TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE SOVIET POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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ARPA ORDER NO.: 189-1
R-907-ARPA
July 1972
Territorial Waters in the Arctic:
The Soviet Position
S. M. Olenicoff
A Report prepared for
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406
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This research is supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency under
Contract No. DAHC15 67 C 0141. Views or conclusions contained in this study
should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of Rand
or of ARPA.
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ARPA ORDER NO.: 189-1
R-907-ARPA
July 1972
Territorial Waters in the Arctic:
The Soviet Position
S. M. Olenicoff
A Report prepared for
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406
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PREFACE
This Report was prepared for ARPA's Office of Advanced Engineering
as a part of the Rand project in Surface Effect Vehicles (SEVs) and
Arctic Operations. It is intended as background material to assist in
planning programs for advanced Arctic applied research in general and
for advanced SEV technology in particular.
This Report-should be of interest to defense agencies and others
concerned with current and future applied research operations in the
Arctic as well as to researchers in the international.legal aspects of
that area of the world.
The author is currently a consultant to The Rand Corporation.
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SUMMARY
The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken the position that its
territorial waters, including those in the Arctic, have an extent of
12 n mi from the coastline of the USSR. The United States, while adher-
ing to the 3 n mi limit, has proposed moving toward international accep-
tance of a 12 n mi maximum limit if such acceptance includes provisions
for freedom of navigation through and over international straits.
In the Arctic, the Soviet Government has in addition declared a
"sector claim." First put forward in 1926, this claim asserts Soviet
sovereignty over all lands and islands in the Arctic Basin sector from
32? 04' 35" E to 168? 49' 30"W. In subsequent writings on this 1926
decree, Soviet jurists have variously interpreted the sector principle
to mean that the Soviet Union can claim not only the lands and islands
within its sector, but also all or part of the following: (1) the
open waters between the islands; (2) the waters between the islands
and the mainland; (3) ice islands and the ice pack; (4) the remaining
areas of the Arctic Basin within the "Soviet sector"; and (5) the air
space above the entire sector. The Soviet Government has not followed
up such interpretations with official decrees; but, at the same time,
it has not repudiated them either, which implies tacit support.
The present policy of the Soviet Union appears to be a realistic
one which recognizes the "high seas" status of the Arctic Ocean and
its airspace. Quasi-official Soviet writings, however, continue to
reiterate the concept of a "Soviet sector" in the Arctic Basin, the
reason being that the Soviet Government probably wants to keep its
future options open.
Over the years, the Soviet Union has also attempted to elicit
acceptance of its claim that the Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas,
as well as the Saa of Okhotsk, should be considered as "closed seas"
or internal waters of the USSR on historical and geographical grounds.
The United States has rejected such quasi-official Soviet claims, but
the American overt presence in these areas has been minimal.
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Recently the Soviet Union has put renewed emphasis on the national
character of the Northern Sea Route, referring to it as the "National
Northern Sea Route and identifying it as an internal shipping lane.
The Soviets back up this contention with historical and "exclusive-
user" arguments, and also cite the 1951 ruling of the International
Court of Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case which established that
:Norway could validly claim .its Indreleia sea route to be national and
internal waters. The. Soviets argue that their Northern SeaRoute,
stretching from Murmansk to the Bering Strait and beyond, should have
.the same status. Soviet- emphasis on this will probably continue, as
will their proprietary attitude toward their "sector" of the Arctic.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to express his appreciation to I. S. Blumen-
thal, J. 0. Fletcher, A. L. Horelick, and T. F. Kirkwood for reviewing
this report and offering valuable suggestions, and to Kathryn Salmi
for her assistance in the researching and preparation of the manuscript.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE
SUMMARY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii
Section
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. ARCTIC BASIN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 2
III. SOVIET REACTIONS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC .
IV. THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION ON ARCTIC WATERS 16
The "Soviet Sector" Claim 16
Territorial Waters in the Soviet Arctic 20
Internal Waters of the Soviet Arctic 24
Closed Seas 26
The Northern Sea Route 28
Appendix
A. TERRITORIAL WATERS: U.N. DEFINITION AND
INTERNATIONAL STATUS
30
B. TERRITORIAL WATERS: SOVIET DEFINITION 36
BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of defining territorial waters in the Arctic Basin
has often been debated, but still remains unresolved. This is due
partly to the unique nature of the Arctic Ocean, which makes the defi-
nition of "waters" difficult and partly to the severe Arctic environ-
ment, which has kept man's presence there to a minimum. Consequently,
there has not been a pressing need for a definitive resolution of what
constitutes trespassing and what does not.
In recent years, however, the importance of the Arctic Basin as
an arena for scientific, economic, and military activities has been
rapidly increasing. This has accentuated the need for an international
agreement on Arctic waters or, at least, a clear mutual understanding
of the individual positions taken by the various Arctic-exploiting
nations.
In this paper the author examines the evolution of the USSR's
position on territorial waters in the Arctic Basin as expounded in
official and quasi-official Soviet declarations, and as reflected in
Soviet reactions to U.S. activities in the Arctic. For background,
the U.N. and Soviet definitions of territorial waters are included as
Appendixes A and B respectively.
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II. ARCTIC BASIN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
The Arctic Ocean is a vast and unique body of water, differing
significantly from the rest of the World Ocean.
In another context, the author has described it thus:
Like the face of an alien planet, it stretches across the
top of the world...its waters held captive by an ever-
present mask of ice. It is the only ocean in the world
that can be crossed on foot...but no man has ever dared
to do so. Scores of ships have been mercilessly crushed
by its guardian icefields...the same paradoxical masses
of ice that benevolently provide island-size floating
platforms for scientific research stations. Stirred slow-
ly by storm winds and sea currents, this perpetually shift-
ing jigsaw of drifting ice crumbles and merges, expands and
contracts, like a restless, breathing beast.. .stealthily
opening up to reveal the mysterious depths beneath it, then
closing with grinding impacts that push up towering and
jagged ice ridges in its wake....
It is this unusual nature of the Arctic Ocean that makes it diffi-
cult to resolve questions of exactly where "Arctic waters" end and
"Arctic territories" begin, and whether the concept of an "open sea"
is applicable in the Arctic Basin. For instance, is Fletcher's Ice
Island, on which a U.S. research settlement has flourished for nearly
twenty years, to be considered as "Arctic Ocean waters" (of which, tech-
nically, it is composed) or as an "Arctic Ocean territory" (which, for
all practical purposes, it is)? Is it correct to refer to the peren-
ially ice-covered Central Arctic as the "high seas," when no ship has
ever passed through it? Submarines, however, can navigate under it,
while at the same time airplanes can land on its ice fields and traaked
land vehicles can travel for hundreds of miles along its surface. One
can say, therefore, that the Arctic Ocean has the characteristics of
both land and sea, and yet, is totally unlike both.
Because of its inscrutable character, and the fact that until sev-
eral decades ago it was an unexplored, blank spot on most maps, the
first territorial aspirations in the Arctic Ocean took the form of "sec-
tor claims."
The precedent for'Sector claims was set by the early boundary
treaties between states occupying Arctic territories. The Conventions
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of 1824 and 1825 between Imperial Russia and England, for example, pro-
vided for a line of demarcation between the Russian and British North
American territories that would extend beyond their respective Arctic
coasts and would continue "...in its prolongation as far as the Frozen
"1
Ocean.... The same sort of wording was used in the boundary treaty
between the United States and Russia in 1867, following the U.S. pur-
chase of Alaska. The treaty declared that the demarcation line"...pro-
ceeds due north, without limitations, into the same Frozen Ocean.?2
And so, there emerged the concept of sovereignty extending beyond the
mainland and into the Arctic Basin. The countries benefiting most from
such a "sector? concept are, naturally, those that have extensive coast-
lines bordering the Arctic Ocean.
It is thus not surprising that, to date, only Canada and the Soviet
Union have made sector claims in the Arctic. Although these claims have
not yet caused serious international disputes, they have cast an aura of
uncertainty over territorial jurisdiction within the Arctic Basin. The
"sector principle" on which the claims are based says, in effect, that
all lands discovered or undiscovered, within a spherical triangle formed
by the North Pole and the easterly and westerly limits of a country's
Arctic Ocean coast, belong to the coastal state concerned or that this
state should have at least a preferential right to acquisition.
As early as 1916, the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
announced in a note that all land between the Russian Arctic coast anil
the North Pole would be regarded as Russian territory.
In 1925, Canada put forward a sector claim that included all islands
known or yet to be discovered within the longitudinal limits of 61?W .
and 141?W and extending "right up to the Pole," In 1928, the Canadian
Government forestalled possible Norwegian claims to certain areas with-
in the Canadian sector by paying the Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup .
$67,000 "for his services." Norway then recognized the claim of Canada
to the areas in question, but specifically declined to recognize the
sector principle. In 1955, when the Soviet ice-floe station drifted
IT. A. Taracouzio, Soviets in the Arctic, The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1938, p. 331.
2Ibid., p. 332.
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into the Canadian sector, there was much discussion in official Canadian
circles about the meaning of the Canadian sector claim and as to whether
the Soviets had "invaded" Canadian territory. In debates that followed,
it was brought out that Canada does not claim sovereignty in any form
,over the "high seas" within its sector, but that Canada perhaps should
exercise some sort of sovereignty over the ice cover within its sector
inasmuch as the ice fields have some of the aspects and uses of land
(when they are used as airfields, for instance). The recent oil activ-
ity on the North Slope and the passage of the Manhattan through the North-
west Passage have spurred a new debate within the Canadian Government on
the question of Canadian control over all navigation in waters north of
Canada (one of the main concerns being the fear of possible oil spills
and pollution).3 Figure 1 shows the "Arctic sectors" claimed by Canada
and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet sector claim was first put forward in 1926. It asserts
Soviet sovereignty over all lands and islands, discovered or to be dis-
covered in the sector from 32? 04' 35" E to 168? 49' 30"W, except for
lands acknowledged to be foreign territory (such as Spitzbergen). In
the late 1920s, Norway protested the Soviet sector claim because it neg-
ated the Norwegian claim to Franz Josef Land. The protest, however, was
not advanced vigorously and Norway's claim to Franz Josef Land has since
been abandoned.
