THE PROBLEMS OF FINDING A STABLE POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE FOR HITHERTO YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000400240003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MISC

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The Problems of Finding a Stable Political-Territorial
Structure for Hitherto Yugoslavia
Peter JORDAN
A u strian Institute of East and Southeast European Studies
A-1010 Wien, josersplatz 6, Austria
Fax [phone]
One might share the opinion of Burkhard WEHNER1 that the universal state in the
traditional sense, in the sense of a definite territory governed by an authority responsible
practically for all fields of governance, is overcharged and should be replaced by several
branch states of varying, overlapping territories and shared responsibilities - one
responsible for administration, one functioning as an economic and currency community,
one as a security community, one as a solidarity community, one as a community defined
by common traditions, culture and education a.s.o. When he presents these ideas in
WEHNER's mind are the European Community and an alternative to its aimed-at
Maastricht system. And it might not be utopian to have these ideas realized within a
region of developed democratic structures.
But I do not see opportunities to realize them in East-Central, Eastern and Southeastern
Europe in general and definitely not in ex-Yugoslavia, where right at the moment classic-
type nation-states are emerging very much resembling the type of universal nation-states
aimed-at in the late 19th century. In some cases - as with the Serbs in Bosnia - nation-
building is even based on the conception of ethnically "clean" territories.
The question arises, whether such an attitude creates a stable political-territorial order. Is
the ethnic aspect the only one which has to be taken into account? Or are there other
essentials too?
Well, ethnic distribution is a criterion not to be neglected, especially in Central and
Southeastern Europe. And confronted with all the cruelties reported from this dirty war in
Bosnia one hardly can imagine that peoples fighting each other in such a way will ever be
able to live together peacefully. But on the other hand it is true as much that in spite of all
ethnical cleansing this region will never cease to be an ethnic mixture and that in many
1 WEHNER, B.: Nationalstaat, Solidarstaat, Effizienzstaat. Darmstadt 1992.
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cases ethnic boundaries do not meet economic and functional regions.
Therefore I should like to draw your attention to some additional criteria, which might be
called "geographical":
- the physio-geographical structure of the region, its geopolitical position and
meaning,
- the main traffic lines and flows, the pattern of economic interaction,
- the pattern of functional regions.
Discussing these criteria on the background of official boundaries and current proposals
of new boundaries I should like to focus on Croatia and Bosnia, because time is limited
and because these are the regions in question today.
But first of all we should nevertheless have a glance at the ethnic map of former
Yugoslavia. It is the starting point of all quarrels and of all proposals for new political
delimitations.
1 Ethnic structure
Map 1 representing relative and absolute ethnic majorities according to communes is
based on the offical population census of 31 March 1991, published by the Federal
Statistical Office in Belgrade. Although the Albanians refused to take part in this census it
may be regarded as fairly reliable.
The map clearly indicates that only Slovenia is an ethnically homogeneous country. Of the
other countries now independent only parts are ethnically "clean": in Croatia the
Northwest and central and southern Dalmatia; in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
large parts of Serbia proper and the west-central part of Montenegro; of Macedonia the
southeastern half.
All of Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as the former autonomous province of Voivodina
and the belt of the former Military Frontier in Croatia are extremely intermixed.
Compared with that map none of the proposals for a new political subdivision will create
ethnically homogenous territories: not the Vance-Owen plan subdividing Bosnia and
Hercegovina into 10 autonomous provinces (overhead); not the claims of Serbian
autonomists in Croatia (overhead); and of course not the line of separation between
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Croats and Serbs drawn by Branko COLAKOVIC last year in San Diego2 -which is not
so untypical for Serbian claims in general, but moderate in comparison to "Greater
Serbia" claims expressed in 1991 (overhead)
It has to be taken into account, of course, that after this population census of 1991
certainly more than 100,000 people have died in the war and that by now about 3 millions
of the Bosnian population (about 70 %) have been forced to leave their homes and to
settle elsewhere at least temporarily. But irrespective of moral aspects it is sure that only a
small share of them can permanently stay where they are now (Only the "safe part" of
Croatia hosts about 650,000 refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from those parts
of Croatia which are now under the control of the UN).
The aspect of local ethnic minorities is stressed by the following 3 maps (Maps 2,3,4)
representing the distribution of Serbs, Croats and Muslims by absolute figures. They
indicate that any effort of creating political units according to absolute and relative ethnic
majorities will result in excluding a large share of the respective ethnic group from its
own ethnic territory.
