SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180010-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 6, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA'
Rival claims to various islands in the South
China Sea provide the potential for serious con-
flict, particularly since the area may contain
important oil and gas deposits. The Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, People's Republic of China
(PRC), Republic of China (ROC), and Philippines-
now claim sovereignty or jurisdiction over the
Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and/or
islands in the Dangerous Ground area, including
the Spratly Islands. Great Britain, Japan, and
France have made claims in the past but do not
now pursue them.
Although the islands in question have little
intrinsic economic value, the establishment of
recognized sovereignty over them could greatly
increase a nation's rights to contiguous marine
resources, living and non-living, if the islands
were used as base points and:
--the surrounding seabed were considered
continental shelf of the islands rather
than a natural prolongation of the
mainland; or
--equidistant lines were used to divide the
area of the seabed over which adjacent
countries had rights; or
--200-mile economic zones were applied.
Nevertheless, even the establishment of
recognized sovereignty would not be sufficient
for resolving the question of rights over marine
resources, because the claimants have not areed
on what principle or principles to use for Flefin-
ing these rights. The Republic of China, flor
example, is the only active claimant to have
signed the 1958 Convention on the Continental
--gICRET.LXGDS -1, 2
WARNING NOTICE I Report No. 672
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED January 6, 1977
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Shelf. The Law of the Sea Conference might provide helpful
criteria; however, while Peking and Manila now participate
in the Conference, Taipei and Hanoi do not.
Claimants have supported their assertions of sovereignty
by the deployment of troops and by a variety of legal and
historical arguments. On the basis of available evidence, no
country seems able to establish persuasively the legitimacy
of its claims with respect to competing claims.
Imprecise Definition of Spratly Islands
The geographic terms themselves complicate discussion of
the claims. Although the claimants apparently agree on the
general extent of the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank,
and Dangerous Ground, they do not agree on a definition of
the Spratly Islands. (See Annex, Map A, for a general view
of the South China Sea.)
The Paracels, it is generally agreed, encompass about
20 small islands divided into two main groups: the north-
eastern Amphitrite Group, which includes Woody, Rocky, and
Tree Islands; and the southwestern Crescent Group, which
includes Pattle, Robert, Money, and Duncan Islands. Also
included but separate from the two main groups are Lincoln
and Triton Islands. Woody is the largest island, with a
length of about 2,000 yards and a maximum width of 1,200
yards. (See Map B for the Paracel Islands.)
Macclesfield Bank is a submarine feature, about 80
nautical miles long and 25 nautical miles wide, southeast of
the Paracels. Water depths range from about 4 to 45 fathoms.
Dangerous Ground is a largely uncharted area south of
Macclesfield Bank. Lying on or near this ground are numerous
small islands, including Amboyna Cay, Flat Island, Itu Aba
Island, Namyit Island, Loaita Island, Lankian Cay, Nanshan
Island, Northeast Cay, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Southwest
Cay, Spratly Island, Thitu Reef, and West York Island. Also
in the area are several submerged features, including Reed
Bank. The largest island is Itu Aba, with a length of about
4,000 yards and a maximum width of about 1,500 yards. (See
Map C for islands in the Dangerous Ground area.)
All interested parties agree that the Spratlys are
among the islands in or near Dangerous Ground. However, the
claimants use imprecise and differing definitions of the
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Spratly Islands, thus generally obscuring the exact extent
of sovereignty claims except in the case of the PRC and ROC.
Recent Occupation of the Paracels
The People's Republic of China now controls all the
Paracels, but other countries have had forces on them. Japan
occupied the islands during World War II. Taipei sent troops
to Woody Island in 1946 after Japan's withdrawal but removed
them in 1950 after Communist Chinese forces occupied Hainan
Island.
In 1947, the French stationed a small garrison of colo-
nial troops on Pattle Island and reopened a weather station
built before the war. In 1956, the last troops under French
command were replaced by forces of the former Government of
Vietnam (GVN). Around the same time, the PRC settled about
200 people and established a naval base on Woody Island.
After 1956, both the GVN and the PRC continued to main-
tain garrisons on the Paracels. By 1973, Peking had forces
on Woody, Rocky, and Lincoln Islands, while Saigon had a
meteorological station and a company of Regional Forces on
Pattle Island, two squads on Money Island, and two squads
on Robert Island.
On January 19 and 20, 1974, Chinese troops, supported
by MIG's and gunboats, drove the Vietnamese off the Paracels.
Peking probably acted for a number of reasons, among which
were to preempt Hanoi's occupation of the islands and to
assert control over potential oil resources.
Recent Occupation in the Dangerous Ground Area
At present, all the active claimants except the PRC have
troops on islands in or near Dangerous Ground, an area that
includes the ill-defined Spratly Islands.
During World War II, Japan controlled the principal
islands in the Dangerous Ground area. The ROC deployed
troops to Itu Aba around 1946, after Japan's withdrawal, but
removed them in 1949 after the Nationalists' defeat on the
mainland. In 1956, the ROC returned to Itu Aba and until
1970 maintained the only garrison in the area.
In apparent anticipation of the discovery of oil, Phil-
ippine President Ferdinand Marcos on July 10, 1971, claimed
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that the ROC garrison was "a serious threat to our national
security" and asked Taipei to withdraw its troops. By 1973,
the Philippines probably had stationed small contingents of
marines on Loaita, Nanshan, Northeast Cay, Thitu, and West
York and had sent other marines to visit Flat Island period-
ically. In April 1976 a US rig operating on behalf of a
consortium of Swedish and Philippine firms began drilling
about 115 nautical miles northwest of Palawan Island, near
Reed Bank.
Apparently also anticipating finds of oil, the former
Government of Vietnam dispatched about 70 soldiers in August
1973 to occupy Nam Yit Island. In February 1974, the GVN
responded to the Chinese takeover of the Paracels by sending
additional contingents, of 20 to 40 men each, to occupy Sand
Cay, Sin Cowe, Southwest Cay, and Spratly Island. The GVN
claimed Amboyna Cay at the same time but said it was too
small to support any troops.
In April 1975, after the fall of Saigon, Vietnam's
"Liberation Navy" took Amboyna Cay, Nam Yit, Sand Cay, Sin
Cowe, Southwest Cay, and Spratly Island. As a consequence,
Manila withdrew its marines from Northeast Cay, which is
about two nautical miles from Southwest Cay. By late 1975,
however, Philippine marines had apparently returned to North-
east Cay.
Justification of Sovereignty Claims
In addition to deploying armed forces, past and present
claimants have supported their assertions of sovereignty
with a number of explanations.
Great Britain has never asserted sovereignty over the
Paracels but in 1955 noted that two 19th century entre-
preneurs engaged in guano mining had hoisted the British
flag over Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay in the Dangerous
Ground area. While the British have not renounced this
claim, they have not pursued it in the intervening years.