In addition to their own sector, the Soviets acknowl
sectors belonging to Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway,
c,
four other
and the United
States (Alaska). As for the North Pole, located at the tip of all the
sectors, V. L. Lakhtin, a noted Soviet authority on polar matters, writes:4
As to the ownership of the North Pole, it should be remarked
that the Pole is an intersection of meridian lines of the
said five sectors. Neither legally nor in fact does it be-
long to any one. It might be represented as an hexahedral
frontier post on the sides of which might be painted the
national colors of the State of the corresponding sector.
3D Newman, "Government Faces Challenge on Arctic Sovereignty,"
The Toronto Globe and Mail, January 20, 1970.
4V. L. Lakhtin,'"Rights Over the Arctic," The American Journal
of International Lap, Vol. 26, 1930, pp. 703-717.
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/cella. at lell
-
0 RANGEL
ISLAND
SECTOR CLAIMS
Canada
4.4
(to ./we
erh. U.S., Downark (Greenland), and Norway
lwarr oo roctrio soctor claims.)
TERRITORIAL- SEA CLAIMS
12 nautical miles Li.und.?,.
4 nautical miles. "4.""?::/?-
3 nautical milast which s smeciiis dein *pellet
Sea opporearty claimed wholly or in port by
USSR. at internal waters; how claims har-
monise with 12-ndle territorial two doh,, hot
not been emsticirly mated.
? 'colones A-rerle territeriel see is swolstr...**d Err ?
rowletswely Jeanne era/osier fishing sorsa el it ed.
elisions' oil's.
t Syntled Amodio. ,33rn4e territorial see hes net ker.,
plotted rho inner roan al the Carosolion Arche
pampa diltangh, in sorter4 the 3-rnde limit entrails
in thew worsors.
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Fig .1 ?Territorial sea and sPapt claims 1.nNhe Arctic
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In subsequent writings on the decree of 1926, Soviet jurists have
/interpreted the sector principle to mean that the Soviet Union can
! claim not only the lands and islands within its sector, but also: (1)
the open waters between the islands; (2) the waters between the islands
and the mainland; (3) ice islands and the ice pack; (4) the remaining
areas of the Arctic Basin within the sector; and (5) the air space above
s. the entire sector. Claims of this nature can be found in the writings
of V. L. Lakhtin,5 S. A. Bergavinov,6 E. A. Korovin,7 L. Breitfus,8
and S. V. Sigrist.9 Although the claims put forward by these writers
have the apparent support of the Soviet Government, the official USSR
position on Arctic sectors is unclear.
The United States, Denmark, and Norway have not made Arctic sector
claims and do not recognize such claims or the sector principle. Non-
Soviet jurists have sharply criticized Arctic sector claims, pointing
out that the sector principle has no basis in international law. Pro-
ponents of the sector principle, however, claim among other things that
their theory is merely a variation of a common theme in the evolution
of boundaries.
The question of Arctic sectors and territorial waters may be af-
fected by the unprecedented 1951 ruling of the International Court of
Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case. The Court's decision held
that the extensive chain of islands off the Norwegian coast could be
5V. L. Lakhtin, "Prava Soyuza S.S.R. V Arktike" (The Rights of
the USSR in the Arctic), Rabochiy Sud, 1928, p. 1135; idem, Prava Na.
Severnyye Polyarnyye Prostranstva (Rights to the North Polar Territories
Moscow, 1928.
6S. A. Bergavinov, "Flag Sovetov Nad Polyusom" (The Flag of the
Soviets Over the Pole), Sovetskaya Arktika, No. 6, 1937, p. 26.
7E. A. Korovin, "Problema Vozdushnoy Okkupatsiyi V Svyazi S Pravom
Na Polyarniye Prostranstva" (The Problem of Aerial Occupation in Con-
nection with Claims to Polar Territories), Voprosy Vozdushnogo Prava,
Vol. I., 1926, p. 104.
8
L. Breitfus, "0 Razgranicheniyi Severnoy Polyarnoy Oblasti" (On
the Demarcation of the North Polar Region), Morskoy Sbornik, No. 1,
1927, p. 3.
9S. V. Sigrist, "Sovetskoye ,Pravo V Polyarnykh Prostranstvakh"
(Soviet Law in the Polar Territories), Rabochiy Sud, 1928, p. 986.
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considered a geological extension of the mainland, and therefore the
fiord waters, extending 40 n mi out from the mainland in some cases,
could be claimed as national or internal waters, with the zone of ter-
ritorial waters starting at the outer rocks and shoals of the island
chain and extending out to sea. It is difficult to say whether this
ruling is applicable to island holdings in the Arctic Basin. Inter-
esting to note, however, is the fact that the Norwegian Fisheries Case
has evoked considerable interest on the part of the Soviets.10
The
significance of the Soviet interest is discussed in the section on
"The Northern Sea Route."
Apart from the lack of international agreement on the width of
territorial waters, the delineation of such waters in the Arctic poses
additional problems. In many regions of the Arctic Basin, ice makes
it difficult to fix the location of the shoreline, thus compounding
the uncertainty for those attempting to define territorial waters and
for navigators attempting to observe limits that have been defined.
In general, international legal practice has accepted the principle of
ignoring "temporary" ice coverage in delimiting territorial waters, but
of taking cognizance of "permanent" ice formations such as shelf ice or
tongues of glaciers that project into the sea, treating such projections
as land. The permanent ice category, however, presents numerous prob-
lems such as determining whether the ice in question is indeed permanent,
and dealing with "coastline" changes resulting from the waxing and waning
of ice. Theories as to how territorial seas should be delimited in re-
gions of permanent shore ice have had few tests because, in areas where
such ice occurs, the need for pinpoint definition of territorial sea
limits has been negligible. The ,Convention ,on the .Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone adopted by the 1958 Law of the Sea onference makes
no provision for ice, either permanent or temporary.
10A. N. Nikplayev, Problema TerritoriaZ'nykh Vod V Mezhdunarodnom
Prave (The Problm of Territorial Waters in International Law), Moscow,
1954, pp. 119-132; see also P. D. Milovskiy and G. A. Glazunov, "Pret-
voreniye V Zhizn' Leninskogo Plana Osvoyeniya Sovetskoy Arktiki" (The
Realization of Lanin's Plan for the Development of the Arctic), Morskoy
Sbornik, No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88.
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The question of the legal status of installations on ice floes
and ice islands is also clouded and uncertain. . International law, in-
sofar as it has addressed itself to the problem, seems to regard in-
stallations on drifting ice as similar in status to ships on the high
seas. Numerous U.S. and Soviet drifting stations have been abandoned
in the Arctic Basin during the last two decades. Some of these stations
have been subsequently found and visited. On one occasion, a disabled
airplane abandoned by Americans on an ice floe was found by Soviet
pilots from the drifting station North Pole-3, who promptly repaired
it, and flew off with it. Whether legal title to vehicles, supplies,
and equipment is retained after drifting stations are abandoned or
left unattended is still an open question.
On the broader question of whether the occupation of ice floes
or ice islands conveys any sort of permanent sovereignty, a German
legal authority, D. Bohmert, is quoted as stating: "In that case [use
of an ice floe as an air base or scientific station], sovereignty over
such 'a floe would exist as long as the state authority was actually
exercised. If the base were given up, the territory would thereby be
,11
relinquished.
When the question of sovereignty over ice fields first emerged as
an international topic of discussion, the views of Soviet spokesmen
were mixed. Professor E. A. Korovin, commenting on Soviet sector rights,
states:12
Must the rights of the USSR be viewed as limited only to
the few islands, and that the rest of the Arctic with its
floating and fast ice-fields, inland lakes, straits, etc.,
is left by the Soviet Government for unlimited exploitation
by any of the capitalist plunderers...? Obviously not, for
such a conclusion would be in conflict with the whole idea
of the Decree.13 Hence this Decree must be understood to
11H. B. Smith, The Use of Polar Ice in Inter-Hemispheric Air
Operations, unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C., June 1956.
12E. A. Korovin, "SSSR i Polyarnyye Zemli" (The USSR and Polar
Lands), Sovetskoye Pravo, No. 3, 1926, p. 43.
13Korovin is referring to thAThgcree of 1926 in which the Soviet
Union put forward its sector claim [Author].
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include in the conception of 'lands and islands,' as
expressed by Soviet legislators, also ice formations
.and the seas surrounding them, for Otherwise the polar
sector adjacent to the USSR would have to be considered
as an open sea with all the consequences resulting from
such an interpretation.
Another Soviet authority, . V. Sigrist, gives a similar interpre-
tation to the 1926 Decree:14
Interpreting this decree from the standpoint of the un-
derlying idea, and not literally, we must admit that to
the USSR belong not only 'lands and islands already dis-
covered and those which may be discovered in the future'
but also the areas among them irrespective whether there
be there immobile or floating ice, or permanently frozen
lands still unknown to us, for otherwise foreigners might
think that between these islands there was 'open sea,'
free for exploitation by every nation. In the spirit of
the Decree we must maintain that the whole region from
the Soviet mainland to the Pole is Soviet possession,
even if it is just as difficult to go there as to climb
the summits of the Caucasian, Ural, Altaian or other moun-
tains the Soviet ownership of which has never been dis-
puted.
A contrary point of view is expressed by V. L. Lakhtin:15
We are of the opinion that floating ice should be assimi-
lated legally to open polar seas, while ice formations
that are more or less immovable should enjoy a legal status
equivalent to polar territory.
