THE TYPES OF DISPUTES: FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR LOVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

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The Types of Disputes: Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lover
Border conflicts and territorial disputes between and within Soviet republics fall
into one or both of two general categories:
Disputes over historical borders. The confused territorial histories of the republics, seven
of which were internationally recognized independent states for a year or more during this
century, has led to conflicting claims on territory based on historical precedent. Prominent
examples include:
^ Belorussia's claim to sections of the current Lithuanian republic--including
Vilnius, the current Lithuanian capital--that were added to the territory of the
formerly independent Lithuania in 1940 after its incorporation into the USSR.
^ The RSFSR's demands for the return of the Crimea, currently an Oblast of the
Ukraine but before World War II an autonomous republic in the RSFSR.
Historical boundary claims are often complicated by ethnic boundary claims.
Disputes over ethnic boundaries often complicate historical boundary claims. The
ethnically mixed character of the peripheral republics and the often arbitrary drawing of
republic borders by central authorities has resulted in substantial pockets of ethnic groups
conung under the government of a different ethnic group.
^ In some cases, the pockets are made up of ethnic groups that have their own
republic elsewhere. Sometimes these pockets have local administrative units--for
example, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh--but more often they do not--for
example, the Russians throughout the union.
^ In other cases, smaller ethnic groups are found only within their local
administrative units--for example, the Abkhaz in Georgia.
^ Some ethnic groups in fact have no administrative unit of their own--for example,
the Poles in Lithuania.
Interrepublic Territorial Disputes: No One Get Tense
Thus far, most republic governments--with the glaring exception of Armenia and
Azerbaijan--have downplayed the issue of potential claims on both the territories of other
republics and on their own territory. Most republic governments are reluctant to
antagonize neighboring governments, particularly at a time when interrepublic economic
and political ties are flourishing.
^ Most republic governments probably believe interrepublic squabbles weaken'the
collective bargaining position of the republics while they are trying to redefine
their relations with Moscow and shape the new union treaty.
^ Border disputes have the potential to flare into ethnic conflicts that the republics
cannot stop of their own, leaving the republics with the unpalatable choices of
losing control in their own territories or requesting undesirable central
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Some republics are using interrepublic agreements to formalize their lack of
Irredentist intentions. The Russian republic's recently-signed treaties with the Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, for example, recognize the territorial sovereignty of both the signatories. This
provision excited debate in the Russian legislature at the time of the ratification of the
treaty with the Ukraine; deputies who favored Russia's advancing temtorial claims against
the Crimea were finally voted down
Despite the risks for republic governments in bringing up territorial claims against
other republics, however, some republic governments mad eventually face serious pressure
from militant citizens to advance claims against neighboring regions where members of
their own ethnic groups are alleging mistreatment by governments dominated by other
ethnic groups. The Central Asian republics, whose borders have less historical weight than
mangy of the European republics and which are riddled with pockets of ethnic groups living
outside their home republics, are particularly vulnerable to such a situation. Thus far,
Central Asian governments have publicly stated their lack of Irredentist claims and have
attempted to cooperate over interethnic clashes. During riots in Kirghizia in June 1990
between Kirghiz and the Uzbeks who dominate three oblasts there, for example, the Uzbek
government was careful not to extend support to its conationals. Several Uzbek informal
groups, however, strongly argued the need to annex the three oblasts in order to protect
brother Uzbeks. The Moldovan government is also under pressure from Moldovan
nationalists to mount claims against regions of the Ukraine that used to be part of
Romania and are primarily inhabited by Moldovans.
The one interrepublic temtorial conflict that is currently being prosecuted, that
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, is unlikely to be
settled in the next few years. Other republic governments have avoided taking sides in the
dispute to date, and Moscow's attempts to restore order are unlikely to meet with success.
It is possible that eventually the Armenian and Azerbaijan governments will attempt to
cooperate in finding a solution, but militant groups on both sides of the border are likely to
attempt to sabotage an imposed peace. Only high civilian casualty tolls for both groups
have the possibility of providing the impetus for a negotiated settlement that will stick. ~ 25X1
Intrarepublic Disputes: Let's Get Tense
The attention of many republic governments is further distracted from promoting
Irredentist claims against others by demands being made on their own territories by smaller
ethnic groups. The extraordinary variety of claims makes generalization difficult, but the
demands fall into several basic categories:
^ Ethnic groups seeking dramatically increased autonomy for the territory they
inhabit or control administratively, to the point of a federated relationship with
the republic to which their territory currently belongs--for instance, the Gagauz
and Russians in Moldova and the Abkhaz and Ossetians in Georgia.
