DISPUTED ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

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A Publication of the Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg
Dieter Heinzig
DISPUTED ISLANDS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Paracels ? Spratlys Pratas ? Macclesfield Bank
OTTO HARRASSOWITZ ? WIESBADEN
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/?
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Dieter Heinzig
Disputed Islands in the South China Sea
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DISPUTED ISLANDS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Paracels ? Spratlys ? Pratas ? Macclesfield Bank
by
DIETER HEINZIG
A Publication of the Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg
OTTO HARRASSOWITZ ? WIESBADEN 1976
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VERBUND STIFTUNG DEUTSCHES CBERSEE-INSTITUT
The Institute of Mian Affairs pursues and promotes research on contemporary Asian affairs.
It cooperates with other Institutes of regional studies in Hamburg which together form
the Foundation German Overseas Institute.
Opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute of Asian Affairs and the Federal
Institute for East European and International Studies are the authors', they do not
necessarily reflect those of the Inititutes.
CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek
Heinzig, Dieter
Disputed islands in the South China Sea:
Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas, Macclesfield Bank. ?
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976.
(A publication of the Institute of Asian''
Affairs in Hamburg)
ISBN 3-447-01804-6
This publication was supported by the Federal Institute for East European and Inter-
national Studies in Cologne.
(c) 1976 Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg
All rights reserved,
including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.
Printed in Germany by Hessische Druckerei GmbH, Darmstadt.
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TO
HENNING
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CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
9
INTRODUCTION
11
CHAPTER I: Geography
13
1. Terminology
13
2. General Remarks on the Disputed Archipelagos
14
3. The Archipelagos in Detail
15
Paracel Group
15
Spratly Group
17
Pratas Group
19
Macclesfield Bank
19
CHAPTER II: Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II and the Claims
Involved
21
1. Developments up to the End of the 19th Century
21
China's Relations to the Islands
21
Vietnam's Relations to the Islands
24
2. Developments Between the End of the 19th Century and World War II
25
First Chinese Attempts at Acquiring Sovereignty
25
Acquisition of the Spratlys and Paracels by France and Japan
27
CHAPTER III: Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims
Involved
31
1. The Actual Development
31
First Chinese Occupation of Islands After the End of the War
31
Developments on the Pratas
32
'Developments on the Paracels
32
Developments in the Spratly Region
35
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8 Contents
2. Diplomatic Events 38
The First Claims Raised 38
The Regulation of the Island Issue in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 39
The Behaviour of Some of the Signatories Following the Conclusion of the
Peace Treaties 40
Renewal of Claims After the Conclusion of the Peace Treaties 42
APPENDIX
Chart 1: The Disputed South China Sea Archipelagos
? Chart 2: The Boundaries in the South China Sea as Drawn by Peking
Chart 3: The Boundaries in the South China Sea as Drawn by Taipei
Chart 4: The Paracel Islands
Chart 5: The Region Where Fighting Took Place on Jan 19 and 20, 1974:
The Crescent Group (Paracel Islands)
Chart 6: The Amphitrite Group (Paracel Islands)
Chart 7: The Spratly Islands
Chart 8: Tizard Bank (Spratly Islands): Itu Aba I., Nun yit I., Sand Cay
Chart 9: Spratly Island
Chart 10: Pratas Island
Chart 11: Macclesfield Bank
Chart 12: Position of the "Republic of Luconia"
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ABBREVIATIONS
CY JP Chung-yang jih-pao (Taipei)
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong)
IHT International Herald Tribune
JMJP Jen-min jih-pao (Peking)
Keesing (Keesings) Archiv der Gegenwart, Vienna (Bonn, Ziirich)
NCNA New China News Agency (Peking)
NFHNA News from Hsinhua News Agency (Peking/London)
NRC Nachrichtenagentur der Republik China, Bulletin fiir Europa
(Taipei/Vienna)
NZZ Neue Ziircher Zeitung
SCMP Survey of China Mainland Press (Hong Kong)
SWB FE Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, The Far East (BBC)
4
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INTRODUCTION
In January 1974 a military conflict broke out between the People's Republic of
China (P.R.C.) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in the area of the
Paracel Islands. The encounter ended in total victory for the Chinese.
There are several reasons why this conflict attracted worldwide attention. The
first question to arise was whether the conflict might be regarded as the first sign of
China's foreign policy taking a new tack. Leaving aside Tibet and Taiwan, which
both represent problems of their own, it may be said that the P.R. China had not
heretofore shown any inclination towards unprovoked territorial expansion by
force. Another question was whether the presumed existence of petroleum deposits
under the sea-bed or, perhaps, strategical considerations were playing a part in this
conflict. At the same time, political observers were reminded of the almost forgotten
fact that there was by no means unanimity among the countries bordering on the
South China Sea as to the ownership of the archipelagos situated in this region.
Another point referred to in current reports on the events was that the Paracel
conflict in January 1974 was by no means the sole, but only the most recent, in a
series of incidents and disputes over certain groups of islands in this part of the sea
that had been going on for a long time.
Covering mainly the period up to the January 1974 conflict the present paperl
deals with the two last-mentioned issues. The author intends to provide a solid basis
of historical information for all those who wish to assess the conflict of Januar 1974
and any future dispute that may arise in the South China Sea, particularly with
regard to the Spratly archipelago where, Hanoi reported, in May 1975 various
islands had been occupied by Communist Vietnamese forces.
The first chapter contains an introduction to the geography of the disputed
archipelagos. This appears advisable in view of the lack of general awareness of the
location and shape of the various islands that has become apparent in the reports
on the January 1974 conflict. As it seems highly probable that hostilities may again
1 The author wishes to thank Dr. Wolfgang Berner for comment and suggestion concerning
this manuscript; Mrs. Barbara Langer for valuable aid in editing this book; Mr. Hung-
hsiang Chou for assistance in interpreting the more difficult parts of some Chinese texts;
Dr. Yu-Hsi Nieh for drawing his attention to some important Chinese sources; Mrs. Wald-
traut Jarke for translating the German manuscript into English, and Mr. Robert Taubman
and Mr. Erich Tetzlaff for reviewing the translation. He expresses his gratitude to the
Federal Institute for East European and International Studies in Cologne, as well as to the
Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg, for their support which made the publication of this
book possible.
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12 Introduction
break out in this area, in particular clashes over the Spratlys, a geographical stock-
taking of the kind proposed here may be considered an investment beneficial to
future watchers of the scene in the South China Sea. This part of the world has
recently become all the more susceptible to conflicts over the possession of the various
islands with the growing interest all states are taking in islands that either have not
been claimed or whose ownership is controversial. The question of maritime eco-
nomic zones remains even more delicate in the case of islands than in that of the
continental shelves and will be a subject of negotiation during the next sessions of
the UN's Law of the Sea Conference.
In the second and third chapters of this book, the author will give an outline of
the rather complicated history of sovereignty in the area of the disputed archipel-
agos. In doing so, he intends to slot the Paracel conflict of January 1974 into its
proper place in the greater context of all the disputes over the possession of islands
in the South China Sea, with the object of revealing the historical background of the
conflict, thus contributing his share to the understanding of the tensions apparent
throughout this region. In the light of this background the author wishes to warn the
reader not to regard China's behaviour in the Paracel issue as indicative of a change
in her foreign policy course with the ultimate aim of territorial expansion, but
only as a reminder that Peking in future be prepared to back up by force certain
existing territorial claims, should this prove necessary or opportune.
Leaving out Hainan (which is an island in itself and not an archipelago) and some
islands in the immediate vicinity of the bordering countries, the following groups
will be understood under the term "archipelagos in the South China Sea" for the
purposes of this book:
(1) the Pratas group (5) the Badas group
(2) the Paracel group (6) the Tambelan group
(3) Macclesfield Bank (7) the Natuna group
(4) the Spratly group (8) the Anambas group.
The actual behaviour of the bordering countries during and after the January
1974 conflict and the statements which the various countries made in this connection
show that the only archipelagos whose ownership is generally recognized are those
specified under (5) to (8) above, which are situated in the extreme south of the
region and belong to Indonesia. Sovereignty over the groups specified under (1) to
(4) is controversial. They are, as far as was known by autumn of 1975, being claimed
by several states, viz. :2
(1) the Pratas by the P.R. China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
(2) the Paracels by the P.R. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam
(3) Macclesfield Bank by the P.R. China and Taiwan
(4) the Spratlys by the P.R. China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam.
It is therefore these four archipelagos, whose ownership is controversial, that will
be dealt with in the present book.
2 For Peking's and Taipei's claims, cf. Charts Nos. 2 and 3 in the Appendix, on which the
boundaries are shown.
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CHAPTER I
GEOGRAPHY
1. Terminology
The various geographical descriptions, available to the author, of the archipelagos
in disputes are rather superficial and by no means uniform. It was difficult to come
by reasonably accurate charts and maps4 and even on some of those the author did
manage to obtain, the information differed. The identification of corresponding
names on Western and Chinese charts confronted the author with considerable
problems.
In the following chapters of this book, the author will use the names normally
employed in Western geographical works except as special reasons call for the ad-
dition of the corresponding names known to the author will be added to the Western
terms in the geographical description of the archipelagos, where the reader may
look them up whenever he needs them. In the absence of precise statistics, many of
3 Wherever the information given in this chapter is not supported by the citation of indivi-
dual references, it is based on the cartographical material specified in Note (4) and on the
following publications: ? Chung-kuo fen-sheng ti-eu, Peking (?) 1964, and the Taiwanese
reprint thereof entitled Kung-fei ch'i-cha hsia ti Chung-kuo ta-lu fen-sheng ti-fu, Taipei
1966, p. 27 b; Nan Hai (Pseud.), Nan-hai chu tao ti hsing-shih yii li-shih yen-ko, in: Hsing-
chou chou-k'an (Singapore), Feb 2, 1974; Hsi-sha ch'iin-tao, in: Hsing-chou jih-pao (Singa-
pore), Feb 14, 1974; Jen Kurzgefafite Geographie Chinas, Peking 1964, p. 186;
Borshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 39, Moscow 1956, p. 195, Vol. 49, Moscow 1957,
p. 379; G. A. Thee!, The World Shipping Scene, Munich 1963, p. 61; Yu-hsi Nieh, Die
Rechtsfrage der Archipele im Siidchinesischen Meer, in: China aktuell (Hamburg), February
1974, pp. 25 ff. (with further citations); Ch'i-shih nien-tai (Hong Kong), March 1974,
pp. 38 ff.; Hsi-sha ch'iln-tao ti i-hsieh i-ming, in: Ta-kung pao (Hong Kong), Jan 27, 1974;
China Sea Pilot, Vol. I, 3rd Edn., Published by the Hydographer of the Navy, London 1964.
4 The chief cartographical material used by the author is specified hereinafter, as follows:
Chung-hua min-kuo ti-eu chi, ti szu ts'e, Chung-kuo nan-pu, 2nd Edn., Taipei 1964;
Chung-kuo fen-sheng ti-eu (see Note 3 above); Chung-hua Jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-eu chi,
Peking 1966, reprinted in Hong Kong in 1971; Hai-nan tao, Prepared by the Army Map
Service (KCLU), Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., Compiled in 1954,
NE 49, Series 1301; Admiralty Charts Nos. 2660 B, 1201, 362, 270, 94; Chung-hua Jen-min
kung-ho-kuo ti-eu, Peking 1957, 6th Edn. 1971; Haack Weltatlas, Gotha, Leipzig 1972;
China, Esselte Map Stockholm, Cartographia Budapest 1967; Chung-hua Jen-min kung-ho-
kuo ti-fu, Peking 1965, 3rd Edn. 1972; Chung-hua Jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-eu, Peking 1965,
5th Edn. 1974.
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14 Geography
the figures given on the following pages have been obtained by interpolation, and
should not be regarded as more than rough approximations.
