THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN OVER THE HELMAND RIVER WATERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 24, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
25X1
Copy No;
14
THE CONTROVERSY BEMELN ITT LND 1iFGHI,NISThN
OVER TEE HEM -ND RIVER 1+nb1.TFRS
OIR Report-No. 4509
October 24, 1947
Division of Research for hear East and l.frica
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCL } LSEARCH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary . o o '. ? ? . . ? . . . ? . . . ? ? . ? ? s . ii
I. The Current Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
R8.ge,
II. The Geographical and Historical Background . . . 2
The Helmand River Basin. . . 2
B .. The Giri shk Brea . . . . F, . ? . . ? . .' , , . 4
Co Negotiations Concerning Contr,c?. of thehelm.anO.
eiatars o t. n c ? a o ? ? . e ? o s ? ? ? , ? ? 6
III. Recent Davel')pmerri; s . . t . . . 10
A~ Causes of Friction . . . . . , . . . . . . . 10
B, CQposing Claims. . I . 14
1. The Iranian; Case. . . . . . . . . 14
2, The Afghan Cac 3 . . . O . . , . . t . . . I.C
3? Analysis of Claims. . .
4, t1rmerioan Attempts to rf:'ect a Settlement, , , . 22
IV> InternE.tiona.l Implications o ; , o e . . , . , 24
D. Temporary Agreement Based on Protocol
A. The Sistan Arbitratiren; 1872. . . . . . . . , . , . 27
B. The tack.ahon Award of 1905, . ,. ~ , . . , . , , , 31
C, Irano k.fghan do:nt Protocol Ccnce:?n'.ng Distribution
of Helmand River 14aters (Signed September 3?-5, 1936) 33
of 1936 (Signed October 5?'7, i937). . ,
Draft i,gl eement Between the Royal Afghan
Government and the Imperial Go ?rex-rxnen t of Iran
Concerning Distribution of the Helmand River
riater (Signed December 29, 9 ) , n 35
F. Drafts of Lnnex to the 1938 "agreement Prepared by
the Iranian and 1_fgha.nnvernments ~ , . . . , . . 38
Iran?,Y.fghanistan: Helmand River Basin. n o , . - . . . . At Endo
SECRET
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
In recent years the issue of the division of the Helmand
River waters has again arisen and has not only embittered
relations between the Iranian and Afghan Governments but also
has threatened the execution of developmental plans that woi;ld
benefit both countries.
The Helmand River rises in central Afghanistan and after
taking a westerly course discharges its waters into a depression
that extends across the Iranian-Afghan border but lies largely
in the Sistan province of Iran. When a British arbitration
commission in 187? established the boundary in this area, it
provided that no works should be constructed on either side of
the boundary that would interfere with the requisite supply of
water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmand."
In the 1900's disagreements arose between the two countries
over the technical interpretation of the 1872 award and the two
;overnments again turned to Great Britain for an adjudication.
In 1905 the British arbitrator interpreted the "requisite supply
of water" for Iranian Sistan as being one-third of the water
in the lower course of the Helmand. The award was not accepted
by Iran and was not executed. Several temporary agreements were
signed by the two parties in the 1930's but a permanent settlement
had not been reached before the outbreak of slorld War II
Severe drought during the 1946 and 1947 growing seasons
and the formulation by the Afghan Government of extensive plans
for irrigation and hydroelectric projects on the middle Helmand
have led the Tehran government to charge Afghanistan with contra-
vention of treaty obligations and to take steps to submit the
dispute to the United Nations. lhile the dispute is essentially
lical it has wider significance as a source r:f friction between
two Middle Eastern states and as a possible means of weakening
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET
iii
;their ability to resist pressure b. the Soviet Union.
