SOVIET POLICY ON LAW OF THE SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
~"t'F 1V il[[O[li[I VV11111iG1111R1
W '~ Foreign
Assessneent
Center
Soviet Policy on
Law of the Sea
Confidential
GC 79-10003
February 1979
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Soviet Policy on
Law of the Sea
Research for this report was completed on
15 February 1979. The author is
Environment and Resource Analysis Center, Office
of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Summary .................................................................................................................... iii
Background ................................................................:................................................. 1
Soviet Maritime Interests ......................................................................................:... 2
Increasing Divergence Between US and USSR LOS Positions ............................ 4
Prospects ................................:............................... 7
....................................................
Appendix : ............................................................:..................................................... 9
The Soviet Maritime Periphery: Sovereignty and Security Considerations .... 9
Graphics
Profile of Typical Continental Margin (diagram) ............................................ 5
Barents Sea Continental Shelf Boundary Claims (map) .................................. 8
Baltic Sea Continental Shelf Boundary Claims (map) ................................:..... 10
USSR: Maritime Limits (map) foldout, rear ........................................ follows 12
i
Confidential
~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Confidential
Soviet Policy on Law of the Sea
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Summary
The Third United Nations Conference on Law of
the Sea has coincided with the emergence of the Soviet
Union as a major maritime power. The earlier obses-
sion with hostile encirclement appears to have been
largely replaced by a global attitude toward the sea
comparable to that of other major naval powers. The
desire of the USSR to effectively employ its new high
seas navy, expanded maritime fleet, and distant water
fishing potential goes far in explaining the current
Soviet behavior in the LOS negotiations, where it has
come on as one of the stronger proponents of retaining
the traditional high seas rights of navigation.
- Long distrustful of coastal state claims to broad
economic zones, the USSR is making alast-ditch effort
in the negotiations to erect strong treaty barriers
against "creeping jurisdiction"-the tendency of
coastal states to claim enlarged resource zones and
establish restrictive controls over international
navigation.
ity in the oceans.
-Moscow's efforts to limit coastal states' jurisdic-
tion over broad continental shelves and to disperse
mid-ocean seabed mining sites are also spurred by its
interest in retaining unobstructed navigational mobil-
The Soviet Union's territorial ambitions as well as its
security concerns in its maritime periphery -steer its
late drive to modify the dispute settlement provisions
of the draft LOS treaty.
- The USSR seeks to eliminate the obligation to
submit maritime boundary disputes to binding settle-
ment by outside parties. Success here would allow the
USSR to continue pressuring Norway and Sweden to
make concessions on the location of the continental
shelf boundaries in the Barents and Baltic Seas.
- The exclusion of bilateral maritime boundary
disputes from compulsory procedures would also
shield the Soviets' novel Arctic sector claim from
judicial review by the International Court of Justice or
an arbitral body.
When the Soviets have tried to accommodate the
interests of the developing countries, and thereby shed
their conservative image as a defender of the status
quo, they have stepped on the toes of the Western
industrialized nations.
- Their support of restrictive production controls
a.nd quotas for seabed mining threatens to hamstring
this new industry.
- Moscow's inconsistent and seemingly self-iniur-
ious stance on coastal state control of marine scientific
research jeopardizes the US goal of retaining some
vestige of freedom of research in the 200-mile ~`
economic zone.
The USSR cannot continue to press on so many
controversial points at the next session of the LOS
Conference (opening March 19 in Geneva) and expect 25X1
a comprehensive oceans treaty that would receive the
consensus approval of a majority of nations. The
Soviets are close to the point where they must choose
between a treaty that is not altogether satisfactory to
them or rio treaty at all. It will be a very difficult
choice for a state that harbors global maritime ambi-
tions.
* Distances throughout this study are in nautical miles unless
specified otherwise.
iii
Confidential
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Soviet Policy on Law of the Sea
Background
revolve the first question but was unsuccessful.
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea was held in 1958. This conference produced
four conventions dealing with fisheries, the continental
shelf, the high seas, and the territorial sea, but did not
reach agreement on a maximum limit for territorial
sea claims nor set a clear and precise limit to coastal
state jurisdiction over resources of the continental shelf.
The Second Conference, in 1960, again attempted to
That failure doomed the traditional 3-mile territorial
sea limit. * More and more states claimed broader
limits. More than 20 percent of the coastal states now
claim territorial seas in excess of 12 miles; among them a
substantial number claim 200-mile territorial seas. ~
since then.
In the mid-1960s, the US and USSR began diplo-
matic efforts to secure international agreement on
standardized maritime claims to protect their naviga-
tional and overflight interests. Both nations hoped to
limit territorial sea claims to 12 miles and balance
coastal state resource interests in the zone beyond with
the navigational rights of the international commu-
nity. At the same time, the emerging corporate interest
in mining deep seabed minerals caused the developing
countries to push a resolution through the UN General
Assembly declaring manganese nodules and other
resources of the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdic-
tion "the common heritage of mankind." ** These
events led, in December 1973, to the beginning of the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
(UNCLOS III), which has held six negotiating sessions
?' The resolution has no legal force. Further, the common
heritage concept has no precise meaning in international law and
tends to be used in differing ways by the various delegations to the
LOS Conference.
sovereign rights it possesses in the territorial sea.