^ Ethnic groups seeking separate republic status for the territory they inhabit or
control administratively--for instance, the Crimean Tatars in the Russian
republic.
^ Ethnic groups without administrative control over the territory they inhabit
seeking to form a separate administrative unit within the republic--for instance,
Poles in Lithuania or some Russians in Estonia.
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^ Ethnic groups wishing to reunite the territory they inhabit or control with their
coethmc republic--for instance, Armenians m Nagomo-Karabakh or some
Russians in the Ukraine, Estonia, and Kazakhstan. While only the Armenians in
Nagomo-Karabakh are supported in their by their coethmc re ublic, the other
groups still are disruptive forces in republic politics
These demands, which often have both been preceded by and led to interethnic
violence, are not likely to subside without some compromise on the part of republic
governments. Many are the offshoots of the often arbitrary and discriminatory nationality
policies of the Stalin era, which placed some smaller nationalities under the control of
historical enemies and assigned others administrative control over disproportionately large
chunks of territory. The resultant grievances on the part of both smaller and titular
minorities, often fanned by historical enmities, have created in many republics--especially
Moldova and Georgia--situations where smaller nationalities allege the impossibility of
receiving fair treatment as long as they are under the primary control of the republic
governments. Many of the groups seeking sovereignty have said that they would seek to
split from the republics to which they currently belong if those republics seek independence
Most republic governments have vigorously opposed smaller ethnic groups'
demands for greater sovereignty, both because they fear division of republic territory and
because they suspect that the center has had a hand in fanning up demands. As a
consequence, several conflicts have already become violent and several more have the
potential to flare up. In Georgia and Moldova, republic governments have turned
increasingly to authoritarian measures--states of emergency, dissolution of local
legislatures, or suspension of elections--in order to quell violence. Such tactics may
eventually be used in at least Georgia to effectively silence minority opposition, threatening
a transition to democracy in the republic.
The republic government that has shown the most tolerance is Russian republic,
where republic president Yel'tsin has taken the public position that autonomous units have
the right to complete sovereignty. Although statements by other republic officials suggest
that Yel'tsin would not allow autonomous units to declare independence from the Russian
republic or to contravene the Russian republic constitution, his forthconung stance has
gone a long way toward defusing potential ciises.~ With the exception of the Crimean
Tatars, all of the smaller ethnic groups appear for now to be content with expanded
autonomy. (see appendix 2)
Implications for the Center...
In the eyes of central authorities, interrepublic and intrare~ublic border conflicts are
a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they emphasize to the republics the dangers of striking
off on their own and the constructive role that a strong central government can play. Some
conflicts have slowed or complicated republic drives for independence drives, and
outbreaks of violence have often had the effect of at least temporarily drawing republic
governments closer to the center.
^ The government of Moldova, for example, requested the introduction of Soviet
troops to quell disturbances surrounding the efforts of the Gagauz and local
Russians to establish autonomous units.
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^ Estonia and Latvia have had to take the interests of local Russians--some of
whom are seeking to set up autonomous units--into account when considering
independence, a factor that has kept progress toward independence in those two
republics behind that in more ethnically homogeneous Lithuania.
Moscow probably also calculates that the perception that republic borders are fluid
erodes the legitunacy of some republics' claims to independence and gives the center a
bargaining chip in talks on secession. Central authonties have warned the Lithuanian
government that if the republic attempts to secede, Moscow will demand the return of land
`ceded by Belorussia to Lithuania after World War II, as well as Klaipeda, the republic's
only seaport, which independent Lithuania returned to Germany--to which the region had
belonged before World War I--in 1939.
On the other hand, the continued threat to the nation's stability and integrity posed
by the violence surrounding many of these claims remains a problem for the central
government.
^ Continued military intervention in such disputes is costly, and the Soviet public is
increasingly unwilling to see Slavic troops used to intervene between warring
ethnic groups. Even though ethnic groups in Moldova and Georgia have
repeatedly requested central intervention to protect their rights--thereby giving
the center a perfect pretext to intervene in republics that have indicated their
unwillingness to sign a new union treaty--Moscow has refused to send troops.
^ Interethnic violence only strengthens the determination of republics that suspect
a central hand in disturbances--Georgia, for example--to seek independence.
^ More violence would also increase the number of refugees in the USSR, already
up to around xxxxx, straining the center's ability--particularly at a time of
unionwide economic crisis--to provide aid and lodging to displaced groups.
Moscow also undoubtedly fears that republics may become involved in international
border conflicts (see annex).
