DISPUTED ISLAND IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: PART I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180027-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 1, 1956
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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411 k
('nnfidiontipl
present equipment) to antisubmarine war-
fare operations involving either carrier-
or shore-based aircraft, but the carrier
aspect of this capability may decline
slightly during the next 2 years as equip-
ment becomes more dated and submarine
operational techniques improve. Shore-
based ASW aircraft strengths are expected
to remain at substantially present levels
as new equipment is phased into service
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to replace existing aircraft stocks.
Physical limitations inhe rent in pre sent
aircraft carriers will preclude the devel-
opment of a carrier-based air defense
capability against high-speed jet aircraft
until completion of the CLEMENCEAU.
Until that time the French Naval Air Arm
will be capable of providing air defense
to the fleet only when it is operating within
range of French shore bases.
Disputed Islands in the
Recent Chinese Communist moves in the Paracel Islands have focused
attention upon the three groups of disputed islands in the South China Sea:
Pratas Island, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands. This is the first
of two articles covering these islands. The Paracel Islands have been selected
for discussion in the first article because it is there that the most significant
activity is currently centered.
Neatly patterned roads distinguish French-occupied Pattle Island, which is about Y2 mile long and 30 feet high.
Note the stone pier at the right.
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of apparently vigorous support of its naval
air arm.
Aquilon aircraft are now being delivered
to the Naval Air Arm and organized into
squadrons of 16 aircraft each. These
squadrons, of necessity, will be shore-
based until such time as the CLEMEN-
CEAU becomes operational sometime in
1959. To date these squadrons have be-
come carrier-qualified through operations
from British carriers. Aquilons willform
the primary air defense capability of the
Naval Air Arm for some time to come.
In addition to constructing new carriers
the French have evidenced some interest
in the conversion of the obsolete carrier
DIXMUDE into an assault helicopter air-
craft carrier (CVHA). Presumably this
conversion would be patterned after that
of USS THETIS BAY, now undergoing con-
version.
Although hampered in the past by the
lack of extensive submarine training, the
difficulties encountered in ASW training
are slowly being overcome and the pilots
are becoming proficient in the conduct of
this type of operation. Shore-based P2V
aircraft are slowly being equipped with
Magnetic Airborne Detection (MAD) equip-
ment, and electronic shortages which pre-
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French Navy carrier fighter Aquilon (Sea Venom).
viously limited the use of P2V's areheing
overcome. Crews have become proficient
in the use of their aircraft and equipment.
The French Naval Air Arm's growth to
date, exclusive of recent aircraft orders
and Aquilon deliveries, may be attributed
directly to the aid furnished the French
Navy through the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Program. Programmed deliveries
through MDAP have been, in the main,
completed although some P2V's are still
scheduled for delivery. Present indica-
tions are that the French Government will
continue to support the development of its
naval air arm, at least through 1958.
Developed primarily in the past 6 years
as an ASW weapon, the Naval Air Arm is
now capable of making an effective con-
tribution (within the limitations of its
Marignane. Aquilons (Sea Venom) and Vampires parked in front of the hangars.
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There are about 25 islands in the South
China Sea whose ownership is disputed by
several nations. Considered solely for
their intrinsic value, the islands are hardly
worthy subjects of dispute. Their com-
bined area is less than 10 square miles,
they nowhere rise more than 40 feet above
sea level, and they have never supported
a native population. In addition, they are
located among some of the most danger-
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ous reefs in the world and most of them
can be approached only by lighters or
small boats.
In spite of this physical insignificance,
these islands have become important in
the game of power politics, and seven
nations maintain claims of sovereignty
over some or all of them. The fact that
two of these claimants are Communist
nations--Red China and Vietminh--makes
Hong Kong
SOUTH CHINA SEA
North Reef
Group
Crescent Group Lincoln I.
Discovery Reef 0. u.s Bombay Reef
Binh Dinh
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PARACELS IS.
'Protas 0
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Newly collected guano is piled on the paved areas left by previous occupants. Workmen are visible and the volley-
ball court (see text) is in the upper right.
the area of interest to us. If Communist
China can successfully maintain its claims
and occupy and administer the Spratly
Islands, as it has be gun to do in the
Paracels, it will have extended its legal
and actual power into Southeast Asia nearly
9? latitude south from Hainan Island. This
is more than the distance from New York
to Charleston. Such an advance would
ominously echo the pattern followed by
Japan which in its southward move suc-
cessively occupied Pratas, the Paracels,
and the Spratlys in 1937-39.
