ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180019-2
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 15, 2012
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 20, 1971
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
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CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180019-2.pdf | 1.26 MB |
Body:
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I\V I Vf\L1U17 U1 JJL11
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South \Ghina_Sea has recently become the site of increased
instability because of the movement of Philippine troops into the
Spratly Islands and the Philippine request to the Republic of China to
evacuate the island of Itu Aba. The recent actions in the South China
Sea may result from the. realization that the petroleum potential, in
particular Macclesfield'Bank, is great.
Sovereigntyy o he Paracel and Spratly islets is actively dis-
puted by the Republic of Viet-Nam, both Chinas, and the Philippines, and
the French have a latent claim to some of the islets. The United States
has taken no position on the sovereignty issue.
Sovereignty over the various islets assumes great importance because
they could be factors in future divisions of the continental shelf and
seabed resources of the semi-enclosed South China Sea. The successful
assertion of sovereignty over the distant offshore islets and the
recognition of these islets as basepoints in any continental shelf
boundary delimitation will greatly affect the share of the shelf to which
the disputant countries will be entitled.
The attached report, Islands of the South China Sea, prepared in INR
.in August 1956, provides some Background on a Sout China Sea, and is
reissued in view of recent activity in the area.
Attachment:
IR-7283, 8/17/56
INR/East Asia & Pacific and
Office of the Geographer
Directors: ESCol'bert (Acting) and
RDHodgson.
`Analysts: EBHubbert (ext..22194) and
TVMclntyre (ext. 22022)
Released by:
This report was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from
normal substantive .exchange with other
agencies at the workingtlevel, it has not i
been coordinated elsewhere. f
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4*1
GROUP 1
. olnded from aut etio
downt,rt'ading and
tit3:.t 18ET1 ic~tion
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A series of seemingly unimportant events recently
has drawn international attention to the small and nor-
mal y uninhabited islands of the South China Sea generally
designated as the Spratly and the Paracel Islands and the
Pratas Reef. The assertion of private claims-by business
adventurers in the Spratly Islands, including the small
reefs and cays named "Dangerous Ground," has brought small
armed units to the scene and revived old disputes. In the
Paracels, Chinese Communist fishing and guano-digging
operations have aroused Vietnamese fears and also have,
led to renewal of-past claims to the island group by
Nationalist China, Communist China, and Vietnam. A small
Vietnamese garrison remains on Pattle Island, some 45
miles southwest of the scene of Chinese Communist opera-
tions on Woody Island,
The international status of these islands has never
been settled, The United States has neither advanced
claims of its own in the area nor made any official determi-
nation of the merits of the respective claims of others,
Despite their small size and apparently limited usefulness,
their strategic location and the nationalistic sensitivities
of the several claimants make it likely that these island
groups will continue to attract international. attention
from time to time, and, as long as they continue to be
visited or garrisoned by the contending parties, there
remains the possibility of armed clashes.
The following report reviews the history of con-
flicting claims, summarizes recent developments in the
area, aad in the two appendices presents'general descrip-
tive information about the island groups.
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This report is based on information available through August 15, 1956.
Abstract ...........................................................
I.
Spratly Islands ?.?...........??.....e......e.o....oo..~o....?
1
... .. ... ..
A. Active Claimants ..?ee..e..?oos.s....~......~.o.e........?
1
le
20
Nationa-1.ist C1 .na
Colmnunist China meoeeomeoomeooe.oooomeeeeeoeoe?.00000.
2
3:
France o::...:o::::::: :::::::......o:?:mo::::::: ::: :
:.
2
It.
Vietnam eoceseeo.ee..000000.0.....000?.......?........
2..
Be Interested Parties ..see....s.a.e .........................
2
1o
Philippines ?eeo~eeseeo.?.oos....s......a.........o..?
2
2e
The United Kingdom .....0000010000 ...................?
3
30
German 00000000005000000600000900..,.................
3
140
Japan 0o.00000.0000ooe.0.00000.....00....?000000000000
3
5.
United States 0000000.s.e.00005055.0500..o...........?
3
0. Recent Developments .....moo...oo....ee.so.....s.~..a.....
4
II.
The Paracel Islands o.oo?e..eo.oo....e .......................?
A.
Active Claimants .e.....e .................................
5
1, Nationalist China :.:.:..,.;...oo55 ...................
