BURMA-CHINA BOUNDARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100190009-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 22, 1950
• Content Type: CABLE

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FROM: LONDON No. 2507, Nay 22, mo (1 amoom44 A
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REF: Zs:haws* DmirmtOh No. 1288, )( OLI*
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Reference is made to the Imban,ps Deepateh L
No. 1288, of Nareh 16, 1950, ene-J*Ing mi 001PY *f *
letter, dated Mareh 13, 1950, addressed to the Nstaser SOM
by the Foreign ?Moe, snolsing two Foreign Offiee
documents on the Burma . Jhina boundary question and
.4 undertaking to forwar0. to the Embassy an up-to to
study on the question then in the course of pr ram.
tion.
There are now transmitted herewith t. apples of
a newly completed Foreign Office document ? ed. the
Burmee.Obina Frontier. The first three nao. a of the study
are a smmmary of this rather enhaustive cent.
DISPAMENT OF STATE
WritStON OF LIBRARY
AND
PISFITITENCE SERVICES
JUN 1-1950
LR FILE C...)PY
Ent:1?6%2r PLEASE RETURN s
3 copies 6T-document, kbA
Burma-China Frontier.
Ar L R. Ringwalt
First Secretary of Embassy.
ARRingwalt:sml
oonrucliTIAL
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1*0
MST TO Raft
10
2),e eti
g-Ve,
CAVA/.
THIS IS NOT A PERMANENT RECORD COPY.
Retain in office files or destroy in accordance with security rtculations. Reproduction of thi, message is not antlultimd
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SECRET
THE BURMA-CHINA FRONTIER.
Summary.
Introduction (1-3)
I. The Boundar Conventions of 18* and 18
BUR/14/50.
DEPARTmENT Or STATE
DIVISION Or L le,- e)V
REPEREWAND ? F
JUN 1-1950
LR FILL- ?? Y
PLEASE RETURN'
At the time of the British annexation of Upper Burma in
1885-86, the boundary with China was regarded as fairly clear in
the Shan States area (4).
Little was known about the boundary further north. Beyond
Bhamo there had once been an extensive Shan Kingdom which had
fallen under Burmese suzerainty, but the Burmese Kings had little
control north of Myitkyina and in the nineteenth century their
power was further weakened by the immigration of the Kachins (5).
The British formed the administrative district of Bhamo
and resisted Chinese claims to part of this area (7-8).
In the 1890s explorations were carried out to the north
of the Bhamo district and it was found that the Irrawaddy-Salween
watershed would form a good boundary in that area (9), but for the
time being administration was not extended beyond 25030'N (10),
and it wap resolved to partition the Kachin Hills east of Bhamo
and south of 25?30' (11).
The Chinese made claims both in the Bhamo district and
in the unadministered north, but finally the Boundary Convention
Of 1894 left the frontier undefined in the north, while south of
25?35 the British made concessions in both the Bhamo district and
the Shan States (12-18).
Owing to objections on strategic grounds, the line was
revised by the Convention of 1897 in favour of Burma (18-20), and
the frontier was then demarcated by a joint Commission except
for a two-hundred miles stretch in the Wa area where no agreement
was reached (21-22).
II. The Undelimited Frontier 1825=19141,
The British formed an administrative district of Myitkyina
in 1895 and began to take an interest in the unadministered
territory beyond (23.724).
(a) The Hpimaw Sector.
Both British and Chinese began to infiltrate into the
unadministered territory, especially in the Hpimaw area which
controlled the principal routes across the watershed (25-26).
The British again claimed the watershed as the frontier and
the Chinese again rejected it (27-28). An investigation on the
ground was effected and Mr. Litton, Consul at Tengyueh, reported in
1905 that there were valid Chinese rights west of the watershed
which, he proposed, should be extinguished by an annual payment
(29-31). The taotai Shih, however, made more extensive claims,
though also willing for them to be extinguished for a monetary
consideration. The Chinese Government rejected both proposals (32).
On let May 1906 the British Government informed the Chinese
Government/
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Government that they intended to regard the watershed as the
frontier and to administer up to that line (33).
Alternative proposals by the Chinese produced no agreement
and infiltration continued from both sides (34-35).
Chinese action was connected with the forward policy in
Tibet, to which colntry a route was sought through the Irrawaddy
basin (36).
In the years 1910-1913 the British occupied Hpimaw and
again offered to buy out Chinese rights, but in vain (37-).i.2)
On reason for Chinese concern was fear that the British
advance would be carried into Yunnan (43).
(b) The Ahkyang Sector.
To prevent the Chinese from using the country north of
Hpimaw as a route to Tibet, the British brought the Hkamti
Long area under administration .in the period 1910-14 and made
extensive surveys of the watershed, not without armed conflicts
with parties of Chinese (44-49).
Some Chinese at this time claimed that all of Burma north
of Myitkyina was properly Chinese territory (50).
III. The Iselin Commission.
In the 1920s Chinese interest in the undemarcated boundary
in the Wa area revived, and when the British began to prospect
for silver mines in the Wa States and to bring them under
administration, it became necessary to define the frontier (51-54)
A joint Commission under Colonel Iselin as neutral chairman
was unable to reach agreement (55).
Chinese plans for a Burma-Yunnan Railway running through
or, near the disputed territory made it possible to arrive at a
settlement and the boundary was finally agreed in an exchange of
Notes of 18th June 1941 (56-58).
IV. The Undelimited Frontier 1914-1941.
The situation remained relatively easy till the late
1920s (59-60). Then the suppression of slavery in the Triangle,
and the extension of British administration into this area in
1934, evoked Chinese protests that this area was their territory
(61-62).
Further proposals for a settlement produced no result
(63-64).
It became common for Chinese maps to show all Burma north
of Myitkyina as Chinese (65).
It is clear that the undelimited frontier north of 25?35'
was never recognised by the Chinese and is only a de facto line
(66).
v./
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V. The War and Post-War Years
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and retain control of the country.
Dn occasion a display d' force was needed to keep their actions
within bounds (67-69). Even when the Japanese had been
driven from Upper Burma, the Chinese tried to occupy parts of
the Shan States, the Namman leased territory, and the ghweli
valley (70-72), and in 1946 several hundred Chinese troops
occupied Waingmaw, on the Irrawaddy (73). It was suspected that
Chinese deserters had been planted in the country to facilitate
an annexation '(74).
A desire to settle the undelimited frontier was manifested
in China and propagandists continued to claim the country north
of Myitkyina as Chinese (75-76). Desire to regain the Namwan
trianglb was also displayed, and after Burma became independent
the Chinese refused to accept the rent for this area (77-78).
Difficulties also arose in the Shan State of Kengtung (79).
VI. Conclusion.
Though the frontier has been delimited from 25?35'N
southwards, the Chinese may demand the retrocession of Kokang
Namwan, while the undelimited frontier north of 25035'N gives
ample opening for Chinese claims (80-81).
By threatening the Kachin country, the Chin
mnu. Apn-nisrA ih i I onarycresrInmdang. nfl 4.1%. use of
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ese Communists
some of its
t the Burmeee
and
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THE BURMA-CHINA FRONTIER.
The annexation of the independent Kingdom of Burma,
proclaimed at Mandalay on 1st January 1886, rendered it necessary
to define the boundary between Upper Burma and China. The
Burmese Kings had been content to leave this matter undefined,
for their administration in the more remote areas of their
realm was far from strong, and so long as they received some
measure of acknowledgment from the chiefs and headmen they
were content: whether, as certainly happened in some cases,
these same chiefs and headmen made similar acknowledgments to
Chinese authority was a matter of indiiference. ',,estern
conceptions of sovereignty were, in reality, inapplicable to
the circumstances; minor chiefs made presents to their greater
neight'ours without necessarily incurring the imposition of any
administrative control. As was observed by an experienced
Political Officer in Burma, Mr. M. Elias, in 1886, "There is a
vast difference with Asiatics between paying tribute and giving
allegiance. Tribute is usually a mere compliment ar
propitiation, and does not always carry allegiance with it".
2. The advent of British power, with the consequent.
imposition of a more rigid system of government even in out-
lying districts, completely altered the situation: the British
authorities needed to know the limits up to which they could
lawfully administer the country in accordance with western
ideas of government. A similar situation was arising in South-
Last Asia in general in this period: there was a crystallisation
of frontiers which had formerly been fluid. Thus the frontiers
between French Indo-China and Siam and between Siam and Malaya,
which had formerly been matters of uncertainty, acquired clear
definition in the later nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Hence there were numerous boundary conventions in
this period, and among these figure the Anglo-Chinese
Conventions of 1894 and 1897.
