TEMPEST IN THE CHINA SEAS, CHAPTER IV: ENTER SOUTH VIET-NAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000300230001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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arF1117EffIfT4AL,00 FOREIGN DISSEM RGES-1
RESEARCH STUDY
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
April 26, 1973
TEMPEST IN THEMINVSEASTECHAPTER_LV:
r-ENTEk SOUTH VIET-NAM
South Viet-Nam will shortly open for4t4ding its offshore petroTera-nn7/
cession zone. Amirtcan companies have shown pat-interest-tn-the-zonerwhich
appears-to-have-a-ecinsiderable resource potential. The Vietnamese concession
zone, however, overlaps continental shelf areas claimed by Cambodia, Indone-
sia, Thailand, and probably. Malaysia. This paper analyzes these disputes on
the basis of developing international practice.
Unilateral declarations of continental shelf limits and off-
shore concession zones in Southeast and East Asia have created areas
of dispute and political conflict. The latest state to join the
progression of claims?South' Viet-Nam--has decreed a national conti-
nental shelf which overlaps prior-claimed areas of Cambodia, Thailand,
and Indonesia. A possible dispute may also exist with Malaysia.1
Vietnamese Decree No. 249/BKT/VP/UBQGDH/ND, dated September 6, 1971,
specified the limits of South Viet-Nam's national continental shelf by
means of 33 sets of geographic coordinates. (See Annex 1 for the text.)
These limits have been plotted on the attached map, "South Viet-Nam:
Petroleum Concessions." The interested parties received these data in
RVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note No. 793-BNG/JA/PL of March 321972.
1. See RGES-1, "The Gulf of Siam, Offshore Concession Problems,"
April 27, 1970; RGES-4, "Effects of the Senkakus on the Division
of the East China Sea Continental Shelf," October 27, 1970; and
RGES-5, "South China Sea: Up for Grabs?", September 14, 1971.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
This r3port was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from
normal substantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level,, it has not
been coordinated elsewhere.
Zni)FTD.ENT-IALLNO FOREIGN DISSEM
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652'
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5B (3)
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The basis for the Vietnamese claim varies locally. In the east,
toward the Philippines, the meridian of 110? East longitude artificially .
forms the limits of the shelf. The meridian extends everywhere beyond
the 200-meter limit (100-fathom isobath on the map), the provisional
seaward extent of the national continental shelf established by the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Convention defines these
limits in Article 1 as "...the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside of the area of the territorial sea, to
a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas...."
The meridian, on the average lies 50 nautical miles beyond the as-yet
unbreached 200-meter limit of the shelf.
Indonesia - Viet-Nam
To the south, the Vietnamese shelf limit has been defined on a
principle of equidistance; every point on the line is equally distant from
points on the baselines of the opposite states. The variation on this
principle adopted by the Vietnamese, however, uses only "mainland"
basepoints of the two states. In this context, mainland status has been
assigned to the continental portions of South Viet-Nam and to such major
islands of Indonesia as Borneo. Smaller Indonesian islands, e.g.,
Kepulauan Natuna Utara, have been disregarded in the construction of
the maritime boundary. Consequently, the boundary is situated within
52 nautical miles of these islands, but, at the same point, it lies
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230 nautical miles from the "mainlands" of Viet-Nam, Borneo,and
Malaysia.
A basis can be said to exist in international law to disregard,
in the construction of equidistant boundaries, uninhabited islets
situated immediately adjacent to the median line of the water body.
However, these emerging international practices stem from negotiated
settlements and not from unilateral declarations. Moreover, the Natuna
group is neither uninhabited nor situated immediately adjacent to the
center line.
On the attached map; the dark, shaded zone indicates the continental
shelf area which Indonesia could claim if the Natuna Islands served
as basepoints along with offshore Vietnamese islands. The disputed
area measures approximately 12,000 square nautical miles.
The bases for both positions have validity. Viet-Nam claims, as
have many other states objecting to insular basepoints, that the
principle of equity would be violated by the use of the Natuna Islands
as basepoints. The argument is built on the relative size and value
of major land masses as the sites of habitation and national sovereignty.
Islands or islets, in contrast, are usually mere specks in the sea
incapable of sustaining large populations. They are, therefore, of
less importance and should be disregarded. Many agreements have been
negotiated on this basis.