THE PARACEL ISLANDS
In discussing these small coral islands
enumeration is difficult because there is
no clear-cut point at which land ceases
to be sandbar or dry reef and becomes a
full-fledged island. In the case of the
Paracels, there are about 15 which are
clearly large enough to merit the name
"island:" Most of these lie in two groups:
the Crescent Group, dominated by Pattle
Island; and the Amphitrite Group, domi-
nated by Woody Island. Triton, Lincoln,
and Passu Keah Islands lie isolated to the
south. The largest?island is Woody, which
is about 1 mile in diameter and 30 feet
high.
Altogether the Paracel Islands dot an
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area of about 650 square miles of sea.
Lying on the natural shipping lane from
Singapore to China, these islands and the
numerous associated reefs present a
serious hazard to navigation. Most ships
bypass the area, either to the east or west,
but numerous still-visible wrecks bear
tragic testimony to the fact that fog,
typhoons, and faulty navigation have made
the Paracels a maritime graveyard.
In January of this year the Danish
freighter BIN TANG (2,315 GRT) ran
aground on North Reef at almost the same
spot where the TAIKINSHAN (2,284 GRT)
broke up in early 1952. The BIN TANG
remained aground for several weeks, but
she was fortunate enough not to be hit by
severe weather and was successfully
lightened of cargo and refloated with the
aid of a tug. During the time she was
aground, the BIN TANG was under the
surveillance of several junks, possibly
coming from the new Chinese Communist
outpost on Woody Island, which will be
discussed later in this article.
Although these islands have been used
for centuries by fishermen who have
stopped there to dry fish, dry nets, col-
lect seaweed, gather firewood, and get
fresh water, they have not supported any
permanent settlements. The earliest re-
ported official claim to. the islands is
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The white crenelated tower was the administration build-
ing when the Japanese held the island. Five new build-
ings and the beginnings of a sixth one are conspicuous.
supposed to have been made by the Empire
of Annarn in 1816.1 According to French ?
claims, the French Navy explored the is-
lands in the late 1800's and erected a
marker on Pattle Island. In 1909 the
Chinese Empire announced annexation of
the islands on the grounds that they had
been used by Chinese fishermen for gen-
erations. They were made a part of
Kwangtung Province along with Pratas
Island. In 1917 Seiju Hirata, managing
director of a company located in Formosa,
visited the Paracels and claimed to have
discovered them. Within 4 years a Jap-
anese company (possibly Hirata's) was
exploiting the guano deposits on several
of the islands and had built offices and
dormitories for the guano workers.
The buildings on Woody Island by 1933
consisted of a 1-story headquarters 63
by 18 feet, two dormitories 90 by 15 feet,
shops, kitchens, and a mes shall. The
Japanese maintained a distillation plant
for water and supplemented it with four
reservoirs for water from rain catches.
They also had a light, push-car railroad
for guano handling (reportedly totaling
1-2/3 miles) connecting with tracks on
the 1,200-foot-long pier. Five years later
the French added some buildings includ-
ing a cement blockhouse to be used as a
police station, a boathouse, and a sick
quarters.
It was in 1937 that the French began to
'Or 1812 or 1865, according to other sources.
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reassert their claims to the Paracels. In
that year they sent an expedii ion of several
ships and two seaplanes to explore the
islands and they erected a lighthouse on
Pattle Island. Then, in the summer of
1938, having heard of the Japanese sei-
zure of Pratas Island, they sent a garri-
son of 55 Anna mit e gendarmes under
French officers to occupy the islands and
proclaimed the Paracels to be posses-
sions of France. On Pattle Island, in
addition to the lighthouse, they built a
cement blockhouse for a police head-
quarters, a cement storehouse for provi-
sions, a thatched village, and other minor
buildings. They collected water from the
roof of the police station and supplemented
this with well water. Reportedly there
were also two wells and several rainwater
tanks on Robert Island and two somewhat
brackish wells on Duncan Island.