? The term "territorial sea" is understood in international law to
mean those coastal waters over which a nation has complete
sovereignty, conditioned only by the right of "innocent passage"
(which in turn is defined as vessel passage not prejudicial to the
"peace, good order, and security" of the coastal nation). The
distinguishing feature of the zones beyond territorial seas-be they
fishing, economic, or other specialized maritime zones-is that the
nation involved is claiming jurisdiction or rights less than the
UNCLOS III has coincided with the emergence of
the Soviet Union as a maior maritime power. The
earlier obsession with hostile encirclement appears to
have been largely replaced by a global attitude toward
the sea comparable to that of other maior naval
powers. The desire of the USSR to effectively employ
its new high seas navy, expanded maritime fleet, and
distant water fishing potential goes far in explaining
the current Soviet behavior in the LOS negotiations; ' 25X1
where it has come on as one of the stronger proponents
of retaining the traditional high seas rights of
navigation.
The LOS Conference is a difficult negotiating envi-
ronment for the USSR. As a maior maritime power, it
has played an active role in support of conservative
proposals and has tried to contain initiatives for
change that it views as detrimental to its security
interests. To that end, Moscow joined the caucus called
the Group of 5, representing the maior industrial/mar-
itime powers-the US, UK, France, Japan, and USSR.
The Soviets have also pressured their East European
allies to back up their defense of the traditional
concepts of narrow territorial seas and freedom of
navigation in straits. This conservatism and conver-
gence of interests with the US and other major
industrial nations has prompted the Chinese to charge
repeatedly that the superpowers are colluding to in-
crease their power and wealth at the expense of the
developing nations.
The major political reality of UNCLOS III, how-
ever, is its numerical domination by the 117 develop-
ing countries, which generally question the universal
application of ocean concepts fashioned in the past by
maior maritime powers. Their UN negotiating cau-
cus-the Group of 77-has further introduced the
North-South dialogue into the LOS negotiations by
demanding that deep seabed mining be controlled by
an International Seabed Authority (ISA), a proposed
UN-linked institution which they seek to control.
The strong Soviet interest in the outcome of the
Conference has thrust the USSR into the limelight, in
marked contrast to the low visibility it has enjoyed in
other North-South forums such as the Common Fund
meetings.
1
Confidential
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Navy and Merchant Marine
The postwar growth of the Soviet Navy and Mer-
chant Marine has been remarkable. Before 1969 Soviet
warships rarely ventured outside their home waters,
but since then they have routinely plied the world
ocean. The Soviet Navy has been greatly strengthened
over the past 20 years by an ambitious ship construc-
tion program involving both general purpose naval
forces and ballistic missile submarines.
In 1960 the USSR merchant fleet ranked 26th in the
world in number of ships; now the Soviet Union ranks
second or (on some lists) third. In deadweight tonnage,
the Soviet fleet totaled 4.2 million tons in 1961. By
1974, the fleet had grown to 14.2 million tons, placing
it seventh in the world. Additional capacity is report-
edly being introduced at a rate of nearly 1 million tons
yearly.
The Soviet Union's LOS policy is largely guided by
its concern over the problem that its naval vessels must
pass through certain vital straits and seas in order to
reach the oceans. These strategic passageways are the
Barents and Norwegian Seas, the Danish Straits, and
the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Moscow has long
been sensitive to any proposals or events that might
navigation-even if they would be overlapped by a 12-
25X1
mile limit. This concept has been accepted by the LOS
25X1
Conference and is embodied in the draft text of the
proposed treaty as the regime of "transit passage."
Acceptance of "transit passage" through interna-
tional straits would rule out governance of vessel
transit by the principle of "innocent passage" which,
among other restrictions, requires submarines to re-
main on the surface and show their flags when passing
through territorial waters. States bordering straits
would also be barred from promulgating further arbi-
trary regulations that might close such critical passages
as Gibraltar, Dover, Bab-el-Mandeb (at the southern
end of the Red Sea), Hormuz (at the entrance to the
Persian Gulf), several straits in the Caribbean, and
Malacca.
By limiting the applicability of transit passage to
those straits used for international navigation, the draft
LOS text indicates that the principle of innocent
passage still applies to other straits. This provides the
USSR with, an arguable right to retain the rule of
innocent passage in the several straits along its North-
ern Sea Route which, Moscow could assert, have never
been used for international shipping. The Soviet defi-
nition of innocent passage requires prior consent for
the transit of foreign warships.
alter the status of these waters.
The, USSR's determined effort to preserve as much
as it can of existing high seas freedoms of navigation is
primarily related to maintaining the strike role of its
navy. In addition, however, the navy has become one
of the principal means by which the Soviets project
political power in the Socialist Bloc and the Third
World. In February 1979, for example, the USSR
deployed warships off the Vietnamese coast in re-
sponse to the buildup of Chinese ground forces across
Hanoi's northern border. Combat ships and naval
auxiliaries are routinely deployed to the Mediterra-
nean Sea, the,Indian Ocean, and the west coast of
Africa. Together with Soviet merchant vessels, they
have supplied extensive material support to client
regimes and liberation movements. By show-the-flag
port calls and by establishing amore-or-less perma-
nen# presence in Third World harbors, the navy
performs a mission of growing importance.