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Indonesia has shown a remarkable degree of sophistication in the
negotiation of its territorial sea and continental shelf limits with
Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia. (Only the agreement with Malaysia
is in full effect.) In every discussion on the law Of the sea or the
peaceful uses of the seabed, Indonesia has started with the premise that
the state comprises an archipelago with geographic unity which cannot
be violated. This principle has apparently become sacred in the minds
of many insular states. To preserve equity, Indonesia allowed Malaysia,
for example, to draw straight baselines about its distant islands to
serve as lines of division for the seabed. However, by this act, Malaysia
accepted the integrity of the Indonesian archipelago)
To compromise on the issue would totally undermine the entire basis
for the national posture toward the oceans,and this could have serious
political, security, and economic consequences.
As a result, Indonesia is unlikely to alter its position unless an
agreement recognizes the inviolate character of the archipelago. A
potential solution would offer the islands a partial effect rather than
no value at all.
Malaysia - Viet-Nan.
The area of potential dispute between Malaysia and Viet-Nam would
probably be small. The Vietnamese decree line incorporates a limited
area which Malaysia could claim with the use of offshore islands as
basepoints. Little difficulty should be encountered in dividing the
territory with equitable results for both states.
1. See International Boundary Study, Series A, No. 1: "Indonesia-
Malaysia Continental Shelf Boundary."
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Cambodia - Viet-Nam
The lateral boundary between Cambodia and Viet-Nam will be the
hardest to resolve. The centuries-old Annamese-Khmer mutual suspicion
will complicate the negotiations. Furthermore, a serious territorial
dispute over the sovereignty of variousoffshore islands further adds
to the complexity of the situation.
In March 1960 the Vietnamese Government dispatched a note to Cambodia
which reasserted the Vietnamese claim to sovereignty over the islands in
the Gulf of Siam north and east of the 1939 Brevie Line. Brevie the
Governor-General of Indochina, had issued a line, which extended roughly
southwestward from the land boundary and enveloped Phu Quoc, as a limit
of administration between the then-colony of Cochin-China and the pro-
tectorate of Cambodia. The Vietnamese note declared that the islands of
Mileu (Hon Phu Du - Kok Thmey), Eau (Hon Nuac - Koh Ses), Pic (Hon Antay -
Koh Tonsay), and the North Pirate Islands belonged historically,
geographically, and legally to Viet-Nam. The status of the Ile de Baie
(Ream) also was unclear. The Vietnamese claims were based on Annamese
colonization, French "recognition in reports," French administration from
Cochin-China in the colonial period, and the establishment of Vietnamese
administration at the end of the protectorate over Cambodia.
No evidence could be uncovered of Vietnamese (Annamese) sovereignty,
over the islands in the latter half of the 19th century. In fact, in
1856 France endeavored to convince Cambodia to cede Phu Quoc, the
largest of the islands. The Khmer king refused and the French did not
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pursue the matter. Strangely, none of the islands has been mentioned
in any of the boundary treaties, or referred to in the decrees of
delimitation bearing on the Cochin-China - Cambodia frontier. It is
obvious, however, that most, if not all, of the islands had come under
Cochin-Chinese administration in the ensuing period. The Brevie order
attests to this fact and to the open dispute between the two territories
concerning the sovereignty of the islands.
Originally Cambodia expressed a willingness to accept the Brevie
Line as a permanent boundary but withdrew the offer after the Vietnamese
claim. The Khmer Government later extended a claim_to the Southern
Pirates and to Hon Pajang and Hon Da Ban groups. The Brevie Line,
however, appears to continue as the de facto limit of administration
between the states in the Gulf.
Without a resolution of the insular dispute, a maritime boundary
solution will remain impossible.
Cambodia, however, has recently redefined its national continental
shelf. The changes in limits, however, were restricted to the north in
the disputed area between Cambodia and Thailand. (See Annex 2.)
Thailand - Viet-Na1
The Thai Government on May 16, 1968, decreed a Tentative Border
Line for the Thai Continental Shelf. The extent of the overlap of this
zone and the Viet-Nam continental shelf is indicated on the attached map.