3. These two Conventions are based on the Convention of
24th July 1886 which was designed to settle the relations between
the United Kingdom and China in respect of Burma, and Article III
of which provided that the frontier between Burma and China should
be marked by a Delimitation Commission.
I. The Bounuary Conventions of 1894 and 1897.
4. Initially, while fairly ample information was aveilable
to the British authorities about the position in the east of Burma,
where numerous petty Shan states lay, there was a dearth of
accurate knowledge about the north-east of the country. So far as
the Shan states were cdncerned, the boundary question was regarded
as simple. The Chief Commissioner, Burma, reported in August
1886 that "generally it is quite clear and well known whether in
past times a particular Shan State paid its tribute to China or to
Burmah". The only areas where uncertainty arose were the trans-
Salween states; of these the Chief Commissioner stated that "for
some years past the trans-Salween Shan States have paid no tribute
to Burmah whatever, still they have not paid tribute to China
either". Later, however, further knowledge of the country showed
that this view required modification, for the trans-Salween states
of Monglem and Kiang Hung were found to have paid tribute to both
Burma and China; indeed, Chinese iniluence was stronger than
Burmese influence n these territories, for the chiefs of the two
states corresponded with officials of the province of Yunnan, paid
an annual tribute, used Chinese seals' of office, and wore Chinese
official costume. It was true that at times tribute had been paid
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by them to Burma, but it had been paid more consistently to
China. However, the situation of the Shan States was in
general regarded as straightforward.
5. The position north of the Shan States was far more
complex. In 1886 little was known of the country beyond the
Irrawaddy river-port of Bhamo. Up to that point the Irrawaddy
had been travelled by a number of Europeans, going to or coming
from Yunnan, but few had penetrated farther north. The country
beyond Bhamo had at one time been occupied by Shans, in the days
when this branch of the Tai race spread over northern Burma
and into Assam, and in the thirteenth century an extensive
Shan kingdom appears to have held the upper part of the Irrawaddy
basin. The rulers of this kingdom appear to have been to some
extent under Chinese influence, till in the sixteenth century
a Burmese invasion forced the chiefs to acknowledge the
overlordship of the Kings of Burma. Burmese control was,
however, weak until 1796, when the Shans were finally subjugated;
from that time officers of the Court of Ave ruled the country,
though again it is doubti.ul whether they were able to exercise
authority far beyond the point where the town of Myitkyina now
stands: a British officer who visited the area early in 1886
reported that the Burmese had maintained no posts beyond
Maingna, some two miles north of Myitkyina, and that Maingna was
the farthest village from which they had ever obtained revenue.
During the nineteenth century, indeed, Burmese control began to
contract: the peoples known under the comprehensive name of
Kachins began to move down from the hills and neither Humans nor
Shans could cope with them. By 1886 Burmese administration
had almost ceased to exist north of Bhamo town, and the Shans had
been to a great extent displaced, surviving in any numbers only
in the. Hkamti Long area round the headwaters of the Mali Kha,
where they still live today in an enclave surrounded by Kachins.
6. In 1886 the British formed the administrative district
of Bhamo, which extended some ninety miles along the Irrawaddy
from Bhamo town; its northern limit lay only a short distance
above the town of Myitkyina and below the confluence where the
Mali Kha and the iNmai Kha join to form the Irrawaddy. This
was as much as the British could undertake to control during
the early days of their rule in Upper Burma.
7. At first administration covered only the lowlands in
the Irrawaddy valley, and it was found that between the
administered area of the Bhamo district and the territory in
Yunnan administered by the Chinese, lay a belt of independent
country occupied by Kachins, over whom neither Burmese nor
Chinese had ever had any authority. The Kachins were unruly
and were in the habit of emerging from their hills to raid the
more settled country on either side. It was argued in Burma
that such raids could not be prevented unless the Kachin
country were brought under administration, and Sir Charles
Bernard, Chief Commissioner of Burma, was in favour of a
partition between Burma and China, holding that there was a
generally acknowledged boundary. His view was controverted by
Mr. Elias, who held that China could never control the Kachins,
and who was the more anxious that the whole tract should be
incorporated into Burma because, according to his information,
the Viceroy of Yunnan was seeking to take advantage of the
uncertainties produced by the British annexation of Upper Burma
to advance his frontier westwards. Indeed, during the
discussions leading to the Convention of 1886, the Chinese
Minister in London had claimed that the Irrawaddy Rivet from
its
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its confluence with the Shweli to its source should be the
frontier, so gaining the river-port of Bhamo for China, but
Her Majesty's Government had firmly refused to recognise
this claim. It was held that the Chinese must be kept out
of the Irrawaddy basin for otherwise the Government of Burma
would have the same troubles as had arisen when the upper
Irrawaddy was held by the Kings of independent Burma. This
view formed in general the foundation of British policy in
this period.
8. The Chinese Government did not press its claim in
1886 and for some years the matter rested. The British
were 2ully occupied in pacifying the more accessible areas,
and not till the 1890s was there any further discussion of
importance on the subject of the frontier.
9. By 1891, however, the occupied areas of the Bhamo
district were reasonably well pacified and attention began to
turn to the unadministered areas on the periphery. Attempts
were made to obtain information about the unknown country to
the north, and in the cold-weather of 1890-91 Lieutenant
Eliott made a tour more than fifty miles beyond the
confluence of the 'Nmai and the Mali. It was thus learnt
that between the 'Nmai, which is the eastern arm of the
upper Irrawaddy, and the Salween River to its east, lay high
mountains crossed by a number of passes from Yunnan, notably
the Panwa and Hpare passes leadincY into the upper reaches of
the Chipwi river, tributary to the 'Nmai, the Hpimaw pass
leading into the valley of the Ngawchang, also tributary
to the 'Nmai, and the Chi Mi Li pass leading to the upper
Ngawchang whence it was possible to go through the Wu Law
pass into the 'Nmai valley. It apfleared to the British
authorities that the watershed between the 'Nmai and the
Salween would form a natural frontier with Chinese territory;
the mountains, despite the passes, were not easy to cross, the
adoption of this line would allot the whole Irrawaddy basin to
Burma and this seemed to accord with reason, and in addition,
the exclusion of the Chinese from any territory west of the
divide would interpose a wedge of territory between China and
India.
10. More immediately urgent, however, was the question
of the Sino-Burman frontier of the Bhamo district, where the
Kachins were still troublesome and the hill area of which
ought to be brought under control. It was therefore decided
not to trouble about the area beyond the northern limits of
the Bhamo district. The Shans of Hkamti had intimated a
desire to COMB under British administration but they lay .
remote from British territory and little was known of their
country. It was not feasible at that time to extend
administration so far and therefore, with a view to controlling
the Kachins to the east of Bhamo, the Chief Commissioner of
Burma was directed in December 1891 to establish frontier-posts
as far north as ,approximately 250 WIN, this latitude being
roughly that of the northern limit of the Bhamo district:
he was not to establish posts farther north nor to extend
administration northwards, but.Burma's claims in the outer
regions were not to be foregone, and it was recommended by
1;701 4-1104. 4.1-wct
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.irovisional boundary for the unadministered north.
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11. The implication of this policy was that, so far as
the Kachin hills to the east of Bhamo were concerned, Her
Majesty's Government had decided that it would not be feasible
to claim the whole area for Burma as Mr. Elias had wanted:
control was established by means of the frontier-posts as far
as the watershed between the Irrawaddy and the Shweli, and on
this basis it was proposed that the country should be divided.
The fact that many Kachins would be relegated to the Chinese
side of the proposed line was not material, since the term
Kachin covered many tribes who did not regard themselves in any
way as a united people.
12, The proposal that the Irrawaddy-Shweli watershed be
the frontier for the Bhamo district and that-the Irrawaddy-
Salween watershed be the provisional frontier father north
was not readily accepted by the Chinese Government who, in
1892, revived their claim to part of the Irrawaddy basin. They
again suggested that their frontier should be advanced to the
river at Bhamo. This claim was resisted on the ground that
in the past the Chinese had exercised no jurisdiction in the
Irrawaddy valley, whereas the Burmese had unquestionably
administered the country well north of Bhamo town and had been
succeeded in that administration by the British.