A similar stand is taken by T. W. Balch, who also expressed the
opinion that sovereignty cannot be declared over the Arctic ice:16
...it might be urged that men might permanently occupy
the ice cover of the Polar Sea. But the ice at the
North Pole is never at rest. It is in continual motion...
14S. V. Sigrist, op. cit., Rabochiy Sud, p. 984.
15V. L. Lakhtin, Prava Na Severnyye PoZyarnyye Prostranstva
(Rights to the North Polar Territories), Moscow, 1928, p. 33.
16T. W. Balch, "The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of
Nations," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, 1910,
p. 266.
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and such possible occupation would be too precarious and
shifting to and fro to give anyone a good title. And so
the rules of.. .the freedom of the high seas would seem
to apply.
One can generally say that a clash of basic conceptions underlies
many of the uncertainties regarding sovereign rights in the Arctic.
According to the long-standing view of international law, the Arctic
Ocean outside a "reasonable" territorial-sea belt has high-seas status,
regardless of its ice mantle. Opposed to this is the view that the
Arctic is a unique region having characteristics of both land and sea,
and so different from any other area on the earth's surface that it
requires special adaptation of laws to deal adequately with its prob-
lems.
The U.S., Norway, and Denmark adhere to the first point of view,
as also does Canada (but with some leanings toward the second concept).
The second point of view has been put forward in the quasi-official
writings of Soviet authorities on polar law. The Soviet Government
has not followed up these writings with official decrees; but, at the
same time, it has not repudiated them, either.
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III. SOVIET REACTIONS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC
Over the years, the Soviets have exhibited a markedly proprietary
attitude toward the Arctic in general, and especially toward the regions
bordering the USSR. This stems to a large extent from the fact that the
Soviet Union is very exposed and vulnerable along its northern border.
It views the Arctic as an unfenced backyard and has always been wary
of trespassers. Furthermore, the Arctic has been an almost exclusive
Soviet preserve for so long, that the Soviets naturally feel a sense of
ownership toward it and regard any non-Soviet presence there as a be-
lated intrusion into an area that Russians have pioneered and "staked
a claim" to.
This attitude is well reflected in the Soviet reactions to U.S.
activities along their northern border. American-Soviet incidents in
the Arctic go back as far as 1924. In December of that year, Chicherin,
the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a note to Wash-
ington that protested the fact that the U.S. Coast Geodetic Survey
Service had set up a magnetic observation station on the Chukchi Penin-
sula in the vicinity of the Bay of Emma (situated across the Bering
Strait from Alaska). Furthermore, almost as if to add insult to injury,
the Americans erected a sign next to the station which read:
Magnetic Observation Station of the Coast Geodetic Survey
Service of the U.S.A. Penalty for removal of this sign---
$250 or imprisonment.
The Soviet protest on the "Bay of Emma Incident," delivered to
U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, read in part:17
...emphasizing, first of all, the fact that a United States
man-of-war has several times visited the territorial waters
of the USSR without any due consent of the latter, which is
contrary to international law, I must call attention to the
fact that ele erection of such a station...is -a gross vio-
lation of tie sovereignty of the Soviet Republics.
Protes:ing categorically to the Government of the USA
against such illegal acts of its officials, who make no
17T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1935, p.55.
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distinction where the territory of their country ends and
the territory of other sovereign states begins, I must em-
phasize the fact that such violation of the legal rights
of the USSR will be suppressed by the Soviet Government
by every available means.
There were no major incidents during the 1930s, and in the 1940s,
the cooperative U.S.-Soviet effort against Germany and Japan precluded
any Arctic confrontations during the war and the years immediately
following it. In the course of the Allied wartime effort, the northern
waters were a busy place, as vast amounts of military supplies were
shipped by Arctic routes to Murmansk and other Soviet ports. Soviet
Arctic airfields were used by American planes in shuttle-bombing oper-
ations and served as entry points for the delivery of lend-lease air-
craft from U.S. bases. Also, a number of U.S. icebreakers were turned
over to the Russians to aid in the navigation operations in Arctic
waters. After the war, the Soviets were very reluctant to return these
icebreakers, but finally did so after considerable U.S. pressure.
With the advent of the Cold War and the emergence of the Arctic as
a strategic U.S.-Soviet arena, a tense and hostile atmosphere began to
prevail in the northern regions. In 1955, a U.S. Navy "Neptune" patrol
plane was shot down by the Soviets near St. Lawrence Island, southwest
of the Bering Strait. The incident reportedly occurred on the U.S.-
Russia Convention line of 1867, but was 20 to 30 miles from the nearest
Soviet land. Although the Convention line was drawn merely to divide
between America and Russia various scattered islands, islets, and
rocks in seas not well known in 1867, the ,USSR seems to have treated
the line as if it marked the seaward limit of Soviet territorial waters
and air space. America protested the "Neptune incident" strongly,
claiming that the plane had at no time violated Soviet air space. The
USSR, in reply, claimed such a violation but tacitly admitted to error
by expressing regret and offering to pay half the damages, an offer
that was eventually accepted.
A number of other incidents in the same area were reported in the
Soviet press during the early 1950s.18
In every case, the Russian
18Pravda3 April 12, 1950; November 30, 1951; July 17, 1952; March
24, 1953.
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accounts stated that "a U.S. military aircraft" intruded "into the air-
space of the USSR," but "was driven off by vigilant Soviet interceptors."
Following the fatal Neptune incident, another U.S. plane was shot
down, this time over the Barents Sea. The downed Air Force reconnais-
sance plane was reportedly at least 60 miles from the Arctic coast of
the Soviet Union, but the Soviets claimed that it had "violated their
air space
.111
In the summer of 1965, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, Northwind,
sailed from Norway into the north Eurasian seas on a data-gathering ex-
pedition. Part of the mission was to study currents, water temperatures
and densities, plant life, and the geology of the ocean floor. Further-
more, the Northwind was under orders to traverse the Northeast Passage
across the top of the Soviet Union. It was continuously shadowed, first
by an eavesdropping trawler, then by a destroyer, and was occasionally
harrassed by low-flying Soviet Badgers. Eventually it got as far as
Severnaya Zemlya, but was then ordered by Washington to turn back, ap-
parently due to strong Soviet diplomatic pressure.
In 1967, determined to try again, the United States sent two ice-
breakers, the Edisto and the Eastwind, on a similar mission. The ships
started in the Barents Sea and again reached the vicinity of Severnaya
Zemlya. This time, however, they were turned back by heavy ice condi-
tions around the northern tip of Severnaya Zemlya. They could have
passed easily through Viltkitskiy Strait between Severnaya Zemlya and
the Taimyr Peninsula, but the Soviets refused them passage, just as
they had in 1965. The Soviet contention was that the 22 n mi wide
straits were territorial waters since the USSR claims a 12 n mi terri-
torial limit. America argued that, under maritime law, the right of
innocent passage through straits connecting international waters is
guaranteed. Although disagreeing with the Soviet position, the United
States decided not to challenge it. The two U.S. icebreakers, denied
passage through the Vil'kitskiy Strait, had no choice but to turn back.
Additional details on the two traverse attempts by U.S. icebreakers
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are contained in a number of more complete accounts.19
In an account of the Edisto and Eastwind cruise, author R. D. Wells
writes:20
While the two ships were working in the Arctic the Soviets
were not idle. The American ships were kept entertained
by a never-ending stream of Soviet Badger and Bear recon-
naissance aircraft. These planes, flying sometimes in vir-
tually zero-zero flying weather, never failed to develop
an audience as they passed overhead. Flying over in clear
weather at 500 to 1,000 feet, in poor visibility they
would decrease their altitude a little at a time until
they could make a visual sighting of the two ships. One
of the giant Bears, lowering gradually step-by-step through
the fog in the course of six passes, finally got a visual
by passing between the icebreakers at a height of not more
than 200 feet on his seventh pass.
Toward the end of the same article, the author makes this con-
cluding comment:
The question of territorial limits, of course, will not be quickly
resolved. The scope of last year's disagreement over Vil'kitskiy
Strait has been reflected already in the headlines across the
country. It seems a bit strange that we should have Soviet elec-
tronics vessels ?three miles off Cape Canaveral and sailing the
waters of Long Island Sound while the Soviet Government says 'nyet'
to our transit and innocent passage inside of 12 miles.
Since 1967, no further U.S. attempts have been made to traverse
the Arctic Basin's Northeast Passage. This is primarily due to the
fact that the United States does not have the icebreaker capability
to accomplish the task boldly. (Since the Soviets have denied Vil'kit-
skiy Strait to U.S. ships, the most difficult leg of a Northeast Pas-
sage traverse would be forcing the heavy ice north of Severnaya Zemlya.)
19J. Y. Smith, "Coast Guard Ships Foiled in Arctic Passage,"
Washington Post, September 1, 1970; "Arctic Trip Frozen Out," Science
News, Vol. 92, September 16, 1967, pp. 273-275; R. Petrow, Across the
Top of Russia, David McKay Co., Inc., New York, 1967. (A condensed,
identically titled version was published in the February 1968 issue
of Popular Mechanics); and R. D. Wells, "Surveying the Eurasian Arc-
tic," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 92, No. 764, October 1966,
pp. 79-85.
20R. 4. 'Wells, "The Icy 'Nyet'!" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Vol. 94, No,. 782, April 1968, pp.. 73-79.
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If an American icebreaker were to get stuck in heavy ice during such
a traverse Attempt, the_VAlted States would be in the embarrassing
position of having alMost no choice but to ask the Soviets to free it.
Of the few icebreakers that the U.S. Coast Guard now has, all but one
are over 20 years old and under 10,000 hp. By contrast, the Soviet
Union has over a dozen more powerful icebreakers, including the 44,000
hp nuclear-powered Lenin, among its total of more than 80 icebreakers.
