov, head of the Soviet Delegation,
declared on July 7, 1986: "The object of this amendment is
the following: if we limit passage of the Straits to 15,000
tons, it will be impossible for us to send greater units
through the Straits from one port to another, and I shall
be obliged to make an exception in this regard. One can-
not divide units; one must even send them at a single time
and even, in case of need, with an escort . . ." (Ibid.,
p. 76). When on July 7 the Turkish Delegation brought
forth an amendment covering the Soviet desire for greater
tonnage for Black Sea powers, Lord Stanley, the British
Delegate, declared: "If this clause is to give reciprocity
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exceptions to this rule: In the first place, as pro-
vided in article 11, Black Sea powers have the
right to send through the Straits capital ships of a
tonnage greater than 15,000 tons, provided they
Pass through singly escorted by not more than two
destroyers; in the second place, at the request of
the Japanese Delegation, it was stipulated in annex
III of the convention that three over-age Japanese
training vessels, the Asama (1896, 9,240 tons) , the
Yalcumo (1898, 9,010 tons) , and the Pwate (1898,
9,180 tons) , two units at a time, should be allowed
to visit in the Straits. The two units would be
arbitrarily classified as the equivalent of 15,000
tons. In any case, however, and as a general rule,
forces in transit are not to comprise more than
nine vessels. Nevertheless, warships which ac-
cording to article 17 are paying a courtesy visit to
a port in the Straits are not to be included in the
tonnage limitation. Neither are warships which
have been damaged in passing through the Straits,
but such vessels, while being repaired, are subject
to any special provisions relating to their security
laid down by the Turkish Government.
(c) Use of aircraft. Under no circumstances
are warships to be allowed to make use of any
aircraft which they may be carrying, while in
transit through the Straits (art. 15).
(d) Period of transit. According to article 16,
except in the event of damage or peril of the sea
warships are not to remain longer than necessary
for transit through the Straits.
(e) Courtesy visits. Provision for courtesy
visits is made in article 17, which stipulates that
nothing in the convention is to prevent a naval
force of any tonnage or composition from paying
a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in
the Straits at the invitation of the Turkish Gov-
ernment. This force must, however, leave the
Straits by its route of entrance, unless: (1) the
force is composed of light surface vessels, minor
war vessels, and auxiliary vessels, whether belong-
ing to a Black Sea or a non - Black Sea power, in
time of peace; (2) the force is composed of not
and if the nonriverain Powers of the Black Sea are to
have the same advantage, we are prepared to accept the
amendment immediately because it represents a step
toward complete freedom of the seas; but if this advantage
is only to be accorded to the riverain Powers of the Black
Sea, that would go entirely against the principle of reci-
procity which we have had always in view, and in this
case we should be obliged to reserve our judgment on this
subject. . ." (Ibid., p. 78).
[6]
more than nine vessels or of over-age Japanese ves-
sels as specified in annex III, or has dam-
age in passage through the Straits; or (3) the force
falls within the limitations of tonnage which non-
Black Sea powers may have in the Black Sea, as
provided in article 18, which stipulates a general
limitation of 30,000 tons global tonnage, or, under
certain conditions, a maximum of 45,000 tons,
single powers being limited to two thirds of the
aggregate.
(f) Sanitary regulations. According to article
22, warships with plague, cholera, yellow fever,
exanthematic typhus, or smallpox, or which have
had cases within seven days, or have left an in-
fected port "within less than five times twenty-
four hours" must pass through the Straits in
quarantine and apply prophylactic measures in
order to prevent infection of the Straits. War-
ships, in other words, are not required to pass a
Turkish sanitary inspection, but are to take their
own necessary measures.
IN TIME OF WAR, TURTCFY NON-BELLIGERENT.
In time of war, Turkey being non-belligerent,13
warships are to enjoy freedom of transit and navi-
gation in the Straits under the conditions pro-
vided in articles 10 to 18, as in peace (art. 19).
Nevertheless, belligerent warships are not to
pass the Straits, except under two conditions.
Since in the first place nothing in the Montreux
Convention was to prejudice the rights and obliga-
tions of Turkey or of the other signatories who
18 This was the original article 7 of the Turkish project
and article 16 of the amended British draft. The Soviet
Delegation suggested the use of the term non-belligerent
instead of neutral. The Soviet Delegation, on June 29,
offered an amendment to this article (art. 7 of the Turk-
ish project is equivalent to art. 19 of the convention for
this purpose), as follows:
"In time of war, none of the riverain States of the
Black Sea being belligerent, warships and naval auxiliaries
will enjoy free passage in the Straits under the condi-
tions provided in the preceding articles of the present
section.
"When a riverain State of the Black Sea other than
Turkey is a belligerent, passage through the Straits to-
ward the Black Sea will be forbidden to all warships of
non-riverain Powers.
"The disposition of the present article may not neverthe-
less bear any prejudice to the passage of warships in
execution of obligations of assistance arising from the
Covenant of the League of Nations and of agreements
concluded within the framework of this Covenant, or
to the passage across the Straits of warships of the
State to which this assistance is due."
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were members of the League of Nations arising
from the Covenant of the League of Nations, it
was presumed that warships might pass through
the Straits, acting in accordance with collective-
security provisions of the Covenant. In the sec-
ond place, warships might pass through the
Straits "in cases of assistance rendered to a State
victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual
assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the
framework of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, and registered and published in accordance
with the provisions of Article 18 of the Cove-
nant." 14
In either of these two cases, however, the limita-
tions on passage of warships as stipulated in arti-
cles 10 to 18 are not to be applicable. Nevertheless,
regardless of the prohibitions limiting passage of
warships to situations in which they were to oper-
ate under the League of Nations or under mutual-
assistance pacts under the Covenant of the League
of Nations, whether of Black Sea or non - Black
Sea powers, separated from their bases, warships
were to be allowed to return thereto.15 Belligerent
warships are not to exercise the right of visit_ and
search, or any other act of war, while in the Straits.
IN TIME OF WAR, TITRKEY BELLIGERENT. Ac-
cording to article 20, in time of war, when Turkey
is a belligerent, the provisions for the passage of
warships through the Straits (arts. 10 to 18) do
not apply, the passage of warships being "left
entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Govern-
ment".
TURKEY UNDER THREAT OF WAR. Under threat
of imminent danger of war, Turkey is to have the
right "to apply the provisions of Article 20" of the
convention. In other words, Turkey has the smile
rights under imminent danger of war as Turkey
would have as a belligerent in war, passage of war-
ships being "left entirely to the discretion of the
Turkish Government".1? Nevertheless, warships
which have passed through the Straits before the
Turkish Government has made use of its discre-
" Discussion of this provision was vehement. It was
discussed especially on July 9 in the plenary session of
the Conference, then appearing as article 23 of the British
draft. The British draft merely provided for recognition
of rights and obligations arising from the Covenant of
the League of Nations, but the British did not want to go
to the extent of recognizing regional pacts or agreements
under the Covenant, such as the Balkan pact. Titulescu,
of Rumania, accused the British of pursuing one policy
at Geneva and quite another at Montreux and demanded
an explanation.
A Soviet amendment to article 23 of the British draft
covers the principles in article 19 of the convention:
"The dispositions of the present convention do not in-
fringe the rights and obligations arising from the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations, for the High Contracting
Parties, members of the League, or restrict in any manner
its [the League's] mission of safeguarding effectively the
security of nations, it being understood that the effect
of the said dispositions and notably of those of articles 5
and 9 to 16 will not be to limit in any way the eventual
operation of the measures provided by the Covenant in
regard to an aggressor State nor bar passage of the Straits
to warships in execution of obligations of assistance as-
sumed or capable of being assumed in the future by such
signatory states of the present convention within the terms
of supplementary accords to the Covenant, as well as the
passage of ships of a state to which this assistance is due."
(Ibid., p. 109.)
Mr. Litvinov, who introduced this amendment on July
9, said that he meant to make a distinction between an
aggressor and a victim of aggression, and declared:
"There already exist different pacts, regional or bi-
lateral, resting on the Covenant of the League of Nations
[7]
or concluded within the framework of this institution
and we desire to safeguard the rights of the parties to
these pacts." (Ibid., p. 110.)
" The Soviet Delegation was much concerned, naturally,
with the right of warships to return to their bases.
?1? The Soviet Delegation was much interested in this
article, the final article 21 of the Montreux Convention
and article 18 of the British draft. It offered an amend-
ment to the first paragraph as follows:
"Nevertheless warships and naval auxiliaries which,
after having passed through the Straits prior to the use
by Turkey of the right conferred on it by the preceding
paragraph, find themselves separated from their home
ports, will be authorized to return to the said ports. It
is however understood that Turkey cannot make benefit
from this right the ships of the State whose attitude has
motivated the application of the present article."
The Rumanian Delegation offered an amendment which
was less restrictive:
"In case Turkey should consider- itself menaced by a
danger of imminent war it would have the right to apply
the dispositions of Article 17 in regard to warships and
naval auxiliaries belonging to the State whose attitude
constituted for it such a menace."
The Turkish Delegation could not accept the Rumanian
draft, since it would be difficult for Turkey to assure navi-
gation of warships in all security if the Straits were put
In a state of defense (Actes de la Conference de Montreux,
pp. 242-49). Mr. Litvinov declared (p. 101) :
"I plead not only in favor of the Black Sea States when
I demand that ships be authorized to return to their base.
I speak for the generality of States, for all navies in the
Black Sea at a given moment, and I propose that they
be permitted to return to their base outside the Black Sea."
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tionary powers may return to their bases. Accord-
ing to article 21, however, Turkey may "deny this
right to vessels of war belonging to the State
whose attitude has given rise to the application of
the present article". If the Turkish Government
makes use of these powers, however, it is provided
in the article that it should notify both the high
contracting parties of the Convention and the Sec-
retary General of the League of Nations. If the
Council of the League of Nations, by a two-thirds
majority, decided that the measures taken by Tur-
key were not justified, and if this opinion was
shared by a majority of the high contracting par-
ties, the Turkish Government agreed "to discon-
tinue the measures in question" as to the passage
of warships, and also to discontinue any measures
which may have been undertaken, in accordance
with the provisions of article 6, which apply to
the passage of merchant vessels. .
Principles Governing the Passage of Aircraft
Article 23, section III, covers the passage of air-
craft in the region of the Straits, a matter which
brought forth considerable discussion at the Con-
ference of Montreux, not only as to flights over the
Straits but also as to the sovereign rights of Turkey
to regulate such flights." In order to assure pas-
sage of civil aircraft through the region of the
Straits, it was provided that the Turkish Govern-
ment should indicate available air routes outside
"the forbidden zones which may be established in
the Straits". Civil aircraft could use these routes
provided that they gave the Turkish Government
a notification of three days for occasional flights,
and for flights on regular services a general notifi-
cation as to the days of passage. Despite the re-
militarization of the region of the Straits, the
Turkish Government was to furnish the necessary
facilities for safe passage of civil aircraft "author-
ized under the air regulations in force in Turkey to
fly across Turkish territory between Europe and
Asia". The route to be followed by aircraft over
the zone of the Straits was to be indicated from
time to time.
Rights of Warships in the Black Sea
The problem of the right of warships to pass
through the Straits into the Black Sea was one of
the most significant of all the issues discussed at
the Conference of Montreux. The British Dele-
[8]
gation, as a general principle, took the position
that the Black Sea should be considered as any
other, to which access was relatively free. The
Soviet Delegation contested this thesis from the
very beginning. Mr. Litvinov pointed out on
June 23, the second day of the Conference :18
"We all know that these Straits?in particular
the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bos-
phorus?have a special character and that they are
not comparable with certain international canals
and other Straits, in this, that they do not lead
anywhere else than into the Black Sea, which is a
closed Sea; 1.9 they cannot be utilized for transit
to a destination of other countries. It is in taking
into consideration these circumstances that nu-
merous European statesmen, including, for ex-
ample, Lord Palmerston, the Duke of Wellington,
pronounced themselves on numerous occasions
in favor of the closure of the Straits.
"Closure of these Strait S is of very great im-
portance for the security, not only of Turkey, but
of all the States of the Black Sea. Doubtless the
best way to guarantee the security would be to
close completely the Straits to warships of non-
riverain States. Nevertheless, my Government
does not insist on this closure and is ready to sup-
port the Turkish proposition tending to keep the
Straits open for certain ends and under certain
limitations to the ships of all nations, with full
freedom of passage by the Straits for commercial
vessels."
The next day, on June 24,20 Mr, Litvinov fur-
ther defined the Soviet attitude:
"I wish to emphasize that we cannot neglect the
fact that there exists no other sea which is in the
same geographical situation as the Black Sea. If
the Mediterranean Sea or the Baltic Sea were in
the same geographical situation as the Black Sea,
I should not oppose equality of rights between the
Black Sea States and those of the rest of the
world; but such is not the case. The Mediter-
ranean is not a closed sea, you can penetrate it
n When this provision was discussed at the session of
July 9, Mr. Paul-Boncour, of France, suggested that some
provisions for flights should be made between the Black
and Mediterranean seas, but Dr. Aras indicated that "the
subject of our discussion is the zone of the Straits", not
the rest of Turkey (ibid., pp. 98-107).
"Thid., pp. 33-34.
" Italics are the author's.
"Ibid., p. 44.
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through its two' extremities and that is also the
case for the other seas. If, to the contrary, you
wish to penetrate the Black Sea, it is for a definite
end. This may be either to pay a visit or to offer
your assistance to a State in difficulty, in applica-
tion of a decision of the League of Nations. For
my part, I cannot imagine another legitimate aim
for which foreign vessels would enter into the
Black Sea. The situation is entirely different
when it is a question of seas which have to be
crossed to reach farther regions. . . ."
The essential discussion of the rights of war-
ships to pass into the Black Sea, however, came
in the discussion of article 6 of the original Turk-
ish draft project for a regime of the Straits, and
of article 15 of the British draft. The Turkish
draft provided that the global tonnage of non-
riverain powers in the Black Sea could not exceed
28,000 tons, and that warships of non-riverain
powers must leave after a maximum period of 15
days. The amended British draft of July 6, arti-
cle 15, provided that the global tonnage of non-
riverain Black Sea powers in the Black Sea should
be limited to 30,000 tons. Nevertheless, it was
stipulated that if, "at a given moment", the ton-
nage in the Black Sea "of the strongest fleet of
a riverain Power exceeds by more than ten percent
the tonnage of the fleet of the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics in the Black Sea . . . the
global tonnage of 30,000 tons . . . will be in-
creased by a quantity equal to this excess to a
maximum of 45,000 tons." The tonnage which
any one of the non-riverain powers could send
into the Black Sea would be limited to three
fourths of the global tonnage, i.e. 22,500 or 33,750
tons. However, if one of the non-riverain powers
desired to send a naval force into the Black Sea
for "humanitarian purposes", the global tonnage
might be increased by 15,000 tons. Except for
humanitarian visits, the visit of a naval force of
a non-riverain power was not to exceed one
month.21
The British draft was discussed at great length
on July 7, and the final article 18 was not com-
pleted before the very close of the Conference.
Mr. Litvinov proposed-22
"that the increase [in tonnage from 30,000 tons for
non-riverain Powers] begin only after the Black
Sea fleet shall have been increased by 30% in place
of 10%. The tonnage of each state must be limited
to one half the global tonnage, that is to say to
[9]
15,000 tons. I shall not oppose that any other aims
be provided for the entrance of warships into the
Black Sea on condition that this does not increase
the tonnage. . . I shall not insist on the designa-
tion of particular categories, but I shall propose to
stipulate that these ships must be light surface
ships. Finally, the duration of the visit of these
ships in the Black Sea must be fixed at fifteen days
in place of a month."
Lord Stanley did not see how he could accept the
Soviet proposition, for "an increase of 10% would
be equivalent to a cruiser, and it seems to us that
if a cruiser is added to the fleet of the Black Sea,
it is only just to admit that the ships of non-
riverain Powers of the Black Sea should have an
equivalent increase." Neither did he approve of
the principle of one-half the global tonnage for
an individual power, but would accept a propor-
tion of two thirds, which Mr. Litvinov accepted
on the proposal of Dr. Aras, the Turkish Foreign
Minister. Twenty-one days was accepted as the
period of sojourn for non-riverain fleets in the
Black Sea. Litvinov doubted the utility and the
purpose of humanitarian visits in the Black Sea,
since there had been no necessity of it since 1923,
and if the British figure of 15,000 tons for this
purpose were accepted "we might find ourselves
in the Black Sea in the presence of naval forces
superior to our own." Mr. Litvinov, who doubted
the use of the Danube stationnaires, also felt that
these ships should be included in the global figure
of 30,000 tons.
The problem was discussed in the Technical
Committee on July 11,23 with Mr. Miller, the Soviet
representative, offering an amendment to para-
graph (d) of article 15 of the British draft, which
dealt with humanitarian visits, as follows:
"Nevertheless, if in exceptional cases such as an
earthquake or other calamity caused by elements
of nature, one of the non-riverain Powers of the
Black Sea desires to send into this sea, for humani-
21 Ibid., annex II, pp. 287-95.
22 Ibid., pp. 77-89, Cor entire discussion of the day.
When the British Delegation persisted in assimilating the
Black Sea to all other seas, Mr. Litvinov declared:
"If we admit that there is no difference between the
riverain countries of the Black Sea and the others, we
shall not arrive at any agreement on this point or any
other, for it is a question of a difference which must be
recognized by all."
" Actes de la Conference de Montreux, p. 242.
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tarian purposes, one of its light surface warships
and if, at the same time, the global tonnage pro-
vided by paragraph a) of the present article is
entirely utilized by other non-riverain Powers, the
entrance of the said ship may take place with the
consent of all the riverain States of the Black Sea,
on the condition that any later entrance of naval
force of non-riverain Powers will be effected only
within the limit of the global tonnage provided in
paragraph a) of the present article."
This amendment was supported by Mr. Menemenc-
ioglu, of the Turkish Delegation. The discussion
then went on to the problem of notification, and it
was Mr. Neicoff, of Bulgaria, who provided the
compromise which went into the final draft. In
the afternoon, the Technical Committee again dis-
cussed drafts of article 15, which became the basis
for article 18 of the convention.24
Article 18, which governs the rights of non-
riverain powers to send their warships into the
Black Sea, provides that the aggregate tonnage of
non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea may not
exceed 30,000 tons in time of peace. Nevertheless,
if at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in
the Black Sea?the Soviet fleet?exceeds by at
least 10,000 tons the tonnage of that fleet (the
Soviet fleet) at the date of the signature of the
Montreux Convention (July 20, 1936), the aggre-
gate tonnage of non-Black Sea powers in the
Black Sea may be increased to a maximum of
45,000 tons. For this purpose, Black Sea powers,
according to annex IV, were to report their Black
Sea naval tonnage to the Turkish Government on
January 1 and July 1 of each year, which in turn
was to transmit this information to the signatories
of the convention and to the Secretary General of
the League of Nations.
The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea power
may have in the Black Sea in time of peace may
not exceed two thirds of the aggregate tonnage, or
20,000 tons. Nevertheless, if at any time the
strongest fleet in the Black Sea?the Soviet fleet--
exceeds by at least 10,000 tons its tonnage at the
date of the signature of the Mmtreux Convention,
the tonnage of the individual non-Black Sea power
may be increased to 30,000 tons.
According to paragraph (d) of article 18, for
humanitarian purposes, one or more non-Black Sea
powers may send into the Black Sea naval forces
not to exceed 8,000 tons altogether without the
15-day notice stipulated in article 13, provided an
[10]
authorization is obtained from the Turkish Gov-
ernment in the following circumstances: (1) the
tonnage limitations of the aggregate total of non-
Black Sea forces do not exceed either 30,000 or
45,000 tons, as stipulated in the premises, and will
not be exceeded by the dispatch of new naval
forces; (2) if the tonnage has already been reached
and would be exceeded, the Turkish Government
is to notify the Black Sea powers of the request,
and if no objection is forthcoming within 24 hours
of the notification the Turkish Government, within
24 hours at the latest, will inform the interested
powers of the reply it has decided to make to their
request.
Any further entry into the Black Sea of the
naval forces of non-Black Sea powers is to be
effected only within the limits of the aggregate
tonnage as provided in article 18, i.e. 30,000 to
45,000 tons.
'Whatever the purpose of their visit, the war-
ships of non-Black Sea powers are not to remain
in the Black Sea longer than 21 days.
General Provisions
Articles 24 and 25 stipulate certain general
provisions not contained in other parts of the
convention. Under article 24, for example, the
functions of the International Commission of
the Straits, established by the Lausanne Conven-
tion of 1923, are transferred to the Turkish
Government.25
The Turkish Government was to collect statis-
tics and information concerning the following:
1. Passage through the Straits of the capital
ships of Black Sea powers (Art. 11).26
2. Passage through the Straits of the submarines
belonging to Black Sea powers (Art. 12).
' Ibid., pp. 141-53, 249-56.
" The British Delegation, in particular, desired to keep
an international commission, if only for the collection of
statistical and other information. The Turkish Govern-
ment, however, rejected the British suggestion. Dr. Aras
declared on July 9: "Our proposition of suppression of the
International commission is absolutely firm." Ibid., p.
106.
" On July 16, Mr. Litvinov objected to this principle,
declaring: "We are not informed of the passage of ships
through the Suez Canal, the Kiel Canal and other navi-
gable ways. Why must an exception be made for the
Straits? Why these statistics which appear useless?
I wish to suppress the fourth paragraph [from art. 21
of the revised British draft]." Ibid., p. 155.
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3. Passage of all foreign warships through the
Straits (Art. 14).
4. Tonnage of warships in the Black Sea of
Black Sea and non - Black Sea powers (Art. 18) .
The Turkish Government was also to supervise
the execution of all the provisions of the conven-
tion relating to the passage of warships through
the Straits. As soon as it was notified of the in-
tended passage through the Straits of foreign
warships, the Turkish Government was to inform
the representatives of the high contracting parties
of their composition, tonnage, date of entry, and
the date of their return, if necessary. The Turk-
ish Government was also to make an annual re-
port to the Secretary General of the League of
Nations and to the high contracting parties of the
Montreux Convention giving the details of the
movement of foreign warships through the
Straits, and all information useful to commerce
and navigation, by sea and air, for which the
convention makes provision.
Article 25, which referred to the League of Na-
tions, is of especial importance, for it provides:
"Nothing in the present Convention shall preju-
dice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of
any of the other High Contracting Parties mem-
bers of the League of Nations, arising out of the
Covenant of the League of Nations."
This article, as has already been indicated, was
discussed at length in the Conference and should
be read as an essential part of article 19, which has
to do with the passage of warships through the
Straits under the provisions of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and under the terms of a
mutual-assistance pact, registered with the League
of Nations, to which Turkey was a party.
Final Provisions
RATIFICATION. Article 26 provided for ratifica-
tion of the Montreux Convention "as soon as possi-
ble", the ratifications to be deposited in the archives
of the French Republic. The Japanese Govern-
ment was allowed to inform the French Govern-
ment through diplomatic channels that the ratifi-
cation had been given.
ACCESSION. According to article 27 the Mon-
treux Convention was open to accession by any
power signatory to the Treaty of Lausanne of
1923.27 Accessions entered into force from the date
of notification to the French Government.
DURATION AND REvaioN. The Montreux Con-
vention, according to article 28, is to remain in
force for a period of 20 years from the date of its
entry into force.28 Nevertheless, "the principle of
freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in Arti-
cle 1" is to "continue without limit of time". If,
two years prior to the expiry of the convention, no
signatory gives notice of denunciation to the
French Government, the convention is to remain in
force until two years after such notice shall have
been given. All such notices are to be communi-
cated by the French Government to the signatories.
In the event of denunciation, the signatories agreed
to be represented at a conference for the purpose of
concluding a new Convention of the Straits.
At the expiry of each five-year period from -the
date of the entry into force (Nov. 9, 1936) of the
convention, according to article 29, each of the
signatories is entitled to initiate proposals for
amendment of the convention. To be valid, how-
ever, any request for revision formulated by any
one of the signatories must be supported, in the
case of articles 14 to 18, dealing with the passage
of warships through the Straits, by one other
signatory. In the case of modification of any other
article, two signatories must support the request
for revision. 29 Any request must be notified to all
2' Italy finally adhered to the convention, after refusing
to be represented at the Conference, on May 2, 1938.
28 The British draft called for a period of 15 years, as
also the Turkish draft. The problem of revision was
closely linked with that of duration.
"There was serious discussion of the problem of revi-
sion. The original Turkish draft, like the British draft,
had proposed a simple method of amendment. Mr. Bendel,
of the British Delegation, declared on July 16:
"I should like to note a point which is really important.
When the present convention was the object of our first
discussions, there were two questions of tonnage on which
we expected to limit ourselves in the greatest difficulties.
One was the ceiling of 45,000 tons for the non-riverain
Powers of the Black Sea whose global tonnage in the said
sea must not exceed 45,000 tons. We have had the greatest
difficulty in accepting this rigid limitation which takes
no account of the increase which another fleet might have
and we have given our consent only on condition that the
five year revision be in reality not subordinated to the
veto of a Power which, for one reason or another, would
be opposed to revision. (Italics are the author's.)
"The other figure of tonnage on the subject of which we
have equally experienced the greatest difficulties was the
rigid limit of 15,000 tons for naval forces passing through
the Straits and our original project was conceived in such
a way that if the Turkish fleet were increased, our figure
of 15,000 tons was to be increased equally up to one-half
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the signatories of the convention three months
prior to the expiry of the current five-year period
and must contain the details of the proposed
amendments, together with the supporting reasons.
If it proves impossible to agree through the regu-
lar diplomatic channels, the signatories agree to
hold a conference for revision of the convention.
Such a conference may reach decisions only by
unanimous vote, however, except as regards arti-
cles 14 to 18, which deal with the passage of war-
ships through the Straits, for which a three-
of the Turkish fleet. We have ceded on this point also and
we have accepted the rigid limitation of 15,000 tons, for
we thought that the five year revision would be a reality."
(Italics are the author's.) (Ades de la Conference de
Montreux, pp. 153-67.)
" Ibid., pp. J81-82.
Italics are the author's.
NOTE: The preceding article is reprinted from the De-
partment of State Bulletin, of Sept. 8, 1946.
[121
fourths majority, including Black Sea powers and
Turkey, must be obtained.
III
The Montreux Convention was finally signed on
July 20, 1936. The Conference ended in a spirit
of good feeling and with a recognition that a
sound compromise between conflicting views had
been reached. The Soviet attitude toward the
Montreux Convention was expressed at the clos-
ing session by Mr. Litvinov, who acknowledged
the accomplishments of the Conference:
"The Conference has recognized, although in an
insufficient way, the special rights of the riverain
states of the Black Sea in the Black Sea u in con-
nection with the passage of the Straits, as well as
the special geographical situation of the Black Sea
in which the general conceptions of the absolute
freedom of the seas could not be entirely applied."
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PRINCIPAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS (1774-1936)
5HE problem of the Turkish Straits, in one
form or another, is one of the oldest, most con-
tinuous in history. It reaches from the period
of the Trojan Wars, in the twelfth century B. C.,
through the days of ancient Greece and Rome
and the period of the Byzantine Empire to today's
latest newspaper stories.
The modern history of the problem of the
Straits may be said to have begun with the Treaty
of Kuchuk-Kainardji between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, July 10, 1774, according to
which Russian commercial vessels received the
right to pass through the Straits to and from
the Black Sea?a right granted in the ensuing
years to the commercial vessels of other nations
as well.