Japan never formally asserted sovereignty over the
Paracels. In 1939, however, Tokyo claimed all the principal
islands in and around Dangerous Ground on the basis that
they had been "no state's land" until 1921, when a Japanese
firm had made a "considerable" investment in them. By the
1951 peace treaty signed with the World War II Allies (but
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not the PRC or the ROC), Japan renounced all claims to the
"Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands." The treaty did not
define either island group.
France as colonizer of Vietnam asserted sovereignty over
the Paracels and Spratlys until the end of the first Indo-
chinese war. According to France, China had ceded the Paracels
to Vietnam in 1816, while France was the first country to
discover and occupy the Spratlys. In September 1955, however,
France implied that it had relinquished sovereignty over the
Paracels in favor of Vietnam, but maintained that the Spratlys
were "French and not Vietnamese." France, like Britain, while
not renouncing its claim, has not pursued it actively.
Hanoi has made clear that it considers the Paracels and
Spratlys to be Vietnamese but has never explained the basis
of its claims. Vietnamese maps published since the fall of
Saigon show both the Paracels and the Spratlys as part of
Vietnam; however, these maps are of poor quality and, particu-
larly in the Dangerous Ground area, do not permit a precise
delimitation of Vietnamese claims. In response to the drill-
ing near Reed Bank, Vietnam issued a vague statement that
asserted sovereignty over the "Spratly Archipelago" but
neither mentioned Reed Bank nor indicated the precise area
where Vietnam claimed rights.
If Hanoi were to justify its claims publicly, it might
use some of the arguments of the former Government of Vietnam,
which frequently asserted sovereignty over the Paracel and
Spratly Islands. The GVN claimed that the Vietnamese emperors
had established sovereignty over these islands and that France
as a colonial power had maintained jurisdiction over them on
behalf of the Vietnamese. Like other claimants, the GVN did
not define the precise extent of the Spratlys.
The People's Republic of China has frequently asserted
sovereignty not only over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,
but also over Macclesfield Bank, a feature entirely under
water at all times. The PRC responded to the start of
Philippine drilling by calling Reed Bank part of the Spratly
Islands and making clear that China claimed exclusive rights
over the resources there. While official PRC maps do not
specify the extent of the "Spratly Archipelago," they do
show the limits of Peking's overall claim in the South China
Sea, which includes virtually all features down to 4? North.
In support of this claim, Peking has cited evidence dating
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back to the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties to demonstrate
that China was the first country to discover, develop, and
exercise jurisdiction over the "South China Sea Islands."
The ROC, like the PRC, has claimed virtually all features
in the South China Sea down to 4? North and has asserted
exclusive jurisdiction over the resources in Reed Bank. Like
Peking, Taipei argues that China was the first to discover
and develop the islands. But whereas Peking has condemned
the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan for failing to assert
Chinese rights, Taipei has contended that the treaty
restored the Spratly Islands to China.
The Philippines has claimed Kalayaan, which Manila
defines vaguely as a set of islands in Dangerous Ground
distinct from the Spratlys. 'Manila has said that the Phil-
ippines acquired Kalayaan "by right of occupation" since the
islands there "were res nullius and did not belong to any
country." Manila has not claimed either the Paracels or the
"Spratlys," but it has contended that these islands were
"subject to the disposition" of the World War II Allies and
therefore not open to unilateral acquisition by any country.
In the apparent hope of minimizing public arguments with
other potential claimants, Manila has defended its offshore
drilling near Reed Bank on grounds that the bank is part of
the Philippine continental shelf rather than on the basis
of a claim of Kalayaan.
Attached as annexes are more detailed descriptions of
how past and present claimants have justified their assertions
of sovereignty. Included in the annexes are maps pertaining
to the claims of Japan, Vietnam, the PRC, the ROC, and the
Philippines.
Prepared by J. H. Yellin
x27363
Approved by H. E. Horowitz
x21179
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 5B 1, 2
(Classified by M. Packman)
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ANNEX A
British Claims
Great Britain has never claimed the Paracels. It has
apparently issued no formal statement on Dangerous Ground
since 1955, when London noted a past British claim to two
islands and denied that any country might annex other islands
in the area.
The Paracels
In 1975 a British Foreign Office research memorandum on
the Paracels included the following statements:
?"Although the ParaceI Islands have long been known
to British sailors, Britain has never taken,much
interest in the islands."
--"There has never been a British claim to any of the
islands, and Britain has avoided taking any public
position as to their ownership. The nearest approach
to a British public position is the statement in the
China Sea Pilot that China annexed the islands in 1909.
The China Sea Pilot is an official publication [of
Great Britain]."
--"The British view at the beginning of the 20th Century
appears to have been that the islands were a Chinese
responsibility. By the 1920's, when the French became
interested in the islands, Britain was inclined to
favor the Chinese claim against the French, fdr
strategic reasons. This remained the British view
until the annexation of the islands [by Britain] in
1939, the Admiralty in particular being keen to keep
these islands out of French hands."
--"Since the end of the Second World War, the main
British interest has been to prevent a dispute over
the Paracels leading to a major international incident."
Dangerous Ground
The last available British statement on Dangerous Ground
is a Foreign Office memorandum of October 12, 1955, responding
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ta a request from the. American EMbassy for Clarification of
London's position. According to the memorandum,
--"The Foreign Office have studied at some length the
question of the status of the islands in the 'Dangerous
Ground'. area in the South China Sea...."
--"Two of the islets, Spratly and Amboyna Cay, were visited
in 1864 by Her Majesty's Ship 'Rifleman,' a ship of the
Royal Navy, and on October 25, 1877, a license was
granted by Her-Majesty's Government to a British subject
and a United States citizen to hoist the British flag on
these two islands and to work them for Guano. These
rights were re-granted in 1889 by the Crown to the
Central Borneo Company [of Brunei, a British dependency]."
-,?"With regard to the other: islands listed within this group,
the review of Her Majesty's. '. Government has been. that, with
one. possible. exception [not specified by. the memorandum],
all except the: two already mentioned are reef and shoals,
some, of.. them being listed as- covered at all stages.' of the
tide, and therelbre-. uninhabitable and incapable of appro-
priation and. occupation."'
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ANNEX B
Japanese Claims
Japan controlled the Paracels and islands in the Danger-
ous Ground area during World War II but afterward renounced
all claims to both island groups.
The Japanese never formally claimed the Paracels, but
they mined guano on Lincoln and Woody Islands from around
1917 to 1929. When Tokyo abandoned the mining as unprofitable,
the Japanese returned to occupy and mine the islands from 1939
to 1945.
Tokyo did claim what it called the "Sinnan Islands,"
which it defined as including all the principal islands in
and around Dangerous Ground (see Map D). On March 31i-
1939, the Japanese Government issued a proclamation declaring
that:
--The Sinnan Islands had been "no state's land" until
1921, when a Japanese firm "invested a considerable
amount of money in the building of permanent establish-
ments for the development of the islands."