Straits Passage
The .USSR has long advocated and claimed a 12-mile
limit for the territorial sea but also strongly endorses
freedom of navigation and overflight for straits that
connect high seas and are used for international
Regarding the Danish and Turkish Straits, there is a
tacit understanding between the USSR and other
concerned states that the legal regimes of these pas-
sages, having been established by custom or earlier
international agreements, will not be changed by a
new oceans treaty. The Montreux Convention pres-
ently governs the Bosporus and Dardanelles and places
restrictions on Soviet warships exiting the Black Sea.
Although the Soviets hold that a high seas regime of
unimpeded transit exists in the Danish Straits, they
usually adhere to Denmark's prohibition of the pas-
sage of more than three foreign warships simulta-
neously, and they comply with the Danish require-
ment that naval transits be made only during daylight
hours.
The USSR's concern for safeguarding its naval
mobility has also been reflected in its attitudes toward
the concepts of 200-mile fishing or economic zones.
Soviet naval leaders fear that state jurisdiction over
ocean resources and vessel pollution out to 200 miles
could be interpreted or extended in scope to include
control over shipping through waters which are now
high seas. The passage of nuclear powered submarines,
2
Confidential
25X1
Z~X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
control.
for example, could be considered a pollution hazard
that coastal states might try to bring under their
Debate at UNCLOS III has produced a compromise
legal definition of the economic zone and a complex
array of checks and balances that purport to accom-
modate the varied-and often contradictory-inter-
ests of coastal states and the international community.
The waters between i2 and 200 miles from shore are
no longer defined as high seas, but vessels of all states
continue to enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight beyond 12 miles. The draft articles, how-
ever, tilt clearly toward the coastal states. They endow
the coastal states with powers to determine the allowa-
ble fish catch and allocate it among competing distant-
water fishermen. They also place marine scientific
research by foreign nations under the jurisdictions of
of the principle in the LOS negotiations.
The Soviets firmly opposed the principle of the
200-mile economic or fishing zone until they were
overwhelmed by weight of numbers in the LOS
Conference, the recognition of 200-mile resource
zones having become the sine qua non of the treaty for
the numerous developing coastal states. Moscow later
established its own 200-mile fishing zone as a defen-
sive reaction to the North American and West Euro-
pean 200-mile zones and acceded to the inevitability
Archipelagoes
Certain proposals for archipelagic regimes have also
furrowed the Soviet brow. The proposals of Indonesia,
the Philippines, Fiji, and other states for archipelagic
regimes enclosing the waters of their island dominions
met initially with strong Soviet resistance. Soviet (and
US) objections apparently have been satisfied by the
willingness of Indonesia to designate sea lanes and air
routes through its archipelago for the "expeditious and
unobstructed transit" of ships and aircraft. Still, Soviet
and US acceptance is conditioned upon the completion
of a comprehensive oceans treaty that safeguards their
navigational interests in straits and economic zones.
At the beginning of the LOS Conference, the USSR
suggested that the outer limit of coastal state jurisdic-
tion over the oil and gas resources of the continental
shelf be fixed either at 200 miles or at the 500-meter
isobath (depth line), whichever is farther seaward. It
was uncertain at the time why the'Soviets favored such
a conservative formula. It now appears that Moscow
has long feared the threat to navigation that could
ensue from creeping additions to the jurisdiction of
coastal states jurisdiction of coastal states in situations
where the shelf extends far beyond the 200-mile
economic zone. The demands of the states possessing
broad continental margins for delimitation of the shelf
by the so-called "Irish Formula" * could, indeed, lead
to the award of jurisdiction over shelves reaching
hundreds of miles to sea.
Navigational Mobility
The Soviet concerns for their navigational freedoms
in coastal state resource zones spring from their de-
fense needs and geographical location. The vessels of
the Soviet Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula
bordering the Barents Sea, must transit the economic
zones of several NATO nations to reach the high seas.
Attempts by Norway, Denmark, the UK, and Iceland
to control warship transits in their resource zones could
dramatically alter the nature of Soviet naval oper-
ations. Such actions, the Soviets fear, could impede
access of the Northern Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean
Soviet strategic interests .also .require that USSR
naval vessels enjoy unimpeded rights of transit be-
tween the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Northern
Sea Route is only navigable in summer. The southern
approaches involve transiting numerous national eco-
nomic zones and archipelagic zones, whether Soviet
vessels proceed around Southern Africa or through the
Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden.
Unequivocal high seas freedom of navigation through
this maze of resource zones would free 'the Soviet
Navy of the burden of coping with onerous coastal
state regulations affecting warship transit. Consenting
to restrictive rules could slow the passage or limit the
type and number of naval vessels moving through
these regions, while protests or violations could be
detrimental to Moscow's relations -with the littoral
states involved.
Distant Water Fishing
The most severe economic challenge facing the
USSR in the oceans is the need to adjust the practices
of its fishing fleets to the new 200-mile coastal state
economic zones. The Soviet catch, currently second
only to Japan, provides one-third of the animal protein
and about 15 percent of all protein in the Soviet diet.