Strictly speaking, only one of the four controversial archipelagos may truly be )
referred to as a group of islands: the Paracels. The Pratas consist of one island and
two sands. Macclesfield Bank is a permanently submerged atoll. The Spratlys are an
agglomeration of islands, reefs, and banks scattered over a vast area and seperated
by distances of up to 1,000 km from each other. Until this day, Western charts have
usually refrained from depicting them as one archipelago. The first time they were
thus labelled was in 1947 when the Nationalist Chinese government officially intro-
duced the name of "Nan-sha &i.in-tao" (Southern Archipelago) for these scattered
islands. 6 After 1949 the government in Peking and the countries then belonging to
the Eastern bloc adopted this name. The emphasis which Chou En-lai laid on the
island of Spratly (Nan-wei in Chinese) in a statement dated August 15, 1951,6 in
which he claimed the P.R.C.'s ownership of the Hsi-sha, Nan-sha, Chung-sha, and
Tung-sha archipelagos and which Peking has repeatedly referred to since, seems to
have resulted in the increasing use of the names of "Spratly archipelago", "Sprat-
lys", "Spratleys" or "Spratleis" in Western publications as a collective name for the
archipelago in question, so that this term may now be regarded as standard.
For the reasons set forth above, the term "archipelago", as employed in the present
paper, has a very comprehensive field of association and the only reason why the
author has adopted it is that it has become common usage in all political discussions
of the disputes concerning the South China Sea Islands.
2. General Remarks on the Disputed Archipelagos
The four archipelagos consist of more than 170 islets, reefs, and banks. The number
of islands in the proper sense of the word cannot be determined with any certainty,
as there seems to be no complete and precise information on the Spratlys; at any
rate, no such information has been published. The most detailed publications avail-
able to the author 7 reveal the existence of 36 islands, including reefs or sand cays of
island character (15 in the Paracels, 20 in the Spratlys, and one in the Pratas). Pratas
island which covers 12 sq.km is the largest of them. The other islands are much
smaller in area: the figure given for the largest of the Paracels, Woody Island, is
1.85 sq.km, the largest of the Spratlys (Itu Aba) covering 0.4 sq.km. As a rule, each
of the islands is surrounded by a coral reef circular or oval in shape. As the archi-
5 For details, cf. p. 38 of this book.
6 For the wording of the relevant passage in Chou En-lai's statement, cf. p. 39 of this book.
7 Admiralty Charts Nos. 2660 B, 1201, 362, 270, 94.
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General Remarks 15
pelagos are scattered over a vast region of the South China Sea, the distances be-
tween them are great, sometimes exceeding 1,000 km.
All the islands are located in the tropical zone. The average annual temperature in
this region varies between 15? and 28?C. Annual rainfall averages 2,500 mm. The
islands' flora consists primarily of coconut palms, tung oil trees, and quince, pine-
apple, and banana trees.
The islands have been, and still are, economically important as bases for fishing
vessels and as sites of valuable guano deposits. Guano, which on some islands has
accumulated to a height of up to 1 metre, is used in the manufacture of high quality
fertilizers. The South China Sea is rich in a great variety of edible fish, sea turtles
(valuable for their shell), cuttlefish, trepang, shellfish, and oysters. On the islands,
fishermen collect swallows' nests, the basic substance of a soup in great demand
throughout East and South-East Asia. If the presumed existence of large petroleum
deposits under the sea-bed of the surrounding waters is confirmed,8 the islands may
attain great economic importance.
The islands also serve as advance naval bases of strategic value which may e.g. be
of use in the surveillance and control of shipping crossing the South China Sea be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The most important archipelago strategically
is that of the Paracels, because the main shipping route from Hong Kong to Singa-
pore passes between the Paracels and Macclesfield Bank.? Other shipping lanes pas-
sing across the South China Sea are used by ships bound from Vladivostok, Pusan,
Yokohama, Shimonoseki, Tsingtao, Hong Kong to Singapore and ? through the
Strait of Malacca ? into the Indian Ocean.1? Chinese publications emphasize the
importance of the islands to national defense.11
3. The Archipelagos in Detail12
Paracel Group (Chin.: Hsi-sha ch'iin-tao; Vietn.: Hoang Sa)13.
Geographical position: between 15?46' and 17?8'N. Lat. and 111?11' and 112?
54'E. Long.
8 In this connection, cf. Wei Ming, Nan-sha shih-chien pei-ching t'an-so, in: Ch'i-shih
nien-tai (Hong Kong), pp. 57 if.
9 China Sea Pilot, loc. cit. (see Note 3 above), p. 65.
10 Ibid.; G. A. Theel, /oc. cit. (see Note 3 above).
11 Jen /oc. cit. (see Note 3 above).
12 The information given in this passage comprises only geographical details and, when
available, details of the status of the various islands as of autumn of 1975. The question of
whether and to what extent islands have been subjected to civilisatory influences is dealt
with on pp. 27 ff., 33 ff. of this book.
13 Cf. Charts Nos. 4, 5, and 6 in the Appendix to this book.
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16 Geography
As a result of the military actions on January 19 and 20, 1974, the whole archi-
pelago is now firmly in Peking's hands.
Its centre is approximately midway between the southern coast of the Chinese
island of Hainan (about 350 km southeast of Yiilin harbour) and the central Viet-
nam coast (about 400 km east of Da Nang). The archipelago comprises 15 islets,
covering a total area of about 3 sq.km and more than a dozen partly or temporarily
submerged reefs and banks, scattered over an area forming a large oval with a
maximum diameter of about 200 km.
The Paracels are generally subdivided into two principal groups, viz.
1) AMPHITRITE GROUP (Chin.: Hsiian-teh ch'iin-tao)14
Located in the northeastern part of the archipelago and comprising seven islands,
as follows:
a) Woody Island (Chin.: Yung-hsing tao or Lin tao; Vietn.: Da Phu Lam). With
its length of 1.8 km and width of 1.1 km, this is the most important of the
Paracel islands. Its guano deposits are estimated to have amounted to 140,000 t,
one fourth having been removed during the Japanese occupation. The island has
a rich vegetation of trees and bushes.
b) Rocky Island (Chin.: Shih tao; Vietn.: Hon Da). 375 metres long, 340 metres
wide, and almost devoid of vegetation.
c) Lincoln Island (Chin.: Wu-ho tao; Vietn.: Dao Linh Con). Length: 2.3 km,
width: 800 metres. The Hong Kong ? Singapore shipping route passes not far
from the eastern edge of the island.
d) South Island (Chin.: Nan tao; Vietn.: Dao Nam).
e) Middle Island (Chin.: Chung tao; Vietn.: Dao Trung).
f) North Island (Chin.: Pei tao; Vietn.: Dao Bac).
g) Tree Island (Chin.: Chao-shu tao; Vietn.: Dao Cu Moc).
The Amphitrite Group also includes eight cays and one reef. These are the West,
North, Middle, and South Bank (Chin.: Hsi-sha, Pei-sha, Chung-sha, and Nan-sha),
the four submerged banks ? Iltis Bank (Chin.: Yin-lo t'an or Yin-li t'an), Dido
Bank (Chin.: Hsi-tu t'an), Jehangire Bank (Chin.: Chan-han t'an), and Bremen Bank
(Chin.: Pin-mei t'an) ? Bombay Reef (Chin.: P'eng-p'o chiao) which measures
about 20 km from end to end, and two rocks.
2) CRESCENT GROUP (Chin.: Yung-lo ch'iin-tao),15 located in the southwestern part
of the archipelago and comprising eight islands, viz.:
a) Robert Island (Chin.: Kan-ch'iian tao; Vietn.: Dao Cam Tuyen),15 about 750
metres long and 400 metres wide, covered with rich vegetation and vast guano
deposits.
b) Pattle Island (Chin.: Shan-hu tao; Vietn.: Hoang Sa),17 about 1 km long and
500 metres wide, covered with vegetation.
14 Cf. Chart No. 6 in the Appendix to this book.
15 Cf. Chart No. 5 in the Appendix to this book.
16 A complete view of Robert Island may be found in Jen-min hua-pao, 1974, No. 8, p. 20.
17 For a complete view of Pattle I. cf. ibid.
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The Archipelagos in Detail 17
c) Triton Island (Chin.: Chung-chien tao; Vietn.: Dao Tri Ton)18, about 1.75 km
long and 1.5 km wide, is the largest island of the Crescent group. It has no veget-
ation.
die) Duncan Island (Chin.: Tao-kan ch'iin-tao; Vietn.: Dao Quang Hoa). The
Chinese name (ch'iin-tao = archipelago) indicates that there are two Duncan
islands, viz.
d) Ch'en-hang taolg (Duncan Island proper), covered with plants, more than 1 km
long and about 500 metres wide, and
e) Kuang-chin tao (no Western name), a tiny islet located at a distance of a few
hundred metres from Ch'en-hang.
f) Money Island (Chin.: Chin-yin tao; Vietn.: Dao Vinh Lac), about 500 metres
long and 200 metres wide, covered with brushwood.
g) Drummond Island (Chin.: Chin-ch'ing tao; Vietn.: Dao Duy Mong), about 500
metres long and 300 metres wide.
h) Passu Keah (Chin.: P'an-shih Vietn.: Dao Bach Quy).
The Crescent Group further includes four partly submerged reefs and ,a sand cay:
Antelope Reef (Chin.: Ling-yang chiao), length about 6 km, width 3 km; Discovery
Reef (Chin.: Hua-kuang chiao), with a longitudinal diameter of more than 30 km;
Vuladdore Reef (Chin.: Yii-cho chiao), with a length of about 15 km and a width of
5 km; North Reef (Chin.: Pei chiao); and a brushwood-covered sand-cay called
Shen-p'ing ean (of which only the Chinese name is known) on Observation Bank.
Spratly Group (Chin.: Nan-sha ch'iin tao; Vietn.: Truong Sa)20.
Geographical position: between 4? and 11?30'N. Lat. and 109?30' and 117?50'
E. Long.
At the end of 1974, seven of the twenty islands, islets, reefs, and cays were in South
Vietnamese hands: Nam yit (Tizard Bank), the main base, Cay du N.E. (North
Danger), Truong Sa (obviously Spratly Island), Sin Cowe (Union Banks & Reefs),
and Sin Ton, Sandcay, and Song Tu Tay, which are unidentifiable.21 Three or four
other islets are occupied by the Philippines, among them Thitu Island, the main
base, and Nan-shan Island.22 The island of Itu Aba (Tizard Bank) has, for some
18 For a complete view of Triton I. cf. ibid.
19 For a partial view of Ch'en-hang cf. ibid., p. 22.
20 Cf. Charts Nos. 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendix of this book.
21 Cf. pp. 36 f. of this book. ? According to Peking sources, South Vietnam also occupied
the island of Nan-tzu, corresponding to South West Cay in the North Danger Group as
shown in a Taiwanese atlas (see Note 4 above). The author has, however, been unable to
find out whether this islands is identical with one of the three unidentified islands referred
to by Vietnam. Cf. Peking Radio on Feb 4, 1974, as cited in SW B FE/4519/A3/1 (Feb 6, 1974).
22 cf. p. 36 of this book.
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18 Geography
time, been used as a naval base by Taiwan." In May 1975 various Spratly islands
were apparently occupied by Communist troops from Vietnam.
The uncounted islands, including reefs or cays of island character of the Spratlys,
probably totalling more than 100, are scattered over a vast area oval in shape and
with a maximum diameter of about 1,000 km. The centre of the group is located at
a point of about 400 km northeast of the northern tip of Borneo and the Philippine
island of Palawan and about 500 km from the South Vietnamese coast. The distance
between the Spratlys and the Paracels is about 700 km, between the Spratlys and
the Chinese island of Hainan, 1,000 km.
The Spratlys comprise twelve regions with islands, reefs, and cays,24 as follows:
1) NORTH DANGER (Chin.: Shuang-tzu chiao)
a) North-East Cay (Chin.: Pei-tzu tao), about 1 km long and 400 metres wide, is
covered with coarse grass and low bushes as well as thickly wooded with trees
growing from about 6 to 9 metres.
b) South-West Cay (Chin.: Nan-tzu tao), about 0.5 km long and 300 metres wide.