--In 1931 a business depression had obliged "the Japanese
settlers concerned" to leave temporarily. In 1933,
while the settlers were still gone, France had dis-
patched a warship to the islands and "publicly pro-
claimed their acquisition." The Japanese Government,
however, in no way had recognized the French claim,
and in 1936 another Japanese concern had resumed work
on the islands.
In view of "the close connection that has existed
between the islands and the Japanese Empire" and to
avoid "the possibility of further complications with
the French government," the Japanese Government has
"incorporated the Sinnan Islands under the jurisdiction
of the Governor General of Formosa."
On the same day as the proclamation, the Japanese
rejected a French aide memoire suggesting that Paris and
Tokyo submit conflicting claims over the Spratlys to the
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Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. And from 1939
to 1945, the Japanese occupied Spratly Island and other
islands in the area.
Under the Peace Treaty signed by the World War II
Allies at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan
renounced "all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands
and Paracel Islands." The treaty, however, did not define
the extent of either island group.
In addition, neither the PRC nor the ROC signed the
1951 treaty. Taipei, however, signed a separate treaty with
Tokyo on April 28, 1952, that said:
"It is hereby acknowledged that pursuant to
Article 2 of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed
in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan
has given up all rights, rightful titles and
demands respecting the Spratly and Paracel
Islands."
The 1952 treaty also failed to define the extent of either
island group.
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ANNEX C
French' Claims
France, before its defeat in Indochina, claimed sover-
eignty over the Paracels on the basis of Vietnamese history
and over islands in the Dangerous Ground area on the basis of
occupation. Paris has not made a formal statement on any of
the islands in question since 1955, when it seemingly
renounced the French claim to the Paracels while clearly
asserting French sovereignty over "the Spratly Archipelago.-"
The Paracels
France showed some proprietary interest in the Paracels
as early as 1899, when the Governor General of Indochina had
plans prepared for the construction of a lighthouse on the
islands. According to one French writer, the Paracels then
"sank into oblivion" for about 20 years. For example, France
did not protest a Chinese claim in 1909.
In the 1920's, however, Indochinese customs officials
visited the Paracels, and an oceanographic ship, the De
Lanessan, surveyed them. On December 25, 1927, the acting
Governor General wrote the Minister of Colonies that France
had "absolute rights over the Paracel Archipelago" by way of
the "traditional rights" of Annam (the French protectorate
in central Vietnam).
On December 4, 1931, and April 24, 1932, France
reportedly sent the Chinese mission in Paris notes that:
--protested that Chinese firms were preparing to mine
guano on the Paracels without permission of the Indo-
chinese authorities;
--claimed that China had ceded the Paracels to Annam
in 1816;
--said that Indochinese guards had been posted to the
islands.
On June 15, 1932, three months after the Japanese had
ended their occupation of Manchuria, the Governor General
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issued a decree creating on Pattle Island an administrative
"Delegation for the Paracels" under the jurisdiction of
Thua Thien Province. On September 8, 1937, two months
after the Japanese had invaded China, Paris sent Tokyo an
aide memoire asserting French sovereignty over the Paracels
but saying that France would not occupy the islands until
it had settled conflicting claims with China. But on
July 4, 1938, after reports that Japan would invade Hainan
Island, French officials in Tokyo and Paris affirmed that:
--France had stationed a small detachment of Annamite
police, constructed a lighthouse, and opened a weather
station on the Paracels, thereby effecting their
complete and definite occupation.
--China had not only ceded the Paracels to Annam in 1816
but also had recognized the establishment of a French
protectorate over Annam by the Treaty of Peking in 1885.
Japan occupied the Paracels during World War II,
although the French probably also maintained some presence.
In 1947, the French stationed a small garrison of colonial
troops and reopened the weather station on Pattle Island.
Dangerous Ground Area
France showed virtually no interest in the Dangerous
Ground area until 1927, when the De Lanessan visited islands
there. On July 23, 1933, France gave official notice of a
claim; in a note to the American Embassy in Paris, the Quai
d'Orsay, without using the term "Spratly Islands" (plural)
said:
--The gunboat Malicieuse had taken possession of Spratly
Island as well as its "dependent islets" on April 13,
1930.
--The dispatch boats Astrolabe and Alerte had taken
possession of Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba, Loaita, Northeast
Cay, Southwest Cay, and Thitu, as well as their
"dependent islets," from April 7 to April 12, 1933.
--All the above islands and islets were "dependent
henceforth on French sovereignty."
France came to interpret its claim as covering all the
"Spratly Islands" (plural) and showed that, as with the
Paracels, fear of the Japanese had in part shaped its attitude
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toward the Dangerous Ground area. According to the daily
bulletin of the French Ministry of Colonies for April 5,
1939, "since the occupation of this [Spratly] archipelago by
a foreign country might be dangerous in case of war to
maritime communications between Cochinchina and Tonkin,"
France had decided in 1930 to place the islands under its
sovereignty.
French Withdrawal
On July 20, 1951, a spokesman of the French Foreign
Ministry said that the draft peace treaty with Japan estab-
lished French sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and
Spratly Island (singular). But on September 5, 1955, after
the end of the first Indochinese war, France sent the United
States an aide memoire that carefully distinguished between
the Paracels and the Spratlys (plural) and vaguely defined
the latter. It said:
--The Paracels had been Vietnamese "since the eighteenth
century"; thereby, the aide memoire implied that Paris
had relinquished sovereignty over them in favor of
Vietnam.
--France rather than Vietnam, however, had discovered
"the Spratly Archipelago," which was "French and not
Vietnamese" and which consisted of "Spratly Island
itself, Itu Aba Island, and the islets lying to the
north and south."
In 1956, the last troops under French command left both
island groups. In the same year, the GVN sent troops to
Pattle Island in the Paracels and the ROC sent forces to
Itu Aba in the Dangerous Ground area.
While the French have not renounced their claim to the
Spratlys, they have not pursued it actively.
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ANNEX D
Claims of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
There is no doubt Hanoi believes that Vietnam has sover-
eignty over both the Paracels and islands in the Dangerous .
Ground area. In November 1975, for example, Senior General
Van Tien Dung told a conference in Saigon that the People's
Armed Forces would "firmly defend our territorial integrity
including the territorial waters and. airspace...from the
frontier to the islands, from the mainland to the continen-
tal shelves."
Although unable to station troops on the Paracels
because of China's presence, Vietnam has small contingents
on six islands in the Dangerous Ground area. In addition,
available Vietnamese maps published since the fall of
Saigon show:
--the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands as part of Quang Nam-Da
Nang Province;
--the Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, which apparently
include most of the islands in and near Dangerous
Ground, as part of Dong Nai Province.
The maps are of poor quality, however, and, particularly
in the Dangerous Ground area, do not permit an exact delimi-
tation of Vietnamese claims (see below).