In 1975 roughly 60 percent of the Soviet harvest of 10
million metric tons was caught within 200 miles of
* See page 5 for a discussion of the Irish Formula and a list of the
"broad-margin" states.
3
Confidential
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
foreign coasts. To ensure continued access to these
productive fishing grounds, the Soviets are fostering
extensive foreign assistance and joint venture pro-
grams.
Increasing Divergence Between US and USSR LOS
Positions
At the most recent sessions of the LOS Conference
the negotiating positions of the USSR and the US have
differed on a number of significant issues, both sub-
stantive and procedural. Moscow and Washington
have long disagreed, for example, on important aspects
of the seabed mining and marine scientific research
issues. Now the US and USSR differ on the definition
of the legal status of the economic zone and on specific
dispute settlement procedures in the economic zone;
the US finds the texts satisfactory on these two sub-
jects, but the USSR seeks to amend the present draft
articles to tilt the treaty in the direction of the
maritime powers. The Soviets are also raising the
stakes at the conference, by linking their approval of
the broad continental margin concept to the exemp-
tion of maritime boundary disputes from third-party
dispute settlement procedures.
The mining issue, however, also divides the Group
of 5. Like the US, Moscow wants guaranteed access by
all countries to seabed resources on an equal legal
footing with the Enterprise. But the USSR and France 25X1
oppose unlimited access by private corporations and
support a quota concept that would limit the number
of minesites available to a state and its nationals. The
Soviets are also adamantly opposed to competition
between states, or between states and private firms, for
seabed mining contracts.
The Soviets have proposed there be limits both on
the total area of the seabed and on the portions of
certain defined regions of the seabed that a single state
or its companies could exploit. The Soviets also favor
establishing a preference for states which have not yet
received any contracts over states which have already
received a certain number of contracts.
Further, in support of efforts of the Group of 77 to
protect land-based mineral producers against the com-
petitive effects of future manganese nodule mining,
Moscow backs a formula that would prohibit seabed
mining from supplying more than 65 to 75 percent of
the growth in the world nickel market for the first 20
years of the industry. The United States opposes these
ideas, feeling that their implementation would ham-
Seabed Mining
After prolonged negotiations, the LOS Conference
has come to accept the broad outline of a parallel
system for exploiting the manganese nodules found in
the ocean depths beyond the limits of coastal state
jurisdiction. Under this system, both corporations and
states would share with the Enterprise, the mining arm
of the ISA, the right to mine the deep seabeds.
But there still is a wide gap between industrialized
and developing countries on the nuts and bolts of the
plan: yet to be determined are the extent of the
royalties and fees that mining firms should pay the
ISA for the right to mine, the nature and extent of
production controls, and the provisions for transferring
technology 'and know-how from the firms to the
Enterprise. The Group of 77 and the industrialized
nations are even farther apart on the sensitive issue of
working out a system of governance for the ISA.
Essentially, the developing countries feel that the
negotiating situation in the LOS Conference offers an
opportunity to restructure one segment of the world
economy in a way favorable to them. To that end they
are withholding agreement on the navigation interests
of the naval powers until they achieve a resolution of
the seabed mining issue consistent with their hoped-
for New International Economic Order.
string the new industry
The Soviet Union's concerns over seabed mining can
be grouped in three categories:
- First, Moscow wants assurance that prime mine-
sites will still be available when Soviet industry needs
minerals from the seabed at some point in the future.
The Soviet Union supports quotas and production
limitations in order to inhibit American access to
seabed minerals and thereby prevent a foreclosure of
its own future resources options that could result from
unfettered exploitation by US and multinational firms.
-Second, Moscow wants to protect its present and
anticipated hard minerals exports. The massive invest-
ments in extractive and processing facilities in the
Soviet Arctic regions are not expected to begin paying
off until several years from now, by which time
25X1
25X1 ICI
LJ/~ I
competition from an American-dominated seabed in- 25)(1
dustry in the world nickel and copper export markets
could be injurious.
- Third, the USSR fears the prospect of US domi-
nation of large areas of the deep seabed. Soviet naval
authorities have indicated concern that international
waters above seabed minesites might become "areas of
influence" of the Western democracies. They may
believe that rights to exploit large tracts of seabed 25X1
4
Confidential
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
graphically dispersed.
could lead to controls on the cruising of naval (and
merchant) vessels in waters above mining operations.
Probably for this reason, the Soviets insist that the
seabed mining sites allotted to each nation be geo-
the LOS Conference.
Having neither the need nor the desire (nor, indeed,
the capability) to begin exploiting the seabed itself
anytime soon, the USSR seeks to gain political capital
with the Third World on the seabed issue whenever
the opportunity presents itself. At the most recent LOS
session in New York, the Soviets ioined the Group of
77 in condemning the seabed mining legislation pend-
ing in the US Congress, stating that such unilateral
action is illegal and could have a destructive effect on
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf failed to precisely delineate the outer limits of
coastal state iurisdiction over the resources of the
continental shelf. That document authorized coastal
state authority over the shelf "to a depth of 200 meters
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superiacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources ..." Most coastal states possessing
Delimitation of Broad Continental Margins
Profile of Typical Continental Margin
territorial
seams
200 m
water depth 200nm
continental shelf
depth: 0 to 200 meters (m)
broad continental margins * extending far to sea em-
braced the 1958 Convention; some incorporated it in
their municipal legislation; and some have licensed
exploration for oil and gas in regions well beyond 200
miles from shore. These "broad-margin" states-the 25X1
United States, Canada, Argentina, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, Norway, Mauritius, India, Australia, and
New Zealand-came to UNCLOS III seeking codifica-
tion in a new oceans treaty of their practice of
claiming and exercising, resource rights over very
broad areas of the continental shelf.
