LAO/CAMBODIAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100240003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 11, 1968
• Content Type: CABLE

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FROM
SU
CT: Lao/Cambodian Relations
: Vientiane
SUMitARY
S / AN
hNALYSIS BRANCH
/ DATE: February 11, 1968
\yr.
The January 23 deadline before which countries were to have made
declarations recognizing and respecting Cambodian frontiers or suffer
a "freeze" in their relations with the Royal Khmer Government has
passed. Among the recalcitrant few who have not responded to Prince
Si a cool war maneuvers is Cambodia's northern neighbor the Kingdom
Neither the government authorities at Vientiane nor the RLG's
etic NLHS members in the "liberated zone" have volunteered a
statement recognizing present Cambodian boundaries. Despite this RLG
obstinacy, relations between the two small neutralist nations seem
unlikely to be affected. Nor do the Lao seem particularly disturbed
by third country statements on RKG boundaries. The RLG considers such
statements irrelevant to its claims which it intends to discuss
bilaterally with the Cambodians when the situation in Southeast Asia
permits. In terms of temperature, Lao/Khmer relations were probably
chilliest in 1964 and by mid-1967 had warmed up to a state nearing
tepidity. Since last June when Prime Minister SOUVANNA Phouma initiated
negotiations to revive an expired Commercial and Cultural Agreement of
1959 between the two countries, Lao/Khmer relations (with some setbacks
and considerable Lao forbearance) have perhaps even warmed up a few
more degrees. Differences that remain, arise both from questions of
substance, i.e., the Laos/Cambodia boundary and of style, the
differences of personality and "neutrality" between Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma and RKG Chief of State Prince NORODOM Sihanouk.
Enclosures:
As stated
FORM
2 OS 323
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified
--GONFI-DENTINE?
2/8/68
Contents and LI inflame= Approved by.
POL:NA3Miotes
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
?9.1n fl Out
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Vientiane's A-184
CONFIDENTIAL
BACKGROUNpON FRONTIERS
1. To understand the guarded optimism of the Lao that Sihanouk will not
change the present state of relations with Laos and that the earlier Com-
mercial and, Cultural Agreement may be eventually reinstated, it is necessary
to recall a. bit of background material against which the past few months
developments may be viewed:
2. The present dividing line between Laos and Cambodia consists of an
"administrative" ,boundary established by the French in 1905. The Lao con- ,
tend that this arrangement, placing Stung Treng Province in Cambodia, rested
on colonial convenience rather than any traditional boundary or a frontier
based on ethnic origin of population. At the Second Conference of Dalat
(August 1946) the RLG reserved its position regarding its frontier with Cam-
bodia. Only this summer the RLG reminded the Soviet Union of the Lao posi-
tion, and, reiterated to the Russians their intent to raise the question of
their boundary with Cambodia at a future date. As a practical matter, Laos
has generally exercised care to respect the 1905 demarcation pending these
bilateral discussions. Until this question is settled, the RLG understand-
ably does not wish to issue a declaration recognizing the present boundaries
of Cambodia'. (FOV-11360).
3. Prince Souvanna Phouma on a visit to Cambodia in March 1964 had seemingly
satisfactorily explained. the RLG's position to Prince Sihanouk. However,
between the time of Souvanna's departure from Phnom Penh and his arrival in
Vientiane, Sihanouk launched a bitter tirade against the Lao Prime Minister
for his "refusal" to recognize the existing boundary as definitive.
Sihanouk's broadcast tended to exaggerate the real importance of the Lao/
Cambodian frontier issue, while his boisterious bad manners and personal
insults offended Souvanna's sensibilities and concepts of proper princely
behavior. As a result of this episode, Sihanouk withdrew his Ambassador
from Vientiane and the RLG-retaliated in kind. Diplomatic representation
has been at the Charge level since that time.
4. To further complicate matters, in October of the same year at a con-
ference of neutralist nations in Cairo, the then RIG Minister of Foreign
Affairs, PHENG Phongsavan, presented an Aide Mhmoire to his Cambodian
counterpart. As can be seen in the enclosed translation (Enclosure 1),
this document, due either to Pheng's lamentable drafting style or his
calculated ambiguity, is obscure samost to the point of incomprehensibility.
It does imply that some gesture was made to reassure the REG of Lao
goodwill and respect for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity.