About 2,000 square nautical miles of Thai shelf, out of a total of nearly
56,000 square nautical miles, overlaps the Vietnamese zone. The Thai
boundary appears to have been drawn on an equidistance principle which
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WAIFIULIIILML/VIV IVALLUVI VLJOL.11
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utilized mainland and nearshore islands while ignoring distant islands, most
of which were Vietnamese and Cambodian. In contrast, the Vietnamese line
uses all of its islands while discounting Thai islands.
The roughly 15-mile-wide zone could be divided easily on the basis
of several existing practices.
Conclusion
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand are parties to the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf. Indonesia and Viet-Nam are not. The latter would not,
as a result, appear bound by the Convention's articles on boundaries. The
International Court of Justice, in the North Sea Cases, repeatedly refers to
the inadvisability of relying on equidistance as the sole basis for the
determination of maritime boundaries between adjacent states. The Court said:
"The conclusion drawn by the Court ... is that the notion of equidistance as
being logically necessary, in the sense of an inescapable a priori accompani-
ment of basic continental shelf doctrine, is incorrect."1 Rather, the Court
stressed the need for an equitable division of the seabed attained by
consideration of all relevant factors within the decision. However, the
Court did speak somewhat favorably of the use of a median line between
opposite states, "ignoring the presence of islets, rocks, and minor coastal
projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated
by other means." The states involved, however, were bound to make serious
efforts to attain a settlement through negotiation and compromise.
RGE-INR/Geographer
)1
Director: RDHodgsoni-A, '
)
Analyst : RDHodgson tl)
Extension: 22022
Released by GCDenney, Jr. j.e-141
1. International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf,
Judgment, 1969, para. 46.
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WAIFIULIIILML/VIV IVALLUVI VLJOL.11
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utilized mainland and nearshore islands while ignoring distant islands, most
of which were Vietnamese and Cambodian. In contrast, the Vietnamese line
uses all of its islands while discounting Thai islands.
The roughly 15-mile-wide zone could be divided easily on the basis
of several existing practices.
Conclusion
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand are parties to the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf. Indonesia and Viet-Nam are not. The latter would not,
as a result, appear bound by the Convention's articles on boundaries. The
International Court of Justice, in the North Sea Cases, repeatedly refers to
the inadvisability of relying on equidistance as the sole basis for the
determination of maritime boundaries between adjacent states. The Court said:
"The conclusion drawn by the Court ... is that the notion of equidistance as
being logically necessary, in the sense of an inescapable a priori accompani-
ment of basic continental shelf doctrine, is incorrect."1 Rather, the Court
stressed the need for an equitable division of the seabed attained by
consideration of all relevant factors within the decision. However, the
Court did speak somewhat favorably of the use of a median line between
opposite states, "ignoring the presence of islets, rocks, and minor coastal
projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated
by other means." The states involved, however, were bound to make serious
efforts to attain a settlement through negotiation and compromise.
RGE-INR/Geographer
)1
Director: RDHodgsoni-A, '
)
Analyst : RDHodgson tl)
Extension: 22022
Released by GCDenney, Jr. j.e-141
1. International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf,
Judgment, 1969, para. 46.
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I
RVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note
No. 793-BNG/JA/PL
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Vietnam presents its compliments to all
Diplomatic and Consular Missions and has the honor
to request them to bring to the attention of their
respective Governments the limits of the Continental
Shelf of the Republic of Vietnam as indicated on
the Table attached, which was established by the
Ministry of Economy (Decree No 249/6KT/VP/UBQGDH/ND
dated 9.6.1971).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails
itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic
and Consular Missions the assurances of its high
consideration.
