COMMUNIST ASSERTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER WATERS IN THE VICINITY OF HONG KONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000200090001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

J.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
cgCrE Li FOREIGN DISSFM/ n, ?
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REA-3, January 8, 1969
To The Secretary
Through: S/S
From INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: Communist Assertions of Sovereignty Over Waters In the Vicinity
of Hong Kong
The recent halting of a number.of merchant ships in waters just south
of Hong Kong has raised the question of Chinese Communist claims to waters
in the mouth of the Pearl River. A chronology of clashes irk this area. since
the Communist assumption of power, and a discussion of Chinese and British
attitudes towards access to the Colony by sea, are presented below. The
conclusion is reached that the recent Communist actions do not represent a
heightened belligerency on Peking's part.
Abstract
The publicity given to the halting in late October by Communist Chinese
gunboats of an American freighter in Chinese-claimed waters south of Hong Kong
focuses attention on the spate of similar, but generally unpublicized, con-
frontations that have been reported this year. A review of Chinese claims and
attempts to assert them indicates that a modus vivendi has developed in the
Pearl River estuary which permits access to the Colony by merchant and naval
vessels within unofficial but well understood geographical limits. This
Memorandum sketches the development of this modus vivendi since 1950 and
speculates that the increase in reported incidents is the result not of a
renewed Communist Chinese bellicosity but of,'among other things, a reaction
to the probable increase in "intrusions" into the Lema Channel by foreign
This report was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside
from normal substantive exchange with
other agencies at the working level,
it has not been coordinated elsewhere.
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merchant ships captained by masters unfamiliar with the unpublicized local
ground rules. In marked.contrast to. their actions in the early 1950's, the
Communist Chinese have not resorted to force, but have only sought to warn
transgressing ships and to insure that they quickly returned to the approach
lane east of the Lema and Chiapeng Islands. (See Map "At').1t
1/
The names used in this RM are those commonly appearing on British
charts and maps of this area and are not necessarily those sanctioned
by the US Board On Geographic Names. The most commonly used part of
the Lema Channel is the eastern mouth between Tankan and Potoi Islands
sometimes referred to as the East Lema Channel. In this RM the words
"inner channel" are used to designate the part between Wailingting and
Tankan on the northeast and Wenwei and Tawan on the southwest.
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"Thunderhead" Challenged
On the morning of October 28, 1968, the six thousand ton American
freighter ss "Thunderhead" passed through the Taitami Channel from the
South China Sea into the Lema Channel in the estuary of the Pearl River
to the south of Hong Kong's southern border (see Map "B"). In so doing
the American ship entered waters claimed by the Communist Chinese. The
Lema Channel proper is bordered on the northwest by the Wanshan Islands,
the Sanmen Islands, and Wailingting Island. On the southeast it is
separated from the South China Sea by the Chiapeng and Lema (or Lima)
Islands. The "Thunderhead"started into the Taitmai Channel at about 7:40
a.m., passing close to both the Chiapeng and the Lema Islands. At about
8:16 a.m. the ship was approached by two Chinese "Shanghai" class motor
gunboats (PGM's) which blinkered it to "halt" and that it was "violating
Chinese territorial waters." According to one of the "Thunderhead's" crew,
as quoted in a Hong Kong newspaper, the PGM's first cruised up and down
beside the freighter, then circled the ship, and later criss-crossed its
bow. The freighter's captain stopped his engines momentarily, but then got
up speed and continued on to Hong Kong. Very flares were fired by the
gunboats, presumably as a further signal to stop, but although guns had been
uncovered and trained upon the "Thunderhead" no other action was taken. The
freighter's master had been radioed by the ship's Hong Kong agents to avoid
the interior passage to Hong Kong per standing orders of the Hong Kong Marine
Department, but had chosen to ignore this advice because he was late to pick
up his pilot off Wanglan Light and the interior passage is slightly shorter.
Hong Kong Square Boundary
Technically speaking, the borders of the Colony were delineated in the
map appended to the Sino-British Convention of June 9, 1898. These are
clearly shown in Map "A".The southern-most portion of the 1898 boundary,
known in British parlance as the "Square Boundary," is 220 09' north latitude.