In Croatia, e.2., only 173,000 of the 581,000 Serbs (=30 %) are inhabiting communes
with a Serbian majority (Map 2). 50,000 Serbs are living in Zagreb, 22,000 in Rijeka -
cities far from the Serbian territories of Croatia. Even the extreme variant of Serbian
autonomy claims in Croatia does not include more than 331,000 Serbs (=57 %), but at
the same time 622,000 Croats, i.e. about two times the number of Serbs.
The Serbs in Bosnia and Hercegovina are somewhat more concentrated. Nevertheless,
681,000 (.50 %) of them are living outside Serbian majority communes, even 53 %
would live outside the provinces defined as Serbian by the Vance-Owen plan.
449,000 of the 752,000 Croats (= 60%) in Bosnia and Hercegovina are living outside
Croatian majority communes (Map 3). According to the Vance-Owen plan still 298,000
Croats (=40 %) would remain outside "Croatian" provinces, although the plan favours
the Croats.
The Bosnian Muslims are quite concentrated on communes where they have a majority,
i.e. 1.564 of the 1.905 million (=82%) are living in Muslim majority communes, only 18
% outside (Map 4). The Vance-Owen plan in its recent version excludes 892 000 (= 47
%) from "Muslim" provinces.
2 COLACOVIC, B.: Drawing the Serbo-Croatian Boundary in Yugoslavia. Paper, presented to the 1992
AAG meeting ind San Diego.
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2 The geopolitical position in general
Hitherto Yugoslavia has a mountainous axis of several chains extending in northwestern-
southeastern direction (Map 5). To the Northeast the mountains pass into the lowlands of
the Pannonian Basin. In the Southwest they fall in steep slopes to the Adriatic coast. The
narrowest section and the most convenient passage of the mountain axis is the Gorski
kotar between Karlovac and Rijeka. A still favourable passage runs along the valley of the
Una river to the town of Knin in Central Dalmatia. To the Southeast a passage becomes
more and more difficult, not so much because of the altitude of the mountains, but
because of several parallel steep chains, deeply engraved valleys and a lot of gorges.
The mountainous core, especially its central section, besides being a strong traffic
barrier between the Pannonian Basin and the Adriatic Coast, since ever functioned as a
region of retreat and as a fortress either in the defensive or the offensive sense:
Thus, up to the early 16th century it enjoyed relative independence from external centres
(Byzantium, Hungary, Venice, Vienna) and, e.g., offered a retreat to the religious
community of the Bogomiles. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Turks during their
offensive period used it as a military base for war raids to the Adriatic coast, into the
Pannonian lowlands and to the Eastern Alps threatening and impoverishing the nearer
vicinity up to depopulation and devastation. After having been beaten and driven out of
the Pannonian Basin the Turks, despite of their political and economic weakness,
succeeded in maintaining large parts of the mountain core as their remotest outpost in
Europe up to 1878 and 1912 respectively. And finally, it was Bosnia, where TITO
resisted the German and Italian occupation in World War II.
On the other hand the mountain core needs co-operation and economic interaction
with the adjacent lowlands and with the coast in order to prosper economically. Not fertile
and rich by nature it will remain a poor and backward region if such co-operation does
not exist. From the earliest times transhumant herdsmen shifted between summer pastures
in the mountains and winter pastures in the Pannonian lowlands or in the Dalmatian
hinterland. Merchants from Dalmatia, especially from Dubrovnik, were so essential for
the supply of the mountains throughout medieval and modem times that their activities did
not cease even under Turkish occupation. The Dalmatian coast is Bosnia's natural outlet
to the sea.
When in the early 16th century Turkish forces had occupied most of present Bosnia and
Hercegovina and the region was to remain under Turkish rule for almost 4 centuries the
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antagonism between the Ottoman Empire and the powers in Central Europe emphasized
Bosnia's peripheral role. The same happened to the adjacent belt on the Croatian and
Dalmatian side of the Bosnian border, by Austrian and Venetian authorities mainly settled
with Serbs to form the Austrian and Venetian Military Frontier. This backwardness has
been reduced, but not really overcome by the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina in 1878, by the final dissolution of the Military Frontier in 1882 and by the
incorporation of the whole region into Yugoslavia after World War I. And it is still
present today. Two indicators may demonstrate this: Map 6 shows the low per capita
national income in 1981, map 7 a lack of urban centres especially in western Bosnia and
in the area of the former Military Frontier.