Aside from the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji
the well-known Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi, July
8, 1833, between Russia and the Sublime Porte
is included. This, likewise, is true of the great
international conventions of 1840, 1841, 1856, and
1878, which firmly established the interests of the
various European powers in the Straits, defined
the international character of the Straits, and laid
down the basic principles governing the passage
of both commercial and war vessels through the
Straits. In principle, according to the nineteenth
century conventions of the Straits, those strategic
waters were to be open, in peace, to the commerce
of all nations and closed, according to "the ancient
rule of the Sultan's Empire," to ships of war.
The great conventions governing the Straits in
the twentieth century are those of Lausanne (July
24, 1923) and Montreux (July 20, 1936) , since the
Convention of Sevres (August 10, 1920) did not
enter into effect. The Convention of Lausanne
730988-47 3
[13]
lasted from 1923 until November 9, 1936, when the
Montreux Convention entered into force. Under
the Montreux Convention, the International Com-
mission of the Straits, established at Lausanne,
was abolished, the "principle of freedom of transit
and navigation by sea" without limit of time was
recognized and affirmed, and the passage of war-
ships, with notable exceptions in favor of the
Black Sea powers, was subject to important limita-
tions. Articles 19 and 25 attempted to fit the
Montreux Convention within the framework of
the League of Nations.
American readers will, no doubt, be somewhat
interested in those treaties and agreements which
have been entered into by the United States and
which have a bearing on the problem. The first
of these is the American-Turkish treaty of May
7, 1830, which provided for most-favored-nation
treatment of American commercial vessels pass-
ing through the Straits. These rights were con-
firmed in a new American-Turkish treaty in 1862.
Likewise, the American-Turkish treaty of Oc-
tober 1, 1929 provided for most-favored-nation
treatment, on a reciprocal basis, of American mer-
chant ships in Turkish waters, a principle which
was also involved in the reciprocal trade agree-
ment of April 1, 1939.
Altogether, selections from about twenty of the
principal treaties and conventions are here made
conveniently available to readers in view of the
current interest in the problem of the Turkish
Straits. It is hoped that, by providing an appro-
priate historical and, especially, treaty back-
ground, the problem of the Straits today may be
placed in clearer perspective.
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SELECTIONS FROM PRINCIPAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS (1774-1936)
I. Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji Between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire, July 10, 1774
[From Turkey No. 16 (1878). Treaties and Other
Documents Relating to the Black Sea, the Darda-
nelles, and the Bosphorus: 1535-1877. (Transla-
tions, Cmd. 1953, No. 18. See also F. de Mar-
tens, Recueil des traites, 1st ed., I, 507, IV, 606,
and 2d ed., II, 286; Gabriel Noradounghian (2
vols., Paris, 1900), Recueil d'actes internationaux
de l'Empire Ottoman, I, 324.]
Article II. For the convenience and advantage of the
two Empires, there shall be a free and unimpeded naviga-
tion for the merchant-ships belonging to the two Contract-
ing Powers, in all the seas which wash their shores; the
Sublime Porte grants to Russian merchant-vessels,
namely, such as are universally employed by the other
Powers for commerce and in the ports, a free passage
from the Black Sea into the White Sea, and reciprocally
from the White Sea into the Black Sea, as also the power
of entering all the ports and harbors situated either on
the seacoasts, or in the passages and channels which join
those seas. In like manner, the Sublime Porte allows
Russian subjects to trade in its States by land as well
as by water, and upon the Danube in their ships, in
conformity with what has been specified above in this
Article, with all the same privileges and advantages as
are enjoyed in its States by the most friendly nations,
whom the Sublime Porte favors most in trade, such as
the French and the English; and the Capitulations of
those two nations and others shall, just as if they were
here inserted word for word, serve as a rule, under all
circumstances and in every place, for whatever concerns
commerce as well as Russian merchants, who upon paying
the same duties may import and export all kinds of goods,
and disembark their merchandise at every port and har-
bor as well upon the Black as upon the other seas,
Constantinople being expressly included in the number.
While granting in the above manner to the respective
subjects the freedom of commerce and navigation upon
all waters without exception, the' two Empires, ?at the
same time, allow merchants to stop within their terri-
tories for as long a time as their affairs require, and
promise them the same security and liberty as are en-
joyed by the subjects of other friendly Courts. And in
order to be consistent throughout, the Sublime Porte
also allows the residence of Consuls and Vice-Consuls in
every place where the Court of Russia may consider it
expedient to establish them, and they shall be treated
upon a perfect footing of equality with the Consuls of
the other friendly Powers. It permits them to have in-
terpreters called Baratli, that is, those who have patents,
providing them with Imperial patents, and causing them
to enjoy the same prerogatives as those in the service of
? the said French, English, and other nations.
Similarly, Russia permits the subjects of the Sublime
Porte to trade in its dominions, by sea and by land, with
the same prerogatives and advantages as are enjoyed by
the most friendly nations, and upon paying the accus-
tomed duties. In case of accident happening to the ves-
sels, the two Umpires are bound respectively to render
them the same assistance as is given in similar cases to
other friendly nations; and all necessary things shall be
furnished to them at the ordinary prices.
II. The Treaty of Defensive Alliance Between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire,
December 23, 1798
[Unofficial translation; Noradounghian, II, 24-27;
Martens, 2d ed., VI, 532-36.]
Article X.?On request of one of the two Powers to the
other for naval assistance, the requesting party will supply
the ships with food and provisions, according to agree-
ment, as long as they [the two Powers] are acting against
the common enemy, beginning with the day [the ships]
enter the canal [the Straits]. The requesting party will
furnish from its Admiralty and its stores, without the
least difficulty, and at current prices, everything neces-
sary for repairs. The warships and supply ships of the
two contracting Powers, during the common war, will be
received, without difficulty, in each other's ports, either
to pass the winter or for repairs.
III. Treaty of Defensive Alliance Between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire,
September 23, 1805
[Serge Goriainov, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles.
Etude historique sur la question des Etroits.
D'apres la correspondance diplomatique deposee
alio Archives centrales de Saint-Petersbourg
(Paris, 1910), p. 6.]
Article VII.?The two high contracting parties agree
to consider the Black Sea as closed and not to permit
therein the appearance of the flag of war or armed ship
of any power whatsoever, and, in case any should at-
tempt to enter therein, the two high contracting parties
engage to regard such an attempt as a casus foederis and
to oppose it with all their naval forces, as the sole means
of assuring their mutual tranquillity. It is understood
that the free passage through the canal of Constanti-
nople will continue to bereffective for warships and mili-
tary transports of His Imperial Majesty of all the Rus-
sias, to which on each occasion the Sublime Porte will
offer every assistance and accord every facility
be required.
[Noradoughian, II, 70-74]
Article V I I .?The two contracting parties, having agreed
as to the closure of the Black Sea, declare that any at-
tempt of any power whatsoever to violate it will be con-
sidered as an act of hostility against them. Consequently,
[1:41
as may
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they engage to oppose with all their naval forces the entry
into this sea of any foreign warship and of any ship
loaded with munitions of war.
IV. Treaty Between Great Britain and the
Ottoman Empire, Concluded at the Dardanelles,
January 5, 1809
[From Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 27. French text in
Noradounghian, II,- 81.]
Article V.?In return for the indulgence and good treat-
ment afforded by the Sublime Porte to English merchants,
with respect to their goods and property, as well as in all
matters tending to facilitate their commerce, England shall
reciprocally extend every indulgence and friendly treat-
ment to the flag, subjects, and merchants of the Sublime
Porte, which may hereafter frequent the dominions of His
Britannic Majesty for the purpose of commerce.
Article XL?As ships of war have at all times been
prohibited from entering the Canal of Constantinople, viz,
In the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea,
and as this ancient regulation of the Ottoman Empire
is in future to be observed by every Power in time of
peace, the 'Court of Great Britain promises on its part
to conform to this principle.
V. Treaty of Peace Between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, Signed at Adrianople,
September 14, 1829
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 35. Text also in Hertslet,
Map of Europe by Treaty, II, 813-831; Noradoung-
hian, II, 166; Martens, Nouveau recueil, VII, 143.]
Article VII.?Russian subjects shall enjoy, throughout
the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land
as by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured
to them by the Treaties concluded heretofore between
the two High Contracting Parties. This freedom of
trade shall not be molested in any way, nor shall it be
fettered in any case, or under any pretext, by any pro-
hibition or restriction whatsoever, nor in consequence of
any regulation or measure, whether of public govern-
ment or internal legislation. Russian subjects, ships,
and merchandise, shall be protected from all violence
and imposition. The first shall remain under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction and control of the Russian Minister
and Consuls; Russian ships shall never be subjected to
any search on the part of the Ottoman authorities,
neither out at sea nor in any of the ports or roadsteads
under the dominion of the Sublime Porte; and all mer-
chandise or goods belonging to a Russian subject may,
after payment of the Custom-house dues imposed by the
Tariffs, be freely sold, deposited on land in the ware-
houses of the owner or consignee, or transshipped on
board another vessel of any nation whatsoever, without
the Russian subject being required, in this case, to give
notice of the same to any of the local authorities, and
much less to ask their permission so to do. It is ex-
pressly agreed that the different kinds of wheat coming
[151
from Russia shall partake of the same privileges, and that
their free transit shall never, under any pretext, suffer
the least difficulty or hindrance.
The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial
care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea par-
ticularly, shall be impeded in no manner whatsoever.
For this purpose it admits and declares the passage of
the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles
to be entirely free and open to Russian vessels under the
merchant flag laden or in ballast, whether they come from
the Black Sea for the purpose of entering the Mediter-
ranean, or whether, coming from the Mediterranean,
they wish to enter the Black Sea; such vessels, pro-
vided they be merchant-ships, whatever their size and
tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoyance
of any kind, as above provided. The two Courts shall
agree upon the most fitting means for preventing all de-
lay in issuing the necessary instructions. In virtue of
the same principle, the passage of the Strait of Constanti-
nople and of that of the Dardanelles is declared free and
open to all the merchant-ships of Powers who are at
peace with the Sublime Porte, whether going into the
Russian ports of the Black Sea, or coming from them,
laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions which are
stipulated for vessels under the Russian flag.
Lastly, the Sublime Porte, recognizing in the Imperial
Court of Russia the right of securing the necessary guaran-
tees for this full freedom of trade and navigation in the
Black Sea, declares solemnly, that on its part not the least
obstacle shall ever, under any pretext whatsoever, be op-
posed to it. Above all it promises never to allow itself
henceforth to stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast,
whether Russian or belonging to nations with whom the
Ottoman Porte should not be in a state of declared war,
which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Con-
stantinople and that of the Dardanelles, on their way from
the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Medi-
terranean into the Russian Ports of the Black Sea. And
if, which God forbid, any one of the stipulations contained
in the present Article should be infringed, and the re-
monstrances of the Russian Minister thereupon should fail
in obtaining a full and prompt redress, the Sublime Porte
recognizes beforehand in the Imperial Court of Russia
the right of considering such an infraction as an act of
hostility, and of immediately having recourse to reprisals
against the Ottoman Empire.
VI. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between
the United States and the Ottoman Empire,
Signed at Constantinople, Niay 7, 1830
[D. H. Miller, Treaties and Other International
Acts of the United States of America, III (No. 69),
p. 549.]
Article VII.?The merchant vessels of the United
States, either in ballast or laden with the productions of
their countries or with productions and merchandise not
prohibited of the countries of the Ottoman Empire, may
pass from the waters of the Imperial Residence and go
and come in the Black Sea like the aforesaid nations [most-
favored nations].
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VII. The Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi [HUnk:r
Iskelesi] Between Russia and the Ottoman Empire,
July 8, 1833
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 39. Text also in Hertslet,
II (No. 168), 925-928; Noradounghian, II, 230.]
Article I.?There shall be forever Peace, Amity, and
Alliance between His Majesty the Emperor of all the
Russias and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans,
their Empires and their Subjects, as well by land as by sea.
This Alliance having solely for its object the common
defence of their dominions against all attack, their Majes-
ties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with
each other upon all the matters which concern their re-
spective tranquility and safety, and to afford to each other
mutually for this purpose substantial aid, and the most
efficacious assistance.
Article IL?The Treaty of Peace concluded at Adri-
anople on the 2nd September, 1829, as well as all the other
Treaties comprised therein, as also the Convention signed
at St. Petersburgh on the 9th/21st July, 1832, are fully
confirmed by the present Treaty of Defensive Alliance, in
the same manner as if the said transactions had been
inserted in it word for word.
Article consequence of the principle of con-
servation and mutual defence, which is the basis of the
present Treaty of Alliance, and by reason of a most sin-
cere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance, and
entire independence of the Sublime Porte, His Majesty
the Emperor of all the Russias, in the event of circum-
stances occurring which should again determine the Sub-
lime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of
Russia, although, if it please God, that case is by no means
likely to happen, engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as
many troops and forces as the Two High Contracting
Parties may deem necessary: It is accordingly agreed,
that in this case the land and sea forces, whose aid the
Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal.
Article IV.?In conformity with what is above stated, in
the event of one of the two Powers requesting the assist-
ance of the other, the expense only of provisioning the
land and the sea forces which may be furnished, shall
fall to the charge of the Power who shall have applied for
the aid.
Article V.?Although the two High Contracting Parties
sincerely intend to maintain this engagement to the most
distant period of time, yet, as it is possible that in process
of time circumstances may require that some changes
should be made in this Treaty it has been agreed to fix
its duration at eight years from the day of the exchange
of the Imperial ratifications. The two parties, previously
to the expiration of that term, will concert together, ac-
cording to the state of affairs at that time, as to the re-
newal of the said Treaty.
SEPARATE AND SECRET ARTICLE
In virtue of one of the clauses of the 1st Article of the
Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between
the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the
two High Contracting Parties are bound to afford each
other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious
assistance for the safety of their respective dominions.
Nevertheless, as His Majesty the Emperor of all the Rus-
sias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the
expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it
by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if
circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the
obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in
place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of
need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent
Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial
Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the I2Txdanelles,
that is to say, to not allowing Zany foreign vessel of war
to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.
The present Separate and Secret Article shall have the
same force and value as if it was inserted word for word
in the Treaty of Alliance of this day.
VIII. Convention Between Great Britain, Austria,
Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, for the Pacification
of the Levant, Signed at London, July 15, 1840
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 43. Text also in Hertslet,
II, 1008-1012; Noradounghian, II, 303 fr.]
Article III. If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to
submit to the conditions of the arrangement abovemen-
tioned [specified in a separate Act], should direct his land
or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contract-
ing Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan,
addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople,
agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that
Sovereign, and to provide for the defense of his throne
by means of a cooperation agreed upon by mutual consent,
for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman
Empire, in security against all aggression.
It is further agreed that the forces which, in virtue of
such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain
so employed as long as their presence shall be required
by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their
presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simul-
taneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea
and to the Mediterranean respectively.
Article IV. It is, however, expressly understood, that
the cooperation mentioned in the preceding Article, and
destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the
Bosphorus, and the Ottoman capital, under the temporary
safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all
aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a
measure of exception adopted at the express demand of
the Sultan, and solely for his defense in the single case
above-mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall
not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the
Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times
been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to
enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.
And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, ex-
cepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm
resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably
established as the ancient rule of his Empire; and as long
[16]
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as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war
into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles;
on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of
Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of
Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to
respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform
to the above-mentioned principle.
IX. Convention Between Great Britain, Austria,
France, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey,
Signed at London, July 13, 1841
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 43. Text also in Hertslet,
II, 1024-1026.]
Article I. His Highness the Sultan, on the one part,
declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the
future the principle invariably established as the ancient
rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all
times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign
Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the
Bosphorus; and that so long as the Porte is at peace, His
Highness Will admit no foreign ship of war into the said
Straits.
And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria,
the King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French,
the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias,
on the other part, engage to respect this determination
of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle
above declared.
Article II. It is understood that in recording the in-
violability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire
mentioned in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves
to himself, as in past times, to deliver Firmans of Passages
for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be em-
ployed as is usual in the service of the Missions of foreign
Powers.
X. General Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria,
France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and the
Ottoman Empire, Signed at Paris, March 30, 1856
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 54. Text also in Hertslet,
II, 1250-1265J
Article X. The Convention of 13th July, 1841, which
maintains the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire rela-
tive to the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of
the Dardanelles, has been revised by common consent.
The Act concluded for that purpose, and in conformity
with that principle, between the High Contracting Parties
is and remains annexed to the present Treaty, and shall
have the same force and validity as if it formed an in-
tegral part thereof.
Article xr.i The Black Sea is neutralized: its waters
and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine
of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted
to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its
[17]
coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions men-
tioned in Articles XIV and XIX of the present treaty,
Article XII. Free from any impediment, the commerce
in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be sub-
ject only to regulations of health, customs, and police,
framed in a spirit favorable to the development of com-
mercial transactions.
In order to afford to the commercial and maritime
interests of every nation the security which is desired,
Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit Consuls in to
their ports situated upon the coast of the Black Sea,
in conformity with the principles of international law.
Article X1II. The Black Sea being neutralized accord-
ing to the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or estab-
lishment upon its coast of military-maritime arsenals be-
comes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence,
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Im-
perial Majesty the Sultan engage not to establish or to
maintain upon that coast any military-maritime arsenal.
Article XIV.' Their Majesties the Emperor of all the
Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention
for the purpose of settling the force and the number
of light vessels necessary for the service of their coasts,
which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black
Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty,
and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed
an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or
modified without the assent of the Powers signing the
present Treaty.
Article XIX. In order to insure the execution of the
regulations which shall have been established by common
agreement, in conformity with the principles above de-
clared, each of the Contracting Powers shall have the
right to station, at all times, two light vessels at the
mouths of the Danube.
Additional and Transitory Article.?The stipulations of
the Convention respecting the Straits, signed this day,
shall not be applicable to the vessels of war employed
by the belligerent Powers for the evacuation, by sea, of
the territories occupied by their armies; but the said
stipulations shall resume their entire effect as soon as the
evacuation shall be terminated.
Xl. Convention Between Russia and the Ottoman
Empire Limiting Their Naval Force in the Black
Sea, Signed at Paris, March 30, 1856
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 55. Text also in Hertslet,
II, 1271.]
Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually en-
gage not to have in the Black Sea any other Vessels of
war than those of which the number, the force, and the
dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties reserve to
themselves each to maintain in that sea six steam-vessels
of fifty metres in length at the line of flotation, of a ton-
nage of eight hundred tons at the maximum, and four
light steam or sailing-vessels of a tonnage which shall not
exceed two hundred tons each.
Abrogated by treaty of Mar. 13, 1871.
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XII. Convention Between Great Britain, Austria,
France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and the Ottoman
Empire Respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles
and of the Bosphorus.?Signed at Paris,
March 30, 1856
[Cmcl. 1953 (1878), No. 56. Text also in Hertslet,
II, 1268.]
Article I. His Majesty the Sultan on the one part, de-
clares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future
the principle invariably established as the ancient rule
of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has, at all times, '
been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers
to enter the Strait of the Dardanelles and of the Bos-
phorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace, His
Majesty shall admit no foreign ship of war into the said
Straits.
And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria,
the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Em-
peror of all the Russias, and the King of Sardinia, on the
other part, engage to respect this determination of the
Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above
declared.
Article II. The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past
times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under
flag of war, which shall be employed, as is usual, in the
service of the Missions of foreign Powers.
Article III. The same exception applies to the light ves-
sels under flag of war which each of the Contracting
Powers is authorized to station at the mouths of the
Danube in order to secure the execution of the regulations
relative to the liberty of that river, and the number of
which is not to exceed two for each Power.
XIII. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between
the United States and the Ottoman Empire,
February 25, 1862. Proclaimed July 2, 1862
[W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, Interna-
tional Acts, Protocols and Agreements between
the United States of America and Other Powers,
1776-1909 (Washington, 1910), II, 1321-28.]
Article I.?All rights, privileges, and immunities, which
have been conferred on the citizens or vessels of the
United States of America by the treaty already existing
between the United States of America and the Ottoman
Empire, are confirmed, now and forever, with the ex-
ception of those clauses of the said treaty which it is
the object of the present treaty to modify; and it is
moreoter expressly stipulated that all rights, privileges,
or immunities, which the Sublime Porte now grants, or
may hereafter grant to, or suffer to be enjoyed by the
subjects, ships, commerce, or navigation of any other
foreign Power, shall be equally granted to and exercised
and enjoyed by the citizens, vessels, commerce, and navi-
gation of the United States of America.
XIV. Convention Between Great Britain, Austria,
France, Germany (Prussia), Italy, Russia, and
the Ottoman Empire, for the Revision of Certain
Stipulations of the Treaty of March 30, 1856.
Signed at London, March 13, 1871
[Cmd. 1953 (1878), No. 62. Text also in Herts-
let, III, 1920-1921.]
Article I. Articles XI, XIII, and XIV of the Treaty of
Paris of March 30, 1856, as well as the special Conven-
tion concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte,
and annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated, and
replaced by the following Article.
Article II. The principle of the closing of the Straits
of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been
established by the separate Convention of March 30,
1856, is maintained, with power to His Imperial Majesty
the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of peace to the
vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the
Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure
the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris
of March 30, 1856.
Article III. The Black Sea remains open, as hereto-
fore, to the mercantile marine of all nations.
XV. The Treaty of San Stefano Between Russia
and the Ottoman Empire, March 3, 1878.
Preliminary Treaty
[18]
[Hertslet, IV, 2674-2694.]
Article XXIV. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles shall
remain open in time of war, as in time of peace, to the
merchant vessels of neutral States arriving from or bound
to Russian ports. The Sublime Porte consequently en-
gages never henceforth to establish at the ports of the
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov a fictitious blockade at
variance with the spirit of the Declaration signed at Paris,
April 4/16, 1856.
XVI. Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria-
Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the
Ottoman Empire, for the Settlement of the Affairs
of the East, Signed at Berlin, 13th July, 1878
[Hertslet, IV (No. 530) 2759-2798.]
MAINTENANCE OF TREATIES OF MARCH 30, 1856 AND MARCH
13, 1871 (DARDANELLES AND BOSPHORTJS, ETC.)
Article LXIH. The Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856,
as well as the Treaty of London of March 13, 1871, are
maintained in all such of their provisions as are not
abrogated or modified by the preceding stipulations.
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XVII. Declarations Made by the British and Russian
Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin,
Respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus, 11th and 12th July, 1878
[Hertslet, IV, 2727-2728.]
(1) BRITISH DECLARATION. EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL 11TH
Jumr, 1878
With regard to the paragraph relating to the Treaties
of Paris and London, Lord Salisbury remarks that at
first sight, at a preceding sitting, he had stated that he
was not satisfied with the wording of this Article. These
apprehensions are now partly set at rest by the explana-
tions offered to the Congress: His Excellency confines him-
self today to asking that the following Declaration, which
is binding only his Government, may be inserted in the
Protocol:
"Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify
an important part of the arrangements sanctioned by
the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and that the interpretation
of Article II of the Treaty of London which is dependent
on the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of
dispute:
"I declare on behalf of England that the obligations
of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the
Straits do not go further than an engagement with the
Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent
determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing
Treaties. . . ."
(2) RUSSIAN DECLARATION. EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL 12TH
JULY, 1878
Count Schouvaloff, referring to the declaration made
in the preceding sitting by Lord Salisbury, on the sub-
ject of the Straits, demands the insertion in the Protocol
of a Declaration on the same subject presented by the
Plenipotentiaries of Russia:
"The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able
exactly to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of
the second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, respecting
the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to demand-
ing, on their part, the insertion in the Protocol of the
observation: that, in their opinion, the principle of the
closing of the Straits is an European principle, and that
the stipulations concluded it this respect in 1841, 1856,
and 1871, confirmed at present by the Treaty of Berlin,
are binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance
with the spirit and letter of the existing Treaties not
only as regards the Sultan but also as regards all the
Powers signatory to these transactions."
XVIII. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers
and Turkey, Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920
[Text from British Treaty Series (1920). Treaty
of Peace with Turkey. Signed at Sevres, August
10, 1920. Cmd. 964. This treaty did not enter
into force.]
SnorioN
Article 87.?The navigation of the Straits, including
the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus,
shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every
vessel of commerce or of war, and to military and com-
mercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.
These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor
shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of
hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance
of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.
Article 88.?The Turkish Government recognizes that
it is necessary to take further measures to ensure the
freedom of navigation provided for in Article 37, and ac-
cordingly delegates, so far as it is concerned, to a Com-
mission to be called the "Commission of the Straits", and
hereinafter referred to as "the Commission", the control
of the waters specified in Article 39.
The Greek Government, so far as it is concerned, dele-
gates to the Commission the same powers and undertakes
to give it in all respects the same facilities.
Such control shall be exercised in the name of the
Turkish and Greek Governments respectively, and in the
manner provided in this Section.
Article M.?The authority of the Commission will ex-
tend to all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth
of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bos-
phorus, and to the waters within three miles of each of
these mouths.
This authority may be exercised on shore to such ex-
tent as may be necessary for the execution of the pro-
visions of this Section.
Article 40.?The Commission shall be composed of rep-
resentatives appointed respectively by the United States
of America (if and when that Government is willing to
participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan,
Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the
League of Nations), Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and
Turkey (if and when the two latter states become members
of the League of Nations). Each Power shall appoint one
representative. The representatives of the United States
of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and
Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of
Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey shall each
have one vote. Each Commissioner shall be removable
only by the Government which appointed him.
Article 41.?The Commissioners shall enjoy, within the
limits specified in Article 39, diplomatic privileges and
immunities.
Articde 42.?The Commission will exercise the powers
conferred on it by the present Treaty in complete inde-
pendence of the local authority. It will have its own flag,
its own budget and its separate organization.
Article 43.?Within the limits of its jurisdiction as laid
down in Article 39 the Commission will be charged with
the following duties: (a) the execution of any works
considered necessary for the improvement of the channels
or the approaches to harbours; (b) the lighting and buoy-
ing of the channels; (c) the control of pilotage and tow-
age; (d) the control of anchorages; (e) the control
necessary to assure the application in the ports of Con-
stantinople and Haidar Pasha of the regime prescribed
in Articles 335 to 344, Part XI (Ports, Waterways and
Railways) of the present Treaty; (f) the control of all
matters relating to wrecks and salvage; (g) the control
of literage.
[19]
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Article 44.?In the event of the Commission finding that
the liberty of passage is being interfered with, it will
inform the representatives at Constantinople of the Allied
Powers providing the occupying forces provided for in
Article 178. These representatives will thereupon concert
with the naval and military commanders of the said
forces such measures as may be deemed necessary to
preserve the freedom of the Straits. Similar action shall
be taken by the said representatives in the event of any
external action threatening the liberty of passage of the
Straits.
Article 45.?For the purpose of the acquisition of any
property or the execution of any permanent works which
may be required, the Commission shall be entitled to
raise such loans as it may consider necessary. These loans
will be secured, so far as possible, on the dues to be levied
on the shipping using the Straits, as provided in Article 53.
Article 46.?The functions previously exercised by the
Constantinople Superior Council of Health and the Turkish
Sanitary Administration which was directed by the said
Council, and the functions exercised by the National Life-
boat Service of the Bosphorus, will within the limits
specified in Article 39 be discharged under the control of
the Commission and in such manner as it may direct.
The Commission will cooperate in the execution of any
common policy adopted by the League of Nations for pre-
venting and combating disease.