13. The Chinese were equally interested in the country
north of the area administered by the British: they wanted to
ensure the exclusion of British influence from all the territory
north of approximately 25? 30' N; .they held that the area beyond
actual Burmese administration in 1885 should be a subject for
negotiation, and in January 1893 the Chinese Minister in London
suggested a partition in this region also. He advanced the
view that the mere circumstance that China had not exercised
jurisdiction over the Kachins "would not invalidate her claim
to exercise it on occasions when such a course might appear to
her as being either necessary or desirable", for there were
considerable areas of undoubted Chinese territory elsewhere which
were not in fact administered. He denied that absence of
administration implied absence of sovereignty.
14. There was a disposition in London at this time to
make concessions to the Chinese point of view and to abandon
claims in unadministered territory for the sake of reaching
agreement on the frontier of the administered areas. Thus on
7th February 1893 the India Office suggested to the Government
of India that, for the sake of arriving at a settlement, the
Chinese might be given "a free hand between the Malikha and
N'maikha Rivers", a proposal which would have given them the
greater part of the unadministered terzitory beyond Myitkyina
and would have carried them far west of the Irrawaddy-Salween
watershed which had formerly been regarded as the only suitable
frontier in this region. The Government of India protested
strongly against the difficulties which would result; already,
It reported in August 1893, Chinese emissaries were stirring
up trouble in the 'Nmai and Mali valleys and the prospect of
serious difficulties in the administered area also would be
greatly increased if the Chinese were formally installed west
of the divide. In particular, the British would be compelled
to occupy and administer such areas as the Hukawng Valley for
fear of further Chinese penetration.
15. Although the suggestion made to the Government of India
in February 1893 does not appear to have been communicated
officially to the Chinese Minister in London, it is possible
that he gained some inkling of it, for in a Note of 19th June
RQA
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1893 he suggested that "a line which would divide equally the
space lying between the 'Nmaikha and the Malikha Rivers be
taken as the frontier" in preference to the 'Nmai-Salween
watershed which was still, officially, the British proposal.
16. The views of the Government of India prevailed,
however, and the proposed concession to the Chinese in the 'Nmai
area was not pursued. To smooth negotiations, Her Majesty's
Government offered concessions father south, and on 14th
September 1893 the Chinese Minister agreed that the line beyond
latitude 25? 30' be left undetermined until better information
about the country should become available. At the same time,
"the claim of the Chinese Government that the frontier should
be the line of water-parting between the Nmaikha and Malika
would remain on record". On these terms the matters was,
for the time being, left. The Convention of 1894 defined the
boundary from a suitably prominent mountain at 250 35'N
southwards, leaving "the settlement and delimitation of that
portion of the frontier which lies to the north of latitude
05?35' north" for "a future understanding between the high
contracting parties when the features and condition of the country
are more accurately known". (Art. 4).
17. In respect of the defined sector of the frontier, the
Convention of 1st March 1894 embodied concessions by the British
in both the Bhamo and the Shan States regions. The area of
British occupation in the Bhamo district /as contracted, leaving
the frontier-post of Sima to the Chinese, while in the Shan States
the trans-Salween states of Monglem and Kiang Hung, together
with Kokang which was a feudatory of Hsenwi but was inhabited
mainly by Chinese, were conceded to China also. In return,
the Chinese Government abandoned any claim to "the territory
lying outside and abutting on the frontier of the Prefecture of
Yung Chang and Sub-Prefecture of Teng Yueh" - i.e. the
territory allocated to Burma in the Bhamo district; and China
further undertook not to cede any part of Monglem or Kiang Hung
to any third Power without the prior assent of Her Majesty's
Government.
18. The frontier as thus agreed was to undergo swift
modification, however. The Government of Burma had, even
before the Convention was agreed to, objected to the proposed
line, and the line was later the subject of severe criticism.
The objections were fourfold. In the first place, villages
and even in some cases houses were cut in two by the line.
Secondly, the Chinese were brought within thirty miles of
Bhamotown. Thirdly, the Chinese were allocated the area of
Namwan, at the point where the roughly north-south boundary of
the Bhamo district meets the roughly west-east boundary of the
northern Shan States, and through this area ran the principal
line of communication between Bhamo and the Shan States.
It was true that under Article 2 of the Convention troops might
pass through the area, but only if prvious notice were given of
the
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the transit of any party of more than twenty men and only
with the prior sanction of the Chinese authorities if more
than two hundred men were sent. The military authorities
in particular objected to this situation, which was liable to
hamper the movement of forces in an area where as yet British
control was not completely consolidated. Fourthly, eleven
villages in the Namkham area and the whole sub-state of Kokang
were allotted to the Chinese although they were in fact
feudatories of the Sawbwa of Hsenwi, the rest of whose state
lay on the British side of the ],ine.
10., In consequence of these objections, an opportunity
was soon found of modifying the line. The French had long
taken an interest in Kiang Hung, to the north of Indo-China,
and it was in view of their interest that the condition had
been inserted in the Convention prohibiting the Chinese from
ceding any part of this state to a third Power. In 1895,
however, under French pressure, the Chinese Government ceded
a portion of the state to Indo-China, and this breach of the
Convention of 1894 was made the grounds for demanding a revision
of the frontier.
20. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 4th February 1897
re-aligned the frontier so that Sima and Kokang were retroceded
to Burma, and a perpetual lease was granted to Her Majesty's
Government of the Namwan area. By ,...rticle 2, the sovereignty
of China in Namwan was recognised, but it was agreed that "in
the whole of this area China shall not exercise any jurisdiction
or authority whatever. The administration and control will be
entirely conducted by the British Government, who will hold it
on a perpetual lease from China, paying a rent for it, the
amount of which shall be fixed hereafter". The rent was
ultimately settled at Rs. 1,000 a year, payable by the Consul
In Tengyueh to the local Chinese officials.
21. Both Conventions provided for the appointment of a
joint Commission to demarcate the frontier, and operations were
accordingly carried on between 1897 and 1900. No great
difficulty was experienced in demarcating the northern sector
of the line from latitude 25? 351 southwards, nor the southern
section between the Shan State of Kengtung and Yunnan; but
there was no agreement between the Commissioners on the
portion between the Namting river and the village of Pangdang
on the Namkha. The definition of the frontier in this region
as given in the Conventions had been arrived at with no
foundation of accurate knowledge, and it was found impossible
to agree on any reconciliation of the description in the
Convention with the geographical facts. Sir George Scott on
the one hand and General Liu Wan-sheng and tao-in Chen on the
other, traced completely different lines, and in the upshot
the matter was left unsettled. The country in this sector of
the line was wild and mountainous, inhabited by the people known
as Wa, head-hunters who had been subdued by neither Burmese nor
Chinese. It was apparent that the Wa could be brought under
administration only at the cost of expensive military operations
which the known resources of the country would not justify.
So long as neither Government made any attempt to impose
administration in the area, therefore, each was content to
take no further action.
22. With the exception of SOMB two hundred miles in the
Wa country, the boundary south of 250 351 N was thus settled.
23.
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II. The Undelimited Frontier 1895-1914
23. Though the frontier of the Bhamo district and the
Shan States was agreed in 1894, north of the point 25?35'N
all was still uncertain. The country beyond Myitkyina was
in a chaotic state, and the Kachins not infrequently
carried their raids across the imaginary line separating the
unadministered from the administered area. The situation
was such as to lead in 1895 to a strengthening of administrat-
ion in the Myitkyina area by the detachment of that area
from the Bhamo district and its formation into a distinct
administrative district of Myitkyina. At that time the
northern limit of the Myitkyina district still lay only a
few riles above Myitkyina town and below the confluence
where the 'Nmai and Mali join to form the Irrawaddy.
24. It was known, however, that Chinese officials were
penetrating into unadministered areas west of the Irrawaddy-
Salween watershed and it was suspected that they aimed at
pnosankkga fait accompli to any Boundary Commission that might
be appointed under the Conventions.
(a) The Hnimaw Sector
25. In January 1898 a Chinese officer with two hundred
men entered the 'Nmai valley. A protest was sent to the
Chinese Government, and in this Note, as well as in a
subsequent Note of 29th November 1898, Her Majesty's
Government declared that the watershed between the 'Nmai
and the Salween should be regarded as "the natural boundary
to be provisionally observed". The Chinese Government did
not reject the definition of the boundary in these terms,
though in May 1900 they protested against their previous
silence being construed as an acceptance of the proposed
provisional line.