Vegetation as on North-East Cay. According to official Peking sources, oc-
cupied by South Vietnam early in 1974.25
2) THI TU ISLAND AND REEFS (Chin.: Chung-yeh tao)
a) Thi tu Island, about 1.5 km long and 1 km wide. Covered with grass, scrub, and
palm-trees. Chief foothold of the Philippines in this region.
b) Sandy Cay. A tiny islet, without vegetation.
3) WEST YORK ISLAND (Chin.: Hsi-yiieh tao).
4) LOAI TA ISLAND AND REEFS (Chin.: Tao-ming c.h'iin-tao)
a) Loai ta Island (Chin.: Tao-ming tao). An island of insignificant size covered
with mangrove bushes, coconut palms, and bushy trees.
Lam kiam Cay (Chin.: Yang-hsin sha-diou). A tiny sand cay.
Loai ta Cay, as under
IRVING CAY
6 a) Nanshan Island (Chin.: Ma-huan tao). Occupied by the Philippines.
6 b) Flat Island (Chin.: Fei-hsin tao).
7) TIZARD BANK AND REEFS (Chin.: Cheng-he ch'iin-chiao)25a
a) Itu Aba Island (Chin.: T'ai-p'ing tao). About 1 km long and 400 metres wide,
covered with trees and scrub. Taiwanese naval base.
b) Nam yit Island (Chin.: Hung-ma tao). Islet of insignificant size, covered with
bushes and small' trees. Until the end of the Vietnam war, this island was the
chief base of the Republic of Vietnam.
c) Sand Cay, covered with bushes, insignificant in size.
23 In this connection cf. p. 35 of this book. ? For the following sentence, cf. Hanoi Radio
(home service in Vietnamese) on May 6, 1975, as cited in SWB/FE/4898/A3/8.
24 The twelve regions specified in this section are shown, under the same numbers as in the
text, in their approximate positions on Chart No. 7 of the Appendix to this book.
25 see Note 21 above (with sources).
25a For Tizard Bank, cf. detail chart No. 8 in the Appendix to this book.
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The Archipelagos in Detail 19
8) UNION BANK AND REEFS
a) Sin Cowe Island. Until the end, of the Vietnam war, this island was occupied
by the Republic of Vietnam.
b) (Sin Cowe) Cay.
9) SPRATLY ISLAND (Chin.: Nan-wei tao; Vietn.: Truong Sa)26. About 750 metres
long and 400 metres wide. Covered with short green vegetation. Until the end
of the Vietnam war, this island was occupied by the Republic of Vietnam.
10) COMMODORE REEF (Chin.: Szu-ling chiao)
Sand cay.
11) MARIVELES REEF (Chin.: Nan-hao chiao)
Cay.
12) AMBOYNA CAY (Chin.: An-po-na sha-chou), consisting of a beach of sand and
broken coral, partly covered with a bed of guano.
Pratas Group (Chin.: Tung-sha ch'iin-tao)27
Geographical position: between 20?30' and 21?30'N. Lat. and 116? and 117?E.
Long.
This group has apparently been firmly in Taipei's hands for a long time.
It is located about 300 km southeast of Hong Kong, 400 km southwest of Taiwan,
and 500 km northwest of Luzon, the largest island of the Philippines. In addition to
the island of Pratas (Chin.: Tung-sha tao), which is 6 km long and 2 km wide, the
group includes two submerged sands (Pei wei t'an and Nan wei t'an). Pratas is
covered with tropical plants and guano deposits. It is located near the Hong Kong ?
Manila shipping route.
Macclesfield Bank (Chin.: Chung-sha ch'iin-tao)28
Geographical position: between 15?20' and 16?20'N. Lat. and 113?40' and
115? E. Long.
This bank is situated about 300 km east-south-east of the Paracels and consists
exclusively of submerged coral reefs. The length of the whole bank is about 140 km,
its width more than 60 km. At the shoalest part of the edge there is a depth of 11
metres, the depth of the shoalest part of the centre being 9 metres.
28 For Spratly Island, cf. detail chart No. 9 in the Appendix to this book.
27 For the Pratas, cf. detail chart No. 10 in the Appendix to this book.
28 For Macclesfield Bank, cf. detail chart No. 11 in the Appendix to this book.
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CHAPTER II
OCCUPATION OF ISLANDS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED
1. Developments up to the End of the 19th Century
In connection with the conflict of January 1974 in the area of the Paracels, the
countries involved attempted in many different ways to assert historical claims to
islands in the South China Sea. Thus, Peking declared that all of the four contested
archipelagos had "always" (li-lai)29 belonged to China. A few years before, it had
claimed that the islands had belonged to China since the 15th century.3? Saigon
argued that the Spratlys had been under Vietnamese sovereignty "for centuries".31
Neither party, however, had claimed permanent occupation of any one of the
islands. Actually it seems impossible to supply proof of permanent sovereignty. In
fact, the historical claims ? generally implicit ones ? rely on the discovery, tem-
porary or repeated occupation, or the maintainance of relations of any kind to
the islands.
Peking, Taipei, and the Republic of Vietnam are the only parties to have endea-
voured to establish a comprehensive historical argumentation going back to before
the 20th century. There cannot be any doubt that in this respect the Chinese are in a
more favourable position than the others.
China's Relations to the Islands
Traces of the discovery of islands in the South China Sea by Chinese mariners
seem to go back to the Han period. Chinese coins, the oldest dating back to the rule
of the Emperor Wang Mang (3 B.C. to 23 A.D.), are said to have been found on the
29 Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry of Jan 11, 1974, as pub-
lished in JMJP Jan 12, 1974.
so JMJP Feb 28, 1959, as cited in Peking Review, 1959, No. 9, p. 21.
31 Statement by the government of the Republic of Vietnam, dated Jan 12, 1974, as cited
in SWB FE/4499/A3/1 (Jan 14, 1974). ? The documentation published by the Republic of
Vietnam's Foreign Ministry under the title of White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and
Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, Saigon 1975, was not available to the author at the time of
writing.
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22 Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II
Paracels.32 This does not seem too far-fetched, because the Han Shu, which was writ-
ten about 100 A.D., carries reports of long voyages of up to 5 months made by
Chinese mariners.33 A chronicle which appeared in the Eastern Han period (25 to
220 A.D.) mentions the existence of islands in the South China Sea.34 It is reported
that the monk Fa Hsien, when returning from India in 414, sailed via the Paracels
(ch'i thou yang)." It is a fact that during the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., Chinese
coastal and maritime shipping was flourishing in the South China Sea region and the
Chinese fleet was beginning to approach the level of the Arab, Persian, and Indian
fleets.36
Chao Ju-shih, in a chronicle written during the Sung period, mentioned for the
year 789 A.D. the existence, in a position east of Hainan, of "ch'ien-li ch'ang-sha"
(literally "sands a thousand li long") and "wan-li shih-ch'uang" (literally "a ten
thousand. li rock bed"). It is generally believed that these names cover what is now
the Paracels (and Macclesfield Bank?).37 In one of the Sung chrdnicles, the author
refers to the emperor's intention to escape from the advancing Mongols by sea,
sailing via "ch'i li yang" (the Paracel archipelago) to "than ch'eng" (Cochinchina).38
The conclusion we can draw from those reports, i. e. that the Chinese were familiar
with the Paracel archipelago in the Sung period or even earlier, is verified by local
finds of coins. During World War II and in 1947, Chinese currency dating from the
K'ai-yiian title of reign of the Tang Emperor Hsiian Tsung was discovered under the
coral reefs of Rocky Island (Chin.: Shih tao), one of the Paracel group.33
We may be sure that General Shih Pi, under orders from Khublai Khan, touched
upon the Paracel archipelago and Macclesfield Bank when sailing to Java with an
32 yeh Han-ming and Wu Jui-ch'ing, Ts'ung li-shih tsai-chi chi yil-eu k'an nan-hai chu-tao
ti chu-ch'iian kuei-shu wen-t'i, in: Ming pao (yiieh-k'an), No. 101, May 1974, p. 19; cf.
Hsing-chou jih-pao of Feb 10, 1974.
33 Han Shu, Chapter 28 (ti-li chih), Section 2, as reprinted by Chung-hua shu-diii, Peking
1962, p. 1671. ? Cf. Feng Ch'eng-ch'iin, Nan-yang chiao-eung shih, Shanghai 1937, p. 1,
as cited by V. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong
1965, p. 8.
34 I wu chih by Yang Fu, in: Pal-pu ts'ung-shu, Sect. 93 (Ling-nan i-shu), Book 9, I wu
chih, p. 2 a?b.
35 Teng Szu-yii, Nan Chung-kuo hai chu tao-hsii ti chu-ch'iian wen-t'i, in: Ming pao (yiieh-
k'an), No. 101, May 1974, p. 3. The relevant passage reads "Chang hai chi t'ou", i. e. "In the
South Sea there are uneven elevations".
36 V. Purcell, /oc. cit. (see Note 33 above), p. 12.
37 Chu fan chih by Chao Ju-shih, in: Pal-pu ts'ung-shu, Sect. 46 (Hstieh-ching t'ao-yiian),
Book 11, Chu fan chih, pp. 16 a?b, 17 a. ? Cf. F. Hirth and W. W. Rodthill, Chau
Ju-kua: His Works on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,
Entitled Chu-fan-chi, St. Petersburg 1911, pp. 176, 185 (Note 4). In Hirth's and Rockhill's
opinion, "ch'uang" (bed) was mistaken for "t'ang" (dyke, dam).
38 Sung shih chi-shih pen-mo, Chapter 180, reprinted by San-min shu-chii publishers,
Taipei 1956, p. 437.
39 Yeh Han-ming and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above).
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Developments up to the End of the 19th Century 23
army in 1293.40 As is evident from travellers' reports, the eunuch Cheng Ho also
sailed via the Paracels in the course of several voyages he made through the South
China Sea between 1405 and 1433.41 It is to this period that the names of Yung Lo
and Hsiian Teh date back. These names, which are still in use for the two groups of
islands forming the Paracel archipelago, both refer to titles of reign of the Ming
Emperors Ch'eng Tsu (1403-1424) and Hsiian Tsung (1426-1435). On a Chinese
chart which was published about the middle of the 16th century and depicts the
region as known by about 1430, the Paracels archipelago appears as "wan sheng
shih-t'ang hsii" or "shih-t'ang" and Macclesfield Bank as "shih-hsing shih-t'ang".42
Since then, the Paracels have been mentioned regularly in the works of Chinese geo-
graphers (the name employed being usually "ch'i thou yang" = sea of the seven
islands), as have the Pratas, which are referred to as "ta tung-sha" (great east sand)
or "ch'ien-li shih-t'ang" (1,000 li long stone dam).43 The Chinese had apparently
gained a fairly firm footing on the Paracels no later than by the middle of the 19th
century. This may be concluded from the fact that in the course of surveying work
on Woody Island (Chin.: Yung-hsing tao or Lin tao) in 1947, a Chinese temple,
estimated by experts to be more than one hundred years old, was discovered.44
No such ancient sources have been found for the Spratlys. The earliest reference to
a Chinese presence in this region dates back to 1867, when the crew of a British
surveying ship met Chinese fishermen from Hainan on the largest of the Spratly
Islands. In accordance with what those fishermen had said (in their Hainan dialect),
the British mariners (allegedly) called the island "Itu Aba", a name which is still in
use on Western charts .43 In Chinese usage, the Spratlys were referred to as "t'uan-
sha ch'iin-tao" until shortly after World War 1.40
In view of these ample references, there cannot be any doubt that the Chinese ?
both on the mainland and on Taiwan ? regard the four disputed archipelagos as
40 Here the islands appear under the name of "ch'i chou yang" and "wan-li shih-t'ang", see
Yuan shih, Vol. 3, Chapter 162, as reprinted by National War College in cooperation with
the College of Chinese Culture, Taipei 1967, p. 1731. Cf. 0. Franke, Geschichte des chine-
sischen Reiches, Vol. 4, Berlin 1948, p. 463; V. Purcell, /oc. cit. (see Note 33 above), p. 15;
Hirth/Rockhill, /oc. cit. (see Note 37 above), p. 185 (Note 4).