A developmental plan for the use of the Helmand waters
could probably be devised and executed that would significantly
inore,use the cultivable area both in Afghanistan and Iran and
would reduce, if not eli'_inc.te, the loss suffered, particularly
by Ire.nian cultive.tors, though uncontrolled annual floods.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET 1
I. THE CURRENT PROBLEM
Present plans for similar programs of agrieq}1turgj and
irrigation developments in Iran and Afghanistan have brought.
into prominence the question of the control and distribution
of the flow of the Helmand River. Through planned irrigation
the cultivable area of both countries can be increased and
their economic productivity raised. The question has received
added urgency because of a serious drought in 1946 and 1947
which caused suffering to inhabitants on both sides of the
frontier.
The traditional mutual distrust of Iranian and Afghan
officials has for ten years prevented the conclusion of a de-
finitive treaty governing the use of Helmand River waters,, The
development of an ardent and jealous nationalise in both countries
during the same period has further helped to create an atmosphere
in which dispassionate eonsulatation is difficult.
While winter rains and spring thews will help to ease
the current tension, the Iranian fear that proposed Afghan
construction on the middle reaches of the river may adversely
affect the flow of water into Iran makes international agreement
urgent and essential.
The United States has an interest in a satisfactory
solution of the problem since eontinu.etc:n of the dispute will
provide an added source of unrest and economic waste in an
important area of the Middle East and adversely affect the
activities of _merican engineering firms in Iran and Jifghanistano
Although the Iranian delegate to the United Nations was instructed
to place the problem on the agenda of the General Assembly, the
United States Government has arranged for consul?;tions to take
place between Iranian and Afghan officials in Washington where
the atmosphere and the availability of' expe:,ienced technical
advisers should be more conducive to a reasonable solutions
c'r r.TMT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET 2
II THE GEOGRAPHI ChL &ND HISTORICAL BACKCROUIM
A. The Helmand River Basin
The Helmand River originates in and flows for most of
its length through &fghanistan but empties into a depression
which extends across the Iranian-Afghan border, but lies largely
in the Iranian province of Sistan. It is the only stream in
eastern Iran and southwestern Afghanistan that does not dry up
during the summer. For this reason much of southern Afghanistan
and all of Sistan, which receive little rainfall, depend on the
Helmand for water to irrigate areas which otherwise would turn
into desert,
Reputedly rich and prosperous until the twelth century
.k.D.1, Sictan suffered severely at that time from the Mongol
inve.sicns> In 1362 Timur the Lame (Tamerlane) entered the
province and captured numerous villages but was repulsed. In
1383 he again entered Sistan end conquered the entire areao
The great dam at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, then known as the Band-i-
Rustam but later called the Band?-i Akva, was destroyed by Timur
2
or by his son Shah Rukh. The canal to the west leading to
Hauzdar and south to Godar-i-Shah was thus dried up and the river
made a new channel west from the site of the present Band-i-Sistan
dam pest Sehkoha (Tapa-i-Sehkuha).3
The Rud-i-Nasru remained the main stream after 1383 but.
the new channel which passed Sehkoha remained substantially as
it was until the 1830's. tit that. time the river suddenly
1. Major P. 11. Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, (New York,
1902) p, 363. In the ninth century A. D. the Saff d dynaoty went
forth from Sistan "to win an empire" and at that time Sistan ifc
described as follows.- "Some land in the vicinity of this city
(perhaps present-day Zabul) is barren and sandy, The air is very
warm, Here they hL ve dates-. there are no hills. In winter there
is no? snow.- in general there is a wind, and they have windmills
accordingly."
2, -!bid., p. 364.
3., See inset maps at end. These maps illustrate the condition
of the Helmand basin just before end after the destruction of the
Band-i Akva by, Timuro
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
abandoned the Sehkohc, channel and icrmed'another channel, this
time from the site of the modern dam Band-i-Sistan directly
northward past Nad-i "-li to the Homun (Laks),' The inhabitants,
in despair because most of central Sistc.n was left waterless,
finally succeeded in the 1840's in directing some water back into
the Sehkoha channel by building a mud dam, the Bend-i-Sistano
bout 1894 the river cut a new course halfway between the Rud-i-
Nasru and the NaOi>:.li channels, destroying a number of villages
1
near the Lake in so doingo Since 189'1 the Nod-i-kli branch, with
an elevation higher than the other channels of the Helmand Delta,
has held little water. as the Nad-si?4.1i Is the only branch
accessible to afghan cultivators in the Chc.khansur area, they are
the f irst and most seriously affected in low water periodso
Furrthermore the boundary commission in 1872 awarded Sistan west
of the Nad-i-Ali channel to the Persians, giving to Persia
practically all of the revenue-paying portion.