The other straight portions are 1140 30' east longitude in the east and
113? 52' east longitude in the west. The Department of State's study of the
China-Hong Kong boundary states that:
"While it is ordinarily recommended that international
boundaries not be shown in the oceans, this boundary is
to a degree an exception. The 1898 convention specifically
delineates the water boundary and, as a result, it has
almost the same validity as the terrestrial frontier."-1/
In practice, however, the Hong Kong Government (HKG), the Foreign Office,
and the Royal Navy, bowing to the realities of Hong Kong's political situation,
and probably recognizing the impropriety of claiming title to parts of the
high seas, have not tried to maintain or enforce this boundary with any
consistancy.
1/ State Department, the Geographer, China-Hong Kong Boundary,
Intn'l Boundary Study No. 13, Washington, April 15, 1962, p.3.
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Sino-British Relationship
The relationship between the Hong Kong and British Governments on the
one hand and the Communist Chinese on the other has always been characterized
by the subtle interplay of legalistic "i"-dotting and flexible pragmatism. It
is not surprising, therefore, that, although the British technically still
claim jurisdiction over the area within the Square Boundary, and to.a certain
extent exercise jurisdiction over territorial waters ajacent to that boundary
in Chinese-claimed inland waters (i.e., that portion which skirts Lantao
Island), a considerable amount of flexibility has been shown by the.Hong Kong
Government in sensitive areas of the water boundary. This attitude.is to a
great extent dictated by the position of weakness from which the Colony deals
with its gigantic neighbor, but to an almost equal extent it is the result of
eighteen years of experience during which Communist China has repeatedly
demonstrated its unwillingness to do away with the British presence.
Communist Chinese Attitude Towards Hong Kong
On September 29, 1949, the Communist Chinese unilaterally declared that
treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments would not be valid unless
specifically reaffirmed by Peking. In the case of Hong Kong and the Portugese
Overseas Province of Macau, the Communists have consistently maintained that
they are Chinese territory occupied on the strength of unequal treaties and
that they will be recovered "without fail" by the Chinese people at "an
appropriate time." That the time is not yet "appropriate" for the recovery
of Hong Kong was demonstrated in 1967 when the violent struggle of local
Communists against the HKG was phased out by Peking. As a result, the Chinese
attitude towards Colony borders has shown the same flexibility as the British
attitude and a modus vivendi can be said to have developed. Incidents which
have molded and marked the extent of this tacit understanding are discussed
below.
Communist Activities, 1950-54
After the Opium Wars and throughout the first half of the 20th Century
the waters of the Pearl River estuary were considered by most authorities
to be international waters and were freely traveled by merchant vessels,
warships, and yachts of all nations. After the Nationalist Chinese defeat
in 1949 the Communist Chinese effectively if not legally established their
claim that the area of the Pearl River estuary bordered by the Wanshan,
Chiapeng, and Lema Islands was a part of China's inland waters and closed
whatyup to that time had been the international waterway west of the Chiapengs
and Lemas to foreign ships. This resulted from two parallel actions on the
part of the Communists: one was to react violently to "intrusions" into this
area by foreign craft, and the other to let it be known through Hong Kong shipping
circles that unless specifically authorized to approach Canton through these
waters foreign ships were to remain to the east of the Chiapengs and the Lemas..
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Clashes in the Pearl River
Violent reaction by Communist forces was particularly severe in the
first year of Communist rule, 1950, when at least eighteen incidents occurred
in which Chinese batteries on the Namtou Peninsula, Lasawei, Wailingting, and
Tankan fired on British, American, and other foreign vessels including a Royal
Navy destroyer, a frigate, and a patrol boat. This fire was directed at craft
in waters immediately adjacent either to the southern or to the western Square
Boundary lines. In 1951, the number of reported incidents declined to eight,
all but one of which involved merchant vessels. In 1952, there were five such
incidents, but four of the five involved Royal Navy or HKG craft. The most
serious occurred October 13, 1952, when the regular Hong Kong-Macau ferry so
"Tak Shing" was fired on by Chicom gunboats in the Lantau Channel and forced
into Lasawei where two Chinese passengers were removed. HMG "Mounts Bay,"
responding to the ferry's distress call, was fired on while still in Hong Kong
waters about 8,000 yards from Lasawei. "Mounts Bay" returned the fire and
silenced the Communist guns. In the following year only four incidents were
reported. In one of them a British officer and six enlisted men were killed
September 9, when Hong Kong ML 1323 was fired on by a Chicom gunboat west of the
Hong Kong western boundary. In addition, on March 21, 1953, the US-owned yacht
"Kert" was seized in the same general area as the ML 1323 incident and the three
Americans on board were taken into custody. In 1954, only one incident was
reported, i.e., the British Forces yacht "Elinor" which was taken on June 4 and
her compliment of six officers and seven enlistedmen detained until July 10.