It may be concluded that a prosperous development of the whole region will be possible
only under the conditions of peaceful co-operation between the mountain axis and its
forelands and that prosperity certainly will not be achieved as long as the mountains on
the one hand and the Pannonian lowlands and the coast on the other are occupied by
antagonistic powers.
3 Main traffic flows and economic relations (Map 8)
Among the cross-mountain passages the route from the central Sava valley along river
Kupa and across Gorski kotar to the Kvarner Bay is the most important. In the 18th and
19th centuries it was the main export route for grain from the southeastern lowlands of
the Pannonian Basin. The grain was shipped by a combined system of river and road
transport to the seaports of the Kvarner Bay. In the course of the second half of the 19th
century Rijeka [Fiume] became the main seaport of the Hungarian part of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. Rijeka's hinterland comprised practically the total Pannonian
Basin. After the wars Rijeka continued to play this role. In the late 1980s it attracted about
53 % of the turnover of all Yugoslavian ports and about 58 % of all transit turnover.3
Rijeka always has been and still is of special importance for Hungary. Thus, Hungary
currently supports plans to improve Rijeka's insufficient hinterland traffic lines to Zagreb
and Budapest. The fact that the oil pipeline from Omi?alj near Rijeka via Sisak (near
Zagreb) to Budapest is not in operation at the moment means essential economic losses
3 STRA2ICI, N.: Pomorska geografija Jugoslavije. Zagreb 1989.
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for Hungary. Besides, the interrupted branch of this pipeline from Sisak to Paneevo (near
Belgrade) was important also for the oil supply of Serbia.
All these hinterland connections of Rijeka to central Croatia and the farther Pannonian
Basin pass the bottleneck of Croatia between Slovenia and western Bosnia. They would
have to cross an autonomous Serbian territory if the intentions of the Serbs in Croatia
would come true in their maximum variant (include the commune of Karlovac, overhead).
"Greater Serbia" aspirations leave that connection in Croatian hands, although they are
near to closing this bottleneck (overhead).
A route of less international but utmost internal importance for Croatia is the one between
central Croatia around Zagreb and Dalmatia. It practically was not in operation during the
period of Turkish rule in Bosnia. At that time Dalmatia was politically separated from
Croatia, first under the dominance of Venice, later of Austria. Dalmatia suffered from this
isolation economically and turned into an extremely backward region with high
emigration rates. In the decades before World War I Austria tried but never succeeded to
improve Dalmatia's economic situation by the construction of a railway line connecting
Dalmatia with the interior. But only the completion of the Lika railway line in 1925 under
the auspices of the first Yugoslavian state and the construction of the Una railway line in
1948 under the auspices of the second was able to reinforce this route. Later also a
highway was constructed. All these traffic lines cross areas not settled by Croats and
converge to the Gate of Knin IKninska vratal, the centre of Serbs in Croatia. The Una
line - the most effective among them - even crosses western Bosnia. Alternatives to this
route bypassing Serbian or Bosnian areas - like plans to construct a railway line passing
the Velebit range by a tunnel or the present traffic deviation via Rijeka and along the coast
- will not be able to replace the above mentioned routes in the long run without harmful
effects on the coherence of today's Croatia.
Transit across the centre of Bosnia and Hercegovina, following the rivers Bosna and
Neretva, practically was blocked under Turkish rule up to 1878. Then it gained limited
importance by the construction of the Bosna (1882) and Neretva (1891) railway lines.
These, however, were narrow gauge lines passing an extremely difficult relief. But also
the modernization of those railways in the 1950s and 1960s and the development of the
seaport of P106e (former Kardeljevo), situated in Croatia, did not convert the Bosna-
Neretva line into a major transit route and increase its importance for the Dalmatian coast.
According to the recent version of the Vance-Owen plan this route would have to cross
Croatian and Muslim provinces as well as the province of Sarajevo with a special status.
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A difficult case is also the Belgrade-Bar route, completed as a railway line in 1976 to
facilitate seabound traffic from the centre of Serbia to the Adriatic. Due to the line's length
and the relief difficulties the Montenegrin port of Bar, however, never succeeded in
gaining more than 2 % of all ex-Yugoslavian seaports' turnover. Serbia continued to ship
most of her commodities via the ports of Rijeka and Salonica. Because of autonomistic
aspirations of the Sandshak Muslims this line faces additional complications.