On 8 July 1938, 4 days after the French
announced the sending of their gendarmes
to the islands, the Japanese Vice Minister.
of Foreign Affairs handed a note of pro-
test to the French Ambassador. Ironi-
cally, the Japanese, who then occupied a
large par;: of the Chinese mainland, based
their protest on the grounds that the
French were violating Chinese sover-
eignty. Even before the Japanese protest
reached the French Foreign Office, how-
ever, Dr. Wellington Koo, then Chinese
Ambassador to France, had already pre-
These Communist junks, photographed off Woody Island
on 10 March 1956, are typical of the craft used to sup-
port the Chinese development there.
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sented his protest at the Quai d'Orsay.
The Chinese and Japanese were in agree-
ment that the Paracels were Chinese
territory. In Japan, the press bitterly
attacked the French action and in a superb
demonstration of o r ie nt a 1 indirectness
said: "Under the circumstances nobody
can guarantee that an undesirable conflict
will never occur between France and
Japan."
Distracted by the growing tension in
Europe, the French withdrew from the
Paracels in late 1938 or early 1939. On
20 February 1939 the Japanese produced
Mr. Hirata, "discoverer" of the Paracels,
and when they took Hainan from the Chine se
they also occupied the Paracels.
During Wo;:ld War II, the Japanese used
the Woody and Pattle Islands as radio and
weather stations to provide typhoonwarn-
ings for their fleets and convoys. In Jan-
uary 1945 United States fliers passing the
area sighted a French tricolor flying from
the white t ow e r of the administration
building on Woody Island. This prompted
CTG 71.1 to order the submarine PARGO,
LCDR C. D. Bell commanding, to conduct
a reconnaissance of Woody Island. On
4-5 February the PARGO verified the
presence of the French flag, sketched the
profile of the island, and sighted about 20
men on the beach. On the 6th PARGO sent
two Australian commandos (Major Jinkins
Trees are rare in the Paracels except on Woody Island.
This cluster of palms is on Lincoln Island, but the brush
and grass in this view are much more typical of the local
flora.
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Drummond Island of the Crescent Group. Duncan and
Money Islands are similar in appearance.
and W0/1 Chew) ashore in a rubber boat.
A little over 3 hours later through the
periscope the shore party was observed'
at close range, smiling and making a hand
signal indicating gunfire. The submarine
surfaced and picked up the two commandos
who reported that the occupants of the
island were clearly Japanese, the flag
being a ruse. The PARGO then fired upon
the island with 71 rounds of 4-inch and 18
pans of 20mm and claimed substantial
damage including destr uct ion of the
weather/radio station.
En route to Woody, the PARGO had a
look at Pattle Island and noted that the
buildings and houses were well kept and
that there were two 110-foot radio masts.
On 8 March 1945 three planes of VPD-
117 from Mindoro hit Pattle and Woody
with twenty-seven 250-pound and nine 100-
pound GP. bombs. The strike was set up
on information provided by the PARGO's
scouting mission and was motivated by
the suspicion that "the target radio sta-
tions...were `Rogering' for messages,
creating circuit interference, and other-
wise disrupting communications in addi-
tion to acting as lookout stations."
Sometime in 1945 the Japanese left the
islands. In 1946 the French and Vietna-
mese returned to Pattle and the Chinese
Nationalist Navy established a weather
and radio station. In 1948 they had 156
personnel on the island including a 29-
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man hydrographic unit. When Hainan Is-
land fell to the Communists in the spring
of 1950, the Nationalists abandoned Woody
Island, and it remained without permanent
inhabitants until about August 1955. At
this time personnel were seen playing
volleyball in a corner of the cleared area.
This promptly caught the attention of
people who know the area, because group
athletics are not normal to native fisher-
men, who find that a day at the nets pro-
vides ample exercise.
From that time on the island has been
under increasingly frequent surveillance.
This early party was apparently a small,
advance group assigned to surveythe area
for future activity. In December 1955 and
in the first 3 months of this year there
was an upsurge of activity on the island.
Some new buildings were erected and some
of the better-preserved, cement-walled
ruins were given new roofs. By April there
were 11 new or newly rehabilitated build-
ings. The Chinese Communists appear to
have approximately 200 persons there,
possibly including some women and
children.
There are no signs of weapons, radar,
or other military equipment on the island,
so it is p r o bable that the immediate
motives of the occupation are economic
(to collect fertilizer) and political (to give
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substance to the claim of sovereignty).
The guano on Woody Island is of an in-
ferior grade having many impurities, but
the Japanese found it worth exploiting and
the Chinese who are short on fertilizer
will find it at least equally worthwhile.
