THE POLISH REGAINED PROVINCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000400260002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1947
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE
Polish Regained
Provinces
by'
J. A. WILDER
With a Foreword by Professor W. J. ROSE
A monograph on the achievements of Poland's first
year of administration of its regained provinces, des-
cribing the state in which they were taken over and
estimating the loss to Germany's economy and their
importance to the economy of the new Poland.
Price 5/= net
WILLIAM HODGE AND COMPANY LIMITED
LONDON . EDINBURGH . GLASGOW
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THE
Polish Regained
Provinces
A Survey of a Year's Achievement
by
J. A. WILDER
WILLIAM HODGE AND COMPANY LIMITED
LONDON - EDINBURGH - GLASGOW
1948
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Printed in Great Britain by
SAMUEL SIDDERS AND SON LIMITED
X15, Salusbury Road, London, N.W.6
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FOREWORD
My acceptance of an invitation to commend this little book
to the British public does not mean that I am in agreement with
everything said in its pages; but it does mean that, in my view,
the factual material set out here, as well as the views represented,
deserve more attention than they have received hitherto. The
author has every right to be considered an authority, since, long
before the war, the field of Polish-German relations had been
? his major concern as an economic historian. To some it may seem
that he has been at too great pains in the assembling of data, and
they may regard certain pages as rather dull reading, but every
picture is made up of many details, and those who follow the
argument with care will have to admit that he has made out a
strong case.
The pity is that, under conditions as they exist in the publish-
ing world, when it reaches the public a study of this kind (made
in the autumn of 1946) is already a year out of date. If the
results of the second year of Polish achievement in the "Regained
Territories," bringing the story down to midsummer 1947, could
have been included, the record would have been much more
impressive, the evidence of progress far more convincing. Even
the grimness of a very severe winter could not hold the march
of events or dim the enthusiasm of those engaged in a great
pioneering enterprise.
The whole visage of the new Poland is markedly different
from that of 1919-1939. From being a chiefly agricultural
country, Poland has taken on the features of a much more
urbanised and industrial nation, possessing in coal an instrument
for international exchange that makes her the envy of her
neighbours. This natural wealth, coupled with the will to work
for which Poles are proverbial and a reasonably sensible eco-
nomic policy can in time bring out of the calamities of war and
occupation a level of well-being known only to few in pre-war
years. No nation deserves this more; and none has a better claim
on the co-operation and goodwill of the whole continent.
W. J. ROSE
University of London,
October 1, 1947.
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This book was written in autumn, 1946. A short supplement
describing the economic developments in the Polish Regained
Provinces during the second post-war year till Midsummer, 1947,
is, for technical reasons, being published separately.
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CONTENTS
PART I. The Economic and Political Aspects:
1. The Part Played by the Former Prussian Eastern Provinces
in Feeding Germany.
2. The Alleged Danger of Agricultural Over-Population of
Germany and the Reality.
3. The Problem of Polish Economic Settlement of the Re-
gained Provinces and its Demographic Aspect.
4. The Economic Correlation of Poland and Her Regained
Provinces.
5. The Political Aspect of the Problem.
PART II. The First Year:
1. The First Year of Polish Administration in the Regained
Provinces.
2. The Settlement and Economic Conduct of the Polish
Regained Provinces.
3. The Area and Administrative Division of the Polish
Regained Provinces.
4. Opole. Silesia.
5. Lower Silesia.
6. The Lubusz Land.
7. Western Pomorze.
8. Mazuria (formerly East Prussia).
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Part I
The Economic and Political Aspects
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1. THE PART PLAYED BY THE
FORMER PRUSSIAN EASTERN PROVINCES
IN FEEDING GERMANY
One often comes across the statement that there is a danger
of Germany starving as the result of depriving her of the pro-
vinces lying east of the Oder and the Western Neisse. There
is no doubt that if the pre-war level of consumption were to be
restored in Germany the loss of the eastern provinces would
make it necessary to increase somewhat the amount of food
imported from abroad. The loss will make it much more diffi-
cult for the Germans to realise their dream of self-sufficiency in
food consumption-that dream of everyone who is preparing
for war, but did these provinces really feed the Reich, and will
their loss really cause starvation? To answer this question one
has to discover what quantities of basic articles of food were
supplied by the lands situated east of the Oder and Western
Neisse, what percentage of the production and consumption of
the rest of Germany these quantities represented. For these
figures we must turn to German pre-war statistics, and, here,
the investigation has been greatly facilitated by the work of a
German scientist who studied this problem and published the
results of his research in 1930.1
All the figures given below are taken from this source, except
where otherwise stated. Adjustments have been made where-
ever necessary, as Volz uses the term "German East" to cover
an area larger than that of the Polish Regained Provinces.
WHEAT AND RYE. It appears that in the year 1927-28, for
instance, the Reich consumption of wheat amounted to 4,895,500
A Volz, Wilhelm: Die Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft, Berlin-Leipzig, 1930.
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tons,' whereas the production was 3,567,000 tons. Of this latter
amount, 845,000 tons were grown in the eastern areas, including
also 32,297 square kilometres situated west of the Oder and
Western Neisse (part of Lower Silesia, part of Brandenburg, and
part of Pomerania). The eastern districts supplied 50,260 tons
of wheat to other parts of Germany, including Berlin. They also
sent 104,320 tons abroad. So that altogether the export from
these areas amounted to 154,580 tons. But during the same year
114,000 tons of wheat grain were imported into these areas from
the central and western provinces of Germany; in other words,
some 63,740 tons more wheat grain were imported from other
parts of Germany than were exported to them; while a further
6,000 tons were imported from abroad. Thus the total imports
of wheat amounted to 120,000 tons and the surplus of export
over import to 34,580 tons.
In the same year, Germany as a whole, had a rye consump-
tion amounting to 6,155,600 tons, while production amounted to
7,680,000 tons,' of which 3,200,000 tons were grown in the "East."
The export from the "East" to other parts of Germany includ-
ing Berlin, amounted to 178,840 tons of rye grain, while 254,000
tons were exported abroad, making a total of 432,840 tons. Dur-
ing the same year, 46,000 tons of rye were imported into this
area from other parts of Germany (so that it had an export
surplus of 132,840 tons, within Germany) while a further 8,800
tons were imported from abroad. Altogether 54,800 tons were
imported into the area, the export surplus of these provinces
thus amounting to 378,040 tons.
Obviously, in order to get a complete and undistorted picture
of the situation, these figures need to be corrected, by taking
the turnover of flour into account. For it appears that in the year
under discussion, 293,600 tons of flour were exported from this
area to other parts of Germany, including Berlin, while 101,700
tons were imported-the net internal export surplus thus
amounting to 191,900 tons. 22,500 tons were exported abroad,
'Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich. 1931, p. 319.
2 Ibid.
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but 4,100 tons were imported from abroad, so in this respect
the export surplus amounted to 18,400 tons. Thus the total
export surplus of flour from the eastern agricultural areas of
Germany amounted to 210,300 tons net. As the local mills
worked on a basis of 70 per cent. rye and 30 per cent. wheat,
one can say with fair accuracy that the surplus of rye flour
amounted to 147,210 tons, and of wheat flour 63,090 tons. Since
after milling, rye has a 70 per cent. flour yield, while wheat has
a 68 per cent. yield, the forgoing figures correspond to 210,300
tons of rye and 92,780 tons of wheat. It appears, therefore, that
the total export surplus of the German eastern provinces in
grain and flour amounted to 127,360 tons of wheat (or 4.68 per
cent. of the production of the rest of Germany) and 588,340
tons of rye (or 13.13 per cent. of the production of the rest of
Germany). But of this Berlin and the rest of Germany con-
sumed only about 30,000 tons of wheat (or 1.18 per cent. of its
own production), and 333,140 tons of rye (or 7.4 per cent. of
its own production). It is then not surprising that the German
authority comes to the conclusion that "for the German Reich
the east plays no role whatever as a supplier of wheat, and a
quite insignificant role as the supplier of rye."'
Further, as we have pointed out, these calculations were made
in respect of an area some 32,297 square kilometres larger than
that which Germany is losing in the East. This represents 27
per cent. of the area which was the subject of the German in-
vestigations. Therefore, assuming that the supply of grain to the
rest of Germany came more or less equally from all parts of the
former eastern areas, we can with fair accuracy reduce the
figures given above by 27 per cent. In considering the extent to
which the Polish Regained Provinces supplied Germany with
grain, we have to make a further reduction,2 since they con-
I Volz op. cit., p. 85.
2 The whole territory covered by Volz has an area of 150,313 square
kilometres, of which only 100,581 square kilometres fall to the Polish
Regained Provinces. Obviously, in reckoning the extent to which these
areas supplied Germany with food, we have not taken into account
that part of East Prussia which has been incorporated with the
U.S.S.R.
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stitute rather less than 70 per cent. of the area to which the
figure quoted above refers. It, therefore, transpires that the
Polish Regained Provinces supplied Germany with some 22,500
tons of wheat and some 233,000 tons of rye. This constitutes
0.77 per cent. of the wheat production and 4.53 per cent. of the
rye production of the rest of Germany. Moreover, it constituted
0.46 per cent. of the wheat and 3.78 per cent. of the rye con-
sumed in the whole of Germany in the year 1927/28.
POTATOES. Here the German writer we are quoting drew up
his statistics for an area rather smaller than in the case of grain.
This amounted to only 8,408 square kilometres more than the
area Germany is losing on the East.' In the years under dis-
cussion the consumption of potatoes in Germany amounted to
some 34,000,000 tons,2 while production was some 40,000,000
tons. Of this, 12,700,000 tons were harvested in the areas with
which we are concerned. However, the export of potatoes from
the eastern provinces to Berlin and the rest of Germany
amounted to not more than 750,000 tons (or 2.74 per cent. of
the production in the rest of Germany, and 2.2 per cent. of the
total consumption in Germany). It is not surprising, therefore,
that Volz comes to the conclusion that the "Reich has no need
whatever of the east (i.e., the eastern provinces) for its supply
of potatoes."3 If we make the same adjustment for potatoes
as we have made for grain, it appears that the Polish Regained
Provinces supplied not more than 622,500 tons of potatoes (or
2.27 per cent. of the production of the rest of Germany, and
1.83 per cent. of the total consumption) to the rest of the
country.
Pics. In respect of pigs, Volz gives figures for a larger
area (exceeding the area lost to Germany by 32,297 square
kilometres). In 1928, 1,628,000 pigs and young pigs were sent
from this area to the rest of Germany, including Berlin, but in
return it received 302,500 head, so that in regard to internal
' In Brandenburg he does not include the Potsdam district while in
Pomerania he leaves out the Stralsund district.
2 Statistisches ahrbuch 1931, p. 319.
3 Volz, op. cit., p. 75.
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turnover the export surplus over import was 1,325,500 head. But
it must be remembered that a further 2,500 head were sent
abroad, while 10,000 head were imported from abroad, so that
the net export surplus of these areas was 1,318,000 head. Making
the analagous adjustment to those made for previous items, it
appears that the Polish Regained Provinces provided the rest
of Germany with 927,500 head of swine in 1928, the net export
surplus being 922,600 head. In the areas now remaining to
Germany there were some 16,320,000 head, or approximately
equal to the local consumption. Thus the Polish Regained Pro-
vinces sent some 5.68 per cent. of the local stock and consump-
tion of the rest of Germany, or some 4.63 per cent. of the total
German consumption.
CATTLE. From the same area as that dealt with above in
respect of swine, 629,000 head were sent in 1928 to the rest of
Germany, including Berlin, while 52,500 head were received.
Thus the export surplus was 576,500 head. Since 13,000 head of
cattle were imported from abroad during the same period, the
net export surplus was 563,500 head. Making the usual adjust-
ment, we can see that in 1928 the Polish Regained Provinces
supplied the rest of Germany with 383,550 head of cattle, or
some 2.75 per cent of its total.'
Here it must be pointed out that other German scientific works
dealing with various aspects of the problem of food supply,
reach figures which closely approximate to those cited, and con-
firm the accuracy of our calculations.'
Therefore, seeing that before the war the Regained Provinces
supplied Germany with only 0.77 per cent. of the wheat pro-
duced in the areas left to Germany, and only 4.53 per cent. of
the rye, 2.27 per cent. of the potato production, 5.68 per cent.
'According to the Statistisches Jahrbuch for 1931, Germany had in
1928, 18,414,136 head of cattle; according to Polish calculations on
the basis of various statistics there were 3,665,700 head of cattle in
the Eastern Provinces before the war.
2 Cf. inter alia Krull, C: Die Ostprussische Landwirthschaft, Berlin,
1931; Rudas A: Die Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung der Proving
Pommern. Zeitschrift des Prussischen St. Landesamtes, Berlin, 1930;
Scheu, E: Deutschlands Wirtschaft-Geographische Harmonie, Breslau,
1924, and works by Hurtig, Witt, etc.
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of the requirements in swine, ana only 2.75 per cent. of the
cattle, it is impossible to say that the eastern areas fed the Reich.
Even if we admit that all the German writers concerned with
this problem took a propaganda attitude to it, and sought for
political reasons to demonstrate that the Eastern Prussian pro-
vinces were not adequately exploited in the state economy, it
is impossible to ignore the testimony of these figures. We have,
it is true, to add a certain quantity of frozen and smoked meat
sent mainly to Berlin, and a certain quantity of dairy products
(especially cheese). But even this does not alter the actual fact
that before the war the eastern provinces played a very insignifi-
cant part in feeding Germany. It follows that the assertion that,
if Germany is deprived of the areas lying east of the Oder-
Western Neisse line, this will have a catastrophic effect on food
supplies to Germany, is quite unfounded-the more so if the
living standards of the Germans are to be reduced by 30 per
cent. in accordance with Allied decisions.
2. THE ALLEGED DANGER OF AGRICULTURAL
OVER-POPULATION OF GERMANY
AND THE REALITY
The provinces lying east of the Oder-Western Neisse line
were regarded as agricultural parts of Germany and, in accord-
ance with the Potsdam decisions," the German population has
been evicted from these provinces. Certain people are now
attempting to suggest that there will be neither employment nor
a place for these agriculturists in a diminished Germany. First, it
must be stated that a considerable part of the arable land situated
east of the Oder-Western Neisse frontier was cultivated by
Polish hands, people who were either autochthonous Polish
population, who had supported themselves all through the cen-
turies on small parcels of land, or seasonal workers, who travelled
" "The Three Governments having considered the question in all
aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations,
or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary will have to be undertaken."
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legally and illegally from Poland during the months of field
labour, attracted by higher earnings than could be obtained on
the land in Poland., The need to bring workers from Poland
into these areas was due to two factors. First, the cumulative
effects of the flight from the land which was general all over
Germany2 and, secondly, there was a spontaneous flight of the
local population westward-a factor we shall discuss later. For
decades past, German writers have expressed anxiety as to the
fate of the areas under discussion. Right down to the outbreak
of the recent war we find this anxiety expressed in the most
varied forms, not only in expert studies but also in popular
expositions, whenever the question of the eastern provinces of
Prussia came up for consideration. This anxiety was formulated
in the following words over half a century ago: "The great
area of agricultural regions (the reference is to the areas east of
the Oder and Western Neisse) is short of people who could cul-
tivate and harvest it. Thousands of agricultural workers' dwell-
ings are standing empty. The shortage of good workers has
reached such dimensions that it has frequently become im-
possible to carry on agriculture rationally."`
For this very reason, despite the agricultural character of the
areas under discussion, out of a total population of some
8,300,000 inhabitants, the number actually engaged professionally
in agriculture was some 1,654,000.4 As the German statistics for
these areas did not give details of profession by nationality, we
I Details of this in The Polish-German Frontier, by J. M. Winiewicz,
2nd ed., pp. 12, 13, 20, 26, 29 and in Zuriick zum Agrarstaat, by
Burgdorfer, 1933, p. 31.
2 In absolute figures the numbers of the population maintained by
agriculture within the frontiers of post-Versailles Germany were:
1882, 15,944,000 (40 per cent.); 1895, 15,446,000 (32 per cent.); 1907,
14,922,000 (27.1 per cent.); 1925, 14,374,000 (23 per cent.); 1933,
13,661,000 (21 per cent.). Statistsches Jahrbuch, 1937, p. 20.
3 Sering, M. Die inn ere Kolonization im ostlichen Deutschland, Leip-
zig, 1893, p. 78; Cf. Rogmann, H. Die Bevolkerungsentwicklung im
preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren, 1937. Many writers
describe these areas as a "Raum ohne Volk" (space without people),
e.g., Volz, op. cit., Burgdorfer, F. op. cit., etc.
4 Occupation census of 1933; it must be pointed out that the figure
for persons actively engaged professionally in agriculture does not con-
sist exclusively of persons maintaining themselves solely by agriculture.
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do not possess exact particulars of the number of Poles included
in this figure. According to Polish calculations made on the basis
of the German population census of 1939, there were some
1,200,000 persons in this area who, being Polish by extraction,
would not be subject to eviction.' At least half of these main-
tained themselves by agriculture. If we accept this same propor-
tion for the population of these areas generally, it appears that
there were at least 363,000 Poles professionally engaged in agri-
culture in the Polish Regained Provinces. Assuming that the
war losses among the agriculturists of the eastern provinces of
Prussia were proportionately no higher than those of the German
people generally, some 70,000 must be deducted from the figure
of 1,291,000 Germans actively engaged in agriculture in these
areas.' Practically, then, it is a question of finding work for
1,221,000 agricultural workers from Germany's former eastern
areas.
Now let us consider what possibilities there are of increasing
employment in the agriculture of the areas left to Germany. The
entire area is distinguished by a comparatively high degree of
afforestation (27.7 per cent.) which quite considerably exceeds
the percentage recognized by experts as necessary for the main-
tenance of a country's self -su iciency in timber. As the German
expert Ostendorff showed,' some two-thirds of the forests in
Germany are located on land which could be exploited agricul-
turally. Two-thirds of the area under forest in Germany, as at
1 The task of verifying these people is now in progress in the Polish
Regained Provinces. Any German citizen who was living in the area
before the war can apply for recognition as a Polish citizen, if he
regards himself as a Pole, and has reached the age of sixteen. Down
to Autumn, 1946, Polish citizenship had been granted to some 900,000
persons, including children who automatically take the citizenship of
their parents. These figures have been compiled by the States Re-
patriation Board.
2 "The Results of the War of 1939-45 as regards the population of
Germany and of the Allied Countries of Europe"-a report of the
International Committee for the Study of European Questions, April
13th, 1946-reckons the German losses at 3,600,000 (p. 10), of which
the civilian losses did not amount even to ten per cent.
3 Ostendorff, "Die bauerliche Siedlungskapazitat des Deutschen
Reiches"; Petermanns Mitteilungen, Erganzungsheft No. 228, 1937,
p. 31.
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present constituted, would amount to 6,778,800 hectares (close on
17 000 000 ' 1d ' d 1 d f 338 9 it
a
) Th
40
cres
is wou prove e an or ,
se -
sufFicient twenty-hectare (close on fifty acres) small-holdings.
In addition, a very large area of German arable land is in the
hands of large landowners. If ten per cent. of the land were left
for the large undertakings necessary for breeding and seed-
selection, after carrying through a thorough-going land reform
there would still be 2,725,000 hectares (close on 6,812,500 acres)
available in Germany for parcellation.l This would provide
136,250 self-sufficient twenty-hectare (50 acre) farms. In other
words, after bringing under cultivation part of the area now
under forest, as German authorities themselves demanded should
be done before the war, and carrying through the agrarian reform
1 In these calculations no account has been taken of the quite large
areas in use by the military in the shape of exercise grounds, airfields,
etc. Here are the figures of land available for settlement after carrying
through a land-reform, by provinces and districts : -
Province Hectares
Saxony .............................. 526,734
Schlesvig-Holstein ............... 222,310
Hanover .............................. 199,390
Westphalia ........................ 135,846
Hesse-Nassau ..................... 48,860
Rhineland ........................... 167,540
Hohenzollern ..................... 2,250
Total: Prussia ... 1,302,930
Bavaria .............................. 257,330
Saxony (Land) .................. 172,782
Wurtemburg ........................ 38,250
Baden .............................. 13,500
Thuringia ........................... 160,254
Hesse ................................. 14,740
Mecklenburg ..................... 573,534
Oldenburg ........................ 63,260
Brunswick ........................... 55,494
Anhalt .............................. 55,396
Lippe ................................. 15,880
Schaumburg-Lippe ............... 1,746
The German Minority in Poland and the Problem of Transfer of
Population; The Polish Ministry of Preparatory Work concerning the
Peace Conference. Information Notes, No. 6, p. 39.
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which both the Social-democrats and the Communists of Ger-
many are now asking for, 9,503,800 hectares (close on 23,759,500
acres) could be made available for distribution in the areas
remaining to Germany, which would provide 475,190 self-
sufficient fifty-acre holdings. In the area of the Polish Regained
Provinces in the year 1939, the area under agricultural cultiva-
tion amounted to 6,123,500 hectares (some 15,483,750 acres) dis-
tributed among 462,226 farms (including those belonging to
Poles, who of course will not be subject to deportation to Ger-
many). Of these, 84.2 per cent. (389,376 in absolute figures)
occupied by holdings of less than twenty hectares and we may
add that they occupied only 36.5 per cent. of the total area under
cultivation in these districts.' Thus it would be possible to form
some 13,000 more holdings in the area of Germany than existed
in the Polish Regained Provinces, and there will be available a
55 per cent. bigger area.