41 Wu-pei chih by Mao Yiian-i (he uses the name "wan-li shih-t'ang), as cited by Ch'i Hsin,
Nan-hai diu-tao ti chu-ch'iian y? hsi-sha ch'iin-tao chih than, in: Ch'i-shib nien-tai, March
1974, p. 38; Hsing-ch'a sheng-lan by Fei Hsin, as cited by Yu-hsi Nieh, Die Rechtsfrage der
Archipele im Siidchinesisdien Meer, in: China aktuell, February 1974, p. 26; Hsun-cheng
Shao, Chinese Islands in the South China Seas, in: People's China, 1956, No. 13, p. 26.
42 The chart referred to is the one contained in Mao Yiian-i's Wu-pei chih, cf. J. V. G. Mills,
Ma Huan, Ying-yai sheng-lan, Cambridge 1970, pp. 216 f., 225, 239, 241 f.
43 For the individual sources, cf. Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), p. 26, and Teng
Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above).
44 yeh Han-min and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above), with further sources.
o Ch'i Hsin, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), with further sources.
46 Cf. e.g. Tz'u hai, 2nd Edn., Shanghai 1948, p. 309. The author already uses the new
name of "Nan-sha chlin-tao", /oc. cit., p. 221.
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24 Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II
having been, and still being under Chinese sovereignty or at least part of the Chinese
sphere of influence. This is particularly true of the Paracels, of which Kuo Sung-tao,
the first Chinese envoy in London, stated succinctly in 1876: "They are Chinese
islands (chung-kto shu tao yeh)"," and least true of the Spratlys.
Vietnam's Relations to the Islands
From an historical point of view, the Vietnamese are in a weaker position than
the Chinese. To start with, they have difficulty in proving the continuity of their
own state and territory from its beginning as the pre-Christian Nam Viet via a
status as the Chinese provinces of Chiao-chih, Chiao-chou, and Annam (between 211
B.C. and 939 A.D.), later the Chinese tributary states of Dai Viet (with a short
period of independence lasting until 1804) and Vietnam (until 1884), as the com-
ponent states of French Indochina, to the Vietnam of our day." On the other hand,
the historical events which the Vietnamese side cites to prove the existence of
relations with the islands are of a much more recent date than the links on which the
Chinese case is based. Moreover, the Vietnamese argumentation, covering the period
until the end of the 19th century, refers exclusively to the Paracels. The mere fact
that in the early days of the January 1974 conflict the official Saigon media used the
wrong names" when trying to support their claims by reference to historical events
makes the Vietnamese assertions appear somewhat dubious.
The earliest event on which the Republic of Vietnam offially based a claim is the
foundation of the "Doi Hoang Sa" society, reportedly in 1700 with the object of
exploiting the Paracel archipelago for commercial purposes.5? According to official
sources in Saigon, the first Nguyen emperor, Gia-Long, reactivated this society in
1802 and had the Vietnamese flag hoisted on the Paracels in 1816. His successor
Minh Mang is said to have built a pagoda on the rock of Ban Na (which probably
formed part of the Paracels) in 1834. According to the same source, the chart issued
47 Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above), with further sources.
48 Cf. Le Than KMi, 3000 Jahre Vietnam, M?nchen 1969, p. 85; H. B. Morse, The inter-
national Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. II, London 1910, pp. 341 f.; J. Buttinger,
Vietnam: A Political History, New York, Washington 1968, pp. 5, 38 f.; K. C. Chen,
Vietnam and China, 1938-1945, Princeton, N. J., 1969, pp. 6 ff.
49 Statement by the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Saigon on Jan 12, 1974, Vietnam
Press in Vietnamese, as cited in SWB FE/4499/A3/1-2 (Jan 14, 1974); Saigon Radio (home
service) on Jan 14, 1974, as cited in SWB FE/4501/A3/4 (Jan 16, 1974); Statement by the
Foreign Ministry in Saigon on Jan 16, 1974, as cited in SWB FE/4503/A3/1 (Jan 18, 1974);
Military Spokesman in Saigon on Jan 17, 1974, Vietnam Press in Vietnamese on Jan 17,
1974, as cited in SWB FE/4504/A3/4 (Jan 19, 1974).
50 The details contained in this paragraph have been taken from: Summary on the Paracels
Islands, as published by the Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam at Bonn-Bad Godesberg in
February, 1974, pp. if.; Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Saigon on Jan 12, 1974,
Vietnam Press in Vietnamese, as cited in SWB FE144991A3I1 (Jan 14,1974).
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Developments Between the End of the 19th Century and World War II 25
by the imperial court of Hue' in 1834 shows the Paracel Islands as Vietnamese terri-
tory. It was also argued that a geographical standard work compiled between 1865
and 1882 had revealed that the Paracels and Spratlys belonged to Vietnam.
The oldest of the sources cited by the then Saigon government to support their
claims51 dates back to about 1800. These sources were not available to the author.
Despite the somewhat scanty material, the existence of relations between Vietnam
and the region in dispute, or at least the Paracel Islands, during the first decades of
the 19th century may be considered probable. This is confirmed by a French publi-
cation of 1843 which flatly states "Le Paracel est un archipel qui depend de l'An-
nam".52 Provided that the historical information given by Saigon is correct, we may
accept that, as a state, Vietnam apparently was showing a definite interest in the
Paracels somewhat earlier than did China.
2. Developments Between the End of the 19th Century and World War II
While during the period considered in the preceding paragraphs no clashes had
been reported between the parties interested in the islands, the following period was
characterized by a great number of conflicts, and these have continued into our own
time. In addition to the parties to the 1974 conflict, France, Japan, and ? apparent-
ly in just one instance ? the German Reich were all involved at some time or other.
Whereas traditionally the islands had served primarily as bases and navigational
aids to Chinese mariners, in particular fishermen from Kuangtung province, the
appearance of foreign powers in the South China Sea caused China during the last
decades of the Manchu period to engage herself as a state in defence of national
interests.
First Chinese Attempts at Acquiring Sovereignty
The German government reportedly sent a military detachment to the Spratlys
in 1883 to carry out survey work. Apparently this work was discontinued under
51 The sources are the following: J. B. Chaigneau, Memoirs sur la Cochinchine, n.p. or d.
(Chaigneau lived from 1769 to 1825, according to contemporary information); Hoang Viet
Dia Du (Geography of the Annamite Empire), n.p. 1835; Mgr. Raberd, History and Des-
cription of the Religion, Customs and Morals of All Peoples, n.p. 1838; Dai-nam Nhat-
thOng-chi (according to Le Than Khild, see Note 48 above, the best geographical publication
of all, compiled between 1865 and 1882). The sources are given in the list published by the
Vietnamese Embassy in Bonn (see Note 50 above).
52 Lettres edifiantes et curieuses, edited by Pantheon Litteraire, Vol. 3, n. p. 1843, p. 38, as
cited in C. Madrolle, La question de Hai-nan et de Paracels, in: Politique Etrangere, 1939
(Paris), p.311.
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26 Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II
Chinese pressure after negotiations had taken place." Following the Franco-Chinese
war of 1884/85, France and China concluded a special border agreement on June 26,
1887, whereby the title to the archipelagos of the South China Sea was implicitly
adjudged to China. The agreement contains a statement to this effect: "Les Hes qui
sont l'est du meridien de Paris 105?43' de longitude est ... sont egalement attri-
buees la Chine."54
The first clear case of a Chinese government taking possession of parts of this
region was in 1902 when the Manchu government, believing it had discovered signs
that France intended to occupy the Paracels by mounting an attack from her base in
Indochina, dispatched Vice-General Wu Ching-yung and Admiral Li Chun, with
the warships "Fu po", "Ch'en hang" and "Kuang chin" in April 1902, to carry out
a local inspection of the islands. The expedition hoisted Chinese national flags on
several islands and erected a stone monument on North Island (Chin.: Pei tao). This
stone, which bore an inscription referring to the inspection together with the year
1902 (28th year of Kuang Hsii), was found in a well preserved state prior to World
War 11.55
In 1907/08 China successfully defended her sovereign rights to the Pratas archi-
pelago. In 1907 a Japanese merchant named Nishizawa Yoshiji, accompanied by
more than 100 compatriots, had settled on Pratas, giving the island his name." On
hearing this, the Foreign Ministry in Peking dispatched the governor Jui Fang, Wu
Ching-yung, and Li Chun to the island at the head of a military detachment, with
orders to explore the island and enter into talks with the Japanese occupants. In
addition, the governors of Kuangsi and Kuangtung negotiated with the Japanese
consul in Canton. The outcome of these negotiations was that China paid Nishizawa
an indemnity of 130,000 silver dollars and Japan, in her turn, recognized the Pratas
archipelago as Chinese territory.
Worried by these events, the governor of Kuangtung province had an expedition-
ary corps, including engineers, chemists, and surveyors, sent to the Paracels under the
53 Yeh Han-ming and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above), p. 18; Hsun-cheng Shao,
/oc. cit. (see Note 41 above). ? The author has not made any attempt to substantiate this
on the basis of documents from German Record offices. However, according to British
sources, a German surveying operation, covering at least the Paracels, was carried out in
1883, cf. Admiralty Chart No. 94.
54 Text of the agreement as cited in Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above); cf. the text,
in Chinese, as published in Yeh Han-min and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above),
p. 18 f.
55 For details of the inspection tour made in 1902, see Ch'i Hsin, /oc. cit. (see Note 41
above); Yeh Han-min and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above), p. 19; Hsing-chcm
Chou-k'an on Feb 10, 1974 (with some further sources).
56 For the Pratas incident, cf. Yeh Han-min and Wu Jui-dfing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above),
p. 19 (with further sources); Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), p. 26 (with further
sources); Hsun-cheng Shao, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above).
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Developments Between the End of the 19th Century and World War II 27
command of Wu Ching-yung and Li Chun.57 The results of three weeks of explora-
tory work were summarized in an investigation report (k'an-ch'a hsi-sha ch'iin-tao
pao-kao) and supplemented by a development plan. In 1908, too, the Pratas and
Paracels appeared for the first time in an atlas published by the Kuangtung pro-
vincial government, the names of "tung-sha" and "hsi-sha" used in that atlas being
still in use today.
In 1917 a Japanese company began to fish the waters around the Spratlys and to
exploit the guano deposits for their phosphate content.58 A British Admiralty publi-
cation dated 1923 says, on the other hand, that Chinese fishermen, regularly supplied
with provisions by fishing boats from Hainan, had been living on many of the
Spratlys for years."
The first practical steps towards developing and exploiting the Paracels on a
large scale were taken by the "Paracel Archipelago Company for Industry and
Commerce" (hsi-sha &un-= shih-yeh kung-szu) starting in 1921.88 The Chinese
government gave the licence for the exploitation of the natural resources and marine
products in this region to the head of the company, a Canton merchant named Ho
Jui-nien. However, when it was discovered that Ho was no more than a figurehead
for the director of the Formosa Monopolies Authority, a Japanese called Ikeda, and
that a sizeable proportion of the natural resources of the islands was being shipped
to Japan without the Chinese authorities being aware of this, Tai Chi-t'ao, a member
of the Chinese National Government, ordered a commission to be set up to investi-
gate the case. As a result of the commission's activity the licence was withdrawn
from Ho Jui-nien in 1927/8 and the Japanese had to leave the archipelago. The
Kuangtung provincial government then had new development plans drawn up for
the Paracels.
Acquisition of the Spratlys and Paracels by France and Japan
Up to the late twenties, the Chinese government had still been capable of con-
solidating its claim to the archipelagos by several acts of sovereignty, but in the
period between 1930 and 1946 it was, with regard to foreign policy, so weak that,
apart from raising ineffective protests, China could do nothing but stand by help-
lessly while the Spratlys and Paracels were o'ecupied by France and later by Japan.