0.1%4 Oat
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Spratly Islands as shown in party paper
Nhan Dan on September 2, 1976.
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In seeming deference to Peking, Hanoi has never given a
detailed explanation of its claims to contested islands in
the South China Sea and has not directly protested Chinese
claims. Thus Hanoi, on September 14, 1958, recognized with-
out stated reservations Peking's decision to fix the limit
of its territorial sea at 12 nautical miles, even though
Peking had explicitly applied this limit to the Paracels and
Spratlys.
Also, Hanoi issued no official statement when the
Chinese occupied the Paracels in January 1974. Agence France
Presse, however, quoted "authorized" North Vietnamese sources
as saying on January 21 that:
--the preservation of territorial sovereignty was a
"sacred cause" for every nation, but
--complex territorial disputes "between neighboring coun-
tries" should be settled by negotiations "in a spirit
of equality and friendship and good neighborliness."
Hanoi has been more direct when referring to the Danger-
ous Ground area but has not stated the exact extent of Viet-
namese claims there. On May 5 and 8, 1975, the Vietnam News
Agency noted that between April 14 and 29 the "Liberation
Navy" had returned six "puppet forces held" islands to the
"fatherland": Amboyna Cay, Nam Yit, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe,
Southwest Cay, and Spratly Island.
In response to the beginning of exploratory operations
near Reed Bank by the Philippines on April 29, 1976, the
spokesmen of the Foreign Ministry of the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government on June 25 issued a cautious statement
neither mentioning Reed Bank nor indicating the precise areas
where Vietnam claimed rights:
"According to Western sources, recently a number of
foreign companies proposed to conduct an oil survey
in the area of the Spratly Archipelago which is part
of Vietnamese territory. Regarding this issue, the
PRG once again reaffirms its sovereignty over the
Spratly Archipelago and reserves for itself the right
to protect this sovereignty."
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ANNEX E
Claims of the Former Government of Vietnam
If Hanoi were to justify its claims publicly, it might
well use some of the arguments of the former Government of
Vietnam, which pictured itself as the successor not only of
Vietnamese imperial but also of French colonial authority.
Saigon frequently asserted sovereignty over the "Hoang Sa
(Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands" and maintained
forces on both island groups. While listing the islands in
the Spratlys of "relatively significant size," the GVN, like
other claimants past and present, failed to define precisely
the extent of this archipelago.
GVN Garrisons and Claims
By 1956, GVN troops had replaced the last forces under
French command on Pattle Island in the Paracels. By 1974,
when the Chinese expelled the South Vietnamese from the
Paracels, the GVN had a meteorological station and company
of Regional Forces on Pattle Island, 15 men on Money Island,
and 15 men on Robert Island.
In August 1973, possibly responding to prospects of oil,
the GVN dispatched about 70 men to occupy Nam Yit Island in
the Spratlys. In February 1974, responding to the Chinese
takeover of the Paracels, the GVN sent contingents of 20 to
40 men each to occupy Sand Cay, Sin Cowe, SoUthwest Cay, and
Spratly Island, all of which lay within the French claim.
The most recent explanation of GVN claims, a White Paper
issued in February 1975, repeated that no country present at
the plenary session of the San Francisco Peace Conference on
September 7, 1951, raised any objections when the Vietnamese
delegate affirmed that the Paracel and Spratly Islands "have
.always belonged to Vietnam." (Neither the PRC nor the ROC
attended the conference, however, and Vietnam was present as
an Associated State of France.)
The Paracels
The GVN White Paper went on to claim explicitly all the
Paracels and nine islands in the Dangerous Ground area. With
regard to the Paracels, the White Paper said that:
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--They rest on the Vietnamese continental shelf and are
joined to the Vietnamese coast by a submarine plinth.
--Vietnamese sovereignty over them "extends back over
300 years." In 1702, the royal Nguyen family (which
controlled much of central Vietnam) had formed a
society to exploit the islands, and in 1816 Emperor
Gia Long "consecrated the will of the Vietnamese...by
formally taking possession of the archipelago."
--"The French, who merely took over rights and responsi-
bilities temporarily transferred to them by the people
under their 'protection,' simply assured a normal con-
tinuation of jurisdiction on behalf of the Vietnamese."
--"At an early stage French action had been only inter-
mittent...but in the last 30 years of their presence,
the French did fulfill all the obligations of a holder?
of title."
--China began making "sporadic claims" to the islands in
1909 but did not in any way occupy them. On February 28,
1937, France proposed to China that the two countries
settle their conflicting claims through international
arbitration, "but China knew the risks involved in such
- a challenge and declined the offer."
The White Paper did not repeat an earlier GVN argument,
put forth in a January 28, 1974, bulletin of the Vietnamese
Embassy in Washington, that China had renounced all claims
to the Paracels when two ships carrying cargoes insured by
British companies were wrecked on the outlying reefs in 1895
and 1896. The GVN apparently dropped this argument after '
Great Britain pointed out that its records did not support
Saigon's interpretation.
The Spratlys
In the 1975 White Paper, the GVN made a general asser-
tion of sovereignty over the "Truong Sa [Spratly] Archipelago"
and within this group claimed by name nine islands, seven of
which France had also explicitly claimed, and three of which
the Philippines occupied. The paper also indicated that
Saigon was prepared to compromise with Manila over two other
islands that the Philippines occupied. More specifically, the
-GVN White Paper said that:
--The Spratly archipelago included nine islands of
"relatively significant size": Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba,
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Loaita, Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay, Spratly Island,
and Thitu (all of which the French had explicitly
claimed); Nam Yit and Sin Cowe (neither of which the
French had explicitly claimed).
--Fishermen from the southern part of Vietnam had
"always frequented" the Spratly Islands, and a Viet-
namese map published around 1838 showed them as part
of Vietnamese territory.
--Unlike the case of the Paracel Islands, the former
Emperors of Vietnam "did not have the time" to
organize "an administrative jurisdiction" for the
Spratly Islands. "However, the French took all those
measures necessary for the establishment of the legal
basis for possession.... In 1933, the Spratlys were
incorporated into the French colony of Cochinchina
and from that year forward have had an adequate
administrative structure."
--No state except Japan protested the French claim.
"It should also be noted that the French occupation...
did not arouse any protest from the United States
Government, which was then acting on behalf of the
Philippines.... This indicates there was no ground
for a challenge of French rights on behalf of the
Philippines."
--"Few people" knew of any Chinese claims before the PRC
suddenly asserted sovereignty over the Spratlys in
1951. And Itu Aba, which the ROC garrisoned in 1956,
was a center of French administrative services for
the Spratlys.
--The Philippines had "surreptitiously occupied" Loaita,
Northeast Cay, and Thitu. Manila's claim that these
islands had been res nullius and were not part of the
Spratly archipelago was "obviously erroneous." The
French explicitly claimed all three islands, which
are "an integral part of the Vietnamese Truong Sa
[Spratly] archipelago."