The-Helmand Delta has been constantly changing as a result
of accumulations of silt, and small new channels At present; out
through the area between Nasratabad (Zabul) and Chakhancur
(Chakansur).2 The large map at the end of this study shows more
.accurately the permanent water-holding hamuns or lakes and also
locates the marshy reed-covered area which is inundated yearly
during the flood season when the gree.i; E_amun may become a hundred
miles long and ten to fifteen miles wide. Below Ffhwabgab the
Band-i-Sistan dam diverts water from the main channels to the
old Sehkoha channel and attempts to stem the floodwaters of the
early summer from ruining the crops between Zabul and Nad--i .kli.
However, the dam.waches out yearly since it is constructed only
1- See inset maps at end.
2. The large map at the end d?nicts the Helmand Delta
as it was in 1944
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET 4
of mud and tamarisk branches and, consequently, in October
after the floods and severe summer winds have subsided, every
village in Iranian Sistan sends its quota of men to rebuild the
ruined dome it is obvious, therefore, that Iranian Si stern
normally suffers not from lack of water but from the devastation
of annual floods, i.e. from an excess of uncontrolled water. Even
in dry years Iranian Sistan receives most of the Helmand water
since the Nadi bli channel which waters the i ghan side is the,
first to dry ups
B. The Girishk krea
Girishk, the center of the 4fghan development projects
on the Helmand River, is ea town of 8,000 inhabitants located 70
miles west by north of Kandahar and 2n miles south of the junction
of the Helmand and Musa Kala Rivers where the helmand leaves the
mouu:;ains and begins its long passage around the Dasht-i-Margo
(desert) to Iranian Sistan, Girishk lies in a level gravel and
silt covered plain at an altitude , of approximately 2,5fO feet
and is located at the junction of several roads leading from
Kabul, Kandahar., Herat$ and, via the Helmand River Valley, from
Si.stan. Since the rainfall is no more than five inches annually,
minor irrigation ditches have existed for many years in the
Girishk area and to the southwest along the Helmand Consequently,
the region has long been one of the few fertile, cultivable
areas in southern itfghanistano
The Girishk project as initially
conceives: by the kfghan
Government was to consist ref a diversion dam located 4,,5 miles up
the Helmand River northeast of Girishk, with a hydroelectric
plant (capacity 6,280 kilowatts) located in the vicinity of the
dam. k canal was to lead off from the darn on the west side of
the river, pass southwestward between Girishk and the river and
1. 'ill E R-60-45, Kabul, .t gust 29, 1945, SECRET.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