Despite the rather innocuous nature of the document both His Majesty
SAVANG Vatthana and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma described Pheng's
actions ds totally unauthorized and the note unacceptable. However, they
apparently did not officially inform the Royal Khmer Government of their
views.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 3
5. King Savang Vatthana has also reportedly expressed himself negatively toward 4
rF:rognizing RKG frontiers. According to FOV-l2,439 the King pointed out in
November 1967 that given Thai and South Vietnamese territorial disputes with
Cambodia, the RLG would not wish to offend /by making a declaration ignoring
their claims. /them
u. NLHS: In general, Sihanouk, whose treatment of Souvanna varies in tone between
pity and censure, has adopted a laudatory attitude toward Prince SOUPHANOUVONG.
For its part, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) which consistently commiserates with
Cambodia as a fellow victim of "American aggression" has on appropriate occasion
issued statements supporting RKG neutrality and territorial integrity, but the
NLHS has issued no statement of recognition and respect for present Cambodian
boundaries. Sihanouk's recent message to Souphanouvong (FBIS 16 Jan 1968,
FB 11/68) indirectly underscored the absence of an NLHS declaration by mentioning
the statement of respect and recognition of RKG boundaries made by the NFLSV and
NVN. To date, it does not seem that the AIMS will be more forthcoming than
Souvanna and the King in this regard.
6. (A) Third Country Statements: In the past few months embassies of governments
making statements regarding Cambodian frontiers have approached the RLG concerning
its attitudes towards their governments' declarations. The RLG has said it is not
concerned with third country statements. However, all governments should realize
that such declarations are irrelevant to the question of Lao/Cambodian boundaries
which will eventually be the subject of bilateral discussions between the two
countries involved. The RIG has not publicized this position. (Vientiane's 4026).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON FRONTIERS
7. Cambodian Charg?'Affaires at Vientiane, UM Amreth has introduced a somewhat
more cordial tone into the official relations between Laos and Cambodia as well
as improved the standing of the Cambodian community at Vientiane. While trying
to improve relations the Charg?emained aware of Prince Sihanouk's omniverous
reading habits and has dutifullyncorrected" Lao "misunderstandings" of the
RKG's foreign policy position and emphasized that Lao recognition of existing
Cambodian boundaries is the keystone of improved Lao/Cambodian relations.
8. In August, one of the Charg? letters.to the editor of Xat Lao referred to
the Aide Memoire that Pheng Phongsavan had given RKG Foreign Minister HOUAT Sambat
at Cairo in October 1964. Disagreeing with the newspaper's claim that Lao leaders
had never respected the division of Lao and Cambodian territories and did not at
the present time, the Charg?"quoted" Pheng's 1964 Aide Memoire which Um Amreth
claimed, disavows any Lao dissatisfaction with the present Cambodian boundary.
"There is no question whatsoever for Laos to sue for territory."
9. Although it would seem that even the most pro-Cambodian interpretation of the
Aide Memoire could not extract from Pheng's abstruse effusions the precise form-
ulation regarding frontiers that Sihanouk has lately been demanding, Um Amreth in
August told the RLG Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Aide Memoire satisfied
Cambodian requirements. At the same time he suggested it would be desirable for
the RLG to reaffirm this document's validity. The RLG did not do so.
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Vientiane' 2 A-1.I
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
10. On July 29, 1)67, in his capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma wrote a letter to the Cambodian government
seeking renewal of a commercial treaty, including provisions for the
transit of goods as well as certain provisions for cultural exchanges,
which Cambodia and Laos had concluded in October 1959. Conditional upon
annual renewal, the treaty had not been discussed since its signing and
expired a year later. In a letter dated July 26, 1967, the RKG expressed
a willingness to discuss the treaty's renewal. As a follow-up to this
exchange BOUASY (8ecretaryGeneral of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
accompanied a Lao tennis team to Phnom Penh and discussed the question of
Lao/Cambodian transit arrangements with his former schoolmate, the then
REG Foreign Minister SON Sann. Since the'railroad from Cambodian ports
does not reach the Lao border, an economical transit system across Cambodia
competitive with the Bangkok/Nongkhai route is not yet possible. However,
the Lao, with the complicity and encouragement of Son Sann, decided to
pursue treaty negotiations as a type of "blackmail" against the Thais and
to demonstrate to the RTG their dissatisfaction with the present Thai/Lao
transit arrangements. The treaty with respect to Thailand therefore
represents more a gesture than a threat, since, as the Lao realize, the
Thai are aware of the cost factors.