The broad-margin states favor a complex proposal
of the Irish delegation to measure the new legal
continental shelf. According to the Irish Formula,
whenever the continental margin extends beyond 200
miles, the coastal state can adopt one of two criteria
for delimiting the outer edge: iurisdiction might ex-
tend to a maximum of 60 miles beyond the foot of the
slope or, alternately, to the line where the depth of
sediments in the subsoil falls below one percent of the
distance between it and the foot of the slope.
' The continental margin, consisting of the shelf, slope, and rise,
is the geomorphological term for the undersea prolongation of the
continental land mass. The term continental shelf is used here in the
legal sense, that is, to denote the seafloor under the resource
iurisdiction of the coastal state.
foot of the
continental slope
(tleflnatl by change
in gradlenq
continental slope
depth: 200 to 3,500 m
5
Confidential
seaward edge
of the continental margin
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
The Arab states have steadfastly opposed the Irish
formula, arguing that the width of the shelf should
coincide with the economic zone; that is, it should be
limited to 200 miles. This would place hydrocarbon
deposits beyond 200 miles under the domain of the
ISA, in which the Arabs would have a voice.
The USSR has also consistently resisted proposals for
far-reaching coastal state jurisdiction over the shelf.
Their initial proffer of 200 miles out or 500 meters
down found few adherents, however. The Soviets say
the Irish Formula is too complex and also expensive, in
that nations would incur considerable deep drilling
costs to determine sediment depth. At the most recent
session, the Soviet delegation offered a compromise
formula; coastal state jurisdiction over the margin,
where it extends beyond 200 miles, to a maximum
additional distance of 100 miles if such extension is
justified by sound geological evidence.
Support for the Soviet 300-mile proposal by the East
European countries, Cuba, and Haiti stalled the move-
ment toward consensus that had been building for the
Irish Formula. Although some LDCs suspect the Soviet
300-mile proposal may be a negotiating ploy, they are
attracted by its simplicity. Many believe that under
the Irish Formula they would find it difficult to
calculate and enforce their shelf limits.
space to coastal states is not really in the best interests
of a naval power such as the United States. 0
25X1
Dispute Settlement Procedures ~~
25X1
The United States seeks a broad regime that would
provide for an orderly settlement of maritime disputes
and for the uniform interpretation and application of
a new Law of the Sea Treaty. As the means of adjudi-
cating disputes, the draft text of the treaty (which the
US approves) offers future signatories the choice of a
new Law of the Sea Tribunal, the International Court
of Justice, or an arbitral tribunal. A complex set of
draft obligations, procedures, applications, and excep-
tions establishes the legal processes.
The Soviet Union has two serious problems with the
text on dispute settlement. The draft treaty exempts
maritime boundary disputes from settlement under
the terms of the Convention, provided that binding
regional or other third-party procedure is accepted
instead. This is unacceptable to the Soviets, who
demand that disputes between opposite and adjacent
states over the delimitation of their sea boundaries be
automatically excluded from all compulsory and bind-
ing procedures. They contend that no sovereign state
should be subject to any obligatory procedure in
resolving such matters.
the
During the recent intersessional period, a Soviet
delegate floated another compromise idea: that of
having two regimes for the shelf. One would coincide
with the economic zone; the other could extend out to
the 2,500-meter isobath, or for an additional 150 miles,
whichever is farther seaward, but would restrict
coastal state jurisdiction over non-resource uses of the
shelf, such as the conduct of marine scientific research
by the international community.
Once again, the USSR is motivated by concern over
potential legal impediments to the mobility of its fleet.
The Soviets state that the Irish Formula would allow
Australia to claim a 600-mile continental shelf around
Heard Island in the Indian Ocean; that the UK and
New Zealand could claim zones in various areas
ranging from 400 to 500 miles wide. The Soviets also
contend that as new geological information became
available broad-margin states would want to further
extend the outer boundaries of their margins.
Even though such NATO states as Norway, the UK,
and Canada would be among the primary benefici-
aries of the Irish formula, the Soviets are mystified by
the US support for the Irish Formula. Moscow feels
that the award of large expanses of ocean and shelf
USSR would not give way on the issue of determining
the outer limits of the continental shelf unless the issue
of compulsory third-party settlement of sea boundary
disputes was resolved to its satisfaction. In effect, the
Soviets were demanding the broad-margin states come
to their aid on the dispute settlement issue in return
for Soviet cooperation on the shelf issue. This ploy is
unlikely to succeed, however, because the small broad-
margin group appears to have little influence over the
countries that have a strong interest in assuring proce-
dures for the compulsory settlement of maritime
boundary disputes.