Article 47.?Subject to the general powers of control
conferred upon the Commission, the rights of any persons
or companies now holding concessions relating to light-
houses, docks, quays or similar matters shall be main-
tained; but the Commission shall be entitled if it thinks
it necessary in the general interest to buy out or modify
such rights upon the conditions laid down in Article 311,
Part IX (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty, or
itself to take up a new concession.
Article 48.?In order to facilitate the execution of the
duties with which it is entrusted by this Section, the
Commission shall have power to organize such a force
of special police as may be necessary. This force shall
be drawn so far as possible from the native population of
the zone of the Straits and islands referred to in Article
178, Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses), excluding
the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, 'Penedos
and Mitylene. The said force shall be commanded by
foreign police officers appointed by the Commission.
Article 49.?In the portion of the zone of the Straits,
including the islands of the Sea of Marmora, which re-
mains Turkish, and pending the coming into force of the
reform of the Turkish judicial system provided for in
Article 136, all infringements of the regulations and by-
laws made by the Commission, committed by nationals
of capitulatory Powers, shall be dealt with by the Con-
sular Courts of the said Powers. The Allied Powers
agree to make such infringements justifiable before their
Consular Courts or authorities. Infringements com-
mitted by Turkish nationals or nationals of non-capitu-
latory Powers shall be dealt with by the competent Turk-
ish judicial authorities.
In the portion of the said zone placed under Greek
sovereignty such infringements will be dealt with by the
competent Greek judicial authorities.
[20]
Article 50.?The officers or members of the crew of any
merchant vessel within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the Commission who may be arrested on shore for any
offense committed either ashore or afloat within the
limits of the said jurisdiction shall be brought before
the competent judicial authority by the Commission's
police. If the accused was arrested otherwise than by
the Commission's police he shall immediately be handed
over to them.
Article 51.?The Commission shall appoint such sub-
ordinate officers or officials as may be found indispensable
to assist it in carrying out the duties with which it is
charged.
Article 52.?In all matters relating to the navigation
of the waters within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
Commission all the ships referred to in Article 37 shall be
treated upon a footing of absolute equality.
Article 53.?Subject to the provisions of Article 47 the
existing rights under which dues and charges can be
levied for various purposes, whether direct by the Turkish
Government or by international bodies or private com-
panies, on ships or cargoes within the limits of the juris-
diction of the Commission shall be transferred to the
Commission. The Commission shall fix these dues and
charges at such amounts only as may be reasonably neces-
sary to cover the cost of the works executed and the serv-
ices rendered to shipping, including the general costs and
expenses of all the administration of the Commission, and
the salaries and pay provided for in paragraph 3 of the
Annex to this Section.
For these purposes only and with the prior consent of
the Council of the League of Nations the Commission may
also establish dues and charges other than those now
existing and fix their amounts.
Article 54.?All dues and charges imposed by the Com-
mission shall be levied without any discrimination and
on a footing of absolute equality between all vessels, what-
ever their port of origin, destination or departure, their
flag or ownership, or the nationality or ownership of their
cargoes.
This disposition does not affect the right of the Com-
mission to fix in accordance with tonnage the dues pro-
vided for by this Section.
Article 55.?The Turkish and Greek Governments re-
spectively undertake to facilitate the acquisition by the
Commission of such land and buildings as the Commission
shall consider it necessary to acquire in order to carry out
effectively the duties with which it is entrusted.
Article 56.?Ships of war in transit through the waters
specified in Article 39 shall conform in all respects to
the regulations issued by the Commission for the observ-
ance of the ordinary rules of navigation and of sanitary
requirements.
Article 57.?(1) Belligerent warships shall not revietual
nor take in stores, except so far as may be strictly neces-
sary to enable them to complete the passage of the Straits
and to reach the nearest port where they can call, nor
shall they replenish or increase their supplies of war ma-
terial or their armament or complete their crews, within
the waters under the control of the Commission. Only
such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them
seaworthy shall be carried out, and they shall not add
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?
In any manner Vvhatever to their fighting force. The Com-
mission shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these
must be carried out with the least possible delay.
(2) The passage of belligerent warships through the
waters under the control of the Commission shall be
effected with the least possible delay, and without any
other interruption than that resulting from the necessities
of the service. ?
(3) The stay of such warships at ports within the
jurisdiction of the Commission shall not exceed twenty-
four hours except in case of distress. In such case they
shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval
of, at least twenty-four hours shall always elapse between
the sailing of a belligerent ship from the waters under
the control of the Commission and the departure of a
ship belonging to an opposing belligerent.
(4) Any further regulations affecting in time of war
the waters under the control of the Commission, and
relating in particular to the passage of war material and
contraband destined for the enemies of Turkey, or re-
victualling, taking in stores or carrying Out repairs
in the said waters, will be laid down by the League of
Nations.
Article 58.?Prizes shall in all respects be subjected to
the same conditions as belligerent vessels of war.
Article 59.?No belligerent shall embark or disembark
troops, munitions of war or warlike materials in the
waters under the control of the Commission, except in
cases of accidental hindrance of the passage, and in such
cases the passage shall be resumed with all possible des-
patch.
Article 60.?Nothing in Articles 57, 58 or 59 shall be
deemed to limit the powers of a belligerent or belligerents
acting in pursuance of a decision by the Council of the
League of Nations.
Article 61.?Any differences which may arise between
the Powers as to the interpretation or execution of the
provisions or this Section, and as regards Constantinople
and Haidar Pasha of the provisions of Articles 335 to 344,
Part XI (Ports, Waterways, and Railways) shall be re-
ferred to the Commission. In the event of the decision
of the Commission not being accepted by any Power, the
question shall, on the demand of any Power concerned,
be settled as provided by the League of Nations, pending
whose decision the ruling of the Commission will be
carried out.
XIX. Treaty of Friendship Between Soviet Russia
and Turkey, March 16, 1921
[Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and For-
eign State Papers, 1923, part II, vol. 118, pp. 990-
96. Article V, cited below, ?is equivalent to
article 9 of the Treaty of Kars, October 13, 1921,
ibid., 1924, vol. 120, pp. 906-13, and to article
9 of the Turco-Ukrainian treaty of January 2,
1922, Current History (No. 5, February 1923),
vol. XVII, p. 770.]
Article V.?In order to assure the opening of the Straits
to the commerce of all nations, the contracting parties
agree to entrust the final elaboration of an international
730988-47-4
[21]
agreement concerning the Black Sea to a conference
composed of delegates of the littoral States, on condition
that the decisions of the above-mentioned conference shall
not be of such a nature as to diminish the full sovereignty
of Turkey or the security of Constantinople, her capital.
XX. The Convention Relating to the Regime of the
Straits, Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923
[Treaty Series No. 16 (1923). Treaty of Peace
with Turkey, and Other Instruments Signed at
Lausanne on July 24, 1928, together with Agree-
ments between Greece and Turkey signed on. Jan-
uary 80, 1928 and Subsidiary Documents forming
part of the Turkish Peace Settlement. (With
Map.) Cmd. 1929, pp. 109.-29; 23 League of Na-
tions Treaty Series, 115 ff.]
Signatories: British Empire, France, Italy, Japan,
Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia, Yugoslavia, and
Turkey.
Article 1.?The High Contracting Parties agree to rec-
ognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and
of navigation by sea and by air in the Strait of the Dar-
danelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, herein-
after comprised under the general term of the "Straits".
Article 2.?The transit and navigation of commercial ves-
sels and aircraft, and of war vessels and aircraft in the
Straits in time of peace and in time of war shall hence-
forth be regulated by the provisions of the attached Annex.
ANNEX. RULES FOR THE PASSAGE OF COMMERCIAL VESSELS
AND AIRCRAFT, AND OF WAR VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
1
THROUGH THE STRAITS
1. Merchant Vessels, Including Hospital Ships, Yachts and
Fishing Vessels and Non-Military Aircraft.
(a) In Time of Peace.
Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day
and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo,
without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever,
(subject, however, to international sanitary provisions)
unless for services directly rendered, such as pilotage,
light, towage or other similar charges, and without
prejudice to the rights exercised in this respect by the
services and undertakings now operating under con-
cessions granted by the Turkish Government.
To facilitate the collection of these dues, merchant
vessels passing the Straits will communicate to stations
appointed by the Turkish Government their name, na-
tionality, tonnage and destination.
(b) In Time of War, Turkey Being Neutral.
Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day
and by night under the same conditions as above. The
duties and rights of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot
authorise her to take any measures liable to interfere
with navigation through the Straits, the waters of which,
and the air above which, must remain entirely free in
time of war, Turkey being neutral just as in time of
peace.
Pilotage remains optional.
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(c) In Time of War, Turkey Being a Belligerent.
Freedom of navigation for neutral vessels and neutral
non-military aircraft, if the vessel or aircraft in ques-
tion does not assist the enemy, particularly by carrying
contraband, troops or enemy nationals. Turkey will
have the right to visit and search such vessels and air-
craft, and for this purpose aircraft are ,th alight on
the ground or on the sea in such areas as are specified
and prepared for this purpose by Turkey. The rights
of Turkey to apply to enemy vessels the measures al-
lowed by international law are not affected.
Turkey will have full power to take such measures as
she may consider necessary to prevent enemy vessels
from using the Straits. These measures, however, are
not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage
? of neutral vessels, and Turkey agrees to provide such
vessels with either the necessary instructions or pilots
for the above purpose.
2. Warships, In,cluding Fleet Auxiliaries, Troopships, Air-
craft Carriers and Military Aircraft.
(a) In Time of Peace.
Complete freedom of passage by day and by night
under any flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge
whatever, but subject to the following restrictions as
to the total force:
The maximum force which any one Power may send
through the Straits into the Black Sea is not to be
greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the
littoral Powers of the Black Sea existing in that sea
at the time of passage; but with the proviso that the
Powers reserve to themselves the right to send into
the Black Sea at all times and under all circumstances,
a force of not more than three ships, of which no in-
dividual ship shall exceed 10,000 tons.
Turkey has no responsibility in regard to the number
of war vessels which pass through the Straits.
In order to enable the above rule to be observed the
Straits Commission provided for in Article 10 will, on
the 1st January and the 1st July of each year, enquire
of each Black Sea littoral Power the number of each
of the following classes of vessel which such Power
possesses in the Black Sea: Battleships, battle-cruisers,
aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or
other types of vessels as well as naval aircraft; distin-
guishing between the ships which are in active commis-
sion and the ships with reduced complements, the ships
in reserve and the ships undergoing repairs or altera-
tions.
The Straits Commission will then inform the Powers
concerned that the strongest naval force in the Black
Sea comprises: Battleships, battle-cruisers, aircraft-car-
riers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft and
units of other types which may exist. The Straits
Commission will also immediately inform the Powers
concerned when, owing to the passage into or out of the
Black Sea of any ship of the strongest Black Sea force,
any alteration in that force has taken place.
The naval force that may be sent through the Straits
into the Black Sea will be calculated on the number and
type of the ships of war in active commission only.
[22]
(b) In Time of War, Turkey Being Neutral.
Complete freedom of passage by day and by night
under any flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge
whatever, under the same limitations as in paragraph
2 ( a).
However, these limitations will not be applicable to
any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent
rights in the Black Sea.
The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power
cannot authorise her to take any measures liable to
interfere with navigation .through the Straits, the
waters of which, and the air above which, must remain
entirely free in time of war, Turkey being neutral, just
as in time of peace.
Warships and military aircraft of belligerents will be
forbidden to make any capture, to exercise the right of
visit and search, or to carry out any other hostile act
in the Straits.
As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war
vessels will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth
Hague Convention of 1907, dealing with maritime
neutrality.
Military aircraft will receive in the Straits similar
treatment to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague
Convention of 1907 to warships, pending the conclusion
of an international Convention establishing the rules of
neutrality for aircraft.
(c) In Time of War, Turkey Being Belligerent.
Complete freedom of passage for neutral warships,
without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever,
but under the same limitations as in paragraph 2(a).
The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships
and aircraft from using the Straits are not to be of such
a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships
and aircraft, and Turkey agrees to provide the said ships
and aircraft with either the necessary instructions or
pilots for the above purpose.
Neutral military aircraft will make the passage of
the Straits at their own risk and peril, and will submit to
investigation as to their character. For this purpose
aircraft are to alight on the ground or on the sea in
such areas as are specified and prepared for this purpose
by Turkey.
3. (a) The passage of the Straits by submarines of
Powers at peace with Turkey must be made on the
surface.
(b) The officer in command of a foreign naval force,
whether coming from the Mediterranean or the Black
Sea, will communicate, without being compelled to stop,
to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or
the Bosphorus, the number and the names of vessels
under his orders which are entering the Straits.
These signal stations shall be notified from time to
time by Turkey; until such signal stations are notified,
the freedom of passage for foreign war vessels in the
Straits shall not thereby be prejudiced, nor shall their
entry into the Straits be for this reason delayed.
(c) The right of military and non-military aircraft
to fly over the Straits, under the conditions laid down
in the present rules, necessitates for aircraft?
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(i) Freedom to fly over a strip of territory of five
kilometres wide on each side of the narrow parts of
the Straits;
(ii) Liberty, in the event of a forced landing, to
alight on the coast or on the sea in the territorial
waters of Turkey.
4. Limitation of Time of Transit for Warships.
In no event shall warships in transit through the Straits,
except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain
therein beyond the time which is necessary for them to .
effect their passage, including the time of anchorage dur-
ing the night if necessary for safety of navigation.
5. Stay in the Ports of the Straits and of the Black Sea.
(a). Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Annex apply to the
passage of vessels, warships and aircraft through and
over the Straits and do not affect the right of Turkey to
make such regulations as she may consider necessary
regarding the number of men-of-war and military air-
craft of any one Power which may visit Turkish ports or
aerodromes at one time, and the duration of their stay.
(b) Littoral Powers of the Black Sea will also have
a similar right as regards their ports and aerodromes.
(c) The light-vessels which the Powers at present rep-
resented on the European Commission of the Danube main-
tain as stationnaires at the mouths of that river as far
up as Galatz will be regarded as additional to the men-of-
war referred to in paragraph 2, and may be replaced in
case of need.
6. Special Provisions Relating to Sanitary Protection.
Warships which have on board cases of plague, cholera
or typhus, or which have had such cases on board during
the last seven days, and warships which have left an in-
fected port within less than five times 24 hours must pass
through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means
on board such prophylactic measures as are necessary to
prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.
The same rule shall apply to merchant ships having a
doctor on board and passing straight through the Straits
without calling at a port or breaking bulk.
Merchant ships not having a doctor on board shall be
obliged to comply with the international sanitary regu-
lations before entering the Straits, even if they are not
to call at a port therein.
Warships and merchant vessels calling at one of the
,ports in the Straits shall be subject in that port to the
international sanitary regulations applicable in the port
In question.
Article 3.?With a view to maintaining the Straits free
from any obstacle to free passage and navigation, the
provisions contained in Articles 4 to 9 will be applied to
the waters and shores thereof as well as to the islands
Situated therein, or in the vicinity.
Article 4.?The zones and islands indicated below shall
be demilitarized:
1. Both shores of the Straits of the Dardanelles
and the Bosphorus over the extent of the zones delimited
below .
[23]
Dardanelles:
On the north-west, the Gallipoli Peninsula and the area
southeast of a line traced from a point on the Gulf of
Xeros 4 kilometres northeast of Bakla-Burnu, reaching
the Sea of Marmora at Kunbaghi and passing south of
Kayak (this village excluded) ;
On the south-east, the area included between the coast
and a line 20 kilometres from the coast, starting from
Cape Eski-Stamboul opposite Tenedos and reaching the
Sea of Marmora at a point on the coast immediately north
of Karabigha.
Bosphorus (without prejudice to the special provisions
relating to Constantinople contained in Article 8) :
On the east, the area extending up to a line 15 kilometres
from the eastern shore of the Bosphorus;
On the west, the area up to a line 15 kilometres from
the western shore of the Bosphorus.
2. All the islands in the Sea of Marmora, with the
exception of the island of Emir All Adasi.
3. In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos,
Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands.
Article 5.?A Commission composed of four representa-
tives appointed respectively by the Governments of France,
Great Britain, Italy and Turkey shall meet within 15
days of the coming into force of the present Convention
to determine on the spot the boundaries of the zone laid
down in Article 4(1).
The Governments represented on that Commission will
pay the salaries of their respective representatives.
Any general expenses incurred by the Commission shall
be borne in equal shares by the Powers represented thereon.
Article 6.?Subject to the provisions of Article 8 con-
cerning Constantinople, there shall exist, in the demili-
tarised zones and islands, no fortifications, no permanent
artillery organisation, no submarine engines of war other
than submarine vessels, no military aerial organisation,
and no naval base.
No armed forces shall be stationed in the demilitarised
zones and islands except the police and gendarmerie
forces necessary for the maintenance of order; the arma-
ment of such forces will be composed only of revolvers,
swords, rifles and four Lewis guns per hundred men, and
will exclude any artillery.
In the territorial waters of the demilitarised zones and
islands, there shall exist no submarine engines of war
other than submarine vessels.
Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs Turkey will
retain the right to transport her armed forces through
the demilitarised zones and islands of Turkish territory,
as well as through their territorial waters, where the
Turkish fleet will have the right to anchor.
Moreover, in so far as the Straits are concerned, the
Turkish Government shall have the right to observe by
means of aeroplanes or balloons both the surface and the
bottom of the sea. Turkish aeroplanes will always be
able to fly over the waters of the Straits and the demili-
tarised zones of Turkish territory, and will have full free-
dom to alight therein, either on land or on sea.
In the demilitarised zones and islands and in their ter-
ritorial waters, Turkey and Greece shall similarly be en-
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titled to effect such movements of personnel as are ren-
dered necessary for the instruction outside these zones and
islands of the men recruited therein.
Turkey and Greece shall have the right to organize in the
said zones and islands in their respective territories any
system of observation and communication, both tele-
graphic, telephonic and visual. Greece shall be entitled
to send her fleet into the territorial waters of the de-
militarised Greek islands, but may not use these waters
as a base of operations against Turkey nor for any mili-
tary or naval concentration for this purpose.
Article 7.?No submarine engines of war other than sub-
marine vessels shall be installed in the waters of the Sea
of Marmora.
The Turkish Government shall not install any permanent
battery or torpedo tubes, capable of interfering with the
passage of the Straits, in the coastal zone of the European
shore of the Sea of Marmora or in the coastal zone of the
Anatolian. shore situated to the east of the demilitarised
zone of the Bosphorus as far as Darije.
Article 8.?At Constantinople, including for this pur-
pose Stamboul, Pera, Galata, Scutari, as well as the
Princes Islands, and in the immediate neighbourhood of
Constantinople, there may be maintained for the require-
ments of the capital, a garrison with a maximum strength
of 12,000 men. An arsenal and naval base may also be
maintained at Constantinople.
Article 0.?If, in case of war, Turkey, or Greece, in
pursuance of their belligerent rights, should modify in
any way the provisions of demilitarisation prescribed
above, they will be bound to re-establish as soon as peace
is concluded the regime laid down in the present Conven-
/don.
Article 10.?There shall be constituted at Constanti-
nople an International Commission composed in accord-
ance with Article 12 and called the "Straits Commission".
Article 11.?The Commission will exercise its functions
over the waters of the Straits.
Article 12.?The Commission shall be composed of a
representative of Turkey, who shall be President, and
representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Russia, and the Serb-
Croat-Slovene State, in so far as these Powers are signa-
tories of the present Convention, each of these Powers
being entitled to representation as from its ratification
of the said Convention.
The United States of America, in the event of their
acceding to the present Convention, will also be entitled
to have one representative on the Commission.
Under the same conditions any independent littoral
States of the Black Sea which are not mentioned in the
first paragraph of the present Article will possess the
same right.
Article 18.?The Governments represented on the
Commission will pay the salaries of their representatives.
Any incidental expenditure incurred by the Commission
will be borne by the said Governments in the proportion
laid down for the division of the expenses of the League
of Nations.
Article 14.?It will be the duty of the Commission to
see that the provisions relating to the passage of warships
and military aircraft are carried out; these provisions
are laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Annex to
Article 2.
Article 15.?The Straits Commission will carry out its
functions under the auspices of the League of Nations,
and will address to the League an annual report giving
an account of its activities, and furnishing all informa-
tion which may be useful in the interests of commerce
and navigation; with this object in view the Commission
will place itself in touch with the departments of the
Turkish Government dealing with navigation through
the Straits.
Article 16.?It will be the duty of the Commission to
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the
accomplishment of its task.
Article 17.?The terms of the present Convention will
not infringe the right of Turkey to move her fleet freely
in Turkish waters.
Article 18.?The High Contracting Parties, desiring to
secure that the demilitarisation of the Straits and of the
contiguous zones shall not constitute an unjustifiable
danger to the military security of Turkey, and that no
act of war should imperil the freedom of the Straits or
the safety of the demilitarised zones, agree as follows:
Should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the
security of the demilitarised zones be inwerilled by a
violation of the provisions relating to freedom of passage,
or by a surprise attack or some act of war or threat of
war, the High Contracting Parties, and in any case France,
Great Britain, Italy and Japan, acting in conjunction, will
meet such violation, attack, or other act of war or threat
of war, by all the means that the Council of the League
of Nations may decide for this purpose.
So soon as the circumstances which may have necessi-
tated the action provided for in the preceding paragraph
shall have ended, the regime of the Straits as laid down
by the terms of the present Convention shall again be
strictly applied.
The present provision, which forms an integral part
of those relating to the demilitarisation and to the free-
dom of the Straits, does not prejudice the rights and
obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the
Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 19.?The High Contracting Parties will use every
possible endeavour to induce non-signatory Powers to
accede to the present Convention.
This adherence will be notified through the diplomatic
channel to the Government of the French Republic, and
by that Government to all signatory or adhering States.
The adherence will take effect as from the date of notifi-
cation to the French Government.
Article 20.?The present Convention shall be ratified.
Tile ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as
possible. . .
[24]
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XXI. Convention Regarding the Regime of the
Straits, Signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936.
Entered into force November 9, 1936
[Turkey No. 1 (1936). Convention regarding
the Regime of the Straits with Correspondence
relating thereto. Montreux, July 20, 1936.
thud. 5249; 173 League of Nations Treaty Series,
213.]
Signatories: Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece,
Japan, Rumania, Turkey, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.
Article 1.?The High Contracting Parties recognise and
affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation
by sea in the Straits.
The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regu-
lated by the provisions of the present Convention.
SECTION 1.?Merchant Vessels
Article 2.?In time of peace, merchant vessels shall
enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the
Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with
any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as
provided in Article 3 below. No taxes or charges other
than those authorised by Annex I to the present Con-
vention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on
these vessels when passing in transit without calling at
a port in the Straits.
In order to facilitate the collection of these takes or
charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits
shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred
to in Article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destina-
tion and last port of call (provenance).
Pilotage and towage remain optional.
Article ships entering the Straits by the Aegean
Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station
near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the
sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the
framework of international sanitary regulations. This
control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of
health or presenting a declaration of health testifying
that they .do not fall within the scope of the provisions
of the second paragraph of the present article, shall be
carried out by day and by night with all possible speed,
and the vessels in question shall not be required to make
any other stop during their passage through the Straits.
Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera,
yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox, or which
have had such cases on board during the previous seven
days, and vessels which have left an infected port within
less than five times twenty-four hours shall stop at the
sanitary stations indicated in the preceding paragraph
in order to embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish
authorities may direct. No tax or charge shall be levied
in respect of these sanitary guards and they shall be dis-
embarked at a sanitary- station on departure from the
Straits.
Article 4.?In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent,
merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of
125]
cargo, shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in
the Straits subject to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3.
Pilotage and towage remain optional.
Article 5.?In time of war, Turkey being belligerent,
merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with
Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in
the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist
the enemy.
Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their
transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each
case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.
Article 6.?Should Turkey consider herself to be threat-
ened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of
Article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except
that vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their
transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each
case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities.
Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no
charge shall be levied.
Article 7.?The term "merchant vessels" applies to all
vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present
Convention.
,SEcruncr 11.?Vessels of War
Article 8.?For the purposes of the present Convention,
the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification
together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage
shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.
Article 9.?Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed
for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not
be subject to the provisions of Article 13 regarding notifica-
tion, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculat-
ing the tonnage which is subject to limitation under Ar-
ticles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall/pass through
the Straits singly. They shall, however, continue to be
on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of
the remaining provisions governing transit.
The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding para-
graph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional
status therein contemplated if their armament does not
include: for use against floating targets, more than two
guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use
against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum
calibre of 75 millimetres.
Article 10.?In time of peace, light surface vessels,
minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging
to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their
flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits
without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such
transit is begun during daylight and subject to the con-
ditions laid down in Article 13 and the articles following
thereafter.
Vessels of war other than those which fall- within the
categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only
enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions pro-
vided by Articles 11 and 12.
Article 11.?Black Sea Powers may send through the
Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid
down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition
that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted
by not more than two destroyers.
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Article 12.?Black Sea Powers shall have the right to
send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining
their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside
the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the lay-
ing down or purchase of such submarines shall have been
given to Turkey.
Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be
entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dock-
yards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed
Information on the matter is given to Turkey.
In either case, the said submarines must travel by day
and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits
singly.
Article 13.?The transit of vessels of war through the
Straits shall be preceded by notification given to the Turk-
ish Government through the diplomatic channel. The
normal period of notice shall be eight days; but it is de-
sirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this
period should be increased to fifteen days. The notifica-
tion shall specify the destination, name, type and number
of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward
passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any
change of date shall be subjeCt to three days' notice.
Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall
take place within a period of five days from the date
given in the original notification. After the expiry of this
period, a new notification shall be given under the same
conditions as for the original notification.
When effecting transit, the commander of the naval force
shall, without being under any obligation to stop, com-
municate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dar-
danelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the
force under his orders.
' Article 14.?The maximum aggregate tonnage of all for-
eign naval forces which may be in course of transit through
the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except ?in the
cases provided for in Article 11 and in Annex III to the
present Convention.
The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall
not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.
Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black
Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in 'ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 17, shall not be
included in this tonnage.
Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage
during their passage through the Straits be included in
this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall
be subject to any special provisions relating to security
laid down by Turkey.
Article 15.?Vessels of war in transit through the Straits
shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which
they may be carrying.
Article 16.?Vessels of war in transit through the Straits
shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the
sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to
effect the passage.
Article 17.?Nothing in the provisions of the preceding
articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or com-
position from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration
to a port in the 'Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish
Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the
same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfils
the conditions required for passage in transit through the
Straits as laid down by Articles 10, 14, and 18.
Article 18.?(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black
Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall
be limited as follows:
[26]
(a) Except as provided in paragraph ( b) below, the
aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed
30,000 tons;
( b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet
in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the
tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of
the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate
tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall
be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of
45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power
shall, in conformity with Annex IV to the present Con-
vention, inform the Turkish Government, on the 1st
January and the 1st July of each year, of the total
tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish
Government shall transmit this information to the other
High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General ?
of the League of Nations.
(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power
may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-
thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above;
(d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black
Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black
Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which
shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be
allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give
the notification provided in Article 13 of the present
Convention, provided an authorisation is obtained from
the Turkish Government in the following circumstances:
if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above has not been reached and will
not be exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is
desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant
the said authorisation within the shortest possible time
after receiving the request which has been addressed
to it; if the said figure has already been reached or if
the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send will
cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Government will
immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of
the request for authorisation, and if the said Powers
make no objection within twenty-four hours of having
received this information, the Turkish Government shall,
within twenty-four hours at the latest, inform the in-
terested Powers of the reply which it has decided to
make to their request.