In the northwestern-southeastern direction the so-called Sava corridor gained importance
as the backbone of new Yugoslavia after the First World War. Later, especially after the
Second World War, and due to Europe's proceeding economic integration, it also became
the main international transit route between Western and Central Europe and the
Southeast. Its technical conditions are the best within former Yugoslavia (mainly
motorway and railway of high performance), frequency of traffic was the highest. The
importance of this route was increased by the Sisak-Slavonski Brod-Pan6evo branch of
the oil pipeline from the coast. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Slavonia the Sava
corridor is interrupted near Oku6ani, international transit bypasses Croatia via Hungary.
Besides its importance for international traffic the Sava corridor also is the main link
between central Croatia around Zagreb and Slavonia, thus of similar importance for
internal Croatian coherence as the Una corridor as the link to Dalmatia. If Serbian
autonomists in Croatia obtain their goals the Slavonian section of the Sava corridor would
come under the controll of a Serbian political unit.
The Danube as a route of river transport had some meaning in the past (transport of
grain). Since industrial production in Europe is proceeding towards sophisticated and
highly manufactured commodities asking for fast transport the prospects of the Danube as
a main transportation route must be considered moderate despite of the recent
inauguration of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal. By all variants of Serbian claims to
Eastern Slavonia Croatia would lose her access to the Danube.
A crossing of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the northwestern-southeastern direction was of
some importance only during short periods of history, when the relations between Austria
and the Ottoman Empire were fairly well and when the two had the desire to bypass
Hungary and Serbia using the route Zagreb-Sarajevo-Sandshak-Kosovo-Macedonia. This
was, e.g., the intention of the Orient Railway Line planned in the 1870s, but never
completed. The route offers a certain opportunity to bypass Serbia if she would remain a
destructive power in the Balkans.
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The route along the Adriatic coast mainly is of touristic value. Its internal function of
connecting the northern and southern sections of the coast is of minor importance, since
economic ties between them are rather weak. But insofar as tourism was and could again
be the main economic branch of the Coast and one of Croatia's most important economic
branches in general an interruption of this route (as by the maximum variant of Serbian
autonomy claims or the Serbo-Croat boundary suggested by Branko COLAKOVIC,
overhead) is threatening the country as a whole.
4 Functional regions
To me comparing the present and the proposed boundaries with the functional regions as
well was interesting. I understand functional regions in the sense of regions, the internal
relations of which are oriented towards a centre or an urban agglomeration. These are the
regions of economic interaction, the real spheres of daily intercourse! [A large share of
the Slovene ethnic minority in Carinthia, e.g. in 1920 voted for staying within this
functional region despite of ethnic discrimination. Only more or less self-supplying small
farmers voted for separation, whereas bigger farmers depending on the market and
workers having their jobs in the urban centres of the region voted in favour of the
maintainance of the functional unit.4]
In order to outline the functional regions of former Yugoslavia for this purpose the
elaborations by Yugoslavian geographers could not be used. Those covering the whole
territory in a comparable manner5 are based on the assumption that a functional region
never crosses the boundary of a republic. Besides, they use the large communes as their
basic units. They are therefore not suitable for demonstrating possible deviations from
republic boundaries.
The subdivision of former Yugoslavia into functional regions as represented in map is
based on frequency of public bus traffic (This. in turn was derived from bus time tables).
Frequency of bus traffic in general is very useful for delimitating functional regions: it
reflects the movements of labour commuting, school attendance as well as daily and
4 MORITSCH, A.: Der nationale DifferenzierungsprozeB am Beispiel landlicher Gemeinden Stidkarntens.
In: MORITSCH, A. (ed.): Vom Ethnos zur NationalUAL Wien-Munchen 1991, pp. 44-92.
5 e.g. ROGI, V.: Nodalno-funkcionalne regije. In: Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije. Zagreb 1987, p.
10. Geografija SR Hrvatske, Zagreb 1975.
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periodical supply. It is of special use in a country like former Yugoslavia, where the rate
of private motorization was comparatively low and the density of railway network
insufficient to meet the tasks of passenger traffic within the catchment areas of medium
and low rank centres. The bus network, however, in general was dense enough.
As we see on the map functional macroregions do not deviate too much from the present
country boundaries.
Along the Slovenian-Croatian boundary there is only one significant deviation: the
macroregion of Rijeka includes the Slovene commune of Ilirska Bistrica.
Along the boundary between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina 4 major deviations can be
observed: one in the Sava valley, where the macroregion Osijek includes some Bosnian
communes, inhabited partly by Croatian, partly by Serbian majorities; a second in the
eastern part of the Lika, where the Serbian commune of Donji Lapac forms a part of the
Banja Luka macroregion; the third in the hinterland of Split, where the Serbian commune
of GlamcZ and the Croatian communes of Livno and Tomislavgrad (former Duvno)
belong to the Split macroregion; and a fourth in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, where the
Split macroregion extends to 4 Bosnian communes with a Serbian ethnic majority,
although the functional relation between Dubrovnik and these communes is not too
strong..