What are the quantitative possibilities of employment for
those professionally engaged in agriculture, on the 9,503,800
hectares, or nearly 23,769,500 acres, we have mentioned? Taking
British conditions as the basis for calculation (where only 27
persons are employed to every 250 acres) we get the figure of
some 2,566,000, or twice as many as need to be found agricultural
work in Germany. However, if we take continental conditions
into account, and choose as our basis the average of 40 engaged
in agriculture to every hundred hectares (250 acres),' we get a
figure of over 3,800,000 persons. One can, therefore, safely say
that Germany has possibilities of employing in agriculture not
only those deported from the Polish Regained Provinces, without
detriment to those who were working in properties destined to
parcellation, but that in addition there are possibilities of moving
i Bulawski, R: Pro blemy osadniczo-przesiedlenczeZiem Odzyskanych,
Cracow, 1945, p. 15.
2 This figure is rather lower than that which prevailed in Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary, and much lower than that for Poland (46.8 per
cent.), Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland (in these three countries the
number of persons professionally engaged in agriculture exceeded 50
to the hundred hectares). All the figures here cited relate to pre-war
days.
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"back to the land" a part of the urban population. Of course,
besides, there is no reason why a part of the people hitherto
employed in agriculture should not work, in the future, in some
"light" industries.
Similarly, no allowance has been made for calculations as to
the development of Germany's population, made by the Reich
Statistical Bureau in 1930. According to these estimates which,
of course, did not take into account the recent war and its
effects, from 1945 onwards the population of Germany should
fall considerably.' In other words, the problem of German over-
population which is such a bugbear to certain experts will grow
less and less important with the passing of the years.
3. THE PROBLEM OF POLISH ECONOMIC SETTLE-
MENT OF THE REGAINED PROVINCES AND ITS
DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT
There is one other aspect of the problem of the Polish
Regained Provinces which causes some anxiety even in official
pronouncements' and must be discussed.
Fears are expressed that the Poles will not be able to take
effective economic possession of and exploit the areas placed
under their administration by the Potsdam decision. These fears
are not new. After the first world war, German propaganda very
suggestively and convincingly put forward the view that the
Poles would ruin economically the areas taken from the Germans
and that, especially in Silesia, the achievements of the period
when this province belonged to Prussia would go to waste.
Twenty-five years ago these arguments seemed so convincing
that for many years they were to be found repeated in non-
German publications.' At that time the Germans, thanks first
' Cf. Burgdorfer, F. op. cit., p. 115.
2 Cf. Mr. Bevin's speech, 26th October, 1945 (Hansard, Vol. 414).
s Vide, e.g., Street, C.J.C., Upper Silesia, an Economic Tragedy,
London, 1924; Staehler, H., The Dismemberment of Upper Silesia,
London, 1929, etc.
21
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of all to certain decisions of the Geneva Convention of May 15th,
1922, and later by way of activities in the League of Nations,
were able to hinder and render difficult Polish economic life in
Upper Silesia. They availed themselves of these possibilities in
a very subtle and vindictive manner, and in addition carried
on illegal activities aimed at making it impossible for the Poles
to run economy rationally in this province.' Nevertheless the
Poles, whom for centuries propaganda originating in Berlin had
declared to be lacking in organizational and economic ability,
managed to carry on. Whereas in 1913 the output of coal had
amounted to 32,200,000 tons, in 1929, it had risen to 34,400,000
tons. Though it was lower in other years, this was only because
production had to be adapted to the requirements of the markets.
The man output per diem, which in 1913 had been 1.2 tons in
the Polish part of Upper Silesia, increased from year to year,
and finally reached two tons. (It must be pointed out that at
the same time the daily man output was 1.2 tons in Great Britain,
1.5 tons in Germany, 1.6 tons in Holland, while in France and
Belgium it was only 0.8 tons). Many similar examples giving the
lie to Prussian propaganda, which attempted to arouse doubts as
to the Poles' organizational capacity and ability to handle eco-
nomic problems, could be adduced from the experience of the
twenty years of independence. But one condition is necessary:
the Poles must be afforded possibilities of displaying their
talents, and the fixing of Poland's western frontier on the Oder
and Western Neisse gives them just those possibilities. We shall
be dealing later on with what has already been achieved in a
single year under most difficult working conditions, in areas
devastated by war to an extent unknown in Western Europe.
There need be no fear that economic life and production in these
areas will stagnate-on the contrary, it will be developed still
further in a number of spheres. In the new situation, the Ger-
mans will not be able to hinder development, as they were in
regard to Upper Silesia after 1918. Above all, they will not have
I Interesting information on the subject of all these German activities
is to be found in the study of Professor W. J. Rose, The Drama of
Upper Silesia, London, 1936.
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control over a number of enterprises, as they had before. For in
the 1920's, some 85 per cent. of Silesian industry in the Polish
section of the province was still in German hands. One could
give the names of numbers of Germans who directed great
enterprises in Polish Upper Silesia from Berlin, deliberately
aiming at reducing them to economic ruin. Some of them were
in possession of shares which were known to have belonged pre-
viously to the Prussian government. They were financed by the
great German banks, which suffered considerable losses for the
sake of these objectives. An example was Baron von Flick, who
was also known for his influence in the Rhenische Stahlverein.
The activity which he and his colleagues pursued (and this in
the days of the Weimar Republic) was unscrupulous and quite
criminal in character. When steps were taken by the Warsaw
government to examine the books of enterprises under Flick's
control, the directors and members of the administration did not
wait to see the results (which were a revelation) but fled. The
trials of the directors of various enterprises controlled by German
finance proved beyond doubt that there had been a deliberate
effort to reduce the production of mines and also of industrial
establishments.' To-day, the Germans will be unable to exploit
international agreements for the purpose of creating political
and economic difficulties in the lands transferred to Poland. In
other words, it will be incomparably easier to carry through the
tasks involved.
But another essential question does arise. Are the areas
situated to the east of the Oder and Western Neisse a com-
plement of Polish economy in a manner analogous to that
in which they were a complement previously to German
economy? Or should the aim be to exploit all their potential
possibilities to the full, and to develop their industry to such
an extent that they will be able largely to take the place
in Europe of that part of German industry now liquidated, in
accordance with the Potsdam decisions, by the Berlin Control
'Rose gives a general summary of these conditions and several
typical examples. (Op. cit., pp. 244/247).
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-- .....1=J0="==. X,.~ iCW 11aL1UUL1o,1 of ruined industry in the
Regained Provinces will call for a maximum effort, especially if
we take into account the powers of a country so devastated
by war as Poland. But the Poles can muster this effort. Judging
by development so far, there is no doubt that the annual pro-
duction of steel, for instance, will reach 2,000,000 tons by the
end of 1949, and this will present some 100 per cent. of the
pre-war capacity and 140 per cent. of the production of the
areas now comprised within the Polish frontiers.' But what of
that? In all probability, even after the restoration of war devas-
tation, this production will exceed home requirements at the
most by 25 per cent.; and it will be possible to assign not more
than some 500,000 tons of steel and steel products to other con-
tinental countries. When the restriction of German production is
taken into account, this obviously does not go far to meet
Europe's needs. However, Silesia affords possibilities of steel
production far in excess of 2,000,000 tons per annum, though
that country which suffered the greatest war devastation of all,
is not as yet in a position to exploit possibilities. Such an effort
calls for outside assistance-for credits from the wealthy
countries, which did not suffer at all during the war, or suffered
only insignificantly. An analogous situation exists in a number
of other branches of industry.
The people of Poland are fully aware of all this, and they have
been not a little surprised to hear others demanding that there
shall be no restriction on the production capacity of German
industry, for the sake of European consumers' interests. Every-
body in Poland considers that these same people would perform
a far greater service to Europe to her living standards and her
security, if they did just as intensive propaganda rather for
1 During the press discussion of the level of production to be left
to German industry, Mr. Lincoln Evans, Assistant General Secretary
to the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, put forward the idea that
German production should be replaced by that of other countries, and
of Poland first and foremost. (The Times, 5th November and 9th
November, 1945).
2 Data from the Polish three-year plan of reconstruction, drawn up
by the Central Board for Planning.
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Poland to be granted credits enabling her to exploit to the full
her present possibilities, and thus replace German by Polish
production.
As the result of the changes brought about by the recent
war, Poland's area has been considerably reduced. In accord-
ance with the Allied decision, and with the Polish-Soviet agree-
ment concluded in Moscow on August 16th, 1945, an area of
69,535 square miles has been ceded to the republics of Lithuania,
Byelorussia and Ukraine, an amount which constituted 46.3 per
cent. of Poland's pre-war territory. In accordance with the
Potsdam decision of August 2nd, 1945, in the north and west
39,555 square miles of former German and Danzig territory
have been placed under Polish administration, 26.3 per cent. of
Poland's pre-war area. As a consequence the total area of Poland
has been reduced by 20 per cent. It is well to remember these
figures when it is said that as the result of the same war the
Germans, who caused it, waged it in a barbarous manner, and
finally lost it, have lost 22 per cent. of their pre-war territory
(including that part of East Prussia taken by the U.S.S.R.).
As a result of these changes the geometrical centre of Poland
has been shifted more than 122 miles to the West, whence it
was driven out by the German expansion of the Middle Ages.
The entire population of Poland has to be accommodated
within this reduced territory, and this incidentally was suggested
by the Allies themselves.'
An agreement was concluded with the U.S.S.R., by which the
Poles who before the war inhabited the area east of the so-called
Curzon Line are now being transferred westward to Poland. The
great majority are being settled in the area of the Regained
Provinces, where by the summer of 1946 some 4,000,000 souls
were already settled.
According to the latest estimates, after all the population
1 Vide Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, December
15th, 1944. (Hansard, Volume 406). In a statement on December 12th,
1944, Mr. Stettinius had even promised the help of the United States
Government in carrying through this transfer of population. (Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, December 24th, 1944, Vol. XI, Nr. 287,
p. 836). But this promise was not kept.
25
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movements within Poland are completed-the deportation of
the rest of the Germans, the completion of the transfers from
beyond the Curzon Line, and the return of those who found
themselves outside the country during the war-the population
of Poland will be close on 25 million.' In other words, the
density of population of the country, as the result of the in-
corporation of the Regained Provinces, will be some 207 in-
habitants to the square mile. If the provinces lying east of the
Oder and Western Neisse had not been incorporated, the density
of population in Poland would have been some 310 inhabitants
to the square mile, and so would have corresponded with the
density of population of a rich and industrialized country. It
would have been impossible to support such a population density
in a Poland deprived both of the western Regained Provinces
and the territories eastwards of the Curzon Line, and backward
in industrial development as the result of nearly a century and
a half of subjection-a Poland which, apart from coal, does not
possess any outstanding natural wealth. Pre-war Poland was
really an agricultural country, and yet because of her climate, the
nature of her soil and imperfect cultivation, comparatively little
of the agricultural production showed a profit. Consequently,
Poland could export agricultural products only because a large
part of the population was undernourished. If the density of
population in Poland to-day were to be 310 to the square mile
-in a country whose material war losses amount to 30 per cent.
of its former national wealth, and whose territory would have
been reduced by close on fifty per cent.-the country's fate would
be unavoidable. Not only would it he impossible to make good
the ruin and devastation, but over one-fourth of the population
left after the ravages of war, some six million people, would be
forced to a lingering death, or to emigrate (no one knows where)
in order to preserve proportionately the same number of in-
1 These estimates have been based on the population census taken on
February 14th, 1946. According to the figures of the report issued by
the above-mentioned International Committee for the Study of Euro-
pean Questions (p. 9), the Germans murdered 4,620,000 Poles, but in
Poland these losses are estimated at some 6,100,000.
I 26
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habitants as Poland had before the war. Yet, even then, when
the country had not been devastated, the population had difficulty
in maintaining a very low standard of living. In such conditions
Poland would lose all chance of survival as an independent
State. For this reason, among others, it has become categorically
necessary that Poland's western frontier should be on the line
of the Oder and the Western Neisse.
4. THE ECONOMIC CORRELATION OF POLAND AND
HER REGAINED PROVINCES
To get a proper understanding of the natural economic bonds
linking Poland with the former German provinces situated east
of the Oder and Western Neisse we must take a glance back into
the past.
The political bonds linking Poland with the various districts
forming the Regained Provinces were snapped between the 12th
and the 17th centuries. (Some of the frontier counties were
annexed by Prussia only in the second half of the 18th century).
None the less, the economic bonds linking the two areas survived
until the first partition of Poland in 1772. Their close co-
operation and interdependence found expression in the special
trade agreements which were concluded between Poland and
various provinces, agreements which did not cover the other
areas of the states of which these provinces were a part. How
close this co-operation was, how far the well-being of these
areas was based on it and how beneficial it was to Poland,
was completely demonstrated when, as the result of the policy
pursued by the King of Prussia, Frederick II, these bonds were
broken. The ineffective protests which the local people of
Wroclaw (Breslau), Szczecin (Stettin), and East Prussia made in
memorials sent to Berlin were in many cases warmly supported
by the administrative authorities of the eastern districts of
Prussia. These memorials were provoked by the impoverishment
which was painfully affecting the people, and which found ex-
pression in numerous bankruptcies, and a sharp decline in trade
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and production.' However, all these steps were without effect,
since from that time right down to the outbreak of the recent
war, political factors had a decisive influence on Berlin's attitude
to these provinces, while economic factors were ignored.
The artificial separation of these areas from the Polish lands
which retained their independence after the first Partition, and
then from those which were under other foreign governments
and, finally, in our days, from the Poland that was reconstituted
after the first world war-a separation maintained by customs
barriers, and later by a tariff policy also-could not conduce to
a normal economic development. Similarly, the Germanization
of the Polish resident population,2 and the economic oppression
of those who refused to be Germanized, were bound to react
harmfully on the life of those areas. All this conduced to the
formation of a situation in which 20th century German authori-
ties, discussing the provinces lying east of the Oder and Western
Neisse called them a Raum ohne Volk (Space without people).3
i This problem is discussed more extensively in relation to all the
provinces now forming the Regained Provinces in my work "The
Polish-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 1775: Poland's loss of access
to the sea-its economic consequences." (La Societe des Sciences et
des Lettres de Varsovie, 1937), Polish edition with an English resume.
A summary of the economic co-operation is given on pp. 49/52; the
effects of the severing of the economic bonds on these provinces, on
pp. 240/260. In the English resume it is discussed, generally on pp.
343/4. This work was based on sources inter alia in the Polish,
German, British and French archives. I have dealt especially with
the fate of East Prussia in my monograph The Economic Decline
of East Prussia, published in English by the Baltic Institute in 1937,
and based on German sources. The period we are now considering
is discussed on pp. 5/16 of this work.
2 Polish periodicals were published in Wroclaw (Breslau) down to the
end of the 18th century. Public worship in the Polish tongue was
forbidden there only after Hitler had come to power. In Szczecin
(Stettin) and Slubice (Frankfurt-on-Oder), the Polish language was
known generally at the end of the 18th century. Larger and smaller
groups of people who did not succumb to Germanization survived,
scattered all over the recovered areas, right down to contemporary
times, and these constitute the group of 1,200,000 Poles already
mentioned, who are not subject to deportation. The majority of them
were poor, small farmers from whom factory and agricultural workers
were recruited, and some lived right on the frontier as it exists to-day.
For instance, the eastern suburb of Barsc (Forst) lying on the right
bank of the Western Neisse, was mainly populated by a Polish pro-
letariat right down to Hitlerite times.
3 Vide Volz, Burgdorfer, etc.
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Anyone closely examining the economic structure of these
areas before the war would have found it difficult to avoid
comparing it with colonial conditions. Perhaps this was most
striking in the provinces richest by nature, and having the
greatest potentialities, namely Silesia. The natural wealth was
exploited by firms which had their headquarters in the heart of
Germany. Silesia supplied raw materials, or semi-manufactures,
which were worked up into ready-made goods of high value in
the west, beyond the Oder and Western Neisse line. The local
officials received a special "eastern" bonus to their salaries, but
the local workers received wages lower than those in other
parts of Germany.'
By way of example, we shall take that valuable metal, zinc.
Before the war German Upper Silesia supplied about half of
the total German production. The local mines belonged to two
firms: Georg von Giesche's Heirs and the "Schlesag." Giesche's
factories were situated in Magdeburg, while the Schlesag fac-
tories were in Cologne. In all Silesia there were only two
small factories producing zinc buckets. The most important
nickel deposits in Germany were situated in Lower Silesia, near
Zabkowice (Frankenstein); and they were under the control of
Krupps. Not only was there not a single manufactory of nickel
alloys in all Silesia, but not even a single refinery; they were
all built in the heart of Germany. When steps were taken in
Germany to develop the production of synthetic rubber it was
difficult not to pay attention to the fact that the necessary basic
raw materials were to be found in Silesia. So one small factory
was built there, in Zarow (Sarau), its production capacity being
not much more than z per cent. of the total German production.
This state of affairs was not due to some fortuitous turn of
circumstances, but was characteristic of German policy, or rather
of Prussian policy, which for ages has been pursued deliberately
in the area of the provinces lying east of the Oder and Western
Neisse. As the result, these districts, which have just as great
1 W. J. Rose, op. cit., the chapter entitled "A Capitalist Culture
Pattern"; J. M. Winiewicz, op. cit., p. 25.
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possibilities as the rest of Germany, had a very low level of
social income; in certain districts it did not amount even to
one-third of the average for all Germany. It is characteristic
that this applies not only to the area situated east of the Oder
and Western Neisse as a whole, but even to the great industrial
centres found there. In 1928, a year when economic conditions
were unusually good, the average income of the working person
in Wroclaw (Breslau), was close on 20 per cent. below the
average for the great cities of Germany, while in Zabrze
(Hindenburg) it was 30 per cent. lower. Even if we take the
former great German ports into account, it transpires that the
one which is returning to Poland, namely Szczecin (Stettin), had
an average income some 8 per cent. below the general average
for German port towns.'
In these conditions it is not surprising that there was a con-
tinual exodus of population from these areas to the west, to
those parts of the state where there were normal, and not
colonial conditions. This outflow applied especially to Germans.
With the aid of Germans statistics this population movement can
be fairly precisely determined, but only for Silesia, Pomerania
and East Prussia; although we know that the population fled
also from the other areas situated east of the line under con-
sideration.2 From the three provinces just mentioned, 2,156,800
people emigrated in the years 1840-1910, a further 402,500
emigrated during the years 1910-1925; and so in 85 years, in
the course of three generations, 2,559,300 people left these pro-
vinces. We can fairly say that for the whole of the area now
recovered by Poland, which before the war had a population of
some 8,300,000 and an average density of population of some 215
to the square mile, the exodus over three generations was from
' Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1933, p. 471.
2 Volz, op. Cit., p. 42.
3 Ibid., pp. 41/42, 111. Heinz Rogmann, Die Bevolkerungsentwicklung
im preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren, Berlin, 1937, took
the years 1843/1933 as a basis (p. 234). From his calculations it
would follow that in the course of these ninety years 3,008,200 persons
emigrated from the areas under discussion. Vide also the cited German
Minority in Poland, pp. 7/9 and 34/35.
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2,800,000 to 3,000,000 people. It is not surprising that the Ger-
man authorities were filled with anxiety at such figures.'
The first attempts on the part of the Berlin authorities
deliberately to counteract this state of affairs came at the begin-
ning of the 19th century.' The subventions, which later, between
the first and second world wars, were called "Osthilfe" (Help to
the East), began to flow into East Prussia in 1808. But the
Prussians did not rely exclusively on positive financial assistance.
Taxation reliefs were granted, special investment funds and
credits were formed; as we have said, the officials were paid
special bonuses, all kinds of facilities were granted in order to
tempt Germans from other districts to settle to the east of the
Oder and Western Neisse, and to tie the local population closely
to those areas. When all these artificial means were of no avail,
the authorities resorted to no less artificial administrative
methods. The most varied obstacles, difficulties and trickeries
were placed in the way of Germans wishing to emigrate from
? those districts. Only two methods were not tried. No attempt
was made to change Berlin's treatment of these areas as colonies,
an attitude which dated back to the Middle Ages, when, as the
Reich advanced its conquests eastward, the so-called marches
were formed in the conquered territories. Nor was any attempt
made to change the policy which aimed at the utmost separation
of these districts from the Polish lands which were not under
Prussian domination. These two possible changes of policy
which, of all justifiable economic measures, were the only ones
that could be really effective, Berlin could not adopt for political
reasons. In the Prussian capital it was consequently held that
Prussian, and later German, "State necessity" required the areas
east of the Oder and Western Neisse to become the "bastion
of Germanism," and to constitute the starting-point for further
expansion. All policy and life in this area had to be sub-
ordinated to this end, and no regard was paid to the fact that
there thus arose conditions and an atmosphere not favourable
1 We are not dealing here with the question of the attempt to colonise
these areas, which began earlier and was of a somewhat different
nature.
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U.:U.,L,1111L; uevelopment. ropular flight from these dis-
tricts was resisted, and not very effectively, only with counter-
measures consisting even of bribery and administrative pressure.
For Poland, in contradistinction to Prussia, the lands lying east
of the Oder and the Western Neisse are of enormous economic
importance, quite apart from their demographic significance
which has already been discussed. On this point a few explana-
tions seem to be called for.