U. Although members of the MFA were not overly optimistic about either
the chances of concluding the treaty's renewal or its immediate practical
value, even if renewed, the Lao government in October named NGON Sananikone,
Minister of Public Works, to head a delegation to conduct the actual nego-
tiations which Bouasy and Son Sann had discussed in general terms in
August and which the RLG Charge at Phnom Penh KHAMTANH Ratanavong had
reportedly pursued in some detail. No further progress has been reported.
12. Editorials in the local Lao daily newspapers Xat Lao and Sieng Lao
welcomed the RLG's initiative and deplored the results of the Thai/Lao
transit negotiations. Xat Lao's editorial (a translated portion of which
is Enclosure 2) provided several details of the contemplated arrangement
and hoped negotiations would succeed. The Sieng Lao article devoted most
of its space to complaints against the Thai but heartily congratulated
the RLG on its policy of seeking another outlet to the sea.
OTHER ISSUES
The Lave tribe's migration Crom Cambodia into Laos in the sprint:, or
.1)67 and their subsequent "pursuit" by RKG officials in July led to a
snarp exchange between the two governments both privately and lirough the
press. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's request that Lie ICC lnvestiate
hie RKG action gained some publicity, but the matter soon disappear
among tne labyrinthian ways of the Commission's pendin agenda iteis.
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Vientiane's
CONFIDENIkIAL ?
i. Occasional needling of the RLG by Sihanouk (personally or through
Agence Khmer Presse) continued. In September, Sihanouk accused the Lao
of infiltrating Cambodian territory as part of an American/Lao special
forces group. In October he threatened war if the RLG tried to occupy
any part of Stung Treng and rejected contemptously any Lao claims to the
province. (He was reportedly responding to rzpats from Laos that the
King and Souvanna had denied the existence of any letter relinquishing
Lao claims to Cambodian territory, i.e., Pheng's Aide Memoire).
1). At a November ) press conference Sihanouk explained that although
the NVN infiltration through Laos to the South violated the 1)62 Accords,
the RLG had "brought in the Americans" and hence the NVN Celt justified
in using Lao territory. In November also the Cambodian journal Neak
Cheat Niyun described. Sayaboury as ninety percent a "Thai Province' which
led to a brief exchange in Xat Lao with Um Amreth and the Prime Minister's
invitation to the Charge to go see for himself if Sayaboury were "Thaicized."
We understand Um Amreth did not accept Souvanna's invitation which was
aJso extended to other members of the diplomatic corps. In any event, the
problems. of Nam Bac interrupted the Prime Minister's proposed tour.
CONCLUSION
16. Behind all private Lao/Khmer discussions or public bickering in the
press lies the larger problem of the war and the particular probleM of
Sihanouk's search for recognition and respect of Cambodia's present bound-
aries. Although Lao officials are well aware of Sihanouk's problem and
sensitivities eem determined to preserve their ri ?? ? s' 0 _heir
bqkder with Cambodia at some unspecified uture date. Despite the annoy-
ances and misunderstandings between the two countries, the -Lao willingness
to 0ontinue moderately cordial relations with Cambodia and to respond on
the social level to the friendlier attitude adopted by the IIKG's Charge
in Vientiane seems to have had moderately good results. The enclosed Xat
Lao editorial, for example, expressed publicly the hope RLG officials had
voiced privately i.e., that the Cambodians would not try to link the
issue of frontiers to the question of renewal of the 1.)':)9 treaty. On
November 25, 1967 the RKG indicated that Cambodia did not intend to relate
the two ,luestions.
17. At Stung Treng the former governor who had insulted Prince BOUN CUM
na Champassak, irritated various other Lao and misunderstood or misconstrued
problems in his reports to Phnom Penh has been replaced by former BEG
Charge at Vientiane, KEO Kimsan (F0V-13,0146). Xat Lao speculated that
t,his replacement augured for improved Lao/Khmer relations and noped the
:ormer Charge's knowledge of Laos would enable the RKG to have a more
correct idea of the Lao situation. Um Anreth,in a letter to Xat Lao on
January II, 1j(),?, agreed that the cnane of governors renresehted the RK(i's
.iesire to improve relations and hoped the Cambodian action would be met
a correspondinn effort by the Lao.