57 For this paragraph, cf. Teng Szu-yU, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above), p. 3; Yeh Han-ming
and Wu Jui-ch'ing, /oc. cit. (see Note 32 above); Hsing-chou chou-k'an of Feb 10, 1974
(where the expedition is erroneously set in the year 1913).
58 Keesing of Apr 7, 1939, p. 4017 A; Hsun-dieng Shao, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above).
59 China Sea Pilot, 2nd Edn., Vol. 3, London 1923, as cited in Hsun-cheng Shao, /oc. cit.
(see Note 41 above).
60 Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above), p. 3; Hsun-cheng Shao, /oc. cit. (see Note 41
above).
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28 Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II
France made her first appearance in this region in April 1930 when she sent the
gunboat "Le Malicieuse" to reconnoitre the waters surrounding the Spratlys and
apparently had one island occupied." In the same year, the Indochinese press publish-
ed demands for the occupation of the Paracels as a preparatory step towards install-
ing a navigation light and a base for sea planes." According to recent Saigon sour-
ces, Pierre Pasquier, then governor of Indochina, asserted Vietnamese claims to the
Paracels in 1931, raising an official protest in 1932 against the exploitation by China
of the local guano deposits. This protest was dismissed by the Chinese.63
In the spring of 1933, France occupied the two principal islands, Itu Aba (Chin.:
T'ai-p'ing) and Spratly (Chin.: Nan-wei), and seven other islands of the Spratly
archipelago." On July 26, 1933, Paris publicly announced the annexation of those
islands.65 The text of the declaration of annexation reportedly pointed out that the
Spratlys had a resident population of Chinese fishermen of Hainan origin.66 The
same statement may be found in a contemporary article by a French author."
The Japanese charge d'affaires in Paris reacted to the annexation of the Spratly
archipelago by raising objections with the French government. He said that Japan
was unable to approve of the occupation, despite France's assurance that she would
fully respect Japanese economic interests." According to Peking and Taipei sources,
the Chinese government also made a demarche in protest against the French action."
This, however, is officially denied by Saigon.7? Nanking is further said to have re-
jected the French assertion that the Paracels belonged to Annam. France had made
this claim in a memorandum sent to the Chinese embassy in Paris in connection with
the occupation of the Spratlys.71
61 C. Madrolle, /oc. cit. (see Note 52 above); Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above). ?
According to recent South Vietnamese sources, Japan applied to France as early as 1920
for a license to exploit the guano deposits on the Paracels. Saigon argued on these grounds
that the Paracel archipelago had been under French administration between 1920 and 1939,
cf. Summary on the Paracels Islands, loc. cit. (see Note 50 above), p. 2 (without sources).
62 C. Madrolle, /oc. cit. (see Note 52 above), p. 310.
63 Summary on the Paracels Islands, loc. cit. (see Note 50 above), p. 2 (without sources).
64 Keesing of July 27, 1933, p.952 A; C. Madrolle, /oc. cit. (see Note 52 above); Teng
/oc. cit. (see Note 35 above); Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), p. 27, with
further sources.
65 Journal officiel de la Ripublique francaise of July 26, 1933, as cited in C. Madrolle,
/oc. cit. (see Note 52 above).
66 Thus Ch'i Hsin, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), p. 39.
67 South China Morning Post of Aug 28, 1933, as cited in Ch'i Hsin, /oc. cit. (see Note 41),
p. 39.
68 Keesing of Aug 22, 1933, p. 993 H.
69 Hsun-cheng Shao, /oc. cit. (see Note 41 above), p.27; Wang Szu-you in: CYJP of Feb 2,
1974.
70 Statement by the Saigon Foreign Ministry of Jan 12, 1974, as cited in SWB FE/4499/A3/1.
71 Ibid.
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Developments Between the End of the 19th Century and World War II 29
After having installed an intermittent flash-light on the Paracel island of Pattle
and a light and meteorological station on the island of Boisee (apparently identical
with Woody I.) as early as October 1937, France announced the occupation of the
whole archipelago on July 3, 1938.72 Contemporary press reports confirm that the
islands were actually occupied by French or Annamese troops." According to a
recent Saigon statement, the occupation had been preceded by an offer from France
to China in 1937 to settle the issue peacefully or to subject the case to arbitration."
It appears that the French decision to occupy the islands was the negative outcome
of negotiations between Paris and London on the one hand and Japan on the other,
with the object of dissuading Japan from occupying Hainan."
China apparently protested through her ambassador Ku Wei-chiin," while the
Japanese government contented itself with an indirect protest: On July 4, 1938,
the Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that, though Japan had
no knowledge of the occupation of the Paracels, she emphatically denied the right
of third parties to occupy, or otherwise claim, any island under Chinese sovereign-
ty.77
After the conquest of Hainan in February 1939, Japan occupied the Spratlys, the
Paracels, and evidently also the Pratas. The occupation of the Spratlys was com-
pleted by the end of March 1939.78 The Paracels, too, were occupied in 1939.79 No
concrete information is available as to the occupation of the Pratas, though all
Chinese authors implicitly assume that all the archipelagos of the South China Sea
were occupied by the Japanese.8? The author has not been able to ascertain whether,
or not, there was any fighting between the Japanese invaders and the French gar-
rison troups. According to Taiwanese sources, Tokyo renamed the Spratlys "Shin-
nan" (New South), placing them, along with the Paracels and Pratas, under the
jurisdiction of the authorities of the port of Kaohsiung (Taiwan).81 The Japanese
stationed some troops on Spratly I. while they converted Itu Aba into a submarine
base."
72 C. Madrolle, /oc. cit. (see Note 52 above), p. 310.
73 Keesing of July 4, 1938, p. 3624 A.
74 Summary on the Paracels Islands, loc. cit. (see Note 50 above), p. 2.
75 Keesing of June 27, 1938, p. 3616 A; ibid., July 4, 1938, p. 3624 A.
70 Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above), p. 7 (with further sources).
77 Keesing of July 4, 1938, p. 2634 A.
78 Keesing Of Mar 31, 1939, p. 4007 B.
79 Summary on the Paracels Islands, loc. cit. (see Note 50 above), p. 2; Wang Szu-you,
/oc. cit. (see Note 69 above).
so Cf. Teng Szu-yii, /oc. cit. (see Note 35 above), p. 4.; Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 41
above), p. 27 (implicitly).
81 Wang Szu-you, /oc. cit. (see Note 69 above).
82 Mid.
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30 Occupation of Islands Prior to World War II
In a letter dated April 1939, Paris protested against the Japanese occupation of
the Spratlys, referring to the fact that France had annexed the archipelago in 1933.83
Tokyo rejected the protest and argued that the Spratlys had been economically in
Japanese hands without interruption since 1917 (for the winning of phosphates and
fisheries)." There is, however, no indication of a French demarche against the oc-
cupation of the Paracels by the Japanese.
83 Keesing of Apr 7, 1939, p. 4017 A.
84 Ibid. ? For details of Japanese arguments and actions see Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see
Note 41 above), p. 27 (with further sources).
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CHAPTER III
OCCUPATION OF ISLANDS SINCE WORLD WAR II
AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED
1. The Actual Development
First Chinese Occupation of Islands After the End of the War
Towards the end of 1946, the Chinese government sent a naval task force to the
Paracels and Spratlys to execute demonstrative possessory acts on the spot. Ac-
cording to a report compiled by one of the two commanding officers, the task force,
consisting of four warships, sailed from Canton on December 9, 1946.85 The "T'ai-
p'ing" and the "Chung-yeh" set course for the Spratlys, while the "Yung-hsing"
and the "Chung-chien" headed for the Paracels. According to recent Taiwanese
sources, the Paracel detail returned to Canton in December, while the other detail
remained in the Spratly region until February 1947.86
On the orders of Mo Yiin-yii, the officer with special powers in charge of the
Spratly operation who reached his destination on December 12, 1947, the principal
island, Itu Aba, was surveyed, the symbols of Japanese sovereignty replaced by
Chinese ones, the Chinese flag hoisted, and a take-over ceremony held.87 According
to Mo's report, he had found out that the Japanese occupational troops had left the
island more than 12 months before. In the light of this report, Itu Aba cannot
possibly have been handed over to China by Japan, though Chinese authors often
maintain that Japan had ceded all the archipelagos to China at the end of the war.88
It is also highly improbable that the Japanese had handed over the Paracels to
the Chinese. Not one of the reports dealing with the events in this archipelago during
85 Mo Yiin-yii's report of 1957, as cited in Ch'i Hsin, Nan-hai chu-tao ti chu-ch'ilan y?
hsi-sha ch'iin-tao diih-chan, in: Ch'i-shib nien-tai, Mardi 1974, p. 39. ? According to a
semi-official version offered by Taipei, all four ships sailed not from Canton, but Yiklin
(Hainan), the "Yung-hsing" as early as mid-November, see Wang Szu-you in: CYJP Feb 2,
1974. ? Peking sources say that the Paracels "where returned to the then Chinese govern-
ment on Nov 27, 1946", JMJP Feb 28, 1959, as cited in: Peking Review, 1959, No. 9, p.21.
86 Ibid.
87 Ch'i Hsin, /oc. cit. (see Note 85 above), p. 39.
88) Thus e.g. Teng Szu-yii, Nan chung-kuo hai chu tao-hsii ti chu-ch'iian wen-t'i, in: Ming
pao (yiieb-k'an), No. 101, May 1974, p. 4; Wang Szu-you, /oc. cit. (see Note 85 above);
CY JP (leader), Feb 8, 1974.
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32 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
1946 and 1947 suggests anything to this effect. In January 1947, the Chinese embas-
sy in Paris published a communique announcing the occupation of the Paracels and
asserting the Chinese claims to that archipelago." In this statement, the Chinese -
underlined their contention that the islands had always belonged to China and had
been governed by the Kuangtung provincial authorities. The Chinese government
had never relinquished its claim to these islands. It had exchanged notes with
France on this issue between 1932 and 1938, and had not accepted the French an-
nexation of the islands in 1938.
Some days later France protested against China's occupation of the Paracel island
of Pattle, arguing that the Paracels had traditionally been controlled by the ruler
of Annam." At the same time, France landed troops on Pattle, whereupon the
Chinese government registered a written protest with the French ambassador in
Nanking.
Developments on the Pratas
This archipelago had evidently remained under Japanese control throughout the
war. It has apparently been firmly in Taipei's hands for a long time." The author
has been unable to find out when and under what circumstances the control of the
group passed from Japan to Nationalist China.
Nor has it been possible to pursue in full the actual developments on the Paracels
and the Spratlys since 1947.
Developments on the Paracels
The exchange of notes between Nanking and Paris in January 1947 reveals that
both parties had landed troops on Pattle, the principal island of the Crescent group
of the Paracel archipelago. Recent official sources in Saigon have it, however, that
French armed units had occupied some islands of the Paracel archipelago as early as
May 1946. They withdrew (with two officers, ten French soldiers, and 17 Vietnam-
ese) to Pattie after the Chinese had occupied Woody I., the principal island of the
Amphitrite group in January 1974.92 The same source says that Woody Island was
evacuated by National Chinese troops on May, 1950, and was immediately occu-
pied by the People's Liberation Army. While the Saigon source admits that Woody I.
89 Keesing of Jan 18, 1947, p. 983 A.
99 With reference to this and the following paragraph, see Keesing of Jan 20, 1947, p. 983 J,
and of Jan 28, 1947, p. 990 E.
91 Cf. CYJP Aug 10, 1974 (as cited in China aktuell, September 1974, p. 538 f.).
92 Summary on the Paracels Islands, loc. cit. (see Note 50 above), pp. 2 ff.
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The Actual Development 33
was still held by the Chinese in January 1974, it does not clearly say how long
French and Vietnamese troops had been stationed on Pattle Island.