Any further entry into the Black Sea of naval forces
of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within
the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided
for in paragraphs (a) and ( b) above.
(2) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers
shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one
days, whatever be the object of their presence there.
Article 19.?In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent,
warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and
navigation through the Straits under the same conditions
as those laid down in Articles 10 to 18.
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Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not,
however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising
out-of the application of Article 25 of the present Conven-
tion, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim
of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance
binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and
published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18
of the Covenant.
In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding
paragraph, the limitations laid down in Articles 10 to 18
of the present Convention shall not be applicable.
Notwithstanding the prohibition of passage laid down
in paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to bellig-
erent Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or
not, which have become separated from their bases, may
return thereto.
Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall
not make any capture, exercise the right of visit and
search, or carry out any hostile act in the Straits.
Article 20.?In time of war, Turkey being belligerent,
the provisions of Articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable;
the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the Turkish Government.
Article 21.?Should Turkey consider herself to be threat-
ened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right
to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present Con-
vention.
Vessels which have passed through the Straits before
Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her
by the preceding paragraph, and which thus find them-
selves separated from their bases, may return thereto.
It is, however, understood that Turkey may deny this right
to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude
has given rise to the application of the present article.
Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers
conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a
notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High
Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations.
If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a
majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by
Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the
opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties
signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish Gov-
ernment undertakes to discontinue the measures in ques-
tion as also any measures which may have been taken
under Article 6 of the present Convention.
Article 22.?Vessels of war which have on board cases
of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or
smallpox or which have had such cases on board within the
last seven days and vessels of war which have left an
Infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours
must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply
by the means on board such prophylactic measures as are
necessary in order to prevent any possibility of the Straits
being infected.
SECTION III.?Aircraft
Article 23.?In order to assure the passage of civil air-
craft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the
Turkish Government will indicate the air routes avail-
able for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which
[27]
may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use
these routes provided that they give the Turkish Govern-
ment, as regards occasional flights, a notification of three
days, and as regards flights on regular services, a general
notification of the dates of passage.
The Turkish Government moreover undertakes, not-
withstanding any remilitarization of the Straits, to fur-
nish the necessary facilities for the safe passage of civil
aircraft authorized under the air regulations In force in
Turkey to fly across Turkish territory between Europe
and Asia. The route which is to be followed in the
Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an author-
ization shall be indicated from time to time.
Szeriort IV.?General Provisions
Article 24.?The functions of the International Com-
mission set up under the Convention relating to the regime
of the Straits of the 24th July, 1923, are hereby trans-
ferred to the Turkish Government.
The Turkish Government undertakes to collect statis-
tics and to furnish information concerning the applica-
tion of Articles 11, 12, 14 and 18 of the present Convention.
They will supervise the execution of all the provisions
of the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels
of war through the Straits.
As soon as they have been notified of the intended
passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force the
Turkish Government shall inform the representatives at
Angora of the High Contracting Parties of the composi-
tion of that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry
into the Straits, and, if necessary, the probable date of
its return.
The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations and to the High Con-
tracting Parties an annual report giving details regard-
ing the movements of foreign vessels of war through the
Straits and furnishing all information which may be of
service to commerce and navigation, both by sea and by
air, for which provision is made in the 'present Conven-
tion.
Article 25.?Nothing in the present Convention shall
prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any
of the other High Contracting Parties members of the
League of Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
SEcrioN V.?Final Provisions
Article 26.?The present Convention shall be ratified as
soon as possible.
The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of
the Government of the French Republic in Paris.
The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform
the Government of the French Republic through their
diplomatic representative in Paris that the ratification
has been given, and in that case they shall transmit the
instrument of ratification as soon as possible.
A proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications shall be
drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, in-
cluding that of Turkey, shall have been deposited. For
this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding
paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit
of an instrument of ratification.
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The present Convention shall come into force on the
date of the said proces-verbal.
The French Government will transmit to all the nigh
Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the proces-
verbal provided for in the preceding paragraph and of
the proces-verbauw of the deposit of any subsequent
ratifications.
Article 27.?The present Convention shall, as from the
date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any
Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne
signed on the 24th July, 1923.
Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic
channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and
by the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.
Accessions shall come into force as from the date of
notification to the French Government.
Article 28.?The present Convention shall remain in
force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.
The principle of freedom of transit and 'navigation af-
firmed in Article 1 of the present Convention shall how-
ever continue without limit of time.
If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of
twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have
given notice of denunciation to the French Government
the present Convention shall continue in force until two
years after such notice shall have been given. Any such
notice shall be communicated by the French Government
to the High Contracting Parties.
In the event of the present Convention being denounced
in accordance with the provisions of the present article,
the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at
a conference for the purpose of concluding a new
Convention.
Article 29.?At the expiry of each period of five years
from the date of the entry into force of the present Con-
vention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be en-
titled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of
the provisions of the present Convention.
To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one
of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the
case of modifications to Articles 14 to 18, by one other
High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications
to any other article, by two other High Contracting
Parties.
Any request- for revision thus supported must be
notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months
prior to the expiry of the current period of five years.
This notification shall contain details of the proposed
amendments and the reasons which have given rise to
them.
Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement
on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the
High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a
conference to be summoned for this purpose.
Such a conference may only take decisions by a unani-
mous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving
Articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters
of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.
The said majority shall include three-quarters of the
High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers,
Including Turkey. . . .
XXII. Commerce and Navigation Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Turkish Re-
public, October 1, 1929. Proclaimed April 25, 1930
[Treaty Series 813.]
Article III.?(a) Vessels of the United States of
America will enjoy in Turkey and Turkish vessels will
enjoy in the United States of America the same treatment
as national vessels.
(b) The stipulations of Article III paragraph (a) do
not apply:
(1) To coastwise traffic (cabotage) governed by the
laws which are or shall be in force within the territories
of each of the High Contracting Parties;
(2) To the support in the form of bounties or sub-
sidies of any kind which is or may be accorded to the
national merchant marine;
(3) To fishing in the territorial waters of the High
Contracting Parties; nor to special privileges which
have been or may be recognized, in one or the other
country, to products of national fishing;
(4) To the exercise of the maritime service of ports,
roadsteads or seacoasts; nor to pilotage and towage;
nor to diving; nor of maritime assistance and salvage;
so long as such operations are carried out in the re-
spective territorial waters, and for Turkey in the Sea
of Marmara.
(c) All other exceptions not included in those men-
tioned above shall be subject to most-favored-nation
treatment.
XXIII. Reciprocal Trade Agreement and Supple-
mentary Exchange of Notes Between the United
States of America and Turkey, April 1,1939. Effective
Definitively November 20, 1939
[Executive Agreement Series 163.]
Article VI.?Unconditional most-favored-nation treat-
ment shall be accorded by the Government of each country
to the commerce of the other country with respect to cus-
toms duties or charges imposed on or in connection with
Imports or exports and the method of levying such duties
or charges, with respect to all regulations and formalities
In connection with importation or exportation, the sale or
use of imported products within the country, transit,
warehousing, the transshipment of goods, the re-exporta-
tion of goods, and with respect to official charges appli-
cable to these various operations.
Unconditional most-favored-nation treatment shall
likewise be accorded by the Government of each country
to the commerce of the other country with respect to all
duties, charges or exactions other than customs duties
imposed on or in connection with imports or exports.
In awarding contracts for public works and in pur-
chasing non-military supplies, the Government of neither
country shall discriminate against the other country in
favor of any third country.
[28]
NOTE: The preceding selections from treaties and con-
ventions are reprinted from the Department of State
Bulletin of Nov. 3, 1946.
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COMPARATIVE CHARTS OF THE CONVENTIONS REGULATING THE TURKISH STRAITS
I. Conventions of the Straits in the Nineteenth Century
Types of ship
1840
-1841
1856
1871
1878
Signatories
I. THE STRAITS
A. Merchant ships:
1. Time of peace.
2. Time of war
B. Warships:
1. Time of peace . . .
2. Time of war
II. BLACK SEA
A. Merchant ships.
B. Warships
Great Britain,
Austria,
France, Prus-
sia, Russia,
Ottoman Em-
pire.
Free passage un-
der earlier
treaties.
Under Ottoman
control.
Closure to foreign
warships "at all
times".
?
On demand of
Sultan, signa-
tories agree to
secure Con-
stantinople and
Straits vs. ag-
gression of
Mehemet Ali.
Great Britain,
Austria,
France, Prus-
sia, Russia,
Ottoman Em-
pire.
Free passage un-
der earlier
treaties.
Under Ottoman
control.
Closure to foreign
warships "at all
times". So long
as Porte at
peace, no for-
eign warship in
Straits. Signa-
tories to con-
form to rule.
Light vessels
for missions to
pass.
Control of Otto-
man Govern-
ment, whether
neutral or bel-
ligerent.
Great Britain,
Austria,
France, Prus-
sia, Russia;
Sardinia, Otto-
man Empire.
Free passage un-
der earlier
treaties.
Under Ottoman
control.
Closure to foreign
warships "at all
times". So long
as Porte at
peace, no for-
eign warship in
Straits. Signa-
tories to re-
spect rule.
Light vessels for
missions and
Danube station-
naires to pass.
Control of Otto-
man Govern-
ment, whether
neutral or bel-
ligerent.
Commerce sub-
ject only to
health, police,
customs regu-
lations. Open
to merchant
marine of all
nations.
Black Sea demili-
tarized, flag of
war prohibited
in perpetuity.
Contracting
parties to have
two station-
naires at mouth
of Danube.
Turkey and
Russia to have
six 800 - ton
steam vessels,
four 200 - ton
ships.
Great Britain,
Austria,
France, Ger-
many, Italy,
Russia, Otto-
man Empire. -
Free passage un-
der earlier
treaties.
Under Ottoman
control.
Closure to foreign
warships ac-
cording to rule
of 1856, with
power of Sul-
tan , to open
Straits in peace
to warships of
allied and
friendly pow-
ers, if neces-
sary to execute
provisions of
1856 treaty.
Control of Otto-
man Govern-
ment, whether
neutral or bel-
ligerent.
Commerce sub-
ject only to
health, police,
customs regu-
lations. Open
to merchant
marine of all
nations.
Remilitarizatio n
of Black Sea.
Rebuilding of
fortifications,
naval forces
permitted.
Great Britain,
Austria - Hun-
gary, France,
Germany, Italy,
Russia, Otto-
man Empire.
Free passage un-
der earlier treat-
ties.
Under Ottoman
control.
Closure to foreign
warships ac-
cording to rule
of 1856, with
power of Sultan
to open Straits
in peace to war-
ships of allied
and friendly
powers, if nec-
essary to exe-
cute provisions
of 1856 treaty.
Control of Otto-
man Govern-
ment, whether
neutral or bel-
ligerent.
Commerce sub-
ject only to
health, police,
customs - regu-
lations. Open
to merchant
marine of all
nations.
Same as in 1871.
780988-47-5
[29]
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Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century
Types of ship ,
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
- Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
Signatories
I. THE STRAITS
A. Merchant ships:
1. Time of peace
2. Time of war
Time of war, Turkey
neutral or non-
belligerent.
Time of war, Turkey
belligerent.
Turkey under threat
of war.
B. Warships:
1. Time of peace
British Empire, France, Italy,
Japan, Greece, Armenia,
Belgium, Hejaz, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania, Yugo-
slavia, Czechoslovakia, and
Turkey.
Freedom of commerce to all
flags ,(art. 37).
Freedom of commerce, any
flag; no blockade except
under decision of League
Council; no belligerent
rights or acts except under
League Council decision
(art. 37).
Freedom of passage, any flag
(art. 37).
British Empire, France, Italy,
Japan, Bulgaria, Greece,
Rumania, Russia, Yugo-
slavia, and Turkey.
General principle of freedom
of transit and navigation
by sea and air (art. 1, 2).
Annex: merchant vessels,
including hospital ships,
yachts, fishing vessels, non-
military aircraft have com-
plete freedom of passage,
day or night, any ,cargo
subject to sanitary provi-
sions, no tax or charge ex-
cept for direct services.
Communicate particulars.
Complete freedom, day or
night as in peace. Turkey
to take no action interfering
with navigation thru Straits,
whose waters, with air above,
remain entirely free. Pilot-
age optional.
Freedom for neutral ships and
non-military aircraft, if no
assistance to enemy, carry
contraband, etc. Turkish
right to search and right to
apply measures to enemy
ships allowed by interna-
tional law. Turkish right
to prevent enemy use of
Straits, not to interfere with
free passage of neutral ships.
Warships (including fleet
auxiliaries, troopships, air-
craft carriers and military
aircraft) enjoy freedom of
passage, day or night, any
flag. Maximum force any
one non-Black Sea power
may send into Black Sea
not to exceed most power-
ful Black Sea fleet. Right
to send into Black Sea, in
any case, force of not more
than 3 ships, none to exceed
10,000 tons. Straits Com-
mission to keep informed
[30]
Bulgaria, France, Great Brit-
ain, Greece, Japan, Ru-
mania, Turkey, IJ. S. S. R.,
and Yugoslavia.
Principle of freedom of transit
and navigation by sea in
Straits affirmed (art. 1);
without limit of time (art.
28). Exercise of freedom
regulated by Convention.
Complete freedom day and
night, any flag, any cargo.
Ships communicate particu-
lars, to facilitate collection
taxes, charges. Pilotage,
towage optional. Sanitary
inspectidn, if necessary (sec.
I, art. 2).
Complete freedom, any flag,
any cargo as in peace (art.
4). Pilotage optional.
Merchant vessels of country
not at war with Turkey
enjoy .freedom of transit and
navigation on condition of
not assisting enemy (art. 5).
Such ships enter Straits by
day and transit indicated
by Turkish authorities.
Turkey threatened, free pas-
sage as in peace, except that
ships must enter Straits by
day and transit by route in-
dicated by Turkish authori-
ties (art. 6).
Light surface vessels, minor
warships, auxiliaries belong-
ing either to Black Sea or
non-Black Sea powers, any
flag, have freedom of transit
(art. 10). Black Sea powers
may send through Straits
capital ships of more than
15,000 tons if pass singly,
escorted by not more than 2
destroyers; right send sub-
marines through Straits con-
structed or repaired outside
Black Sea. Turkey to be in-
formed, vessels travel by
?
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II. Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century?Continued
Types of ship
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
. Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
B. Warships?Con.
1. Time of peace?con..
2. Time Of war
Freedom of passage, any
flag. Waters not subject to
blockade except under
League Council decision.
No hostile acts except
under League Council
decision. Belligerent war-
ships not to revictual or
repair except as strictly
necessary, under Commis-
sion control. Passage
without delay or interrup-
tion, 24-hour delay in case
of distress; 24-hour inter-
val between hostile? war-
ships. Further regulations
subject to League Council.
Prizes subject to same con-
trol as warships. No dis-
embarking of troops, ex-
cept when necessary. 1Noth-
ing to limit powers of bel-
ligerents acting under Cov-
enant of League (arts. 37,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60).
by reports as to Black Sea
fleets. Naval force sent in-
to Black Sea calculated on
number and type of war-
ships in active service only.
Passage of Straits by
submarines must be made
on surface. Military and
non-military aircraft free-
dom to fly over strip 5 km.
wide on each side of nar-
row part of Straits. Can
light on coast or in terri-
torial waters if forced.
Warships except for dam-
age, remain only time for
passage. Turkey to regu-
late number of warships
and military aircraft any
one power may send to
visit Turkish ports at one
time, duration of stay.
Danube stationnaires
counted as additional to
warships. Right of Tur-
key to move fleet freely in
Turkish waters not in-
fringed by Convention (art.
17).
day, on surface, pass Straits
singly (arts. 11, 12, 14).
General Rules for Passages:
1. Notification: normal pe-
riod 8 days, 15 days desirable
for non-Black Sea powers;
2. Maximum tonnage: not to
exceed 15,000 tons, except
for Black Sea powers, over-
age Japanese training ships.
Forces not to include more
than 9 ships. Courtesy
visits not included in , ton-
nage calculation. Damaged
ships not calculated in ton-
nage, but subject to Turkish
security regulations; 3. Use
of aircraft forbidden; 4.
Period of transit: except in
case of? damage, not to re-
main longer than necessary
for passage; 5. Courtesy
visit: nothing to prevent
naval force of any tonnage
or composition from cour-
tesy visit of limited period
at Turkish invitation, but
force must leave by same
route of entry unless: (a) it
is composed of light surface
ships, minor warships, and
auxiliary ships, in time of
peace, belonging to either
non- or Black Sea power; (b)
in time of peace, force com-
posed of not more than 9
ships, or over-age Japanese
training ships (annex III)
or have suffered damage in
passage of Straits; or (c) fall
within limitations of ton-
nage non-Black Sea powers
may have in Black Sea
(arts. 13-18).
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II. Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century?Continued
Types of ship
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
Time of war, Turkey,
neutral or non-bel-
ligerent.
Time of war, Turkey
belligerent.
Turkey under threat
of war.
Complete freedom as in peace.
Limitation not applicable
to any belligerent to prej-
udice of rights of belliger-
ent in Black Sea. Rights
and duties of Turkey as
neutral not authorize meas-
ures interfering with navi-
gation in Straits, air above,
which must remain free.
No capture, visit, search,
other hostile, act. Thir-
teenth Hague Convention
(1907) as to revictualling
and repairs. Military air-
craft receive similar treat-
ment as warships, pending
conclusion of convention
regulating aircraft.
Complete freedom for neutral
warships, under same con-
ditions as in peace. Turk-
ish measures to prevent
enemy passage not to pre-
vent passage of neutral
ships and aircraft, instruc-
tions or pilots to be as-
signed. Neutral aircraft
make passage at own peril,
submitting to examination.
Security Provisions: Signato-
ries, in any case, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
acting together, if Straits
violated, attacked, threat-
ened, to act by all means
League Council decides.
Straits regime applied again
after trouble. Provisions
(art. 18) not prejudice rights
and 'obligations of signa-
tories under League Cov-
enant.
[32]
Complete freedom of transit
and navigation under articles
10-18, as in peace (art. 19).
Ships belonging to belliger-
ents not to pass Straits ex-
cept: 1. In cases of assist-
ance rendered to victim of
aggression in virtue of mu-
tual assistance pact binding
Turkey, under article 25 of
League Covenant, ;kovid-
ing that nothing in Conven-
tion prejudices rights and
obligations of Turkey or
other signatories as mem-
bers of League (art. 19).
In this case, limitations of
arts. 10-18 not applicable.
Notwithstanding prohibi-
tions above, warships be-
longing to belligerents, Black
Sea or not, separated from
bases, may return thereto..
No capture, search, visit, or
other hostile acts permitted
(art. 19).
Provisions of arts. 10-18, gov-
erning passage, not appli-
cable. Turkey has discre-
tion as to passage of war-
ships through Straits (art.
20).
Under threat, Turkey 'has
right to use own judgment
as to passage of warships;
nevertheless ships which
have passed Straits before
Turkey has made use of
powers, may return to bases,
but Turkey may deny this
right to warships belonging
to state, attitude of which
has given rise to suspicion.
Use of powers must be
notified to high contracting
parties and to League of
Nations. If League Council
decides by two-third ma-
jority measures unjustified,
and if opinion is upheld by
majority of signatories, Tur-
key to discontinue measures
under art. 21 as applied
to warships and under art. 6
as applied to merchant ves-
sels.
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Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century?Continued
Types of ship
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
Special sanitary regu-
lations for war-
ships.
C. Civil aircraft
D. Demilitarization of
the Straits.
Enforced by the Commission
of the Straits.
Straits region under complete
control of Inter-Allied Com-
mission (art. 39).
Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
Warships with plague, cholera
or typhus, within 7 days, or
have left infected port
within less than 120 hours
must pass Straits in quar-
antine and apply measures?
to prevent infection of
Straits region. Same rules
apply to merchant vessels
with doctor on board, if
passing in transit without
stopping. If no doctor on
board, to comply with inter-
national sanitary regula-
tions. Warships and mer-
chant ships calling at Straits
ports subject to sanitary
regulations.
Region of Straits? (Darda-
nelles, Sea of Marmara,
Bosporus) demilitarized to
depths varying from 3 to
approx. 15 miles. Islands
of Marmara, exception of
Emir Ali Adasi, Aegean
Islands of Samothrace,
Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos,
and Rabbit Islands demili-
tarized. No fortifications,
artillery organization, sub-
marine engines of war aside
from submarines, no mili-
tary air organization, or
naval base in demilitarized
zone. No armed force ex-
cept police and gendarm-
erie. Turkish Government
right of observation balloons
and planes over Straits,
with right 'to land. No
submarine engines of war,
other than submarines in
Marmara. No battery or
torpedo tubes, interfering
with passage, of Straits, in
coastal zone. Garrison of
12,000 at ' Constantinople,
arsenal and naval base. If
Greece and Turkey at war,
provisions of demilitariza-
tion modified, must revert
, on peace.
[33]
Warships with plague, cholera,
yellow fever, exanthematic
typhus or smallpox; or have
had cases within 7 days, or
have left infected port within
120 hours, must pass Straits
in quarantine and apply pro-
phylactic measures to pre-
vent infection of Straits
region (art. 22).
To assure passage of civil air-
craft through Straits, Turk-
ish Government to indicate
routes, outside forbidden
zones to be established.
Civil aircraft use routes, pro-
vided they give notification
of 3 days for occasional
flights, and general notifica-
tion of dates of passage for
flights on regular service.
Turkish Government, de-
spite remilitarization of
Straits, to furnish necessary
facilities for safe passage of
civil aircraft, routes to be
indicated from time to time
(sec. III).
Right of Turkey, in sovereign
control of region of Straits,
to re-fortify zone, fully rec-
ognized.
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' II. Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century?Continued
Types of ship
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
? Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
E. Commission of the
Straits:
1. Composition
2. Jurisdiction
3. Functions
II. BLACK SEA
British Empire, France, Italy,
Japan, Greece, Rumania,
United States if and when
willing), Russia, Turkey,
Bulgaria (if and when mem-
bers of League). Great
powers 2 votes each.
Over all waters between
Mediterranean mouth of
Dardanelles and Black Sea
mouth of Bosporus, and
waters within 3 miles of each
mouth.
(1) Works for improvement of
channels or harbors; (2)
lighting and buoying; (3)
pilotage and towage; (4)
control of anchorages; (5)
control to assure applica-
tion in Constantinople and
Haidar Pasha; (6) wrecks
and salvage,. (7) control of
lighterage; (8) assurance of
freedom of passage of
Straits; (9) acquisition of
property; (10) enforcement
of sanitary provisions; (11)
police functions.
Presumably free entry, any
tonnage, on part of non-
Black Sea powers.
>
Turkey (President), France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania,
Y
Russia, ugoslavia, United
States (on accession); other
Black Sea states on acces-
sion. One vote each.
Over the waters of the Straits
(Dardanelles, Marmara,
Bosporus).
(1) Enforcement of provisions
relating to passage of war-
ships and military aircraft
are executed, as laid down
in pars. 2, 3, 4, of annex to
art. 2; (2) under League,
reports, information, etc.
Maximum force any one non-
Black Sea power may send
into Black Sea not to be
greater than most powerful
fleet in Black Sea at time of
passage, but powers, in any
case, have right to send
force of not more than 3
ships, none to exceed 10,000
tons. Naval force sent into
Black Sea calculated only
on number and type of war-
ships in active service.
134]
Under Turkish Government's
jurisdiction.
Functions transferred to the
Turkish Government, which
is to collect shipping data,
supervise execution of all
provisions relative to passage
of ships through Straits, and
make annual report to the
signatories and to the League
of Nations, giving details of
movement of warships
through Straits, and, gen-
erally, all information useful
to commerce and navigation,
by sea and air, for which
Convention makes provision
(art. 24). Nothing in Con-
vention prejudices rights and
duties of Turkey or signa-
tories under League Cove-
nant (art. 25).
In general, aggregate tonnage
of non-Black Sea powers in
Black Sea not to exceed
30,000 tons in time of peace.
May be increased to 45,000
tons if Soviet fleet exceeds
by at least 10,000 tons ton-
nage of SovietS fleet at date
of signature of Montreux
Convention. Annex V pro-
vides for annual report of
Black Sea fleets. Tonnage
any one non-Black Sea power
may have in Black Sea, in
general not to exceed 20,000 ,
tons. If at any time Soviet
fleet in Black Sea exceeds by
at least 10,000 tons tonnage
of Soviet fleet at time of
signature of Montreux Con-
vention, individual tonnage
of non-Black Sea power may
be increased to 30,000 tons
(art. 18). For humanitarian
purposes, one or more non-
Black Sea powers may send
into Black Sea naval force
not to exceed 8,000 tons
altogether after giving noti-
fication (generally 15 days);
tonnage limitation not to
exceed either 30,000 or 45,-
000 and will not be exceeded
by dispatch of new forces; if
tonnage has already been
reached and would be ex-
?
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II. Conventions of the Straits in the Twentieth Century?Continued
Types of ship
Convention of Sevres Aug.
10, 1920 (not in operation)
II. BLACK SEA?Con.
III. FINAL PROVI-
SIONS
1. Accession
2. Ratification.....
3. Duration
4. Denunciation
5. Amendment or
revision.
United States, Russia, Bul-
garia, and Turkey 'might
accede.
Part of general Treaty of
Sevres.
Convention of Lausanne
July 24, 1923
Convention of Montreux
July 20, 1936
Other powers might accede to
Convention (art. 19). "
Subject to ratification (art.
20). Signed Aug. 14, 1923
by Soviet Union, hut not
ratified.
ceeded, Turkish Government
will notify Black Sea powers
of request, and if no ob-
jection forthcoming in 24
hours, Turkish Government,
within 24 hours at latest,
will inform interested powers
of reply to request. Any
further entry into Black Sea
of naval forces of non-Black
Sea powers only to be -ef-
fected within limits of aggre-
gate tonnage of 30,000 to
45,000 tons. Warships ' of
non-Black Sea powers not to
remain in Black Sea longer
than 21 days, whatever ob-
ject of presence.
Others might accede (art. 27)
Italy did so on May 2, 1938.
Ratification as soon as possible
(art. 26).
Twenty years, provisions of
freedom of commerce with-
out limit of time (art. 28).
If, two years prior to expiry,
no signatory gives notice of
denunciation to French Gov-
ernment, convention in force
until two years after such
notice shall have been given.
Any such notice communi-
cated to signatories by
French Government. If de-
nounced, signatories - agree
to hold conference for con-
cluding new convention (art.
23).
At expiry of each 5-year period
from entry into force, each
of signatories entitled to in-
itiate proposal for amend-
ment. To be valid, any re-
quest for revision formu-
lated by one of signatories
must be supported, in case
of modification of arts. 14-
18.
[35]
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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1945-1946
I. The Potsdam Agreement
5HE Montreux Convention of the Straits,
signed on July 20, 1936, came into force on
November 9, 1936. In accordance with article 29 of
the Convention, it is subject to revision at the ex-
piry of each five-year period from the date of entty
into force.]: It was natural, therefore, that consid-
erable discussion of the problem of revision of the
Straits convention should have taken place during
the period of 1945 to 1946. Inview of the long-
time American interest in the principle of freedom
of commerce and nayigation, it was also natural
that the United States should be concerned with
the question of the Turkish Straits.2
In the years following the entry into force of
the Montreux Convention the .new regime of the
Straits appeared to work well and in the interest
of all parties concerned. Few questions were
raised in the years prior to the outbreak of World
War II. Immediately after the outbreak of the
great conflict, Turkey became the ally of Great
Britain and France under the terms of the alliance
of October 19, 1939, although it remained a non-
belligerent ally until the final year of the war.