26. Their silence did, however, encourage the British
authorities to advance their influence northwards, and in
December 1899 an expedition led by I:r.H.F.Hertz, Politibal
Officer, went into the unexplored mountainous, area north-oat
of xlyitkyina'with the intention particularly of discovering
whether any natural features connected the delimited frontier
at 25?35'N with the Nmai-Salween watershed. mx. hertz reported
and ShwelEYOu9AsaifltF14/?AnPM
i rivers and linking up the 'Nmai-Salween watershed
with the demarcated frontier. He also reported that "no
Chinese inhabited the valley of the Nmaikha or its tributaries,
nor have any Chinese villages ever existed on the western
side of the Nmaikha watershed". It should, however, be
observedthat Mr. Hertz was exploring only the area south of
Hpimaw and was not in a position to ascertain the situation
farther north; it may also be noted that he referred to the
non-existence of Chinese population and not to the question
of Chinese claims to jurisdiction. In fact the Chinese did
still claim as theirs the area in which he was operating, and
he met opposition from a force of Chinese troops near the
village of Hpare: in the resultant conflict, the Chinese lost
four officers and eighty men killed, and thirty-nine wounded
of whom twenty-eight later died. After this unfortunate
episode the column withdrew to Myitkyina before the onset
of the rainy season of 1900.'
27. It was apparent that conflicts of this kind were
likely to occur again unless the frontier were defined and
discussions with the Chinese Government were therefore
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pursued. The Chinese, however, still rejected the watershed
as a boundary; they now claimed that the true frontier lay
along the Ngawchang river to its confluence with the 'Nmai.
Under pressure from His Majesty's Minister in Peking, however,
they issued orders for the withdrawal of their forces to the
east of the watershed; they appear to have been the more
willing to issue these instructions since the activities on
the border seem to have been undertaken by the Viceroy of
Yunnan, in those days an almost independent ruler, without
reference to Peking. It was not till many years later that
any great interest in the Burma frontier was displayed
elsewhere than in Yunnan.
28. The Boxer troubles at this stage prevented further
negotiations and British effort was limited for a time to
obtaining a more detailed knowledge of the area. A further
entry of Chinese troops into the country west of the watershed
in 1902 caused His Majesty's Government to reopen the matter
in a Note of 18th September 1902, in which the statement was
made that, according to the results of careful investigation,
the watershed was not only the best natural boundary but was
also the actual limit of Chinese authority. The Chinese
Government deferred a reply pendin investigation from their
side, and then in June 1903 reported that, according to
officials of the Yunnan Government who had inspected the area,
the provisional frontier claimed by the British lay thirty
or forty miles within Chinese territory. Following this,
in December 1903 they demanded an undertaking that British
troops would not be sent into the debatable territory and that
a joint commission should delimit the frontier.
29. The former undertaking was refused, and there was
reluctance to accept the second proposal; but the Chinese
referred to Article 4 of the Convention of 1894, confirmed by
that of 1897. So, while still asserting that investigation
by British officers had found no trace of Chinese authority
west of the watershed, His Majesty's Government agreed to send
officers to explain the true position to any representatives
sent by the Chinese Government. The acting Consul at
Tengyueh, Mr. Litton, the Deputy-Commissioner of the Bhamo
District, and Shih Hung Shao, taotill, of Tengyueh, then toured
the area. The duty of the British officers was not to
determine the frontier but only to provide information.
30. After examining the country as far north as 260301,
Mr. Litton, in his report of May 1905, stated that the
watershed was from the ethnographic and geographic points of
view the most convenient frontier; it was, indeed, "an
almost ideal frontier line as far north as the confines of
Tibet". Prior to his inspection, he had taken the view that
beyond the demarcated frontier there was "a wide tract of
almost unknown country, which has never been brought under
control either from the Indian or the Chinese side, and to
which, on the ground of actual jurisdiction, Burma can put
forward no claims and China only very shadowy claims"; but
after his investigations he was disposed to give slightly more
weight to the Chinese case. There were, he found, valid
Chinese rights over some of the mountain villages west of the
watershed. The fuyi (headman) of Minkuang claimed rights
in the Hpimaw area over Tzuchu, Hpare, Htawgaw, La Chang,
La Mok and Pa Mia villages, but he had no control over them
and was afraid to enter the country; his rights were based
on ancient official documents of doubtful validity, supported
by
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by an official exchange of presents. The fuyi of Tatang
claimed Shang Son, on the Ngawchang river, and supported his
claim on grounds of a triennial exchange of presents; but no
regular control was exercised by him. The fuyi of Tengkeng
claimed Hpimaw, Utung, Kang Fang, and a small mountainous
area containing five villages, nine hamlets, and two hundred
and fifty households of Lisu, near the left bank of the upper
Ngawchang; this claim was based on the levy of an irregular
house-tax and a toll on timber taken at Kang Fang. The total
revenue derived by Tengkeng was not more than Rs.300 a year,
and the fuyi had no administrative control. The claims of the
Tientan fuyi to three villages on the upper Chipwi river had
no fouAdation.
31. 4hile asserting that the Chinese authorities had no
control over the fuyis and the fuyis had no control over the
Kachins, hr. Litton recognised the validity of the Chinese
claims defined above and recommended that a payment of
Rs. 500 a year, to be withheld in event of their causing any
trouble west of the watershed, be offered as compensation for
the extinction of the rights claimed by the fuyis, and that
along with this His Majesty's Government should insist on the
adoption of the watershed as the international boundary.
32. The taotai Shih, on the other hand, held that the
boundary should run from 25? 35' not along the watershed but
across country to the point where the Ngawchang makes its turn
northwards, and from that point should run up the left bank
of the Ngawchang to its source, so giving to China the region
around the upper reaches of the Chipwi river and everything
between the upper Ngawchang and the watershed. On the other
hand, he approved of the proposal that Chinese rights over this
area should be leased to the British Government, so overcoming
the objection that several villages held land on both sides
of the Ngawchang. His report was a disappointment to his
Government, which had hoped to establish a line along the east
bank of the 'Nmai, and he was transferred in disgrace to south-
west Yunnan: thus his discussions with Mr. Litton came to an
end.
33. In March 1906 a draft agreement on the lines proposed
by Mr. Litton was forwarded to the Chinese Government and was
categorically rejected. On 1st May 1906, therefore, His
Majesty's Government informed the Chinese Government that they
Intended, to regard the watershed as the frontier and to
administer up to that limit.
34. The Chinese Government then proposed a further
examination on the ground, and in August 1906 put forward a
statement by the Viceroy of Yunnan to the effect that the
frontier "starting from Manang Pum should run north across the
Chipwi Kha river to the west of the foot of the Kiaolung Kung
hills, and then following the Khetmaw Kha should extend to the
west of the Palatwa hills, where it should stop". Roughly,
the Viceroy's line followed that suggested by the taotai Shih
t5r the sector between 25? 35' and the Ngawchang, but then,
Instead of following the Ngawchangs% continued northwards, on the
west-of the hills lying between the lower Ngawchang and the
'Nmai, as far as the confluence of these two rivers. This,
though not so extreme as the views of the Chinese Government
who wanted to advance to the 'Nmai, would give China not
only
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only the area between the watershed and the upper Ngawchang but
also a good deal of the territory between the Ngawchang and
the INmai. It was at this period that the "five colour map",
later made use of by Chinese propagandists, was produced, showing
the different lines suggested by various authorities - blue by
the All Wu 2g, red by the Tsungli Yemen. yellow by the Yunnan
Viceroy, green by the taotal Shih, and purple by Mr. Litton.
35. Thus there was no agreement, and both parties
continued their infiltration. In 1906 a Chinese officer
visited Hkamti Long, in the far north, to persuade the Sham
to accept Chinese control, and in January 1908 a Chinese
officirl with fifty men entered the Chipwi valley.
36. In 1910 the pace began to quicken. This was
connected by the British with Chinese aspirations in Tibet.
It was believed that the Chinese were seeking a short route
into Tibet through the territory which was claimed.for Burma,
and the extension of British authority beyond the formerly
administered limits is clearly connected with Chinese policy
in regard to Tibet.
37. Early in 1910 villagers on the Ngawchang sent a
petition to the Government of Burma complaining that the
Tengkeng headman had raided and burnt Hpimaw: a protest from
the British Consul at Tengyueh evoked a reply from the taotai
that Hpimaw was in Chinese territory and that the trouble was
due to the lawlessness of the people themselves. The Consul
then made a tour of the area and reported that the statements
made in the petition were correct and that the headman had
been inspired by Chinese officials. The Chinese Government
took the case up and on 10th May 1910 presented a Note claiming
jurisdiction over Hpimaw and reasserting the frontier proposed
by them in August 1906 (paragraph 34 above). Again the British
Government in reply reasserted the watershed as the frontier.