The second dispute settlement issue that deeply
troubles the USSR concerns judicial procedures for
resolving fishing disputes in the economic zone. The
Soviets are disturbed that most challenges of a coastal
state's discretionary powers over fisheries conservation
and utilization are not subject to binding dispute
settlement. The present text finesses the topic by
subjecting such disputes to a procedure of "compul-
sory conciliation" which requires parties in dispute to
negotiate their differences but does not mandate a
binding settlement. Moscow feels that its historic
distant water fishing rights will not be adequately
6
Confidential
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
coastal states.
protected against capricious acts of coastal states by
such a mechanism. Soviet lobbying for stronger proce-
dures, however, has been forcefully resisted by the
control.
The United States and the Soviet Union have split
sharply on the issue of how much authority the coastal
states should possess over the conduct of marine
scientific research in their economic zones and on
their continental margins. The US objective of free-
dom of scientific research in these zones is in consider-
able jeopardy, for the negotiating text now proposes a
regime wherein all research is subject to coastal state
ever, require the consent of the coastal state.
The US prefers a so-called "notification" system.
Under this concept all fundamental research-that is,
research not related to resources-would be author-
ized upon the serving of notice to the coastal state,
subject only to specific limitations and procedures as
stipulated in the treaty. Research that is resource-
oriented, that involves drilling into the continental
shelf, or the use of explosives, or the utilization of
artificial islands or similar installations would, how-
The proponents of a full consent system received
unexpected support for their position . in 1976 when
the USSR, in an abrupt about-face, accepted the
principle of coastal state control over all research in
resource zones. This change in position was out of
character for the Soviet Union which, with a large and
growing interest in marine scientific research, had
been expected to remain a defender of the traditional
high seas freedom of unencumbered scientific re-
search. The reasoning behind-the switch has never
been made clear. It may simply have been a case of
recognizing the overwhelming support of the develop-
ing coastal countries for the consent regime. Soviet
sensitivity to research off its own coasts might also
-have been a factor.
The vacillations in USSR positions on the continen-
tal shelf and on marine scientific research bring the
Soviet LOS decision-making processes into question. It
appears the Soviets may have underestimated the
desires of the broad-margin states for jurisdiction over
vast areas of continental shelf. And, if they chose the
scientific research problem as an issue on which to
separate themselves from the industrial democracies,
hoping to collect some political capital from the Group
of 77 and offset Chinese allegations of superpower
collusion, it may turn out to be a far more expensive
concession than they realized.
Legal Status of the Economic Zone
Nowhere is the USSR treading on more sensitive
ground than in its last-minute challenge of the draft
agreement on the coastal state economic zone.
Lengthy and intense negotiations have produced deli-
cately balanced texts that apparently accommodate
the interests of the majority of developing coastal
states as well as most of the major naval and maritime
nations. The delegates have crafted a series of articles
that assure high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight for all states in the economic zone but also
.make it clear that the zone is no longer part of the high
seas. The text provides the coastal state with sovereign
'~ FX'I
25X1
25X1
rights over the exploration for and exploitation of 25X1
resources, and jurisdiction over marine scientific re-
search, preservation of the environment, and the
establishment of artificial islands, installations, and
structures.'
The Soviet Union has proposed instead that the
economic zone enjoy high seas status, in which case the
coastal state would not be sovereign. The coastal states
overwhelmingly oppose this idea. The developing
countries among them view the LOS negotiations as a
means of establishing a new, more equitable economic
system and see this proposal as just one more attempt
by the industrialized states to maintain the global
status quo.
Prospects
The USSR cannot continue to press on so many
controversial points at the next session of the LOS
Conference (opening March 19 in Geneva) and expect
a comprehensive oceans treaty that would receive the
consensus approval of a majority of nations. The
Soviets are close to the point where they must choose
between a treaty that is not altogether satisfactory to
them or no treaty at a11..It will be a very difficult
choice for a state that harbors global maritime ambi-
tions.
7
Confidential
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Barents Sea Continental Shelf Boundary Claims
- Median line -Soviet Arctic sector
o ~-_-----=z
/ J/, I
Disputed area
- - 2OO-nautical-mile limit
~~~~ %
so
Ostrov Ushako a
(U.S.S.R.)
Barents
Sea
100 / 200 kilomete~
8
Confidential
strov
in
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Confidential
Appendix
The Soviet Maritime Periphery:
Sovereignty and Security Considerations
As technological advances of this century, especially
in aviation, made the- frozen north more and more
accessible to other powers, the USSR sought to gain
both physical and legal control over the Arctic waters,
islands, and air space adjoining its long northern coast.
In 1926 Moscow issued a decree claiming all lands and
islands within a triangular sector bounded by the
northern coast of the USSR and the meridians passing
through its eastern and western limits (32?04'35"E
and 168?49'30"W). In 1928 and again in 1950 the
Soviet press advanced a claim to the open polar seas
within this sector as well, but Moscow has not formal-
ized this claim. Some Soviet writers assert that the
lands and waters of the Arctic Ocean have unique
characteristics that justify special legal treatment.