--"Moreover, it remains to be determined in a common
and friendly spirit whether or not some other islands
occupied by Philippine soldiers [presumably Flat and
Nanshan] are dependent islets of these Vietnamese
main islands. In this regard, it should be recalled
that when the French took possession of the Spratlys,
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they only listed the major islands on the official
act and indicated these islands were incorporated
'with their dependent islets.'"
--In 1956, the Vietnamese Navy began patrolling the
archipelago and in 1963 "rebuilt" sovereignty steles
on Amboyna Cay, Loaita,-NaM Yit, Northeast Cay,
Southwest Cay, Spratly Island, and Thitu.
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ANNEX F
Claims by the People's Republic of China
Peking has frequently asserted sovereignty not only over
the Hsi Sha (Paracel) and Nan Sha (Spratly) Islands, but also
over the "Chung Sha Islands" (Macclesfield Bank), a feature
entirely under water at all times. Indeed, official maps of
the People's Republic of China:
--show the Chinese claim as including virtually all
features in the South China Sea down to 40 North
(see Map E);
--show the Spratly Islands as comprising all the
principal islands in and around Dangerous Ground,
to include Amboyna Cay, Flat, Itu Aba, Nanshan,
Northeast Cay, Sin Cowe, Southwest Cay, Spratly
Island, and Thitu; but nevertheless
--do not define the precise extent of the Spratlys.
In support of Chinese claims, the PRC has had troops in the
Paracels since 1956, but it has never maintained a presence
in the Dangerous Ground area.
First Public Claim by the PRC: 1951
The PRC's first public claim came after the World War II
Allies published on July 12, 1951, a draft peace treaty with
Japan that in part read:
"Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to
Spratly Island [singular] and the Paracel Islands."
On August 15, 1951, then Foreign Minister Chou En-lai
responded by condemning the draft treaty for failing to
recognize Chinese sovereignty over the islands and by appeal-
ing to pre-1949 Nationalist claims on behalf of China. Chou
commented that:
--The draft treaty stipulated that Japan should renounce
all right to Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands,
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but again deliberately made no mention of the problem
of restoring sovereignty over them.
--These islands, as well as the entire Spratly Islands
and Macclesfield Bank, "have always been China's
territory."
--Although Japan had occupied these islands during World
War II, "the then Chinese Government" took them all
over after Japan's surrender.
The final version of the treaty, signed at San Francisco
on September 8, 1951, referred to the Spratly Islands rather
than Spratly Island (singular), but otherwise repeated the
language of the draft, despite the PRC's complaints.
Elaboration of PRC Claims: 1956 and 1958
, Peking gave a more complete explanation of its claim on
June 13, 1956, when the journal People's China responded to
a remark by Philippine Vice President Carlos Garcia that the
Spratly Islands should belong to Manila by reason of proxim-
ity. In addition to offering historical arguments to demon-
strate that China had "for centuries" had "indisputable
sovereign rights" over the Paracel and Spratly Islands as
well as Macclesfield Bank, the journal:
--maintained that the Convention relative to the
Frontier between China and Tonkin (a French protector-
ate in Vietnam), signed on June 26, 1887, confirmed
that the Spratlys "belong to China." (The American
Legation in Nanking, however, reported on August 3,
1933, that an official Chinese textbook described the
southern boundary of China's waters as extending
"just below" the Paracels and north of the Spratlys.)
--acknowledged that the "Chung Sha Islands" (Macclesfield
Bank) were "shoals submerged by the sea," but asserted
that "China's sovereign rights over them have always
been taken as a matter of course."
On September 4, 1958, the PRC issued a statement declar-
ing the extent of Chinese territorial sea to be 12 nautical
miles and noting that this extent applied to the Paracels,
Spratlys, and Macclesfield Bank. Without defining these
features, the statement said that the territorial waters
would be determined by straight baselines, thus implying
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that the seas around the Paracels, Spratlys, and Macclesfield
Bank within these baselines were China's internal waters.
Takeover of the Paracels: 1974
Around 1956, the PRC settled about 200 people and estab-
lished a naval base on Woody Island in the Paracels. At about
the same time, GVN forces replaced the last forces ?under
French command on Pattle Island.
Both the PRC and the GVN continued to maintain garrisons
on the Paracels. By 1973, Peking had forces on Woody, Rocky,
and Lincoln Islands; Saigon had a meteorological station and
a company of Regional Forces on Pattle Island, two squads on
Money Island, and two squads on Robert Island.
On January 11, 1974, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman
accused the GVN of attempting to seize the Paracels perma-
nently because it had "not long ago" incorporated some of
the islands into Phuoc Tuy Province. (In fact, the GVN had
done so four months previously, in September 1973.) The PRC
spokesman routinely asserted Chinese sovereignty over the
South China Sea Islands but stated for the first time that
"the natural resources in the sea around them also belong
to China."
On January 19 and 20, 1974, Chinese forces, supported
by MIG's and gunboats, drove the Vietnamese off Money,
Pattle, and Robert Islands. Peking asserted that it had
acted in self-defense and had opened fire only after Saigon
forces had "invaded" Chinese-held islands.
Whatever the pretext, China enjoyed overwhelming mili-
tary superiority and probably acted for several reasons,
among which were to preempt Hanoi's occupation of the
islands, to assert control over potential oil deposits, and
to consolidate coastal defenses. By April 1974, the Chinese
had begun exploratory drilling in the Paracels.
Most Recent Explanation of PRC Claims: 1975
An article in the Kwangming Daily on November 25, 1975,
offered the most recent and detailed explanation to date of
Chinese claims. Unlike People's China in 1956, the Daily
did not cite the Convention of 1887 or attack the Peace.
Treaty of 1951. Nevertheless, the Daily reiterated that the
Chinese were the first to discover, develop, and exercise
jurisdiction over the Paracels, Spratlys, and Macclesfield
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Bank. As evidence that the Chinese were the first to dis-
cover the islands, the Kwangming Deily said:
--"By the time of the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties
(200 B.C.-220 A.D.), the South China Sea had become
an important navigation route for China."
--During the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), "China's earliest
sea maps were drawn, which included the South China
Sea Islands."
--From 1405 to 1433, the Chinese navigator Cheng Ho
called at these islands "time and again."
As evidence that China was the first to develop the
islands:
--In 1974 and 1975, archeologists made new finds showing
that "the Chinese people have lived on many of the Hsi
Sha [Paracel] Islands since ancient times." Bowls,
vases, and utensils from the Tang (618-907) and Sung
dynasties were found on Robert Island. Other artifacts
were found in or around Woody, Money, Pattle, Lincoln,
Drummond, Jehangire Reef, North Reef, and Tree Islands.
--Fishermen from Hai Nan "began to settle on the Nansha
[Spratly] Islands long ago." During the 4.930's, the
French found Chinese houses, temples, and "farmland"
on Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba, Loaita, Northeast Cay, and
Spratly Island, as well as five Chinese living on Thitu.