38. It was evident that no agreement was likely; it was
also apparent that if the British authorities claimed
jurisdiction over Hpimaw they were under an obligation to
see that the place was not burnt down again. Mr. d.A. Hertz
Deputy-Commissioner, Myitkyina District, was therefore
instructed to visit the Ngawchang valley, to assert British
authority there, and to establish a police-post. Mr.
Hertz's movements were accelerated by receipt of news that
Chinese officials had lately visited Hpare and that the sub-
prefect of Lungling was about to go to Hpimaw. With ten
British officers and four hundred and ninety-four other ranks
of the Burma Military Police, Mr. Hertz occupied Htawgaw on 25th
December 1910, and a number of headmen from the Ngawchang valley
came in, bringing hats and letters of appointment issued to them
by the Chinese. After visiting the Chipwi valley, Mr. Hertz
went on to Hpimaw and Kang Fang. He was on his way back to
Myitkyina when information arrived that Chinese troops had
occupied Hpimaw, but later it was found that only some servants
of the Tengkeng chief had come there and summoned the elders to
Tengkeng, where they had been compelled to agree to a petition
stating a preference for Chinese as against British rule. Mr.
Hertz therefore continued his withdrawal, leaving a police-post
of three officers and one hundred and twenty-five men at
Laukhaung, between the 'Mimi and Htawgaw; during his tour he
had caused a mule-track to be cut between Laukhaung and Myitkyina.
39.
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39. In contrast to the view expressed by his brother in
1900 (paragraph 26 above), Mr. Hertz reported that "it is
impossible to deny that China has more than a semblance of
a right to the tract It is certain that their claim to
Hpimaw, belittle it as we may, is not.entirely fictitious".
He was therefore disposed to accept an alternative line
somewhat farther west than the watershed, though still east
of the 'Nmai. His Lajesty's Government, however, adhered to
kr. Litton's proposals, and when the Chinese Government made
further protests against the movement of troops into the
disputed area and again proposed a joint demarcation, they
refused to enter into any discussions unless Mr. Litton's
propoelals were accepted as the basis; they again, in a Note
of 14th April 1911, offered to buy out Chinese rights in
respect of the villages in the Hpimaw area, either by means
of a pbrpetual lease from the Chinese Government or by
payment of a lump-sum to the Tengkeng headman, though they
were not prepared to make any payment in respect of the claims
of the Minkuang and Tatang chiefs. The plan was also under
consideration in this period of proposing an exchange of the
rights of Tengkeng against those of the Mir of Hunza over
Sarikol in Sinkiang, but it was soon realised that the semi-
independent Viceroy of Yunnan was not likely to make any
such sacrifice for the benefit of distant Sinkiang, and the
project was not even broached to the Chinese Government.
40. The policy of asserting British authority in the
border was pursued, with the more vigour because in May 1911
a Chinese party made its way to the junction of the Ngawchang
and the 'Nmai and thence moved northwards up the 'Nmai
In the endeavour, it was thought, to reach Tibet via Rima.
During the 1911-12 season the Ngawchang valley was taken under
British administration, the mule-track was extended as far as
Htawgaw, and a military post was established at the latter
village to command the valley up to Hpimaw. Boundary pillars
were erected from 250 35' along the presumed frontier.
41. The Chinese Government protested in December 1912
against the erection of the boundary pillars and asked for
their removal. His Majesty's Government could scarcely deny,
In view of its offer of monetary compensation, that the
Chinese had some claim over territory to the west of the
watershed, but the view was advanced that as the Chinese had
failed to reply to the proposals for the extinction of the
claim, His Majesty's Government were justified in occupying
the territory without prejudice to an equitable financial
settlement whenever the Chinese cared to put forward proposals
to that end. It was pointed out, in a Nbte from His Majesty's
Minister at Peking on 21st December 1912, that his Government
had waited nearly two years in vain for a reply to their
proposals of April 1911, and that failing a reply they had had
no alternative but to occupy and administer the territory.
The Chinese Government in reply pointed out that verbal
discussion had'in fact taken place when the Note had been
presented and this consideration invalidated the argument
that they had not replied; moreover, the situation of
China's domestic politics, following the Revolution of 1911,
had made it difficult to render a formal answer. They
denied any intentional delay; asked again for the removal
of the boundary-pillars, and proposed the maintenance of the
status gyg pending an agreed settlement. By the status am
they
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they apparently meant the acceptance of the Ngawchang boundary.
On 25th January 1913, however, His Majesty's Minister replied that
his instructions precluded his telegraphing to the Government of
India to that effect.
42. It was reported by the officers who had been operating in
the Ngawchang valley that Hpimaw was the key to the whole position:
it would be of considerable military value to the Chinese and should
on no account be left in their hands. His Majesty's Government
therefore decided that Hpimaw must be occupied, and on 1st February
1913 a military post was established there. Boundary-pillars were
then erected as far north as the Chi Iii Li pass. The Chinese
Government again protested and asked for the withdrawal of the
military force, but the request was refUsed.
43. It appears that there was a good deal of nervousness in
Yunnan at this time about British intentions: the objections to the
occupation of hpimaw arose not merely from a natural desire to hold
the place for China but also from fear that the British would use it
as a base for an invasion of Yunnan itself. The circumstance that
the British advance stopped at Hpimaw was later interpreted by the
theory that it was only the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 and the
consequent diversion of effort that prevented agression into Yunnan.
(b) The Ahkyang Sector
? 44. 1,,s has been observed above, one of the reasons for paying
so much attention to the Hpimaw sector of the undelimited frontier
lay in the suspicion that Chinese ambitions aimed at securing the
country round the headwaters of the 'Nmai and its tributaries, on
the west of the divide, with a view to ensuring an approach to Tibet
through that region. Hpimaw, which controlled a number of routes
through the divide was thought to be the key for the whole position,
but there were alternative routes farther north and it was thought
well to guard these. So in the period when the Chinese were active in
Tibet, not only was the Hpimaw sector of the watershed secured but
also attention was turned northwards.
45. Contact had long before been established with the Shans of
the Hkamti Long area, around the headwaters of the Mali Kha, and in
1891 a son of one of the lesser Hkamti sawbwas had come to Bhamo
with presents for the Deputy-Commissioner; again in 1892 the grandson
of the principal sawbwa had visited Rangoon. But Hkamti was remote
from Myitkyina and the intervening country was held by Kachins over
whom there was no control; thuo apart from occasional visits of Shans
to Myitkyina, there was no real contact until, in the season 1910-11,
an expedition was sent under Mr. j.T.O. Barnard, with three British
officers and one hundred and twenty-five other ranks of Military
Police to Putao, the principal town of Hkamti, with the object of
confera.Ang a sanad on the sawbwa of Putao and asserting British
authority. ,i,fter the expedition had withdrawn, however, the Chinese
party which entered the country in May 1911 arrived (paragraph 40
above). This party had apparently entered the Ngawchang valley by the
Chi Mi. Li pass, north-east of hang Fang, and thence had gone by the
Wu Law pass to the 'Nmai Kha, and so northwards. They cut inscriptims
and issued appointment-orders to local headmen as they went. It is
not clear whether the party every reached Rima, thought to be their
objective, or whether they perished of starvation or were enslaved by
the Kachins as was thought by some observers.
46. In 1911-12 Mr. Barnard again visited Hkamti; and in the
1912-13 season two further expeditions went there, both accompanied
:by survey-parties. Mr. Barnard went by the Mali route and Lr. F.Clerk
went by the 'Nmai valley. Both were instructed to survey the country
and to report on such physical features as offered suitable landmarks
for a continuous frontier between seam and Upper Burma on the one
hand and Yunnan on the other. In the course of these operations the
country
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country in the 'Nmai and Mali valleys was brought under a
loose form of administration, though the area between the two
rivers, known as the Triangle, was not entered. In their
investigations of the Ahkyang valley, the survey-party under
Mr. Barnard came into conflict with a Chinese survey-party, all
of whose members were taken prisoner, andanother Chinese
survey-party was dispersed with some loss of life. The
expedition were, however, able to select a suitable frontier
from the Chi Li Li pass northwards.