5
2. Cozmiunist Chin .s.ooe??i..o.s...o..eae.....s........?
6
34 Vietnam ?e?.e?.o..e.s.a.e ............................?
6
Be
Other Interested Parties..,....,......,.....,.,.....,,.,
6
1. France ?............?..:.:.:::.:::..::::.::....::.....
6
2. Japan .............:::::.........::::::........:..:..:
6
3. The United Kingdom ...................................
7
1.: The United States .........o.e..eee....eo.m........c..
7
5. Philippines.and Coirrnmi.st Vietnam .... 009900*0
7
C.
Recent Developments 000000?eo.e.o..........o............?
7
III.
Pra
tas
Reef and Island ......................................
9
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APPEI S
Page
A.
Geographical Description oseoeosas~~oo~~oa~soo~~~~e~e~~o~~s~;~~?
10
B.
anor Islands of the South China Sea ?s~eoeeo~?oo~eo~~~?~?OO'~~e
13
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I. SPRATI ISLAAIDS
In the southeastern part of the South China Sea between Vietnam,
the Philippines, and Borneo, lie a string of tiny islands known in
English as the Spratly Islands.1 The group extends in a northeasterly-
southwesterly direction for a distance of about 300 miles.
Interest in the islands stems from-their geographic position
and possible eccnoinic value. The largest, Itu Aba, is of sufficient
size to have been used by the Japanese for limited military operations.
There is consequently some fear in Vietnam and the Philippines that
the islands might eventually be lost to the Chinese Commanists and be
used for military purposes. Furthermore, the Spratlyso guano phosphate
deposits and'fishing grounds are of some economic value and the islands
might also be used for meteorological observations and as navigational
aids. Rumors concerning the possible emistence of petroleum deposits
have been circulated recently, but available geological information does
not support such prospects.
A. Active Claimants
Claims have been made to all or-part of the Spratlys by four
governments within the last few months, and at least two others cur-
rently appear to be considering asserting their rights in the area. No
general attempt to settle the problem has been made by the claimants.
1. Nationalist China. The islands have been visited for matt years
by Chinese na ion s and Chinese fishing vessels. At one time they were
"administered" by the Governor of Taiwan. The Chinese protested early
Japanese exploitation of the islands and the French announcement of an
vexation in 1933. Following the defeat of the Japanese in Word W7ar, II,
the Chinese sent token forces to occupy the islands in'December 1945, and
proclaimed sovereignty over them the following January. The Nationalist
Government presently-lays claim to the islands including the area lazown
as "Dangerous Ground,'t and has protested the recent claims of the Filipino
citizen, Tomas Cloma.
There is no terns ion agreed a on of precisely what is
referred to by the term ttSpratly Islands." It was used in the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty to apply to an undefined group of islands
west of the island of Palawan (Philippines) in the South China Sea,
held by Japan during the war, For the purposes of this paper, the
term is used to apply to Spratly Island itself,-Anboyna Cay, the
Tizard ' Banlc (including Itu Aba and Namyit), Loaita, Thitu, and North.
Danger. Between these islands.and Palawan. lies an uncharted area of
miles and reefs known as the "Dangerous Ground." For a more detailed
description, see Appendix A.
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.2. Communist China. The Chinese Communist claim to these islands was
first sett fort i 7y rh`ou En-ia3 on August 15, 1951 in his formal comment on
the San Francisco Peace Conference, when he asserted that. these islands
"have always been Chinese territory." On ;Iay 29, 1956, a spokesman for
the Foreign Office of the Peiping regime reiterated Chows statement. Other
recent Peiping broadcasts have attempted to Justify these claims on the
basis of Chinese historical records dating back to the 15th century and
on the Sino-French Convention of 1887, respecting the delimitation of ter-
ritory between Tonlin and. China, which Peiping views as having aclffiowledged
Chinese rights to these islands,
In late June 1956, Izvestia carried an article which endorsed the
Chinese Communist claim, shat "for several centuries China has been
exercising its sovereignty over the four archipelagos in the South China
Sea," and that Chinals claims to'the islands were "confirmed by history and
appropriate diplomatic documents."
3. France. A French gunboat visited Spratly Island in 1930 and France
claimed possession that same year. In April 1933, two French warships
raised the French flag over Spratly Island, Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba, Loaita,
Thitu.,and North Danger and their satellite says. Shortly thereafter, on
July 25, 1933, these were formally annexed by the French Government. French
vessels made periodic visits in the following years and in 1938 Annamese
gendarmes were sent to Spratly Island with materials for the construction
of unspecified installations. When the Japanese announced their anne.ration
of the archipelago in 1939, the French protested vigorously. Than aide
memoire of September 5, 1955, the French Government declared categorically
tat ze Spratly Islands were part of the French Union and specifically
distinguished them from the Paracels where the French recognize the
Vietnamese claim.