During this same period there were countless press stories of Communist attacks
on Hong Kong-Macau "native" or'Chinese" shipping (i.e., junks, barges, etc.)
and fishing craft. In 1950-51, as a result of these violent encounters, the
Hong Kong Marine Department issued an advice to mariners to avoid the estuary
when approaching Hong Kong and recommended that ships remain at least five
miles away from the North East Head of Tankan_Island. This was reinforced
by emanations from the Hong Kong office of the (Communist) Chinese Ocean
Shipping Company, all of which seems to have resulted over the four years
discussed above in general awareness of and compliance with the Chinese ground
rules by British and third country shipping on regular runs in this area.
Chart Shows 10-mile Closing.
The successful culmination of Peking's campaign to establish its authority
west of the Lema and Chiapeng Islands seems to have been behind the unpublicized
delivery to the Hong Kong Government in September 1954 of a chart of the area
marked to show a 3-mile limit for Chinese waters and a 10-mile closing line for
the mouth of the Pearl River. Unfortunately, a copy of the chart was not
available at the time this Memorandum was prepared, but it is presumed that the
Communists took cognizance of a 1951 International Court of Justice ruling that
the 10-mile rule for bays was not necessarily contrary to international law and
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left "the choice of delimitation, under certain criteria recognized in
international law, to the national state."1/ An interesting legal oddity
of the 1954-58 period was a December 1955 ruling by a Hong Kong Puisne Judge
that a robbery which had taken place 25yards off the southwestern tip of
Lantao was within British jurisdiction.!/ In reply to the defense counsel's
assertion that the area was not within British territory, Crown Counsel claimed
that these waters had been patrolled by British forces for some time and that
there was no indication that the Communist Chinese Government had ever challenged
British. jurisdiction over the area or had ever sought to exercise its own juris-
diction. No mention was made by Crown Counsel of the events narrated in the
previous paragraph. The Chinese Communists appear to have ignored the import
of this ruling and routine traffic between Hong Kong and Macau has been permitted
to continue without serious interruption.
Peking Claims 12-mile Territorial Sea
On September 4, 1958, Peking announced its claim to a 12-mile territorial
sea measured from straight baselines. The pronouncement occurred at the height,
of the Taiwan Straits crisis when US Navy ships were convoying Nationalist
Chinese vessels to within three miles of the Offshore Islands, and this seems
to be the main reason for the timing of the claim. It also appears that the
Communist Chinese were conversant with the provisions of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted that April at the UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Although conferees did not reach agreement on the
question of the breadth of the territorial sea, the Convention did provide for
delineation of such a sea utilizing the straight base line method "where the.
coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinity" (Article 4) and, alternatively, also,
provided for a 24-mile closing line (Article 7).3/ When it announced its claim
Peking did not make any reference to how a baseline would be laid down across
the mouth of the Pearl River. It is worth noting that legal experts in London;
when the matter was under discussion by the British in 1960, concluded that
under Article 7 the Chinese could draw a closing line across the estuary in a
south-westerly direction from the edge of their territory on South West Point
at the northwest mouth of Deep Bay and concluded that the waters seaward of
this line, up to the limits of the territorial sea, are territorial sea, and
on the landward side are Chinese internal waters. The authorities also concluded
that the Chiapengs and Lemas could be said to constitute a "fringe of islands"
under Article 4 (see below).
1/ See Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries, US Coast & Geodetic Survey
Publication 10-1, Vol. 1, pages 72 and 73.
2/ See also "Royal Navy Operational Practice," page 12.
3/ Shalowitz, Appendix I and pages 212-230.
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"Magar" Notes
Although Peking announced its 12-mile claim in September 1958 and
immediately began issuing "serious warnings" regarding "intrusions" into
Chinese territory by American warships and planes, the first and, so far
as can be ascertained, only'public protest specifically related to the
sea approach to Hong Kong was a result of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
On September 7,.,?1959, the Indian. Embassy was given a note by the Chinese stating
that:
"On August 9, 1959, the Indian LST "Hagar" on its way to
Hong Kong, instead of taking the international route south-
east of Hong Kong and east of the Tankan Islands, unlawfully
intruded into China's territorial sea from the direction
southwest of the Wansan Islands outside the mouth of the
Pearl. River..,and sailed through the wa erway west of the
Chiapeng and Tankan Islands of China,"1
The note also protested a similar trip by the Indian cruiser "Mysore" the
previous July and, once again referring to the outside passage as "the
international route always followed by ships of other countries" and to
failure to "heed" the warnings served by the Chinese coast guard units,"
attributed it all to "India's planned military, provocations against China,"
This protest, probably to Peking's dismay, opened something of a Pandora's
box because the Indians in their reply dated six days later baldly stated
that the route followed by the "Magar" and the "Mysore" is:
"...an internationally recognized approach to the Hongkong
port and is mentioned as such in the China Sea Pilot, Volume
I, page 454. There was no previous information that the
Chinese Government had placed any restriction on the use
of this channel." .