47. Correspondence captured from the Chinese in the
Ahkyang valley showed that they were endeavouring to
establish themselves in the 'Nmai, Ahkyang, Taron and Namtamai
valleys, and it was therefore decided that a permanent post
must be established at Putao, with guard-posts along the
track linking it with Myitkyina. In December 1913 a fairly
large force was sent to Putao: Mr. Barnard with one hundred
and twenty-five police set out, and reached Putao in January
1914; another party of one hundred and ninety-seven men with
two guns arrived later in the same month, and a further one
hundred and twenty-six men arrived early in February.
Before kr. Barnard set out, news had been redeiVed that Chinese
force had aguinentered the Ahkyang valley and he was instructed
to expel them. In fact, however, he found none there. A
permanent post was now set up at Putao which, under the name
Fort Hertz, became the headquarters of an administrative
district, of which Mr. A.W. Hertz was the first Deputy-
Commissioner.
48. The Chinese Government protested against the entry
of British forces into the Ahkyang valley and denied the
right of British officers to seize appointment-orders issued by
Chinese authorities; they asked for an undertaking that
such actions would not be repeated. In reply His Majesty's
Minister in Peking pointed out that the area in question
lay west of the oiatershed, and added that the Chinese Government's
protest only proved that the Chinese themselves had trespassed
beyond that limit. The Chinese Government responded on 14th
July 1914 by observing that the boundary question would never
be settled until action was taken under Article 4 of the
Boundary Conventions.
49. The explorations which the survey-parties had
undertaken had, however, shown that Chinese influence did
exist in the Taron valley, farther north than the Ahkyang,
and hence in British survey maps from this time onwards the
upper part .of the Taron valley is indicated as within the
Chinese Republic.
50. So trifling a concession was far from satisfying
Yunnaneee opinion. In November 1912 the Consul-General at
Yunnan-fu reported that General Li Ken-yuan, President of the
Yunnan Kuomintang, was maintaining that not only Hpimaw but
all the unadministered territory of Upper Burma - i.e. every-
thing north of the then restricted limits of the Myitkyina
distilict- properly belonged to China, but that as China was too
weak to assert her claims she should defer any settlement to a
later date.
III.- The Iselin Commission
51. On the delimited sector of the frontier, the
situation remained quiescent for thirty years after the
cessation of the Boundary Commission's work in 1900. There
were
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were, of course, the usual troubles arising from trans-
frontier crime, but these were settled by joint meetings between
frontier-officers of both parties. In the 1920s a series of
raids from the Chinese side, in respect of which no compensation
was obtained, caused the British authorities to suspend in 1923
the payment of rent for the Namwan ,issigned Tract; but in
view of the very doubtful legality of the suspension payment
was resumed in 1928, though the arrears were still withheld
pending a settlement of the unpaid claims.
52, 2'.s the 1920s drew on, however, the question of the
undemarcated boundary was revived. Local opinion in Yunnan
had never entirely forgotten the matter, and with the growth
of national feeling in China the desire to assert China's
claims to territories which had once been regarded as Chinese
became vocal. In 1926 a Society for the Study of Frontier
Questions was formed in Yunnan, at Tengyueh, and, with the
encouragement of the Kuomintang in Yunnan, it began to bring
pressure to bear on the Central Government. In response,
the Chinese Foreign hinister raised the question with the
British Minister in 1929, suggesting that a joint boundary
commission be appointed. His Majesty's Minister replied to
the effect that a general agreement on principle must precede
a boundary commission, and the Foreign Minister, who appears
to have had little knowledge of or interest in the subject,
was content to drop the matter.
53. In the 1930s, however, it became necessary to deal
with the issue. With the loss of Manchuria, Chinese
nationlists sought compensation elsewhere, and their
aspirations gave a national complexion to what had so far
been little more than a Yunnanese provincial agitation.
In 1931 Ch'en Yu-kto, chief of the Bureau of Propaganda of the
Yunnan Provincial Kuomintang Executive Committee, published
his Yunnan Pien-ti Wen-t'i Yen-chiu (translated by J.
Siguret under the title Territoires et Populations des Confins
du Yunnan) in which all the former Chinese claims were put
forward. In addition, the aa country assumed an economic
importance previously unknown. There were ancient silver-
workings in the northern part of the unadministered territory,
and the Burma Corporation, which worked an extensive silver-
lead mine in the northern Shan States, took the view that its
oporations could profitably he extended into the Wa area.
It proved impossible for prospectors to operate without
protection, however, since the Na head-hunters were naturally
averse to alien penetration. In January 1934, therefore, a
prospecting-party entered the territory with an escort of
armed forces of the Crown. Express instructions were given
not to cross the line laid down by the Chinese Commissioners
Liu and Chen in 1900 and assurances were given to the Chinese
authorities on this score; but Chinese troops were moved
forward and a protest was made by the Chinese Central
Government in March 1934 on the ground that the British party
Ilad entered Chinese territory. The British came into
conflict with the Wa, perhaps encouraged by the Chinese, and
although the geologists were soon convinced that there were no
lodes which could be profitably worked, it was considered
that, the expedition having entered the country, some
measure of permanent control must be maintained.
54.
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54. s the Wa country was now ceasing to be unadministered,
the settlement of its boundary was urgent, and ultimately it
was agreed with the Chinese Government that a boundary
commission should be appointed under a neutral chairman
selected by the President of the Council of the League of
Nations, with the duty of first affixing on the map the line
laid down in the Convention of 1897, and then of reporting to
the two Governments on any cases in which modification of the
line appeared necessary; later a conference might '-)e convened
in Nanking to determine any such modifications. This
agreement was embodied in an exchange of Notes on 9th April 1935.
55, The Commission, under the chairmanship of a Swiss
officer, Colonel F. Iselin, assembled on 1st December 1935,
and finally dissolved at the end of April 1937. AS had
happened thirty-five years before, there was no agreement
between the British and the Chinese Commissioners, and there
was now the added complexity that the neutral chairman
suggested a third line in addition to those proposed by the two
groups of Commissioners. On the other hand, the work of the
Commission had the advantage of providing at last a thorough
knowledge of the topography of the disputed area.
56. The issue was still under debate when, during 1938,
the Chinese Government developed its plans for improving
communications with Burma. The disruption of the railways
to the China Coast as a result of the Japanese invasion led to
the construction of the Burma Road; but the Chinese wanted
also a Yunnan-Burma Railway, and proposals to this end were put
forward even before the Burma Road was formally opened in
January 1939. The Chinese Government suggested that the
Railway should follow an alignment surveyed as long before as
1905-06, which ran well south of the Burma Road and crossed the
frontier in, or very near, the undelimited portion. It was
therefore intimated to the Chinese Government that if this part
of the country was to be opened up by means of modern
communications, the frontier must first be agreed; thereafter
the construction of the proposed Railway, and of a parallel
road which the Chinese also desired, could be commenced with
British aid.
57. After lengthy discussion, the boundary was agreed in
an exchange of Notes of 18th June 1941, whereby a new
definition of the undemarcated sector was substituted for that
given in the Convention of 1897. The new line was based on?
the reports of the Iselin Commission, but the British made
concessions to the Chinese in the south and centre while the
Chinese made concessions in the north. The effect was to
secure for Burma the area of Lufang, where the silver-mines
were supposed to lie; but as a gesture of good-will the
Government of Burma agreed that Chinese capital might
participate up to a limit of 49 per cent in any British
concerns working the eastern slopes of the Lufang ridge.
58. The frontier in the Wa area was thus at last settled.
It was not yet demarcated, however, and the outbreak of war
with Japan in December 1941 prevented any operations to this
end.
59.
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Iv. The Undelimited Frontier 1914-1941,
59. During the war-years from 1914 to 1919 there was little
activity on either side. Minor troubles arose from the re-
fusal of the Chinese to recognise the watershed as the frontier
in the Hpimaw sector: thus they objected to the discussion at
frontier-meetines of any trans-frontier criminal cases arising
in this area pending the agreement of the boundary, and after
1918 no such cases wore taken up at these meetings. It wasp
however, determined by His Majesty's Government not to raise the
general ouestion, in the hope that in time the Chinese Government
would come to accept the fait accompli. The quiescent state of
the frontier is indicated by the fact that in 1925 the Putao
district was abolished end the area was reduced to the administra-
tive status of a subdivision of the leyitkyina district.