Although in western Europe the Polish worker has long since
won himself a good opinion as being intelligent, conscientious
and industrious, although Polish technicians are inventive and
ingenious, as is shown, for instance, by the large number of
patents taken out by them, and although Polish industrialists
abroad have not yielded place to representatives of other nations
in their ability to organize labour or in their resourcefulness,
even when working under the most difficult conditions, never-
theless, down to the outbreak of the recent war Poland was an
agricultural country, or rather, was under-developed industrially.
To find the explanation for this state of things, we must take yet
another glance into the past.
Factory industry began to develop in Poland, as in the majority
of European countries, in the 18th century. At the end of the
sixties of that century a revolution broke out. The then King
of Prussia, Frederick II, gave his support first to one then to
the other side, aiming at prolonging the state of unrest which
was destroying the country economically and weakening the
State's prestige and its political strength. From Frederick's
correspondence we learn that he was concerned, inter alia,
with destroying Poland economically, and especially, as he
declared, with ensuring that a further industrialization of
the country should not be carried out in the immediate future.'
Soon after the end of the revolution Poland suffered the first
Partition, in 1772, which enabled Prussia to cut her off from the
sea and thus, in the existing state of communications, to bring
"Friedrich der Grosse: Politische Korrespondenz, Vol. XXVII, pp.
333, 347 and 366, letters to Benoit dated 18/9/1768, 25/9/1768 and
2/10/1768.
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her foreign trade entirely under Berlin's control and obtain a de-
cisive influence on her economic life. During the last twenty odd
years of Poland's independent existence (1772-95), the Prussians
were therefore able, not only effectively to prevent the normal
development of industry in Poland, but also to reduce the existing
textile
iron
ceramic and
th
d
i
t
i
i
,
,
o
er
n
us
r
es to ru
n. This policy
provided Prussian industry with enormous possibilities of
development, especially as it had an almost exclusive market
for its goods in Poland, which was hermetically cut off from
the rest of the world.- From the time when, at the end of the
18th century, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state,
being divided up among Prussia, Austria and Russia, the first
two of the partitioning powers pursued a policy of preventing
the development of industry, continuing this right down to the
outbreak of the first world war. They did no more than exploit
the slender local resources, which were passed through the manu-
facturing processes elsewhere. Only in the area taken by Russia
were these tendencies aiming at preventing a normal development
of industry not to be found. But in that area there were hardly
any natural riches on which industry could be based. To give
some idea of the conditions then prevailing and the situation in
which Polish industry had to work, I cite the example of German
capital buying up coal-bearing districts in parts of Poland under
Austrian or Russian control, in order to make it impossible to
open up new production, or at least restrict existing production.
The object of this activity was clear, nor was it a secret to any-
one living at that time. In a period of intensive development of
industry throughout Europe steps were taken to ensure the most
far-reaching restriction of economic development in Polish areas,
irrespective of the state political frontiers within which they
were situated.
1914 brought the outbreak of the first world war, which was
to bring Poland her independence. But before this deliverance
came, the Germans had occupied that part of Poland which had
1 Vide the fuller analysis of this problem in my work already men-
tioned, The Polish-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 1775.
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been under Russia-the only part in which the authorities had
not deliberately set obstacles in the way of the development of
industry. Because of the lack of natural resources mentioned
above, this industry was not very extensive, yet it played a con-
siderable part in the economic and social structure.
It so happened that during the years 1914-18 there were no
pitched battles in the neighbourhood of the Polish industrial
centres, and the latter might hope to emerge unscathed from the
first world convulsion. But the German occupation authorities
decided not to let this happen. The moment they were settled-in
they set about the destruction of Polish industry on a large
scale. Excuses for this were easy to find. For instance, the people
were obliged to hand over all the copper found in the country
to the authorities for the requirements of the German armaments
industry. A single copper screw or a plate with a copper surface
was made the pretext for dismantling great and expensive
machinery. Even the very assumption that some part of a
machine was made of this metal was sufficient to ensure its
destruction. In the case of a number of factories some basic
piece of equipment, such as generators, was confiscated and
carried off. After the war, a number of pieces of equipment of
this kind, taken from the Lodz mills, were found near Kovno
in Lithuania in sealed warehouses, or in the open, in a condition
rendering them suitable only for scrap.
As a result of this deliberate action on the part of the German
authorities it was established after their eviction that Polish
industry had suffered losses amounting to some ?692,400,000,
according to prices then current, and although under the Ver-
sailles Treaty the Germans were bound to pay reparations for
the damage done, the sums actually recovered did not exceed a
small fraction of one per cent. of what was due.'
During the period separating the first from the second world
war, while Poland was independent, her economic situation was
extremely difficult. The country's population was mainly agricul-
1 Almanach Polonais, Paris, 1926; Rzepecki, B : La situation general de
l'industrie, p. 187 and 190.
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tural and, as agricultural had not the advantage of either a very
rich soil or a favourable climate, with the conditions then pre-
vailing on the world market it could not provide either full em-
ployment or adequate support. The only way out of this situa-
tion was an intensive development of industry. On the other
hand, in the competitive conditions reigning in the world, and
above all in Europe during these twenty years, countries with a
backward economy which had not created the foundations for
modern industry on a large scale during the 19th or at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, could think of developing their own
industries only if they had exceptionally good natural conditions
and substantial capital at their disposal. Poland did not possess
any considerable capital of her own, since the economic situation
we have described had prevented its accumulation, and the war
had largely destroyed such capital as she did possess. Foreign
capital came to Poland with great difficulty and only in "homeo-
pathic" doses-a large part of the available international capital
was located in Germany.' The natural foundations were confined
to a certain, actually quite considerable quantity of coal which,
however, in general was not suitable for coking. The oil-
fields were approaching exhaustion.2 This was obviously too little
to ensure that in the conditions of the inter-war years an agri-
cultural country could change over to industry by its own efforts.
The efforts actually made in this direction were tremendous, the
percentage of the population employed in industry rose from
10.3 per cent. to 19.3 per cent.,3 but the number of surplus
agricultural workers was still estimated at some five million, or
12 per cent. of the total population. This caused grave over-
1 In the years 1924/35, the total foreign credit, both long and short-
term, granted to Poland amounted to some ?100,000,000, while, dur-
ing the same period, Germany was granted ?1,240,000,000.
2 At the beginning of the present century the annual output of crude
oil in territories which before 1939 belonged to Poland exceeded that
in 1939 by 2,000,000 tons; by 1913 the figure was only 1,114,000 tons,
and in 1938, only 507,000 tons. Concise Statistical Year Book of
Poland, 1941.
3 According to the 1921 and 1931 population censuses (1931 was the
last population census held before the outbreak of the war). From
1920 to 1939 the proportion of persons living by agriculture fell from
66 per cent. to 59 per cent. (the latter figure is an estimate).
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population on the land, an extremely difficult situation, that
gravely disturbed the social and economic balance of the country.
The foreign investigators of Polish conditions who declared that
the country's economic position was at the root of all Poland's
troubles were completely justified.
The transference to Poland of the lands lying east of the Oder
and Western Neisse gives her the possibility of making good
the enforced neglect of the country's economic development dur-
ing the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, since it provides
the requisite natural bases for the expansion of industry.
It is not a matter of increasing Poland's already considerable
coal deposits, but the essential one, that she should get adequate
deposits of coking coal suitable for foundry work, and that the
centres of Poland's heavy industry should have direct water com-
munications via the Oder with the sea port of Szczecin (Stettin)
in order to ensure comparatively cheap water transport of iron
ore from Sweden.
In these conditions there are completely new prospects for
iron and steel, and therefore for all machine-industry. This is
the more important since to-day, within the Polish frontiers, are
found certain deposits of manganese ore, and some chrome. The
same is true of the possibilities that are provided by large
deposits of zinc, lead, copper, and the nickel mines. Supplies of
special fire-proof clay of the muffle type provide an indispens-
able auxiliary raw material for the zinc industry. There is no
need to mention all the types of mining to be found in the
Polish recovered areas. There are deposits of quartzite, of clays
suitable for pottery and china, special sands which, since they
lie close to the coal-mines, will make it possible to produce all
kinds of glass, etc. Even this partial list of the natural riches
available reveals the possibilities that these areas provide to
Polish industry, and ipso facto of solving her economic problems
with all their consequences. In addition, there are great pros-
pects for the textile industry in Silesia which, thanks to its
specially good conditions for flax cultivation, already constituted
a source of wealth for this area even before it was torn from
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ruianu in uie iviiaaie tiges.
It is true that in 1945 the Poles found an enormous part of the
industry existing east of the Oder and Western Neisse in ruins;
it is true that even before the war this industry, as we have noted,
was not developed to the extent that the possibilities of the areas
allowed: but the energy with which the Polish people have set
about the reconstruction of what did exist and the realization of
plans aiming at exploiting local resources, not only provides a
guarantee that general living standards will be raised in Poland,
but also ensures that Europe as a whole will by no means lose by
Germany being deprived of these areas. Everything indicates that
the quantity of goods produced there will increase by comparison
with the pre-war position, and in any case, will not diminish.
A high level of production in those areas is far more to Poland's
direct interests than it was to Germany's.
In this summary of the economic significance for Poland of
her new western frontier, I have not mentioned one other
factor of far-reaching importance, viz., the extension of the
Polish seaboard to some 308 miles. Pre-war Poland had the shape
of an irregular sack which, on the seaboard, narowed to a width
of only some 45 miles (including the Bay of Puck). Passing over
the strategic significance of such a state of affairs, it also had
tremendous influence on the country's economic life. Although
a large part of her foreign trade was carried by sea, she was a
continental country. For the great majority of the people, the
sea-coast was only the spot to which they thronged from all
over the country in the summer-time, for holidays in crowded
seaside resorts which stretched almost unbrokenly one after
another for the whole distance. Only to-day have conditions been
created for the Poles to become a genuinely continental-maritime
nation with all its economic consequences, from fisheries through
ship-building to adequately developed overseas trading relations.
One of the most fundamental causes of misunderstanding
between people of good will is the fact that, seen through
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Cyr-b, ,?C Ja1I1C u?ng uocs not always look alike to
everybody. The situation is still worse if it is observed from
different parts of the world, since not only is the perspective
changed, but the same thing or problem is seen from completely
different angles. At such a time no little effort is needed in order
to see the thing whole. We have to overcome the tendency to see
the picture which is shown to us in two dimensions, we have
always to remember the third dimension which is a fundamental
feature of our world, not to mention the fourth dimension, as
time is often regarded.
The author's object here is to present the German problem
and the question of the Oder and Western Neisse frontier as it
appears when observed from present-day Poland. In the British
Isles, in Western Europe, in the U.S.A., this problem is seen
from its western side; for centuries the peoples of these countries
have been used to seeing Germany's western features, which are
completely unlike those she presents to the East. This is why,
to a large extent, the very problem of a definitive separation of
Germany's eastern provinces from the Reich is regarded with
quite different eyes on the East.
To realize the picture of Germany as seen from Poland, one
has to bear in mind that through the ages Poland has had
contact first and foremost with her immediate neighbours, the
Prussians. "Prussian" was a synonym for "German" hun-
dreds of years before Berlin became the capital of the Reich,
before the time when, in the words of the British sociologist, A.
Farquharson, "complete domination of Germany by Prussianism,
Prussian brutality and efficiency (became) a model for the whole
nation. Traces remained of romanticism and a lofty idealism, but
a realism which went to the verge of cynicism and indifference
to all ideals and all morality was widely accepted. The idea of
universal humanity fell into contempt.71
This is the picture of the Prussian mentality imposed on Ger-
mans as it is seen from London, and it is similar to the view
1 Gooch, G.P., Ginsberg, Willoughby, Butler, Stirg, Pascal, Farquhar-
son: The German Mind and Outlook, London, 1945, p. 199.
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01 1L 11V111 i a11J, liiuaxio vi i..a, .=ague. Unfortunately, to any-
one observing it from Warsaw or Prague, it appears even less
attractive.
All the power of Prussia was built up on the foundation of the
lands which she wrested from Poland. Some interesting remarks
on this question are to be found in the book by Mathews,
European Balance.' When, for instance, to go no further back,
the Hohenzollerns broke the political bonds linking East Prussia
with the Commonwealth of Poland (until that time East Prussia
had been a vassal state of Poland with political and social institu-
tions similar to the Polish), they had to terrorize the population,
who resisted, by methods not very dissimilar from Nazi methods.
It is understandable that in these conditions the Prussian rulers,
in their anxiety to tie to themselves the peoples of considerable
areas, among whom the memories of Poland, of Polish political
and social institutions were too vivid, had to propagate a fierce
anti-Polonism, the only analogy for which is to be found in anti-
Semitism. For centuries officials and all who, for one reason
or another, wished to find favour in their rulers' sight, were on
principle negatively disposed to everything Polish. There was
not a defect which they did not ascribe to the Poles. And so,
in the course of generations, hatred was artificially generated,
the effects of which were felt most painfully in Poland during
the recent war. We do not want to burden this work with quota-
tions, so we only cite the words spoken by Bismarck: "Beat
down the Poles until they have no spirit left in them . . . All we
can do is to exterminate them altogether. 112
But Bismarck was speaking of Poles who had been subdued,
who had been deprived of their own state rights, and were under
Prussian domination. Such words would not have come from
the Bismarck known to the West; he uttered them with his face
turned eastward.
As the Prussian hegemony took firmer and firmer root in
Germany, and as its influence extended, there was a development
1 London, 1945, pp. 18 / 19.
2 Vide Winiewicz, J. M. op. cit., p. 30.
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... u rll VrJasatiua, U1 11dLlcll
-a-? -- For Poland and the Poles
without regard to whether the period was the time of Polish
subjection before the first world war, or during the existence
of an independent Polish state between the two wars, or during
the occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945. Wherever the
Prussian influence was stronger, there this hatred was deeper.
Wherever the Prussians were less popular, it was less strong, or
did not exist at all. A Pole travelling through Germany before
the war was definitely conscious of this fact; and those Poles
who were carried off to forced labour in Germany during the
war, or even those in the various military camps, were conscious
of this difference in the attitude of the local population. For
instance, one found no feeling of hatred for Poles among the
Austrians. Despite the fact that Austria shared in the partitions
of Poland, although a large part of Polish lands was under
Austrian domination for as long a period as were those lands
taken by Prussia, yet it was difficult to think of any Polish-
Austrian antagonism after 1919.
No one in Poland indulges in the illusion that sentiments
deliberately excited and maintained for so many generations, and
teachings driven into the heads of so many generations, can now
suddenly disappear without leaving a trace, just because the
Germans lost the war.' This is not the first war the Germans
have lost. Moreover, there is, it appears, good reason for D. W.
Brogan's statement: "What irked the rulers of Germany, long
before the rise of Hitler, was not the injustices of Versailles.
but the loss of the war . . . The fundamental injustice was the
loss of the war by the people who, in its own eyes, deserved to
win it, as the most efficient nation, militarily and economically,
in Europe and the world. It was not because the world had
judged them unjustly, because they had been forced to bear the
burden of an unjust defeat that they were embittered."2
After all, even those Germans who succeeded in resisting the
1 Vide German primers and history readers for youths and children,
the sections relating to Poland.
2 D. W. Brogan: Is Innocence Enough: Some reflections on Foreign
Affairs. London, 1941; pp. 59/60.
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propaganda of hatred admit that "Nazism has successfully in-
filtrated into Germans suspicion of all foreigners ... There are
still forces in Germany to-day who try to exploit the material
difficulties of the occupying powers with propaganda which tries
to prove that Western civilization is done for and that Nazism
or some other totalitarian regime has taken its place. Such pro-
paganda will lead to new disasters not only in Germany but in
the whole of Europe . . . In the present situation the Nazi ideas
will become the last aim to which the young people cling."`
So long as these "forces" function and influence the mentality
of the people in Gerrhany, it is difficult for Poles to view the
future without fear. The more so, as these "forces" are revealing
their activities quite definitely, if only in the form of the expand-
ing illegal organization "Edelweiss," which is strongly remini-
scent of the terrorist bands that operated after the previous war,'
a fact which, for that matter, is quite openly confirmed, among
others, by the Bavarian premier, Dr. W. Hoegner.3
As the trial held before a British military tribunal at Luneburg
in April, 1946 showed, this organization in directing its terroristic
activity "mainly against displaced persons, particularly Poles,"4
those who have suffered most of all during the war, who against
their will were carried off to Germany and had to work in hunger
and cold, in the worst of conditions, at the demand of the
Hitlerites, who punished resistance with death by long-drawn-
out torture.
The Poles have grave reasons for fear and anxiety so long
as there is no "re-education" of the Germans; of all Germans
who regret not so much their provocation as their loss of the
war, whose characteristic feature is, to use the words of one who
knew them well (Sir Neville Henderson), "inability either to see
1 Pastor Niemoller, in Berlin, 20/3/46. Reported in Manchester
Guardian, 21/3/46.
2 After the first world war various anti-Polish and anti-democratic
terrorist organizations, such as the Freikorps, the Selbstschatz, and
the notorious Black Reichswehr, operated in the eastern provinces of
the Reich.
3 The Observer, 21/4/46.
4Evening Standard, 25/4/46.
' 41
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any siae or a question except his own, or to understand the
meaning of moderation,"' a "re-education" which is proceeding
far more slowly than was expected. And here it must be remem-
bered that the British occupation zone, in which in Field-
Marshal Montgomery's view "75 per cent. of the German popu-
lation had remained Nazi,"2 is no exception to the rest of Ger-
many. In view of such conditions, can the Poles expect that the
Germans will quickly forget the teachings of Hegel, Treitschke,
Nietsche, not to mention the teaching of Hitler, Rosenberg, or
Goebbels?
It has to be remembered that while a subdued, disarmed and
demilitarised Germany will not be a threat for some of the
powers for decades, or even for fifty years, she is always dan-
gerous to Poland. Hitler, indeed, lost the war militarily, but, as
Lord Beveridge confirms, in respect of population he won it.3
To a large extent he realized his plan, the plan which, accord-
ing to Rauschning, was outlined as follows, as early as 1934:
"We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of
preserving the German population. We shall develop a tech-
nique of depopulation. And that is what I intend to carry out-
that, roughly, is my task ... I shall keep their men and women
segregated for years . . . The French complained after the war
that there were twenty million Germans too many. We accept
the criticism. But our friends will have to excuse us if we sub-
tract the twenty millions elsewhere."4
It is true that, according to the calculations of the "Inter-
national Committee for the Study of European Questions,"
Hitler did not succeed in murdering twenty million people, but
the losses of the European allies in killed alone amount to not
less than fifteen millions, over four times as many as those of
Germany; while by their brutal and ruthless policy the Germans
succeeded in reducing the natural increase of population all over
1 Final Report . on the circumstances leading to the termination
of his mission to Berlin, Cmd. 6115, p. 4.
2 Speech at Hastings, 8/3/46.
3 Sir W. Beveridge, "Peace and Population," The Observer, 28/4/46.
4 Rauschning, Hermann: Hitler Speaks, 3rd Impression, London, 1939,
p. 140.
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the continent, though increasing it in their own country, despite
the war. According to the same committee's calculations, Poland's
losses in population (97 per cent. of them being civilians mur-
dered in cold blood) are far higher than Germany's not only
in percentage, but in absolute figures, since the difference
amounts to over one million more.' One must seriously reckon
with the fact that certain still influential elements in Germany,
and especially in Prussia, will come to the logical conclusion that,
even if lost, a war waged with barbarous ruthlessness pays in the
case of weaker neighbours. This manner of reasoning can be very
easily instilled into the German people. And the industrial
potential left to Germany by the resolution of the Allied Control
Commission on March 28th, 1946, is incomparably higher than
that of Poland. Without going into an analysis of the possibilities
in all spheres of production one can state on the basis of the
figures concerning steel, after taking over the Regained Provinces,
Poland will have only one-fourth of Germany's armaments
possibilities. Of course, the peace treaty will stand in the way
of German rearmament. But everybody in Poland remembers
that, when Germany signed the Versailles Treaty, she bound
herself not to rearm; that the Versailles Treaty established a
special Allied Control Commission, entrusted with the task of
seeing that Germany scrupulously fulfilled her obligations. So
surely it is difficult to expect the Poles to base their feelings of
security on legal prescriptions restricting German freedom of
action, until they pass the test of experience. A quarter of a cen-
tury ago, Poland put her hopes in the League of Nations, and
the clauses of the peace treaty concluded with Germany. She
4 was tragically deceived. There is not one Pole who did not
directly feel the painful consequences of this failure, and one-
sixth of the entire nation was murdered ruthlessly. Thus, it is
not surprising that to-day the instrument constituted by U.N.O.,
which undoubtedly is a more perfect instrument than the League
' The report on the results of the war of 1939-1945 already quoted.
According to Polish calculations, the number of killed and murdered
is 11 million higher, so that the difference between the Polish and
German losses amounts to 2,500,000.
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of Nations, must snow convincingly that Poland can feel safe
in its protection.' Nor is it surprising that Poles want the future
peace treaty with Germany, which will undoubtedly provide
better security against a new German aggression than did the
Treaty of Versailles, to demonstrate its actual effectiveness: Nor
is it surprising that everywhere in Poland to-day there is distrust
of Germany, and fear, of a revival of Prussian militarism.