Since this theory is not based on any generally accepted
international legal precepts and has never been litigated
in international courts of law, however, it does not
provide a firm basis for determining jurisdiction.C
Soviet writers have used terms such as "internal
waters," "historic waters," and "closed seas" in de-
scribing numerous Arctic coastal water bodies. Inter-
nal water status, denoting complete sovereignty, has at
times been claimed for the Kara, Laptev, White, East
Siberian, and parts of the Barents and Chukchi Seas,
either on the basis of historic factors or because the ice
cover is a "land-like" entity that encloses them on the
seaward side. Recent Soviet publications, however, list
in the Arctic only the White Sea and a few bays in this
category.
.territorial sea.
US icebreakers, aircraft, submarines, and drift sta-
tions have tested these Soviet claims to Arctic waters.
The USSR has been flexible in regard to its sector and
internal seas claims, but it has resolutely maintained
authority over foreign naval vessel transits of its
12-mile territorial sea and straits overlapped by the
' Foldout map at rear shows maritime limits and claims in seas
surrounding the USSR.
Barents Sea Continental Shelf Boundary
The delimitation of the continental shelf and fishery
zone boundary in the Barents Sea has been the subject
of sharp debate between the USSR and Norway since
1970. The area in question is a rich fishing ground;
furthermore, seismic surveys indicate the presence of
thick continental shelf sediments that may contain oil
and gas deposits.
The Norwegians favor amedian-line shelf boundary
equidistant from adjacent and opposite coasts, while
the USSR demands that the western boundary of its
self-declared Arctic sector be used to partition the
maritime zones. At stake are 132,000 square kilo-
Oslo has signaled that its negotiating position is
flexible, meaning that it might accept a boundary
drawn somewhat to the west of a true median line, but
the USSR has shown no inclination to compromise,
preferring to sit on its sector-line offer and wait for
further Norwegian concessions. The USSR does make
occasional references to the inclusion of the boundary
settlement issue in a bilateral northern issues "pack-
age" that might also embrace the controversy over
whether the signatories to the 1920 Treaty Concerning
Spitzbergen enjoy rights to exploit the resources of the
continental shelf in the treaty area surrounding Sval-
bard.
International law on shelf delimitation is defined by
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
to which both the Soviet Union and. Norway acceded.
The Convention sets down the applicability of the
median or equidistant line, but also indicates that
special circumstances
the median line.
The existence of special circumstances or the lack
thereof is what the disagreement on the boundary line
in the Barents Sea is about. Moscow, strongly maintains
9
Confidential
25X1
25X1
25X1
j Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Confidential
Baltic Sea Continental Shelf Boundary Claims
p o , ~, e si n i
_ra! . _..n, i
r ~ .
C
Finland, Sweden,
emit USSR tripoint Swedish
e8 Soviet version ~' ersion
soviet verslonp
Poland, Sweden,
USSR tripoint ~ Swedish
a///
/ o ~ 25 3
I
I
I E
Gu~t~of y Finland
Bofhfnia o ; '
~'
1} I a
I ~~, L/i/and ~ ~ ?r-'' ~ ?O
i~ ~ '' ct H I k' ~(~
I version
J C O I
itorisi Sea limit
~.
TM UnitaE Stores GmernmeM hes iM rempnized the
mrporetion al Estonia lw(Na erid Ulhuenie iMO the
Soviet Unian. Names mre 6oundery repeseMelion
me mt nnmsssriq mnnoritmiva
~Klaypeda
~0
Confidential
Lake
Peipus
Disputed area
Limit of Soviet claim
Limit of Swedish claim
--Continental shelf
treaty boundary
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
Many international lawyers view the closed sea
doctrine as little more than a manipulation of interna-
tional legal theory in the interests of Soviet foreign and
strategic policy. During the cold war period some
Western writers described this doctrine as a potential
legal rationalization for Soviet domination of its non-
communist neighbors. It is probably more accurate to
assess the doctrine as a defensive response grounded in
motion lust before it was to be voted upon.
Ukrainian and Rumanian delegates withdrew their
the naval weakness of the USSR at that time.
Sea of Japan-Sea of Okhotsk
There are few territorial constraints on Soviet Naval
operations in the Pacific. Naval vessels based at Petro-
pavlovsk on the Kamchatka .Peninsula can reach their
patrol stations , on the high seas without transiting
waters claimed by other states. Naval vessels departing
Vladivostok, however, usually pass through Japanese
waters to reach the Pacific. The most direct exit
requires transit of Tsugaru Strait, separating the Japa-
nese islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. Tokyo is ex-
tremely sensitive about the flight of Soviet. aircraft
over the strait and the passage of nuclear-propelled or
nuclear-armed vessels through it, but the Japanese are
likely eventually to acknowledge the international
status of Tsugaru and accept a treaty regime of transit
passage. If the Soviet. Navy is prevented from using
this strait, lengthy detours through either the Korea or
LaPerouse Straits would be required.
At the San. Francisco Conference convened in Sep-,
tember 1951 to draf t a peace treaty with Japan; the
USSR submitted a proposal for regulating the regime
of the Sea of Japan. Since that -time, Moscow -has,
repeatedly expressed its willingness to reach agree-
ment with other littoral states to exclude warships and
military planes of nonlittoral states from both the Sea
of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. Soviet writers have
not been able to produce much in the way of historical
precedent that would iustify a closed status for either
the Sea of Japan or the Sea of Okhotsk. None of the
Soviet proposals has been accepted by other nations.