60. There still remained in Yunnan some uneasiness about
British intentioes, however. Thus in 1922 there was unfounded
excitchent arising from rumours of Lritish military activity at
Rpinaw, though on the other hand in 1023 after the Chinese
Consul from Rangoon had passed through the area there was a
rumcer ,n circulation that Hpimaw and the upper Ngawchang valley
were to be ceded to China. The Chinese Government did make a
tentative enquiry in 1923 about the possibility of resuming ne-
otiations for a boundary settlement, but it was decided to make
no reply until they raised the point again.
61. On the west of the watershed British control Was meanwhile
strengthened. In pursuance of the policy of abolishing slavery,
an expedition led by Mr. Barnard was sent into the Triangle, be-
tween the "Zmai and the Mali, in the cold weather of 1926-27,
and subsequent expeditions followed, in the next two years.
Finally, by an order of 14 Yehruary, 1934, the Triangle was
broueht under direct administration.
62. Those activities did not escape the attention of the
Chinese; moreover, they coincided with the period in which
Chinese nationalist aspirations werf turning towards China
irredenta. in 1929 the Yunnanese Society for the Study of
Frontier Questions sent representatives to Yanking to petition
the Central Goveenment, which apeointed a departrental committee
to study the suhject; and in March 1929 the l'Titish Consul at
Tengyuch received a protest from the taoyin against the invasion
of the Trianele, which, it was claimed, was Chinese territory.
In hde report on the natter, H.. Consul, in a letter dated 4
March 1929, states that "this is the first time that any official
claim to territory west of tho nevi Kha has been made by the
Chinese"; hut io this he was under a misapprehension, for in
1893 the Chinese Minister in London had proposed a partition of
the Triangle, and at the .time of the conclusion of the Convention
of 1894 he had placed his Government's claim in this regard on
record (paragraphs 15 and 16 abcve).
63. Following the reprcsontations from Yunnan, the Chinese
Foreign Einister urged in hey 1929 that the time had come to
seek a settlement, particularly in the Hpimaw sector, and he
revived the project for a. boendary commission (paragraph 50
above). The Government of eurma, when consulted, stated that
while an amicable settlement would be welcome, yet it would be
useless to appoint a commission until the boundary had been
agreed in principle; and further, in view ef differences of
orinion about Hpimaw, it was unlikely that agreement in principle
could be reached. It was therefore sugeested that the old pro-
posal far a lease ef the disputed area in the Hpimaw area might
be 000
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be revived, or alternatively that some concession might be made
to the Chinese in the r5a area, in return for an agreement about
Hpimaw. The government of India approved in general the views
of tlec C'overnment of 'Alma, and agrced that the watershed con-
stituted a scientific frontier; on the other hand, they pointed
out that there was no sanction for the watershed-line in the
Conventions and that the C':n.inese undoubtedly had certain claims
on the west of that line; furthermore, in contrast to the views
held fifteen ecars before but in agreement with the opinion once
expreseed by Er. Hertz (paragraph 39 above), they were disposed
to the view that ITpimaw was not of great intrinsic value and that
it might 'ie advantageous to make some concession there so as to
obtain better terms in the Wa sector.
64. Neither party appears to have been anxious to press the
matter, however, though in response to local agitation the
Chinese authorities stopped the hire of mules to the Covernment
of Irma for use in operations in the Triangle, and it was not
till 1934 that the matter came up again. Then the Chinese
Government raised the issue in connexion with the case of the Wa
frontier. The Covornriont of India were now reluctant to enter
into discussions on the subject, for fear that the Chinese might
be encouraged to make larger demands in the Wa sector, whereas
they hoped that perhaps concessions in the latter might be made
conditional on Chinese acceptance of the do facto line in the
north.
65. There the matter appears to have rested so far as official
exchanges wer concerned, though Chinese official interest was
indicated by a ruling of the Customs Department at Tengyueh in
1935 that coffin-wood from the forests of the Htawlang area Was
not dutiable on entering Yunnan as Htawlang was Chinese territory.
Chinese propaganda continued active, however. Ch'en Yu-ko's
book (paragraph 53 above) advanced the maximum claims for the
Chinese: according to him, the headmen in the Triangle held
appointment-orders dating back to the Ming Dynasty t he also
stated that in 1892, On the first approach of the Tritish, some
of the headmen from the Triangle had gone to the Salween valley
to ask protection on the ground that they had long lived within
the jurisdiction of the mcwistrate of Yungling. These views
were taken up by the Chinese press, which in some cases advanced
similarly extensive claims. It became common for Chinese maps
to show all of :urma nerth of he tri, inal limits of the Myitkyina
administrative distriot (paragraph 23 above) as Chinese, right
across the country to the borders of Assam. Thus the 1936
edition of the Chinese Postal Atlas showed tho frontier as run-
ning roughly west from the terminus of the demarcated boundary
at 25? 351N to the Patkoi range bordering Assam, and thence
north-east to the neighbourhood of Tibet. Chinese school
atlaseo showed similar claims. The attention of His Majesty's
Government does not appear to have been drawn to the point till
1939: it was then agreed that it was undesirable to complicate
the negotiations about the Wa area by raising this issue, es-
pecially as the Government of Burma took the view that no serious
inconvenience was caused by the lack of an agreed frontier. The
outbreak of war in Eurone in the same year .and the deterioration
of the international situation in eastern Asia were further argu-
ments in favour of avoiding this controversy.
66. The salient factor which emerges from the history of the
undelimited frontier up to the outbreak of the Pacific War is
that at no time did the Chinese Government recognise the frontier
claimed by the ;ritish. They consistently held that they had
rights west of the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed, and though they
were 044
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wore at no time in a position to enforce those rights, they
never abandoned them. The frontier traced by the British was
thus a de facto frontier onleo.
V. The War and Post-War Years.
6'i. The fortunes of war enve stimulus to Chinese interest in -
northern lirma. Plans for developinh overland communications
with India, for example, resulted in the survey by a Chinese
Party in 1941 of the Chaukan pass rbuto, leading westwards from
Putao into Assam. Still more important, after the commencement
of the Palific War the Chinese V and VI Armies were brought into
Durma early in 1942. After the collapse of Allied resistance,
the 03rd Division of the VI Army, stationed in Kengtung in the
east of the Shan States, did net withdraw from that area but .
hovered about in the hills until 1945; alsewhere the remnants
of the Chinese forces withdrew, and those who retired northwards
thruueh the Kachin cuntry committed the most horrible atrocities
nt the expense of the lccal people.
68. Considerale difficulty was experienced by the Lritish
authorities in coping with the Chinese forces during the sub-
sequent period of the war. Towards the end of 1942, finding
that the Japanese had not advanced very far north of Diyitkyina,
detachments of Chinese entered the Namtamai and AhkyanF valleys,
and it was quickly apparent that they had come there to occupy the
country rather than to fight thE Japanese; they told the Kachins
that the :ritish had given the country back to them, they issued
appointment-orders to headmen, they arrested hritish-appointed
headmen in the Ahkynne valley, and also arrested the escort of a
British officer sent from Putao to protest. They began to move
on Putao till they were intercepted by a force of Gurkhas who
induced them to return to China. After that, a Home Guard armed
with eritish weapcns was formed in the Namtamai valley to exclude
future Chinese intruders,
69. Farther south the Chinese also entered the Hpimaw area and
occupied Fetawfaw and Laukhaune; some even advanced as far as
the Triangle. In 19,13, however, the Japanese drove them out.
The Japanese then took and held hpimaw until the rains of 1944,
but after their withdrawal the. Chinese made another incursion which
was r, pelled by Maru and LaahiLevies under 101 Detachment of the
United States 0.S.S. Lech of the trouble was due to the activi-
ties of Chinese deserters rather then to those of regular forces,
and aftue the formation of .7,teuth-East Asia Command the defining
of an operational boundary within which Chinese forces were to be
enployed did somethine to stahilise the situation.
70. Even when most of Burma had been retaken from the enemy,
difficulties continued, how,ver. Thus in May 1945 the British
commander in the southern Shan States received a letter from
the commander of the Chinese 93rd Division stating that he
wanted to take over kenyane, in the north-cast of Kentung; but
the :Triers and the Lahus serving in the Levies under Force 136
threatened to withdraw from service unless the Chinese were kept
in order, affirming that they were more oppressive than the enemy
in their dealings with the local people. It was therefore sug-
hosted that the 93rd hivisien withdraw to Yunnan, but the
C-enerelissimo ebected on the erounds that the Japanese were
still a threat in the Kenhtenh area; he also advanced the
ar unent, somewhat strangely ie view of the boundar- Fettlement
in 1041, that the frontier with 'urrma was not clearly drawn in
this region.