As evidence that China was the first to exercise juris-
diction over the South China Sea Islands, the Daily cited
activities of the Emperors and the Kuomintang, thereby again
implicitly recognizing the legitimacy not only of Imperial
but also of Nationalist claims on behalf of China:
--By the beginning of the second century A.D., the
"Chinese government" was already sending officials to
inspect the "South China Sea Islands." By the time
of the Sung and Yuan dynasties, China had included
these islands within its "sea frontier areas."
--Responding to the Japanese occupation of the Pratas
Islands, the Governor of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in
1909 sent an expedition of 170 men under Admiral
Li Chun to the Paracels. He surveyed 15 of the
islands, hoisted the Chinese flag over Woody Island,
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and issued a proclamation reaffirming that the South
China Sea Islands were "China's sacred territory."
--In 1946, "the then Chinese government" sent three
warships "to take over the various islands." It
erected stone tablets and stationed troops on Woody
Island in the Paracels and Itu Aba in the Spratlys.
In 1947, "the then Chinese government" placed the
Paracels, Spratlys, and Macclesfield Bank islands
"under the jurisdiction of Kwantung Province."
The Daily concluded by making clear that at a minimum
China would continue to assert its claims over the Spratlys
despite the Vietnamese and Philippine presence:
--"...Some of the islands have not yet been returned to
the hands of the Chinese people. The Chinese people
are determined to liberate Taiwan, and all islands
belonging to China will certainly return to the
embrace of the motherland."
--"The South China Sea Islands are China's sacred terri-
tory. We have the duty to defend them and build them
up."
PRE Reaction to Drilling in Reed Bank: 1976
On June 14, 1976, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman
responded to the start of Philippine drilling by issuing a
statement on Reed Bank "of China's Nansha [Spratly] Islands."
The statement made clear that China claimed exclusive rights
over the resources within Reed Bank and strongly implied
that China claimed exclusive rights over all the resources
within its South China Sea claim:
--The PRC has "indisputable sovereignty" over the Paracels,
Spratlys, and Macclesfield Bank and "their adjacent sea
areas," and the "resources there belong to China."
--"Any foreign country's armed invasion and occupation
of any of the Nansha [Spratly] Islands or exploration
and exploitation of oil and other resources in the
Nansha [Spratly] Islands constitute encroachments on
China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and are
impermissible."
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--"Any foreign country's claim to sovereignty over any of
of the Nansha [Spratly] Islands is illegal and null
and void."
By rejecting any "foreign country's" armed invasion or claim,
the spokesman seemed to aim his remarks at the Vietnamese
and Philippine presence while implicitly accepting that of
the ROC as representative of a "Chinese" claim.
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ANNEX G
Claims of the Republic of China
The Republic of China has frequently asserted sover-
eignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as
Macclesfield Bank. The ROC, like the PRC, has issued maps
showing the Chinese claim as including virtually all fea-
tures in the South China Sea down to 4? north (see Map E).
In support of this claim, Taipei has troops on one island in
the Dangerous Ground area, but none on the Paracels. Taipei's
justification of Chinese claims has been similar but not
identical to Peking's.
Past and Present ROC Garrisons
In 1946, the ROC sent troops to occupy Woody Island in
the Paracels. But in 1950, within one year after the Nation-
alists' defeat on the mainland, Taipei withdrew its troops
permanently.
Also around 1946, the ROC established a weather station
on Itu Aba in the Dangerous Ground area, but it withdrew
from the island after the defeat on the mainland. In 1956,
ROC troops returned to Itu Aba, where they have remained.
Presently on the island are about 300 ROC marines and
sailors, a weather station, a radio facility, and 100
civilians, mostly retired ROC servicemen engaged in guano
mining.
Justification of ROC Claims
The ROC asserted sovereignty over the "South China Sea
Islands" as early as 1947. An internal briefing memorandum
of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated August 3, 1973,
is the most complete available justification of ROC claims.
Many of the arguments resemble those of the PRC and have
appeared in ROC media or communications to other govern-
ments, e.g., the 15th century voyages of Cheng Ho, the 1909
expedition of Li Chun, the 1946 deployment of troops to the
islands, and the subsequent incorporation of the islands in
Kwangtung Province. Nevertheless, the justification in the
internal memorandum differs somewhat with both the previously
outlined PRC position and the ROC position as advanced
publicly or to other governments.
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--The memorandum acknowledged that France has contended
that the Convention of 1887 between China and the
French Protectorate of Tonkin did not establish
Chinese sovereignty over either the Paracels or the
Spratlys. ?This contrasts with the public ROC.and
PRC positions, which do not allude to any French
reservations.
--The memorandum quoted without comment the 1951 peace
treaty, as well as the 1952 peace treaty signed by
Tokyo and Taipei; this contrasts with the PRC position,
which has attacked the 1951 treaty, and with the ROC
position as outlined in a letter of May 23, 1956, to
the Philippine Vice-President. The letter argued that
both the 1951 and 1952 treaties "stipulated that the
Spratly Islands were among the territories which were
restored by Japan to the Republic of China." (In fact,
both treaties merely stipulated that Japan renounced
all rights to the Paracels and Spratlys.)
The memorandum also maintained that in 1963 an ROC
expedition had visited Amboyna Cay, Loaita, Nam Yit, North-
east Cay, Sand Cay, Southwest Cay, Spratly Island, Thitu,
and West York "to boost the morale of the GRC garrison on
Itu Aba Island," and that another expedition in 1966 had
visited Loaita, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay, and Thitu "to
re-erect national monuments there." (No othe/ country then
had forces on these islands.)
Echoes of Peking
Taipei has implicitly recognized PRC claims on behalf
of China. Commenting on the PRC's takeover of the Paracels,
the Kuomintang paper Chung Yang Jih Pao on. February 1, 1974,
rejected the contention that they were Vietnamese and
refrained from criticizing Peking. The paper reiterated that
"our South China Sea island groups" include the Paracel
Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands, "our
southern-most boundary."
Also in terms similar to those of Peking, Taipei
responded to the beginning of drilling by the Philippines by
making clear that the ROC claimed exclusive jurisdiction
over the resources in Reed Bank. The ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs declared on May 28, 1976, that "no other country
would have the right to enter into a contract for oil explor-
ation or exploitation on the Reed Bank which is situated
within the Nan Sha [Spratly] Islands."
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ANNEX H
Philippine Claims
Active Philippine interest in the Dangerous Ground area
dates from at least World War II. In 1939, for example,
Manila protested Tokyo's acquisition of the Spratlys as
threatening Philippine security. On May 17, 1950, President
Elpidio Quirino told the press that the Spratlys should
belong to the Philippines, although he stopped short of mak-
ing a formal claim.