4. Vietnam. Ever since the San Francisco Conference in 1951,. the
Vietnamese Government has steadfastly maintained its right to sovereignty
over the islands, This claim is presumably based on historical rights and
suecessIon to theFreneh rights there, since a .Foreign 11inista7 spokesman
informally described the Vietnamese claim as applying to the islands which
the French claimed in 1933,
B, Interested Parties
1, Ph i.>ines. For some time members of the Philippine Government
have expressed =interest in extending Filipino sovereignty to the islands
of the "Dangerous Ground" and Spratly group, On at least two occasions
former President Quirino expressed his opinion that the Spratlys ought to
belong to the Philippines because of their geographic proximity. More
recentlyr in 1955 and again in 1956, the Philippine Foreign Office has con- .
sidered occupying and laying claim to one or more of the islands, but ap-
parently has hesitated to do so without the backing of the United States,
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Within the last year, individuals operating from the Philippines twice have
claimed the islands as their private property and each claim has stimulated
Philippine interest in the unoccupied isles. No formal claim to the islands
on the part of the Philippines has been advenoed to date.
2. The United Kingdom, Spratly Island-and Amboyna Cay were visited by
a Britisn nav vesse , tKifleman," in 18611, and the former was ? named in
honor of a.whaling captain. According to the UK Foreign Office, a license
was issued to a British subject and an American in 1887'to hoist the British
flag" and work the two islands for guano, These rights were refracted in
1889 to the Central Borneo Company. In 1939 the British Ambassador in Toi fro
explicitly denied the legal foundation of the Japanese annexatibn, A Foreign
Office memorandun dated October 12, 1955 asserts Her iIajestyts Government
had never?ac::nowledged the various claims that-have been made by other
countries,]. In the view of the Foreign Office, with the exception of Spratly
and Ambcyna Cay and possibly one other, the islands are "reefs and shoals,
some of them being listed as covered at all states of the tide and therefore
uninhabitable and incapable of appropriation and occupation," Although the
UK has not recognized any other claim to the islands, it is not clear that
she has explicitly advanced her own claim,
3. German At the time that Germany was extending its-colonial empire
into'Nicronesia, there were indications of German interest in these islands
also. A late 19th century report alleged that Germany was preparing to sur-
vey the islands but refrained from sending the expedition because of Chinese
objections,
4. Jan, In 1917 a party from a Japanese steamer discovered phosphate
on anumner of the islands of the group. The next year a Japanese company.
sent out an exploratory expedition and in 1921 began the construction of
establishments there. Although they abandoned the guano operation in 1931
because of the depression, the Japanese protested the 1933 French annexation
of six of the islands, In 1936 the Japanese phosphate company resumed
operations, and in 1939 the Japanese Government announced annexation of
what it called the Sinnan Islands, a large'area including much of the
"Dangerous Ground,', as well as the Spratlys. During World War II, the
Japanese established a meteorological and communications station on Itu Aba.
All claims to the area were renounced by Japan in Article II (f) of the
Japanese Peace Treaty.
5, United States. The only official action ever taken by United States
on:the s atus o eislands was to protest the Japanese claim in 1939. The
Secretary of State addressed a note to the Japanese Ambassador stating that
the US- did-not--consider a33 the islara anct reefs within-the- extensive--area
1. T?153, Tokyo, March 31, 1939, CONFT.DBNTIAL, reports that the British
withdrew their claim in favor of the French when the Japanese announced
annexation.
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claimed by Japan as properly constituting one group and did not'consider
that Japan had adequately demonstrated its claim to all of them. The US
supported the French suggestion that the issue be submitted to arbitration.
C., Recent Developments
The recent scramble to claim the islands began in June 1955 when an
American citizen, Horton F. Pleads, without US Government backing, laid claim
to the'ttIianity Islands" west of Palawan where he established his "Kingdom
of Humanity." This action d:,ew a note from the Chinese Nationalist Ambas-
sador in Manila to the effect that any boats which may have visited the
islands were violating Chinese territorial waters.
On May 21, 1956, Tomas Cloma, a friend and business associate of
Philippine Vice President and Foreign Iiinister Garcia, announced that he
had staked claim to most of the Spratlys and to the "Dangerous Ground" area
as his private property.- Cloma stated he had recently visited the islands,
surveyed and mapped them, and left there a number of cadets from his own
private Philippine Maritime Institute Nautical School. Vice President
Garcia showed an obvious interest by stating he saw no reason why the islands
should not belong to the Philippines and ordered the Foreign Office to look
into the matter.