The consequences of republic border conflicts are likely to be of greater significance
to the United States than the precise disputes themselves. Increased violence stemming
from such conflicts may lead the groups involved or possibly even the center to request aid
for refugees. The confusion produced by interethnic conflicts in republics such as Georgia
and Moldova may complicate their attempts to establish local democracies. The potential
for interethnic conflict in Estonia and Latvia will be an important factor in the speed of
those republics' drive to establish full independence.
The precise border of greatest concern to the United States is likely,, to be the
Lithuanian-Belorussian border. The United States and the West European states are likely
to receive appeals from the Baltic states to recognize Lithuania's current borders as those
governing the territory of a newly independent Lithuanian state.
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a? `'' Moscow
This map depicts actual and potential ethnic claim:: -territorial
and cultural - in the USSR. The issues indicated ar!; in most cases,
not ollicial nor are the areas in dispute precisely delimited.
Claims are tatcyorized as lollows:
~ Public demands for return of lerrilory
? Public requests for a role in cultural supervision of
co-nationals living outside the native administrative unit
? Public demand tar eslahlishmenl or re-establishment of a
nationality-hosed political administrative unit
Q'~ Polenlial demands for territorial adjustments based on
elhnitity nr nalionalily
Each claim is identified by the symbol corresponding
to the categories above.
Claims
t Ponionol Kola Peninsula to Karelian $SR
2 Border area of R.S.F.S.R. to Estonian SSR
3 Border area DI R.S.f.S.R. to Latvian SSR
4 Portion of Kaliningrad Oblast to Lithuanian SSR
5 Northwest portion al Belorussian SSR to Lithuanian SSR td
6 Creation of Polish ethnic I administrative unit Irom
western porlbn of Belorussian SSR
7 Southern portion of Lithuanian SSR to Belorussian SSR
B Noilhem border area of Ukrainian SSR to Belorussian SSR ~
9 Southern border area of Belorussian SSR to Ukrainian SSR
10 Portion of norlhem Moldavian SSR to Ukranian SSR
t t SoWnwestern border area of R.S.F.S.R. to Ukranian SSR
t2 Border area of Rostov Oblast to Kalmyk SSR 9
t 3 Border area of Stavropol Kray to Kalmyk SSR ~'
t4 Creation of separate nationality-Dared administratve
units in KarachayLherkess Autonomous Oblast d~
t5 Creation of separate nationality-based admmistralrve
units in Kabardino-Balkar ASSR
t6 Creation of separate nationality-based administrative -
unns in Chechemingush ASSR
t 1 Merger of tJOnh Ossetian ASSR with South Ossetian
-Aulonnrtwus Oblast a
REPUBLICS
i Lithuanian SSR
2 Latvian SSR
3 Estonian SSR
4 Belorussian SSR
5 Ukrainian SSR
6 Moldavian SSR
7 Georgian SSR
8 Armenian SSR
9 Azerbaijan SSR
10 Turkmen SSR
91 Uzbek SSR
92 Tajik SSR
93 Kirghiz SSR
94 Kazakh SSR
i Russian SFSR
18 Northwest jSaingilo) portion of Azerbaijan SSR to
Georgian SSR a
79 Northeastern border area of Georgian SSR Io
Azerbaijan SSRa
20 Southern portion of Armenian SSR to Azeroaiian SSR o
2t Nagorno-Karabakh Auotnomous ObW51 to Armenian SSR a
22 Karakalpak ASSR Id Kazakh-SSR D
23 Undetermined area in Kirghiz SSR to Kazakh SSR B'
24 Southern portion of Uzbek SSR to Turkmen SSR
25 Border area al Uzbek SSR to Turkmen SSR
26 Bashkir ASSR to Tatar ASSR ~
27 Tatar ASSR to Bashkir ASSR d
28 Eastern section of Gorno Allay Autonomous Oblast to
Tuvinsk ASSR
29 Border area of R.S F.S.R to Tumnsk ASSRS'
30 Aginskiy-Buryat Autonomous GDIa51 to Buryat ASSR ~
37 Cutwial supervision of southeastern R.S F.S.R. rZeienyi
Hlin - "Green Triangle"~ by Ukrainian SSR i
32 YJCSIern section of Magadan ODlasl to 1'akulsk ASSR 2
Communities of ethnic Germans seeking to ieeslaULSh
?a pohhCal adm~mstialrve unit
Communities of Cnmcan Tatars seeking to rces!a5lun
~a loaner political adrtiinistrative unit iCnmean Tatar
Autonomous GDIasI. abolished m t944j
Office of The Geographer
lJnllOd Slates Department of Slate
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