As early as August 10, 1941, however, Great Bri-
tain and the Soviet Union pledged their fidelity
to the Montreux Convention and indicated that
they had no designs upon Turkish territory.
President Roosevelt gave an indication of the
significance of the Turkish position at the Straits
when he declared on November 7, 1941 that he had
"found that the defense of the Government of Tur-
key is vital to the defense of the United States."
By the end of the war there was a general feeling
that the Montreux Convention required some kind
of revision. The problem was discussed at the
Potsdam Conference during July 1945. In his
report of August 9, 1945, concerning the confer-
ence, President Truman declared: a
"One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe
in the last two centuries has been the selfish control
of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube,
[36]
the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal,
and all the inland waterways of Europe which
border on two or more states.
"The United States proposed at Berlin that
there be free. and unrestricted navigation of these
inland waterways. We think this is important
to the future peace and security of the world. We
proposed that regulations for such navigation be
provided by international authorities.
"The function of the agencies would be to de-
velop the use of the waterways and assure equal
treatment on them for all nations. Membership
on the agencies would include the United States,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, plus
those states which border on the waterways."
The Potsdam Conference produced no ultimate
disposition of the problem of the Straits and there
are two versions of the agreement which was
reached. According to the British version :4
"The three governments recognize that the Con-
vention concluded at Montreux should be revised
as failing to meet present day conditions. It was
agreed that, as the next step, the matter should be
the subject of direct conversations between each
of the three governments and the Turkish Govern-
ment."
According to the Soviet version:
"The three governments declared that the Con-
vention regarding the Straits, concluded in Mon-
treux, should be revised, as it does not meet the
conditions of the present time;
"The three governments agreed_ that as the
1 For an analysis of the problem see p. 1.
2 See H. N. Howard, "The United States and the Question
of the Turkish Straits", Middle Bast Journal, vol. I, no. 1,
of January 1947. See also p. 13.
See Department of State Bulletin of Aug. 12, 1945, p.
212.
See the statement of Foreign Minister Bevin in the
British House of Commons, Oct. 22, 1946. Parliamentary
Debates (Hansard). House of Commons. Official Report,
vol. 427, no. 201, Oct. 22, 1946, cols. 1500-1502.
From the Soviet note to Turkey, Aug. 7, 1946, Annex,
p.47.
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proper course the said question would be the sub-
ject of direct. negotiations between each of the
three powers and the Turkish Government."
II. The American Note of November 2,1945:
Reception by the Powers
In the months which followed the Potsdam Con-
ference discussion of the problem of the Straits
continued. Moreover, in line with the traditional
policy of the United States, President Truman, in
an address of October 27, 1945,6 expressed his
belief "that all nations should have the freedom of
the seas and equal rights to the navigation of
boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and
waterways which pass through more than one
country." These remarks were repeated in the
President's annual message to the Congress on the
state of the Union on January 21, 1946.
In accordance with the agreement reached at
Potsdam and in line with the general principles
as to waterways of international concern which
the President had enunciated, the United States
presented a note to the Turkish Government on
November 2, 1945 embodying the American pro-
posals for a revision of the Montreux Convention.'
The American note called attention to the agree-
ment between the United States, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union at Potsdam to the effect that
the Montreux Convention required revision and
that the matter should be the subject of direct con-
versations between each of the three governments
and the Turkish Government. It was the "earnest
hope" of the American Government that the prob-
lem of the "control and use of the Straits" could
be "solved in a manner which will promote inter-
national security, will show due consideration for
the interests of Turkey and all Black Sea riparian
powers, and will assure the free use of this im-
portant waterway to the commerce of all nations."
The American Government understood that the
Montreux Convention was subject to revision in
1946, suggested an international conference for
this purpose, and indicated its willingness to par-
ticipate if invited to do so. As a basis for an
equitable solution of the question of the Straits
the United States set forth the following prin-
ciples:
"1. the Straits to be open to the merchant ves-
sels of all nations at all times;
"2. the Straits to be open to the transit of the
warships of Black Sea powers at all times;
"3. save for an agreed limited tonnage in time
of peace, passage through the Straits to be de-
nied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at
all times, except with the specific consent of the
Black Sea powers or except when acting under
the authority of the United Nations; and
"4. certain changes to modernize the Montreux
Convention, such as the substitution of the United
Nations system for that of the League of Nations
and the elimination of Japan as a signatory."
The British and Soviet Governments were also in-
formed of the views set forth above.
On November 21 the British Government pre-
sented a memorandum to the Turkish Govern-
ment indicating that it was agreeable to the Amer-
ican proposals, but adding that the matter did
not seem urgent. On December 6 Turkey replied
to the United States, accepting the note of No-
vember 2 as a basis of discussion.8 The Turkish
Government welcomed the Amerioan note, an-
nouncing publicly that Turkey would "partici-
pate in an international conference on the Dar-
danelles and accept any decisions reached there,
provided 'Turkey's independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity are not infringed.' "9
Likewise, the British Government was well dis-
posed toward the principles which had been set
forth in Washington. In an address before the
House of Commons on February 21, 19461? Mr.
Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, seriously
questioned Soviet desires with respect to the east-
ern frontiers of Turkey, indicated that any re-
vision of the Montreux Convention of the Straits
should keep the international aspect of the Straits
in view, and declared that Great Britain had "a
treaty with Turkey". Mr. Bevin further observed
that he would like to see the treaty of friendship
between Turkey and the Soviet Union renewed,
did not feel that this conflicted with the Anglo-
Turkish alliance, and distinctly did "not want
Turkey converted into a satellite State". Some
See Department of State Bulletin of Oct. 28, 1945, p. 654.
See Department of State Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1945, p.
766.
M. Epstein, the Annual Register (London, Longmans,
Green, 1946), p. 215.
Turkish Embassy, Washington, Press Release no. 1,
Feb. 1, 1946.
" Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Com-
mons. Official Report, vol. 419, no. 87, Feb. 21, 1946, cols.
1357-59.
[37]
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weeks later, on March 25, 1946,11 Hector MacNeil,
British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs, indicated that the Anglo-Turkish treaty
of October 19, 1939 obligated Great Britain to
assist Turkey in the event of that country being
involved in hostilities with a European power "in
consequence of aggression by that Power against
Turkey", but he had no reason "to believe that
any such aggression was likely to take place".
In his Army Day address of April 6, 1946 12
President Truman reiterated the intention of the
United States to "press for the elimination of arti-
ficial barriers to international navigation, in order
that no nation by accident of geographic location,
shall be denied unrestricted access to seaports and
international waterways." The President also
made some pointed remarks as to the significance of
the Near and Middle East, an area which presented
"grave problems". He continued:
"This area contains vast natural resources. It
lies across the most convenient routes of land, air,
and water communications. It is consequently an
area of great economic and strategic importance,
the nations of which are not strong enough indi-
vidually or collectively to withstand powerful
aggression.
"It is easy to see, therefore, how the Near and
Middle East might become an arena of intense
rivalry between outside powers, and how such
rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict.
"No country, great or small, has legitimate inter-
ests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be
reconciled with the interests of other nations
through the United Nations. The United Nations
have a right to insist that the sovereignty and in-
tegrity of the countries of the Near and Middle
East must not be threatened by coercion or pene-
tration."
Apparently the situation in the Near East re-
mained relatively unchanged, for on May 10 Presi-
dent Inonii of Turkey declared that the world
situation continued "darker and even more un-
settled than could have been foreseen a year ago".13
There appeared to be no new elements in the pic-
ture. Nevertheless, on June 4, 1946, Foreign Min-
ister Bevin discussed the Turkish problem in an
address before the House of Commons.' 4 He did
not believe that there was any real basis for mis-
understanding or "fundamental disagreement"
concerning the Straits, and continued:
[38]
"We have been willing, equally with our pred-
ecessors, to consider the revision of the Montreux
Convention. What we are anxious' to avoid, and
I emphasise this, is to do anything, or agree to
anything, which will undermine the real independ-
ence of Turkey, or convert her into a mere satellite
state. But, with the recognition of these prin-
ciples, I am convinced that these two factors are
not irreconcilable. Let me go further and say
that We will always welcome the mercantile fleet of
the Soviet Union on all the seas of the world. We
sail the Baltic, but we have not got a base and
have not got a port there. We will sail to Odessa
again, to the Black Sea and Constanza, quite free-
ly, but we do not ask for a base or military re-
quirements to enable us to do so. Our aim, as a
Government, is the free movement of shipping
and the world's trade. Therefore, whatever re-
sponsibilities we undertake in the defence scheme
of the world in any particular area, we give a sol-
emn undertaking that they will be on a basis of
freedom to all members of the Peace Club on equal
terms. I believe that, if such an attitude is ac-
cepted all round, this great desire for bases can be
considerably minimised."
III. The Great Debate: The Exchange of Notes on
the Straits, 1946
The Soviet Note, August 7, 1946
The substantial exchange of views concerning
the problem of the Straits began on August 7,
1946 when the Soviet Government presented a
detailed note on the subject to the Turkish Gov-
ernment.15 This note was also transmitted to the
Governments of Great Britain and the United
States. The Soviet Government called the atten-
tion of the Turkish Government to the agreement
at Potsdam as to the revision of the Montreux
Convention, indicating that this question was to be
"the subject of direct negotiations between each
of the three powers and the Turkish Government".
In the course of the note, the Soviet Government
"Ibid., vol. 421, no. 109, Mar. 25, 1946, cols. 6-7.
" See Department of State Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1946, p.
622.
" Turkish Embassy, Washington, Press Release no. 8,
May 17, 1946.
"Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Com-
mons. Official Report, vol. 423, no. 153, June 4, 1946, cols.
1836-37.
See Annex, p. 47.
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called attention to a number of incidents which
had occurred in the Straits during World War
II, as follows:
1. On July 9, 1941, the German patrol boat
Seel alke was sent through the Straits into the
Black Sea, with a resulting protest from the Soviet
Government to the Turkish Government.
2. In August 1941, Turkish authorities per-
mitted the Italian auxiliary warship Tarvisio to
pass through the Straits into the Black Sea, with a
consequent Soviet protest, as an apparent violation
of the Straits convention.
3. On November 4, 1942, the Soviet Government
again called the attention of the Turkish Govern-
ment to the "fact" that Germany intended to send
140,000 tons of auxiliary warships through the
Straits into the Black Sea under the guise of mer-
chant vessels.
4. In June 1944, the Soviet Government pro-
tested against a series of passages through the
Straits toward the end of May and early in June
1944 of German warships and auxiliary warships
of varying tonnage of the Ems (8 vessels) and
Kriegstrans port (5 vessels) types, which had taken
part in naval operations in the Black Sea.
The Soviet Government, therefore, believed that
since the Montreux Convention had not, appar-
ently, prevented the use of the Straits by enemy
powers, it should be revised?as proposed at the
Potsdam Conference. The Soviet Government
also indicated its familiarity with the American
note of November 2, 1945 and with the British note
of November 21, 1945 which had been addressed
to the Turkish Government on this question. For
its own part, the Soviet Government proposed to
establish a "new regime" for the Straits, along the
following lines:
"1) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of merchant ships of all countries.
"2) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
"3) Passage through the Straits for warships
not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not
be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
"4) The establishment of a regime of the Straits,
as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black
Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the
competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
"5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers
most interested and capable of guaranteeing free-
dom to commercial navigation and security in the
Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of
the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of
the Straits by other, countries for aims hostile to
the Black Sea Powers."
The first three of these principles were in
general agreement with the first three principles
of the note of the United States Government of
November 2, 1945. Points 4 and 5, however, called
for the establishment of a new regime of the
Straits by the Black Sea powers and the develop-
ment of a joint Turco-Soviet system of defense
for the Straits, on the ground that the Black Sea
powers were primarily concerned and that only
a joint defense system could offer genuine security
to the countries of the Black Sea.
The American Note, August 19, 1946
The United States replied to the Soviet note on
August 19, 1946," substantially reiterating its po-
sition of November 2, 1945 and expressing the
view that the establishment of a regime of the
Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Black
Sea powers?a view which. American representa-
tives had set forth vigorously at the Lausanne.
conference in December 1922. The United States
note further declared that Turkey should remain
primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits
and stated that if this region became the object
of a threat or an attack on the part of an aggressor,
the resulting situation "would constitute a threat
to international security and would clearly be a
matter for action on the part of the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations". The American note
also declared its position that "the regime of the
Straits should be brought into appropriate re-
lationship with the United Nations and should
function in a manner entirely consistent with the
principles and aims of the United Nations". In
conclusion the United States reaffirmed its willing-
ness to participate in a conference for the revision
of the Montreux Convention.
The British Note, August 21, 1946
The British note ,of August 21, 1946 expressed
views similar to those of the United States. In
particular, the British note pointed out:
"that it has for long been internationally recog-
nized that the regime of the Straits is the concern
of other States besides the Black Sea powers. His
Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, agree
with the Soviet view that the future regime should
[39]
" See Annex, p. 49.
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be the concern of the Black Sea powers and Turkey
alone.
"As regards the fifth propo?al that Turkey and
the Soviet Union should organize the defense of
the Straits by joint means His Majesty's Govern-
ment consider that Turkey, as the territorial power
concerned, should continue to be responsible for
defense and control of the Straits."
The Turkish Note, August 2Z, 1946
The Turkish Government replied to the Soviet
note on August 22, 1946 in a very detailed state-
ment,17 indicating that it had examined the Soviet
position "with all the more attention" since the
"international importance" of the question of the
Straits was "only surpassed by the vital interest"
which it represented "from the Turkish national
point of view". After repeating the thesis ad-
vanced in the Soviet note of August 7, the Turkish
note gave a detailed answer as to the charges con-
cerning the passage of Axis vessels through the
Straits, as follows:
1. The motor-vessel Seel alke, of 37 tons, flying
the German commercial flag and not listed in the
record of war fleets, arrived at the entrance of the
Dardanelles on July 6, 1941, requesting passage
to go to Constanza. Since the vessel had none of
the characteristics of warships listed in annex II
of the Montreux Convention, it was authorized to
pass through the Straits.
2. The Italian vessel T arvisio passed the Straits
in June 1941 as a commercial vessel. The passage
was brought to the attention of the Turkish For-
eign Ministry as fraudulent since the vessel had
been listed as an auxiliary warship. Italy ex-
plained, however, that it had been removed from
this list. Nevertheless the Turkish Government
ordered that passage be stopped on the next at-
tempt of the Tarvisio. When it appeared on
August 9, 1941 at the Dardanelles passage was
refused. After remaining at canakkale for 25
days with its radio apparatus sealed, the T arvisio
turned back into the Mediterranean on September
2, 1941. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union,
on August 25, 1941, expressed his gratitude for the
decision of the Turkish Government in this case
and "confirmed that his government fully shared
the Turkish point of view as regards the admis-
sibility of the right to change auxiliary war vessels
into commercial vessels."
3. During November and December 1942 no
German merchant vessels passed the Straits to-
[40]
ward the Black Sea. From January 1, 1943 to
January 1, 1944 only 10 German merchant ships,
displacing in all 19,476 tons, passed through the
Straits into the Black Sea.
4. Ships of the Ems type each displaced less
than 100 tons, were not armed, had freight holds,
and carried wood, coal or fodder. Ships of the
Kriegstran,sport type had the character of mer-
chant ships, were not represented in the list of
German auxiliary warships, and could not be in-
cluded in any of the categories of annex II of
the convention. When the British Embassy in-
formed the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the
Kriegstransport type were in the service of the
German navy, passage was refused.19
Although the Turkish Government could not
accept the Soviet charges concerning its alleged
conduct during the war, it was prepared to admit
that the definitions of warships in annex II of
the Montreux Convention and provisions "by-
passed by events and weakened by experience,
need to be adapted to technical progress and pres-
ent conditions". It was, indeed, prepared for a
revision of the Montreux Convention through an
international conference including the signatories
and the United States of America.
But the Turkish Government was unable to
accept point 4 of the Soviet note of August 7,
which called for the establishment of a regime of
the Straits by Turkey and the other Black Sea
powers. Nor could the Turkish Government ac-
cept point 5 as to the setting up of a joint Turco-
Soviet system of defense for the Straits. From
the Turkish point of view, the Soviet proposal was
n Among other places, the Turkish note of Aug. 22 was
published in the New York Times, Aug. 23, 1946.
18 See also Cemil Bilsel, "International Law in Turkey,"
American Journal of International Law, October 1944,
vol. xxxviii, no. 4, pp. 553-556. Ahmed Siikril Esmer, "The
Straits: Crux of World Politics," Foreign, Affairs, January
1947, vol. xxv, no. 2, pp. 290-302. It may also be noted
that at this time the Soviet Government published a
series of captured German documents bearing on
Turkey, a review of which appeared in Pravda,
Aug. 11, 1946, and in the New Times, Aug. 15,
1946, no. 16, pp. 26-30. The full publication consisting
of 36 documents is: Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Ministerstva
Inostrannikh Diel Soiuza SSR. Dokumenti Ministerstva
Inostrannikh Diet Germalvii. Vipusk II. Germ,anskaia Po-
litika v. Turtsii (1941-1943). OGIZ--Gospolitizdat. 1946.
19 For Mr. Eden's statement in the House of Commons on
this subject see Parliamentary Debates. House of Com-
mons. Official Report, vol. 400, no. 90, June 14, 1944, cols.
1986-88.
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"not compatible with the inalienable rights of
sovereignty of Turkey nor with its security, which
brooks no restriction". Moreover, it was felt that
from the international point of view, the Soviet
proposal raised the- "gravest objections". In the
Turkish view, the surest guaranty for the security
of the U.S.S.R. in the Black Sea lay "not in the
search for a privileged strategic position in the
Straits, a position incompatible with the dignity
and sovereign rights of an independent country,
but in the restoration of friendly and trusting rela-
tions with a strong Turkey," determined to in-
augurate the happy era of friendly relations, "but
whose efforts in this direction must be seconded
by an equal good will coming from its northern
neighbor." The Turkish Government also felt
that the security of each country was under the
guaranty of the United Nations, of which both
Turkey and the U.S.S.R. were members.
The Soviet Note, September 24,1946
The Soviet Government answered the Turkish
note on September 24, 1946, substantially reiter-
ating the position taken in the Soviet statement
of August 7, 1946. The second note repeated the
charges of violations of the Montreux Convention
during the recent war. It took account of the
Turkish acceptance of the first three principles set
forth in the August 7 note concerning commercial
freedom in the Straits, opening of the Straits to
the warships of Black Sea powers, and closure to
warships of non-riparian .powers "except in cases
especially provided for". These principles had
been enunciated in the American note of November
2, 1945.
In view of the Turkish objections, the Soviet
note discussed points 4 and 5, involving the estab-
lishment of a regime of the Straits by the Black
Sea powers and Turkey and the setting up of a
joint Turco-Soviet system of defense for the
Straits, at some length. In the opinion of the So-
viet Government, since the Straits led into the
closed Black Sea and differed, therefore, from
world seaways like Gibraltar or the Suez Canal,
it was necessary that a regime of the Straits which
would above all meet the special situation and the
security of Turkey, the U. S. S. R., and the other
Black Sea powers should be established. The
note indicated that Turkey had accepted the prin-
ciple of the elaboration of a regime of the Straits
by Turkey and the Black Sea powers in the treaties
of Moscow (March 16, 1921) and Kars (October
13, 1921) and in the Turco-Ukrainian agreement
of January 2, 1922.20
The Soviet Government also elaborated on the
theme of joint Turco-Soviet defense of the Straits,
pointing, among other things, to the passage of the
German cruisers Goeben and Breslau in August
1914 through the Straits as well as to alleged inci-
dents during World War II.21 The fact that the
Soviet Union had a shoreline of some 1,100 miles
along the Black Sea which gave access to important
regions of the U. S. S. R. was also cited as a reason
for direct participation of the Soviet Union in the
defense of the Turkish Straits. In the Soviet view,
only a joint system of defense could offer genuine
security to all parties directly concerned, namely
Turkey and the Black Sea states.
The Soviet Government also expressed the view
that its position as to joint defense was entirely
consonant with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations since the proposal was intended
to serve not only the general interests of interna-
tional commerce but to create the conditions for
the maintenance of the security of the powers of
the Black Sea and to contribute to the consolida-
tion of the general peace.
Finally, the Soviet note stated the Soviet view,
in the light of the Potsdam Conference, that the
Montreux Convention should be 'revised to meet
present conditions and that the calling of a con-
ference for this purpose should be preceded by a
discussion of the- question through direct pour- I
parlers between governments.
The American Note of October 9,1946
Although the Soviet note- of September 24 was
not addressed to the United States, the American
Government again expressed its views in a note of
October 9, 1946,22 reiterating its earlier position,
expressed on November 2, 1945 and August 19,
1946. The United States Government recalled?
"that in the Protocol of the proceedings of the
Potsdam Conference, signed by the U.S.S.R.,
Great Britain and the United States, the three
Governments recognized that the Convention on
the Straits concluded at Montreux should be re-
vised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It
was further agreed in the Protocol that as the next
[41]
" For texts see p. 21.
" For details as to the Goeben and Breslau see Foreign
Relations, 1914, Supp., pp. 62, passim.
22 See Annex, p. 59.
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step the matter should be the subject of direct con
versations between each of the three Governments
and the Turkish Government."
The American Government understood that the
three governments, in agreement with each other
as to the desirability of revision of the Montreux
Convention, "mutally recognized that all three
signatories of the Protocol have an interest in the
regime of the Straits and in any changes which
might be made in that regime". Although the
United States, in its note of August 19, 1946, had
indicated that the regime of the Straits was a mat-
ter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers
but to other powers, including the United States,
the Soviet Government had reiterated its position
as to the establishment of a new regime of the
Straits by the Black Sea powers in the Soviet note
of September 24.
The American Government did not believe the
Potsdam agreement contemplated that the "direct
conversations" envisaged in the protocol "should
have the effect of prejudicing the participation of
the other two signatory powers in the revision
of the regime of the Straits". On the contrary,
the United States considered that the Potsdam
agreement "definitely contemplated only an ex-
change of views with the Turkish Government as
useful preliminary to a conference of all the in-
terested powers, including the United States, to
consider the revision of the Montreux Conven-
tion". Finally, the United States reiterated its
view that "the Government of Turkey should con-
tinue to be primarily responsible for the defense of
the Straits and that should the Straits become the
object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor,
the resulting situation would be a matter for action
on the part of the Security Council of the United
Nations". ?
The British Note of October 9,1946
The British Government replied to the Soviet
Government on the same day, October 9. Like
the American Government, Great Britain indi-
cated that the Potsdam agreement "laid it down
that as the next step" the problem of revision of
the Montreux Convention should be "the subject
of direct conversations between each of the three
Governments and the Turkish Government".
In addition, however, the British Government
stressed that the "next step" had already been
completed "by the exchange of views which have
[42]
now taken place between these Govern' ments". It,
therefore, saw "no need for or purpose in continu-
ing direct correspondence on the subject". Al-
though the British attitude towards points 4 and
5 of the Soviet note of August 7 remained as the
Foreign Office had stated it on August 21, Great
Britain was ready to attend a conference of the
Soviet Union, the United States, the United King-
dom, France, and all other signatories of the
Montreux Convention, with the exception of Ja-
pan, "to consider a revision of that Convention".
The Turkish Note of October 18, 1946
In its note of October 18, 1946 the Turkish Gov-
ernment reaffirmed its earlier position, once more
replying point by point to the Soviet charges of
misconduct during the recent war. The note re-
iterated certain difficulties in the technical distinc-
tions of annex II of the Montreux Convention be-
tween warships and commercial vessels. The note
stressed, however, that the "real threat to the
rn
security of the Soviet Black Sea shores came from
the occupation of a large part of the shore of that
Sea by the German Armies, from the German
possession of the Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets
and from the presence of German and Italian
ships sent to the Black Sea ports by rail or through
the Danube." The Turkish Government believed,
however, that the Montreux Convention required
revision. In the first place, annex II, which de-
fined warships, required technical revision. More-
over, the provisions of the Montreux Convention
relative to the League .of Nations would have to
give way to the system established by the United
Nations, "in its task of preserving the peace of
the world". Finally, Japan should be removed
from the list of contracting parties, and the United
States should become a signatory of the revised
convention. It was within this framework that the
Turkish Government envisaged an eventual revi-
sion of the Montreux Convention and was willing
to be represented at a conference for revision of
the convention. It would, therefore, make no dif-
ficulty concerning such a conference.. Neverthe-
less, the Turkish Government could not admit
"unfounded complaints tending to justify this re-
vision on the basis of an alleged responsibility on
its part, born of pretended violations of the re-
gime of the Straits in the course of the Second
World War".
Once more, the Turkish Government took special
note of the Soviet contention that the regime of
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the Straits shOuld be elaborated by Turkey and the
Black Sea powers, in view of their special interests
and in view of the fact that, in the Soviet view, the
Black Sea was a "closed sea". In reply the Turkish
Government pointed out that the Montreux
Convention had already established "a preferen-
tial regime in favor of the riverain Powers". But
it was unable to accept the Soviet reasoning based
on the 1921-1922 treaties or the argument as to the
"closed sea". Moreover, it pointed out that, in
accordance with the Montreux Convention revision
could take place "in an international conference
uniting the contracting States and in accordance
with a procedure foreseen by the text of the con-
vention itself".
The Turkish Government agreed with the Soviet
Government that the Montreux Convention went
further than the Lausanne Convention of the
Straits and established "a sharply-defined system
of preference" for the benefit of the Black Sea
powers. Nevertheless, it was also clear to the
Turkish Government that the three principles for
revision of the convention proposed by the United
States, supported by Great Britain, Turkey, and
the Soviet Union offered the possibility "of giving
greater satisfaction to the Soviet desiderata".
Likewise, the Turkish Government could not ac-
cept point 5 as to the establishment of a joint
Turco-Soviet system for defense of the Straits,
which it continued to regard "as incompatible with
the sovereignty and the security of Turkey, with-
? out previously having examined the concrete sug-
gestions of the Soviet Government on this subject".
? The question had been discussed in the Saracoglu-
Molotov discussions in September and October
1939. Acceptance by Turkey of a joint system
of defense of the Straits "would mean no less than
the sharing of her sovereignty with a foreign
power". Turkey was anxious for friendship with
the Soviet Union, however, and it urged stress on
the United Nations as the hope for the security
and peace of all nations.
Relying on the explanations of its attitude, the
Turkish Government was convinced that it had
established tangible proof of its good-will and of
its spirit of conciliation in agreeing to participate
in a conference for revision of the Montreux Con-
vention. It appealed to the Soviet Government
to study, in its turn, the reflections which the
Turkish proposals might evoke, with the same
good-will and objectivity. The Turkish Govern-
ment felt that the direct conversations contem-
plated by the Potsdam Conference had been ful-
filled, and doubted the usefulness and advisability
of continuing to follow the same procedure as to
exchange of views by correspondence. It there-
fore declared its readiness to attend a conference
for revision of the Straits convention at which
representatives of the Soviet Union, the United
States, Great Britain, and France, and the signa-
tories of the Montreux Convention, with the ex-
ception of Japan, would attend.
IV. Toward the End of the Great Debate
By the fall of 1946 the great debate over the
question of the Turkish Straits, in which the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,
and Turkey had outlined their fundamental posi-
tion concerning the problem, appeared to be draw-
ing to a close. There was no indication, however,
that the argument was really over.
On October 22, 1946,23 Mr. Bevin summarized
the British position as it stood after the exchange
of notes which had taken place since August 7.