Reaction from abroad was inanediate. The following day the Chinese
Ambassador in Manila delivered a note to the Foreign Office reasserting the
Chinese Nationalist claim. The Chinese National Government considered it
of prime Uportance to its prestige that its claims be vim orousl,y upheld.
President Chiang himself apparently ordered two destroyer escorts with a
platoon of marines on board to the , ctme. This force, dispatched from
Taiwan on June 1, did not make contea': with the'Filipinos supposedly on
the islands, though in the course-of temporary landings on several of the
islands signs of recent occupancy, including anti-Nationalist slogans.
written in. Tagalog and dated as late as May 27, 1956, were discovered.
In short order other claims to the archipelago were publicly put
forward by Communist China in a radio broadcast on Hay 29, by the Government
of Vietnam through a Foreign Office conmunique on June 1, and by France in
a note to the Philippine Government on June 7.
Cloma, who named the islands "Freedomland" and set up a government for
them, returned several times after the Chinese expedition had returned to
Taiwan. A larger Chinese expedition from Taiwan landed in the islands on
July 11 but again found them abandoned, although there were evidences of
recent occupancy of Thitu.as well-as Itu Aba Island, Part of this force''
was left on Itu Aba Island as a permanent garrison to protect the Chinese
claim. Considerable supplies were off-loaded and a radio tower and other
permanent constructions were erected. Meanwhile, the press-6n Taiwan ad-
vertised for farmers and fishermen to volunteer as colonists for the islands.
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Cloma and his brother claim to have visited the islands again since..
the Nationalist Chinese established their garrison:on.Itu Aba. Although he
claims to have passed by Itu Aba and landed on Thitu, no contact was made
with the Nationalists. Cloma appears to be doing his.best to uphold his
claim in the hope the Philippine Government will decide. to support him.
Host recently he was reported in Japan negotiating for the purchase*of a
fishing vessel for corimiunications and transportation. to the islands,
The Vietnamese informally are encouraging the Philippines to advance
a claim for part of'the islands, and have indicated they. will send a force
to occupy one of them. Although Vice President Garcia has recommended to
President 1-agsaysay that the Philippines announce their claim, the president
and his leading foreign and military advisors have expressed opposition to'
Phil ppine involvement in the dispute.
II. THE PARACEL ISLANDS
The Paracel Islands, comprising the Amphitrite and Crescent Groups
and a few additional reefs and islets, lie approximately equidistant from
Vietnam and the island of Hainan. All units in the cluster, except the
submerged North Reef, lie south of the 17th Parallel, dividing Communist
North Vietnam from South. Vietnam. (See'Appendix A).
These islands lie in the main shipping lanes of the South China Sea`
and provide a number of safe anchorages for small ships. For-these reasons
and because of their potential as bases for ship interdiction, emergency
landing strips for aircraft, and for surveillance, they have attained
importance in international affairs far beyond what their size and general
utility. would warrant. In the past the Paracels have been used principally
ass 1) a base for seasonal fishing operations by the Chinese and Vietnamese;
2) the site of a meteorological station maintained by the Chinese, French,
and Vietnamese; and 3) a source of guano for the Japanese during World War ii
and the Chinese Communists at present.
A. Active Claimants
Sovereignty- over. the Paracel Islands, in the absence of any inter-
national agreement, has been in dispute since the 19201s. The principal
claimants today are the Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of China, and the
Chinese Communists, although several other powers have an historical and/or
current stx ategic interest in them.
1. Nationalist China. Chinese fishermen, operating from Hainan Island,
have used var ous oT`tie islands-for several centuries, China officially
claimed the Paracels (in Chinese, Hsi-sha Chlpun.tao) in 1909 on the grounds
that they had "always been part of China" and had never been alienated.
The islands are referred-to'in-mid-18th century Chinese histories as belong-
ing to China. On July ), 1938, the Chinese Ambassador to Paris protested
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a French assertion of sovereignty. The National Government of China sent
an expedition to Woody.:Island. in December 1946 and China again proclaimed:
sovereignty over-the Paracels on January 17, 1947. A minor brith with a'
French expedition in. Na,r 1947 led to an informal-agreement to Bottle the
conflicting claims-by negotiation or arbitration, but this has=not been
done. In May 1950, following the loss' of Hainan to the Chinese. Conmunists,
the Nationalist post on Woody Island was withdrawn, but the - Nationalist
claim to the island group was strongly reasserted on June 2, 1956.