The boundary between Croatia and Vojvodina is completely in line with the
macroregions.
Along the Drina boundary between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia proper the Bosnian
macroregion of Tuzla also extends to the Serbian right bank of Drina river opposite the
town of Zvornik thereby including that town's catchment area.
There is a full coincidence between the republic of Montenegro and the Podgorica
macroregion.
Within Serbia the boundaries of macroregions deviate to some extent from the boundaries
of the formerly autonomous provinces Voivodina and Kosovo, very much to the expense
of the macroregions of their capital cities.
As an intermediate summary one might say that with some significant exceptions the
macroregions are coinciding fairly well with the former republic, now international
boundaries.
Now let us have a look at the coincidence between functional regions and ethnically
defined regions as well as suggested boundaries.
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As regards the communes with a Serbian majority in Croatia (13 communes) they are split
among 4 macroregions (Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Banja Luka) and 8 mesoregions (Sibenik,
Zadar, Rijeka, Karlovac, Sisak, Banja Luka, Bjelovar) Neither a macroregional nor a
mesoregional centre is situated within these communes. That means, the Serbian
communes are by no means forming a functional unit and have no real centre. Actually
they are economically weak peripherical units.
Naturally enough, the functional orientation becomes even more diversified, if one takes
into account the extreme variant of Serbian autonomy claims in Croatia. These 23
communes are spread over 5 macroregions (plus Osijek) and 12 mesoregions (plus
Zagreb, Slavonska Poiega, Slavonski Brod, Osijek). They comprise 1 macroregional
(Osijek) and 3 mesoregional (Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Karlovac) centres, but these are
only the centres of 11 out of 23 communes.
The Serbo-Croatian boundary suggested by Branko COLAKOVIC (overhead) cuts the
macroregional centre of Osijek off its northeastern and eastern catchment areas (Baranja,
eastern part of the Osijek commune, commune of Vukovar), cuts the Serbian communes
in Croatia off their mesoregional centres Sisak, Karlovac, Rijeka, Zadar and Sisaic and
attributes them alltogether to western Bosnia, to which only the commune of Donji Lapac
and the areas on the left bank of the lower Una river had functional contacts before. In
Hercegovina two Croatian communes of the Split hinterland are attributed to Dalmatia
according to their functional orientation, but the Mostar macroregion is cut into two
halves. Divided into two parts Croatia could survive as an economic unit only if peaceful
relations with its eastern neighbours are provided.
The boundaries of Greater Serbian claims of 1918 and 1991 (overhead) are more
reasonable from the functional point of view. But by including 47 and 54 %,
respectively, of the Croatian population of ex-Yugoslavia they would not solve any
problem.
Another question is the coincidence of functional regions in Bosnia and Hercegovina with
the 10 provinces of the Vance-Owen plan. It must be said that only 1 province shows a
fairly good coincidence with a functional region: the province of Mostar. But 4 of these
ethnically defined provinces do not dispose of a mesoregional centre, that means that their
territory is oriented towards such centres in other provinces, frequently with a different
ethnic composition, or even to centres outside the country (Slavonski Brod, Dubrovnik,
Split). The conclusion is that most of these provinces could not prosper economically
without intensive interaction with one another or with foreign centres.
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5 Summary
'Fo summarize briefly it might be stated that
- due to the intensive ethnic mixture in this region any effort to subdivide according to
ethnic principles excludes a good share of an ethnic community from its own territory.
- economic prosperity in Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also in Dalmatia and Slavonia is
dependent on peaceful co-operation between these regions.
- a permanent interruption of the Una and Sava corridors by antagonistic forces means the
end of Croatia as an economic unit.
- the Serbian communes of Croatia are peripherical areas without major urban centres. To
cut them off their centres in Croatia and to join them with western Bosnia means to
connect two peripherical regions, which never had functional relations worth to
mention.
- to adapt the Bosnian-Croatian border in some sections (lower Una valley, hinterland of
Split, south of Slavonski Brod) would be reasonable from the ethnic as well as from the
functional point of view. But in general the present country boundaries coincide fairly
well with the functional pattern.
- the subdivision of Bosnia and Hercegovina as suggested by the Vance-Owen plan is
hardly in line with functional relations. To grant the provinces autonomy would not
mean much more than a formality facing quite different functional and economic
realities.
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