He advised the House of Commons of the Potsdam
agreement, adding that he thought "there should
be a discussion between the great powers and
Turkey, in order to consider a revision of the
Montreux Convention". The basic British posi-
tion was more or less as follows, according to the
British Foreign Minister:
"At the various international conferences during
the last three or four years, and in their latest cor-
respondence with the Turkish Government, the
Soviet Government have made it clear that they
are anxious to obtain a base in the Straits, which
would ensure, in effect, that the control of this
waterway would rest in the hands of the Soviet
Union and not in the hands of the territorial Power
most clearly concerned. His Majesty's Government
have made it clear that in their view, if this were
adopted, it would involve an unwarrantable inter-
ference with the sovereignty of Turkey, and the
effect of it would be to put her really under foreign
domination, and would also represent an improper
interference with the rights of other Powers con-
[43]
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Com-
mons. Official Report, vol. 427, no. 201, Oct. 22, 1946,
cols. 1500-1502.
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cerned. During the last two months, the Soviet
Government have placed their views publicly on
record in two Notes to the Turkish Government,
which have received wide publicity. I repeat that
His Majesty's Government do not dispute that the
existing Convention requires modification in cer-
tain respects to bring it into accord with present
day conditions. For instance, at present Japan
is one of the signatories. The Convention itself
contains a number of references to the League of
Nations and the definition of warships given in an
annex to the Convention is clearly out of date. We
agreed at Potsdam with the United States and the
Soviet Government that as a next step matters
should be the subject of direct conversations be-
tween each of the three governments concerned,
and the Turkish Government. But, while recog-
nising that revision is necessary, His Majesty's
Government are very anxious to keep the inter-
national aspect of this waterway always in view."
Mr. Bevin took note of the Soviet charges that the
Montreux Convention -had not prevented enemy
powers "from using the Straits for hostile pur-
poses against the Soviet Union, and other Allied
States". The British Government, although it had
had "some difference of opinion with the Turkish
Government about the interpretation of the Con-
vention, held that, on the whole, its terms had
been conscientiously observed". The British Gov-
ernment was unable to accept the position that the
regime of the Straits should be reserved. to the
Black Sea powers alone and that Turkey and the
Soviet Union should jointly organize the defense
of the Straits. Against this view, Great Britain
had pointed out the international character of the
Straits and had declared that the proposal for a
joint Turco-Soviet system of defense "was not ac-
ceptable". As the territorial power, Turkey
"should continue to be responsible for the defence
and control of the Straits". This view was similar
to that of the United States. Mr. Bevin now felt,
in view of the exchange of notes, in which the
powers had outlined their basic positions, in ac-
cordance with the Potsdam Agreement, "any fur-
ther discussions should . . . take place at
an international conference" for the revision of
the Montreux Convention. If such a conference
were called, of the United States, Great Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and all the other sig-
natories of the Montreux Convention, other than
[44]
Japan, Great Britain would be glad to join, "and
to strive hard for an agreed solution of this
difficult problem". A solution of the problem
should take into account "the legitimate interests
of Turkey and the Soviet Union", with both of
which Great Britain had treaties of alliance. But
any solution should "respect the sovereignty of
Turkey and the interest of other Powers concerned
outside the Black Sea". The British Foreign Min-
ister believed that if the case were "not pushed uni-
laterally, and is dealt with on an international
basis," a solution would be found. Matters had,
nevertheless, been made much more awkward by
"the war of nerves" which had been carried on,
and the British Government was convinced that if
this ceased, "a new atmosphere would be created
which would enable the matter to be dealt with on
a much better footing".
There was a similar note in the address of
President Inonii to the Turkish Grand National
Assembly on November 1, 1946 24 in which the
question of security was listed as the first among
Turkish problems. President Inonii desired to
see the war followed by a general settlement
among nations, and noted especially the fact that
Turkey was now faced with the question of a re-
vision of the Montreux Convention of the Straits.
In particular, President Inonii declared:
"We agree that it is necessary to improve the
Montreux Convention in a manner conforming to
new conditions, in keeping with the methods and
within the limits clearly foreseen by Montreux.
We are considering with good-will that the Con-
vention in question should become the subject of
conversations at an international conference. We
shall welcome wholeheartedly any modifications
which take into consideration the legitimate in-
terests of each of the interested parties on the
basis of ensuring the territorial integrity and
sovereign rights of Turkey. We are convinced
with a perfectly clear conscience that, during the
second world war, the Montreux Convention was
24 Turkish Embassy, Washington, Press Release, no. 13,
Nov. 13, 1946. See also the more general remarks of
Ambassador Huseyin R. Baydur in the United Nations
General Assembly on Oct. 26, 1946 in which he indicated
that "Arms and military might are powerful weapons,
but the force of world opinion is far more potent. It may
be defied for a time, but it cannot be flaunted always and
forever." (Journal of the United Nations, no. 16, p. 89.)
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applied by us with the greatest attention; and the
allegation to the effect that the Montreux Con-
vention was applied with a bias in favor of the
Axis Powers is manifestly unjust. We have
nothing to fear from submitting our actions to ex-
amination and decision by arbitration. Inasmuch
as concerns the question of the Straits, too, we per-
ceive in the United Nations Charter every pos-
sible guarantee for ourselves and for every other
nation concerned. So long as the clauses of the
United Nations Charter concerning territorial in-
tegrity and sovereign rights are respected, no
obstacle should exist to prevent the adjustment
and improvement of relatiOns between ourselves
and the Soviet Union. It is our well-considered
and sincere desire to have friendly and confidence-
inspiring relations with the Soviet Union, as be-
fits two neighbors."
NOTE: The preceding article is reprinted from the De-
partment of State Bulletin of Jan. 26, 1947.
[45]
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?Annex
EXCHANGE OF NOTES
The American Ambassador in Turkey to the
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs
ANKARA, November 0, 1945.
EXCELLENCY:
I have the honor, under instructions of my Gov-
ernment, to inform Your Excellency as follows:
The American Government has given careful
consideration to the Turkish Government's note
of August 20, 1945, together with the aide-memoire
attached thereto, concerning the question of the
Straits.
The Turkish Government is no doubt aware that
at the recent conference in Berlin, the President of
the United States concurred with Premier Stalin
and Prime Minister Attlee (1) that the convention
of 1936 signed at Montreux regarding the regime
of the Straits should be revised to meet present
day conditions and (2) that the matter would be
the subject of direct conversations between each of
the three governments and the Turkish Govern-
ment. It is the earnest hope of the Government
of the United States that the problem of the con-
trol and use of the Straits can be solved in a man-
ner which will promote international security, will
show due consideration for the interests of Turkey
and all Black Sea riparian powers, and will assure
the free use of this important waterway to the
commerce of all nations.
It is the understanding of the Government of
the United States that the Montreux Convention
is subject to revision in 1946. This government
suggests that an international conference be held
for the purpose of revising the convention in order
that the regime of the Straits may be more in
harmony with changed world conditions. The
Unite'd States, if invited, would be pleased to par-
ticipate in such a conference.
The Government of the United States is of the
opinion that a revision of the Montreux conven-
tion undertaken to meet changed world conditions
should be based on the following principles:
, (1) The Straits to be open to the merchant ves-
sels of all nations at all times;
(2) The Straits to be open to the transit of the
warships of Black Sea powers at all times;
(3) Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time
of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied
to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all
times, except with the specific consent of the Black
Sea powers or except when acting under the au-
thority of the -United Nations; and
(4) Certain changes to modernize the Montreux
Convention; such as the substitution of the United
Nations -system for that of the League of Nations
and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.
The British and Soviet Governments are also
being informed of the American Government's
views set forth above.
Please accept [etc.] EDWIN C. WILSON
His Excellency
HASAN SAKA,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ankara.
[47]
II
The Soviet Charge at Washington to the Acting
Secretary of Statel
[Translation]
EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Washington, D. C ., August 7, 1946.
SIR:
By direction of the Soviet Government I have
the honor to communicate to you the following:
As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three
Powers on the question of the Montreux Conven-
This note, which was presented to the Turkish Govern-
ment in Ankara, was also transmitted to the United States
Government and to the Government of the United
Kingdom.
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tion adopted a resolution, whereby the-three gov-
ernments declared that the said convention should
be revised, since it does not correspond to present
conditions: At the same time the three govern-
ments agreed that this question was to be the sub-
ject of direct negotiations between each of the
three powers and the Turkish Government. In
accordance with this, the Soviet Government on
August 7 of this year addressed to the Turkish
Government a note which is transcribed below:
"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. has the honor to inform the Turkish
Government of the following:
"Events which occurred during the past war
clearly indicated that the regime of the Black Sea
Straits, established by the Straits Convention,
signed in 1936 at Montreux, does not meet the in-
terests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and
does not insure conditions under which the use of
these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black
Sea Powers would be prevented.
"It will suffice to mention a series of incidents
during this war, when the Axis Powers directed
their warships and auxiliary craft through the
Straits into the Black Sea and out of the Black
Sea, which in its turn gave rise to the correspond-
ing steps and protests registered by the Soviet
Government with the Turkish Government.
"On July 9, 1941 the German command sent the
German patrol boat See falke through the Straits
into the Black Sea, which was a gross violation of
the Straits Convention and called forth a protest
to the Turkish Government on the part of the
Soviet Government. _
"In August, 1941, Turkish authorities gave the
Italian auxiliary war vessel Tarvisio permission
to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea,
which likewise called forth a representation on
the part of the Soviet Government, calling to the
attention of the Turkish Government the fact that
the passage of the Italian auxiliary vessel into the
Black Sea would appear to be a violation of the
Straits Convention.
"On November 4, 1942, the Soviet Government
again called to the attention of the Turkish Gov-
ernment the fact that Germany planned to send
to the Black Sea through the Straits auxiliary war-
ships under the guise of merchant vessels with a
total displacement of 140,000 tons. These vessels
were intended for the transfer of military forces
[48]
and war materials of the Axis countries into the
Black Sea. In its representation, the Soviet Gov-
ernment emphasized the fact that 'the admission
of the aforementioned vessels through the Straits
into the Black Sea would be an obvious violation
of the Convention regarding the regime of the
Straits concluded in Montreux, inasmuch as these
vessels are left at the disposal of the German Gov-
ernment and are in reality auxiliary warships.'
"In June, 1944, the Soviet Government registered
a protest against the fact that toward the end of
May and early in June of 1944 there took place a
series of passages through the straits from the
Black Sea into the Aegean Sea of German war-
ships and auxiliary warships of varying tonnage
of the Ems (8 vessels) and, Kriegstransport (5
vessels) types, which had taken part in the naval
operations in the Black Sea.
"It is obvious from the aforementioned facts
that at the time of the past war with Germany and
her allies, the Straits Convention did not prevent
the enemy powers from using the straits for mili-
tary purposes against the U.S.S.R. and other allied
powers, with the Turkish Government not being
able to escape the responsibility for this situation.
"In view of this, the Soviet Government sug-
gested to the Berlin Conference of the Three Pow-
ers?Great Britain, the United States of America
and the Soviet Union, which took place in July and
August 1945, to discuss the question that the
regime of the Straits, established by the Montreux
Convention, does not conform to present condi-
tions and that it is necessary to establish a new
regime of the Straits. As is known, the Berlin
Conference of the Three Powers adopted a resolu-
tion consisting of the following:
"a) The three governments declared that the
Convention regarding the Straits, concluded in
Montreux, should be revised, as it does not meet
the conditions of the present time;
"b) The three governments agreed that as the
proper course the said question would be the sub-
ject of direct negotiations between each of the
three powers and the Turkish Government.
"The Soviet Government is also acquainted
with the contents of the note of November 2, 1945
of the Government of the United States of
America and with the note of the British Govern-
ment of November 21, 1945 addressed to the Gov-
ernment of Turkey on this question.
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"For its own part, the Soviet Government pro-
poses to establish for the Straits a new regime,
proceeding from the following principles:
"1) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of merchant ships of all countries.
"2) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
"3) Passage through the Straits for warships
not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not
be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
"4) The establishment of a regime of the
Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the
Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come
under the competence of Turkey and other Black
Sea powers.
"5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the
powers most interested and capable of guarantee-
ing freedom to commercial navigation and security
in the Straits, shall organize joint means of de-
fense of the Straits for the prevention of the
utilization of the Straits by other countries for
aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.
"The Soviet Government is informing the gov-
ernments of the United States of America and
Great Britain regarding the present declaration."
The Soviet Union has directed me to bring this
to the knowledge of the Government of the United
States of America.
Accept [etc.] FEDOR OREKHOV
Acting Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON,
Department of State, Washington.
III
The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Charge
at Washington
August 19, 1946.
SIR.:
I acknowledge receipt of your note of August
7, 1946 which sets forth the text of the note ad-
dressed on the same day by the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Government of the Republic of Turkey and ex-
press the appreciation of this Government for the
.courtesy of the Soviet Government in making this
information available.
1 Copies of this note have also been transmitted to the
Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Turkey,
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which were among the
signatories of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936.
It will be recalled that the American Embassy
in Moscow made available to the Soviet Govern-
ment in November 1945 a copy of the note which
the American Embassy in Ankara delivered to the
Turkish Government on November 2, 1945.
This Government has given careful study to the
views expressed by the Soviet Government in its
note to the Turkish Government. It would ap-
pear from a comparison of this Government's note
of November 2, 1945 with the Soviet note to the
Turkish Government of August 7, 1946 that the
views of the Governments of the United States
and of the Soviet Union, while not in entire accord,
are in general agreement with regard to the three
following proposals set forth in the Soviet note:
"1. The Straits should be always open to the
passage of merchant ships of all countries.
"2. The Straits should be always open to the
passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
"3. Passage through the Straits for warships
not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not
be permitted except in cases specially provided
for."
The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note
does not appear to envisage a revision of the Mon-
treux Convention as suggested in our note to the
Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but
rather the establishment of a new regime which
would be confined to Turkey and the other Black
Sea powers. It is the view of this Government
that the regime of the Straits is a matter of con-
cern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to
other powers, including the United States. This
Government cannot, therefore, agree with the
Soviet view that the establishment of the regime
of the Straits should come under the competence
of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other
powers.
The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the
Soviet Government was that Turkey and the
Soviet Union should organize joint means of de-
fense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this
Government that Turkey should continue to be
primarily responsible for the defense of the
Straits. Should the Straits become the object of
attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the re-
sulting situation would constitute a threat to in-
ternational s'ecurity and would clearly be a mattei-
for action on the part of the Security Council of
the United Nations.
[49]
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It is observed that the note of the Soviet Gov-
ernment contains no reference to the United Na-
tions. The position of the Government of the
United States is that the regime of the Straits
should be brought into appropriate relationship
with the United Nations and should function in a
manner entirely consistent with the principles and
aims of the United Nations.
The Government of the United States reaffirms
its willingness to participate in a conference called
to revise the Montreux Convention.
Accept [etc.]
DEAN ACHESON
Acting Secretary of State
MR. FEDOR T. OREKHOV,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim of tite
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to the Soviet Charge at London,
August 01, 1946
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of
your note of 8th August in which you communi-
cated to me the text of a note which the Soviet
Government had delivered to the Turkish Gov-
ernment on the 7th August concerning the future
of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Gov-
ernment will already be aware from the communi-
cation addressed to the Soviet Government by
His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow on the 23-rd
November, 1945 that His Majesty's Government
are of the opinion that a revision of the Montreux
Convention is desirable and that they would, if
the Soviet Government or the Turkish Govern-
ment desired to call a conference for the revision
of the Convention, be ready to take part in its
work. His Majesty's Government have conse-
quently given careful consideration to the pro-
posals which the Soviet Government have now
put forward for the new regime which they con-
sider should be established in the Straits.
Before, however, they comment on the pro-
posals put forward by the Soviet Government,
His Majesty's Government wish to point out that
the agreements reached regarding this question
at the Potsdam Conference, as recorded in Section
XVI of the Protocol of the Conference, were that
as a next step the matter should be the subject of
direct conversations between each of the three
Governments and the Turkish Government. It
was not, as is suggested in the second paragraph
of the note under reply, agreed at Potsdam that
the matter should be the subject of direct negotia-
tions between each of the three Powers and the
Turkish Government.
As regards the proposals now put forward by
the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Govern-
ment note that there is no mention in these pro-
posals of the United Nations. His Majesty's
Government desire to place it on record that in
any modification of the Montreux Convention the
regime should be consistent with the purpose and
principles of the United Nations. Subject to this
His Majesty's Government wish to offer no com-
ments at the present stage upon the first three
proposals made by the Soviet Government.
As regards the fourth proposal, however, His
Majesty's Government would point out that it has
for long been internationally recognised that the
regime of the Straits is the concern of other States
besides the Black Sea Powers. His Majesty's
Government cannot therefore agree with the
Soviet view that the future regime should be the
concern of the Black Sea Powers and Turkey
alone. As regards the fifth proposal, that Turkey
and the Soviet Union should organise the defence
? of the Straits by joint means, His Majesty's Gov-
ernment consider that Turkey, as the territorial
power concerned, should continue to be respon-
sible for the defence and control of the Straits.
In conclusion, His Majesty's Government wish
to make it clear once again that they would be
ready to attend an international conference to
discuss a revision of the 1936 Convention if all
the interested parties agree.
V
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy in Turkey
Despatch 1057
[Translation]
ANKARA, August 00, 1946.
The Government of the Republic has examined
with the greatest interest the note dated August
-7, 1946 which the Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics delivered to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs concerning the question of the
[50]
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Straits. The Government of the Republic has ex-
amined this note with all the more attention in
that it expresses the Soviet point of view on a
question of which the international importance is
only surpassed by the vital interest which it rep-
resents from the Turkish national point of view.
From the reading of this note it appears that, in
the opinion of the Soviet Government, the events
which took place during the second World War
clearly showed that the regime established by
the Montreux Convention did not correspond to
the interests of the Black Sea Powers, and does not
insure the conditions under which the use of the
Straits for purposes hostile to the Black Sea Pow-
ers would be prevented. In support of this thesis
the note recalls the passage in both directions
through the Straits of war vessels and auxiliary
war vessels of the Axis such as the See falke, and
the Tarvisio, and of ships designed for the trans-
port of troops, a combination of facts, which, in
the opinion of the Soviet Government, established
proof of the possibility of the use of the Straits
by Powers enemy to the Soviet Union and the other
allied states, a use for which the Turkish Govern-
ment, adds the note, could not declare itself unre-
sponsible.
Then, after a concise account of the Anglo-
American-Soviet deliberations at Potsdam in July
and August, 1945 on the subject of the Straits,
deliberations as a result of which the three powers
under reference decided:
a. that the Montreux Convention, as not cor-
responding to present conditions, should be
revised,
b. that this question would be the object of direct
conversations between each of the powers and the
Turkish Government, the note reveals the Soviet
proposals for the establishment of a new Straits
regime. These proposals are formulated as fol-
lows:
1) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of merchant vessels of all countries.
2) The Straits should be always open to the
passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
3) The passage of warships of non-Black Sea
Powers through the Straits is not permitted, ex-
cept in cases especially provided for.
4) The establishment of the regime of the
Straits as a natural maritime route leading to and
from the Black Sea should be within the com-
petence of Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers.
5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers
most interested and able to insure the freedom
of merchant navigation and security in the Straits
would insure by their common means the,defense
of the Straits to prevent their use by other states
for purposes hostile to the Black Sea Powers.
Before beginning any examination as to the
form and basis of the Soviet demarche, the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to
pause on the cases of passage through the Straits
by certain Axis vessels, cases cited in the above-
mentioned note in contention of the inefficacy of
the Montreux Convention in order to deduce there-
from a supposed responsibility on the part of the
Turkish Government.
The motor-vessel See falke of 37 tons, flying the
German commercial flag and not listed in the rec-
ord of war fleets, arrived at the entrance of the
Dardanelles on July 6, 1941. It requested passage
through the Straits to go to Constanza.
The vessel was not armed and it only carried on
board a large life raft and a life boat. There was
discovered no indication leading to the supposi-
tion of its use for purposes of war.
Given that the vessel in question presented none
of the characteristics mentioned in Annex II of the
Montreux Convention, treating of the definition,
tonnage, and specifications of warships, the See-
falke was authorized to pass through the Straits.
In the case of the Italian oil tanker Tarvisio the
facts are as follows:
The Tarvisio passed through the Straits in June
1941 as a commercial vessel. Its passage was
brought to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as a case of fraud, in view of the fact that
the ship in question also appeared on the list of
auxiliary ships of the Italian war fleet. When
explanations were requested of the Italian Em-
bassy, the latter declared that the Tarvisio had
been removed from the list of auxiliary war ves-
sels and was sailing exclusively for commercial
purposes. The Government of the Republic
none the less gave the appropriate authorities the
order to stop the Tarvisio upon its next attempt
at passage.
The Tarvisio appeared a second time on August
9, 1941 at the entrance of the Dardenelles. Pas-
sage was refused it. Despite the insistence of the
Italian Embassy, the Government of the Republic
did not change its point of view, which consisted
of not recognizing the right to change, in time of
[51]
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war, auxiliary war vessels into commercial vessels
The Tarvisio after having been at anchor for 25
days off canakkale, with its radio apparatus
sealed, turned back into the Mediterranean on
September 2.
The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, at the time of his visit to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs on August 25, 1941, expressed
the gratitude of the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics for the decision of the
Government of the Republic in this case and con-
firmed that his Government fully shared the Turk-
ish point of view as regards the admissibility of
the right to change auxiliary war vessels into com-
mercial vessels.
The Honorable Embassy mentions as well in its
note a demarehe dated November 4, 1942, having
for purpose the drawing of the attention of the
Turkish Government to the intention of Germany
to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea
auxiliary war vessels displacing a total of 140,000
tons, in the form of merchant vessels.
During the months of November and December
1942, no German merchant vessels passed the
Straits in the direction indicated. From the first
of January 1943 to the first of January 1944 only
10 German merchant vessels, displacing in all
19,476 tons and of which the commercial character
was verified beyond; doubt by the appropriate
authorities, passed through the Straits into the
Black Sea.
As regard s the passage through the Straits
in May and June 1944 of ships of the types Ems
and Kriegstransport, the facts can be stated as
follows:
Ships of the type Ems displaced less ,than
100 tons, were not armed, had freight holds, and,
at the time of their passage, carried cargos of
wood, coal, or fodder. The German Embassy had
declared that they belonged to private shipping
companies and were sailing for purely commercial
purposes.
The ships of the type of Kriegstransport also
had the characteristics of merchant vessels, were
not represented in the list of auxiliary German
war vessels and could not be included in any of
the categories of Annex II of the Convention.
The British Embassy having informed the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs that, according to entirely
reliable information from its Government, said
ships, of which several had already passed through
[52]
the Straits, were in the service of 'the (German)
fleet or used as troop transports, the Turkish naval
authorities stopped at the entrance of the Straits
one of the German ships belonging to this group,
which was requesting passage. Passage was hence-
forth refused to ships of this type.
It results from the preceding explanations that
the objection to the Montreux Convention concerns
less the intrinsic dispositions which govern the
purely juridical aspects of the regime, and
which have kept pace here with circumstances,
than the definitions of warships and their specifica-
tions as well as the calculation of tonnage, which
form the purely technical annex of the Conven-
tion. The exigencies of war of all kinds, the tacti-
cal and strategic needs, made certain belligerents
decide to adopt during the war new types of war
ships which, from the point of view of specifica-
tions and tonnage, departed completely from the
type of war ships defined by the Convention of
Montreux, and presented all the characteristics of
innocent commercial vessels, which, because of this
fact, were controlled by Article 7 of the Con-
vention.
The Government of the Republic, responsible
for applying rigorously the provisions of the Mon-
treux Convention, has always referred, for the
separation of ships requesting passage into war
ships or commercial vessels, to the criterions fixed
by the Convention, and it is in consequence of the
application of these criterions that it, in each case,
refused or authorized passage to the ships in
question. Therefore, there can be no complaints
addressed to it on this point. Moreover, the sur-
veillance exercised by the Turkish authorities over
ships in transit through the Straits was compli-
cated by the fact that the only kind of control to
which the ships in question could be submitted
according to the Convention was limited to a sani-
tary control to be carried out "by day and night
with the greatest possible speed." If, in the ex-
tremely difficult conditions of surveillance and
control, some very few ships were able, by taking
on the characteristics required for commercial
ships, to pass fraudulently through the Straits,
the Government of the Republic hastened, as soon
as it was informed of complaints, to take the neces-
sary measures looking towards preventing the
repetition of the fraud.
The Soviet Government bases all its arguments
leading to obtaining a Straits regime entirely in
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conformity with its own interests upon the al-
legation that the regime established by the
Montreux Convention does not assure the con-
ditions in which the use of the Straits for purposes
hostile to the Black Sea Powers would be pre-
vented. In fact, with the exception of several
cases of fraudulent passage which were the objects
of demarch,es of the Soviet Embassy, not once
during the course of the Second World War did
the Soviet Government inform the Government of
the Turkish Republic of a situation which would
endanger its security in the Black Sea. This atti-
tude, which indicated an appreciable feeling of
internal tranquillity as regards the loyalty of
Turkey, is perfectly understandable, because the
Soviet Union, a power deeply interested in follow-
ing the always uniform political line of its neigh-
bor, was the first to declare, that, despite the
immeasurable advantages which the free use of
the Straits could present for strategic and tactical
purposes, the Axis countries never dared force
the Strait in order to pass their war fleets through.
The Government of the Republic must emphasize
this highly significant abstention, which certainly
did not result from the lack of interest which this
perspective presented to-the Axis countries, as the
clearest proof of the unanimous conviction in-
spired by the capacity and absolute correctness?
correctness carried at times as far as a fanaticism
disregarding even purely Turkish interests?with
which it fulfilled the role of guardian of the
Straits which was given it by history. It is cer-
tainly not the fraudulent passage, under con-
ditions independent of the good faith and good
will of the Turkish authorities, of a very few Axis
auxiliary war vessels hidden under the mask of
commercial vessels which can change the ap-
proach of History as regards the loyal attitude of
the Turkish Government in this connection.
In consequence, the complaint addressed to the
Montreux Convention of not responding to present
conditions cannot be accepted by the Government
of the Republic except in the measure that this
complaint concerns the technical part of the Con-
vention which deals with the definition applicable
to war ships, with their specifications and tonnage,
and the provisions treating of the control of ships
in transit. The Turkish Government acknowl-
edges that the above-mentioned definitions and
provisions, by-passed by events and weakened by
experience, need to be adapted to technical prog-
[53]
ress and present conditions. But it cannot admit
that these facts, destined to remain specific cases,
serve as motives for the rejection in its entirety
of the Convention, which reveals itself as a bal-
anced instrument, and still less for the deduction
of a supposed responsibility in its regard. The
Turkish Government cannot accept that an ex-
tremely limited number of cases of fraudulent
passage through the Straits, moreover rapidly
corrected, were able, in the totality of war opera-
tions, to acquire such an extent that they put the
security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in danger. The Turkish Government believes it-
self in a position to affirm before world public
opinion, and, if such should be necessary, to prove
before an arbitral authority, the good faith and
the high realization of international respon-
sibilities with which it has not ceased, in the
application of the regime of Montreux, to be the
guardian of the Straits.