For this very reason the incorporation of the so-called Re-
gained Provinces is from the political point of view understood
in Poland first and foremost as a strengthening of Poland's
potential and a weakening of the Prussian potential. Of course,
in order to understand the Polish attitude to a frontier along the
Oder and Western. Neisse other factors have to be taken into
consideration. These have already been discussed, with the ex-
ception of the emotional aspect of the problem, evoked by the
return of ancient Polish lands to their mother country, which
has no place here. But one of the most essential factors is, as
we have just indicated, the change in power relations as between
Poland and Prussia. It is not a matter of reducing the area of
the German Reich by 22.2 per cent., but of reducing the area
of Prussia by 40.2 per cent.'-' This fact affords a basis for the
expectation that there will be an actual reduction of Prussian
influence in Germany, and that it will finally be possible to build
up normal good neighbourly relations with Germans who have
not been systematically poisoned by the anti-Polish propaganda
of Prussian militarism.
Unless the influence of Prussian mentality is rooted out of
Germany, not only will it be impossible for normal neighbourly
relations to exist along the Polish-German frontier, but the peace
of Europe generally, and even of the world (as the last two
wars have shown) will be under continual threat. The words
1 It is difficult to be surprised at the attitude taken by Poles, when
doubts as to the effectiveness of U.N.O. activity are expressed by
others. Vide British Security, a report by a Chatham House Study
Group, London, 1946; or D. J. Dallin, The Big Three, London, 1946.
2 One should remember that the area of Prussia has been reduced
not only by the transfer of areas to Poland, but also by the area trans-
ferred to the U.S.S.R.
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uttered seven years ago by the present Prime Minister of Great
Britain have not lost their actuality for the present day: "The
problem to-day is not merely the defeat of German aggression,
but the establishment of conditions which will make aggression
impossible."'
When all that has been said is taken into consideration, one
cannot be surprised that everybody in Poland understands the
importance of the new frontier. This is shown by the result of
the referendum held on July 30th, 1946, in which 94.2 per cent.
voted in favour of this frontier. And it must be remembered that
very many of the people understood the approval of the western
frontier as meaning the final renunciation of the areas situated
east of the Curzon Line, the renunciation of Lwow and Wilno,
with which all Poles, not only those coming from those districts,
have been very closely bound by ties of sentiment. Even
among emigre circles who are irreconcilably hostile to the pre-
sent government in Poland, there is general realization of the
necessity of attaching to Poland the former eastern German
provinces.'
1 Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Labour's Peace Aims, November, 1939,
p. 8.
2 Vide articles in the emigre press opposed to the Warsaw government,
,e.g., Dziennik Polski i Zolnierza Polskiego, of 2nd May, 1946, Mysl
Polska, May-June, 1946, etc.
1 45
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Part II
The First Year
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1. THE FIRST YEAR OF POLISH ADMINISTRATION IN
THE REGAINED PROVINCES
"I am greatly impressed by the mass of tasks which await
the Polish Government in this vast area, which is equal to
one-third of the present territory of Poland. But I am also
filled with admiration for the determination with which the
Poles are setting about this work."
C. M. DRURY.
Head of the Unrra Mission in Poland; in a statement to the
Press, on August 6th, 1946, after a journey through the
Regained Provinces.
"A great deal is being written abroad about the bad
management of the Western Areas. That is not in accordance
with the truth; on the contrary, what I have seen in the
areas Poland has recovered indicates that a genuine economic
reconstruction is going on there."
LA GUARDIA.
Statement to the Press, August 24th, 1946, after a visit to
the Regained Provinces.
The following pages constitute a modest attempt to describe
life, and above all, economic life in the areas of the Polish
Regained Provinces during the first year of Polish administration.
49
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"Though the decision concerning these areas was taken on
August 2nd, 1945, at Potsdam, in actual fact a spontaneous
drive of Poles westwards started even earlier. They commenced
work on empty farms, in workshops, and even factories. June is
thus regarded as the anniversary of the actual beginning of the
Polish activity in almost the whole area. Owing to the difficulty
of assembling material it is possible that not all the figures and
comparative data will apply exactly to June, 1946; some may
relate to a rather earlier date, others to a later date (though these
exceptions are always indicated), but they will always be
undoubtedly accurate.
Obviously it is impossible in a few dozen pages to present the
full results of a year's endeavour by millions of men and women
over an area of some 38,824 square miles,' so I have been con-
tent with a general summary of the conditions which the Poles
found on their arrival, the conditions in which they worked, and
a number of examples, drawn from the most important spheres,
showing the results achieved. The examples are various and the
achievements both great and small-I shall always endeavour
to provide an explanation of such disparities. Perhaps, when the
reader comes to realize the conditions in which these people are
working to-day, and especially in which they worked a year
ago, when he sees the ruins in which they began living without
support from any country, for none could provide them with
adequate material help, he will agree that the average of those
achievements seems incredibly high. To understand how this
could be, one must understand the psychological state of the
Polish people when they were liberated from the German occu-
pation. At last they had the opportunity to give vent to their
accumulated desire of six years for concrete creative labour,
labour for their own State and for themselves. It would be
difficult to find anyone in Poland who has not mourned the loss
of some near and dear one, not to speak of the material losses
everyone has suffered-millions have lost literally everything.
Thus, a large section of the community regards the pre-war
I Excluding the former Free City of Danzig.
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days as a "previous life, before the reincarnation." These people,
especially those who have felt the pain and the despair more
intensely, seek oblivion and are finding it in hard work. So they
work, often beyond their strength, but it is work which yields very
positive results, results which are astonishing the more pers-
picacious of the foreign observers who are now visiting Poland.
A description of these results in the Regained Provinces has
been made possible thanks to materials placed at my disposal
by several friends. Especially I feel bound to express my
gratitude to Dr. R. Fleszarowa and M. Z. Milobedzki in War-
saw, and M. P. Zaremba, the Mayor of Szczecin, who spared
no effort to obtain the information for which I asked them.
Apart from these sources, a considerable amount of information,
especially of a detailed nature, concerning particular localities,
industrial works, etc., is derived from the Polish Press. Wherever
the material is drawn from other sources, the fact is stated in a
footnote.
2. THE SETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT OF
THE POLISH REGAINED PROVINCES
A Bureau of Western Areas was set up under the Polish Prime
Minister's office.' The purpose of this Bureau was to study all
the problems connected with the former Prussian provinces lying
east of the Oder and Western Neisse.
The Bureau's labours, especially in regard to the destruction
or removal of Warsaw libraries by the Germans, were greatly
facilitated by the many exact and detailed studies prepared
in Poland during the German occupation by a group of experts
and specialists who worked in a special section of the Under-
ground Movement concerned with the problem of taking over
control of these very areas. This assistance was of particularly
1 Later 1945, it was transferred to the Ministry for Public Adminis-
tration, and in November, 1945, it ceased to exist, on the creation of
a special Ministry for the Regained Provinces.
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urgent importance because the Bureau had to make up the com-
plements of the administrative authorities who entered these
areas shattered by war and almost depopulated to organize the
life of the provinces as they were liberated by the armies.
Furthermore, it had to supply these authorities with their in-
formation and data. Before long particular Ministries, especially
those dealing with economic life, had organized so-called
"Operational Groups" to take over industry, agriculture, com-
munications, etc.
In the first months this work of staffing the administration
in the areas then recovered obviously involved an enormous
effort on the part of Poland. I am not referring simply to the
fact that these people had to travel in ramshackle, lorries which
often broke down on the way, or that each of these lorries
with its requisite load of petrol reduced the already very in-
adequate transport supplying the towns of Central Poland with
food. Nor do I have in mind the fact that the entire personal
baggage with which these people set out, often to an unknown
area, to engage in the hard work of the pioneer, often consisted
of a single change of underclothes and a stock of food sufficient
for a few days, carried sometimes in a rucksack, but usually in a
sack slung by a string over the shoulders, as all rucksacks had
been confiscated by the Germans. The effort consisted in the fact
that these people were just as much needed in the areas from
which they were sent. During their occupation of the country,
the Germans particularly exterminated the educated members
of the community and all who had had experience of administra-
tion. At this time only very few of those who had survived in
the various German camps had succeeded in returning to Poland,
and the repatriation of those abroad had not yet begun. And for
these reasons every individual sent to occupy an administrative
post in the Regained Provinces left a gap in the administration
of the rest of the country. Nevertheless, both the Government
and the people fully realized the necessity of sending the best
and most energetic to the areas taken over from the Germans.
Although these "Operational Groups" were prepared to find
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considerable devastation, what they did find on the whole sur-
passed anything they had imagined. Only a few of the southern
counties in Silesia at the foothills of the Sudeten mountains,
which had never been attacked and where Germans had remained
until the capitulation, only these had escaped.
The value of the areas put under Polish administration as
the result of the Potsdam decision was estimated at some
?2,250,000,000.1 Of course this figure relates to pre-war days.
The value of these territories when they were taken over by the
Polish authorities consisted above all in their potentialities, for,
although the destruction in industry, by comparison with the
position in 1938 is reckoned at 50 per cent. for the whole
area, this by no means signifies that 50 per cent. of the industrial
establishments were ready to start work. It merely means that the
total value of the mines after the water had been pumped out
and the underground and surface equipment put in order, the
value of the factories capable of repair, the value of the un-
damaged machinery (often dug out of rubble), which can be
put into serviceable order, amount to 50 per cent. of the value
of the industry which was situated in the Polish Regained Pro-
vinces in 1938. The Polish authorities on their arrival found
there only 27 per cent. of all pre-war industrial establishments
in workable condition. The installations of the coal industry and
the fuel and power industry have been salvaged up to 80 per
cent., but those of the chemical industry, for instance, only up to
40 per cent. In the metal industry, which before the war employed
some 85,000 persons, and had an estimated value of some
?28,000,000, 50 per cent. of the buildings have been saved
out only 10 per cent. of the machinery and technical installations
remains intact. Industrial establishments were at first taken over
by engineers and technicians sent by the Ministry of Industry,
and in the great majority of cases their main task was to make
an inventory and to secure the existing equipment and buildings,
1 According to the figures published in volume x526 of the Statistik des
Deutschen Reiches the value of the area of the Polish Regained Pro-
vinces on January 1st, 1935 was approximately ?1,595,000,000. This
figure, however, did not include transport and communication, military
establishments, etc.
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and any stocks there might be, against destruction and pilfering
by the bands wandering over these areas. Special commissions
of experts investigated the state of the damaged factories and the
possibilities of starting them up again.
At the same time steps were taken to create institutions called
"patronates." That is individual industrial enterprises in the old
Polish areas took over the care of analogous institutions in the
Regained Provinces. Above all they "lent" them professional
staffs, of which there is such a shortage in Poland to-day, and
which are indispensable in the work of reconstruction, refitting,
or even only the restarting of the industrial works taken over.
These staffs organized first training courses for workers. Some
times the factories undertaking the "patronate" were in a position
to supply missing machinery, or parts, so that, thanks to this
system, it was possible in a comparatively short time to resume
production in a considerable percentage of the industry of these
areas. Thus, in May, 1946, the industries of the Regained Pro-
vinces were already giving employment to over 184,500 people'
of whom over 80 per cent. were Poles (the remainder consisted
of German prisoners of war and Germans not yet deported from
the areas). These 184,500 people were engaged in the following
works, that by then had been put into operation:
36 works in the chemical industry.
6 works in the sugar industry.
61 works in the timber industry.
13 works in the electrotechnical industry.
77 works in the fuel and power industry.
24 works in the foundry industry.
64 works in the production of building materials.
1 This figure covers only the workers and employees of the branches
of production specified below. Actual figures for the rest of industry,
such as the glassworks, foodstuffs, etc., could not be collected. In
September, 1946, there were 200,000 Poles in the industries of the
Regained Provinces.
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77 works in the metal industry.
39 works in the papermaking industry.
44 works in the leather industry.
74 coalmines.
181 works in the textile industry.
To give an idea of the progress made, we may take the example
of the metal industry, for which we have equally exact data
relating to June, 1946. In May, 11,299 persons were working in
this industry in the Regained Provinces, while in June the figure
was 16,534; in this latter month, Poles constituted some 94 per
cent. of the total.
Destruction was greater in communications, than in industry.
With the exception of those in the southern counties of Silesia
the railway lines had been destroyed over long distances (70.6
per cent.) and the bridges blown (55.3 per cent.). This latter cir-
cumstance was particularly unfortunate on the Oder (all the 52
bridges between Kozle (Cosel), and Szczecin were destroyed),
since it not only made it impossible to restart east-to-west rail-
way and road traffic, but also prevented navigation on the river.
The bulk of the rolling stock had been taken away by the retreat-
ing Germans. The engines and trucks left were in need of very
thorough repair-which was the reason why they had been left
behind. The buildings of the railway workshops had not suffered
serious damage (10 to 20 per cent.) with the exception of the
largest of them all, at Wroclaw (Breslau) 30 per cent., and at
Starogard (Stargard) 40 per cent.; but their equipment was
damaged irreparably to the extent of 85 to 95 per cent.'
Before the war there were close on 44,600 kilometres (27,875
miles) of hard surface roads in the area of the Regained Pro-
vinces. 23 per cent. of their surface, or close on one quarter
1 The only exception was that of the comparatively small repair shops
at Pita (Schneidemuhl), where 10 per cent. of the equipment was lost.
Vide U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, Transport Rehabilitation
in Poland. June, 1946, p. 7.
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was destroyed.'
As this destruction was chiefly caused by mines, and to some
extent by bombs, during _ the initial phase in reality a much
greater percentage of the roads were unfit for use. Over enormous
distances the former railway bridges did not exist at all, and
obviously those built by the military as the armies advanced were
inadequate.
The problem of getting communications into working order
was undoubtedly the most pressing of all. First, the most im-
portant railway lines were restored, and the main roads repaired
sufficiently to be used. U.N.R.R.A. supplies did much to increase
the rolling stock, supplementing home production (a large per-
centage of which is carried on in the restored and re-equipped
factories in the Regained Provinces). In addition steps
have been taken to bring the ports on the Oder into service
(by the end of 1945 the ports of Gliwice, Kozle and Maluszyn
were all in operation) to clear the river channels, to repair and
add to rolling stock, etc. In 1946, a total sum of ?2,525,000 was
assigned for the restoration and development of communications
on this river (a body has been specially set up to cope with this
task), all the sectors of which, with all the existing installations
were transferred to the Polish authorities by the Soviet military
authorities on August 6th, 1946. The clearing of the river chan-
nel and repair of the locks was also completed about this date.
Perhaps the industry most hard hit in the Polish Regained
Provinces was agriculture. Enormous tracts of the country were
devastated, and almost everywhere there was danger of mines,
so that every time anyone ventured into a field he ran consider-
able risk (8,782,500 acres had been mined). After the front had
moved on the average state of equipment in the farms was bad
(it has to be remembered that the great majority of the farms
were completely abandoned, and the villages completely or almost
completely deserted, so that there was no one to guard property.
Worse still, the position in regard to livestock was absolutely
tragic. The county of Boleslawiec (Bunzlau) in Lower Silesia,
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with an area of over 400 square miles and 5,181 agricultural
holdings of various sizes, had atlogether four pairs of emaciated
horses, sixty cows and five pigs, and this state of affairs was by
no means exceptional. For the Regained Provinces as a whole
the number of horses amounted to 10 per cent. of pre-war days,
the number of horned cattle some 8 per cent., pigs some 4 per
cent., and sheep some 3 per cent.'
The total pre-war value of all the agricultural holdings in the
Polish Regained Provinces was estimated at some ?500,000,000.2
Out of a total of some 462,000 holdings, some 240,000 were so
devastated that they could not be brought into service (i.e.,
apart from lack of livestock, their buildings and farm equip-
ment were either completely destroyed, or required -thorough
repair). Obviously this does not mean that the absolute agricul-
tural value of these areas has been reduced by close on 59 per
cent. But it did mean that close on 59 per cent. of the farms
were, practically speaking, eliminated from production in the
immediate future, while the remaining 41 per cent, were capable
of being brought into operation only after a very large quantity
of livestock, and above all of settlers, had been brought into
the area. However, it was far easier to find agricultural labourers
than livestock.' Immediately on the heels of the Polish adminis-
tration, and more than often preceding it, crowds of people,
mainly farmers, arrived in the areas, desiring to settle and to
work there. The majority were Poles from the farther side of
the Curzon Line, or were drawn from the above-mentioned group
of people "surplus to agriculture" in areas which had remained
with Poland, or else landless agricultural workers and small
farmers from the same areas, who were unable to obtain even a
modest existence from their land. At first this movement was so
spontaneous that the authorities, who at that time were only in
1 J. Kolipinski, A Study of the Role of the Regained Provinces in
Poland's Economic Organism, Przeglad Zachodni, Nr. 6/1946, p. 517.
2 Calculated on the basis of Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Vol. 526.
Berlin, 1939. "Die Hauptfeststellung der Einheitswerte nach dem Stand
von 1 Januar. 1935."
3In Se,itember, 1946, Polish settlers were already running 330,150
individual farms.
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an incipient state of organization not only in the Regained Pro-
vinces, but throughout Poland, were unable to control it. Only
after some months had passed, and brought stabilization, was
it possible to begin to put proper detailed plans for settlement
into practice. In principle what was done, was to see that the
settlers took over areas with soil and climatic conditions similar
to those with which they were acquainted, and that socially
organized groups of settlers were not broken up, for it was
assumed that on the one hand a peasant would feel more com-
fortable if in his new home he had the same neighbours as
before, as far as possible the same priest, the same village
teacher, and that on the other, in the atmosphere of post-war
demoralization (which, we may say in parentheses, proved less
than was feared), it would be easier for him to maintain a moral
standard. The transports of settlers "from beyond the river Bug,"
which began officially to arrive after the conclusion of the agree-
ment with the U.S.S.R. already mentioned, were organized on
these principles.
By then the law on agrarian reform,' which enacted the prin-
ciple that agrarian holdings in private hands should be of not
not more than fifty hectares (about 12'5 acres), or 100 hectares
(about 250 acres), was already in force. It was, however, con-
sidered that to set about carrying through agrarian reform in the
Regained Provinces before they had been brought under
economic control would have a negative effect on production.
Nevertheless, apart from a small number of large estates under
the adminstration of the State or of institutions intended for
cattle-breeding, etc., it is expected that in principle all the agri-
cultural areas will be divided into small holdings of from seven
to fifteen hectares (171 to 371 acres) according to the soil condi-
tions, while in certain cases the holdings may be of twenty
hectares (fifty acres).
At first the settlers arriving in the Regained Provinces did
not obtain holdings as their own property, but they were guaran-
teed priority in.allocation of the areas which they were managing
I Issued September 6th, 1944.
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and cultivating. As the various counties are brought under
economic control, the local farmers receive the farms as their
own property by a special transfer deed. This is usually associa-
ted with a special ceremony. Naturally, this procedure does not
affect the Polish autochthonous population already possessing
farms in the Regained Provinces.
The large estates constituted a separate problem. Some 8,000
farms aggregating some four million hectares (about ten million
acres) half of which is cultivable, are destined to be parcelled
out. At first they were administered by managements delegated
from the Ministry for Agriculture and Agrarian Reforms. In the
spring of 1946 steps were taken to form special co-operatives
for the purpose of parcelling out the large agricultural properties
and forming them into individual small holdings with their own
buildings and equipment. This type of co-operative must com-
plete its task within a period of not more than five years, after
I ? which it will be automatically dissolved. Anyone can become a
member of a co-operative, if he has obtained a transfer deed for
an agricultural property from the administrative authorities. In
other words, the farmer first becomes the owner of the land, and
only thereafter may (but not must) become a member of a co-
operative. On joining the co-operative the farmer pays an enrol-
ment fee of about one pound, and is under an obligation to con-
tribute his share in the form of a corresponding number of hours
of labour in co-operative work (helping in building his co-
operative neighbours' farms, etc.), or by paying in cash a sum
of about one pound four shillings per hectare (about 21 acres),
of his own farm. These co-operatives enjoy the benefit of quite
considerable government and banking credits, and also aid in
another form. For instance, 10 per cent. of the livestock supplied
by U.N.R.R.A. has been allocated to members of these co-
operatives. It may be of interest to give the total figures for the
livestock with which work was begun on these farmsteads, which
cover over five million acres of arable land; there were 9,200
horses, not quite 17,800 cows, 6,500 sheep, and less than 3,300
pigs.
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Taking into consideration the conditions the Poles found in
the Regained Provinces and the difficulties under which work
has been and still is carried on there, it is not surprising that in
1945 only some 18 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown and
that the harvest amounted to no more than 7.1 per cent. of the
pre-war figures.
In 1946, close on 30 per cent. of the whole pre-war area was
sown. Sowing of the entire area is to be expected only in 1949,
and then only because, inter alia, three-quarters of the total
credits assigned for rural reconstruction in Poland down to that
date are destined for the Regained Provinces.
The situation in these areas in the summer of 1946 was already
easier than in 1945. The position in regard to livestock was
gradually improving; the number of horses exceeded 20 per cent.
of the pre-war figure (four-fifths of these being brought _by
repatriated people from beyond the Curzon Line), that of cattle
was more than 12 per cent. (of which one-third was brought by
repatriated people from beyond the Curzon Line). The agricul-
tural population was however, disproportionately high and in
quite a number of districts it has been necessary to stop any
further influx of settlers. The total figure was already some
2,000,000 persons, which amounts to 80 per cent. of the pre-
war population.' Taking into account the serious devastation,
it is doubtful whether any large number of agriculturists can still
be settled in the area of the Regained Provinces before agrarian
reconstruction and reform has been carried through.
Yet we must remember that when the organizers arrived these
areas, with the exception of the few counties in Southern Silesia
which the war had passed by, were wildernesses over which roved
remnants of the German army, deserters, and bands of robbers.