In addition, the Soviets have begun work on several 66,000 hp ice-
breakers and a giant 80,000 hp icebreaker. This will further strengthen
Soviet capabilities in the Arctic, while U.S. capabilities remain in-
adequate.
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IV. THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION ON ARCTIC WATERS
There has been much confusion generated by the numerous Soviet
declarations (few of them official, some of them contradictory, and
many of them ambiguous) concerning territorial sovereignty in the Arc-
tic Basin. What then can be said about current Soviet attitudes on
Arctic waters? Outlined below is what appears to be the present posi-
tion of the Soviet Union, based on its operational policy during the
last two decades and on a survey of the most recent Soviet literature.
In addition to summarizing the current Soviet position on Arctic waters,
this Section attempts to distinguish the direction in which Soviet
policy may be evolving.
THE "SOVIET SECTOR" CLAIM
Soviet spokesmen have frequently reiterated the sector claim of the
USSR to all lands and islands in the Arctic Basin north of the Soviet
mainland. For example, Capt. P. D. Milovskiy and Justice-Col. G. A.
Glazunov, writing in the June 1970 issue of Morskoy Sbornik, the of
journal of the Soviet Navy, state:21
The most important declaration of rights by the Soviet
Government in regard to arctic territories is the Decree
of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the USSR dated 15 April 1926, which established the geo-
graphical boundaries of the Soviet sector of the Arctic
as being between the meridians of 32? 4' 35" E. and 168?
49' 30" W. Within the limits of this sector, the Soviet
Union exercises full sovereignty over all lands and is-
lands situated in the Arctic Ocean to the north of the
USSR coast and as far as the North Pole.
? Commenting on the present attitude of other Arctic nations toward
sector claims, the Encyclopedia Britannica states:22
Most countries interested in the arctic seem to have
accepted the sector principle with respect to land
21Op. cit., p. 86.
2252cyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 2, 1968 revision, p. 346.
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(that is, the arctic islands and territorial waters sur-
rounding them), although the United States has at times
maintained a noncommittal attitude. Consequently, it is
unlikely that nations having sector claims would accept
claims of any other state based on discovery or occupation;
and conversely, nations making such discoveries are not
likely to assert claims to lands or islands found in sec-
tors of other states.
Today, with the Arctic Basin fully explored, this has become an
academic issue since all Arctic islands have been discovered and claimed.
As it has turned out, the territory of the USSR encompasses all the
islands in what is claimed as the "Soviet sector," and no other country
is disputing Soviet claims to these islands. The USSR, by the same
token, is not claiming any territories in other sectors of the Arctic
Basin. .It can be said, therefore, that the Soviet and Canadian sector
claims, the only two put forward at a time when the Arctic Basin
.was largely unexplored, are now synonymous with the status quo.
Why then do the Soviets continue to emphasize their 1926 sector
'claim? No one is disputing their sovereignty over all the lands and
islands in their sector, and there are no.unknown'islands remaining to
be discovered within it. The reason behind the Soviet policy is prob-
ably a desire to keep alive the concept of a "Soviet sector,' By stress-
ing this concept of a sector exclusively containing Soviet lands and
islands, the Soviets are keeping open. the option of possibly going a
step further and declaring that the Arctic waters containing these Sov-
iet lands and islands must be considered as Soviet waters. A-number.
,
of Soviet jurists and Arctic authorities have already made such claims.23
Although the Soviet Government has not officially made claims of this
nature, it would seem to prefer to keep this option open through un-
official emphasis on the concept of the Soviet sector.
In the course of its extensive research and continuous work in the
Arctic Basin, the Soviet Union has not treated the "sectors" of other
countries as inviolate. Manned Soviet drifting stations have meandered
over the entire Arctic Basin, and Flying Laboratory aircraft have made
hundreds of landings on ice fields north of Greenland, between the
23
V. L. Lakhtin, S. A. Bergavinov, and E. A. Korovin'.
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Canadian Archipelago and the North Pole, and north of Alaska in the
Beaufort Sea.24
And, conversely, the USSR made no official reaction
when U.S. ice stations drifted into the Soviet sector.
25
Airspace over the high seas in Arctic sectors has also remained
open. Soviet jurists have declared in their writings that the Soviet
Union has sovereignty over the airspace above its sector.26
The Soviet
Government, however, has never officially made such a claim and probably
will not do so in the future. During recent years, international air-
lines have been flying an increasing number of regular passenger routes
over the Central Arctic. With the advent of the SST (and its incompati-
bility with populated areas), there will undoubtedly be many more flights
over the Arctic Basin in the future.
In the course of their Arctic operations, the Soviets have flown
all over the Arctic Basin and have made hundreds of landings in all the
sectors.27
Similarly, U.S. military aircraft in transit or performing
some function in the Arctic Basin (conducting ice reconnaissance or
supplying drifting stations), have frequently flown through the Soviet
sector without incident. The Soviet Government, however, on a number
of occasions has protested Arctic flights by nuclear-armed B-52s. In
April 1958, for instance, the Soviet Union submitted a note to the U.N.
Security Council calling for "urgent measures to put an end to flights
24J. 0. Fletcher, Origin and Early Utilization of Aircraft-
Supported Drifting Stations, P-3395, The Rand Corporation, Santa Mon-
ica, California, 1966.
25In October of 1967, the author was on U.S. ice station T-3
(Fletcher's Ice Island) when it drifted into the Soviet-claimed Arctic
sector at a point north of the Chukchi Sea. A rare overflight by Sov-
iet aircraft took place on that day. Two Soviet ice-reconnaissance
planes approached from the west, flew over the stations, then circled
around and flew back in the direction from which they came. This may
have been a symbolic gesture, but, more than likely, it was just an
accidental coincidence -- considering the fact that the Soviets always
make it a point to stay clear of U.S. stations and expect the same in
return.
26See Section II, p. 6 and Appendix B, p. 41.
27Maps showing the extent and numerousness of the Soviet landings
in the Arctic Basin are contained in footnote 24.
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by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs
in the direction of the frontiers of the USSR." In replying to this
charge, the United States proposed an Arctic inspection zone, but this
was immediately rejected by the Soviets. In February 1968, when a U.S.
B-52 bomber with four hydrogen bombs on board crashed near Greenland
while on airborne alert over the Arctic, the Soviet Union again issued
a sharp protest against such U.S. flights.28a
As a rule, U.S. airborne-alert flights have prudently avoided the
"Soviet sector" of the Arctic Basin. United States nuclear submarines,
however, have not shied away from the Soviet sector, and Russian sub-
marines, in turn, cruise the waters of other sectors.28b
It appears, therefore that the present policy of the Soviet Union
is a realistic one which recognizes the high-seas status of the Arctic
Ocean and its airspace. This means that the oft-reiterated Soviet sec-
tor claim pertains only to the lands and islands within the sector,
which all belong to the Soviet Union anyway. Although presently irrele-
vant, the Soviet sector claim could become a significant factor
at some future time. For example, suppose some day it became techno-
logically feasible to securely ground an ice island on the continental
_ _ _ ,
shelf, or to permanently restrict its movement to a small area.29 The
Soviets could declare that such an artifically created and permanent
platform in their "sector" becomes part of the sector's "land and is-
lands," and is thus subject to Soviet sovereignty.
Another possibility associated with the Soviet sector claim could
be that the Soviets may intend to permit only "innocent passage" and
28a1,H-Bomb Hunt in the Arctic Night," Life, February 9, 1968; see
also, "Missing: Four H-Bombs," Newsweek, February 5, 1968.
28bW. Lyon, "The Submarine and the Arctic Ocean," The Polar Record,
September 1963, Vol. 11, No. 75, pp. 699-705.
29In the spring of 1960, Fletcher's Ice Island (T-3) was drifting
westward in the Beaufort Sea. It passed within 19 miles of Barrow and,
shortly afterwards, ran aground northwest of the Point. There it
came to a total halt 80 miles offshore and in about 25 fathoms of
water. The ice island remained immobile and at that same spot (71?
43' N, 1610 14' W) for almost two years, until a series of violent
storms during JEnuary 1962 dislodged it and pushed it back into the
current. This incident serves to show that the concept of a grounded
ice island is nct at all farfetched. See also "Ice Islands May Be
Used As Ship PiErs," Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1970.
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"innocent overflight" in their sector. This possible Soviet intent has
never been tested, since the United States has so far conducted only ,
minimal surface and aerial activities in the Soviet sector of the
Arctic Basin. Past Soviet reactions to U.S. military activities in
the Arctic have been strong, even when such activities were far re-
moved from the Soviet sector. If activities that the Soviet Union con-
sidered hostile were to take place inside the Soviet sector, the reac-
tion of the Soviet Government would probably be much stronger, possibly
to the extent that it would declare the "Soviet sector" of the Arctic
Basin closed to all activities which it does not consider "innocent."
Still another possibility is that the Soviets may use their sector
claim to make their side of the Arctic Basin completely "off limits"
to the United States at some future time. This could be for reasons
of "national security," or to counter U.S. activities, either in the
Arctic or in some other part of the world. For example, if the United
States should put tough restrictions on Soviet activity in and around
Cuba (where the United States is strong and can enforce restrictions),
the Soviet Union could counter by restricting U.S. activity in the
Arctic (where the Russians hold the stronger hand).
TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE SOVIET ARCTIC
Soviet doctrine has always asserted the right of a nation to uni-
laterally set the limit of the territorial waters along its coastline,
according to that nation's own needs and interests.30
The Soviet Union
has declared the width of its own territorial waters, including those
in the Arctic, to be 12 n mi. The Soviets have strenuously resisted
all international efforts to set a lesser norm for all nations to ad-
here to. However, in negotiations for a 1973 United Nations Law of the
Sea Conference, the Soviets are actively seeking multilateral agreement
on a maximum breadth of 12 miles for the territorial sea.