To return to the practical ends which the
Government of the Soviet Union would appear
to wish to attain through its note of August 7,
the Government of the Republic takes it that it
is a question of putting into application the pro-
cedure for quinquennial revision provided for in
Article 29 of the Montreux Convention. The
choice of the date for giving notice, as well as
the indication of the motives of the proposed
amendments, would seem to militate in favor of
such an interpretation. If such is indeed the
intention of the Government of the Soviet Union,
the request for revision formulated ought, in
order to be admissible, to fulfill certain conditions
provided for in the above mentioned Article 29
of the Convention. It is principally necessary
that the request be supported by one or two con-
tracting parties, depending upon what articles
of the Convention it is a question of modifying.
Then the request thus supported must be notified
to all contracting parties three months before the
expiration of the current period of five years. The
Government of the Republic, which has noted the
desire for revision expressed by the Soviet Govern-
ment, and which moreover desires to satisfy the
wish expressed by American public opinion con-
cerning the use of maritime passages, does not
intend, insofar as it is concerned, to create any
difficulty as regards the placing in application
with the agreement of the signatories of the Mon-
treux Convention and the United States of
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America, and through an international confer-
ence including the above-mentioned powers, of
every demand for revision provided for by the
Convention and the examination of proposed
amendments, in concert with said powers.
As regards the basic part of the question raised,
the Government of the Republic is cognizant of
the five principles constituting the Soviet amend-
ments. It observes that the first three points take
up in more or less identical terms the suggestions
presented on November 2, 1945 by the govern-
ment of the United States for the readaptation
of the Montreux Convention to present condi-
tions. In the report then made to the American
suggestions, the Turkish government stated inter
alia that it pertained to the international con-
ference of signatories provided by the terms of
the Montreux Convention to determine the best
way to conciliate the principle of freedom of
passage through the Straits for merchant and
war vessels with the rights of sovereignty and
security of Turkey.
"That, once it had been informed of the full
viewpoints of the three Powers represented at
Potsdam regarding the Straits question it would
not fail to proceed to a thorough study of the
problem, a study after which it would hasten to
convey its point of view to the three above-men-
tioned Powers; that it was none the less at the
moment permitted to say that the Turkish Govern-
ment received favorably the American suggestions
which, under certain conditions and reservations,
were worthy of being taken as a basis for discus-
sion; that as regards the participation of the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, in the
proposed conference, the Turkish Government re-
garded it not only as a realization of a warm de-
sire but also as an imperative international neces-
sity."
The same answer applies at present to the three
first propositions contained in the Soviet note.
It is not the same case with the propositions con-
tained in points 4 and 5 of said note, which re-
quire more thorough consideration. As regards
point 4 in particular, the Soviet note seems to fore-
see a new Straits regime set up on a new basis
and in the development of which only Turkey and
the powers bordering the Black Sea would partici-
pate to the exclusion of all others. Such a con-
cept seems in the first place to set aside the re-
mainder of the duration of the Montreux Con-
[54]
vention, which is scheduled to exist at least until
1956, and the procedure for revision, which ex-
cludes by definition the setting up of a new regime,
the general economy of which would depart from
the Montreux regime. It seems moreover to desire
to ignore the interests of the other powers signa-
tory to the Convention, which have equal right to
participate in the negotiations and signature of
the revised text and which are making evident in
the most definite manner their desire to take part
in these negotiations.
As for the fifth principle set forth in the Soviet
note, the Government of the Republic states that
this proposition aims at nothing less than organiz-
ing the security of the Straits against all aggres-
sion coming from the Mediterranean, by means of
the establishment of a combined Turco-Soviet de-
fense.
From the national point of view the Soviet
proposition is not compatible with the inalienable
rights of sovereignty of Turkey nor with its se-
curity, which brooks no restriction. Moreover,
from the international point of view, the same
proposition raises as well the gravest objections.
The acceptance of the Soviet thesis would result
in the suppression of the role of factor of equi-
librium and liaison played by Turkey in the Straits
and in building the so-called security of the Black
Sea Powers upon the annihilation of the security
of Turkey. The Turkish Government experi-
ences many difficulties in understanding the Soviet
apprehensions which the new security system set
forth in the August 7 note would remove. The
Government of the Republic considers that Turkey
is herself interested in defending by all her means
the country against all aggression, no matter
whence it comes. History gives no example of a
war in which Turkey has been involved without
the Turkish nation's having accomplished its duty
to the country. It is up to Turkey to take all the
measures necessary to insure the security of the
Country against every danger which may come
from abroad. If Turkey had not been in a posi-
tion to defend by its own means the sovereign
rights which it exercises over the Straits, it would
not have escaped during the greatest war history
has known the fate of its neighbors, which were all
attacked or occupied. Moreover, to desire further
to strengthen a form of defense having already
been proven, at the very moment when all the na-
tions of the world are competing in order to bring
their contribution to create an era of peace and se-
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curity, would be to deny the existence and aims
of the United Nations Charter and would show
toward these same nations, of which the ideal is to
preserve future generations from the scourge of
war, a mistrust of which the Turkish Government
is unable to understand the cause.
The surest guarantee for the security of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Black
Sea resides, not in the search for a privileged stra-
tegic position in the Straits, a, position incompati-
ble with the dignity and sovereign rights of an
independent country, but in the restoration of
friendly and trusting relations with a strong Tur-
key, which, as far as it is concerned, is determined
to dedicate itself with all its strength to the inau-
guration of this happy era, but whose efforts in
this direction must be seconded by an equal good
will coming from its northern neighbor. More-
over, beyond,this important guarantee furnished
by Turkey herself, the Turkish Government, as
co-signatory with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics of the San Francisco Charter, believes
that it has the right to think that, in the new con-
cept of war, the security of each country is under
the guarantee of international forces placed in the
service of the United Nations Organization by
the United Nations, of which the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as well as Turkey are members.
Consequently, even in the wholly improbable
case where the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics feared an attack on its Black Sea positions as
the result of aggression coming from the Mediter-
ranean through the Straits, the Turkish Govern-
ment considers that there would be reason for it
to rely on the efficacy of the United Nations Organ-
ization to which Turkey, as far as it is concerned,
remains firmly attached.
A copy of this note has been sent to the signa-
tories of the Montreux Convention, as well as to
4 the Government of the United States of America,
which Turkey would be happy to see participate
in an international conference for the revision of
the Montreux Convention.
VI
The Soviet Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
.?
[Translation]
September 2445,194B.
The Soviet Government has carefully studied
the note of the Turkish Government dated August
22, which was the response to the note of the
U.S.S.R. Government of August 7 of this year on
the subject of the regime of the Straits of the
Black Sea (Dgtroits de la Her Noire).
In its note of August 7 the Soviet Government
took up a number of cases of the use of the Straits,
in the course of the last war, by the states at war
with the U.S.S.R. and its allies. It was at that
time a question only of cases which have been the
object of representations and specific protests to
the Turkish Government by the Soviet Govern-
ment during the years 1941-2 and 1944, which
does not at all include all the cases of the use of
the Straits by Germany and Italy for the passage
of their warships and their auxiliary warships
into the Black Sea and in the opposite direction.
It is sufficient to mention the repeated passage
through the Straits of German fast pinnaces
(peniehes) in 1942 and 1943, as well as other
similar acts.
The Turkish Government has given its explana-
tions on this subject. However, these explana-
tions have not denied the statements set forth in
the Soviet note of August 7 as far as the concrete
facts are concerned. The reference contained in
the note of the Turkish Government and accord-
ing to which Turkey undertook, upon the demand
of the Government of Great Britain, measures
against the passage through the Straits of German
vessels destined for servicing the German fleet
and for the transportation of German troops
while recognizing that the passage of certain of
these ships through the Straits had been author-
ized prior to the said protest on the part of Great
Britain, only confirms the justice of statement of
the Soviet Government that during the last war
the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy
powers from using the Straits for purposes of the
war against the Allied states.
Consequently, the Soviet Government considers
it necessary to record also the fact that during
the war the Turkish Government ceased to furnish
the belligerent states with reports on the move-
ment of vessels in the Straits, although Turkey
was required to do this in accordance with Article
24 of the Convention.
In its note of August 22, the Turkish Govern-
ment indicates certain circumstances which in its
opinion rendered control in the Straits difficult.
Thus, it is pointed out that in the naval annual
there are no names of warships and auxiliary war
vessels which illegally passed the Straits during
[55]
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the war. However, the Turkish Government cer-
tainly is not unaware that official annuals contain-
ing the complete list of warships and especially
of auxiliary ships, do not exist, especially during
wartime. The Note of the Turkish Government
also states that, in accordance with the Conven-
tion, the only form of control of vessels passing
through the Straits is the sanitary control. But
it is known on the other hand that the Turkish
authorities, by their notices to mariners dated
February 25, and May 6, 1941 and June 27, 1942,
established for transit vessels compulsory stops
and the use of Turkish pilots in the Straits. The
Customs authorities also carried out control of
vessels in transit. If these control measures were
however insufficient, one is nevertheless obliged to
record that during the course of the war the
Turkish Government did not once raise the ques-
tion of whether it was necessary to strengthen the
measures for the control of the passage of vessels
through the Straits.
In the note of the Turkish Government it is
stated that during the second World War the
Soviet Government made no declaration to the
Government of the Turkish Republic concerning
the existence of the threat to the security of the
U.S.S.R. in the Black Sea region. From this, the
said note draws the conclusion that Turkey dis-
charged during the war the task of guardian of
the Straits and that the Axis countries, in view of
the attitude taken by Turkey did not decide to in-
fringe the regime established in the Straits.
The Soviet Government does not consider this
point of view justified and draws the attention of
the Turkish Government to the fact that the re-
peated representations which the U.S.S.R. made
to Turkey on the subject of the passage of enemy
vessels through the Straits during the war prove
the contrary. As to the extent of the above-men-
tioned threat, it is sufficient to recall the fact that
the Soviet High Command, having in mind the
repeated cases of free passage of enemy warships
and auxiliary war vessels through the Straits dur-
ing the war, found itself obliged to withdraw an
important number of military etTectives from the
principal sectors of the war theatre for the de-
fense of the Black Sea region.
All the foregoing confirms that the Straits re-
gime established by the Montreux Convention does
not respond to the security interests of the Black
Sea powers and does not assure conditions in which
[56]
it will be possible to forestall the use of the Straits
for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers. The
explanations given by the Turkish Government
have not overcome, according to the Soviet Gov-
ernment, the above-stated conclusion. These ex-
planations moreover do not furnish the reason
why the Government of Turkey should be relieved
of the responsibility which rests upon it for the
violation of the Straits regime during the war.
In the note of August 7, the Soviet Government
expressed an opinion on the subject of the five
principles which it proposes to advance as a basis
of the establishment of the new regime in the
Straits. To judge from the Turkish note of Au-
gust 22, the Government of Turkey has nothing
against the taking as a basis of discussion the first
three points of the Soviet proposals, namely:
1. The Straits shall always be open to the
passage of merchant vessels of all countries.
2. The Straits 'shall always be open to the
passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
3. The passage of warships of powers non-
riverain of the Black Sea through the Straits is
not allowed, except in cases especially provided
for. (There is no paragraph here in the French
text?the text continues.)
The Soviet Government expresses its satisfac-
tion with the fact that the Turkish Government
is ready to accept as a basis the three above-men-
tioned principles although it pointed out that it
had in view the making later on of certain reserva-
tions.
The Government of Turkey made known its own
opinion with regard to the proposals of the
U.S.S.R. embodied in points 4 and 5 of the Soviet
note of August 7.
In point 4, the Soviet Government proposed to
recognize that the establishment of the regime
of the Straits should be a matter within the com-
petence of Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers.
Since the Turkish Government has indicated a
certain distrust regarding this proposal, the So-
viet Government considers it necessary to dwell
longer on this question.
In accord with this, the Soviet Government
desires before all to invite the attention of the
Turkish Government to the special situation of
the Black Sea as a closed sea. Such a situation
means that the Straits of the Black Sea represent
a seaway leading only to the shores of a limited
number of powers, namely: to the shores of sev-
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era,1 Black Sea Powers. Therefore, it is entirely
natural that the Soviet Union and the other Black
Sea Powers are the most interested in the regu-
lation of the regime of the Straits of the Black
Sea and accordingly their situation in this matter
cannot be compared with that of the other powers.
The destination of these Straits, leading to the
Black Sea which is a closed sea, differs from that
of world seaways such as for example, Gibraltar or
the Suez Canal, giving access not to a limited num-
ber of States, and which, as is known, are seaways
of world importance. With regard to such in-
ternational seaways it is indeed necessary to es-
tablish an international control with the partici-
pation of the Powers most interested, which more-
over, has not yet been realized. With regard to
the Straits of the Black Sea leading into the Black
Sea, which is a closed sea, it seems proper in this
case to establish such a regime of the Straits which
above all would meet the special situation and the
security of Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and the other
Black Sea Powers.
It is the Montreux Conference of which the in-
sufficiency in this matter is evident, which estab-
lished a preferential position for the Black Sea
Powers with regard to the Straits regime. On the
other hand the Turkish Government has agreed
to recognize as a basis the first three points of the
Soviet proposals of last August 7, in which the
special situation of the Black Sea Powers in the
Straits was recognized in a much more definitive
way than in the Montreux Convention. In these
proposals it is stated that on the one hand the
Straits shall be open to the passage of merchant
vessels of all countries and on the other hand only
warships of the Black Sea Powers shall have access
to the Straits, whereas the passage through the
Straits of warships of countries not on the shores
of the Black Sea is not allowed, with the exception
of special cases. As is known, these principles,
bringing into relief the position of the Black Sea
Powers in the Straits in relation with that of
the other countries, have been fully recognized by
the whole world, although they are not duly re-
flected in the Convention in force, adopted at
Montreux.
With reference to the matter under considera-
tion, the Soviet Government deems it necessary
to recall that the special position of the Black
Sea Powers in the Straits was further recognized in
the Soviet?Turkish treaty which was signed March
16, 1921.
In Article 5 of this treaty the following is
stated:
"In order to assure the opening of the Straits
and free passage through these Straits for com-
mercial relations between all peoples, the two
contracting parties are agreed to entrust a special
conference of delegates of the littoral countries
with the definitive drafting of the international
statute of the Black Sea and Straits, provided that
the decisions which it shall take shall not impair
the absolute sovereignty of Turkey, and her capi-
tal Constantinople."
Thus, the Turkish?Soviet treaty of 1921 is based
on the recognition of the necessity of confiding the
drafting of the international statute of the Black
Sea and Straits, to a conference, composed only of
the representatives of riverain countries. There
is an analogous article in the treaty concluded
between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet
Republics on October 13, 1921, as well as in the
treaty concluded between Turkey and the Ukrain-
ian Soviet Socialist Republic on January 21, 1922.
The insertion in the above mentioned treaties of
the article containing the principle of the estab-
lishment of the Straits regime by the riverain
countries of the Black Sea, indicates the great im-
portance attributed to this principle by the said
countries, including Turkey.
All this demonstrates that the proposal of the
Soviet Government set forth in point 4 of its note
of August 7 is in full accord with the above men-
tioned treaties, signed by Turkey. The subsequent
postponement of the putting into force of the pro-
cedure regarding the establishment of the statute
of the Black Sea and of the Straits, contemplated
by these treaties, cannot be justified.
On the other hand, the experience of the last
war proved that the principle of the establishment
of the regime of the Straits which was recognized
in these treaties by Turkey, as well as by the Soviet
Union really meets the legitimate interests of the
Black Sea Powers and is not at all in conflict with
the interests of other countries interested in the
stability of general peace and the security of
nations.
The Turkish Government also opposes point five
of the Soviet note of August 7 in which it is con-
templated that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as
the Powers most interested and best able to assure
freedom of commercial navigation and security in
[57]
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the Straits, assure the defense of the Straits by
joint defense means in order to prevent the usage
of the Straits by other States for purposes hostile
to the Black Sea Powers.
The Turkish Government states that the said
Soviet proposal is incompatible with the sovereign
rights of Turkey and would destroy her security.
The Turkish Government reached this conclusion
long before hearing several concrete considerations
of the Soviet Government on this subject, and
without even having made an attempt to put tinder
joint study the pertinent proposals of the U.S.S.R.
In declining, en bloc, all possibility of joint
study with the Soviet Union of this important
problem, indissolubly linked with the security
interests of the U.S.S.R. and the other Black Sea
Powers, the Turkish Government is in complete
contradiction with its declarations regarding its
desire to reestablish friendly relations with the
U.S.S.R., based on confidence, by considering it
possible to give voice to such suspicions which
had no basis at all and which moreover are incom-
patible with the dignity of the Soviet Union.
Despite the point of view expressed in the Turk-
ish note, the Soviet Government is of the opinion
that only the means of Turkey and the Soviet
Union combined can assure the freedom of com-
mercial navigation as well as the security of the
Straits. Accordingly, the Soviet Government
believes that the application of the above men-
tioned Soviet proposal should not prejudice the
sovereignty of Turkey and should, at the same
time, meet still better the interests of its security,
since the joilit measures of Turkey and the Soviet
Union can assure the safeguarding of these Straits
in much fuller measure than those of Turkey
alone.
The refusal of Turkey to assure the defense of
the Straits jointly with the Soviet Union deprives
the Black Sea Powers of the possibility of guaran-
teeing the necessary security in this region.
During the last war the Axis countries used the
Black Sea for their military operations against
the U.S.S.R., to which contributed the fact that
they were able to send into the Black Sea certain
warships and auxiliary war vessels. There is also
well remembered such a fact as the sudden pas-
sage through the Straits to the Black Sea in 1914
of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau which
upon entering the Black Sea attacked the Russian
[58]
fleet and the Black Sea ports. All this is taken
into consideration in the proposal for the common
Soviet Turkish defense of the Straits having for
purpose the assuring of a strong defense of the
Straits in the interest of Turkey as well as in that
of those of the other Black Sea Powers, which
can not be fully assured by Turkey alone. On the
other hand, if Turkey, after having declined the
proposal of the U.S.S.R., were to set about taking
(s'gtait mise a effectuer) military measures in the
Straits by common accord with several Powers
non-riverain of the Black Sea, this obviously
would be in contradiction with the security inter-
ests of the Black Sea Powers. It would be unjust
to forget that the Soviet Black Sea shores, extend-
ing 2100 kilometers, give access to the most im-
portant regions of the country, wherefore the
necessity for assuring their security with direct
participation of the Soviet Union in the defense
of the Straits, has its origin in the vital interests
of the U.S.S.R. All this explains the reason why
the Soviet Government considers it necessary that
the defense of the Straits should be carried out
by the joint efforts Of Turkey and the Soviet Union
and have for its objective the assuring of the secur-
ity of all the Black Sea States.
Regarding the reference of the Turkish Govern-
ment to the UNO, the Soviet Government believes
it necessary to state that its proposal set forth in
the note of August 7 is entirely in conformity with
the principles and objectives of that organization.
This proposal assures not only the general inter-
ests of international commerce, but creates also the
conditions for the maintenance of the security of
the Black Sea Powers and thereby even contributes
to the consolidation of general peace.
The Soviet Government believes it necessary to
note that the remarks of the Turkish Government,
relating to the procedure for the revision of the
Montreux Convention, do not take into account
the decisions of the Three Power Conference at
Berlin that the Straits Convention, concluded at
Montreux, should be revised as not meeting present
conditions. With regard to the conference on the
subject of the Straits regime, the Soviet Govern-
ment is of the opinion that the calling of this con-
ference should be preceded by as full as possible a
discussion of this question through direct pour-
parlers between the Governments, as was envis-
aged by that same decision.
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VII
The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union
to the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Presented October 9, 1946.1
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that
my Government has studied carefully the contents
of the note of the Soviet Union to Turkey of Sep-
tember 24 relating to the regime of the Straits.
In pursuance of its policy of making clear to all
interested parties its views on matters relating to
the Straits, my Government has instructed me to
inform you that after examining the note referred
to above it continues to adhere to the position out-
lined in its note of August 19, 1946 to the Soviet
Government.
It will be recalled that in the Protocol of the
proceedings of the Potsdam Conference, signed by
the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States,
the three Governments recognized that the Con-
vention on the Straits concluded at Montreux
should be revised as failing to meet present-day
conditions. It was further agreed in the Protocol
that as the next step the matter should be the sub-
ject of direct conversations between each of the
three Governments and the Turkish Government.
It has been the understanding of my Govern-
ment that the three Governments, in agreeing with
one another that the regime of the Straits should
be brought into accord with present-day conditions
by means of a revision of the Montreux Conven-
tion, mutually recognized that all three signatories
of the Protocol have an interest in the regime of
the Straits and in any changes which might be
made in that regime. My Government further-
more informed the Soviet Government in its note
of August 19, that in its view the regime of the
Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black
Sea powers but also to other powers, including the
United States. The Soviet Government, neverthe-
less, in its note of September 24, apparently con-
tinues to take the position set forth in its note of
August 7 to Turkey that "the establishment of a
regime of the Straits . . . should come under
the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea
powers". My Government does not consider that
Copies of this note were distributed on Oct. 10, 1946 to
the representatives in Washington of the following signa-
tories to the Montreux Convention: France, Greece, Ru-
mania, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.
it was contemplated at the Potsdam Conference
that the direct conversations which might take
place between any one of the three signatory gov-
ernments and the Turkish Government with re-
gard to the regime of the Convention of the Straits
concluded at Montreux should have the effect of
prejudicing the participation of the other two
signatory powers in the revision of the regime of
the Straits. On the contrary, my Government con-
siders that the Potsdam Agreement definitely con-
templated only an exchange of views with the
Turkish Government as a useful preliminary to a
conference of all of the interested powers, includ-
ing the United States, to consider the revision of
the Montreux Convention. As stated in its note
of August 19, my Government stands ready to
participate in such a conference.
My Government also feels that it would be
lacking in frankness if it should fail to point out
again at this time, in the most friendly spirit, that
in its opinion the Government of Turkey should
continue to be primarily responsible for the de-
fense of the Straits and that should the Straits be-
come the object of attack or threat of attack by
an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a
matter for action on the part of the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations.
VIII
The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union to
the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Presented October 9,1946.
I have been instructed by my Government to
inform the Soviet Government that the following
are their views on the note dated September 24th
from the Soviet Government to the Turkish Gov-
ernment on the subject of the Straits.
The Potsdam Agreement laid it down that as
the next step this matter should be the subject of
direct conversations between each of the three
Governments and the Turkish Government. But
it is the view of my Government that this "next
step" has been completed by the exchange of
views which have now taken place between these
Governments. My Government therefore see no
need for, or purpose in, continuing direct corre-
spondence on the subject.
While my Government's attitude towards pro-
posals 4 and 5 of the Soviet note of August 8th
remain as stated in the British note of August
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21st, my Government remain ready to attend a _
conference of the four Powers (namely the Soviet
Union, the United States, the United Kingdom
and France) and all other signatories of the
Montreux Convention, excepting Japan, to con-
sider the revision of that Convention.
Ix
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy in Turkey
[Translation]
ANKARA, October .18,1946.
The Government of the Turkish Republic has
taken cognizance of the note of the Soviet Govern-
ment dated September 24, 1946, in reply to the
Turkish note of August 22, regarding the even-
tual revision of the Montreux Convention, It
hastens to set forth, hereunder, the views and
reflections which the meticulous examination of
the above-mentioned document has permitted it
to reach.
In its first part, the Soviet note takes up again
the theme of the alleged use of the Straits by
ships belonging to the countries of the Axis and,
replying to the refutation applied against this
subject in the Turkish note of August 22, it cites
the cases of passage in 1942 and 1943 of German
rapid pinnaces, in order to deduce from them,
once again, the justice of the Soviet allegation.
In its August 22 note in reply, the Government
of the Republic furnished to the Soviet Govern-
ment the most complete explanations on the sub-
ject of the perfect correctness with which Turkey
was able, during the extremely difficult period of
the second World War, to acquit itself of the
task which it assumed because of the Montreux
Convention. It clearly set forth that the few cases
of fraudulent passage which had caused the Soviet
objections arose essentially from the lacunae of
Annex II of the Convention treating of definitions,
specifications, as well as of calculation of tonnages;
that the Annex in question for this reason admitted
of the necessity of an adaptation to present con-
ditions and concepts; and that, moreover, if the
Soviet Government nonetheless considered that it
could raise complaints concerning the execution
of the Montreux Convention, the Government of
the Republic would undertake to show, if neces-
sary, before an arbitral court, the good faith and
the loyalty with which it had conducted itself
in order to assure with perfection theexecution of
[60]
the Convention confided to its care. Therefore,
the Government of the Republic is of the opinion
that, given the definite position taken by the two
parties as regards the appreciation of the substance
and the reality of the facts, it would be desirable
to consider discussion on diplomatic grounds to be
exhausted, the Turkish Government holding it-
self at the disposition of the Soviet Government
to have recourse to arbitration. As regards par-
ticularly the case of the German pinnaces of which
the passage through the Straits seems to be em-
phasized as a violation of the terms of the Con-
vention, let it be sufficient to observe that the
pinnaces in question were constructed in ship-
yards on the Danube under German control, and
their presence in the Black Sea was consequently
completely independent of the will of the Govern-
ment of the Republic. Moreover, if the ships in
question were able to pass through the Straits, it
is also because they did not present any of the
characteristics belonging to auxiliary war vessels
or war vessels.
Along these lines, the Soviet note points out
that, during the war, the Turkish Government
ceased to present to the belligerent states reports on
the movement of ships in the Straits, as it should
have done according to the terms of Article 24 of
the Montreux Convention.
It is appropriate to set forth, first of all, as re-
gards this subject, that the reports in question
ought, according to the terms of Article 24, to
be presented not to the belligerent states, but to
the powers signatory of the Montreux Convention,
as well as to the Secretariat General of the League
of Nations. As regards their non-presentation,.
it suffices to observe that the Turkish Government,
taking on the one hand, into consideration the
principles of refusal of passage for warships of the
belligerents, and foreseeing that, on the other
hand, no neutral power would consider, during the
hostilities, sending warships through the Straits,
considered that the content of the Annual Report
to be furnished to the signatory powers and to the
Secretariat General of the League of Nations
would, because of this, be deprived of their most im-
portant information. As regards the statistics
concerning commercial movements to be included
in the report, the Turkish Government considered
that this movement, reduced to ridiculous pro-
portions because of the hostilities, could not, if it
were made public, but influence unfavorably the
war efforts of the Allied countries, without, more-
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over, any counterpart of usefulness. It therefore
decided to stop sending the report while con-
tinuing to compile it regularly. Moreover, it
brought this fact to the attention of the Secretariat
General of the League of Nations and of the powers
signatory of the Montreux Convention, in Feb-
ruary, 1942 for the report of the year 1941, and in
February, 1943 for that of the year 1942. The
hostilities having ended in 1945, the Annual Re-
ports referring to the years 1941-44 were sent to
the interested states on January 29, 1946. It is
useful to emphasize here that no power signatory
of the Montreux Convention ever raised objections
concerning this attitude of the Turkish Govern-
ment. Let it be equally permitted to add that
another consideration of special nature, which de-
cided the Government of the Republic to enter
upon this course, was present in the discovery that,
during the years under reference, the powers
bordering the Black Sea, including the USSR, did
not think it necessary to conform to the obligation,
set forth in Article 18, Paragraph B, of the
Montreux Convention, to advise the Turkish Gov-
ernment on January 1st and July 1st of each year,
of the total tonnage of their fleets in the Black Sea.
Now the figures to be furnished because of this
obligation were to be the basis of the information
in the Annual Report to be presented by the
Turkish Government. This abstention of Moscow
during the war period was perfectly understand-
able and it never occurred to Turkey to address a
complaint to the Soviet Government because of it.
The Government of the Republic hopes likewise
that the cessation of the sending of the Annual Re-
ports during the same period, for the reasons set
forth above, will no longer be considered by the
USSR as having prejudiced its security in the
Black Sea.