This state of things was the result not only of the mass flight
of the local population before the approaching invasion, but
also of the evacuation which the German authorities had early
carried out on an enormous scale. From the beginning of
1 Before the war the total agricultural population of the area was
2,491,000; the figure of 1,654,000 previously given being that of these
professionally active in agriculture.
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1945 onwards, news and descriptions of this organized exodus
from the eastern provinces of Prussia had begun to appear
in the German, and even the Swedish Press.' In the course
of February alone, 651,000 civilians were evacuated from
East Prussia and by sea routes alone.' As before the war East
Prussia had some 2,500,000 inhabitants, it is obvious that much
larger numbers were evacuated overland. For some weeks in the
summer of 1945, after the close of hostilities, there was a wave
of German refugees from the West returning to the Polish
Regained Provinces, but this ceased as soon as the frontier was
adequately manned.-' Very often when they arrived at their former
places of habitation they found that Polish settlers were already
ensconed there, which caused additional difficulties for the local
authorities then in process of organization.
When speaking of the additional difficulties, one may not
ignore the armed bands of so-called "Freies Deutschland" under
the command of German officers, who were even in 1946 still
ravaging certain districts, plundering, robbing, blowing up
bridges, burning and looting. It is true that such incidents
occurred later only sporadically, but at first they were a real
? plague.
Finally, we must remember that these areas were taken over
at a time when chaotic conditions prevailed not only in these
areas but nearly on the whole of the European continent. Besides
these provinces were generally regarded by the Soviet Army as
conquered enemy territory. This did not render the work of the
Polish pioneers any easier. The Soviet army understandably,
took possession of those buildings which were in better condi-
tion, the larger farmsteads, and all kinds of communication and
transport resources, as well as certain industrial enterprises, and
i E.g., Morgentidningen, January 27th, 1945; Aftentidningen, February
2nd, 1945.
2 Deutsches Nachrichten Biiro, March 1st, 1945.
3 This has to be regarded as the explanation of the disparity between
the figure of 1,500,000 Germans in the Polish areas, given by the
Polish Government at the Potsdam Conference and the number
of Germans later deported.
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exploited them for their own requirements.
Then, too, we must recall the conditions prevailing in the
hinterland of these areas. Poland had been stripped of its ex-
perts in every branch. Those who had escaped during the war
began to return home only in the summer and autumn of 1945
(as is well known, this movement is not yet ended). The country's
material destruction surpassed anything that could be witnessed
anywhere else in Europe (proportionately the devastation was
even greater than that in the U.S.S.R.). Suffice to say that the
material losses caused by the war and the activities of the occu-
pation authorities in the former Polish lands have been estimated
at some 30 per cent. of the pre-war national capital wealth.
Some 32 per cent. of industry was destroyed, and transport
was in an even worse situation, half having been destroyed.
Some 16 per cent. of the farms had been eliminated from general
production. The position in regard to livestock was certainly
better than in the Regained Provinces, but the numbers did not
amount even to half the pre-war total: horses, 44.9 per cent.,
cattle, 33.5 per cent., sheep, 46.6 per cent., pigs, 17.3 per cent.
Only when all the foregoing factors have been taken into account
can one attempt to obtain an objective estimate of what has been
achieved during the first year in the territories placed under
Polish administration by the Potsdam decision of August 2nd,
1945.
When all the difficulties are taken into account (and we have
outlined only the most important of them, those of fundamental
significance) then the fact that as we have said, the 1945 harvest
in the Polish Regained Provinces did not exceed 7.1 per cent. of
the pre-war harvest, and that in 1946 some 37.3 per cent. of the
pre-war areas had been sown, and the harvest was expected to
be 30 to 40 per cent. of the pre-war level, ceases to cause sur-
prise. Nor is it surprising that the production of the coal mines
in the areas taken over by the Polish authorities rather late in
1945 in a very deteriorated condition, did not much exceed
25 per cent. of the annual production in normal pre-war years
during the remaining months of 1945, especially if it is borne in
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mind that in June, 1946, the worker's daily output was already
over 56 per cent. of his pre-war productivity, while employment
has reached over 85 per cent. of the pre-war level.
In a word, it is not a matter for surprise that during the first
year of Polish administration of the Regained Provinces produc-
tion in all spheres was much below the pre-war level. Any objec-
tive estimation of what has been achieved in these areas must
take into account the state of devastation, and the conditions in
which they were and still are, working. Those conditions are
undoubtedly more difficult than anywhere else in post-war
Europe, and certainly far more difficult than in the various
German zones, where the occupation authorities are coming up
against such considerable difficulties in the organization of nor-
mal economic life.
3. THE AREA AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF
THE POLISH REGAINED PROVINCES
The Polish Regained Provinces embrace the former Regierungs-
bezirk of Oppeln (German Upper Silesia) which under its ancient
historical name of Opole Silesia has been incorporated into the
province of Silesia. The Silesian Voyevoda, whose administrative
seat is in Katowice, has a branch of the administration with its
headquarters in Opole (Oppeln). The former Regierungsbezirk
of Breslau and part of the Regierungsbezirk of Liegnitz lying
east of the Western Neisse, with the exception of the Wschowa
county (Kreis Fraustadt), and the Zielonogorski county (Kreis
Grunberg) from the former Regierungsbezirk of Frankfurt-on-
Oder, the eastern part of the Barsc county (Kreis Forst) and the
Zoraw county (Kreis Sorau), and, finally, in the south the
Zytawski district (Zittau) form Lower Silesia and come within
the province'of Wroclaw (Breslau). The Wroclaw Voyevoda has
a branch in Boleslawiec (Bunzlau). The Wschowa county, lying
east of the Oder part of the Regierungsbezirk of Frankfurt A.O.,
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with the exception of the above-mentioned counties, and without
Chojnice county (Kreis Konigsberg) and Mysliborz county
(Kreis Soldin), Babimost county (Kreis Bomst), Miedzyrzecki
county (Kreis Friedeberg), Trzcianka county (Netzekreis) and Pila
county (Schneidemuhl), of the former Regierungsbezirk Grenz-
mark Posen -Westpreussen, have been included, under the histor-
ical name of Lubusz Land, in Poznan province. The Poznan
Voyevoda has his local department at Gorzow (Landsberg). All
that part of the former Stettin Regierungsbezirk lying east of the
Oder, together with a small scrap lying on the west, right at the
mouth of the river, the small eastern part of the island of
Uznam (Usedom), some six miles across at its widest part, and
the island of Wolyn (Wollin), the former Regierungsbezirk of
Koslin without the county of Leborg (Kreis Lauenburg) together
with the rest of the former Grenzmark Regierungsbezirk are
called Western Pomorze and form the province of Szczecin.
Some 65 per cent. of former East Prussia is also under Polish
administration, namely the part lying to the south of a line
running from west to east some twenty miles south of Krolewiec
(Konigsberg, now Kaliningrad). The greater part of this area,
known as Mazuria, is part of the Olsztyn province. Outside the
bounds of this province are certain counties in the west, the
former West Prussian (Westpreussen) Regierungsbezirk, there
being the counties of Elblag (Kreis Elbing), Kwidzyn, (Kreis
Marienwerder) Malbork (Kreis Marienburg) and Sztum (Kreis
Stuhm) which with the above mentioned county of Leborg
(Kreis Lauenburg) are attached to the province of Gdansk; but
on the east the counties of Elck (Kreis Lyck) from the former
Allenstein Regierungsbezirk, and Olecko (Kreis Treuburg) and
part of Goldap county (Kreis Goldap) of the former Gumbin-
nen Regierungsbezirk have been attached to the province of
Bialystok.'
1 Before, and even during the war the administrative division of these
areas suffered quite frequent changes. Consequently we have taken the
position that applied in the beginning of the 1930's as the basis of
comparison with the present division, as the situation then was, seem-
ingly, most generally known.
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4. OPOLE SILESIA
Opole Silesia has an area of some 3,750 square miles and
embraces the southern part of the easterly projection of former
German Silesia. Before the war its professionally active popula-
tion was divided up as follows: about 43 per cent. were in
agriculture, about 35 per cent. in industry and crafts, about 12
per cent. in trade and communications, and the rest in other
professions, the total population being some 1,500,000. From
the economic aspect the most important part of this area is the
coalfield, situated close to such towns as Bytom (Beuthen),
Zabrze (Hindenburg), Gliwice (Gleiwitz). It amounts to rather
less than one-tenth (some 220 square miles) of the whole of
the Upper Silesian coalfield, the rest of which before the war was
within the frontiers of Poland, containing about 15 per cent, of
the total coal deposits of this field. There are sixteen mines,
rather large, with an annual production which before the war
fluctuated between 500,000 and about 2,000,000 tons. The aggre-
gate output of the Opole mines in the year 1937 was some
23,200,000 tons, and they gave employment to some 50,000
workers.
The individual mines, when they were taken over by the Poles,
were flooded, fires were raging in almost all the others, the majority
were cut off from electric power. Everywhere the "wartime"
system of exploitation carried on by the German authorities had
caused unforeseen and incalculable rock-movements resulting in
the piling up, crushing and crumbling of coal. The number of
miners at work did not in general exceed fifty per cent. of the
pre-war figure. The lack of trained people for executive positions
was particularly felt, for these had consisted almost entirely of
Germans, and they had fled westward before the advancing front.
Despite the obvious difficulties arising out of these conditions,
sooner than many expected, all the coal mines in Opole Silesia
were working on a larger or smaller scale. Obviously the produc-
tion in that month was not and could not be large. It amounted
to only some 8 per cent. of the average monthly output in the
year 1937. When it is taken into account that all the under-
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ground fires were brought under control or localized- only in
November, 1945, the production for December, which exceeded
33 per cent. of the monthly average for 1937, cannot be regarded
as low. In June, 1946, it already exceeded 45 per cent. of the
average level in 1937. And the output per worker per day
leapt in the course of the year from some 25 per cent. of the
pre-war output to some 60 per cent. In June, 1946, the em-
ployment figures were about 80 per cent. of the pre-war employ-
ment figures.
Of the four coking plants one was so completely wrecked
that it could only he brought into operation after the necessary
reconstruction now in progress has been completed. After the
necessary repairs the other three were able to start up on a
small scale in July, 1945, reaching some 10 per cent. of the pro-
duction of all four coking plants in 1937. Owing to further
repairs, by June, 1946, this production was approximately
doubled. Of the two formerly existing briquette plants one was
brought into operation comparatively quickly, the other was in
such a condition as to be able to begin work only after thorough
repairs lasting several months. None the less, in June, 1946, the
output of briquettes in Opole Silesia was already close on 90
per cent. of the 1937 level.
In addition to coal, there are deposits of zinc and lead ores
with a heterogenous content of these two metals, that constitute
a valuable addition to the natural wealth of Opole Silesia. In
1937 the production was 722,000 tons, yielding close on 77,500
tons of zinc and 17,500 tons of lead. The four mines in the
area, all situated near Bytom, employed an aggregate of 2,940
workers before the war. When taken over by the Polish authori-
ties the mines were completely unfit for exploitation, owing to
the effect of war operations. The small, single-shaft mine "Nowa
Wiktoria". (formerly the "Neue Victoria") called for least repair,
and even this mine yielded close on 126,700 tons of ore in 1937,
but to-day its deposits are almost completely exhausted, and the
ore left contains not more than 6 per cent. of metal, which is
far below the average for the area. The other mines lacked
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pumping machinery, hauling machinery, compressors, boilers,
transport, slipwire for underground, and even the former cable
railways had disappeared. Of the surface installations, only
empty buildings were left. The shops for machinery construction
closely associated with the mines had been stripped. Despite
the extremely difficult conditions in which the work had to be
carried on, and a definite and considerable drop in the metal
yield, in June, 1946, the output of the Opole mines then in opera-
tion already reached over 39 per cent. of the whole pre-war
output in the area.
So far as the entire zinc industry in Opole Silesia is concerned,
the damage done by the Germans during their withdrawal is
estimated at ?4,788,000 at pre-war prices. The Polish authorities
took over only 35.8 per cent. of the previously existing establish-
ments in a state fit for operations even after repairs had been
completed.
And so if we remember that in relation to pre-war monthly
figures the output of ore in June, 1946, as we have said, amounted
to 39.3 per cent., the production of zinc concentrates 47.2 per
cent., while zinc oxide was 65.9 per cent.,' we get some idea of
the effort put into the reconstruction of this branch of industry.
Before the war the iron industry in Opole Silesia produced
some 275,000 tons of pig iron and some 700,000 tons of raw
steel. When it was taken over by the Polish authorities the
industry was not in a much better state than the zinc industry.
Owing to the enormous needs arising from the reconstruction
of the country the work of restoring this branch of production
was undertaken with particular intensity. Of the six previously
existing foundries two had been completely destroyed, in the
others and in the wire-rolling mill at Gliwice whole departments
of production did not exist at all, while those remaining called
for very thorough repair, without of course taking into account
the fact that the furnaces had been extinguished. None the less,
1 Before the war, zinc ore extracted in Opole Silesia was only partly
processed there, so it is possible that some disparity may be found
in the figures.
I A7
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in June, 1946, not only were the four former foundries and the
wire-rolling mill at work, their production ranging between 10
and 75 per cent., but the construction of a new foundry at
Gliwice has been completed and production started on July 22,
1946, with over a thousand workers employed.
All the other branches of industry are in an analogous state.
Certain factories, which were taken over in a state of less devas-
tation, have already surpassed the pre-war level of production,
e.g., the great works for the chemical transformation of timber,
situated near Strzelce (Gross Strehlitz). In general everything
that can be put into operation is being operated. A characteristic
example of this policy is the town of Raciborz (Ratibor), 85 per
cent. of which was destroyed, so that out of 3,500 buildings only
352 are suitable for use. Yet already in June, 1946, a great fac-
tory of carbon electrodes (which is working first and foremost to
meet the needs of the artificial fertilizer works), a soap and
candle works, the third largest in Poland, a macaroni factory, a
sugar refinery, a yeast works, and a chocolate works (with a pro-
duction based on U.N.R.R.A. supplies) were in operation.
The work of restoring the main communication lines in Opole
Silesia can be regarded as completed. The most important
achievement of this kind was the opening of six railway bridges
over the Oder in Opole on July 21st 1946.
Already in 1946 there were small-holdings vacant in Opole.
Of the great estates, the one in the worst state was being farmed
up to 80 per cent. of its pre-war amount. As it is proposed to
parcel out the great estates covering an aggregate of some
100,000 acres of arable land, one must reckon with the influx
of a further small number of farmers in the future.
According to the population census of February 14th, 1946,
the density of population in Opole Silesia was some 85 per
cent. of the pre-war figure, and it must be pointed out that about
half of the population were indigenous Poles. Since then a
few more settlers have arrived and to-day, owing to the devas-
tation in the area, further settlement not only in agriculture but
in the towns, too, is impossible. The Poles now arriving there
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from beyond the Curzon Line must be transported further to the
West.
The educational system was considerably extended in Opole
Silesia during the school year, 1945/46. There were 772 ele-
mentary schools, attended by over 151,000 pupils; there were
also 53 general secondary schools, attended by about 9,250 pupils
and 23 technical secondary schools with over 1,850 pupils, in
addition there was a very considerable number of courses and
trade-finishing schools for adults. And finally, there was the
newly opened engineering faculty (school of university degree)
at Gliwice, with 2,270 students. In the school year 1946/47,
plans were made for the opening of more schools, above all of
elementary and secondary schools.
Lower Silesia, which administratively forms the Wroclaw
province, extends over an area of some 9,516 square miles to
the West of Opole Silesia as far as the Western Neisse. In the
? south it has a natural frontier in the chain of the Sudeten moun-
tains, which towards the north pass into a spacious plain, ending
in small moraine hills rising to a couple of hundred feet. Lower
Silesia, especially its southern part, contains various natural
riches, though only in relatively small quantities, yet they served
as the basis for quite a considerable industrialization of the area.
It has to be pointed out that the industrial traditions of Lower
Silesia reach back to times before there was any considerable
exploitation of its natural riches. Owing as it was mentioned
above to the suitable soil and climate, flax cultivation, for in-
stance, was quite successful in the area, and the result was a
development of the textile industry, which constituted the basic
wealth of the province during the Xliddle Ages when it formed
part of the Polish State.
Before the war there were some three million people living
in Lower Silesia, and the average density of population was
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approximateiy 3i / mnaoitants to the square mile. Of the working
population some. 37 per cent. were employed in agriculture, some
35 per cent. in industry and crafts, some 14 per cent. in trade
and communications, and the remainder in other professions.
Although the average devastation of the whole province as
the result of war operations is estimated at not more than 20.7
per cent., nevertheless, owing to the com,tparatively high percent-
age of destruction of living accommodation the present absorp-
tion capacity of the whole area is estimated at not more than
65.8 per cent. of the pre-war state (in figures, 2,000,100 persons).
According to the population census taken on February 14th,
1946, Lower Silesia then had some 1,930,000 inhabitants (or
96.5 per cent. of the total that can at present be accommodated
in the province). Although since then a large number of Poles
have arrived, mainly repatriated people from beyond the Curzon
Line, it has to be remembered chat large numbers of Germans
have also left for the West, so that the population in Lower
Silesia cannot have undergone any great change, and it is to be
assumed that in the summer of 1946 it had not exceeded its
size of February, or at least only to an insignificant extent.
The capital of Lower Silesia is Wroclaw, a large industrial
centre, which before the war had close on 630,000 inhabitants.
The retreating German authorities transformed the town into
a fortress, and it was captured only after a long siege. Despite all
the efforts of the Poles on the spot to extinguish the fires that
raged all through the town after its capture (in many cases
started deliberately by the military garrison and Hitlerite organ-
izations), the destruction exceeds 64 per cent.
Owing to the difficult general economic situation the Govern-
ment was not in a position in 1946 to grant credits of more
than some ?480,000 for the rebuilding of Wroclaw.
At first the work of safeguarding the remaining undestroyed
part of the town and the equipment of the industrial enterprises
was rendered particularly difficult, owing to the fact that large
areas were mined. For instance, the municipal gasworks, which
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was also partly destroyed, was the scene of a number of tragic
accidents, and it became necessary to stop work there until
the military had cleared the mines.
Of the many examples indicating how the work of rebuilding
economic life in Wroclaw has been and still is proceeding, we
quote that of the artificial silk mill (formerly the Vereinigte
Glanzstoff-Fabriken A.G.). After thorough examination of the
state of the factory', a commission of experts pronounced that it
was impossible to put it into operation. As there is a very severe
shortage of textiles in Poland, a group of engineers and a staff
of workers was found who decided to try to save the factory.
They obtained permission to do so and set to work to dig the
machinery out of the ruins, to repair it, and put in order the
damaged equipment. The factory was already in operation in
May, 1946, and was producting 17,600 lbs. of artificial silk per
day, with 820 workers employed.
Another extremely important achievement was the repair of
the State Railway Truck Works (formerly Linke-Hoffmann). It
was found possible to bring this works into operation in January,
1946, and in that month it turned out its first hundred goods
trucks. During the first six months of 1946 it turned out 1,234
goods trucks, and in June its monthly production reached 320
trucks, or about 40 per cent. of its pre-war production capacity.
In the same months steps were taken to produce railway car-
riages. When it is taken into account that parallel with production
the factory is continually being extended, repaired, and
machinery completed, a large part of which was completely
destroyed, then one begins to realise the enormous effort put into
this form of production, which is so important to-day in view
of the lack of transport facilities in Europe.
Among the more well-known Wroclaw industrial works one
may mention the hydrometer works (formerly H. Meinecke),
which had a large proportion of its buildings, as well as pumps,
electric cables, and gas pipes completely destroyed. Only just
under 34 per cent. of its machinery was left in a state suitable
for repair, the rest being completely destroyed or carried off
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Pone the less, in the middle of 1946, after many months of
intensive work, it was possible to put the works into operation
on such a scale that by the end of 1946 it will be in a position
to turn out 3,000 hydrometers.
Work on the saving and restarting of all the rest of the once
extensive industry of Wroclaw has been undertaken on the same
scale ever since the arrival of the polish authorities. For instance,
the many factories of the clothing industry that existed there
before the war were taken over either in a destroyed or a pillaged
state (there was an aggregate of over 15,000 workshops in 1939).
Not one factory was in a state ready for immediate operation.
Consequently those workshops and machinery suitable for ex-
ploitation and which could he re-erected are being assembled
in the buildings left undamaged, and new industrial establish-
ments are being formed from the fragments of the past, being
brought together so that the aggregate should form a unit capable
of production.
In June, 1946, work had already been completed on the
restoration of a great soap and glycerine works, a great oil
works (to produce eight tons per day), nine manufacturies in the
provisions industry were already operating, as well as a weights
factory, a pump factory (formerly the Albert Knauth), a num-
ber of factories producing insulating material, ferro-concrete
materials, etc. It is impossible to mention them all.
In May, 1946, the population of Wroclaw exceeded 100,000.
The great majority are former inhabitants of Lwow and partly
of Vilno. The characteristic dialect of the first city particularly
is mainly to he heard in the streets. Here too the representatives
of the Lwow scientific world have founded new homes and with
enormous effort and hard physical labour succeeded in rescuing
a considerable part of those collections and installations of the
the Wroclaw educational and scientific institutions which the
Germans failed to carry off. And they, too, in the autumn of
1945, made the University and Polytechnic active again. The
lecturers, numbering 102, consist almost entirely of professors of
the Lwow higher educational institutions, who managed to keep
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alive during the German occupation and are now continuing
their work, in Wroclaw. In the spring of 1946, the University
had 1,300 students, while the engineering faculty had eight
hundred. The former Lwow scientific societies hold their meet-
ings in Wroclaw on the same days as they were held before the
war. Works of art and scientific collections are also being brought
from Lwow. In 1945 a special Commission for Care of Historical
Remains was organized in Wroclaw, to watch over the care and
repair of historical buildings.