The Soviets initially argued for the right of nations to unilater-
ally set their own territorial water limits in order to buttress the
USSR's early 12 mi claim. Later, as more and more nations declared
30See Appendix B, which discusses the Soviet stand on territorial
waters in more detail.
f;
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12 mi limits for their territorial seas, such justification was no
longer necessary. But, the Soviets continued to maintain their posi-
tion in regard to unilateral determinations, due partly to the fact
that it was a positive factor in their relations with developing nations
and also because extended territorial sea claims tended to hamper West-
ern naval activities more than their own. Furthermore, such extended
claims created frictions between Western nations and developing states.
In recent years, however, the Soviet Union's emergence as a major naval
power has led to qualification of its position.
Starting in the mid-1960s the Soviets, though continuing to main-
tain that coastal states have a right to unilaterally determine the
width of their territorial waters, qualified their statements by indi-
cating that such choices should range between the limits of 3 and 12
miles. In recent years, the Soviet Union has also shown an increased in-
tolerance toward claims exceeding 12 mi, labeling such extended claims
as "excessive," "unrealistic," and "illegal."31
On the question of passage through their territorial waters, both
in the Arctic and elsewhere, the present Soviet position appears to be
as follows:
1. Commercial vessels have the right of "innocent passage," but are
subject to Soviet regulations and surveillance. In addition, they must
stay out of restricted areas and Soviet internal waters. At present,
the only commercial ships that pass through the Arctic Basin are Soviet.
This situation could, however, change in the future with the advent of
Surface Effect Vehicles (SEVs) and submarine transports.
2. Foreign warships (a designation that covers all foreign naval
vessels, including submarines) do not have the right of "innocent
passage" without prior permission. Such permission must be requested
through diplomatic channels "at least 30 days prior to the intended
passage.?32
The Soviets include U.S. icebreakers in this category and
31O. Bozrikov and K. Bekyashev, "Pravovoy Rezhim Prilezhashchikh
Morskikh Zon" (Law Regime of Contiguous Sea Zones), Morskoy not,
Issue 1, 1970, p. 55.
32G. S. Gorshkov, "Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoy Rezhim Tikhogo Okeyanna"
(International Law Regime of the Pacific Ocean), Morskoy Sbornik, No. 7,
July 1970, p. 94.
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list them as "naval vessels." All U.S. icebreakers are now operated
by the Coast Guard. Prior to 1966, the icebreakers were operated by
the U.S. Navy. When the Eastwind and the Edisto sailed into the waters
of the "Soviet sector" with the dual purpose of gathering scientific
data and traversing the Northeast Passage, the Soviets referred to the
U.S. icebreakers as "warships." Although the icebreakers are certainly
not warships as such, each does carry twin-mounted five-inch guns on
its bow, and standard Coast Guard armament.33
3. The Soviet Union does not permit research activities in its
territorial waters without prior permission. This apparently means
that research vessels (which can gather data at anytime and in a
continuous fashion) do not have the right of "innocent passage" without
requesting and receiving permission beforehand (similar to the regula-
tion pertaining to warships). As research activities multiply in the
Arctic regions, the question of passage will be of importance to
oceanographic vessels and weather ships, especially since the greater
part of the Arctic Ocean is unnavigable and the research vessels would
probably have to operate close to the coastlines.
4. Although the Soviets claim to adhere to Article 16.4 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,34 which grants
the right of innocent passage through "international straits," they
have apparently taken the position that the straits along the Soviet
Arctic coastline cannot be construed as "international straits." The
straits in question are Karskiye Vorota Strait (between Novaya Zemlya
and Vaygach Island), Vilekitskiy Strait (between Severnaya Zemlya and
the Taimyr Peninsula) through which the U.S. icebreakers were refused
passage, Sannikov Strait (separating the Novosibirsk Islands), and
Dimitri Laptev Strait (between the Novosibirsk Islands and the Soviet
mainland). The Soviet contention is that these straits are not, in
the language of the Article, "used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas." This
33J. Y. Smith, op. cit.
34 Article 16.4 is quoted in Appendix A.
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presently stands as a true statement. Its truth is due partly to the
inability of international shipping to operate in the Arctic environ-
ment and partly to the fact that the Soviets have pot allowed foreign
vessels to pass through the straits. Thus, the Soviet contention
emerges, as valid by default. These straits connect seas which are
presently being navigated only by the Soviet Union, and it certainly
cannot be said that they are used for "international navigation." The
U.S. icebreaker cruises that ventured into these areae were really
nothing more than experimental probes. If, at some time in the future,
cargo-carrying SEVs and submarines become a reality, the Soviet Arctic
straits may emerge as important passageways for international naviga-
tion, in which case international law would require that they be un-
conditionally open to all ships. At present, however,.since,there is
no international traffic dependent on these straits, the Soviet Union
Is keeping them national by invoking its territorial-waters limit
acniss them.
5. The Soviets do not permit foreign aircraft to fly over their
territorial waters. Since the entire Arctic coastline of the Soviet
Union is a defense zone speckled with military installations, the
Soviets have been especially touchy about foreign (especially American)
aircraft operating close to their northern borders. (As was mentioned
in Section III, this is where most of the U.S.-Soviet incidents have
taken place.) One can be sure that the stringent Soviet attitude toward
foreign aircraft near their Arctic borders will continue. Strong Soviet
reactions can be expected not only in the event of intrusions into the
airspace over their territorial waters, but also as a result of foreign
aircraft even coming within 50 to 100 miles of Soviet territorial waters.
Following the incident .on October 21, 1970, when three U.S. Army
officers in a light plane blundered across the Turkish border and were
forced to land inSoviet Armenia, the. Soviet Government vigorously pro-
tested what it called "frequent U.S. violations of Soviet air space,'
and scoffed at American claims that most U.S. violations have been
accidental strayings by pilots on innocent missions. A Tass:news
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agency release commenting on the incident reflects Soviet sensitivity
about their borders,- especially in theArctic:35
The4imericanb-ases situated close to the Soviet Union are
being widely used for eapionage and other hostile activ-
ities...American propaganda is trying to picture this border
violation and past violations as small accidental incidents
not worthy of serious attention. Washington officials say,
for example, that at least half of all these violations in
the past three years were done by hunters for polar bears...
But the main question is why in general these U.S. military
planes find themselves along Soviet borders--were they
looking for polar bears on the borders of Soviet Armenia?
INTERNAL WATERS OF THE SOVIET ARCTIC
The Russian term "Vnutrenniye vody" frequently appears incorrectly
translated in the U.S. literature as "inland waters." The correct
translation for this term is "internal waters." The term "inland
waters" usually refers to water features of the landscape, such as
lakes, rivers, and canals. "Internal waters," on the other hand,
refers to water areas along a coast, such as bays, inlets, ports,
mouths of rivers, estuaries, etc. According to international law,
a coastal state has the same complete sovereignty over its internal
waters that is has over its land areas, and "innocent passage" is not
permitted through such waters. At times, there has been disagreement
?
as to whit-constitutes "internal waters" and there are no universally
accepted international criteria for making this determination.
The Soviets have defined the "internal waters of the USSR," both
in the Arctic and elsewhere as follows:36
1. The waters of ports, bounded on the seaward side by a line con-
necting the outermost points of the hydrotechnical or other port struc-
tures;
35"Russians Scoff at U.S. Claims of Pilot Error," Los Angeles
Times, Sec. A, p. 9, November 1, 1970.
36B. M. Klimenko, pravo Prokhoda Cherez Inostrannuyu Territoriyu
(The Right of Passage Through Foreign Territory), Foreign Affairs
Publishing House, Moscow, 1967, p. 48.
fc__\
(
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2. The waters of gulfs, bays, inlets,' and estuaries, the shores
of which belong entirely to the USSR, bounded on the outside by a
straight line extended from shore to shore at a point where, on the
seaward side, one or several sea lanes become possible;
3. The waters of gulfs, bays, inlets, and estuaries, as well as
seas and straits, which have historically been possessions of the USSR.
K. G. Tsimanovich, writing in a geographic periodical, elaborates
a little further:37
From this it follows that all gulfs, inlets and bays
whose width on the seaward side is less than 24 miles, re-
gardless of a greater width further inland, are entirely
the property of the Soviet Union. In the case of gulfs
whose width is greater than 24 miles on the seaward side,
only a portion of the water can be regarded as belonging
to the USSR.
In some cases, gulfs, inlets and bays whose width on
the seaward side is considerably greater than 24 nautical
miles are also considered inland waters; these are the so-
called "historical" gulfs which for an extended period were
known to Russian navigators, and which at the present time
are functioning as internal waters of our state. Included
among them are the Gulf of Riga, the Cheshsk and Chaun
Inlets, Peter the Great Gulf, and the White and Azov
Seas.
In the Arctic, the Soviet Union has designated numerous coastal
water areas as its "internal waters," based on both geographic and
hlstorical criteria. The water areas apparently so claimed, going
from west to east, are the following: the White Sea, the Mezen'
Inlet, the Cheshsk Inlet, the Pechora Sea, the Pechora Inlet, the
Khaypudyr Inlet, the Baydaratak ,Inlet, the Ob' Inlet, the_Gyda Inlet,
the Gulf of Yehisey, the Gulf of Pyasin, the Gulf of Tollya, the Gulf
of Faddeya, the Gulf of Khatahga, the Gulf of Anabarak, the Gulf of
Olenek, the Buorkhaya Inlet, the Gulf of Yansk the Selyakh Inlet,
the Ebelyakh Inlet, the Gusinaya Inlet, the Chaun Inlet, the Kolyuchin
Inlet, the Gulf of Mechigmensk, the Gulf of Krasta?the Gulf of Anadyr.
_
.
37K. G. Tsimanovich, "Gosudarstvennaya Granitsa SSSR" (The State
Boundary of the USSR), Geograf4a V Mole, No. 6, November-December
1967, p. 13.