Enclosure: as stated
Saigon, March 3rd, 1.972
/s/
DUONG-HOANG-THANH
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS:
SAIGON
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LUNI-1ULNI1IALOU 1-UKLIUN lAbbLM
10
LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
Points
Latitude
Longitude (Greenwich)
1
8?19'N
104?50'E
2
8?33'N
105?27'E
3
9?00'N
105?40'E
4
9?25'N
106?45'E
5
10?09'N
107?06'E
6
10?32'N
108?00'E
1
11?00'N
108?36'E
8
11?00'N
110?00E
9 '
7?05'N
110?00'E
10
5?20'N
107?20lE
11
7?03'N
103?52'E
12
7?34'N
103?19'E
13
7?42'N
102?58'E
14
.8?31'N
101?56'E
15
9?36'N
101?30'E
16
10?09'N
101?27E
17
10?09'N
102?58'E
18
10?03'N
103?31'E
1.9
10?22'N
103?41'E
20
10?29'N
103?45'E
21
10?31'N
103?45'E
22
10?31'N
103?47'E
23
10?30'N
103?54'E
24
10?30'N
103?57'E
25
10?29'N
104?04'E
26
10?24'N
104?11'E
27
10?28'N
104?20'E
28
10?28'N
104?21'E
29
10?14'N
104?22'E
30
10?23'N
104?24'E
31
10?00'N
104?31'E
32
8?36'N
104.?31'E
33
8?26'N
104?35'E
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KHMER REPUBLIC
[Presidential Decree] No. 439-72/PRK
Decree
In view of:
The Constitution of the Khmer Republic;
Ordonnance No. 1/71-CE of October 18, 1971 governing matters coming L
under the law;
Ordonnance No. 17/72-CE of March 12, 1972 defining the title of the
Chief of State of the Khmer Republic;
Ordonnance No. 2/72-PRK of March 12, 1972 conferring the powers of Head
of Government on the President of the Khmer Republic;
Decree No. 187/72-PRK of March 21, 1972, amended by subsequent texts'
Providing for nomination of the Ministerial Cabinet; and
Consultation with the Council of Ministers;
The President of the Khmer Republic hereby decrees:
Article 1. In application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of April 29, 1958 on the Continental Shelf, to which the Khmer Republic
has adhered, the Franco-Siamese Treaty of March 23, 1907, and the Proces-
Verbal of delimitation of the boundary, dated February 8, 1908, the exterior
limit of the continental shelf of the Khmer Republic is established as
indicated by French Navy chart No. 1972, drawn on the scale of 1:1,096,000,
attached to this decree, with the coordinates of its bench marks as follows:
The lateral northern delimitation between the zones of the continental
shelf under the jurisdiction of the Khmer Republic and Thailand shall be
formed by a straight line joining boundary-point A on the coast to the
highest peak of the island of Koh Kut "S" extending to point P; points
A and P are defined as:
Point A: Boundary-point on the coast (Treaty of Bangkok of March 23, 1907):
Lat. 761703 N.; Long. 102?54'81 E.
Point: P A point equidistant from the Cambodian base A, Kusrovie Islet,
and the Thai baseline opposite: Lat. 11032100 N.; Long. 101?20'00 E.
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Article 2. The delimitation of the median line, in a north-south
direction, shall be formed by a broken line starting at point P and passing
successively through pointsPPPPPPPP
ckl ck2 ck3 ck4 ck5 ck6 ck7 ck8
PPPPPand B, the boundary point with South Viet-Nam;
ck9 ck10 ckll ck12 ck13
those points are defined below and marked on the attached map.
Point
Latitude North
Longitude East
P A point equidistant from the
ckl
Cambodian islet of Kusrovie and the
following Thai points: Koh Charn
islet and point 8 area 2 (Hin Bai)
10?59'00
101?13'00
ck2
ck3
10?16'50
9?05'00
101?29'00
101?36'00
ck4
8?31'00
101?57'50
ck5
7?42'00
102?59'50
ck6
7?34'00
103?21'00
ck7
9?01'00
104?08'00
ck8
9?18'00
104?01'00
ck9
9?38'50
104?08'50
ckl 0
9?56'00
104?16'50
ckll
10?01'00
?104?15'00
ck12
10?05'00
104?10'50
ck13
10?12'00
104?09'00
B Boundary point with South Viet-Nam
10?25'23
104?26'63
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Article 3. French Navy chart No. 1972, 1949 edition, drawn on the
scale?B7-71796,000 is attached to this decree.
Any reference to the decree implies at the same time a reference
to chart No. 1972.
Article 4. All provisions contrary to this decree are rescinded.
Article 5. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of
Industry, Mineral Resources and Maritime Fisheries are each charged with
execution of that part of this decree applicable to his Ministry.
Done at Phnom-Penh, July 1, 1972.
Signed: Lon Nol
Presented for signature of the
President of the Khmer Republic:
Signed: Chhann SOkhum'
Minister of Industry, Mineral
Resources and Maritime Fisheries
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