2. Communist China. There were unconfirmed reports, in-1950 and 1951,
of ChineseTomrn s tentions"to seize the island group and of actual
landings on some of the islands. The Chinese Communists publicly claimed
sovereignty to the islands, based on historic Chinese claims, at the time
of the San Francisco Peace Conference, and Chinese Corrinunist as well as
Chinese Nationalist maps continue to show the area as Chinese territory.
3. Vietnam." The Vietnamese' officially claimed the Paracels at least
as early a'~"s =0, when Enperor Bao Dai declared that - he considered them
part of Vietnamts national territory. Unofficially' the Vietnamese have
cited documents. describing the Paracels as under the sovereignty of Arnlam
as early as 1701. During the San Francisco Conference in 1951 Vietnam as-
serted its claim to both the Paracel and Spratly'island groups. 'Vietnamese
progressively took over the garrison on Pattie Island from the French, and
in.the wake of recent Chinese Communist activities on Woody Island, have
reasserted claims to sovereignty (most recently on June 1, 1956).
B, Other Interested Parties
t. France, The French surveyed the islands in the 1920's.. In 1937
an expedit..son took soundings and erected a lighthouse on Pattle Island.
During a second expedition in 1938, France proclaimed possession of the
islands, and announced that they had been completely occupied and placed
under the jurisdiction of Indochina.. This claim was based on the assertion
that China had ceded the islands to Annam in 1816, and that France inherited
these rights when it obtained control of Annam (by the Treaty of Pei;.ng of
June 9, 1835). However, no documentary evidence of the 1816? cession is
available. A small French-Vietnamese garrison was withdrawn, 'under Japanese
pressure, prior to.the Japanese-occupation of Hainan in 1939. A French*
weather station was opened in 1947 on Pattle Island, and 'a small garrison
of French colonial troops was there until replaced by Vietnamese early in
1956. Apparently a few French meteorologists still remain. A September'5,
1955 French-aide memoire renewing the French claim to Spratly and neighbor-
ing 'islands, ode ` -ia"~the Paracels' -have been Vietnamese since the 18th
Century.,. and created the presumption that the earlier French 'claim was
exercised on behalf of Vietnam `and ' now 'has .reverted to' the latter.
2, JJapan. 'In 1915 the Japanese disoovered the existence of lihosphates
in the PaAacels'annd the Japanese Government made an unsuccessful effort to
determine ownership of the islands. In 1921 a Japanese fire attempted to
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e:;ploit the guano deposits on the islands, but made no permanent settlement.
Japan protested the (1938) French claim to sovereignty and herself claimed
the islands by right of "discover" and development. After the` occupation
of Hainan, the Japanese occupied the Paracels and exploited the guano
deposits during World War II. Japanese claims were extinguished by
Article II (f) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
3a The United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has made no claim to the.
area, alb" zsfi surveyed the islands in 1925 (an earlier survey
had been made by the Germans in 1881.). As late as 1936 the British ap-
pai ently considered the islands part of China, for the LZC sought rights to
establish commercial aviation bases from China,
4. The United States, The US has made no claim to the islands nor
any dete:r.Mnat~"' sovereignty (beyond the San Francisco Treatyt s
affirmation that they are not Japanese). A 1939 note from Secretary. of State
Hull to the Japanese protesting the latterts claims to the Spratlys ap-
parently did not encompass the area of the Paracels.
5a Philippines and Communist Vietnam. On the basis of geographic
proxiyty;?'`0ieAcrac"" ep.c o a.etnam" and conceivably the Philippines
also could be considered as "interested" parties, but neither has advanced
any claim to the Paracels. The Vietnamese Communists apparently are deferring
to Com ist Ch3nals claims.
C. Recent Developments
Reports that Chinese Communists were in the Paracels in 1950 and 1951
were never confirmed, but since August 1955 their presence on Woody Island
has been observed on innumerable occasions,
The Chinese Communists have constructed several permanent type build-
ings and recreational facilities and have brought in women and children;
aerial' reconnaissance on Iiay 23, 1956 revealed about 250 persons on the
island. These developments suggest that permanent settlement is intended.
Small boats unloading supplies and tales on cargo have been observed and
some fishing activity in the area has been noted, There is no evidence of
any military activity on the island; the primary occupation of the Communist
settlers appears to be guano collection.