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Vientiane's
CONFIDENTIAL
Finally, the Lao, although always suspicious of the mercurial Sihanouk,
had understood from Phnom Penh and from the RKG Charg?ere that a change
? in Lao/Cambodian relations was unlikely even though the RLG made no state-
ment regarding Cambodian frontiers before the January 23 deadline. The
earlier decision of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officials who dealt with Cambodia, to resist attempts to secure an RLG
statement about RKG borders has so far been proven justified. Having decided
that practically anything they were prepared to say about Cambodian borders
?)111d only upset Sihanouk, the Lao, with commendable good sense, decided to
say of big :diatsoever. The practical care the Lao have taken to respect
ic acCual administraLive line, their refusal to be overly provoked by
2inahouk's taunts, and their general disposition to deal with Cambodia in
official and private channels rather than'in the press has enjoyed a certain
sccess. (However, relations between the two kingdoms are likely to remain
at. the Cnarc:4 level unless Sihanouk would take some initiative Co restore
ail ambassadorial exchange). Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has probably
decided that both he and Sihanouk have sufficient problems of their own
without inviting more difficulties by arguing over a ..iuestion of not very
L,reat significance and even less urgency that is best reserved for solutions
in a calmer and less critical atmosphere. Until such a time, the Lao seem
luite disposed. to let smiling Khmer lie.
SULLIVAN
COI?TIDEN'fliAL
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Enclosure 1
Vientiane's A-1.-
CONFIDENTIAL 1
AIDE MEMOIRE
Embassy Tranclation of French Original
0'14
wily'vkiva
The fraternal friendship that links the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Kingdom of
Laos is legendary. Our glorious monarch Fangum, architect of the territorial
and spiritual unity of Lane Xang could only have accomplished his brilliant
deeds as a National Hexowith the aid of the filial affPction and of the sup-
port in supplies and troops on the part of the Cambodian throne. Since then
the centuries have never tarnished this grand friendship, confirmed above all
others by the tis ?.)f. the 3ame royal blood which perpetuates itself in the
hearts of our resper-tive courts up to the present.
Recently Prince Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, has again aided the
Kingdom of Laos to recover its national path of neutrality, strengthening
therefore the perenniality of the international personality of the Lao nation.
Thanks to his inestimable support, Prince Souvanna Phouma, our Prime Minister,
was able to raise himself to the high position of undisputed national leader
and unquestioned architect of Lao neutrality. This has earned for him the
respect and sympathy of the important figures in the family of non-aligned
nations.
The lack of understanding which now characterizes the international relations
between our two brother nations is, in our view, an erroneous interpretation
of the real intentions of our government.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Laos wishes to call the
attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Khmer Kingdom to the
following points to first smooth out the lack of understanding and,
secondly, to createa common front in the struggle for the success of the
policy of neutrality upon which the future of our two countries depends:
a.
It was never contemplated that the Kingdom of Laos would claim
any part of Khmer territory;
b. Due to the fact that Cambodia, by virtue of the 1962 Geneva Accords,
"recognizes and will respect the sovereignty, the independence, the
neutrality, the unity and the territorial integrity of Laos and will
conform to these principles in every respect", it would be
unseemly, illogical and inconsistent that Laos should decide not
to accord ummumma-VIE-3Affe-tYeAtment.
At the heart of Cambodian thought, Cambodia by this international undertaking
recognizes and will respect among all clauses, by the juridical term of inter-
national law "territorial integrity", the line of the present frontiers of
Laos.
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Enclosure 1
Vientiane's A-16/4
CONFIDENTIAL 2
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Laos would be grateful
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia for being so kind as to
transmit these clarifications to the worthy regard of His Highness Prince
Sihanouk, Head of the Cambodian State who enjoys the highest esteem and
the profound affection of the entire Lao people. Prince Souvanna
Phouma, Head of the Royal Lao Government, has additionally instructed
him (the Minister), to be so kind as to act as his intermediary in renewing
to His Excellency, The Chief of State of Cambodia, the assurances of his
most affectionate and most grateful sentiments.
(October 1964, Cairo, RL G Minister of Foreign Affairs Pheng Phongsavan
to RKG Foreign Minister Houat Sambat. ed.)