The evolution of post-World War II Philippine claims is
complex and not always consistent, but in general can be
summarized as follows. The Government of the Philippines
(GOP) has:
--claimed as res nullius an area in and around Dangerous
Ground which the GOP calls Kalayaan (Freedomland) and
vaguely defines as distinct from "the Spratlye;
--defended its right to drill in Reed Bank without saying
that Reed Bank is part of Kalayaan;
--not claimed other islands in the Dangerous Ground area
(or the Paracels), but said no other country can
unilaterally occupyothem.
In addition, the Philippines has stationed marines on perhaps
five islands in the Dangerous Ground area and sent marines
periodically to visit one other island.
Meads and Cloma
In the mid-1950's, the activities of Morton Meads, a
private American citizen living in Manila, increased Philip-
pine interest in the Dangerous Ground area. In a number of
letters written from 1954-56 to, among others, President
Eisenhower and the American Ambassador in Manila, Meads asked
recognition and support for the "Kingdom of Humanity," which
he described as a sovereign country "located approximately in
the center of the South China Sea." Meads at various times
said that his Kingdom included Nam Yit, Sin Cowe, Spratly,
Thitu,and West York Islands.
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The Manila Chronicle's accounts of Mead's claims may
have helped inspire a Filipino attorney, Tomas Cloma, who on
July 6, 1956, proclaimed the establishment of a new state
called the "Free Territory of Freedomland," whose government
was "democratic in character, de facto in nature." He defined
Freedomland's boundaries as including all the islands in the
Dangerous Ground Area (see Map F).
Cloma may have been acting in part at the behest of the
GOP. He declared, for example, that Freedomland would "make
immediate representations for 'protectorate status' under the
Republic of the Philippines as a first preference." He was
a friend of Carlos Garcia, Vice President and Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, who encouraged the Freedomland scheme.
Zonal Scheme: 1956
In a conversation with the American Charge' d'Affaires
on June 26, 1956, Garcia not only defended Cloma's claims
but also said he had recommended to President Magsaysay that
the GOP assert Philippine rights in the Dangerous Ground
area by dividing it into three zones (Map F). As outlined
' by Garcia:
--Zone Y lay closest to the Philippines and contained
islands that had never been claimed or occupied by any
other country. Therefore, the GOP should formally
claim them.
--Zone X contained most of the Spratlys, including
Itu Aba. By the peace treats' of 1951, Japan had
relinquished all claims to them but not in favor of
any other power. Therefore, the parties to the treaty
retained authority over the islands, and the GOP should
ask the parties to recognize a Philippine claim.
--Zone Z lay farthest from the Philippines and had little
strategic or economic value, but the GOP should claim
the islands there nonetheless.
Although the GOP never formally advanced the zonal scheme,
Garcia's reasoning, with some variations, served as the basis
of subsequent Philippine claims.
Garcia's Letter: 1957
On February 8, 1957, Garcia wrote Cloma a letter that
substituted vague geography for the more precise zonal scheme
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and implicitly endorsed the concept of' Freedomland. Accord-
ing to the letter:
--In the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs, "the
islands, islets, coral reefs, shoals and sand cays
within what you call 'Freedomland,' with the exclusion
of those belonging to the seven-island group known inter-
nationally as the Spratlys," are res nullius, unoccupied,
and uninhabited, and therefore "open to economic exploi-
tation and settlement by Filipino nationals."
--"As regards the seven-island group known internationally
as the Spratlys, the Philippine Government considers
these islands as under the de facto trusteeship of the
victorious Allied Powers of the Second World War, as a
result of the Japanese Peace Treaty...." Thus, the
Spratlys are "open to economic exploitation and settle-
ment by nationals of any member of the Allied Powers,"
including the Philippines.
The letter nevertheless failed to say which islands were the
Spratlys.
Renewed Interest and Marcos' 1971 Press Conference
Manila's interest in Freedomland apparently remained
dormant for more than 10 years, when it was revived by reports
of potentially valuable petroleum deposits. Around 1970 and
1971, Manila probably sent small contingents to visit the
islands of Flat, Nanshan, Southwest Cay, Thitu, and West York.
In July 1971, a Philippine Congressman alleged that ROC
troops on Itu Aba had fired on a boat and airplane owned by
him. In response to this supposed incident, President Marcos
held a press conference in Manila on July 10, 1971, during
which he made an implied claim to Freedomland and called the
ROC troops on Itu Aba a threat to Philippine security.
He said:
--"In 1957 we affirmed that the Spratly Island Group
falls under the de facto trusteeship of the allied
powers by virtue of the Japanese peace treaty.... By
virtue of that trusteeship no one may introduce troops
on any one of these islands without the permission and
consent of the allied powers...."
--"Because the Chinese garrison on Ligaw [Itu Aba] was
established on the island without the permission and
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 31 -
consent of the Allies, we have requested the Chinese
government to withdraw."
--"Freedomland refers to the 53-island group, with the
exclusion of the Spratlys, which Filipino explorer
Tomas Cloma explored and occupied from 1947 to 1950.
These are islands, islets, coral reefs, cays and banks
which are regarded as res nullius and may be acquired
according to the modes of acquisition recognized under
international law--among which is occupation and
effective administration."
?"Insofar as these islands are concerned, we are in
effective control of the islands of Pagasa [Thitu],
Lawak [Nanshan], and Patag [Flat]."
Marcos thus retained a legal distinction between the
Spratlys and Freedomland, while implying that the Spratlys
were within the area of Freedomland. Although he indicated
that Itu Aba was part of the Spratlys and that Flat, Nanshan,
and Thitu were not, he failed to define further the limits of
either the Spratlys or Freedomland.
Formal Claim: 1974
By 1973, Manila had stationed small contingents of
marines on Loaita, Nanshan, Northeast Cay, Thitu, and West
York and was sending some marines to make occasional visits
to Flat. As indicated previously, during August 1973 the
GVN occupied Nam Yit, and after the PRC takeover of the
Paracels in January 1974, the GVN also occupied Sand Cay,
Sin Cowe, and Southeast Cay. All four islands lay within
Cloma's definition of Freedomland.
On February 5, 1974, the GOP responded by advancing a
formal claim in notes to the GVN and ROC Ambassadors which
marked the completion of a process that transformed Freedom-
land from one man's claim to an official Philippine concept.
The notes for the first time used "Kalayaan," Freedomland in
Tagalog, and taken together said that:
--The landing of Vietnamese forces in the area known as
Kalayaan was a "matter of grave concern" to the Philip-
pine Government, which had previously declared that
"said area had been acquired by right of occupation."
--Two ROC destroyers were "in the general area" during
the Vietnamese landing, and the Philippine Government
strongly protested this ROC "display of force."