The Soviet note then passes to the discussion of
the grounds of certain other arguments included
in the Turkish note of August 22nd as proofs of
the circumstances which made difficult the control
of the Straits. Notably it denies the probative
character of the official annuals of war fleets,
forcedly incomplete in the war period. Moreover,
as reply to the Turkish argument drawn from
the fact that the only kind of control to which
ships in transit could be submitted, according to
the Convention, was limited to a sanitary control,
the Soviet note recalls the establishment by the
Turkish Government of obligatory stops and of
recourse to pilots in the Straits, as well as the sur-
[61]
veillance by the Turkish customs authorities of
ships in transit. The note adds finally that if the
totality of these control measures was considered
insufficient, on the other hand, not once during the
war did the Turkish Government inform the con-
tracting powers of the need to strengthen them.
The Turkish Government has already strongly
set forth and emphasizes once again that the essen-
tial difficulty in differentiating, between warships
or commercial vessels, as regards ships in transit,
rested in the imperfection of Annex II of the Con-
vention. All the other arguments advanced by
the Turkish note of August 22nd have no other
end than to corroborate this elementary and patent
truth, and to illustrate by facts and examples the
conscious and considered correctness with which
the Turkish authorities applied themselves, having
recourse to all the sources which could, more or
less, carry authority in the matter, to discovering
the true character of the ships requesting passage
through the Straits. It is in this light that the
recourse to the official annual should be consid-
ered. As regards the establishment of obligatory
stops and the recourse to pilots, it is clear that these
measures had no other end than to protect ships in
transit against the risk of running into the nets
installed at the entrance of the Straits. They
could not, in the presence of the contractual con-
ditions, involve any purpose of control; they do
not therefore have any connection with the subject
under reference. Likewise, the allegation accord-
ing to which the customs authorities exercised sur-
veillance on ships in transit is completely lacking
in foundation, for the good reason that because
of the stipulations of the Montreux Convention,
the surveillance in question could never take on
the character of a customs visit and was limited
to a simple precautionary measure destined to pre-
vent attempts at smuggling. Finally the reproach
addressed to Turkey of not having asked of the
contracting powers the strengthening of the meas-
ures for control of ships in transit also cannot be
admitted, for it does not take into consideration
either the procedure established for the revision
of the Montreux Convention, above all during a
war in which the signatory powers were divided
between the two opposing camps, nor the fact that
the question of the control today described as being
imperfect, was not the object, during the war, of
any request of the contracting powers who could
feel the need to see bettered the conditions relative
to this formality.
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All the facts developed above, adding them-
selves to the explanations already furnished, con-
firm the correctness and the vigilance of which
the Government of the Republic gave proof in the
accomplishment of its historic task in the Straits,
correction and vigilance thanks to which the
USSR was able, during the entire length of the
war, to remain in the Black Sea, sheltered from
every Axis attack coming from the Mediterranean.
This truth, which everybody pOssessing objectivity
is pleased to recognize, cannot be covered up by iso-
lated facts and specious arguments. It also
suffices to refute the allegation regarding the
movements of troops which, according to the
Soviet note, were alleged to have as their basis the
supposed free passage through the Straits of war
ships belonging to the Axis countries. In effect,
the note affirms that this free use of the Straits by
the Axis obliged the Soviet Government to with-
draw an important number of military effectives
from the principal sectors of the theater of war
to assign them to the defense of the Black Sea
region. Such would not seem to be, in the opinion
of the Turkish Government, the real motive of the
troop movements thus brought about. Judged in
retrospect in the light of developments of the war
and on the purely military plane, the despatch of
troops to the Black Sea region presents no con-
nection with the attitude of Turkey in the Straits,
and this for the following reasons:
1. The real threat to the security of the Soviet
Black Sea shores came from the occupation of a
large part of the shore of that Sea by the German
Armies, from the German possession of the
Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets and from the pres-
ence of German and Italian ships sent to Black
Sea ports by rail or through the Danube.
2. The despatch of troops to the Black Sea
region is explained by the obligation to face the
German offensive unleashed from the beginning of
hostilities, and above all commencing in the spring
of the year 1942, along the shore of that Sea. This
same offensive was also the origin of the uneasiness
felt in Turkey from the point of its eventual de-
velopment and of the measures of defense which
this country had to take on the Turkish shores of
the Black Sea.
The reading of the present note, as well as the
reading of that dated August 22nd, which it com-
plements, is sufficient to determine what really
should be amended in the Montreux Convention,
in order to give the Black Sea powers.all judicious
and adequate satisfaction. In the first place,
Annex II should be revised, account having been
taken of present conditions and technical concepts.
In the second place, the provisions of the Mon-
treux Convention relative to the role and to the
intervention of the League of Nations should give
way to the system established by the United Na-
tions Organization, in its task of preserving the
peace of the world. Finally, Japan should be
removed from the list of contracting powers, while
the United States of America should be a signa-
tory in the revised text. It is within this frame-
work that the Government of the Republic would
envisage an eventual revision of the Montreux
Convention and if, deferring to the requests which
have been addressed to it, it has been able to give
its consent to be represented at a conference
charged with the revision of the dispositions re-
garding passage through the Straits, one should
see in this gesture only the manifestation of a
laudable spirit, of international cooperation in
regard to any initiative which could reconcile the
rights of sovereignty and the exigencies of the
security of Turkey with the general interest. In
consequence, and basing itself on the explana-
tions and the reasoning formulated in the two
Notes mentioned above, the Government of the
Republic reiterates once more its intention to
make no difficulty for the application, with the
consent of the Contracting Powers of the Mon-
treux Convention and of the United States of
America, and at an international conference unit-
ing the said Powers, of any request for revision
specified by the Convention. But it can not admit
unfounded complaints tending to justify this re-
vision on the basis of an alleged responsibility on
its part, born of pretended violations of the re-
gime of the Straits in the course of the Second
World War.
The Turkish Government has also studied with
the greatest interest the complementary explana-
tions furnished on the subject of point four of
the Soviet Note. It thanks the Government of
the USSR for the kindness shown in this respect,
with the object of assuring a perfect understand-
ing of this point whose delicate character can not
escape attention.
It results from these explanations that, in the
opinion of the Soviet Government, the establish-
ment of the regime of the Straits should for the
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following reasons fall within the exclusive com-
petence of Turkey and of the other riverain
Powers of the Black Sea:
1. The Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have
a special situation. The Straits are said to repre-
sent, because of this, a maritime route leading
only to the coasts of a limited number of Powers
in the Black Sea and to differ in consequence from
the maritime routes of world importance such as
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. It is therefore
natural that the riverain States of this sea are
those most interested in the regulation of the re-
gime of the Straits.
2. The Montreux Conference has already es-
tablished a preferential regime in favor of the riv-
erain Powers. In addition, in accepting the three
first points of the Soviet proposal as basis of dis-
cussion, Turkey has recognized for the Black Sea
Powers "a much more definitive preferential
regime".
3. The special situation of the Black Sea was
also recognized by Turkey in Article 5 of the
Turco-Soviet Treaty dated March 16, 1921, which
establishes the agreement of the two Contracting
Parties to entrust the elaboration of the interna-
tional statute of the Black Sea and of the Straits,
on the basis of the principle of free navigation,
to a conference uniting the representatives of the
riverain countries of the Black Sea. Invoking
the authority of this Article, the Soviet Note de-
clares that the regulatory procedure thus envis-
aged, which meets the legitimate interests of the
riverain Powers of the Black Sea without being in-
consistent in any way with the interests of other
countries, should be applied without further delay.
The Government of the Republic permits itself
to develop below the replies which are called forth
by the points summarized above:
1. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the
Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special
situation which limits interest in it to the riverain
Powers alone.
Without wishing to introduce into this debate
the authority of the doctrine which, moreover,
seems to be unanimous in considering the Black
Sea as an open sea, the Turkish Government limits
itself simply to the observation that all the regula-
tions of an international character which have ap-
peared thus far, in each case with the participation
of Russia, on the subject of the Straits have ad-
mitted more or less severe restrictions on the free-
dom of passage of riverain and non-riverain states
only as exceptions freely agreed to by Turkey, in
common accord with the other interested powers,
in the general interest. It is the exceptional char-
acter of the closure which explains the efforts made
towards the middle of the 19th century by the Gov-
ernment of the Czar to have this same rule set up
as a general principle of European public law. To
cite only examples from the most recent conven-
tions, in support of the point of view developed
above, it suffices to refer to the acts of Lausanne
and Montreux which, breaking with the ancient
rule of the Ottoman Empire sanctioned by inter-
national treaties, a rule in virtue of which it was
forbidden at all times for foreign powers to enter
the Straits while the Porte was at peace, having
admitted the principle of the freedom of passage
through the Straits, which includes equally the
freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The ex-
ceptions made by the conventions mentioned above
to the principle of freedom in favor of the river-
ain powers of the Black Sea prove, not the possi-
bility of excluding the non-riverain powers from
negotiations looking toward the amendment of
certain provisions of the regime at present in force,
but the necessity of basing the revision on the agree-
ment and the consent of all the powers interested in
a reasonable regulation of this problem. To de-
part from these general limits of competence would
mean nothing less than the negation of the fun-
damental principle of the law of nations, according
to which a Power can be released from the obliga-
tions of a treaty, or modify its stipulations only
by the assent of the contracting parties. In conse-
quence, since the point under discussion has refer-
ence to the regime of passage through the Turkish
Straits and since the Montreux Convention places
upon the signatory Powers the obligation of pro-
ceeding to a modification of the provisions of this
document only in an international conference unit-
ing the contracting States and in accordance with a
procedure foreseen by the text of the convention
itself, it follows that the Soviet point of view is
difficult to reconcile with the principles of interna-
tional public law.
Without doubt Turkey is the first power to rec-
ognize the vital interest which free navigation
through the Straits has for the riverain countries
of the Black Sea. This is, moreover, the reason
why she has without difficulty consented to be rep-
resented at a conference of revision. But she can
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not fail to recognize the interest which the other
Powers also have in an equitable regulation of the
same problem. Turkey has a clear consciousness of
her status as a Power of the Black Sea. But she
cannot forget that she is also a Mediterranean
country. Charged by a particularly delicate geo-
graphic situation, with assuring the liaison be-
tween two worlds separated by the restricted space
of the Straits, she is conscious of the obligation
which this situation imposes on her with respect
to the two seas which bathe her. The Turkish Gov-
ernment can therefore not consider the question of
the Black Sea and of the Straits as a problem
interesting the riverain Powers of this sea alone.
2. The Turkish Government agrees with the
Government of the USSR that the Montreux Con-
vention, going still further than the Lausanne
Convention concerning the regime of the Straits,
has established for the benefit of the riverain
states of the Black Sea a sharply defined system of
preference. It is equally clear that in adopting as
a basis of discussion at the international confer-
ence foreseen for the revision of the Montreux
Convention, the three principles suggested by the
Government of the United States of America, and
taken up again later by the Soviet Government,
the Turkish, British, and American Governments
in a spirit of conciliation have consented to take
into consideration the possibilities of giving
greater satisfaction to the Soviet desiderata. It
seems to the Turkish Government that, in these
conditions, the argument advanced in the Soviet
Note serves rather to emphasize the complete good
will with which the requests of the USSR have
been received by the Governments principally in-
terested in the revision of the regime of the
Straits; but it in no way removes the right and the
interest which the same Powers as well as the other
signatories of the Montreux Convention can have
in seeing the procedure of revision begin and end
under the happiest auspices, in the interest nat-
urally not only of the Black Sea Powers, destined
to derive a considerable profit from the new con-
cessions foreseen in their favor, but also of all the
States entitled to make their voices heard and to
defend their interests in the course of the import-
ant meetings in prospect.
3. Considered from the strictly legal point of
view, Article 5 of the Turco?Soviet Treaty signed
at Moscow on March 16, 1921 expresses an under-
taking. In actual fact, the two Contracting
Parties disposed of it otherwise, and manifested
their act of will in an absolutely opposite sense, in
the first place, by their effective participation in
the negotiations undertaken at Lausanne on the
subject of the regime of the Straits within a con-
siderably enlarged international framework. It
is true that in the course of the discussion engaged
in on this subject, Mr. Chicherin, First Soviet
Delegate, who defended with ardor and eloquence
the system of closure of the Straits, did not hesitate
to announce his intention of "proposing to the
Black Sea Powers the calling of a conference to
establish the reciprocal conditions of an effective
security of the shores of this sea." This project,
nevertheless, encountered the almost unanimous
objection of the Delegations present at the Con-
ference. It results from the declarations made on
this subject that the Soviet point of view appeared
not to take into account the views of the other
riverain Powers, whose representatives in effect
denied to the USSR the right to speak in their
name and added that their ideas on the mainte-
nance of the peace of the world and the security of
their territories on the shores of the Black Sea
differed substantially from those of the Soviet
Government. Moreover, the same declaration
made it apparent that the Soviet proposal ex-
cluded the principle of international law accord-
ing to which the passage between two seas should
be considered as an international route; that it
would give to the USSR, if it were adopted by the
Conference, an exceptional and unjustly advanta-
geous position in the Black Sea; and that the
Soviet argument according to which the opening
of the Straits to warships would be to the ad-
vantage of the strongest naval power lost all its
force and value in the presence of the contrary
argument according to which the closing of the
Black Sea would put the other riverain states at
the mercy of the maritime power which possessed
the strongest land forces, in other words, at the
mercy of the USSR itself.
The same change in the attitude of Turkey and
of the USSR toward the subject of the framework
of elaboration of the regime of the Straits ap-
peared, in the second place, in the participation of
authorized representatives of the two countries in
the conference which established the Montreux
regime, the fruit of long and laborious discussions,
in the course of which the eminent Soviet Delegate,
Mr. Maxim Litvinov, distinguished himself by the
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great competency with which he defended and
carried to victory the points of view of his Gov-
ernment. It is net in vain that at the last plenary
session of the Conference, he rejoiced in the excel-
lent results obtained. It is also not in vain that in
speaking at the closing session of the Conference,
he addressed to his audience this moving appeal:
"The Conference has had to understand that in
place of the old imperialist Russia which sought
to use the Black Sea as a base for its participation
in the imperialist struggle of the great Powers and
for the realization of new territorial conquests,
there is today a new Soviet and socialist state
which occupies the largest part of the Black Sea
and one of whose first acts was to renounce com-
pletely all imperialist objectives, and which sub-
sequently has invariably and systematically pur-
sued a policy of peace, jealous not only of its own
security, but also of that of all states near or far
. . . All those who have participated in the
Conference will go away satisfied there will be no
one discontented."
These words, just as well as realistic, which do
honor to the Government from which they ema-
nate, words which the Government of the Republic
is glad to recall and which still sound in the ears
of those who had the privilege of hearing them,
have moreover the merit of proving that the Gov-
ernment of the Turkish Republic, initiator of the
meeting at Montreux, and the Soviet Government
were in 1936 no longer at the point where, in 1921,
they envisaged for the regulation of the question
of the Straits a conference limited to the Black
Sea Powers only. There is no doubt that the terms
on which an understanding between states is based
cease to be in force from the day when a subse-
quent accord of the parties replaces the former
undertaking by new arrangements duly signed and
ratified. This is the case, especially, with relation
to the framework of elaboration of the regime of
the Straits. The preceding explanations and the
citations demonstrate clearly that the controversy
that the Soviet note has raised by invoking Article
5 of the Treaty of Moscow has today only a his-
toric character. In any case, the facts set forth
above are there to prove that the historic argu-
ment advanced by the Government of the USSR
no longer appears of a nature to serve as a solid
base for the thesis which it maintains.
The same explanations and citations also prove
the fact that the Soviet formula directed toward
the elaboration of a regime of the Straits by the
riverains of the Black Sea alone does not seem,
contrary to the opinion expressed in the Note of
September 24, to satisfy any of the non-riverain
countries whose interests in the Straits are
involved.
The same reasoning and the same conclusions
are equally valid in refuting the Soviet demon-
stration based on the authority of an article,
drafted in the same manner as the said Article 5
and appearing in the treaty of October 13, 1921,
concluded between Turkey and the Transcauca-
sian Republics, as well as in the treaty of January
21,1922 concluded between Turkey and the Ukrain-
ian Soviet Socialist Republic.
In its Note dated August 22, the Turkish Gov-
ernment was intent on setting forth the reasons
of a contractual character which were opposed to
the revision of the regime of the Straits except
within the framework and according to the pro-
cedure foreseen by the Montreux Convention. In
the presence of the complementary explanations
obligingly advanced in the Soviet Note of Septem-
ber 24 on the subject of point four, the Turkish
Government has felt bound to develop, in its turn,
the manner in which it views the new commentaries
furnished by the above mentioned Note. The Gov-
ernment of the Republic would consequently be
grateful to the Government of the USSR if it
would consider the explanations of the present
note as supplementing those furnished on the same
subject in the previous Note.
With regard to point five of the Soviet Note of
August 7, which recommends a mixed system of
Turco?Soviet defense in the Straits, the Govern-
ment of the USSR states that the Turkish Gov-
ernment considers this proposition as incompatible
with the rights of sovereignty and the security of
Turkey and that it arrives at this conclusion with-
out having previously examined the concrete con-
siderations of the Soviet Government on this sub-
ject. In doing this, the Note adds, and in formu-
lating suspicions which are baseless and incom-
patible with the dignity of the Soviet Union, the
Turkish Government finds itself in full contradic-
tion with its own declarations concerning the res-
toration of friendly relations, marked by mutual
confidence with the USSR. The Soviet Govern-
ment believes that the application of its proposal
could be realized not only without the slightest
prejudice to the sovereignty of Turkey, but with
an appreciable augmentation of its security.
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The Turkish Government cannot share the opin-
ion according to which it has opposed the discus-
sion of point five, which it regards as incompat-
ible with the rights of sovereignty and the security
of Turkey, without previously having examined
the concrete suggestions of the Soviet Government
on this subject. It is first of all necessary to un-
derline here that the Government of the Republic
has never failed to receive with interest and good
will the dgmarelles of foreign powers with which
it has relations. In this connection, the Turkish
Government wishes particularly to recall that,
raised for the first time at Moscow in 1939, in the
course of the Saracoglu-Molotov conversations,
the question of a joint defense of the Straits by the
Turkish and Soviet Governments was also taken
up, later, by the Government of the USSR, in an
aggravated form, in the course of a conversation
with the Turkish representative at Moscow. It
is because this subject has been justly considered
as injuring the rights, through the respect of which
a nation is and remains independent, that it has
encountered the opposition of Turkey. The en-
tire question of the Straits has continued likewise
to be, by means of the extensive correspondence re-
cently exchanged on this subject between Ankara
and Moscow, the subject of a substantial examina-
tion of the respective positions of Turkey and the
USSR. It is therefore unjust to accuse the Turk-
ish Government of avoiding the opening of
friendly conversations with the USSR with the
object of clarifying point 5. The principle of
freedom of passage through the Straits is, accord-
ing to principles universally recognized, limited
by the right of the riverain State to guard the se-
curity and defense of its territory, and can not
in any way diminish the right and duty that State
has to see to its preservation. The right to de-
fend itself against all aggression is, beyond denial,
for an independent State which respects itself the
most essential attribute of its sovereignty. The
acceptance by Turkey of a joint defense of the
Straits would mean no less than the sharing of her
sovereignty with a foreign power. The Govern-
ment of the Republic, in its note of August 22,
has given to the Soviet Government all the neces-
sary assurances with regard to its firm intention
to defend, as in the past, Turkish territory against
all aggression and had indicated to it its desire
to see established between Turkey and the USSR
cordial and confident relations. It is happy to re-
peat again the same assurances. It does not lose
[661
sight of the fact that the Soviet. coasts on the
Black Sea have a length of 2100 kilometers, but
it also does not forget that the Turkish coasts of
the Black Sea are almost as long. If the principle
of the closing of the Straits to the powers non-
riverain of the Black Sea, a principle which, in it-
self, already constitutes a very important guaran-
tee for the security of the USSR, is not sufficient to
eliminate Soviet apprehensions completely, it is in
order for that country to have recourse in the
event of an attack against the Black Sea, to the
most perfect solution which mankind has yet found
to repel aggression, that is the joint defense by
national forces and the forces of the United Na-
tions Organization charged with preventing all
aggression, from wherever it comes.
Apart from these reflections, the Turkish
Government cannot understand how the right of
defense of the Soviet Union can be exercised in
Turkey, in defiance of the rights of sovereignty
of this country. The Turkish Government cannot
resist recalling here the vehement terms in which
Mr. Chicherin protested at the Lausanne Confer-
ence, against the proposal to take from Turkey
the control of the passage of the Straits and op-
posed what he rightly called "a flagrant violation
of the sovereignty and independence of Turkey".
It cannot conceive that the rejection by Turkey of
this same demand for control now proposed by the
Soviet Union should be considered by that Power
as incompatible with its dignity, since, in the
opinion of the Government of the Republic, it is
on the contrary to the honor, the dignity and the
very existence of Turkey, as an independent na-
tion, which are involved.
The Soviet note recalls, in support of its thesis,
the passage of the German cruisers Goeben and
Breslau through the Straits in 1914. This refer-
ence to two vessels purchased by the Ottoman
Government has no relation either to the subject
under discussion or to the enforcement of the
Montreux Convention and seems rather a question
of international law relating to the propriety of
the acquisition by neutrals of belligerent vessels
taking refuge in their territorial waters.
In the same way, the allusion made in the Soviet
note to the subject of the adoption of supposed
military measures in the Straits by joint accord
with certain powers non-riverain of the Black Sea
is not understood in Turkey, since it relates to facts
lacking any foundation. In consequence it is out-
side this discussion.
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In its note a August 22, the Turkish Govern-
ment, after having emphasized that the most cer-
tain guarantee of the security of the USSR in the
Black Sea rested not in the seeking of a privileged
strategic position in the Straits, a position in-
compatible with the dignity and the sovereignty
of an independent country, but in the restoration
of relations of trust with a strong Turkey, ardently
desirous of contributing to that healthy task, but
whose activity in this respect has unfortunately
been restricted by lack of efforts on a parallel plane,
added that in addition to this first class guarantee
furnished by Turkey, the USSR should, in the
wholly improbable case of an attack in the Straits,
also count upon the efficacy of the United Nations
Organization of which she as well as Turkey is a
member.
After having recalled this reference the Soviet
Government states in its note that its proposal No.
5 is entirely in .conformity with the principles and
objectives of the said Organization. In emphasiz-
ing the importance of the United Nations Organi-
zation in a question which is properly of the ut-
most interest to the USSR, the Turkish Govern-
ment precisely wished to refer to the First Article
of the Charter, relative to objectives and to prin-
ciples, an article according to the terms of which
the new international organization should, hence-
forth, answer for the security of everyone, placed
under the guarantee of the international forces
put at the service of the Organization. It also
wished to allude to the undertaking solemnly as-
sumed by the members of the Organization, by vir-
tue of Article 2 of the said Charter relative to
principles "to refrain in their international rela-
tions, from the threat or use of force, against either
the territorial integrity or the political independ-
ence of any State, or in any. other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations".
Putting aside any considerations as to the neces-
sity of allowing every country to defend itself in
its own* way against outside aggression, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic has difficulty in under-
standing how, in an age when all the peoples avid
for tranquility and peace are in the position of
having placed their hopes in the guarantees of se-
curity flowing from the work of San Francisco, a
proposal disregarding the existence of the new
Organization and the guarantees of collective se-
curity which it provides can be compatible with
the objectives and the principles thereof. It also
asks itself how this same proposal which, to estab-
lish security at home, believes it possible to wipe
out the security and sovereignty of a neighbor can
be reconciled with the obligation to respect the
territorial integrity and political independence of
others. The Government of the Republic is thus
obliged to repeat again that point 5 of the Soviet
note of August 7 is incompatible with the inalien-
able rights of sovereignty of Turkey and with her
security which permits of no restriction.
Basing itself upon the long explanations fur-
nished above, the Turkish Government is con- _
vinced that it has established tangible proof of its
good will and of its spirit of conciliation in agree-
ing to participate in a conference for the revision
of the Montreux Convention. It appeals to the
Soviet Government to ask it to study, in its turn,
the reflections which its proposals evoke, with the
same objectivity and the same good will.
Finally, to reply briefly to the Soviet reproach
to the Turkish Government that it confines itself
to conditions of admissibility of the procedure for
the revision of the Montreux Convention, without
taking the Potsdam decisions into account, this
Government must first of all state that the de-
cisions in question, which by a free manifestation
of its will it has consented to take into considera-
tion, contemplated only the attempting by means
of conversations of an endeavor at conciliation of
the respective points of view of the three Powers
represented at the said conference, ,within the
framework of the rights of sovereignty of Turkey,
in a manner to prepare the ground for the con-
vocation of the conference for revision. They are
symptomatic of the interest which these same
Powers attach to the question of the Straits, but
they cannot replace the Montreux Convention
which, alone, binds the signatory states. More-
over, the Government of the Republic believes it
useful to point out that, to its knowledge, the de-
cision to which the Soviet note refers envisaged
direct conversations between the Turkish Govern-
ment, on the one hand, and each of the three
Powers represented at Potsdam on the other hand,
on the subject of the eventual revision of the
Montreux Convention. Now, in the opinion of
the Turkish Government, the preliminary pre-
paratory work desired by the Potsdam conference
is now virtually completed, thanks, in the first
place, to the communications made by the Govern-
ments of the United States of America and of
Great Britain to Ankara and, then, to the ex-
change of notes which have taken place concern-
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ing the same subject between Turkey and the
Soviet Union. The Government of the Republic
consequently believes that the contacts thus accom-
plished have definitely and sufficiently \clarified ,
the respective positions of Turkey and of the three
Powers Concerned with respect to the question of
the Straits. Under these circumstances, the
Turkish Government cannot avoid expressing its
doubts as to the usefullness and the advisability of
continuing to follow, in the future, the same pro-
cedure of exchange of views by means of cor-
respondence. It considers the ground sufficiently
prepared in order that the procedure of revision
can be usefully begun (deelenches). The Turk-
ish Government, insofar as it is concerned, while
maintaining its attitude defined in the present note
as well as in that of August 22, concerning points
4 and 5 of the Soviet demands, declares itself
ready to attend a conference at which are as-
sembled the Soviet Union, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom and France as well
as the other states signatories of 'the Montreux
Convention, except Japan, in order to proceed with
negotiations for the revision of the above men-
tioned convention.
This note would certainly be incomplete if it
closed without a fervent 'homage rendered to the
organism which crystallizes all the hopes of
0
peoples towards a future of peace. The Govern-
ment of the Republic wishes, once more, to express
its profound faith in the future of the United Na-
tions Organization, the support of universal order
based on concord, equity and mutual respect,
framework of efficacious institutions in the service
of living cooperation. It bases the greatest hopes
on this constellation which has assumed the task
of inculcating in everyone the necessity of collabo-
ration between the peoples and of a law which
governs them, and of orienting the community of
nations towards a rich development of solidarity
and interdependence, thus creating a work of high
civilization, regenerator of stability and general
prosperity. The Government of the Republic
firmly hopes to find itself with its great neighbor
of the North in this field of serenity, in the efful-
gence and radiance of international collaboration,
dispenser of benefits for all the peoples of good
will.
A copy of the Soviet note of September 24 has
been transmitted by the Turkish Government to
the Governments of Great Britain and of the
United States of America.
A copy of the present note has been sent to the
signatories of the Montreux Convention?except
Japan?and to the Government of the United
States of America.
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