This partial occupation by Chinese Communist elements stimulated the
Vietnamese to consider ways of asserting their claim and protecting their
installation on Pattle Island, On Iay 29, the Chinese Communists restated
their claim to the Paracels and Spratlys; on June 1 the Vietnamese Foreign
I:in;stry issued its renewed claim which, the announcement asserted, had been
"recognized" by the San Francisco Treaty; on June 2 the Chinese Nationalist
Foreign'iinistry denied the validity of the Vietnamese claim and reasserted
its own.
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On June 10, the Vietnamese reported a landing by Chinese Communist
troops on Rober JplFancl, approximate1y three miles from Patt1ke_2sla-i4. US
.aerial reconnaissance on une c e p esence of some 75 persons
on 1Zobe-Yt Island, apparently engaged in Guano collection, but subsequent
investigation, including a patrol by a landing party from US destroyers
despatched to the scene, found that the island had been abandoned by the
Chinese Communists. At the beginning of July, the Vietnamese reinforced
their garrison 'on Pattle.Island and apparently intend to occupy Robert
Island as well. There are no present indications that the Vietnamese will
attempt to oust the Chinese Communists from Woody Island.
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III. PPATAS REEF AND ISLAUD
Although not currently an international issue Pratas Reef occupies
a position similar in other respects to that of the Spratlys and the
Paracels. Located about 160 miles southeast of Hong Kong., 280 miles north-
west of Luzon, and 280 miles east-northeast''of Hainan, the reef consists of
a circular coral barrier, roughly 13 miles in diameter, enclosing a coral-
studded lagoon with Pratas Island on the western side. Many points -vdthin
the lagoon and on t he'northern, eastern, and southern sides of the reef are
uncovered at low tide. Pratas, largest of the South China Sea islands con-
sidered in this paper, had no permanent inhabitants before 'World I'Tar II but
was frequented by Chinese., Japanese, and Formosan fishermen, who gathered
seaweed, shells, and corals. It has guano deposits of some value and also
can be'used for meteorological observations.
From earliest times Chinese fishermen from Kwangtung and Fukien have
visited the island. Chinese sovereignty apparently was recognized by Japan
in about 1909, and the island was officially placed by the Chinestie under the
administration of the Governor of Iwangtung. In 1911 the Chinese Imperial
Mariti~re Customs surveyed it and in 1926 the Chinese Admiralty constructed
and-assumed administration of a radio station, lighthouse, and weather
observatory on the islands ?. At the .time of the Japanese occupation in
September 1937, a Chinese staff of some 30 men was removed to Taiwan,
After World I-Tar II the Chinese Nationalists established a meteorolog-
ical station on Pratas Island, and have since maintained it under the auspices
of the Nationalist navy, Although the Chinese Communists claim the Pratas
Reef as Communist territory, they have made no effort to displace. the
Nationalists.
In 1906 Japanese discovered buried phosphate on Pratas Island. The
following year plans to exploit the deposits were formulated and put into
effects The Japanese felt that? since the island was uninhabited, there was
.no obstacle to mining, and they sold about lO..000 tons of phosphates to
Japanese fertilizer companies. After these activities began,.however,
Chinese warships repeatedly inspected the island and the issue of ownership
arose...The Japanese discontinued operations then, in view of the proximity
of the island to South China, they decided that acknowledgement of China's.
sovereignty would promote Sino-Japanese friendship. As a result of
negotiations, the Chinese Government on October 11, 1909 paid 160,000 Canton
silver dollars to defray the cost of installations constricted by the
Japanese, and the island reverted to Chinese administration.
In September 1937, after'the outbreak of war between Japan and China,
.the Japanese Navy occupied the island and plans for the cultivation of
coconut trees and the exploitation of phosphate deposits were announced,
Whether or not the Japanese implemented these plans during World War II is
not known.
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Appendix A
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION
1. Spratly Islands
In the southeastern portion of the South China Sea., spread out
between Vietnam, and the Philippines,, and Borneo., lie numerous islands,
cat's, reefs, shoals,, -rd banks which have no common nomenclature' in English
but which are known collectively by the-Chinese as Nan-sha Ch'lln-tao
(South San Archipelago). In this paper, the islands and cays in this area
a.re.collectively referred to as the Spratlys or the Spratly Islands,, and
the collective term includes Spratly Island proper, Amboyna Cay, and islands
in the Tizard Bank, Loaita Bank, Thitu Reef,, North Danger, and in the vast
.area of reefs and jutting rocks known as "Dangerous Ground"..