On February 27 and April 5, 1959, the Foreign Ministry in Peking protested
against infringement by Saigon of Chinese sovereign rights in the Paracel archi-
pelago." According to Chinese sources, a South Vietnamese gunboat had entered
the waters around North Island, one of the Amphitrite group, on February 20, 1959.
The following day the Vietnamese had boarded several Chinese fisherboats and
questioned one of the fishermen on the situation in the Paracel region. On September
22, the boat landed on the Crescent island of Ch'en-hang, the main island of the
Duncan group, where violent fighting was to take place in January 1974. The Viet-
namese tore up the Chinese flag, plundered the houses, arrested 82 Chinese fishermen,
and seized five fishing boats. According to the same source, the fishermen were taken
by force to Da Nang, interrogated, and forced to sign confessions, before being re-
leased on March 9. On February 27, two more Chinese fishing boats were stopped
by Vietnamese warships. At about the same time, several ships of the Saigon Navy
were cruising in the waters of the Crescent group, with South Vietnamese and US
aircraft making reconnaissance flights over the whole archipelago. A Vietnamese
gunboat is said to have again robbed fishermen based on the island of Ch'en-hang
on March 26 and to have threatened to shell the island.
These events and the fact that, according to Chinese sources, Japanese fishermen
had devastated installations on North Island on March 12, 1959," show that, at the
time in question, by no means the whole Paracel group was under Peking's military
control. According to a Peking report, this motivated the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party to start a campaign in the spring of 1959 with the object
of inducing Hainan islanders to settle on the Paracels, and in particular on Woody
Island." According to the same source, the new settlers immediately proceeded to
establish a telephone system and to construct a radio tower.
In 1960, units of the British Navy observed that Woody Island had four radio
masts and one observation tower, that an overhead cable connected the island with
the neighbouring islet of Rocky and that extensive work was in progress on the
construction of new storage facilities." This source does not contain any information
of a move to civilize the island of Pattle or the other islands of the Crescent group.
In 1971, US reconnaissance planes observed that frequent convoys of Chinese
ships were transporting construction materials to the Paracels. In its analysis of the
situation, the Pentagon came to the conclusion that Peking intended to establish
93 For this and the following paragraph, cf. Peking Review, 1959, No. 9, p. 9; IMP Feb 28,
1959, as cited in: Peking Review, 1959, No. 15, p. 18 f.; cf. also NCNA Feb 27 and 28,
1959, SCMP No. 1966 of Mar 5, 1959, pp. 46 ff., as well as NCNA Apr 5, 1959, SCMP
No. 1988 of Apr 8, 1959, pp. 35 ff.
94 NCNA Apr 4, 1959, SCMP No. 1988 of Apr 8, 1959, p. 35.
95 Peking Radio (in Chinese) on Sep 22, 1974, as cited in SWB FE/4715/BII/9 (Sep 28, 1974).
96 On this and the two following sentences: China Sea Pilot, Vol. I, London 1964, pp. 102 ff.
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34 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
naval bases on the island." A press report from the same year states that US ob-
servers had noticed that the P.R. China had constructed a port, a dam, and 50 build-
ings on the islands." The only two islands named in that report were again Woody I.
(in connection with the construction of a canal) and Lincoln I. (where Chinese
settlers had been observed). In a series of photographs on the life of the Chinese
residents of the Paracels which appeared shortly after the January 1974 conflict in
a Peking-oriented review, only one photograph is accompanied by a text revealing
the name of the island it depicts: Woody Island.99 The photograph shows a number
of buildings.
The first time that Peking published a series of photographs on the Paracel archi-
pelago following the January conflict was in the summer of the same year.'" Of the
eight Crescent islands, five are shown in toto or in section (Robert, Pattle, Triton,
Drummond, Ch'en-hang). Nothing much can be recognized on Ch'en-hang. Nor are
there any traces of civilization to be seen on the photographs of Triton and Drum-
mond. On Robert and Pattle, tents and a total of three radio towers or watch-
towers are visible. The only island on which a permanent building, resembling a long
shed, can be recognized, is Pattle. There are photographs which show a quay, a veget-
able plantation, a primitive road passing through a forest of coconut palm-trees,
with trucks, and single-storied buildings but there is no indication which of the
islands these photographs depict. The only building of more than one storey to ap-
pear on the photographs, according to the accompanying text, is located on Woody
Island and serves as a residence for the Revolutionary Committee of the Paracels,
Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys. This implies that Peking regards Woody as the
administrative centre for all the South China Sea archipelagos, with the exception
of the Pratas.
All this suggests that, prior to the January 1974 conflict, the only islands per-
manently occupied and developed in the Paracel archipelago were those of the
Amphitrite group, the only country involved being the P.R. China. Neither Peking
nor Saigon had made any comparable efforts to develop the Crescent group. It ap-
pears, however, that Peking was beginning, towards the end of 1973, to make in-
creasing use of some of the Crescent islands (especially the island of Ch'en-hang) as
fishing bases. It is also highly probable that both the Chinese and the South Viet-
namese navies were conducting occasional patrol cruises in the Crescent region.
97 New York Times, July 12, 1971, as cited in: J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's
China and International Law, Vol. I, Princeton 1974, p. 346; FEER 1971, No. 29 (July 17,
1971), p. 4.
98 CYJP July 8, 1971, with reference to Associated Press, as cited by Yu-hsi Nieh, Die
Rechtsfrage der Archipele im Siidchinesischen Meer, in: China aktuell, February 1974, p. 29.
The AP office in Frankfurt, however, informed the author on Nov 12, 1974, that no report
of this kind could be found either in AP's central office in New York or in the AP's
Washington office's archives. ? Ta-kung pao, a communist paper published in Hong Kong,
reported on Jan -26, 1974, that there were a road system, a fertilizer factory, a meteorolo-
gical station, and business houses "on the major islands".
99 Ch'i-shih nien-tai, March 1974, pp. 43 ff.
loo len-mm hua-pao, 1974, No. 8, pp. 20 ff.
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Developments in the Spratly Region
National China, the Philippines, and both Vietnanis occupied islands in the
Spratly region at various times since World War II. The P.R. China remained in-
active. There have not even been any reports of the Peking navy having operated
in this region at any time before the conflict in January 1974.
According to official Taipei sources, National China has had troops stationed in
the Spratly area for a considerable time. The only permanent garrison of recent
times, however, seems to be on Itu Aba Island."' Taiwanese information as to when
the troops were first stationed in the region appears someWhat contradictory.
A statement made by the Foreign Ministry in Taipei on January 18, 1974, implied
that the islands had been occupied by troops since December 1947.1" In an interview
some weeks later,103 Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo said in one passage that the
islands had been under military occupation for years and in another that they had
been occupied for decades. A speaker of the Ministry of National Defence in Taipei
announced on February 14, 1974, that the Spratlys had been returned to China in
1945 and had since been under continuous occupation by garrisoned troops. That
this was not quite correct became apparent when he added that Taiwanese naval
craft had been providing a shuttle service between the islands and Taiwan for more
than twenty years.104 On February 7, 1974, the Foreign Minister in Taipei said that
the Republic of China had been maintaining a garrison on the Spratlys since Dec-
ember 1949.1"
Contrary to the above statement, the latest edition of the British Navy Sea Pilot
for the region mentions for 1959 the existence on Itu Aba of several partially de-
molished buildings and two wells, but no human settlement.106 According to the
same source, there were no permanent residents and not even buildings on Spratly
Island in 1963, the only human artefact being an obelisk, five metres high, which
the Pilot does not describe in detail but which may well be the symbol of sovereignty
which National China had erected in December, 1946.1" The Pilot contains two
references to human activity in the Spratly region. It first notes that traces of recent
habitation had been discovered on Loai ta Island, north of Itu Aba. Then it mentions
Chinese fishermen from Hainan who visit the islands of Itu Aba and Nam yit of
Tizard Bank every year in December and January and leave again when the south-
west monsoon season sets in.108 According to press reports which appeared in the
101 NRC No. 126 of Aug 13, 1974, p. 1.
102 CY JP Jan 19, 1974.
103 Interview with Roy Rowan (Time Magazine), in: NRC No. 35 of Mar 8, 1974, p. 1.
104 Freies Asien (Bonn), No. 8 of Feb 28, 1974, p. 2. ? Cf. also Wang Szu-you, op. cit. (see
Note 85 above).
106 NRC Feb 11, 1974, p. 1.
106 China Sea Pilot, loc. cit. (see Note 96 above), p. 110.
107 Ibid., pp. 107 f.
108 Ibid., pp. 110 f.
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36 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
summer of 1971 and were later confirmed by President Marcos of the Philippines,
National Chinese troops were at that time busy emplacing guns on Itu Aba, turning
the island into a fortress.n? In due consideration of all the information available, it
seems reasonable to assume that, between the end of 1946 and mid-1971, there were
no permanent civilian settlements on the Spratlys nor had any of the islands been
occupied by the Taiwanese forces for any length of time.
President Marcos himself announced that the Philippines had occupied three of
the Spratly islands between 1970 and 1971.110 As may be gathered from a protest
raised by Peking,111 two of them were Thitu (about 80 km north of Itu Aba) and
Nansha (about 170 km east-north-east of Itu Aba). The islands then occupied by
Manila are said to be the ones which a Philippine businessman named Tomas Cloma
had reclaimed in 1951, colonizing them with fishermen and craftsmen and proclaim-
ing them the "Free Territory of Freedomland" with government in Manila.112 The
present author has been unable to ascertain whether or not there has ever been any
connection between Cloma and the state of the Philippines. In summer 1971 it was
reported that a Philippine vessel, trying to land on Itu Aba, had been shot at and
forced to withdraw by Taiwanese soldiers. This was denied by Taipei.113 However,
the Philippines are reported to have succeeded in taking possession of a fourth
Spratly island prior to the spring of 19 74.114
South Vietnam seems to have sent troops to the Spratly region for the first time
in August or September 1973.115 Whereas less than one hundred men had been
stationed on Nam yit island at first, the units were reinforced to a strength of
several hundred during the following months, and in particular since the conflict of
100 J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, /oc. cit. (see Note 97), p. 346; FEER, 1971, No. 29
(July 17, 1971), p. 4.
110 Yu-hsi Nieh, op. cit. (see Note 98 above), p. 28, with further sources. ? As early as
1938, the then President of the Philippines is said to have tried to persuade the Japanese
government to take part in a joint occupation of the Spratlys, cf. Teng /oc. cit. (see
Note 88 above), p. 3.
111 NCNA July 16, 1971, as cited in SCMP, July 1971, p. 140.
112 yo-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 98 above). ? The name "Free Territory of Freedom-
land", the presidency of Cloma, and the governmental residence at Manila were, however,
still referred to in 1974, in letter-heads. ? On May 15, 1956, Cloma again raised claims to
"33 Spratly islands", FEER of Oct 22, 1973, p. 27.
113 J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, /oc. cit. (see Note 97 above), p. 346.
114 'HT Mar 28, 1974.
115 This statement is based exclusively on official information from Saigon, cf. Vietnam
Press (in Vietnamese) of Feb 22, 1974 (as cited in Monitoring Service of Deutsche Welle on
Feb 22, 1974), Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) on Feb 22, 1974 (as cited in SWB FE/4535/A3/1
of Feb 25, 1974), The Times (from Saigon) Feb 1, 1974. The report per se does not appear
unrealistic, however, since the date indicated coincides with the date when the Spratly
Islands were incorporated into the South Vietnamese province of Phuoc Thuy to form one
administrative unit. This act in turn was corroborated by Peking, together with other
Saigon appropriations in the area of the Spratlys, cf. Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) of
Jan 12, 1974 (SWB FE/4499/A3/1 of Jan 14, 1974), IMP Jan 12, 1974, Peking Radio (in
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January 1974. According to official Saigon sources, the troops were distributed
over at least five islands, reefs or cays, with headquarters on Nam yit Island. In
May 1975 Hanoi Radio reported the occupation of "various islands of the Spratly
archipelago" by Communist Vietnamese troops, without going into detail."'