POL:aTrunzo:lsa
J1/9/67 CONFIDENTIAL
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Enclosure 2
Vientiane's A- 1 ,11
UNCLASSIFIED 1
XAT LAO October 30, 1967
"LAOS ASKS TO RENEW THE COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH CAMBODIA
FOR COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE"
The heading is a quotation from a letter of June 29, 1967, from H.H. the
Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cam-
bodian Government, asking for a renewal of the treaty of commercial and
cultural exchange, and of the transit of goods Which Cambodia signed on
October 10, 1959, conditional upon renewal every year.
As we have no way out to the sea, we asked the Thai Government to reduce
the cost of transporting our goods across Thailand. These costs of
transportation are the most expensive in the world (or it can be called
"scrape and squeeze out of the Lao"). For having swallowed. our pride
and begged for help, the end result that we gained from the country we
consider as "our brother" was not as reasonable as we had hoped.
Nevertheless, Cambodia is a neighbor and a friend of long date, Who
once lived with us under the French regime. Even though the two countries
have not gotten along very well for some years, Cambodia stilled showed
its goodwill by answering the Prime Minister's letter on July 26, 1967.
The answer stated that Cambodia had no.objection and were pleased to have
the treaty which was signed on October 10, 1959, brought up again six
years after its expiration.
In the agreement on the exchange of goods, Cambodia would allow Laos to
export the following products for sale in Cambodia: elephant tusks,
coffee, dried mushrooms, teak, ayes, potatoes, benzoin, zinc and other
raw materials. It is rumored that the exports made by Cambodia into
Laos should not exceed $2 million. Various (Cambodian) products imported
into Laos would be: rice, pepper, water melon seeds, sugar, tobacco,
fresh and dried fish, peanut oil, sausages, fish sauce; Chinese noodles,
art crafts, automobile accessories, vacines and other products. The
English pound sterling and the American dollar are to be the guarantee
of the exchange of money.
As for the cultural exchange, it seems there are already many Lao students
in Cambodia. Even after the expiration of the treaty the students went
to Cambodia either by private means or by government grants. For example,
this year 19 students .have already been sent there officially to follow
',heir studies in the University. They are studying to be engineers of
public works, buildings and construction as well as artists.
As for the transit of goods, the Barcelona agreement or March 20, 1921
is the basis of the former Cambodian and Lao agreement; i.e., Laos is
UNCLASSIFIED
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Enclosure 2
Vientiane's A-
UNCLASSIFIED 2
given the right to use the docks in SihanoUkville. According to the treaty,
Cambodia allowed Laos to transport goods from Sihanoukville docks through
Phnom Penhi Kratie and Stung Treng to Ban Het Sal Khoune in Laos, a distance
of about 817 kilometers. In addition, Cambodia also accorded to Laos the
transportation of goods from Saigon to Laos through Cambodia, by passing
through Snoul, Kratie and Stung Treng to Ban Hat Sal Khoune. As for the
transportation by the river, the route taken is the same as above, but in
Laos the boat docks in Ban Vouen Khao.
Additionally there is also an agreement that While there is no railway from
SihanoUkville to the town of Stung Treng the Lao and Cambodian authorities
can establish a Lao/Cambodian transport group. The Cambodian government
will also provide a cite close to Sihanoukville harboi for storage under
Lao responsibility. These smaL problems such as the costs of the trans- ?
port and the location of the warehouse cite will be decided later. It was
also reported that the Lao government would send Mr. Ngon Sananikone as
president of the delegation to the meeting which is to be held shortly.
The problem is that the transportation will cost much more than from.
Bangkok to Thanaleng because it is by truck. Yet the goods reaching Pakbe
or Savannakhet from Cambodia may still be cheaper (than those coming by
way of Thailand).
Perhaps the Cambodians will not be difficult to deal with, if they really
want to help us. We believe that Cambodia would surely not bring up the
problem of our two frontiers as the main condition to squeeze us on the
coats of the transportation.
Although the. cost of the transports from Sihanoukville docks will be more
expensive than from Bangkok, the writer sincerely believes in and supports
the government's decision initiated by H.H. the Prime Minister.
(Note: Several lines regarding costs of transit through Thailand have
been deleted).
POL:JFMurphyasa
UNCLASSIFIED
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