Spratly Island is a small islet, ap_iro.cimately 500 yards by 300 with
an elevation of about 8 feet, situated some 260 miles southeast of Vietnam,,
630 miles south of Hainan, and about 330 miles west of Palawan and 325 miles
west-northwest of British North Borneo It has no indigenous population but
has been frequented by fishermen from several countries during many decades
past. There are some guano deposits on the islands and perhaps phosphate
rocks Several palms,stand out conspicuously,
About 60 miles southeast of Spratly Island, lies Amboyna Cay, a
minute sandy cay truth ,an elevation of about eight feet. This. cay apparently,
possesses little significance,, perhaps on account of the steep coral ledges
upon which the sea breaks heavily in a swell,
Some 200 miles northeast of Spratly Island, directly outside the
northwest portion of the region designated as "Dangerous Ground," lies"the
Tizard Bank and Reefs., on which are located two islands and a sand cay.
Itu.Aaa., the larger of the two islands, is about three-quarters of a mile
long and one-quarter wide. It is covered vn th small trees and bushes,
including a scattering of coconut and plantain trees. A well provides fresh
water. Several wrecks dot the shallow -water surrounding Itu Aba. A sand
cay covered with 15 foot high bushes is situated near the center of a three-
ouarter mile reef six miles east of Itu Aba Island.
About 12 miles south of Itu Aba Island is Namyit'., the second island
in the Tizard Bank, About 20 feet high., Nar,Wit is probably. not over one-
quarter mile in length, and is covered with bushes and small trees,
Some 18 miles north of Itu Aba is Loaita Island in Loaita Bank and
Reefs. Loaita (also called South Island) is a small., oval cay.,300 yards
in diameter., covered with bushes and fringed by a reef. About seven miles
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northeast of Loaita Island is a reef about three-.fourths of a mile in
diameter within which lies small, sand;,- Lankiam Cay. Another cay is
located on a reef five miles northeast of;Loaita..
About 24 miles north-northwest of Loaita Island, located at the
eastern extrerlity of the Thitu Reefs., is Thitu Island, an oval patch of
low'.lying sand., less than one-half mile at its maximum dimension, with a
scattering of coconut and plantain trees. A well is located in the island
and at one time there were also a few-bamboo huts thereo About four' miles
west of Thitu Island ..s a sandy cay about one and one-half miles long
lying on a reef -1h.ich dries at low water-
About 20 miles north of Thitu Islanc' is a coral reef knot- as North
Danger, upon which rest Northeast Cay and Southwest Cay, (called by the French
"Groupe de Deux-Isles") each less than one-half mile long and 10 and 15
feet high respectively.
vhereas the abcve-mentioned islands all have. been frequented by
fishermen and adventurers and are fairly well ;crown, there are others in the
largely uncharted area known as 10Dangerous.Ground" about which very little
is knov:n. Perhaps the most prominent of these is Sin Cows Island, vahich
may be larger than any of the other islands listed above in the Spratly
Group, hut, about which very little information is available,
2. Paracel -Islands and Reefs .
The-northernmost cluster., the Amphitrite Group, consists of Tree,
North, Middle, South, Rocky, and Woody islands, and three sand Gays. Of
these only Woody Island., the southernmost and largest of the groups appears
to have any significance. It is a clamshaped island approximately one mile
in length and three-fourths of a mile wide. The island is studded with
palms and brush, has a pier, and some permanent construction, including
about 11 buildings as of March 1956. At present it is occupied by Chinese
Communists who appear to be mainly interested in the island for guano
exploitation. Rocky Island, half a mile northeast of Woody and within the
sane reef is approximately one-quarter by one-half mile in size and
conspicuous chiefly because of its elevation of )40 to 50 feet? Tree Island
is of like size and, receives its name from a palm tree located near its
center.
The Crescent Group is situated 35 to 45 miles southwest of Woody
Island, and consists of six low islands.,-most of'which are covered with
thick vegetation. The islands are Money, Robert, Pattle, Drummond, and
Duncan (Duncan actually consists of two islands within one reef), each of
which has a ratiismun dimension of about one-half miles and a height of about
20 to 30 feet. There are, in addition, several sand cays, one on Antelope
Reef and several between Observation Bank and Drummond Island. Pattle
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12
Island has several buildings, constructed by the French and Japanese during
their respective periods of occupation, and Robert Island had five huts on
the southeast end as of early June 1956, Fresh water wells are to be found
on all islands of the group, except possibly Money Island, and small piers
have been constructed on several,
Lincoln Island, second.largest of the Paracels, is one and one-half
miles long and about one-half mile wide and 15 feet high, and stands alone
about 23 miles southeast of Woody Island, It has some vegetation and a
fresh water well.