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the Gulf of Karaga, the Gulf of Kamchatka, the Gulf of Kronotsk, the
Penshina Inlet, the Gizhiga Inlet, and the Gulf ofShelikhov.
CLOSED SEAS
In numerous places in the Soviet literature, claims have been
made that the Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas are actually "land-
locked seas" (mare clausum)38 or that they "are in fact broad, shallow
bays" which historically should be considered as part of the internal
waters of the Soviet Union.39 A "closed sea" regime, by definition,
"provides for the unrestricted passage of all vessels of the coastal
states, but excludes any transit of warships of any non-coastal
state..., and any sea, regardless of expanse, may be rendered closed by
the concurrence of all the coastal states which border the sea...."40
The Soviets define closed seas as "seas which essentially constitute
routes leading to the ports and shores of coastal states and are con-
nected to the high seas through a series of straits."41 This defini-
tion agrees with that of U.S. sources.
In view of this definition a case could indeed be made that the
Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas are "closed," if the Arctic ice
cover is defined as a "land-like" entity -- which in many respects it
is. If, however, the Central Arctic is considered to be "high seas,"
then the case for "closed" Soviet Arctic seas is a much weaker one.
The Sea of Okhotsk is another body of water which the Soviets have
defined in their literature as a closed sea. A Soviet military jurist,
G. S. Gorshkov, is quoted from Morskoy Shornik, the official journal
38T. A. Taracouzio, Soviets in the Arctic, The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1938, pp. 353-355.
39E. A. Korovin, ed., Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo (International Law),
Moscow., 1951, p. 296; see also J. F. Meade.
40j. F. Meade, "The Great Territorial Sea Squabble," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 95, No. 794, April 1969, p. 49.
41Justice-Col. A. S. Bakhov (ed.), Voyenno-Morskoy Mezhdunarodno-
Pravovoy Spravochnik (Military-Naval Handbook on International Law),
Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1956, pp. 81-83.
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of the Soviet Navy, as follows:42 "...legal arguments confirm the
correctness of fixing the status of the sea of Okhotsk as both a
closed and internal sea coming under the international law concept
of historical waters."
Another quote by Gorshkov is also taken from the same journal:
The United States is also giving particular "attention"
to the Sea of Okhotsk, an area of great economic and defen-
sive importance to the Soviet Union. This sea penetrates
deep into the territory of the U.S.S.R., and its configura-
tion is greatly different from other far eastern seas. No
international waters or air lanes pass through or over it;
no American territory adjoins it. Nevertheless, U.S. mili-
tary ships and aircraft have turned up here time after time
for intelligence purposes, violating the security of the
Soviet state....
D. W. Given, commenting on the Soviet position regarding the Sea
of Okhotsk, writes:44
43
The first step toward establishing the Sea of Okhosk
as a closed sea was taken during the 1951 San Francisco!
Peace Conference when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei GrOmyko
proposed that the straits around the Japanese islands be
closed to foreign military navigation and that the Seas 'of
Japan and Okhotsk be declared closed. The U.S. Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson, and the other allied representatives
refused to consider Gromykois proposals. Accordingly, the
Soviet Union was not a signatory of the peace treaty with
Japan.
Although Soviet jurists have asserted repeatedly that
the Sea of Okhotsk should be regarded as a closed or terri-
torial sea, Moscow has expediently avoided an official de-
claration. The United States, therefore, has never specif-
ically recognized or denied any Soviet claim over this
water. Should an official declaration be made, the United
States would be obliged to protest its validity or accept
the consequences of inaction.
AB the situation stands at present, the Soviet Union has not of
designated the Sea of Okhotsk, nor the Kara, Laptev, and East
42D. W. Given, "The Sea of Okhotsk: USSR's Great Lake?" U.S.
Naval Inatitute Proceedings, Vol. 96, No. 811, September 1970, p. 49.
43Ibid., p. 48.
44Ibid., p. 51.
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Siberian Seas in the Arctic Basin as "closed seas." As to-what it
might do in the'future,.the Soviet Union may take a position similar
to that regarding its "sector" claim.45
THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
The Soviets have recently put renewed emphasis on the national
character of the Northern Sea Route. It is referred to as the "Na-
tional Northern Sea Route" and identified as an internal shipping
lane. P. D. Milovskiy and G. A. Glazunov, writing in the June 1970
issue of MOrskoy Sbornik, state that:46
...the path of the Northern Sea Route is situated close to
the coast of the Soviet Union. It represents a vital na-
tional communication line of the USSR, whith-Iftmbeen used
and is being used only by Soviet eSoviet-piloted)vessels.
The route passes, in part, through Soviet.territnfial
waters.. .and is closed to military ships of foreign na-
tions....It should be added that the Northern Sea Route
passes through vast Siberian seas--the Kara, Laptev, East
Siberian, and Chukchi Seas which, by their configuration,
represent large shallow bays surrounded by the coastlines
of the Soviet Union. Their bottoms are part of the con-
tinental shelf of the USSR....From Murmansk and Archangelsk
to the Chukchi Peninsula extends our national Northern Sea
Route. Its exploration, conquest, development and main-
tenance...is the result not only of collossal expenditures
of the Soviet Government's means and labor, but represents
also the great efforts expended by the Russian people over
a period of centuries....
The authors conclude their article by stating that:
...the Northern Sea Route is a Russian national route, in
many ways identical to Norway's Indreleia sea route.
This latter point is especially interesting in that it refers to
the Norwegian Fisheries Case mentioned earlier in this paper.47
The
1951 ruling in that case extended Norway's territorial waters beyond
the fringe of its outer coastal islands, and designated the area be-
See Section Section IV, p. 17.
46Op. cit., p. 87.
47See p. 6.
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tween these islands and the mainland (including the Indreleia shipping
lane) as internal waters. It is obvious that the Soviets feel their
Northern Sea Route should have the same status, and they will probably
continue to stress this in the future.
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Appendix A
TERRITORIAL WATERS:
U.N. DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS
"Territorial waters," or "territorial sea," is the designation
given to a zone of water off the coast of a state, over which the
coastal state maintains complete jurisdiction. A zone of territorial
waters may vary in width from 3 to 12 or more nautical miles, depend-
ing on the national policy of the coastal state.
At present, there is considerable disagreement among coastal
nations about the extent of territorial waters. Several full-scale
international conferences on this question have been held under the
auspices of the United Nations, but the issue has still not been re-
solved. The primary basis for recognizing any given width of terri-
torial waters as an international norm is contained in the guidelines
provided by the International Law Commission of the U.N. General
Assembly) The The guidelines presented in the International Law Commis-
sion's report, however, are ambiguously worded and have been differently
interpreted by individual states to support their own national politics
and aspirations. These guidelines, contained in Article 3 of the Com-
mission's report, read as follows:
? The Commission recognizes that the international practice is
not uniform as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea.
? The Commission considers that international law does not permit
an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
? The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth
of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes on the one hand,
that many States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles
and on the other hand, that many States do not recognize such
a breadth when that of their awn territorial sea is less.
? The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial
sea should be fixed by international conference.
Report of the International Law Commission, General Assembly,
Official Records: 11th Bess., Supplement No. 9 (A/3159), United
Nations, New York, 1956.
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By stating that "...many states have fixed a breadth greater than
three miles...." the Article seems to imply that 3 miles is the conven-
tional width of territorial waters.2 On the other hand, by stating
that "...international law does not permit an extension of the terri-
torial sea beyond twelve miles...," the Article implies that an exten-
sion of territorial waters up to 12 n mi is legal.
Today, most nations still adhere to the 3 n mi limit. In recent
years, however, more and more states have unilaterally extended their
territorial waters, usually to the 12 n mi limit. (There are now over
44 nations claiming a 12 n mi limit, as contrasted to only 6 such na-
tions in 1954.) There are, in addition, many nations which claim
territorial waters of varying widths falling between the 3 and 12 n mi
limits. Still other states (Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, Sierra Leone, Brazil, and Peru)
have claimed sovereignty over waters up to 200 n mi from their shores.
Among the Arctic countries, Canada claims a 12 n mi territorial sea
and a 100-mi "pollution prevention zone" north of Latitude 60o N;
the United States claims a 3 n mi zone of territorial waters, Norway
and Denmark, a 4 n mi zone; Iceland, a 4 n mi zone and after September 1,
1972 an exclusive fishing zone 50 n mi wide; and the Soviet Union, a
12 n mi zone.
In 1958 and again in 1960, special U.N. conferences were held for
the purpose of codifying the law of the sea. Although the question of
the width of territorial waters was a major issue at both conferences,
no international agreement was reached. The conferences did, however,
produce four conventions relating to: (1) fisheries; (2) high seas;
(3) the continental shelf; and (4) the territorial sea and contiguous
zone. The four conventions were signed and have all become effective.
Article 1 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone affirms the existence of territorial waters, but skirts the issue
of their extent: "The sovereignty of a state extends beyond the limits
of its land territory and internal waters, encompassing also a sea zone
lying adjacent to its coast and known as the territorial sea." The
?contiguous zone" is defined as a band of water outside, or beyond,
*Three nautical miles corresponds to one league, a unit of meas-
urement formerly used by mariners.
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the territorial sea, in which the coastal state may exercise controls
such as thoae over customs and sanitation. The contiguous zone is ,
measured from the same baseline as the territorial sea and may extend
no more than 12 n mi seaward from it. For nations that claim a 12 n mi
territorial sea, the contiguous zone coincides with the zone of
territorial waters and is absorbed by them. Thus, by definition, a
"contiguous zone" exists only for coastal' states that claim territorial
waters of less than 12 n mi.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone also
contains a number of articles dealing with the right of passage
through territorial waters:
? Article 14.1 states that "...ships of all states, whether
coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent page
through the territorial sea."