There is one further event that should be mentioned though at first sight it may
appear to be a mere curiosity; it is, however, 'quite possible that concrete economic
interests may loom in the background. On September 28, 1974, the "Republic of
Luconia" was founded in Munich, with a man named Aloysius George Guarghias-
Irghen appearing as its president.'" The latter had previously represented "Free-
domland" in Europe but had obviously left that enterprise in the meantime. The
founders of "Luconia" located their state with a declared area of 174,000 sq.km in
the southern part of the South China Sea (see Chart 12 in the Appendix), its fron-
tiers passing parallel to the coasts of Sarawak, Brunei, and the south of Sabah. This
area covers a number of reefs and sand bars. In an attempt to make their claim to
this region legitimate, the founders postulated that Mr. Guarghias-Irghen had flown
over the territory in question in 1971, setting foot on the principal island in 1973,
and, by doing so, had validly taken possession of this region. The founders' argu-
ment that the territory of "Luconia" had never before been claimed by any state is
incorrect, as this region is clearly situated within China's frontiers shown in Peking
and Taipei charts, and was also claimed by the Republic of Vietnam. Though all
this may sound somewhat odd, the news that the Luconian government intended
permanently to station a ship in the vicinity of North Luconia cay permits the as-
sumption that their ultimate intention is to prospect the sea-bed for petroleum, and
perform test drillings. At present it is impossible to say whether the "Luconia"
enterprise serves as a camouflage for a state or for a circle of private businessmen.
English and Chinese) on Jan 11, 1974 (SWB FE/4499/A3/1 of Jan 14, 1974). ? For the
following sentence, cf. Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) of Feb 22, 1974 (SWB FE/4535/A3/1
of Feb 25, 1974); IHT (from Nam yit) Mar 28, 1974, IHT Feb 19, 1974; AP Feb 18, 1974
(as cited in NZZ Feb 20, 1974). ? Contrary to these reports, whidi refer to five islands
being occupied, another official Saigon source refers to a total of seven islands, cays, and
reefs, including Spratly (Vietn.: Truong Sa), cf. Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) of Feb 22,
1974 (Monitoring Service of Deutsche Welle dated Feb 22, 1974). ? For the troop reinforce-
ment prior to February 1974, cf. IHT Feb 6, 1974.
116 Hanoi Radio (home service) on May 6, 1975, as cited in SWB FE/4898/A3/8 of May 8,
1975.
117 In this connection and for the following passage, cf. "Proklamation der Republik
Luconia" (with appendices), on file with the present author's archives. For the position of
"Luconia", cf. chart No. 12 in the Appendix to this book.
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38 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
2. Diplomatic Events
The First Claims Raised
According to official Taipei sources, the Nanking government had made a state-
ment on December 1, 1947, to the effect that the South China Sea archipelagos in
dispute formed part of the Republic of China, at the same time publishing the
official names which the Ministry of Domestic Affairs had given to the archipelagos
as follows: Tung-sha (Eastern Sands) for the Pratas, Hsi-sha (Western Sands) for the
Paracels, Chung-sha (Central Sands) for the Macclesfield Bank, and Nan-sha
(Southern Sands) for the Spratlys.118
The P.R. China illustrated its claims by printing on charts published since the
seizure of power in 1949 a curved boundary enclosing about three quarters of the
South China Sea and passing parallel to and at a distance of between 50 and 100 km
from the coasts of Central Vietnam, Sarawak, Brunei, and the West Philippine
islands.118 This boundary is essentially identical with the one shown in Taiwanese
atlasses.128 As to the names of the archipelagos, Peking keeps to the terminology
adopted by the Nationalist Chinese government in 1947. While the states under
Soviet, hegemony generally follow Peking's example in their maps and charts,121
Western publications have avoided this difficulty by wholly or partly refraining
from giving any boundaries in the region.
118 Statement made by the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry on Jan 18, 1974, in: CY JP Jan 19,
1974.
119 The boundaries drawn by Peking are shown in Chart No. 2 in the Appendix of this
book. ? This author is in possession of a Peking chart published between 1949 and 1952
which shows the same boundary lines. In addition, cf. the following charts published in
Peking: Chung-kuo fen-sheng ti-eu (1964), reprinted in Taiwan in 1966 (see Note 3 above);
Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-eu chi (1966) reprinted in Hongkong in 1971; Chung-
hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-eu (1957; 6th Edn. 1971); Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo
ti-eu (1965; 5th Edn. 1974).
120 Chung-hua min-kuo ti-eu chi, ti szu ts'e, Chung-kuo nan-pu, 2nd Edn., Taipei 1964,
pp. 19/20.
121 E.g. Atlas mira, Moscow 1954, chart No. 141 (no boundary lines drawn, but Spartlys,
Paracels and Macclesfield Bank referred to as Chinese); Ceskoslovenskl, Vojensleil Atlas,
Prague 1965, chart No. 180 (boundary in the southwestern part of the South China Sea
following Peking's model), chart No. 182 (no boundary line drawn, but Paracels, Spratlys
and Macclesfield Bank as in Peking's model), chart No. 159 (as chart No. 182); Haack
Weltatlas, Gotha/Leipzig 1972, chart No. 128 (boundary resembling Peking's model);
Borshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2nd Edn., Vol. 21, Moscow 1953, chart following
p. 168 (Spratlys shown as Chinese territory by name and boundary line, Pratas shown as
Chinese).
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Diplomatic Events 39
The Philippines, too, were beginning to show an interest in the possession of the
Spratlys as early as 1946 and 1950122, while Vietnam officially claimed the Paracels
and Spratlys in 1951.123
The Regulation of the Island Issue in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and
the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952
The first occasion on which the P.R. China and Vietnam expressed their claims to
the islands was in the declarations they made in connection with the San Francisco
Peace Conference (September 4 to 8, 1951). They continued to use these declarations
as a basis throughout the subsequent argumentation.124
As a reaction to the publication of the joint US/UK draft for the Peace Treaty
with Japan of August 15, 1951, Chou En-lai, then Foreign Minister of the P.R.
China, made a statement, also dated August 15, in which he said:
"At the same time the draft deliberately stipulates that Japan shall renounce all claims
to Nan-wei Island (meaning Spratly ? the author) and to the Hsi-sha archipelago, but does
not mention the problem of restitution of sovereignty. In reality, the Hsi-sha archipelago
and Nan-wei Island, just as the whole archipelago of Nan-sha, and the Chung-sha and
Tung-sha archipelagos, have always been Chinese territory. Though occupied for some time
during the war of aggression unleashed by Japanese imperialism, they were taken over by
the then Chinese government following Japan's surrender. The Central People's Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China declares herewith: The unviolable sovereignty of the
People's Republic of China over Nan-wei Island and the Hsi-sha archipelago will by no
means be impaired, irrespective of whether the American-British draft for a peace treaty
with Japan should make any stipulations and of the nature of any such stipulations."125
Vietnam, which, unlike the two Chinas, was present at the San Francisco Confer-
ence as a participant and signatory power, declared through her delegates during
the seventh plenary session on September 7:
we affirm our right to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have always belonged
to Vietnam."126
On September 8, 49 of the 52 participating states signed the Peace Treaty, while
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused to sign.127 The passage
concerning the South China Sea islands in the Treaty (Art. 2 f. in Part II) reads as
follows:
122 Hsun-cheng Shao, Chinese Islands in the South China Sea, in: People's China, 1956,
No. 13, p. 27.
123 Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 595.
124 Statement made by the Peking Foreign Ministry on Jan 20, 1974, in: JMJP Jan 21, 1974;
Statement by the Spokesman of the Saigon Foreign Ministry on Jan 12, 1974, in: SWB FE!
4499/A3/1-2 (Jan 14, 1974).
125 Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi, Vol. 2, Peking 1961,
p. 32.
126 Digest of International Law, /oc. cit. (see Note 123 above), p. 595.
127 Keesing of Sep 8, 1974, p. 3102 F.
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40 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
"Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel
Islands."128
An application by Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, for an amendment pro-
viding for the transfer of all four archipelagos to the P.R. China had been rejected
by 46 votes to 3.129 The reason why the Treaty did not clearly specify to whom the
said archipelagos ? likewise Taiwan and the Pescadores ? were to be ascribed, was
that the opinions of the signatory powers, in particular the United States of America
and the United Kingdom, differed as to which of the Chinese governments was to be
regarded as the legitimate one: Peking or Taipei. As only the Spratlys and the
Paracels had been referred to in the Treaty, it may be presumed that the Conference
had proceeded from the assumption that the Pratas had not been annexed or oc-
cupied by Japan, or that they continued to belong to China as evidently as the
island of Hainan, which was not mentioned in the Treaty either. Macclesfield Bank
was also omitted, because it was apparently ? and rightly ? not regarded as a
genuine group of islands.
Nor does the Peace Treaty of April 28, 1952 between the Republic of China
and Japan make any reference to a devolution of sovereignty over the archipelagos
that had been given up by Japan. It merely repeats the Japanese renunciation as
pronounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty:
"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the
city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 ..., Japan has
renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as
well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."188
The Behaviour of Some of the Signatories Following the Conclusion of the Peace
Treaties
Some of the powers that had signed the peace treaties have since made statements
on the territorial question in which they interpret or disregard some of the stipul-
ations of the treaties.
On February 4, 1955, the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, said before
the House of Commons that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty had not placed Taiwan
and the Pescadores under either Peking's or Taipei's sovereignty and that the ques-
tion of de jure sovereignty over these islands was uncertain and vague.131 On Dec-
ember 1, 1954, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, emphasized in a
statement at a press conference that the question of technical sovereignty over
128 Digest of International Law, loc. cit. (see Note 123 above), p. 594; complete German
translation of the Agreement in: Europa Archiv, Vol. VII/2 (July to December 1952),
pp. 5267 ff.
123 Keesing of Sep 8, 1974, p. 3102 f.
iso Hungdah Chiu (Ed.), China and the Question of Taiwan, New York, Washington,
London 1973, pp. 245 f.
131 Ibid.
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Diplomatic Events
41
Taiwan and the Pescadores had never been settled, and that the future legal title to
those territories had not been determined by either aireement.132 Six years later, the
State Department announced that the Paracel Islands did not belong to the P.R.
China.133 In the Joint Sino-American Communique of February 27, 1972 (Shanghai
Communique), however, Washington expressly declared that it recognized the
opinion of the two Chinese states according to which there was only one China, of
which Taiwan formed an integral part, and that it respected this point of view.'"
At first Japan avoided taking a firm stand in the question of sovereignty over the
islands which she had renounced.135 It was not until September 29, 1972, that Japan
finally took sides. In the Joint Sino-Japanese Communique which was issued on the
establishment of diplomatic relations, Tokyo declared that it recognized the Peking
government as the sole legal government of China, understood and respected the
Chinese view of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the territory of the P.R.C., and
adhered to its own conviction of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declar-
ation.'" On the same day, the Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, while
still in Peking, explained the Japanese position,137 saying that it was only natural
for the Japanese to support the view that Taiwan belonged to China, since Article 8
of the Potsdam Declaration referred to the Declaration of Cairo, which demanded
that Taiwan should be returned to China. In a rather vague and imperspicuous
manner, befitting the delicacy of the legal situation, Mr. Ohira went on to say that
the Peace Treaty between Japan and Taiwan "has lost the meaning of its existence
and is declared terminated" (or, according to another translation, had been "ter-
minated" and "lost its significance of existence").
A scrutiny of the peace treaties with Japan and the subsequent behaviour of the
signatory states in the territorial question reveals that Taiwan (and implicitly the
Pescadores?) which Japan had ceded as a result of the lost war, had been acquired,
according to Japanese views, by the P.R.C. and, according to US conceptions, by
"China". In the case of all the other territories relinquished by Japan, including the
Paracels and the Spratlys, the situation continues to be as open as in the treaties, no
reference being made to an assignee.