All over Lower Silesia life is developing as it is in Wroclaw.
Apart from the few southern counties already mentioned there
is quite considerable devastation throughout the province. A
glance through the data concerning the former county towns
most often reveals a degree of devastation fluctuating between
20 and. 40 per cent., though of course in some cases the figures
are higher. For instance Zegan (Sagan) shows over 50 per cent.
Luban (Lauban), 65 per cent., Trzebnica (Trebnitz) 80 per cent.,
the historical town of Glogow (Glogau) which before the war
had 33,000 inhabitants, is destroyed almost to 100 per cent., and
so on.
Taking all Lower Silesia with the exception of Wroclaw, the
devastation in the various branches of industry is as follows:
.........................
Mining ........
Metal-working industry ............
Building materials ..................
Chemical ..............................
Timber .................................
Paper .................................
Provisions ...........................
Textiles .................................
Public Utilities .....................
20 per cent.
90 per cent.
74 per cent.
82 per cent.
67 per cent.
70 per cent.
80 per cent.
60 per cent.
70 per cent.'
Obviously the above figures are subject to the same reserva-
tions as were made in discussing the losses suffered as the result
1 Records of the Industrial Congress of the Regained Provinces,
August 27th to 29th, 1945.
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of military operations in the Polish Regained Provinces generally.
We begin our summary of the economic situation in 194-6 in
Lower Silesia with mining, which has suffered least of all the
branches of industry. Here we shall give only a general descrip-
tion of the more important spheres of mineral production. We
begin with the coal deposits grouped at the foot of the central
section of the Sudeten mountains in Walbrzych (Waldenburg),
and in Nowa Ruda (Neue Rode) near Kladzko (Glatz). This field
is distinguished by its relatively difficult conditions of exploita-
tion, due to the strong dislocation of seams, and also by the large
variety of kinds of coal, among them much high quality coking
coal. Before the war there were seven mines (four in Walbrzych
and three in Nowa Ruda). In 1939, their aggregate output was
up to 4,911,000 tons, with some 19,500 workers employed.' As all
these mines required comparatively little repair when taken
over it was possible to have them operating shortly, and
despite the shortage of labour, close on 37 per cent. of the
average monthly pre-war output was reached. In June, 1946,
the total output of these mines with a degree of employment still
rather below the pre-war level exceeded 44 per cent. of the pre-
war monthly output.2 The reasons for this disproportion between
the state of employment and the output by comparison with the
pre-war position has to be sought in the fact that there is a
shortage of the specially highly qualified miners these mines
require. The great majority of the miners employed there in
June, 1946, consisted of unqualified only in the training stage.
One must expect that only with the influx of experienced miners,
who worked in France in emigration before the war, will the
output be greatly increased. Apart from exploitation of the
existing mines, since 1945, geological investigations have been
in progress in Lower Silesia. In the coalmining industry they have
resulted in the discovery in the largest mine, the Julia, of seams
1 The state of employment in 1938, as quoted by the U.N.R.R.A.
publication, Industrial Rehabilitation in Poland, which gives 19,481
workers, p. 7.
2 In June, 1946, the output of the coking plants attached to the
mines reached 62.3 per cent. of the monthly pre-war output.
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9ft. 10in. thick, whereas hitherto the seams have been of 2ft. 71in.
to 3ft. 3? in. thick. In this field a seam of such thickness as over
9ft. is a discovery of considerable importance. Furthermore it has
been established that there are considerable, hitherto unknown
deposits of nickel in the Kladzko county in addition to those
that have long been worked at Zabkowice (Frankenstein).
Similar geological investigations and borings have added
importance to the exploitation of arsenic ore (which contains
a small admixture of gold) with the discovery of a number of
new veins three times as rich as those exploited before the war.
As a result the mine at Zlotystok (Reichenstein) near Zabkowice,
which was taken over in a state of devastation, but which after
pretty thorough repair was brought into operation in the middle
of November, 1945, reached an output in June, 1946 which was
equal to 150 per cent. of the monthly pre-war level.
It is impossible to mention all the other mines in so brief a
sketch. They have been put into repair and brought into opera-
tion, but great difficulties have been met with. Not only were
they flooded, but all the installations were destroyed, the
machinery carried off or broken up, and obviously these mines
? took longer to bring into operation. We may take the opportunity
of pointing out that a large part of the production of the Lower
Silesian quarries is now allocated for the rebuilding of Warsaw,
and the first transports of this material began to arrive in the
capital already in the autumn of 1945.
The textile industry, in Lower Silesia, which was highly
developed, was in a bad condition when the Polish authorities
took over, 60 per cent. of its installations were found to have
been destroyed. Its reconstruction and the earliest possible start-
ing up of whatever could be put into operation was from the very
beginning regarded as among the very urgent tasks, because of
the shortage of textile goods, which is felt even more painfully
in Poland than elsewhere. It is difficult to compare the pro-
duction of those factories which were taken over in a condition
suitable for restarting after lesser or greater repairs with the pre-
war position, since, as in other areas, the machinery salvaged
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I?? u?- ~~=~ a===?u in complete production units in
accordance with the state of the buildings, so that really new
industrial establishments are being organized; existing enter-
prises are enlarged, the missing machinery is brought from
Central Poland, etc. We may give the case of the cotton goods
mill in Bielawa (Langbielau-formerly the Christian Dierig A.C.)
as an example. It was taken over on August 10th, 1945, and
two weeks later spinning began, while simultaneously further
repairs were proceeded with, which made it possible to start the
weaving shops on January 1st, 1946. In May, 1946, the works
were already employing far more workers than in pre-war days,
and were accounting for 10 per cent. of all Polish production.
This mill is in course of still further extension.
In April, 1946, taking the whole of Lower Silesia, 50 per
cent. of the pre-war total of spindles and 20 per cent. of the
looms were working in the cotton industry, while in the woollen
industry the figures were 40 per cent. of the spindles and 45
per cent. of the looms. In the flax industry 25 spinning and
weaving shops have been brought into operation, giving employ-
ment to over 10,000 people, and the monthly production is about
900,000 yards of woven goods.' In Rychbach (Reichenbach)
alone, twelve spinning shops (with an aggregate of over 100,000
spindles), eighteen weaving shops (with over 2,800 looms) and
three independent dyeing works were in operation. There were
great difficulties associated with the starting up of the artificial
thread mill at Jelenia Gora (Hirschberg) which was producing a
kind of nylon, because the secrets of its production were nom
known. Their discovery called for several months of laborious
work on the part of Polish experts, before it was possible to
begin production in the spring of 1946.2
The clothing industry, which is closely associated with the
textile industry, has similarly been brought into operation. Only
seventy (or 35 per cent.) of the previously existing factories
1 The figures for the flax industry relate to September, 1946.
2 In September, 1946, 152 textile works were in operation in Lower
Silesia.
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taken over had any machinery at all. These works were mainly
partially destroyed, and in many instances had been pillaged.
Here too it was necessary to bring together machinery, etc.,
from various works, and it was found possible to complete
seventeen works, all of which are in operation, and on July 1st,
1946, they employed an aggregate of some 3,200 workers.
In the timber industry, which was next to the textile industry
in the extent of its destruction, only 37 works were suitable for
reconstruction. Of these 32 have already been re-equipped and
brought into operation,' and they employ an aggregate of 2,400
workers. Work is in progress to bring the remaining five into
production. Here it may be mentioned, that part of the furniture
ordered by Great Britain is being made in these Lower Silesian
works.
Turning to the public utilities, we may only say a few words
in passing about the production of electric power. Apart from
the southern counties already mentioned, the Polish authorities
found the power stations more or less destroyed, and the high
tension cables had been torn down over long distances. In April,
1946, the total power output of all the Lower Silesian power
stations then in operation already exceeded 71 per cent. of the
pre-war output, while some 50 per cent. of the total length of
high tension cable had been restored.2 Here it must be pointed
out that the great power station at Walbrzych (Waldenburg) is
daily supplying 500,000 kilowatt hours (or over 71 per cent. of
its output) to Czechoslovakia.
We have already said a little about the building materials
industry, destroyed as to 74 per cent. of its pre-war state, when
discussing the mining industry. Here we must also mention
the most important of the enterprises operating in 1946, such
as the large cement works near Boleslawiec (Bunzlau) which is
situated in an area that is one of the most devastated of all-
40 per cent. of this county's area was mined when taken over.
Then there is the gypsum works near Lwowek (Lowenberg).
1 Up to September, 1946.
2 By September, 1946, 60 per cent.
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Then the glassworks at Walbrzych, with a production capacity
of 222,000 square metres of molten glass, or those at Peczek
(Penzig). We may also mention one of the largest manufacturers
of roof shales in Europe, that at Borowsko (Freiwalden), near
Zegan (Sagan), and, finally, the porcelain works at Walbrzych,
which by 1946 were half restored; it is well-known that
despite the suitable conditions and its situation on the spot
where the raw materials were available, the German firm of
Rosenthal, to which it belonged, would not permit the produc-
tion of fine quality porcelain in it before the war. In addition,
in June, 1946, there were also six works producing fine china;
four more were under reconstruction, but all hope of putting
the remaining four into operation had to be abandoned, as they
were completely destroyed.
We shall not discuss the provisions industry, which has been
ruined to a large extent (80 per cent.). It consisted mainly of
small establishments, and those that were saved or could be
brought into operation were almost all working in 1946. By
way of example we may mention that of the 21 sugar refineries
in Lower Silesia, only the one at Swidnica (Schweidnitz) was
left in such a condition that it could be repaired. It was able
to provide service during the 1945/46 sugar refining season.
The other refineries were either completely destroyed, or all
the machinery had been removed from them by the Germans.
Eighty-two per cent. of the chemical industry in Lower
Silesia was destroyed; of those works which have been brought
into operation the most well-known are those at Zarow (Saarau),
near Swidnica, which reached its pre-war level of production as
early as May, 1946.
We have already discussed to some extent the restarting of the
90 per cent. devastated metal-working industry, when speaking
of the reconstruction of Wroclaw's economic life. Owing to the
very serious devastation of this branch of industry, the aim is
first and foremost, independently of plans for the future, to
restore the production which is most indispensable in the present
phase of reconstruction. In the machine tools works at Wroclaw,
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that have really been rebuilt, in the casting works at Nowa
Sol on the Oder (Neusalz) which were started in June, 1946,
after thorough repair and partial re-equipment, in the works
turning out steel cables for the mining industry, started at
Walbrzych, and a number of others, everywhere one can see
unsparing effort and energy being put into the work of making
production possible.
Ending this very hasty survey of Lower Silesian industry, we
must once more emphasize that it by no means covers the whole
of the industry, nor all the achievements in any one sphere dur-
ing the first year of Polish administration. We have been simply
concerned to provide a general summary, on the basis of
examples drawn from the most varied spheres.
Here we must devote a few words to the crafts of Lower
Silesia. Before the war there were close on 65,000 handicrafts
workshops and establishments in the area. As the result of the
consolidation policy of the German authorities during the war,
their number was reduced to some 30,000. The Poles arriving
in Lower Silesia found some 15,000 workshops and crafts works
completely destroyed. Of those which could be put into opera-
tion or repaired, some 8,000 were working by the end of March,
1946, giving employment to about 30,000.
When considering the economic life of Lower Silesia it must
be borne in mind that the most serious "bottle-neck," especially
in the incipient phase, was the absence of communications and
transport. It was not possible to set about the planned restora-
tion of communications on a larger scale for months after
the, close of war operations, owing to the movement of Soviet
troops, which for some time absorbed every available means of
transport. And for the same reason the date when work
on the restoration of communications in Lower Silesia began,
must be taken as about August 20th, 1945. Down to April 1st,
1946, 149 bridges, viaducts and railway conduits had been res-
stored out of a total of 249 destroyed; six tunnels had been re-
built, out of nine destroyed; and 800 railway buildings had been
repaired; finally, during these seven months over 1,051 miles
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of permanent way had been repaired, raising the length of line
in service to 1,450 miles (throughout the entire province only
399 miles of permanent way were taken over in serviceable
state). It is true that the rolling stock is still inadequate, but it
is now sufficient to meet the most urgent needs.'
Next we must discuss agriculture in Lower Silesia. Apart
from the several southern counties already mentioned more than
once, in general, agriculture suffered very severe devastation.
There was a very acute shortage of livestock, and the percentage
that remained in relation to the pre-war position was lower than
the average for the Polish Regained Provinces generally (the
county of Boleslawiec has already been mentioned, by way of
example, and it is situated in Lower Silesia). Moreover, large
tracts of the country were mined (as already mentioned, 40 per
cent. of the area of the Boleslawiec county, and not only arable
land, was mined, while the figure was 25 per cent. for Strzelin
(Strehlen) county, and so on). Finally, a considerable number of
the farmsteads were destroyed to such an extent that only
traces of the former buildings were found on them. At the end
of March, 1946, i.e., before the commencement of that year's
field work, some 89 per cent. of the farms on which work was
at all possible had been taken over by Polish settlers, while 8
per cent. were reserved for repatriated Poles returning from
Yugoslavia and Switzerland and the so-called "soldiers' settle-
ment." For it must be remembered that the farms in five coun-
ties have been set aside for soldiers' settlement, in other words,
the farms in these counties are handed over to men who have
taken part in the struggle for independence during the last war
(irrespective of what army or partisan force they were in).' It
is intended that from the large estates, which for the time being
are being managed by state administrations, or by social institu-
1 On March 1st, 1946, the state of the rolling stock was as follows:
locomotives in service, 283 (506 under repair), carriages, 727 (in service
and under repair), goods trucks, 14,391 (in service and under repair).
Statistical News of the Chief Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of
Poland, No. 8, 1946, pp. 1111112.
2 In other areas four counties have been set aside for soldiers' settle-
ment in the Lubusz Land, and six counties in Western Pomorze.
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tions, a further 875,000 acres will be parcelled out.
Here it is worth mentioning that the Germans left some
10,000 acres of hewn forests in Lower Silesia. Taking advantage
of credits of some ?30,000 for this purpose, during 1946 one
quarter of these "arrears" will he made good, and steps taken
to re-forest the rest of this area.
As, owing to the conditions described above, the 1945 harvest
could not meet the winter requirements of the population of
Lower Silesia, from the beginning of 1946 down to the opening
of the harvesting season considerable quantities of food were
systematically assigned to the area from central Poland. With
this assistance the colonists not only in the towns, but also in
certain viral areas, were enabled to get through that first, very
difficult winter.
In this province, as in the rest of Poland, trade is partly in
private hands, while part of it is carried on by co-operatives, of
which there were 334 in the province, with 464 shops, on June
1st, 1946. It must be pointed out that in the undevastated towns
all the former shops were open again by April, 1946.
Finally, to complete this cross-section of life in Lower Silesia,
we must say a few words on the educational system. We have
referred to the higher educational institutions when dealing
with Wroclaw. On April 1st, 1946, there were 944 elementary
schools, with over 71,700 pupils; there were also 37 general
secondary schools with some 6,200 pupils, and fifteen secondary
technical schools with close on 600 students (this, of course,
does not include the very extensively developed schools system
attached to certain industrial works). Obviously this state of
affairs is quite inadequate to meet the educational requirements
of a population of some two million people, and it was plane-,d
to extend education considerably in the 1946/47 school year.
The Lubusz Land, which constitutes the western part of
historical area known as Wielkopolska (Great Poland) is n..,.,
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administratively part of the province of Poznan. It embraces an
area of some 4,287 square miles situated on the middle Oder,
the Lower Warta and the - otec rivers. Before the war this
province was inhabited by some 661,000 people employed mainly
in agriculture, though the soil is in general only average. A
considerable part of the area is covered with forest. The only
natural riches are brown coal and peat.
Industry was represented by several dozen medium and small-
sized works. They were mainly textile and clothing factories,
and a few metal works. The provisions industry was rather more
developed (it consisted mainly of small works) and so was the
timber industry, which however was reduced to half its size
by the wwar.
On arrival in this area the Polish authorities found it con-
siderably devastated, with the exception of the southern zone.
The towns, large and small, were devastated up to 40 per cent.,
though greater devastation was also found in certain cases.
Throughout the whole of the area only one small town, that of
Zemsz (Sommerfeld), which had 10,000 inhabitants before the
war, remained untouched. The villages situated along the main
east-west lines of communication were almost completely burned
down, while the remainder were almost completely stripped of
their livestock, agricultural machinery, food stocks and almost all
movable possessions. There was an average of less than five
horses and less than two cows to every 2,500 acres of arable
land.
()wing to the very large number of residential buildings
destroyed, it was calculated that the whole of the area could
have a maximum absorption capacity of some 370,000 people,
or about 54 per cent. of the pre-war position. On February 14,
1946, when the population census was taken, there were some
272,000 inhabitants, or over 73 per cent. of the total that could
be settled there. But the population had greatly increased by
the summer of 1946 because of the influx of Polish settlers, and
the very small possibilities of reduction through the departure
of Germans, who in February, 1946, constituted only some 6
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per cent. of the total population. However, with the reconstruc-
tion and repair of the less damaged houses, the possibilities of
settlement are continually increasing. It must he pointed out that
certain less devastated counties, especially in the east, were 100
per cent. populated already in the winter of 1945/46 (the first
was the county of Miedzyrzecz).
The German army was forced to retire from the Lubusz Land
relatively early (partly during the February of 1945), and the
spontaneous influx of Poles from the neighbouring area of Wiel-
kopolska started to come to the province deserted by former
inhabitants. This is the explanation of the fact that repatriated
Poles from beyond the Curzon Line constituted not more than
about half of the total Polish settlers.
As in other areas of the Polish Regained Provinces one tre-
mendous difficulty in restarting economic life was the very
serious devastation of the railways and highways, and the lack of
rolling stock and motor transport. This caused enormous diffi-
culties not only in regard to the transport of settlers, but in the
necessary supply of food for them from central Poland, the
supply of livestock and equipment to the rural areas, and
machinery and installations for the industrial works, which-
where they were not completely destroyed-consisted mainly
of empty buildings.
Despite these difficulties, by the autumn of 1945 three brown
coal mines, four textile works, several saw mills, a furniture
factory, two larger power stations, and three gasworks, were
completely in operation, not to mention the numerous com-
paratively small works of the provisions industry. Almost all
the crafts workshops which could be brought into operation
were already in service, manned in the majority of cases by
settlers from Wielkopolska.
Since then a number of other brown coal mines have been
restarted, and, as new shafts are being sunk, there are cases in
which, as in the mine at Zielona Cora (Grunberg), the output in
the summer of 1946 had reached 200 per cent. of the pre-war
production. It is expected that in the near future, thanks to
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this development, not only the Lubusz Land, but also a con-
siderable part of the rest of the Poznan province will be
rendered quite independent of supplies of coal from Silesia.
Already certain power stations are being run on brown coal.
One of the most important achievements for the State as a
whole, was the starting up of the Trans-Oder Works for bridge
and truck construction (formerly the firm of Beucheld) at
Zielona Gora. It is true the buildings of this works were taken
over almost untouched, but they had been completely stripped
of machinery and plant, so that it was necessary to put the whole
works on a new basis, with new equipment. As each shop was
completed it was brought into production, and the works as a
whole began production in June, 1946; in that month it turned
out 25 goods trucks. As it is being extended, in the course of a
year since its restarting one can reckon on its achieving an out-
put of 300 trucks monthly. At the same time it is engaged in the
construction of iron bridges.
Similar work, though not always so advanced, owing to the
varying degree of difficulties, is going on in all the industry
of the Lubusz Land. In March, 1946, the first exhibition of
Polish industry in the Lubusz Land was organized at Gorzow,
and people were surprised to find that the production possibilities
of the area were greater than had been expected. Gorzow is
becoming the capital of the whole province. It is the centre of its
cultural life, with its own permanent theatre, etc.
Apart from the devastation and lack of livestock and equip-
ment already mentioned, agricultural production was still further
impeded by the fact that the soil, which is naturally of poor
quality, had been rendered almost barren by the spoliatory
policy pursued by the Germans during the war. The soil re-
quired large quantities of fertilizers, which did not exist in 1945.
The areas in the neighbourhood of the Oder, which were com-
paratively the most fertile, were mined, and at first it was quite
impossible to set foot on them. A considerable part of the agri-
cultural settlers put into this area came from Podolia and Vol-
hynia (beyond the Curzon Line) and were accustomed to very
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fertile soil, and now are being taught how to cultivate poorer
soils at specially organized courses. But, in general, it can he
said that in 1946 the fields were cultivated wherever the villages
had been spared or were only partially destroyed so that the
settler had somewhere in which to live. But where the buildings
were destroyed and it has not yet been possible to rebuild them,
large tracts of land were lying fallow.
Education in the Luhusz Land, especially of the elementary
kind, was started on a considerable scale relatively early. On
April 1st, 1946, there were 394 elementary schools, with some
33.000 pupils, 21 general secondary schools, with over 2,500
pupils, and one secondary technical school.