? Article 14.2 defines innocent passage as follows: "Passage is
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or 'security of the coastal state."
? Article 16.3: "Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the
coastal state may, without discrimination amongst foreign
ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its terri-
torial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such sus-
pension is essential for the protection of its security."
? Article 16.4: "There shall be no suspension of innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships through straits which are used for in-
ternational navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a
foreign state."
? Article 17: "Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent
passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by
the coastal state in conformity with these articles and other
rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws
and regulations relating to transport and navigation."
? Article 23: "If any warship does not comply with the regula-
tions of the coastal state concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
which is made to it, the coastal state may require the warship
to leave this territorial sea."
Article 2 of the same document (Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone Convention) states that a coastal nation maintains complete
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sovereignty of the air space over its territorial waters and that no
"right of innocent passage" exists through the air over such waters.
This air law concept has evolved as customary law from the Paris con-
vention of 1919 and was confirmed by the Chicago Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation of 1944.
The Soviets have voiced reservations to Article 23 of the Conven-
tion of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which permits the
removal of warships from territorial waters if they do not obeyregula-
tions. The position taken by the Soviet Government is somewhat
stronger, as reflected in the following quote from a Russian text:3
A littoral state which exercises sovereignty over terri-
torial waters naturally has the right, in the interests of
its own security and defense, completely to close its terri-
torial waters to foreign men-of-war. When a state consents
to the passage of foreign ships through its territorial
waters, it can make this passage subject to the observance
of special regulations.
? In an attempt to reach some sort Of international compromise on
the width of territorial waters, a joint U.S.-Canadian proposal was
put forward at the 1960 United Nations Law of the The
proposal called for a 6 n mi territorial sea, with an additional 6 n mi
cOntiguous zone in which the coastal State would have exclusive fish-
ing rights. The proposal narrowly missed getting the two-thirds
majority vote required for its adoption. So adamant is the Russian
position on the 12 n mi territorial sea limit that, when it appeared
that the U.S.-Canadian 6-plus-6 proposal might be adopted by the 1960
Conference, the Soviet Government declared that it would not be bound
by it.
The issue of territorial waters is further complicated by national
claims to "internal waters" and "historic waters." The Soviet Union
has, on occasion, claimed internal-water status for seas along its
Arctic coast. This claim seems to be based in part on a "historic
waters" argument.
3G. E. Carlisle, "Three Mile Limit: Obsolete Concept?" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 93, No. 768, February 1967.
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Designation as "internal waters" refers to all waters landward of
the territorial sea baseline which is measured as provided in Article 5
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. Intentional law gives nations complete sovereignty over their
internal waters and innocent passage" is not permitted through such waters.
"Historic waters" is a concept somewhat harder to define, but it
generally involves sovereignty claims based on national and historical
use. Historic waters have the same status as internal waters, and
foreign vessels do not have the right of "innocent passage" through
them. England's Bristol Channel, Canada's Hudson Strait and Hudson
Bay, Chesapeake Bay of the United States, and the Soviet Union's White
Sea, Gulf of Riga, and Sea of Azov are among the water areas considered
to be "historic waters." The U.N. Law of the Sea Conferences discussed
the subject of "historic waters" but were unable to reach agreement
on criteria.
Partly because of the failure of the numerous attempts to reach
international agreement on territorial sea limits and other questions
pertaining to coastal waters, most nations have adopted unilateral
positions reflecting their own interests. An increasing number of
countries, the Soviet Union among them, has declared a 12 n mi extent
of territorial waters. It has been estimated that if all countries
were to extend their territorial waters to the 12 n mi limit, some
3,000,000 sq mi of ocean would be lost to the regime of the high
seas.4 Furthermore, many strategic straits and channels along con-
tinental margins and between archipelago islands would lose their high-
seas status and become territorial waters.5
The United States has steadfastly adhered to the 3 n mi limit.
Arthur H. Dean, head of the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea
4Sovereignty of the
telligence and Research,
5Straits that would
Gibraltar, the Strait of
Persian Gulf), entrances
and passages through the
Sea, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of In-
Geographic Bulletin No. 3, April 1965.
undergo such a change include the Strait of
Dover, the Strait of Hormuz (at entrance to
to the Gulf of Bothnia and Gulf of Finland,
chain of the Indonesian islands.
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Conference, reiterated the official U.S. position on territorial waters
as follows: "...[three miles] is the sole breadth of territorial sea
on which there had ever been anything like common agreement," and
claims in excess thereof "are not sanctioned by international law,"
and "conflict with the universally accepted principle of the freedom
of the sea....Furthermore, we have made it clear that in our view there
is no obligation on the part of states adhering to the 3 mile rule to
recognize claims on the part of other states to a greater breadth of
territorial sea. And on that we stand.?6 Despite this official posi-
tion, U.S. officials have in recent years proposed moving toward inter-
national acceptance of a 12 n mi maximum limit if such acceptance in-
cludes provisions for freedom of navigation through and over interna-
7 ?
tional straits.
6. E. Carlisle, op cit.
7J: R. Stevenson, "International Law and the Oceans," Department
of State Bulletin, March 16, 1970, pp. 339-343.
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Appendix B
TERRITORIAL WATERS: SOVIET DEFINITION
HISTORICAL VIEWS
Prior to 1917, Tsarist Russia generally adhered to the 3 n mi
territorial sea limit. F. F. Martens, a well known Russian jurist at
the turn of the century, defines territorial waters as "that part of
the sea which adjoins the territory of a coastal state," and "is con-
sidered to be an extension of the land territory of the coastal state,
which therefore has full sovereignty over such waters."1 A number of
other Russian jurists and law scholars of the same period also sup-
ported this position, i.e., that territorial waters were a legitimate
extension of a nation's coastline, and that a nation had the same full
jurisdiction over territorial waters as it had over its land territory.
Among those expounding this view were V. A. Nezabitovskiy, L. A.
Kamarovskiy, and V. A. Ulyanitskiy.2 Two other Russian scholars, V.
Seevers and P. Kazanskiy, writing in 1902, defined territorial waters
as having a dual nature.3 They felt that, in addition to being the
sovereign offshore territory of a coastal state, territorial waters
were also an integral part of the "open sea" and should be open to
innocent passage by foreign vessels.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet Government de-
clared a 12 n mi territorial sea limit and stressed that the U.S.S.R.
would maintain full and unconditional sovereignty over this zone of
1F. F. Martens, Sovremennoye Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo Tsivilizovanykh
Narodov (Present Day International Law of Civilized Peoples), Vol. 1,
5th ed., St. Petersburg, 1904, pp. 386-387 (tr. Olenicoff).
2V. A. Nezabitovskiy, Sobraniye Sochineniy (Collected Works),
Kiev, 1884; L. A. Kamarovskiy and V. A. Ulyanitskiy, Mezhdunarodnoye
Pravo (International Law), Moscow, 1908.
3V. Seevers, Glavneyshiye Svedeniya Po Morskomy Mezhdunarodnomy
PPavy (Main Principles of International Sea Law), St. Petersburg,
1902; P. Kazanskiy, Uchebnik Mezdunarodnogo Prava (Textbook on Inter-
national Law), Odessa, 1902.
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coastal waters. This latter point is reiterated.in,the writings of
Soviet specialists on international law, among them F. I. Kozhevnikov,
A. M. Ladyzhenskiy, T. B. Cherepakhina, V.-N. Durdeneyskiy, and .
A. N. Nikolayev.4
Professor V. N. Durdenevekiy states that: "Territorial waters
(also known as 'territorial sea' or 'coastal waters') are 4 strip of
sea of determined width along the coast of a state and under its sov-
ereignty... Territorial waters are an integral and sovereign part of
a coastal statee's territory.1!.5
T. B. Cherepakhina, in her writing, states essentially the same
thing: "...'by territorial waters is meant that strip' of sea which ex-
tends along a nation's coastline and the outer edge of its national or
internal waters...with the coastal state having full sovereignty over
such territorial waters, since they constitute a seaward extension of
that government's territory."6
Two other Soviet law specialists, P. P. Orlenko and V. A. Belli,
expounded the somewhat different and more international view that ter-
ritorial waters remain part of the open sea and should not be consider-
e&as totally restricted national areas.7 It is interesting to note
that the views of Orlenko and Belli have been criticized, rejected,
4F. I. Kozhevnikov, Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo I Mezhdunarodnoye
Pravo (The Soviet Government and International Law), Moscow, 1948;
A. M. Ladyzhenskiy, "Yuridicheskaya Priroda Territoriallnogo Verk-
hovenstva" (Jurisdictional Nature of Territorial Sovereignty), Bulle-
tin of the Moscow State University, No. 10, Moscow, 1948; T. B.
Cherepakhina, Bor'ba "Dvoukh Lagerey" V Voprose 0 Mezhdunarodno-
Pravovom Rezhime TerritoriaZ'nogo Morya (Battle of the "Two Camps" on
the Question of the International Law Regime Governing Territorial
Seas), Sverdlovsk, 1950 (tr. Olenicoff); E. A. Korovin, ed.,
Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo (International Law), Moscow, 1951 (tr. Oleni-
coff), hereinafter referred to as Korovin, Int. Law; A. N. Nikolayev,
Problema TerritoriaZ'nykh Vod V Mezhdunarodnom Prave (The Problem of
Territorial Waters in International Law), Moscow, 1954.
5V. N. Durdenevskiy, in Korovin, Int. Law, op. cit.,
pp. 300-301.
6T. B. Cherepakhina, op. cit., p.4.
7P. P. Orlenko, Voyenno-Morskoye Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo (Natral'
International Law), Leningrad, 1948; V. A. Belli, Voyenno-Morskoy
Mezhdunarodnyy Spravochnik (International Naval Handbook), Leningrad,
1939.