In addition, the Indians denied that the "Magar" had been challenged but
undertook to instruct her captain to avoid the interior passage on his return
voyage. He did so, taking the outer eastern passage, but this also was the
subject of a Chinese protest, a Memorandum this time, delivered on October 20.
The Memorandum said in part: .
"According to the report of the Naval Command of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army, I.N.S. Magar...again made intrusion
into China's territorial sea on 16th September on its way from
Hong Kong to Singapore. At 1135 and 1510 hours ...the ship made
unlawful intrusions 5.5 nautical miles deep into China's
1/ All quotations are from texts provided by the Indian Ministry
of External Affairs in its White Paper No. II on exchanges with
the CPR over Tibet. (Underscoring supplied by IN R).
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territorial sea east of the Chiapeng and Tankan
Islands,...,The Chinese coast guard unit issued
light and flag signals 15 times warning the ship
to leave (the) Chinese territorial sea..."
Referring to the Indian defense of the "Magar's" earlier use of the interior
passage, the Memorandum went on to say:
"...the Government of India in its reply note dated
13th September... even cited the so-called China Sea
Pilot published by the British admiralty before the.
liberation of China as the basis for asserting that
(the interior passage)...is 'an internationally recognized
approach to the Hongkong Port.` The Chinese Government
cannot but express its surprise and regret at such an
allegation which ignores the fact that China has already
freed itself from the imperialist bondage and become a
completely independent sovereign State."
To which the Indians tartly replied that:
"The Chinese Government are aware that the Hongkong
harbour lies within two miles of the Chinese mainland
(sic). It is not posaible.for any ship to approach
Hongkong without coming within 12 miles from the...
mainland or one of the Chinese islands lying off the
coast of South China. (The position. given by the
Chinese is correct)... but, as already stated, no ship
could leave Hongkong...without coming within the 12 mile
limit imposed by China."1/
"The Government of India would like to point out that
although the China Sea Pilot has been compiled by the
British Admiralty, it is generally recognized and inter-
nationally used.... The Government of India has no knowledge
of any official Chinese publication for the guidance of
ships sailing in the neighborhood of Chinese territorial
waters: and they cannot, therefore, understand the reference
to 'imperialist bondage' in this context."
1/ The Indian assertion is not precisely true. A "window" could
exist in the southeast portion of the Square Boundary.
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Chinese Memorandum of 1960
Having.themselves given the Indians an opportunity to make known to the
world at large. the contradictions of the Chinese position, Peking, after
several months reflection, quietly took.action-to reassert its claims. On
February 10., 1960, the British Charge in Peking was given the. following,
confidential. memorandum:
"The waterway west of the Chiapeng and Tankan Islands
at the mouth of the Pearl River of China is a part of
China's inland waters. Following the founding of. the
People's Republic of China, the Chinese authorities. in
charge. of maritime affairsclose&this.waterway to all
foreign ships. (Foreign. merchant. vessels wishing to pass
the Wanshan Islands in approaching and leaving Canton
harbour may do so with. permission by making application
in accordance with regulations. governing the navigation
of foreign ships as laid down by Chinese authorities
concerned.) According to reports of. the. departments
concerned, since September 1959, British ships have on
more than twenty occasions wilfully passed through the.
above mentioned waterway in disregard of regeated.warnin s
given in international signals by the Chinese authorities in
charge of maritime affairs. The: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
hereby requests the Office of the British Charge d'Affaires
immediately to convey the matter to the British Government
and the British authorities in Hong Kong for their serious
attention, with the request that the British authorities
in Hong Kong immediately. notify the vessels concerned not
to pass through the above mentioned waterway in the future."
As was noted at the time, the memorandum was not technically a protest.