There are indications in recent Soviet legal writings
and in the USSR posture at the LOS Conference that
the Soviets may be abandoning their closed sea doc-
trine. Since the theory was first enunciated, the Soviet
Union has become a powerful naval and maritime
state. Once parochial concerns. have been transformed
into global equities. Now the closed sea theory could
represent a greater threat than advantage. to Soviet
maritime interests if other states used it to iustify
closing their waters to Soviet vessels.
25X1
25X1
12
Confidential
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
there are special circumstances in the region that
necessitate such an exception. The Soviet negotiators
point to disparities of population and economic devel-
opment between the adjoining land areas of the two
states; they argue that the population of the Kola
Peninsula is double that of north Norway, and since
the region is of rising economic importance, the USSR
should be entitled to a larger segment of the Barents
Sea. Moscow has also pointed to the sector claim itself
as a significant special circumstance, noting the use of
the sector line as the sea boundary between Norway
and the USSR in official Soviet maps and atlases since
1926.
adverse judgments by third parties.
The USSR wants to confine this- jurisdictional dis-
pute to bilateral talks with its smaller and weaker
Norwegian neighbor. Although Oslo might be willing,
Moscow is not likely to allow the issue to come before
the International Court of Justice or the proposed Law
of the Sea Tribunal, nor to submit to any other means
of binding third-party arbitration. Where its crucial
national interests are concerned, the USSR will not risk
compromise.
The trends in the LOS Conference generally favor
the Soviet position: in the present draft text, the
median-line principle has been consigned to a secon-
dary position; in favor of the vague concept of equita-
ble principles. The apparent weakening of the
median-line principle is welcomed by the USSR and
could account, in part at least, for the Soviet ref~lsal to
support for it.
Oslo disputes all of these points and believes it is on
firm legal ground in claiming the median line as the
boundary. Oslo notes, for examples, that there is no
precedent in international law for delimiting a shelf
area in. accordance with the sector principle, adding
that .only one other state, Canada, has expressed
Since the early 1950s the Soviet Union has urged the
non-Communist Baltic states to loin the Socialist na-
tions in an agreement to make the Baltic a "sea of
peace" by excluding the warships of nonlittoral pow-
ers. (The Soviets regularly protest NATO naval exer-
cises in the Baltic). The strongest initiative to establish
a. legal basis for a regional administration of the sea
came in the "Moscow Declaration" of 23 October
1968, which was sponsored by the USSR, Poland, and
East Germany. Its most controversial points state that
no part of the continental shelf of the Baltic Sea "shall
be turned over to the non-Baltic states, their citizens,
or firms for mineral prospecting, development, or'
other uses," and that "the continental shelf of the
Baltic Sea must be used by all states exclusively for
peaceful purposes." Sweden, Denmark, and West Ger-
many have not acceded to the declaration. They view
the Baltic as an open sea and insist that the warships of
all nations have full rights to equal access.
The idea of furthering Baltic unity also has been
expressed in Soviet proposals to cooperate in fishing
and oceanographic research, to jointly explore the 25X1
water resources of Northern Europe, and to coordinate
methods of rescue at sea.
The major jurisdictional dispute in the Baltic centers
on the effect the island of Gotland should have on the
location of the continental shelf boundary. The Swedes
propose a median line that would evenly bisect the
Baltic except in the vicinity of Gotland; there, they
claim, the boundary should be drawn halfway be-
tween that island and the coast of the USSR. The
Soviets propose to ignore Gotland and place the shelf
boundary midway between the mainlands of the two
countries. Such boundary would fall very close to the
eastern coast of Gotland.
25X1
25X1
The status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits
has long been a shifting compromise among great
powers competing for influence in the area. At pre- 25X1
sent, the Montreux Convention of 1936 grants Turkey
virtually full control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
A new oceans treaty will not change the situation in
these passages since straits subject to treaties now in
force will be exempt from changes in general interna-
tional law.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted that the
Black Sea should be a "closed sea." The USSR 1951
international law textbook referred to the Caspian,
Black, and Baltic Seas as closed; regarding the latter
two seas, it claimed that the littoral states enjoyed
freedom of navigation and the right to engage in
fishing and other maritime trades. Commercial navi-
gation by vessels of non-littoral states "may be permit-
ted" in the interests of international trade, however.
25X1
25X1
At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea, representatives of the Ukrainian SSR and Ruma-
nia introduced the closed sea doctrine as an amend-
ment (which clearly comprehended the Black Sea);
rather than endure a formal recording of what would
have been a lopsided vote against it, however, the
11
Confidential
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/18 :CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010007-1
 USSR: Maritime Limits
r~r~ey,
Batumi
~?
North
Sza
rm uvams~ef~ aore~,m~n o~ ~a-~m~m ma
nmrportlim of EsIMi4 La~v'2 ard 4ih~anie into lh
sow, Union. Names avd eo~ndnn ~ea,e:~.ia