132 Mid.
133 NCNA of May 13, 1960, SCMP No. 2261 of May 19, 1960, p. 31.
134 NFHNA of Feb 28, 1972, p. 4.
135 F. P. Morello, The International Legal Status of Formosa, The Hague 1966, p. 39.
136 NFHNA of Sep 29, 1972, p. 6.
137 For this and for the following sentence, cf. NFHNA of Sep 29, 1972, p. 18; ibid., Sep 30,
1972, p. 6; Kyodo (in English), SWB FE/4106/A3/8 (Sep 30, 1972). ? Cf. also the statement
by the deputy Foreign Minister Hogen of Sep 29, 1972, Kyodo (in English), SWB FE/4106/
A3/10 (Sep 30, 1972). The corresponding passage of the Cairo Declaration of Dec 1, 1943,
the Proclamation of Potsdam of July 26, 1945, and the Japanese declaration of acceptance
have been reprinted in E. Roper, Geteiltes China, Mainz 1967, pp. 231, 233 ff.
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42 Occupation of Islands Since World War II and the Claims Involved
Renewal of Claims After the Conclusion of the Peace Treaties
In 1956 and 1971 Peking re-affirmed its claims to the four archipelagos, making
reference to Chou En-lai's statement of August 15, 1951.138 A government state-
ment dated September 4, 1958 again mentioned all the groups of islands in dis-
pute.130 Sovereignty over the Paracels was claimed in further statements in 1959 and
1960.140 Taipei has also repeatedly claimed a title to all four archipelagos. According
to Taiwanese sources, declarations and &marches in this respect were again made
on July 12, 1971, as well as on January 25, August 9 and 27, and October 26, 1973.141
In the spring of 1956, the Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Garcia claimed the
Spratly archipelago, including the islands of Itu Aba and Spratly, for his country
on the grounds of their geographical proximity to the Philippines.142 At the same
time, however, it was announced that Manila intended to enter into negotiations
with Taipei to discuss this question.143 On July 10, 1971, President Marcos declared
at a press conference that the Spratlys were derelict and disputed.144 Therefore,
"occupation and control" would be sufficient for a country to acquire a title to the
islands. In accordance with this legal interpretation, the islands, which had mean-
while been occupied by Manila,148 had now become part of the Philippines.
South Vietnam is said to have renewed its claim to the archipelagos in dispute in
the spring of 1956.146 Besides this information, there were reports from official
Saigon sources that the South Vietnamese government, commencing in 1961, had
188 Statement made by the Foreign Ministry of May 29, 1956, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-
kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi, Vol. 4, Peking 1961, p. 61 f.; English text in: SCMP
No. 1301 of June 4, 1956, p. 20. - Hsinhua report of July 16, 1971, JMJP July 17, 1971;
English text in: NFHNA of July 17, 1971, p. 27 f.; cf. also the speech made by Huang
Yung-sheng, Chief of General Staff, on July 16, 1971, IMP July 17, 1971, English text
published in: SWB FE/3738/A3/4 (July 19, 1971).
139 Governmental statement on the Chinese territorial waters, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-
kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi, Vol. 5, Peking 1959, p. 162; English text in: Peking
Review, 1958, No. 28, p. 21.
140 Statements made by the Foreign Ministry on Feb 27, 1959, Apr 5, 1959, and May 13,
1960, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi, Vol. 6, Peking 1961,
pp. 28, 37; ibid., Vol. 7, Peking 1962, p. 154. English texts in: NCNA of Feb 27, 1959,
Apr 5, 1959, and May 13, 1960 (SCMP No. 1966 of Mar 5, 1959, p. 47; No. 1988 of Apr 8,
1959, p. 36; No. 2261 of May 19, 1960, p. 32).
141 FEER 1971, No. 29 (July 17, 1971.), p. 4; NRC No. 9 of Jan 22, 1974.
142 NCNA of May 29, 1956, SCMP No. 1301 of June 4, 1956, p. 20.
143 Mid.
144 For this and the following sentence, cf. FEER 1971, No. 29 (July 17, 1971), p. 4; NCNA
of July 16, 1971, SCMP No. 7130/1971. - For details, cf. Yu-hsi Nieh, /oc. cit. (see Note 98
above), pp. 28 f.; J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, /oc. cit. (see Note 97 above), p. 346.
145 See p. 36 of this book.
146 G. T. Little, Nan-sha ch'iin-tao ti chu-ch'iian wen-t'i, in: Tung-fang tsa-chih (Taipei) of
Apr 1, 1974, p. 57 (first printed under the title of "Title to the Nan Sha Islands: Prescription
Versus Occupation in the South Sea" in an omnibus volume published for the 30th anni-
versary of the Political Academy in Taipei (Cheng-chih ta-hsiieh) in 1957 (relevant passage
on pp. 397 ff.).
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Diplomatic Events 43
issued various decrees relating to the administration of the islands as territory of the
Republic of Vietnam. By decree dated July 13, 1961, South Vietnam separated the
Paracels from Thua Thien province and incorporated them in Quang Nam pro-
vince.147 At the same time, the Vietnamese asserted that a village called Dinh Hai,
administratively attached to the Hoa Vang district, had been founded on the
islands.1" If they meant Dinh Hai to be considered a permanent settlement, their
assertion must, for the reasons indicated,"" be regarded with as much scepticism as
the statement that a Prime Ministerial decree dated October 21, 1969, had merged
this village with another community called Hoa Long.15? Scepticism would appear
to be all the more justified in view of the fact that the South Vietnamese never dis-
closed on which island the settlement had allegedly been built.
An unusually grave blunder was made by the Spokesman of the Saigon Foreign
Ministry who announced on January 12, 1974, that President Ngo Dinh Diem (as-
sassinated in 1963) had incorporated the Spratlys into Ba Ria village in a decree
dated October 22, 1966.151 The simultaneous reference to a decree promulgated by
President Nguyen Van Thieu in September 1973 to the effect that eleven islands of
the Spratly archipelago (and the village of Phuoc Hai) should be placed under the
jurisdiction of Dat do district in Phuoc Thuy province152 appears to be more cred-
ible. The administrative measure referred to was corroborated by the P.R.C. in a
declaration made by the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in Peking on January
11, 1974,1" the declaration which proved to be the verbal prologue to the military
conflict of January 19 and 20, 1974.
In May 1975, Hanoi which had kept silent during the Chinese take-over of the
Paracels in 1974, announced the occupation of various Spratly islands by Com-
munist Vietnamese troops.154 This attitude may be regarded as evidence of a new
self-assurance Hanoi has been developing towards Peking after the victorious con-
clusion of the Vietnam War. It indicates, moreover, that possible conflicts over the
islands of the South China Sea may effect the Spratly region in the first place.
147 Press statement made by the Spokesman of the Saigon Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Jan 12, 1974, published in Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) on Jan 12, 1974, as reprinted in:
SWB FEI44991A312 (Jan 14, 1974); press statement by the Spokesman of the Saigon Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on Jan 16, 1974, Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) on Jan 17, 1974, as re-
printed in SWB FE/4503/A3/1 (Jan 18, 1974). ? This author is unable to understand why
these statements refer to the "Nansha Islands", while the context clearly shows that they
refer to the Paracels.
148 Ibid.
143 See pp. 33 f. of this book.
150 Press statement by the Spokesman of the Saigon Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jan 16,
1974, /oc. cit. (see Note 147 above).
151 Vietnam Press (in Vietnamese) on Jan 12, 1974, as reprinted in SWB FE/4499/A3/2.
Though the context shows that the report deals with the Spratlys, the Vietnamese, for some
obscure reasons, used the term "Chungsha Islands" here.
152 ibid.
153 JMJP Jan 12, 1974. ? For the question of jurisdiction over the islands, cf. Yu-hsi Nieh,
/oc. cit. (see Note 98 above), p. 25 (with further sources).
154 Hanoi Radio (home service) on May 6, 1975, as reprinted in SWB FEI48981A318.
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APPENDIX
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Chart 1
47
1021.
110'
P.R.CHINA
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The Disputed South China Sea Archipelagos. ? Mercator Projection ? Equatorial Scale
1: 5 800 000
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48
2
Chart 2
120
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The Boundaries in the South China Sea as Drawn by Peking. ? Source: Chung-hua jen-min
kung-ho-kuo ti-t'u, Peking 1965, 3rd Edn. 1972 (detail). Scale: 1 : 15 000 000
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Chart 3
49
.."
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The Boundaries in the South China Sea as Drawn by Taipei. ? Chart based on Chung-hua
min-kuo ti-t'u chi, ti szu ts'e, Chung-kuo nan-pu, 2nd Edn., Taipei 1964 (scaled down)
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17 : CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
'19' '30.
?
li
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112121. '1r
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The Paracel Islands. ? Chart based on British Admiralty chart No. 94
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16.
observation fit
410
..
PattIel.
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The Region Where Fighting Took Place on January 19 and 20, 1974: The Crescent Group (Paracel Islands).
Chart based on British Admiralty chart No. 94 (addenda by the author). Scale: 1 cm = approx. 2 km
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112.
5o,
17.
eat9and
orth I.
iddle I.
.., South I,
outh Sand
,..._.:
_
Amphitrilt Group
- ?
woodyi:, ,..o.2.,..,\.
501.
.0
Dido Dank
.% Vi
\ Idris Bank
!
,
..
Limon, I.
i ?
gr
\
0 i i
Neptune aankv!---

30'
The Amphitrite Group (Paracel Islands). ? Chart based on British Admiralty chart No. 94
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
The Spratly Islands.? Chart based on British Admiralty chart No. 2660B. The numbered circles refer to the positions of
the islands and cays specified under (3) in Chapter I of this book
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
10.
20.
114'
30^
4
C3 0
10,
30 East F 6r.
20'
10'
100
Tizard Bank (Spratly Islands): Itu Aba I., Nam yit I., Sand Cay. ? Chart based on British Admiralty chart No. 1201
_ Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Chart 9
55
40'
1110
55
40'
8?
(2
/
,
i
,
?
Et?
39'
36'
i
, i
.
, ;
, !
?
I 41 '
:21 "-..,.
.4???.t
..
.,
... ...... . ...is
-.....
r14411 ?.,-
/.."
?;:'
,26;
i....
'
36'
111?
too 0
SOO
1000
55'
Metres
Spratly Island. ? Source: British Admiralty chart No. 1201
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
.35'
45'
2o?
40,
40'
,.:North Channel
'45' 116*
? ......
.............
?I'Llervesf Horn
..... .....
'55' for.
45'
20
40'
35,
40'
Loneirucle 115.
50.5.1 from Greenwich
iss' 417.
Pratas Island. ? Source: British Admiralty chart No. 362 (reduced)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
tie
'40
44 . ..!..9/.3..'
....? RAii
S4 qii,
;a/ .
Cili;a.i.iii.;..
30'
piqmy Shoal
,
Hardy
Palchu
115.
Egeria
Bank
....A..,
Calflayihoal
Combiii.S heal
Tancred Shoal
.........*--
Penguin Bank
Cawstdn Shoal
*/
.... Ali-i.n-iiOW. . ...
Pardl iiWar
,Payne Shoal
Shoal
lioncl Shoe
maroesson
Shoal
Howard
...lhoal
. .
Learmenth
Shoal
.
Jo'
.
Parry Snos'
Balfour Shoal
riar
? ..... ?
Smith Shoal
air
145.
kr
Macclesfield Bank. ? Source: British Admiralty chart No. 270 (reduced)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
Position of the "Republic of Luconia"
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8
P.R. CHINA
BURMA
TAIWAN
HONGKONG
THAILAND
\ CAMBODIA
V I Eil'N A M
# JAPAN
PHILIPPINES
0
90
MALAYSIA
a 0
SINGAPORE
.6"
LUCcINIA j
Scale i : 22, 500.000
0 200 400 600 800
0 100 200 300 400
IN DON ES IA
?Z:=5 ?
C:30?3?
POSITION
of the
REPUBLIC
LUCONIA
o'c=.
Di)
.12
0
?rc CjjfiSeCr21* *
eti;D TIMOR
ALISTRALI?A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/17: CIA-RDP08001297R000300180013-8