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and labeled as "confused" by Soviet party-line jurists, and their
writings have been relegated to a second-rate standing.8
The Military-Naval Handbook on International Law, issued to all
Soviet naval units and border forces, elaborates on the matter of ter-
ritorial waters as follows:9
The territorial waters of the Soviet Union are understood to
be a coastal strip of sea, which comprises an offshore ex-
tension of the territorial holdings of the USSR, lies under
its sovereignty, and is an integral part of its national
territory.
The sovereignty of the USSR extends along the entire depth
of its territorial waters, including the bottom and its
resources, and also encompasses the air space over these
waters.
On the basis of the customary international-law position
giving coastal states the right to assert their sovereignty
by individually determining the width and regime of their
territorial waters, the Soviet Government, through a series
of legislative acts, has set up a twelve mile limit and
regime of territorial waters along the coasts of its con-
tinent and islands....
...The twelve mile width of the territorial waters of the
Soviet Union serves to safeguard its economic needs and
the security of its sea borders....
A few paragraphs later, the Handbook provides this rather signif-
icant statement on the Soviet position:10
The sea boundary of Soviet territorial waters constitutes
the state border of the Soviet Union at sea. It is the
sacred responsibility of the Military-Naval Fleet of the
USSR to provide for the security and defense of this sea
border along its entire extent.
An important role in the fulfillment of this task is played
by the established regime for the territorial waters of the
USSR, which has been set up through a series of special
normative acts.
8A. N. Nikolayev, op. cit., p. 13.
9Justice-Col. A. S. Bakhov (ed.), Voyenno-Morskoy Mezhdunarodno-
Pravovoy Spravochnik (Military-Naval Handbook on International Law),
Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1956, pp. 81-83.
10
Ibid., p. 83 (this author's italics).
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The "regime" for territorial waters refers to the established regu-
lations governing activities in this zone, such as fishing, radio com-
munications, surveillance, customs and sanitation operations, the
passage of vessels, and overflights by aircraft.
The Soviet position on the passage of ships and aircraft through
the waters and airspace of the territorial sea zone appears to be the
following, based on a survey of the previously referenced Soviet liter-
ature.
PASSAGE THROUGH WATERS AND AIRSPACE
The Soviets class foreign vessels into three categories: (1) war-
ships (this designation covers all foreign naval vessels, including
fighting ships, troop carriers, surveillance ships, submarines, supply
ships, and even rescue ships); (2) commercial ships (which includes
merchant freighters, tankers, fishing vessels in transit, and passenger
ships); (3) research vessels (which includes ships carrying out meteoro-
logical, geophysical, hydrological, acoustical, archeological, and
oceanographic investigations, as well as weather ships, satellite-
tracking ships, research submersibles, and bottom-coring vessels).
The Soviet Government has set up special territorial sea regulations
for each of the three categories.
Regulations Pertaining to Warships and Submarines
Vessels in the warship category listed above may not enter Soviet
territorial waters unless they request and receive permission before-
hand from the Government of the USSR. Requests for permission must
be made well ahead of time through diplomatic channels and should
state the following information: (1) the number of warships intending
to pass through Soviet territorial waters; (2) the name and designation
of each warship; (3) the reason why the warship is entering Soviet
waters; and, (4) the estimated duration of its stay. Upon entering
Soviet territorial waters, a foreign warship must immediately radio
Soviet authorities about its presence and inform them of iti course.
If a foreign warship enters Soviet territorial waters because of.
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unusual or compelling -circumstances beyond its control, such as a
storm or a disaster at sea, it must inform Soviet authorities of its
presence and proceed directly to the nearest Soviet port which is open
to foreign vessels.
The outlined Warship regulations also apply to submarines which,
the Soviets state, "must remain surfaced While passing through the
territorial waters of the USSR."11 The Soviets further state that a
submarine entering their territorial waters while submerged is commit-
ting an "unlawful act," and units of the Military-Naval Fleet are in-
structed to "take all the necessary measures to compel it to surface."
If the foreign submarine does not surface when ordered to do so, "the
Soviet Military-Naval Fleet units will have no choice but to resort to
strongest defensive measures available to them, and the responsibility
for this will be borne by those commanding the submarine and their
government."12
At this point, it would be appropriate to quote from another
Soviet source on the subject of pursuit: "The pursuit by our defense
forces of foreign vessels, which have violated Soviet territorial
waters, may go beyond the twelve mile limit and continue into the open
sea. Pursuit is discontinued if and when the vessel in question
enters the waters of a foreign state and, in the case of vessels fly-
ing a foreign flag, pursuit is unquestionably terminated upon the
entry of such vessels into a foreign port."13
Regulations Pertaining to Research Vessels
The types of ships falling into this category were listed earlier.
As early as 1932, Soviet authorities announced that "the right to per-
form oceanographic and hydrological investigations in seas adjacent to
the USSR, within the 12 mile zone of territorial waters, is granted
11Ibid., p. 85.
12Ibid.
13Nikolayev, op. cit., pp. 233-234.
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only to ships flying the flag of the USSR.u14 Since then, this restric-
tion has been expanded to include all types of scientific and technical
research. As it stands now, foreign research vessels can perform in-
vestigations in Soviet territorial waters only with the -express per-
mission of the Government of the USSR.15
Regulations Pertaining to Commercial Ships
This category includes all types of freight-carrying ships, as
well as tankers, fishing vessels in transit, and passenger ships.
Soviet regulations pertaining to the passage of such vessels through
territorial waters are stated thus:
1. Foreign commercial ships may pass through Soviet territorial
waters if they are en route to or from an open Soviet port;
2. Foreign commercial ships may also pass through Soviet terri-
torial waters if they are in transit along the shortest route (or a
recommended route) between two foreign ports;
3. Foreign commercial ships can avail themselves of Soviet terri-
torial waters if this is necessitated by a storm or disaster at sea,
or by other unusual circumstances;
4. While passing through Soviet territorial waters, foreign com-
mercial vessels are subject to surveillance by Soviet naval and border
units;
5. Soviet naval vessels have the right to stop and search foreign
commercial ships passing through Soviet territorial waters, and the
foreign ship can continue its voyage only after the investigating
Soviet ship has granted it permission;
6. Foreign commercial vessels may not load or unload goods or
passengers in Soviet territqrial waters without the knowledge and
permission of Soviet authorities;
14
Tsirkulyar Gidrograficheskogo Upravleniya (Circular of the
Pydi.ographic Office), No. 85, 16 March 1932.
15Nikolayev, op. cit., p. 218; Bakhov, op. cit., p. 89.
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7. Foreign commercial ships passing through Soviet territorial
waters should follow recommended routes and must not enter (a) in-
ternal waters; (b) restricted areas closed to navigation; (c) re-
stricted defense zones or so-called "fortified zones."
Generally speaking, the position taken by the Soviet Government
in regard to foreign commercial vessels is in keeping with interna-
tional laws permitting "innocent passage." Commercial ships under-
taking innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters are, however,
subject to numerous and stringent regulations.
Regulations Pertaining to Aircraft
The Soviet Government claims full sovereignty over the airspace
of its territorial waters and does not permit "innocent passage" by
foreign military or civil aircraft, a position in keeping with inter-
national laws pertaining to airspace over territorial waters. In-
structions issued to Soviet air units on border-defense duty are ex-
plicit: "When foreign aircraft violate the airspace of the USSR
[which by definition includes the airspace over territorial waters],
pilots are instructed to intercept such aircraft and force their land-
ing at a Soviet airfield. In the event of resistance, pilots are in-
u16
structed to open fire.
Another Soviet statement declares: "Pilots engaged in espionage
or surveillance activity in Soviet airspace are subject to arrest,
trial, conviction, and even the most severe degree of punishment, in
accordance with our laws."17
16Bakhov, op. cit., p. 93.
17Declaration of the Delegate of the USSR to the Political Com-
mittee of the United Nations on December 19, 1951, reported in Pravda,
December 22, 1951.
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THE SOVIET STAND ON TERRITORIAL WATERS
To summarize the Soviet position on territorial waters, a concise
statement from,an authoritative Soviet source is presented below.18
An analysis of Soviet legislative acts, international
agreements, diplomatic documents, and statements of USSR
representatives to international bodies on the question
of territorial waters shows that the Soviet point of view
on this subject consists, first of all, of the recognition
of the obvious fact that, due to the different historical
economic, political, and military-strategic conditions
characterizing each individual state, the width of terri-
torial waters is different for different states. In view
of this fact, there can be no general norms set up by in-
ternational law establishing one common width for terri-
torial waters. In the absence of special international
agreements, the determination of the width of territorial
waters is made by the states themselves. In determining
the width of territorial waters, the legislative organs
of the states must judiciously take into account both
their own national interests, and the interests of inter-
national navigation.
The width of Soviet territorial waters was determined
with due regard to the historical, economic, political,
and military-strategic conditions characterizing the USSR--
a great sea power and the world's leading socialist state.
This width equals 12 nautical miles, measured from the
mean low-water line of both continent and islands. This
width of Soviet territorial waters is, at the present time,
in keeping with the economic and security interests of the
USSR. At the same time, it in no way impedes the use of
international sea routes. Soviet territorial waters com-
prise an offshore extension of the territory of the USSR,
the sovereignty of the USSR extends over them, and they
constitute a State socialist possession of the USSR.
Soviet jurisdiction prevails within the limits of the
territorial waters of the USSR; and, the regulation of the
regime of the territorial waters is performed exclusively
by organs of the USSR. The Soviet Government rigorously
guards its right of sovereignty in its territorial waters
and will decisively block any and all attempts on the
part of imperialist states to violate the regime of these
waters. At the same time, the Soviet Government will
respect the sovereign rights of other states in their
territorial waters.
18B. M. Klimenko, Provo Prokhoda Cherez Inostrannuyu Territoriyu
(The Right of Passage Through Foreign Territory), Foreign Affairs
Publishing House, Moscow, 1967 (tr. Olenicoff).
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