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CONFIDENTIAL
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--The Philippines now occupied Loaita, Nanshan, North-
east Cay, Thitu, and West York. (The notes did not
repeat Marcos' 1971 assertion that Manila controlled
Flat Island.) The Philippines had acquired these
five islands, which by their proximity had clear
strategic importance, "as they were res nullius and
did not belong to any country." Moreover, they did
not form part of the Spratlys and were "located about
200 miles northeast thereof."
Thus, unlike Marcos, who in 1971 had implied the Spratlys
were within the area of Freedomland, the notes indicated that
the Spratlys were outside Kalayaan. But once more there was
considerable ambiguity, for the notes failed to define the
limits of either Kalayaan or the Spratlys and stopped short
of claiming by name the islands occupied by Vietnam or Taiwan.
Finally, while not asserting any Philippine claim to the
Paracels and Spratlys, the notes for the first time contended
that the Paracels as well as the Spratlys were "subject to
the disposition" of the World War II Allies. "By no means,
therefore, can any single country acquire sovereignty over
the Paracels and Spratlys by use or display of force in the
vicinity thereof."
Defense of Reed Bank Drilling
On April 29, 1976, the Brinkerhoff II, a US rig operat-
ing on behalf of a consortium of Swedish and Philippine firms,
began drilling about 115 nautical miles northwest of Palawan
Island, near a submerged feature called Reed Bank. In the
apparent hope of minimizing public arguments with other
potential claimants, Manila has defended this drilling on the
basis of Law of the Sea and tacit Chinese approval, rather
than on the basis of claims to Kalayaan.
Responding to renewed assertions of sovereignty over the
Spratlys by Hanoi, Taipei, and Peking, Foreign Secretary
Carlos Romulo told the press on June 14 that:
--"The Reed Bank is within the Continental Shelf of the
Philippines which was declared by the Republic of the
Philippines to be within the economic exploitation zone
of the country in accordance with a United Nations
convention on continental shelves [sic] in 1958 [to
which the Philippines is not a party]."
--"The Republic of the Philippines declared its right
to explore and exploit the economic zone within 200
miles without opposition from anyone in 1968."
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 33 -
--"The matter of exploration and exploitation of the
area west of Palawan was brought up by President
Marcos in conversations with the Chinese leaders...
in June 1975."
In fact, the Philippines did not declare a 200-mile eco-
nomic zone. Instead, Marcos in a proclamation of March 20,
1968, borrowed terminology of the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf. He asserted that the GOP had exclusive
jurisdiction and control over exploitation of the seabed and
subsoil of the continental shelf to where the depth of the
waters admitted "the exploitation of such resources." Romulo
may have avoided repeating the substance of Marcos' proclam-
ation because Reed Bank is about 70 nautical miles west of
the 1,300-meter-deep Palawan trench. Nevertheless, the
Philippine Solicitor General has contended that "the trench
is part of the shelf, not a boundary to it."
CONFIDENTIAL
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' Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP08001297R000300180010-1
South China Sea
Ma
.9.??
111
VIETNAM
c.1)
?
CHINA ?
CAMBODIA e
./???/.
0
.9
\
Paracel
Islands
?
e--1 HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
'Macclesfield Bank
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Taiwan
Luzon
PHILIPPINES
?
- Dangerous .
Ground
BRUNEI
(U.K.)
MALAYSIA i
/
/
/
N. r'?'?',-?,.. ??j
_I -\.,?? INDONESIA
1, ?-.../
17 \
190 290
- miles
Palawan
SULU SEA
CELEBES SEA
2490 12-76 STATE(RGE)
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Paracel Islands
Ma DB
,
112
NortirReel
_
AMPHITRITE GROUP
17
?17
CRESCENT Gr . '.?
Pat
Robe
0 Drummond
MoneC3O Antelope Duncan
Reef
MN*
360iDiscovery Reef 41?11"13
Qu Keah
West San ,:, co e
ort iddle
uth
outh Sand
?Rocky
Woody
Lincoln
Vuladdore Reef
Bombay Reef
''16
16
?Triton
SOUTH CHINA
NAMES ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 112
SEA
,
0 10 20 30 nautical miles
,
I
0 10 20 30 statute miles
2491 12-76 STATE(RGE)
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Islands in the Dangerous Ground Area
Ma DC
?
15
0
115
...
15
VIETNAM
SOUTH CHINA
SEA
North
Danger
SO! Vwheeasstt t(??',
Reed Bank
(2)
Thitu Island. West York Island
?Flat Island
.
i
,
Loatta Island. ?
*Nanshan Island
Itu Aba Island. Sand Cay
..,
-
10
*Namyit
Island
Union Banks and Reefs )--
? Sin Co
Island
e
.
,s0
.
Palawan
Spratly' ,
Island
,.,
.Amboyna Cay (3
PHILIPPINES
I
.00
\ ,ri
)
I
.Friendship Shoal
BRUNEI
'42"
v..-
U1S)
\
N.
\
Lydie Shoal.
, N'''
\'"Is
\e
' i i'a -? ' ':-:\ ;
sqr.
It
I
4it..? ,e
-INDONESIA
0
5.0 190 ' 150 nautical miles
I
0
60 160 160 statute miles
110
_
-76 STATE RGE)
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Japanese Claim of 1939
Map D
110
115
-15 ,
VIETNAM
,
,
?
SOUTH CHINA
SEA'
15
Q'eq- 7
cs

4:
Southwest
? ?
tiita-N*
tOttOLIISI
,lifii:Iiisa ii
rnxit
1
klst
?
t! Island,-.
-113
I1and
rJ3nksnd,',,:as
n
Amboyna Cay
w
(31
,03(2
.e.
Palawan
O PHILIPPINES
I
'b.
.Friendship Shoal
\
\
(!)
.s.?
1
t
1
,
110
7
BRUNEI
Lydie Shoal.
C4`
j
T
'INDONESIA
CO
A.
12"
Nr-.....
Ir....,
C? ?
'tiq
.,C
50 190 190 nautical miles
0
60 100 160 statute miles 115
2493 12-76 STATE(RGE)
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. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/12 : CIA-RDP08001297R000300180010-1
PRC and ROC Claims
Map E
Paracel
Islands
?
a
e--1 HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
Macclesfield Bank
SOUTH CHINA SEA
0
Luzon
c9,
PHILIPPINES
\
BRUNEI 6
(U.K.)
'-I.
?
i.?
\../ 4
/
' e? \ r
/ 0 ? r
MALAYSIA !
i
I
/
,_ ,. 1
?
.?.. .-i INDONESIA
.0
2494 12-76 STATE(RGE)
100 200
miles
Palawan
SULU SEA
?
/ 4:1) ?
CELEBES SEA
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Tomas Cloma's Definition of Freedomland
and Carlos Garcia's Zonal Scheme
Map F
15
110
115
,
VIETNAM
,
o
.
0
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
15
'I'Q' 7
.R f
Northeast '';'/M?1, g
ThttuIlL d ...
itt?A????/, //
Loa aldland
p/.:?::::...f./ a
Itu A ',;?,/
p