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71. There were similar troubles farther north. After the
Japanese left Bhamo and Lashio, Kachins of 101 Detachment fought
several actions with Chinese forces in the Sinlumkaba and
Kutkai areas. Again in Namwan, a Chinese force occupied the
area in May 1945, claiming that "the period of thirty years'
lease" for tbk, Assigned Tract had expired. Only after
representations in Chungking were they withdrawn. In the
Shweli valley in the same period the commander of the Chinese
forces was holding flag-raising ceremonies and stating that the
area had been conquered for China.
72 One of the most troublesome areas was Kokang, which,
allotted to China by the Convention of 1894, had been transferred
to Burma by the agreement of 1897. The Chinese had expelled the
chief of the state in 1943, and in 1945 a Chinese, accompanied
by an armed gang, came there stating that he had purchased the
territory from the Governor of Yunnan: he and his men had to
be expelled by Kachin armed police. There was also Chinese
Infiltration into the Wa area, but the head-hunters dealt
effectively with this problem; and after the rains of 1945 a
British force expelled Chinese marauders from the Manglong
state.
73. Again in February 1946 a force of three-hundred and
seventy-five Chinese troops crossed the frontier and occupied
Waingmaw, across the Irrawaddy from Myitkyina, having left two
or three hundred more men at points along the road from the
frontier. The major commanding stated that they had come to
take over former Chinese engineering installations on the Paoshan-
Myitkyina military road and to arrest Chinese deserters. He
refused to withdraw, asserted that his men were under orders to
guard the road and to prevent any damage to it, and added that
if there should be any trouble in which Chinese troops were
killed he would arrest those responsible. He held a meeting of
local Chinese at which they were invited to report any cases of
unjust treatment by the British. His troops were meanwhile
digging entrenchments at Waingmaw. It was only after strong
representations had been made to the Chinese Government and
after a considerable military force had been assembled in the
neighbourhood that the Chinese withdrew, after staying more
than a month in Burma. Even then the Chinese Government
claimed that as the Paoshan-Myitkyina road had been constructed
with Chinese funds and man-power, the Chinese had the right to
use the road whenever they wished; and when this claim had been
rebutted they suggested that China be reimbursed for the cost
of the road.
74. Throughout the period Chinese deserters were ttebane of
Upper Burma, and there was some suspicion that they had been
deliberately planted in the country so as to factlitate a
Chinese annexation if circumstances should prove favourable.
75. The problem of the undelimited frontier was again raised
at the end of the Japanese war. In August 1945 H.M. Consul-
General at Kunming reported that the local government had
suggested that the time was ripe for a final settlement of the
northern frontier. Again in May 1947 the Chinese Minister of
the Interior reported to the People's Political Council his
hope that "the long outstanding question of demarcation of
borders between China and Burma should be settled in the near
future"; he added that officials of his Ministry were studying
the topographical conditions on the border, and in September 1947
it was stated in the press that a Chinese survey-party was to
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go to Yunnan for this purpose. At the end of the same year an
official of the Ministry of the Interior stated that an area of
77,000 square miles on the China-Burma border was rightfully
Chinese; he affirmed that tho frontier should run not along the
watershed between the Salween and the Irrawaddy but westwards
as indicated on Chinese mapsIstarting from Chien Kao Peak and
following the Shihoo and 'Nmai rivers and then running through
the Hukawng valley to the ratkoi Rance. The Chien Kao Peak is
apparently the "high conical peak" referred to in the Boundary
Conventions of 1894 and 1897 as tho starting-point of the agreed
frontier, and the Shihoo is probably the Shingaw Hka, tributary
to the '-mai. The line thus suggested is very much that adopt-
ed in the Chinese maps referred to above (para. 68).. The sug-
gestion that tho area of Lurra north of this line amounts to
77,000 square miles is a gross exaggeration: 22,000 square miles
would be more accurate. It may be observed in this connexion
that in july 1943 a war-map issued by tho Chinese Ministry of
Information, and later puhlished in various Chinese newspapers,
not only showed tho boundary as running westwards but also,
whereas in the Postal Atlas the frontier was shown as undemar-
cated, indicated it as demarcated; an official protest was made.
.76. In Auaust 1048 it was stated in the Chinese press that the
Yunnan survey-party had made its report, and a press-report -
attributed to "a Foreign linistry source" the statement that the
Chinese Covernment might claim some 100,000 square kilometres of
territory, thouah this was at once disclaimed by the Yinistry.
77. The Namwan Assigned Tract also became the subloct of
Chinese interest. 'laen in July 1945 the protest was made
against the Chinese occupation of the Tract (para. 71), the
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that, while orders
would_le given for the withdrawal of the force, his Government
were not unmindful of the anomalous state in which the area in
question finds itself. It is the intention of the Chinese
Government to take up this question with the Fritish Government
in the future when a suitable occasion presents itself with a
view to settling it on a basis more in conformity to the prin-
ciple of China's territorial intearity". At about the same
period tho acting Linister also mentioned that "it was proposed
to raise the question of olcana".
76.- After the declaration of iaurma's independence in January
1948, tho Chinese Government began to press the case of Nanwan,
and they refused to accept from the Covcrnment of 7:alma tho
annual rent, while the sawala of ivienamao, to whose state the
state had originally belonged, was inspired to agitate for its
return to him. It is possible that the Chinese attitude was
based on the argument that, the lease having been made to the
:ritish Government, it automatically lapsed when the Eritish
ceased to administer the area and to pay tient for it. As
against this, Durma may claim to have inherited the benefits of
the Convention of 1697 on tho principle of state succession.
With a view to ensuring their communications between Ehnen? and
tho Shan States, howver, the Ourmose Government are now con-
templating the construction of a bye-pass road round the south
of Namwan.
79. The Shan State of Kenatuna is also in a difficult position.
It occupies an important strategic position, bordering China,
Indo-China and Thailand, and through it runs the easiest land-
route between Yunnan and Upper Sian. Refugees from Yunnan,
fleeing before the advance of the Chinese Communists, took
refuge in Kenatung during 1949, beth civilians and also remnants
of the 93rd Divisiea, and in January 1950 a small party of
Communists
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Communists entered the state to demand the surrender of the
refugees.
VI. Conclusion.
80. There owht not to be any difficulty about the delimited
part of the frontier. It was agreed between the United Kingdom
and China, and 171a.rma has inherited British rights. Yet there
are possibilities of dispute. The Namwan lease is resented by
the Chinese as arising from one of the "unequal treaties" of
which they complain, and there can be no doubt that the area is
Chinese territory, though administered for many years as an
integral part of 4.3urma. The position of Kokang is not alto-
gether dissimilar, for undoubtedly the greater part of its in-
habitants are Chinese and it was recognised as Chinese territory
in 1694; it was surrendered by the Chinese in 1897 by the same
"unequal treaty" that deprived them of Namwan, and the remarks
of the acting Foreign Minister in 1945 show that the Chinese are
not satisfied in regard to the situation. Despite the Conven-
tion of 1897, the Chinese may at any time demand a revision of
the frontier on grounds of equity and justice.
81. The northern, undelimited frontier obviously gives even
more opening for Chinese claims. It has to be faced that there
is no local basis for the frontier as now drawn by the Eritish
and Burmese, other than the fact of occupation in the face of
Chinese protests. It is a de facto, not a de jure, frontier.
It has also to be faced that Eritish action in the area forty or
fifty years ago was more than a trifle arbitrary. Common sense
suggests that the watershed is a suitable frontier, far prefer-
able to the line claimed by the Chinese which runs across country
without following any well-defined natural features. Moreover,
the country has long been under Dritish or Burmese administra-
tion and, so far as the principle of self-determination is con-
cerned, the inhabitants appear to have no desire for a change;
they are satisfied with their present status as members of a
largely autonomous unit of the Union of "Surma and have no wish
to join their.fellow-Kachins across the frontier under Chinese
government. But Chinese irredentism can make out a case, and
the upshot might be embarrassing for Eurna.
82. On the other hand, whereas a Chinese Government could
happily advance claims msainst "the British imperialists", it
may possibly be slightly more difficult for them to make similar
demands on a fellow-Asian Government. Whether this considera-
tion would influence a Chinese Communist rdu,ime, anxious to
cause unrest in .burma and, by threatening the Kachin country,
to deprive the UniOn of Burma of the use of some of its most
dependable troops in the anti-Communist civil war, is, however,
far from certain.
Research Department,
24th April, 1950. Foreign Office.
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