With the exception of the county of Lebork (Lauenburg)
? which was incorporated into the province of Gdansk, all
Western Pomorze (embracing part of the former Regierungs-
hezirk of Grenzmark) as far as the Oder, and a small scrap of
land west of the Oder near Szczecin and the eastern cape of the
island of Uznam (Usedom) are part of the province of Szczecin,
covering an area of some 11,624 square miles.' Before the
war, this area was inhabited by not quite 1,780,000 people. The
average density of population of this part of the Regained Pro-
vinces, was some 139 inhabitants to the square mile (if the in-
habitants of the one large city in the area, Szczecin, are left out
of account, the figure was about 115 to the square mile), whereas
at that time the average for the whole province was about 153
to the square mile. The professionally active population was
divided as follows: some 50 per cent. in agriculture, some 23 per
cent. in industry and crafts, and some 14 per cent. in trade and
communications, the remainder being in other professions.
On their arrival in Western Pomorze the Polish authorities
found considerably less than half a million people there, a large
The county of Lebork, which has been incorporated with Gdansk
province, has an area of 497 square miles.
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proportion of them consisting of the Polish autochthonous
population, prisoners of war and Poles carried off to forced
labour. Later, as in other areas of the Polish Regained province,
there was a return wave of Germans into the area, but it
difficult to put this into figures.
The devastation over the whole area is estimated at 40 to 50
per cent. of the pre-war position. By comparison with the, pre-
war position, the devastation in the towns amounted to 64 per
cent., which in pre-war prices represented a value of some
?48,840,000. In the villages the total estimate of buildings
destroyed, is some 32 per cent., or a value of about ?3,200,000.
Taking into account the destruction of residential buildings the
maximum absorption capacity of Western Pomorze was then
estimated at some 900,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants. On February
14th, 1946, the population of the present Szczecin province
was over 895,000.1 The inhabitants were estimated at a similar
figure in June, 1946, with the difference that Polish settlers
had taken the place of the considerable number of Germans
evacuated (estimated at about 20 per cent. of the total local
population). Of the Poles by then settled in Western Pomorze
some 60 per cent. constitute repatriated persons from beyond
the Curzon Line. As this province is outstandingly agricultural in
character, to understand the present situation and settlement
possibilities we need to consider the "geography of rural devas-
tation." The only really fertile areas of Western Pomorze lie on
the West, extending in a southerly direction along the Oder.
It was here that the Germans built one of their last lines of
defence and here that the most desperate battles were waged.
As a result 40 per cent. of the area of the four counties of
Kamien (Cammin), Nowogrod (Neugard), Gryfin (Greifenhagen)
and Chojnice on the Oder (Konigsberg) which are of the
greatest agricultural value, was mined, when the Polish authori-
ties took them over. The rural buildings were destroyed to such
an extent that there could be no thought at all of agricultural
1 The population census was taken before the change in the administra-
tive division of the country.
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settlement before their reconstruction. Along the sea coast on
the north and along the southern boundary of Western Pomorze
stretch two parallel zones of greatly inferior soil. In both these
areas violent battles took place, but as the Germans had not
organized permanent defences there, the destruction was much
less. Not only whole farms, but entire villages were completely
unscathed, and so there was already a large number of settlers
there in the spring of 1946, all the undestroyed farms were
occupied, and the adjacent fields under cultivation. Between the
two zones we have mentioned, stretches a considerable area of
sandy soil, which is of little value to agriculture. It so happened
that there was little fighting here, and so very little destruction.
As a result, at the beginning of the summer of 1946, all th-
farms were already taken over by Polish settlers, and were being
managed. But it must be noted that in this very area there were
large Prussian junkers' estates, so that before the war the average
density of population of a number of the local counties fluctuated
from 82 to 93 inhabitants per square mile, even if the urban
populations and areas are included. Obviously rational agricul-
tural settlement, corresponding to the real absorption capacity
of the area, will be possible only after agrarian reform has been
carried through; as we have said, special co-operatives are
occupied in this task. The state of livestock and equipment was
just as catastrophic in Western Pomorze' as in the other parts
of the Polish Regained Provinces. A considerable improvement
has now taken place (though the position is still inadequate)
thanks not only to what the Polish settlers brought with them
but also to U.N.R.R.A. supplies and to supplies brought in
from Denmark and Sweden. It must be pointed out that already
?2,122,500 had been invested in the reconstruction of agricul-
ture in Western Pomorze down to September 1st, 1946.
Apart from Szczecin, which will be discussed separately later
the state of the various towns in regard to which the totat
extent of devastation has already been given, was as follows:
Out of U.N.R.R.A.'s supplies for 1946, 10,326 horses and 7
cattle were assigned to Western Pomorze.
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Out of the total of 25 towns of significance as economic centres,
five were destroyed not more than 10 per cent.,' nine were
devastated between 10 and 20 per cent.' Two were devastated
between 20 and 40 per cent.,' four were 40 to 60 per cent.
devastated,4 two were 60 to 80 per cent. devastated' and three'
over 90 per cent .6
We have already dealt with the nature of the industries in
this province. The state in which they were found by the Polish
authorities when they arrived is indicated by the fact that the
value of the industrial buildings destroyed is alone estimated
at 83 per cent, of their value in pre-war days (some ?7,840,000
according to pre-war prices). In the case of the buildings saved,
a large quantity of the machinery was carried off, or destroyed.
It has to be emphasized that the larger establishments were most
badly hit, and only 43 per cent. of these were in such a state
that it was possible to think of their reconstruction at all.
Among these, about one-third were already at work in April,
1946. Down to September 1st, 1946, some ?467,500 had been
invested in the industrial reconstruction of this province.
By way of example we shall describe the fate of certain larger
industrial works which played an important part in the economic
life of Western Pomorze before the war, dealing at the moment
with those situated outside the town of Szczecin. In the pro-
visions industry, the largest enterprises were the numerous sugar
refineries, which handled some million tons of sugar-beet each
year. They were all destroyed. Only one at Gumience (Gumenz),
near Szczecin, was in a condition to be restarted after thorough
repair and replacement of the missing machinery. As a result,
1 Bialogrod (Belgard), Drawsko (Dramsburg), Szczecinek (Neustettin),
Walcz (Deutsche Krone) and also Lebork (Lauenburg), incorporated
with Gdansk province.
2 Bytow (Butow), Derlowo (Rugenfelde) Koszalin (Koslin), Lawiczka
(Regenswalde), Leba (Leba), Miastko (Rummelsburg), Mysliborz
(Soldin), Postumino (Stolpmunde) and Slawno (Schlawe).
3 Gryfin (Greifenhagen), and Swinoujscie (Swinemunde).
4 Kamien (Cammin), Nowogrod (Neugard), Starogrod (Stargard) and
Wolyn (Wallin).
Chojnice on the Oder (Konigsberg) and Choszczno (Arnswalde).
6 Kistrzyn (Kustrin), Kolobrzeg (Kolberg), and Pyrzyce (Pyritz).
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the beetroot harvested in 1945 had to be transported to such
refineries in central Poland as had not been destroyed. In view
of the state of communications at that time, this involved enor-
mous difficulties. As two other refineries, at Zagorze (Greifen-
burg), and Kluczow (Klutzow), which have been rebuilt in the
meanwhile, were in operation in addition to the refinery at
Gumience for the 1946/7 sugar refining season, and as there has
been a considerable improvement in the state of communications,
this situation was much easier that season.
In the metal industry, the first works calling for mention is
the foundry at Stolczyn (Kratzwieck) near Szczecin which before
the war had a production capacity of 150,000 tons of pig iron
per annum. It was 30 per cent. destroyed. After taking it over
in the middle of March, 1946, the Polish authorities immediately
set to work to reconstruct it, and it will be in a position to restart
production soon. We must also mention the railway waggon
works at Chojnice on the Oder (the former firm Waggon-Fabrik
L. Steinfurt A.G.), which had a production capacity of 2,000
trucks per annum; it was so completely destroyed that it is not
capable of restoration.
In the building materials industry, four large cement works
played the most important part in the province's economic life.
With the exception of the one situated on the island of Wolyn
(Wollin) which for Pomorze conditions was little destroyed, they
were all in ruins. After this one had been brought into a state
rendering production possible, a second is now being rebuilt.
The situation in this branch of industry is difficult because
before the war it was provided with raw materials from the
island of Rugen, now cut off by the frontier.
Of the larger power stations, only one has really been spared,
that at Police (Politz) near Szczecin, with a 300 MW capacity,
which has worked normally from the moment it was taken over.
The other, smaller stations which it has been possible to start
up so far (August, 1946), have an aggregate capacity of over
28 MW.
In the textile industry the most important concern was the
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artificial silk works at Zydowin (Sidowsane), its buildings were
only 30 per cent. destroyed, but when it was taken over it was
completely without machinery. None the less it was decided to
start it up, and the work of reconstruction is under way,
machinery being brought from central Poland. Although it was
expected that normal work would begin only in the early spring
of 1947, the works already had orders not only for the home
market, but also from Sweden.
The synthetic petrol works at Police (Hydrierwerke Politz
AG), with a production capacity of 600,000 tons per annum, was
completely destroyed during air raids.
In Western Pomorze the timber industry consisted mainly of
small works, which were 40 per cent. destroyed during ,1_
operations. In June, 1946, 90 per cent. of the works lending
themselves to repair and renewal of production were already in
operation. On the other hand, the paper industry will to all in-
tents and purposes have to be rebuilt from the foundations.
Sea fisheries played quite an important part in the economic
life of Western Pomorze. As it is extremely important for
Poland that this sphere should be exploited-far more im-
portant for Poland than it was for Germany-considerable
activity was at once devoted to restarting the fishing centres.
The fishing ports on the coast were transferred to the Polish
authorities in general between the autumn of 1945 and the
spring of 1946. With the exception of Nowe Warpno (Neuwarp),
a little port in the Gulf of Szczecin, which was preserved, the
extent of destruction of the ports varied between 20 and 60
per cent. In the summer of 1946, not only was reconstruction
in progress in them all, but they were all functioning as fishing
centres. Very energetic steps were taken to reconstruct and repair
the yards engaged in the building of fishing boats all of which
are by now in operation.
Finally, we must mention that the railways, which were taken
over in the same state as those in other parts of the Regained
Provinces, have been put into a condition rendering it possible
to maintain communications all over the province. The repair
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of the permanent way and the necessary railway installations
alone absorbed a credit amounting to some ?917,500 (down to
September 1st, 1946). On March 1st, 1946, the area of the
then province of Szczecin' had operable rolling stock consisting
of 129 locomotives, 7,390 trucks and 430 carriages.' Since then,
thanks to intensive repairs and U.N.R.R.A. supplies there has
been a notable increase in the quantity of the rolling stock.
Apart from the private traders, of which there are many all
over Western Pomorze, especially in Szczecin, the distribution
of commodities is in the hands of co-operatives, as it is in the
remainder of Poland. On June 1st, 1946, there were over two
hundred co-operatives, with over 270 shops scattered all over
the province.
Owing to the fact that settlement operations in general met
with very great difficulties during the first phase, much greater
than, e.g., Opole Silesia, the state of education in Western
Pomorze during the school year 1945/46 was inadequate, and it
was to he extensively developed for the school year 1946/47. On
April 1st, 1946, the province of Szczecin as it was then con-
stituted had 427 elementary schools with over 31,000 pupils,
22 general secondary schools with some 2,200 pupils, and five
secondary technical schools with 400 students.
Now we must devote some attention to the capital of Western
Pomorze Szczecin. Szczecin is a seaport with a com-
paratively poorly developed industry. Its main hinterland was
Silesia and, at certain periods in its history when there were no
artificial barriers caused through customs frontiers- -Wielkopol-
ska. Though canals link the Oder with the Spree, Berlin, which
lies comparatively close, mainly used its communications with
Hamburg, and made only limited use of the port of Szczecin.
Before the war the town of Szczecin had 273,000 inhabitants.3
When the first Polish authorities arrived there, after searching,
' On May 29, 1946, the province had been increased by six counties
with an aggregate area of some 3,222 square miles.
= Statistical News, No. 8, 1946; pp. 1111112.
During the war, in October, 1939, the area of the town was enlarged
almost six-fold by the inclusion of adjacent communities, and the
population of "Great Szczecin" increased to 381,000.
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they tound only 0,000 people,' among the ruins of a town 42
per cent devastated. Because of the serious destruction of living
accommodation in the town it was not possible to accommodate
more than some 80,000 persons, while after thorough repair of
the houses which had not been completely destroyed the figure
could be increased to 140,000. In June, 1946, Szczecin had
some 80,000 inhabitants, but according to the figures for
October 1st, 1946, it had then about 110,000, of which 5.4 per
cent. were Germans. This last figure was made up of the families
of German workers who were temporarily employed by, the
Soviet authorities in that part of the port which had not been
transferred to the Polish authorities. The work of taking over the
port by the Poles began comparatively late (March 5th, 1946),
since it was still used by the Soviet authorities as a transhipment
port for the export of reparations from the Societ occupation
zone in Germany. The first ship arrived at the coastal zone, some
three miles in length, along the Lower Oder, originally assigned
to the Poles, on March 15th, 1946. In June, 1946, the Polish
authorities had 10 per cent. of the port at their disposition, and
by October 1st, 1946, 25 per cent.
Extensive investments will be required to bring the port to
a normal serviceable state, since the quays have been destroyed
from 10 to 20 per cent., the warehouses, etc., from 20 to 30
per cent., while the interior equipment of the warehouses and
loading installations have been destroyed to over 80 per cent.
A bureau for ports reconstruction, specially set up for this
type of work, is carrying out the restoration of the port installa-
tions as they are taken over.
According to plans already in operation the port of Szczecin
will be used for the export of coal (the first coal transport
carried down the Oder, now cleared of obstacles to navigation,
arrived in the port at the beginning of August, 1946), and the
import of iron ore destined for Silesia and possibly for Czecho-
slovakia. In addition it will be used for the transhipment of
1 Later there was a considerable influx of German people returning
from the west, as was the case everywhere in the Polish Regained
Provinces.
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cement and other building materials from Silesia. It is also
expected to service the Oder basin (and part of Wielkopolska)
with small commodities and in the export of provisions from
those areas.
Turning to the most important of the Szczecin industrial
works, we begin with the docks. The most important group,
comprising the former Stettiner Oderwerke and the Baltic
Werke, was stripped of all the most essential machinery and
installations by the Germans, and it will be necessary to bring
in and instal entirely new equipment. Here a dock is now being
built which will be the second largest in Poland. Before the
war Szczecin had another dock (the former Stettiner Vulkan)
which has its buildings almost undamaged, but the Germans
completely stripped it of all machinery and technical plant. In
addition there was a motor-car works (the firm of Stoewer
Werke AG), which was 30 per cent. destroyed, and the majority
of the machinery also. The buildings have already been restored.
Machine-tools have been brought from central Poland, and it
will be possible to fit up new machinery from parts of the
broken machinery. This works began to produce car trailers in
August, 1946, and at the end of the year a car repair workship
was also in operation.
The clothing industry was extensively developed in Szczecin,
and there were four large factories turning out medium quality
men's clothing. Out of the salvaged parts three factories have
been fitted up (the first began to operate in the winter of 1946,
and the others were started during the summer) and these are
at present specializing in workmen's clothing made from Lodz
materials. They give employment to some 750 workers.
The large shoe factory which existed before the war (the firm
of Wolff and Co AG), which employed 1,200 workers, was
completely destroyed and cannot be rebuilt.
Of the four paper mills operating in Szczecin and its im-
mediate neighbourhood, two were completely destroyed as the
result of military operations, and in the other two the buildings
were 60 to 70 per cent. undamaged, but on the other hand all
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the machinery was carried off. Among the more important
Polish successes must be reckoned the starting up of a factory
for yeast vitamin extract (the former firm of "Crepin") which
called not only for repair and partial reconstruction, but also
the discovery of methods of production previously unknown
in Poland.
In addition to its quickly developing economic life, Szczecin
is becoming an important centre of cultural and scientific life.
Two new higher educational institutions (the Academy for
Maritime Commerce and the Engineering Faculty) were in 1946
in course of organization, and a number of scientific institutions
had opened branches there. In the summer of 1946, the Lwow
theatre, famous in Poland took up permanent residence in the
town, with not only all the actors and actresses, but the scenery,
costumes, and all appurtenances.
Despite its eccentric situation on the very frontier, the com-
munications with the town, which have largely been restored,
will enable it to be transferred into an important centre both
economically and culturally; eighteen trains daily linked it in
1946 with the interior of the countn'.
The reconstruction of the town is going on according to the
plan which was available for examination at the International
Housing and City Planning Exhibition held at Hastings from
October 7th to 13th, 1946. 4.4 per cent. of the total credits
assigned for urban building in Poland down to the year 1949
has been allocated to Szczecin.
8. MAZURIA (FORMERLY EAST PRUSSIA)
About 65 per cent. of former East Prussia was handed over
to Poland by the Potsdam conference. This is equal to an area
of some 9,150 square miles. Before the war (1939), some
1,290,000 people inhabited the area, the density of population
being some 147 to the square mile. About 82 per cent. of this
territory is now administratively part of the province of Olsztyn.
Of the remainder, as was said above, the four western counties
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have been incorporated with the province of Gdansk, while the
three eastern have been incorporated with the province of
Bialystok. In the former East Prussia, as a whole, the pro-
fessionally active individuals were 55 per cent. engaged in agri-
culture, not quite 20 per cent. in industry and crafts, while some
12 per cent, were in trade and communications, the remainder
being in other professions. We have no exact data concerning
the nature of employment for that part of East Prussia which
fell to Poland, but one can safely state that in this part the
percentage of employment in agriculture was still higher than
in East Prussia as a whole, while the percentage in industry
and crafts was lower.
Although the country was of an outstandingly agricultural
character, yet by its very nature it is not destined for agricul-
ture. Really fertile soil is to be found almost exclusively only
in the west, in the valley of the Vistula, and along the Vistula
bay. The rest of the country consists almost entirely of light
sandy soil, or so-called clayey sands, which cover about 75
per cent. of the total area. But not only the soil is the agricul-
turist's enemy in this territory, but also the climate. One need
only state that the average period of vegetation lasts 188 days
in a year. Although the German government was never niggardly
with help for the local agriculture, putting very considerable
capital, more than elsewhere, into its modernisation and into
raising the fertility of the soil by every possible means, the
average harvests were much lower not only than the average
for Germany, but even the average for the Polish Regained
Provinces.' Moreover, the field crops were regarded in general
as of poor quality. Cattle-breeding yielded greater possibilities
than crop cultivation, but it had to depend to a large extent
on fodder brought in from outside, since the locally grown
fodder was insufficient.
i The average harvest per acre in the province of Olsztyn was lower
than the average for the Polish Regained Provinces by 2 per cent. in
the case of rye, nearly 12 per cent. in the case of wheat, nearly 11
per cent. in the case of barley, 9 per cent. in the case of oats, over 16
per cent. for sugar beet, 13 per cent. for potatoes. Plans for the
afforestation of the poorest soils are now under consideration.
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Mazuria was taken over by the Polish authorities in perhaps
a worse state than any other of the areas we have so far
described. Undoubtedly this was partly due to the fact that in
this area fighting went on for a very long time. Such towns as
Malborg (Marienburg) were defended by the Germans right
up to the capitulation of Germany, while for some weeks after
smaller and larger German forces commanded by officers made
it difficult for the area to return to normal life, by attacking,
burning and destroying towns and villages. The railway network
was very badly damaged, considerable lengths of roads and areas
of field were mined, and all this made it difficult to reach cer-
tain districts at first. A large part of the fertile county of Elblag
(Elbing), which is situated in a land depression (some 13- feet
below the surface of the sea) was flooded by the Germans, and
the pumping stations rendered useless.
In the towns 50 per cent. of the buildings were destroyed com-
pletely, in the villages 20 per cent. The position in regard
to livestock did not come up even to the level of the provinces
already described. In the case of horses, so indispensable to
field work, there were barely 3 per cent. of the pre-war total,
while pigs amounted only to the minute fraction of 1 per cent.
As a result of this, settlement, especially at first, was proceeded
with more slowly than elsewhere, and as, owing to the energetic
compulsory evacuation before the approaching front which the
German authorities had carried out, only very few people were
left behind' and they almost entirely old people, women and
children. That is why in the spring of 1946 large areas were
lying fallow. During the first phase, a strong movement was
to be observed in the southern counties, as a great wave of agri-
culturists from the neighbouring over-populated areas of central
Poland shifted into them. But the planned settlement of the
areas situated more in the interior of the province began only
later, and went on mainly parallel with the restoration of com-
munications. To this area Poles from the Vilno district were pri-
1 The Polish authorities found some 30 per cent. of the pre-war popu-
lation, one-third of these being autochthonous Poles.
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marily directed, as they are accustomed to quite similar, though
in general better climatic and soil conditions. A large number
of former inhabitants of the destroyed city of Warsaw have
settled in the towns, especially in Olsztyn. By June, 1946, over
78 per cent. of the farms smaller than 250 acres were taken
over by settlers and were most of them under cultivation. The
larger estates, managed by administrators on behalf of the
State, were most of them transferred to the co-operatives of the
type already mentioned, for settlement and parcellation. Although
there has been a considerable improvement in the number of
livestock, it was still very inadequate; horses amounted to 8
per cent. of the pre-war number; cattle to 3 per cent., pigs to 1
per cent. and sheep to 5 per cent.
Apart from agriculture, which was the basis of the local
economy, the area has large potentialities in fresh water fisheries.