Furthermore, the Royal Navy and major British'and other foreign shipping
.companies had been avoiding the area since 1950. Nevertheless, in early
March, the-(Communist) Chinese Ocean Shipping Company took the trouble once
again to warn. Hong Kong shipping companies against the use of the south-
westerly approach in a letter that also outlined the approach procedures for
the port of Whampoa.near Canton.-// Neither the British nor the Chinese
authorities, as far as is known, have ever made the existence of the memorandum
public nor have the Chinese officially repeated,their claim.
1/ English text of letter is given in Appendix "A".
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"Serious Warnings."
Hong Kong has been an important liberty port for the US 7th Fleet for
many years, but the first "serious warning" regarding US Navy ships south of
Hong Kong (there were six previous warnings related to overflights by US
aircraft) was No. 115 dated June 29, 1960, referring to the aircraft carrier
USS "Ranger" and four escorting destroyers which had exited Hong Kong for the.
China Sea through the interior Lema Channel. Since that time there have been
other such "warnings" but when compared with the number of warnings issued
relating to the Taiwan Straits area and to the Paracel Islands these have been
few in number. Part of the reason for this may be the issuance by the US Navy
of confidential standing instructions for 7th Fleet ships to avoid the interior.
passage and, when approaching the western portion of Hong Kong harbor via the
East Lamma Channel as the large carriers and fleet tankers must do, to "remain
at least five (nautical) miles from Chinese Communist-claimed territory whg e
feasible and in no case (to)...close to less than three (nautical) miles."
It also seems to be the result of deliberate restraint or a lack of sensitivity
on the part of the Chinese who apparently ignored violations of the inner Lema
Channel by US and Royal Navy ships prior to the "Magar" notes and who continue
to protest only a relatively small proportion of US "violations" to the present.
time. Evidence to support this theory is provided by several reports of
violations by British, Indonesian, and 7th Fleet ships which were blinkered or
otherwise signalled by shore stations in the Lemas and Chiapengs but whose
"intrusions" were not publicly protested.
protested "Intrusions
Reports about blinkering of non-US ships by Communist shore stations is
sparse but available information indicates consistent failure on the part of
the Chinese to protest "intrusions" in this area by British and other third-
country vessels as well as a tendency to protest intrusions by US Navy ships
only sporadically. In June of 1961, for example, the Indonesian destroyers RI
"Siliwangi" and "Singamangaradja" were challenged by signal lamp from Erhchou
when approaching Hong Kong from the south but the incident is not known to have
been protested to Djakarta. In late December 1961, two British warships leaving
Hong Kong at night on two separate occasions,were similarily challenged but a
protest was not made. A US Navy officer who was on the bridge of an aircraft
carrier that visited Hong Kong a number of times in 1965-66 has remarked that,
due to the relative narrowness of the eastern mouth of the Lema Channel, US
warships frequently "intrude" into the five nautical mile zone while rounding
North East Head. A blinkered warning from the observation post on Tankan is
the rule in these cases, yet the number of "serious warnings" related to these
"intrusions" has been very small. One such incident occurred August 16 when
the USS "America" passed within 4.6 nautical miles of Tankan on a sortie into
1/ See Paragraph 4B, Tab "A" to Appendix "D," COM 7 FLT
Operation Order No. 201, 68.
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the South China Sea. In this case, a Hong Kong Marine Department launch
reported sighting the "America" within three miles of Tankan and the Consulate
General was so informed by the Royal Navy Commodore. The Chinese Communists,
however, did not issue a serious warning. Had the launch not made its erroneous
sighting, it is likely that the challenge would have given rise to no more than.
an entry in the ship's log book. On the other hand, on October 29, 1968,the
Chinese, in a seemingly random choice of "intrusions," protested a "violation":
(Serious Warning No. 465) by the US Coast Guard Cutter "Ingham" when that ship
passed with 4.2 nautical miles east of the Lemas?_
Royal Fleet Auxilliary Stopped
Further evidence that the Communists, while determined to maintain their
claims to a 12-mile territorial sea, do not wish at this time to make political
capital out of "intrusions" in this area can be found in their stopping of the
Royal Fleet Auxilliary "Gold Ranger" on April 2, 1968. (The British Navy makes,
a distinction between warships and auxiliary vessels). The fleet oiler, on a
voyage from Japan to Hong Kong, was stopped at a position within Chinese-claimed
waters about 26 nautical miles due east of the eastern Hong Kong boundary. Some
British sources believe that the Chinese gunboats that halted the "Gold Ranger"
may have mistaken it for a 7th Fleet tanker, because when the master broke out
a large Union Jack (the "Gold Ranger" flies the Blue Ensign in contrast to the
White Ensign of the Royal Navy and the Red Ensign of the Merchant Navy) it was
permitted to proceed. The incident was reported briefly in the Hong Kong press,
but Peking seems not to have taken notice and no protest was registered by
either side.