In 1922 the average depth of guano there
was about 1.3 feet, and in 1933, after
some years of Japanese exploitation, it
was estimated at 10 inches.
The estimate for the whole Paracel
group in 1922 was that 34 percent of the
total area was covered to an average
depth of 1.5 feet. In 1938 the Japanese
were still working on Woody and were
preparing to begin operations on Lincoln
Island. The deposits on Robert Island are
reported to have been exhausted, but
other islands as yet untouched have con-
siderable deposits.
Vietnamese marines have replaced the
French and Senegalese troopers on Pattle
Island. Woody and Pattle are about 50
nautical miles apart, and the two occupy-
ing groups have apparently had no contacts
to date.
At present active claims to possession
of the whole Paracel group are actively
maintained by France, Communist China,
Nationalist China, Vietnam, and Vietminh.
The Japanese abandoned their claims in
1951 in the Treaty of Peace.
Hong Kong, 7 March: After months of
heartbreaking effort the 2,315-ton Danish
freighter BINTANG was towed into Hong
Kong Harbor today, the first vessel in 50
years refloated from the treacherous
north reef of the Paracel Islands.
BINTANG ran aground in January and
was salvaged on a "no success, no pay"
basis by tug skipper Leslie George Moore
Warner, of Sydney, and a Danish salvage
expert.
Among the welcoming crowd at BIN-
TANG's triumphant berthing today were
members of the police narcotics squad.
They boarded her and seized 438 pounds
of opium and 5 pounds of morphine, worth
?28,000, and detained several men.
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Spanish Naval Officer Training
Spain did not take part in the Second U.S. Navy, including training of personnel
World W/ar and therefore did not have the in-.-the United States and the provision of
opportunity to advance in proficiency and /technical training aids and guidance in
tech, ical knowledge as didthepartici-/
pas. Naval training has been carried
out in accordance with Spanish naval
experience of the Civil War period of
1936-39, supplemented by secondhand in-
formation obtained largely from naval
professional periodicals. The organiza-
tion and training methods of the navy are
outmoded and inc ap a bre of providing
trained personnel to in modern war-
ships. The senior officers are inexperi-
enced in modern naval tactics , especially in
antisubmarine warfare, escort of convoys,/
harbor defense, ,and in combined opera-
tions and coordination with other services.
The junior officers have had little training
in the operation and maintenance of equip-
ment used by a modern navy. In Septem-
ber 1953 the Defense and Mutual Defense
Assistance agreements between Spain and
the United States were signed and subse-
quently a mo de rni z ation program for
Spin's obsolete warships was begun. It
was soon discovered that modernization of
the ships had to be accompanied by a
modernization of the training of naval
personnel. During the summer of 1955 a
joint Spanish-United States committee
made a study of Spanish naval schools
and methods and of applicable United States
methods. This study resulted in recom-
mendations that have been approved by the
Spanish Minister of Marine, who in Nove,rn-
ber 1955 directed the Chief of Training
to proceed immediately to implement the
report within the limitations of the cur-
rent budget. With current aid from the
192
4".
Spanish schools, the present outmoded
training program should soon show signs
of improvement and within several years
begin to provide officers and men capable
of operating the newly modernized Spanish
Fleet.
The procurement of officer candidates
for the various naval corps is by means of
annual competitive examinations which
take place at Madrid. Each year the fol-
lowing approximate numbers are chosen:
General Line, 30; Engineering, 15; upply,
8; Marine Corps, 8; and other corps in
various numbers to the maximum of 5.
The instruction of the first four branches
is carried out at the lyval Academy
over a period of 5 yearvf one of which is
spent on board the /s/c ho ol ship J.S.
ELCANO. During the final quarter of the
last year instruction is carried out in
ships of the faeet. All other officers
take 1 year/Of military training at the
Naval Acad(my and aboard ship.
Line officers can specialize in the / ca
fol-
lowing tegories: electricity, gunnery,
.??
undersea warfare, hydrography, and na-
val Avarfare. There are also special
courses for the submarine and aviation
services.
Those qualified in aviation serve as ob-
servers in the air force when its planes
are operating with the navy. They may
also qualify as pilots of navy helicopters.
The officers of the Marine Corps spe-
cialize either in close-range antiaircraft
defense or chemical warfare. Marine
Corps officers can take courses at the
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