It includes 1,060 lakes with an aggregate area of close on
233,600 acres. To be objective it must be said that this type
of activity was unnecessary to German economy and so the lakes
were not intensively exploited, being confined to satisfying the
comparatively small local requirements. So the lakes were not
stocked with fish, nor was attention paid to quality, with the
result that some 50 per cent. of the catches consisted of low
quality fish.' When the Polish authorities took over the area,
apart from a serious exhaustion of the stock, 41 per cent. of the
surface of the lakes generally was not suitable for fishing as
large numbers of barriers and obstacles against aeroplane land-
ings were sunk in them. Owing to the systematic cleaning of the
lakes, in August, 1946, it was possible to exploit 83.5 per cent.
of the total surface. In addition steps were taken to restock the
lakes. Apart from the large fish-rearing establishment at
Szwaderki, it is planned to bring three others into operation.
The fish manufactury works have not only been rebuilt, but
extended. The shipbuilding yard engaged in building fishing
boats at Gizyce (Lotzen) is already in operation, and a further
yard is on the point of being put into service at Frombork
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(Frauenburg). In the first season the fishing of the Mazurian
lakes resulted in a total catch of not more than 350 tons, but
in the 1946/47 season it was reckoned, on the basis of results so
far, that the catch would be at least 2,000 tons.
The only natural riches in the area consist of a certain
quantity of peat; after the repair of machinery, exploitation of
the peat bogs was begun in the summer of 1946. The timber
wealth of the country is only a myth.
When one talks of the industry of this particular area, one
thinks really of only one important enterprise, namely the
large dock and shipbuilding yard at Elblag (F. Schichau
GmBH), which gave employment to some 5,000 workers. In
addition to ships, turbines and pumps were also manufactured
there. Of this establishment all that is left is a reminiscence of
the past in the form of the remains of its ruined buildings. In
addition there was also a large factory of gumboots in Malbork
(Standard Marienburg Gummiwerke AG), now completely
destroyed, which before the war employed some 500 workers. All
other industry was on a small scale, often bordering on larger
crafts workshops. For instance, there were a certain number of
small factories turning out agricultural machinery and imple-
ments, building and cabinet-making fixtures, and numerous
repair workshops. Less than 22 per cent. of these establish-
ments were taken over in a condition justifying consideration of
their restoration and operation, and only 10 per cent. of the
machine-tools in the area before the war were found on the
Polish authorities arrival; and all of these were of old-fashioned
types and required capital repair. All the basic more expensive
machinery was_ missing, and there was a complete lack of
any tools and instruments. The small-scale provisions indus-
try, which was extensively developed, played a greater role in
the area's economic life. But here, too, the destruction was pretty
considerable. The dairies that were suitable for repair and
operation had a manufacturing capacity equal to some 37.5 per
cent. of the pre-war figure. The fact that, owing to the lack of
cattle, they could not be exploited at once in any case, is another
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question. Quantitatively the flour-mills saved, or capable of
being operated after repair, amounted to 63 per cent. of the
pre-war figure, but as they were only the smaller mills, their
milling capacity was only some 45 per cent. of the pre-war
total capacity for the area. Forty-four per cent. of the distilleries
were saved, and were suitable for repair or for reconstruction;
and so on.
In addition the timber industry played a certain part in the
economic life, but when taken over, 60 per cent. of the works
were destroyed. But as the forests had been greatly over-
exploited, and considerable areas burnt down, at first, steps
were only taken to secure the majority of the undamaged saw-
mills from destruction, and only six were at work in the spring
of 1946. The question of electrification of the province was at
first quite, a difficult problem. For the former East Prussia
constituted an independent centre supplied with power primarily
by five larger power stations, of which only the one at Elblag
was situated within the new Polish frontiers, and that one was
badly damaged. The destruction of the Elblag power station made
it also impossible to set to work to pump away the water from
the depression of the Elblag (one-third of the county) and the
Malborg county. In June, 1946, the Elblag power station (15
MW) had been working for some months, and fourteen
pumping stations had been repaired and put into operation, so
that the work of draining the area was already in progress.
A number of small power stations scattered all over the province
have been put into operation, in many cases equipping one
station with the remnants of several others (for instance, in
Biskupiec-Bischofsburg). The crafts workshops that could be
put into operation in the towns are already working (in April,
1946, over 900 workshops were already functioning). Here it
must be pointed out that in certain of the larger towns especially
there is definite over-population. For instance, the situation in
the capital of the province, Olsztyn, is characteristic; though
some 40 per cent. of the town was destroyed, on June 1st, 1946,
the population was 70 per cent. of the 1939 figure, and toward:;
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the end of that month it had risen to 80 per cent. This town is
the more attractive to settlers because, like other capitals of
various provinces, it is not only an administrative, but also a
cultural centre. For instance the Vilno theatre, which has a fine
tradition behind it, has settled in the town, and there is a music
school of high standard, etc.
When speaking of the towns of former East Prussia it has
to be remembered that before the war the German authorities
in this province aimed at a far-reaching urbanization, since for
political reasons they were concerned with the formation of as
many administrative and military centres as possible. In this
connection every settlement where the population exceeded two
thousand became a "town." Obviously we shall not depict the
state of all these "towns." Among the most important, one must
mention Elblag, which in 1939 had about 86,000 inhabitants.
The first group of Poles who arrived there, wandering through
the deserted town found it very badly damaged, and in fact
only the suburbs (15 per cent. destroyed), and part of the
modern centre (30 per cent. destroyed) were saved, while the
old part of the town, where a large part of the economic life
was concentrated, was destroyed up to 95 per cent. Down to
June, 1946, 2,000 houses had been rebuilt and repaired, and
90 per cent. of the water-mains and sewers that had been
badly damaged, were in operation. The restoration of the power
station already mentioned made it possible to put the tramways
into working order, after the lines had been repaired; two small
shipyards were completed (together they employ 770 workers),
a railway truck works, so necessary at the present time (170
workers), was started, and so on. In June, 1946, the town had
a population of 33,000, of which one-third were Germans. It has
to be stated that the evacuation of the German population from
this province has proceeded at a slower rate than in the pre-
viously discussed areas (in June, 1946, they still amounted to
about 25 per cent. of the total population), owing to the above-
mentioned extremely serious destruction of communications,
which can only be restored with great difficulty. Down to
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September, 1946, eight railway lines and 62 station buildings,
had been restored, over 186 miles of permanent way had been
built anew, over 620 miles of track had been brought into service,
and 35 per cent. of the railway electro-technical and telephonic
equipment had been repaired. Obviously the work is not yet
completed. Simultaneously work is going ahead on the intensive
repair of rolling stock. On March 1st, 1946, there were 55 loco-
motives working in the area, in September there were 120; a
similar development is to be observed in regard to trucks, of
which there were over 6,800 in March, and there were some 250
carriages.' As communications were progressively restored, the
Polish settlement of the area could begin to make progress.
At the time of the population census, on February 1, 1946,
there were some 470,000 inhabitants in the Polish part of former
East Prussia, this figure corresponding to some 66 per cent. of
the area's absorption capacity after the destruction of living
accommodation has been taken into account. Between that date
and June 1st, 1946, despite the efflux of Germans, the popula-
tion rose by some 10 per cent., owing to the systematic arrival
of Poles in large numbers from beyond the Curzon Line, and
especially from the Vilno district. When considering the actual
absorption capacity of the area one has to remember two factors.
First, there is the comparatively large number of great agricul-
tural estates (some 1,300 of over 250 acres), very many of which
will be broken up and parcelled out, and then there is the fact
that investigations are being made and various plans are being
very seriously considered for making the best use of the poorest
land in the province.
As in Western Pomorze, the educational system was only in
its initial phase during the 1945/46 school year. On April 1st,
1946, there were, in the Olsztyn province (which, as we have
said, accounts for about 82 per cent. of the total area) 367
elementary schools with about 27,000 pupils, 1l general
secondary schools with over 1,200 pupils, and five secondary
technical schools with 240 students. It has to be pointed out that
1 Statistical News, No. 8, 1946; pp. 111/112.
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at Ketrzyn (Rastenburg) a "Mazurian Lycee" was being set up
on the model of the former Krzemieniec Lycee, and it will con-
tinue the traditions of that ancient and greatly honoured Polish
educational institution.
In the foregoing pages we have presented what Poles think
of the territories placed under Polish administration at Potsdam,
and also a summary of what they are doing there. The Potsdam
decision was preceded by numerous promises, and also declara-
tions on the part of Allied statesmen. By way of example we
need only mention the speech made in the House of Commons
on December 15th, 1944, by Mr. Churchill, then British Prime
Minister, who officially stated that the Poles "are free so far as
Russia and Great Britain are concerned, to extend their terri-
tories at the expense of Germany to the West."' Several weeks
after this statement a declaration was jointly signed at Yalta
in the Crimea by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mar-
shal Stalin, in which these three statesmen stated in the names
of the nations they represented, "that Poland must receive sub-
stantial accessions of territory in the north and west."2 Finally,
there was the Potsdam decision which we have already discussed,
which in addition to the economic, demographic and political
aspects already presented had undoubtedly one other aspect of
considerable significance, namely the psychological one.
The four-fold diminution of the Polish-German frontier to a
length of some 250 miles gives the Polish people a generally
appreciated increased feeling of security in regard to the Ger-
mans. It is difficult to explain this feeling. It can be fully under-
stood only by a nation which, having an open and completely
undefended frontier with a much stronger, better armed neigh-
bour, has for all its 1,000 years of history been subject to con-
tinual attacks, ending sometimes with a temporary partial, or
complete loss of independence. These attacks were all through
] Hansard, Vol. 406, December 15, 1944.
2 Crimea Communique, February 11, 1945, chapter 6, section 7.
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those 1,000 years right down to the last war, accompanied by
the murder of the Polish civilian population, pillage, and devas-
tation carried out on a great scale, and in the age-old popular
tradition were associated with the conception of gigantic bandit
invasions, and not wars of chivalrous knights. The carrying off
of Poles to forced labour, which during the years 1939/45
was organized "scientifically" on an enormous scale, or the carry-
ing off of little boys in a time of formal peace, to be put into
special "schools," where they were Germanized and trained as
Prussian soldiers (as happened in the times of Frederick II in
the 18th century), for Poles these are not only facts of history:
they still live in the popular tradition, and right down to the,
outbreak of the last war they were passed on with dread from
generation to generation. That is precisely why such a consider-
able reduction of the' Polish-German frontier is undoubtedly
leading to a feeling of greater certainty of the morrow in Poland,
of that morrow for which it is worth working, since it is not
threatened at any moment by an invasion which will destroy
all that has been achieved.
For Poles, access to the sea along a coast of over 300 miles
will have at least as far-reaching psychological importance as
the diminution of the Polish-German frontier. Even after the
passing of only a few months the first manifestations of this
feeling were to be observed in Poland, especially among the
youth, in their bearing and in the interest they were displaying.
One sentence justly printed in The Economist applies to
the Poles to an enormous extent. Writing about the Slavs, The
Economist' said: "That they have suffered from insufficient
access to the sea, from dependence on overland communications
and from the inconvenience of river routes." And that is pre-
cisely why they "belong to the hinterland of Europe, they are
an inland people, and for this reason have had little. share in
the main movement of European history which has been closely
related to sea traffic and communications . . ." Poles have long
realised this. One need only refer to the fact that this theme
' 1 The Economist, September 28, 1946; p. 486.
103
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was taken up in Polish literature as early as the 16th century.
This explains why such great importance is attached in Poland
not only to Silesia and the Oder, the waterway leading from
Silesia to Szczecin, but also to Western Pomorze, to the entire
sea coast.
So it is not to be wondered at that all suggestions of reserva-
tions as to the new Polish western frontier cause such great
exasperation in Poland. There has been talk of making recogni-
tion of the frontier dependent on the question of elections.,
That attitude to the question was quite unintelligible to the
Poles. Even ignoring the previous solemn declarations, promises,
statements, the man in the Polish street cannot for the life of
him see how these two matters are connected. For in Potsdam
the Provisional Polish Government made in fact a unilateral
declaration in the matter of holding elections, which was taken
into cognisance, but there is no suggestion in the Potsdam
declaration of any connection of the question of elections with
the problem of the frontier. On the contrary. In chapter nine of
that declaration both these questions (concerning the Polish
Government and concerning the frontier) are clearly treated
separately, two quite distinct sections (a and b) are devoted to
them. And furthermore, the section concerning the Government
laid down the "attitude" of the members of the conference to it,
whereas in section (b) it states that the question of the frontier
has become a matter of "accord" and it is clearly stated that the
administration of the "jlomney" German areas is transferred to
the Polish State (there is no mention of the Government). And
so it is clearly stated that the connection of these areas with the
German State has been broken, and the Polish State administers
them in its own name and not in the character of an occupying
power. The final delimitation of the frontier at the Peace Con-
ference, as foreseen at Potsdam, also would appear to leave no
suggestion of doubt. One of the pronouncements of the Hague
Tribunal states that the function of delimitation is restricted
Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons, October 22nd, 1946; Hansard,
Vol. 427.
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to small frontier changes, and not to essential shifts in the
frontier line.' And so the conviction reigns in Poland that the
Potsdam decisions concerning the Polish-German frontier are
clear, definite, and contain nothing equivocal. For in Potsdam
it was decided that the entire German population still remaining
to the East of the Oder and the Western Neisse was to be evicted.
By December 7th, 1945, the State Department in Washington
published a plan for evacuation of the Germans inter alia from
the Polish Regained Provinces.' Finally, on February 18th, 1946,
an agreement was concluded in Berlin between Great Britain
and Poland, concerning the settlement in the British Zone of
Occupation of all those Germans from the Polish Regained
Provinces, who are not deported to the Soviet Zone.3 In other
words, if any probability previously existed, despite the promises
and obligations, of the Anglo-Saxon Powers questioning Poland's
new western frontier, it has been formally cancelled by these
three acts.
Moreover, it must be pointed out that such reservations do
not seem desirable, either from the point of view of reassuring
the people of Poland, or from that of achieving tranquillity in
Europe generally. Ignoring all political considerations, they lead
to the destruction of faith in the existence of morality, the
existence of justice.
And the recognition of Poland's right to the Regained Pro-
vinces is understood by many precisely as a kind of act of
historical justice. For it must not be forgotten that the Germans
deprived Poland of her independence after it had been recovered
for barely twenty years, and furthermore crushed the Polish
1 The Hague Tribunal expressed its opinion on the subject, in connec-
tion with a dispute concerning the powers of one of the delimitation
commissions, in the following words, namely, that delimitation relates
only to "Such modifications, which had to be justified by the interests
of individuals or of communities in the neighbourhood of the frontier
line and to have regard to special local circumstances, were bound to
preserve the character of 'modifications' and could not involve a
complete or almost complete abandonment of the line fixed . . . .
Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series
E, No. 1, pp. 218/219.
2 Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VI, p. 7644C.
3 Ibid., p. 7738A.
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nation with a fury perhaps not to be found in their attitude to
any other country. All those Poles who have come through the
ordeal have behind them 51 years of, at the best, systematic
undernourishment, of having to hide themselves, of living under
the continual threat of death, torture, or being sent off to forced
labour or the concentration camp. Millions of children who
throughout those 5 years were undernourished (in many case;.
this meant undernourishment from birth) were robbed of their
childhood, saw death continually around them and scenes which
were so monstrous that they are not to be committed to paper.
To this must be added the material destruction. The destruc-
tion of the achievements of many generations, which, in the
difficult conditions of a State deprived of independence were
much more difficult to achieve than in countries where there were
.normal conditions of economic development. Accepting estimates
so far made as our basis, we can already state, as we have said,
that about a third of the pre-war Polish national capital no longer
exists, partly as the result of military operations, but to a much
greater extent as the result of the systematic destruction carried
out by the German authorities on a scale unknown in Western
Europe. The secretariat of the Sub-commission set up by the
Economic and Social Council for investigation of the question
of reconstruction of war-devastated areas estimated the damage
in Polish agriculture and industry alone at a sum of about
?1,069,200,000. In a memorial presented by the Polish Govern-
ment to this same Sub-commission, giving an estimate of the
value of effective destruction (not taking into account the lack
of maintenance of equipment and so on), adding to agriculture
and industry the loss of municipal buildings and bank values
also, a sum equal to about ?1,609,720,000 is given. And this does
not include the cost of the enormous destruction in transport,
communications, trade, crafts, forestry not to mention hospital
services, or cultural values, scientific centres, etc., which are
difficult to estimate.
For all these crimes and wrongs the Germans have been com-
pelled to give back to Poland territories which once formed
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part of the Polish state, trom which that State was expelled
in the course of centuries as the result of German expansion.
These areas had a social income which was almost equal to
the sums expended by the Germans in preparation for the last
war.' And this in material respects constitutes a partial recom-
pense for the damage suffered by the Polish people as the result
of the German devastations.`
Here it must be pointed out that from the economic aspect
the Germans are suffering a comparatively small sacrifice. They
have lost an area in which the national income was only half
the average for the German Reich as a whole. Obviously these
areas were of great strategic and political significance to Ger-
many, as a sally-port for attacks eastward. The natural riches of
Silesia were a tremendous help during the war in the decentral-
ization of the armaments industry, which in consequence was not
exclusively dependent on the resources of the Ruhr. None the
less, as we have said, these areas were not of great economic
significance. The Germans did not even regard it as worth while
exploiting their potential economic possibilities to the full.
And so one can say with confidence that, while being forced
to make at least a partial act of justice towards the State which
' Burkheiser: Finanzierung des totalen Krieges, states that the German
expenditure on armaments in the years 1927-1939, amounted to 94
milliard Reichmarks, which constituted some 11.3 per cent. of the
national income during this period. The German statistics give the
national income of the various provinces, from 1926 onward, only
for the years specified below. In calculating the income of the areas
lying east of the present frontier, in the case of provinces part of
which have remained in Germany, the percentage of territory now
under Polish administration has been taken on basis. The income of
? that part of former East Prussia which has been incorporated with
the U.S.S.R. is not taken into account. The national income of the
Polish Regained Provinces, which constituted 22.2 per cent. of the
pre-war area of Germany, was as follows, by comparison with the
entire German national income: 1926: 10.5 per cent.; 1928: 10.5 per
cent.; 1932, 11.0 per cent.; 1934, 10.8 per cent.; 1936, 9.9 per cent.
Vide Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1928, p. 743; ibid, 1937, p. 533; ibid,
1939/40: p. 578.
2 As we have said, the value of these areas was estimated to be some
?2,250,000,000. At that time the war damage in the areas was not taken
into account, and this, judging by estimates made so far, reduces the
pre-war value of the area by 50 per cent., reducing the value in
monetary terms to ?1,125,000,000 at most.
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they have wronged most of all, the Germans are doing it at
small cost. For them the most painful aspect of it all is that
the German population of the former eastern provinces, who
fled from them before the approaching front, will never return
there, while those who remained are being evicted. In other
words, in accordance with the just decision of Potsdam the
same principle of conduct is being applied to the Germans as
they for many years applied to others. However, the method by
which it is being carried out is different.' Ignoring the demo-
graphic aspect of this problem, which has already been dealt
with, i.e., the necessity of finding a place of settlement for the
people repatriated from beyond the Curzon Line, one other
very important consideration has to be taken into' account.
Namely, there is the question of peace in Europe. Painful ex-
perience has taught us that every national minority, but above all
any German minority, is in the present phase of development of
humanity not only the cause of serious internal difficulties
for the State within whose borders it resides, but also is a
constant source of international disputes and misunderstandings.
The existence of a national minority as a factor tending to pro-
voke international conflict greatly facilitates the inflammation
of passions, and provides a convenient pretext for provoking
the fires of war. And so it has to be stated that all those who for
humanitarian reasons regret the Potsdam decision to evacuate
the German minority from these areas are not taking into
account the fact that it is the lesser evil, which will avert the
greater. That it is the cause of a minor amount of suffering which
will avert a major amount of suffering, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, in the future. They do not take into account
the circumstance that this operation, so painful for many, will
I Impartial observers testify that no manifestations of brutality are
to be discerned in connection with the evacuation of the Germans,
such as was a characteristic feature of the method systematically
adopted by the Germans in deporting Poles. In his book : Russia's
Neighbour-the New Poland (London, 1946), Bernard Newman writes
in a very interesting way about this question; the writer specially in-
vestigated this problem in September, 1945, during personal studies
in the Polish Regained Provinces.
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reduce the tension which is hindering the work of raising the
general standards of existence on the Continent, which, in the
conformation of the conditions of the age in which we are
living will have a positive reaction in all the rest of the world.
It must not be forgotten to-day, that, as experience
demonstrates, the Germans question every frontier on the East.
For twenty years between the First and Second World Wars the
then existing Polish frontier was described by them in political
slogans as the Brennende Grenze (the burning frontier), and
even in the days of the Weimar Republic was declared in Ger-
man propaganda to be "unbearable." And that is quite under-
standable: German, and above all Prussian expansion has for
centuries been directed eastward, seeking in the territories
brought under subjugation in that direction a basis of support
rendering possible German hegemony first in Europe, and then
in the world. And so, so long as it is not made absolutely and
convincingly clear that the era of German conquests in the East
has come to an end, that it is the inflexible will of the Powers
that Germany should not only renounce territorial expansion,
but should return these areas to Poland, from whom she took
them in the days of the "Drang each Osten," there can be no
talk of stabilization of European conditions, there can be no
talk of lasting peace. For, as experience also demonstrates, in
these days it is impossible to localise war on Germany's eastern
frontiers. Any fires of war kindled in that direction will inevitably
spread not only all over the Continent, but to the British Isles,
and will reach North America.
11)9
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