Recent Merchantship Haltings
In addition to the "Thunderhead," three other foreign merchant ships
recently have been stopped by Communist gunboats while passing through the
interior Lema Channel. On October 8, a pair of gunboats challenged the
Israeli ship m.v. "Har Boker" when it was about 3.5 nautical miles northwest
of Erhchou Island in the Lema's, forced it to turn southward and to anchor
at a point about one nautical mile northwest of Akan Head on Chih (Puntin)
Island, (see Map "B"). The master radioed these events to the Hong Kong port
authorities who contacted the ships agents, Wallem and Company, a firm which
has done a great deal of business with the Communist Chinese. Wallem radioed
"Har Boker's" master to apologize for intruding into Chinese territorial waters
and also sent a telegram of apology to the Canton office of the Communist state
shipping agency, Penavico. The apology was duly given and after several hours
the ship was permitted to proceed to Hong Kong. The master later told marine
Department officers that it was his first voyage to the Far East and that he
approached Hong Kong on the recommended course marked on US Hydrographic Chart
5595 which passes to the west of Wenwei Island. According to a British source,
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- 10 -
similar printed routes appear on Admiralty Charts and, as "Bar Boker's"
captain noted, the China Sea Pilot contained no reference to restrictions
on inshore navigation in that area. (The US Sailing Directions for the area
are being changed as a result of the "Thunderhead" incident.) Another problem
faced by the "Bar Boker" was the unintelligibility of the Chinese signals,
which was also remarked on by the masters of the "Gold Ranger" and the "Thunder-
head". On October 16 the American as "Steel Vendor" was stopped by gunboats
while it was en route-from Hong Kong to Quinhon, South Vietnam. This incident
took place about five nautical miles northwest of the Chiapengs and culminated
in the ship reversing course and returning to Hong Kong. The most recent
incident in this series occurred November 12 when the Soviet freighter mv.
"Sinegorsk" was approached two nautical miles southeast of Wailingting by two
gunboats from Chinwan (see Map "B"). The captain told Hong Kong officials that
just prior to the gunboats approach a message had been picked up addressed to
all Russian ships instructing them to keep out of the Lema Channel and to
approach Hong Kong only by way of the Tathong Channel. The captain therefore
understood why the gunboats were signaling him, reversed course, and exited
the channel around the southern tip of the Chiapeng Islands. He said he was
late and attempting to save time. The "Sinegorsk" did not stop nor was it
boarded as one Hong Kong newspaper reported.
Increase in Use of the Lema Channel
It is not possible to document an increase in the use of the inner Lema
Channel in recent years because merchant captains and shipping line agents have
been reluctant to expose themselves to censure by the Hong Kong Marine Depart-
ment by reporting challenges in the channel from Communist vessels or shore
stations. After the "Thunderhead" incident, local shipping agents and Marine
Department officials informally approached by the American Consulate General
unanimously expressed the view that the sudden spate of incidents was the
result of merchant ships "blundering" into the channel. These sources also
indicated that ships passing into the southern portion of the channel have
tended over a number of years to elicit a variety of responses from the Communists
ranging from blinkered warnings to hailing by gun boats, In the past, regular
service to Vietnam was generally carried out by well known shipping lines that
saw to it their captains were aware of and observed the ground rules for the
channel. Since 1966 there has been a marked increase in traffic between South
Vietnam and Hong Kong, as a result of the US logistics build-up, and North
Vietnam and Hong Kong, as a result of increased Soviet aid to the DRV. American
flag vessels utilized in this service have in many cases been captained by
masters unfamiliar with the area (one expressed surprize that he was challenged
because he had utilized the southern approach once before without incident).
Furthermore, utilization of the approach from the south saves about 10 nautical
miles and therefore offers a temptation to the master intent on making up time,
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The juxtaposition of the increase in incidents and the increase in Hong Kong-
Vietnam traffic strongly suggests that there have been many more violations
of the Sino-British rules governing access to Hong Kong. by sea than has been
reported.