South of the Crescent Group are two sandy cat's, Passu Leah and Triton
Island, 58 and 94 miles southwest of Woody Island, respectively. Triton
Island is about-the size of TW..oody Island and 10 feet high, while Passu Keah
is a narrow cay9 less than three-quarters of a mile in length. Neither has
played an important role in affairs relating to the Paracels.
None of the above islands has an indigenous population, but all have
been used by fishermen from various countries for many years. Their resources
include guano and phosphate deposits, fish, coral, shells, and medicinal
seaweed.
3? Pratas Island
Pratas Island (200421 N., 116?431 E.) is a low, horseshoe-shaped island
about one and one-half miles long and one and one-half miles wide. Vegetation
includes a few coconut trees and some bushes. The island has a radio, station,
a 120-foot light tower, and a radar reflector.
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Appendix B
MINOR ISLANDS OP THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Sprats Islands
Spratl.v
Island
Amboyna Cay
Tizard Bank
Itu Abu
Island
Namyit Island
Sand Cay
Loaita Bank
Loaita Island
Chinese Name and
Alternative Name
Nan..sha Chlun-tao
Ait: Sinnan-(Japenese)
Size
. Dimension Elevation
ards)_ _ (feet)
Nanpvei Tao 500 x 300 8
Alt: Storm Island
(Prench)
An,bo-?an Sha
Cheng-ho Ch!un-chiao
4Ttai-p'ing Tao; and 1300 x .450 8
((b=ang Tao
Hung-hsiu Tao 450 x 150 20
Tao-wing Chun-?tao
Tao.-Ming (t) , 300 x 300 , 11 Alt: South Island'of
Horsburgh
UNCLASSIPIED
Distance (Statute Miles
Viet- Hong
mink Hainan Kong Philippines
(Palawan)
260 630 890 330
Borneo: 325
330
CA
(Pal )7-
770 210
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Appendix D
MINOR .ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (Continued)
Chinese Name and
Al.ternat ive -Name
Size
Dimension Elevation
(yards) _ (feet)
Distance Statute Miles From:
Snratlly Islands Group, Contd.
Lankiam Cay
Thitu Reef
Thitu Island
North Danger
Yang-hsin-an Sha
Chung-yeh Chow-tao
Shuang-tzu Chiao
700 x 500 11
minh
310
540
Hong
Bong Phil ip
_pines
(Palawan)
250
Alt: Groupe do
Deux.4Isles
(French)
Northeast Cay
750 x 200
10
'Southwest Cay
500 x 250
15
Dangerous Ground
Sir.Cowe
Island _
Paracel Islands
Vei-hsien Ti-tai
Ching-hsiung Tao
Hsi-sha Chtun tao
Amphitrite Group
West Sand
Tree Island
Hsuan-te Chfunr-tao
Hsi-sha Chou
ca 400.x 300
UNCLASSIFIED
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Gr Island Al
t
ernative Name (yards) (feet) mink Hainan Xo phili ines-
Ls.racel Islands Group? Ccntd?
North Island
ca 1000 x150
Middle Island ca 1100 x 150
South Island ca 700 x'200
South Sand ca 1100 x 250
Rocky Island
Woody Island
Drummond
Island
Duncan Island
(Twin)
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix B
MINOR ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEAS (Continued)
Size Dtanc? Statute Miles Fromo
Chinese Name and Dimension Elevation Viet-
500 x 300 110-50
(W -hsin Tao.
and
(Lin Tao
(Luzon)
Alta -Boise (French)
Yung-le Chtun-tao
2000 x 1200
. X160
ca, 900 x 1100
ca 900 x 1100
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Appendix B
MINOR ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA-SFA (Continued)
Size Distance Statute Miles From
Chinese Name and Dimension Elevation Viet- Hong
Group Island Altexn?a.tive Name arils feet minh Hainan Kon Phili ines
Paracel I slandy. . Grotap, Contd.-,o.
Money Island
Chinnyin Tao
ca 800 x 350
Robert Island
n
Kan,,,cchuan Tao
880 x 300
Pattle Island
Shan-hu Tao
880 x 400
30
Individual Islands
Lincoln
Ho-vu Tao
2800 x 900
15
Island
Pyramid Rock
Kao-chien Shih
17
Passeu Keah
Ptanb-ship Hsu
1200 x. 200
Triton Island
Chung--chiea - ao; and
1700-k-1200
10
Pratas Reef
Ttu-lai-ttang Tao
2600 x 2600
UNCLASSIFIED
(Luzon
170 i6o 4oo 540 ..
660
390 200
(Luzon)
290
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