British Reaction
Procedures and practices surrounding the Sino-British modus vivendi in
Hong Kong waters are generally clear, but they have never been openly publicized
by either side. First and most clearly understood are the rules governing the
approaches to the Colony from the China Sea laid down by the Hong Kong Marine
Department and Royal Navy in 1950-51. The most direct reference to this was
issued in reaction to the "Har Boker" incident by the Political Adviser to
the Hong Kong Government who circulated an.informal note to all foreign repre-
sentatives in the Colony which, after giving details of the incident, suggested
that:
"You may wish to consider whether masters of vessels on
your country's register would benefit from a reminder about
political considerations that need to be taken into account
when navigating near Hong Kong. They might for example, be
advised that the most suitable approach to Hong Kong is to
keep to the south of the Lima Group and five miles or more
off Tamkan Head."
The Hong Kong Marine Department informed the American Consulate General at
the time that it felt that the traditional informal means of dissemination
of this cautionary notice, both to shipping companies and presumably to the
Communist Chinese themselves, had been effective and therefore did not plan
to make the note public.
Current HKG Operational Practice
Not as well known nor as clearly understood are the confidential limitations
imposed by the Royal Navy and the HKG on their own operations. The Political
Adviser to the Governor recently outlined HKG's understanding of these rules
for the American Consulate General. He said the Hong Kong Marine police operate
within the Square Boundary, except in Deep and Mirs Bays where the police must
remain at least one mile off the Communist shore. The Royal Navy, he said,
operates under similar restrictions except that on the south and east of the
Square Boundary ships remain within that boundary or within three miles of a
"sinuous line" drawn three miles from Hong Kong islands, whichever is narrower.
Where the distance between British and Communist territory is less than six
miles a line is drawn in the middle of the channel. Furthermore, in Mirs Bay
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the Navy may not enter Starling Inlet not pass between.Pingchau Island and
Mainland China. The Political Adviser also said that in May 1968,the HKG'
proposed that Royal Navy operations along the southern boundary be confined
to the area within one nautical mile of the Soko Islands and one and a half
miles off Potoi Island in the Lema Channel, but hedid not know if this had
been acted on.
Royal Navy Operational Practice
The Political Adviser's description of current HKG and Royal Navy
practice apparently is correct, except that the Navy no longer observes the
"sinuous line" rule; it operates within the Square Boundary except off the
western . shore of Lantao where vessels must keep within one nautical mile of
the shore.: (The Hong Kong-Tai 0 ferries and ordinary small craft also go
outside the Square Boundary to reach Tai 0.) The Navy is not currently
operating in Deep Bay at all and specific permission must be obtained from
Commodore Hong Kong for vessels to operate south of the Soko Islands or Potoi.
When permission is given, Royal Navy craft must remain within one nautical mile
south of the Sokos and no more than a mile-and-a-half south of Potoi.
American Reaction
The "Thunderhead" incident served the useful purpose of reminding both
American merchant shipping and the United States Government of Chinese sensi-
tivity regarding the Lema Channel. As a result of consultations between the
Departments of State and Navy, the US Navy issued a notice dated November 8,
1968, that modified information contained in the Sailing Directions for the
Western Shores of the South China Sea (H.O. Pub. 93) and warned shipping to
remain east of the Lema Islands.L/ Steps are also being taken to alter the
recommended course lines on charts of`the area,which show an approach by way
of the southeastern entrance of the Lema Channel and to.remove the outdated
reference to a "Submarine Exercise Area" immediately east of the Lemas.
Comment
The record of Chinese Communist assertions of sovereignty over the waters
of the Pearl River estuary over the past eighteen years clearly demonstrates
that in the Hong Kong area Peking's attitude towards its claims to a territorial
sea of 12-miles measured on a straight base line system is as much subject to
1/ For text of change see Appendix "B."
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- 13 -
compromise for political and economic reasons, at least for the time being,
as is Peking's denial of the validity of the treaties related to British rule
in Hong Kong. It also shows that, although capable of causing considerable
trouble to merchant and naval ships operating off.their coasts and in and out
of Hong Kong, the Communists have not been willing so far either to kill the
Hong Kong goose,which contributes substantially to China's foreign exchange
earnings,or to interfere with ships of the 7th Fleet and run the additional
risk of conflict with the United States. (For this reason; the "Gold Ranger"
incident would seem to have been a gentle warning to the Royal Navy to keep
twelve miles off the Kwangtung coast rather than a case of mistaken identity.)
So long as Peking believes it is advantageous to keep the British in Hong Kong
the Communist Government is likely to continue to maintain a discreet public
public silence regarding the exact limits of its claim. The recent spate of
incidents involving merchant ships does not, in our view, presage a new harder
line from Peking, but instead is a reaction to an increasing number of passages
through the interior Lema Channel, the result, possibly, of increased traffic
between the east coast of Vietnam and Hong Kong by Free World ships, and of
increased travel to North Vietnam and Southeast Asia ports by ships of the
Soviet Far Eastern Shipping Company. If this analysis is correct, the Chinese
have already produced the effect they desired and will not push the matter
further. The issuance of a warning to US merchant ships to avoid the area and
the publicity given to the "Thunderhead" and "Sinegorsk" incidents will probably
both reassure the Communists that a deliberate attempt is not being made to test
their willingness to defend their claimed seas and at the same time bring to
the attention of ship masters the wisdom of keeping clear of the southeastern
approach to Hong Kong.
SEC RET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM,
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y
Nan-t' 1
o . / ~.
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Wan
ILHA DE TAIPA
v ~4
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_ 'Ienwei Island (atroximate location)
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CH'I-A0 TAO
aj
fi-chia-huan
N_A
MACAO
(Port.)
MACAO
Hsi-hs4n8? . ..
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Chiu-pao-an
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G; .!&K ."- P 'M i. , /aeieJ?+. A r, e9: "~~' ?O 9/A ...
I:hn f hay :
~
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(W)
5 6 7 E
Scale: Nautical miles
-15 -
EXERCISE AREA .
A. "Har Boker" intercepted.
B. "Har Boker" anchors
C. " zhundert3,ead" stops.
D.. "Sinegorsk26 sights gunboats.
E. "Sinegorsk" reverses course.
Soundings in Fathans..
23
yyM
23
lMAP " b" - LE M CHANNEL
fran: H.O. 3199 114?20'
111?.
12
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- 16
APPENDIX "A11 'f REA-3
The English translation of the Sailing Instructions for Foreign
Vessels Entering and Leaving.Whampoa circulated by the China Ocean
Shipping Company's Canton office to Hong Kong Shipping companies in
Marchand April of 1960 follows:
"SAILING INSTRUCTION FOR FOREIGN VESSELS ENTERING AND LEAVING
WHANPOA
We append hereunder the following Sailing Instruction
for Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Whampoa in English
received from the China :Ocean Shipping. Agency, Whanpoa Branch,
for your information and guidance:
"The water way west of Chiapang and the Tankan
Islands at the mouth of Pearl River is a part of China's
inland waterways. We have been notified by Authorities
concerned that foreign vessels are prohibited to .sail in
the waterways west of the Chiapang and the Tankan Islands.
Foreign vessels entering or leaving Canton (including
Whampoa) should adhere to the following routes, strictly
effective from 6th April., 1960."
"1. From Eastern Routes or Hong Kong:
To start from the position Latitude 22?08'32"
North Longitude 11,4?32'06 " East, and then set the
c arse True) .174? to the position 21?57'150N. 114?
33 3000 . then alter course (True) 3340 to the position
2105.2?13"N? .113?42'10"E. then alter the course (True)
052? to the position 22?00'00"N. 113?52'30"E..then
alter course (True) 3310 to Lafsami Pilot Station
22?07'45"N, 113?42 48"E. and anchor there to wait for Pilot.
"2. Southern Route:
To start from the position 21?52'13'IM. 113042'10"E.
and then set the course (True) 0520to the position
22?00'00"Na 113o52'30"E., and then alter the course
(True) 3316 to Lafsamai Pilot Station 22007?45"N.
113?47'48"E.. and anchor there to wait for .pilot.
"Foreign vessels exit for Lafsami Pilot Station take the
same course as above, but, in reverse direction."
The above instructioti.should be strictly complied with."
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APPENDIX "B" to REA-3
"HYDROPAC 2292/68 GENERAL. HONG KONG APPROACH INFORMATION.
In order to minimize the possibility of challenge'by Chinese
Communist naval craft, ships approaching and departing Hong Kong
are advised to do so only from and to the southeast, remaining at
all times east of the Chia-P Eng (Chia-P Eng Ch Un Tao) and Lima
(Li-Ma Ch Un Tao) Island groups, which are controlled by the
Chinese Communists, and to pass at least five miles to the east
of the northeast head of the Lima Islands. Normally, ships should
enter and leave Hong Kong berths via the Tathong Channel. However,
ships assigned berths in the vicinity of Green Island (Tsing Chau)
should proceed through the Lema (Lima) and East Lamina Channels. In
passing through the Lema Channel, ships should remain as far north
as is feasible for safe navigation and in no case less than three
miles north of the northeast head of Li-Ma Ch Un Tao.
8 Nov. 1968)"
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