continue southwesterly in a broad are which would turn to the
southeast and bring the canal back into the.Reimand approximately
50 miles downstream from the dam site. The canal was to parallel
the river. at a distance of a few miles, and the land to be
irrigated was the strip lying west of the Helmand between the
river and the canal, estimated at 44,500 acres*
The project was first proposed in the middle 1930's and
work was actually begun in 1937 under the direction of German
and Japanese engineers who accomplished little before they were
expelled during the war, the Germans in 1941 and the Japanese
in 1943, A number of engineering reports, estimates, and plans
were submitted by these engineers before they left and eight
miles of canal were partially constructed near Giri;:,hk.,,
Subsequently the work was supervised by the ! 1ghanc# them-
selves under the direction of an ,f,meriean-trained Afghan, Muhammad
Kabir Khan Ludin, who in 1944 was appointed _kcting hinister of
Public orks . Ludin was instrumental in hiring two americans,
John B. Alexander and Bruce Keesee,, as engineers in his Depart?-
ment and it was under the direction of Ludih and these two
M?mericans that work was carried on until the late summer of 196.3
Negotiations carried out in the summer of 1945 between the
Afghan Government and the Morrison-Knudsen Construction Company
of New York resulted in the signing of contracts for various
construction projects in Lfghanistan. N-K engineers and
construction men began arriving in Afghanistan in the ?arly
summer of 1946, but because of extreme difficulties in trans-
portation of construction equipment were able for several
mcnths to accomplish only the initial surveys.4
11 See large map at end.
2. V'D0 R??60-45, Kabul, August 29, 1915, SECRET,
3. Ibi_d
4. Memorandum cf conversation between M-K` official Dunn
and Department of State officers, dated Ii arch 18:, 1947, SECRET,,
SPCRBT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET 6
timong the construction projects proposed by the ifghan
Government was the Girishk canal and hydroelectric project.
Consequently, 14-I1 experts were detailed during the late summer
of 1946 to prepare studies of the area to be irrigated and to
investigate the practicality and cost of a storage reservoir on
1
the Helmand River somewhere northeast of Girishka Since that
time little actual construction has been completed, but M-K
engineers are continuing their surveys of the cultivable land
near Girishk, of the Helmand River water flow at various points
from Girishk to Sistan, of the water requirements of the canal
and the hydroelectric plant, and of a site for the contemplated
storage dam in the mountains above Girishk. Very few figures
have as yet been released by either the t,.fgha.n authorities or
by the PSI-K engineers but the few made available serve as a basis
for understanding the size and scope of the Girishk project, its
effect on the Giri shy area and on the Helmand River, and its
effect and relation to the water requirements of Iranian Sistan,,
C. Negotiations Concerning Control of the Helmand Waters
Before the death of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1747, Sistan
was unquestionably pert of Persia. lifter his death, mad Shah
Durrani, one of Nadir Shah"~s nfghan generals who made himself
king of 1..fghanistan, claimed and held Sist?.n as part of his
realm and for 125 years after his reign it was an hf ghan possession.
The last half century of r,fgh?n control was, however, no more
than nominal since at various times Sistan was in rebellion
against Kabul, or was held independently by an aspirant to the
bfghan throne.,
1Jevertheless, the territory was recognized as being under
In Memorandum of conversation between 14-K officials and.
Department of State o.fficc;rs, dated November 18, 1946, UNC .SSIFIEDo
S'gCRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
Afghan sovereignty, although the r.uth.ority of,the central
government over the area had been progressively weakened..
the 1860's, at a period when the 4.fghan Kingdom was split by a
contest for the throne, Persia took advarta:ge of Afghanistan's
weakness and sent troops to occupy Sistan. After Sher Aui finally
established himself on'the throne at Kabul in 1868, however, he sent
forces to recover Sistan and was successful in the initial stages
of the campaign. .tit that point the Persian Government appealed
to Great Britain to use its influence in halting the Afghan
forces. The British persuaded both parties to agree to an
arbitration of the dispute and in 1670 sent a mission to Sistan
under Major General Sir Frederic Goldsmid to survey the area and
then establish and demarcate the bc'rndaryo
Although GoT,damid's mission was hampered at'every turn by
local Persian officials determined to prove Persia 7 s right to
Sistan, the arbitral award gave to Persia most of the fertile area
of the Helmand, depression' by locating the Persian-k,,fghan
boundary on the easternmost channel of the Helmand deltao
Furthermore Goldsmid specified that "no works are to be carried
,out on either side oaleulaed to interfere' with the requisite
supply of water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmand?1
The evidence gathered by the Goldsmid mission regarding the
opposing claims to Sistan established a stronger case for Afghan
rather than for Persian sovereignty over the area. However,
British foreign policy at this period favored ctrengtheniag of
the Persian Government as a barrier to Ru.>s:ian aggression in the
Caucasus and Trans-Caspian regions, and therefore the award
lo Majors St. John,. Lovett, and Evan Smith, Eastern Persia;
An Account of the Journeys of the_ Persian-Boundary Commission,
ls ON ~Londos, 18i6~ p, 4 4~_ Coe Appendix 1,o _..._..M ._
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06 _ CIA-RDP08CO1297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECRET 8
was drafted to elicit Persian cooperation in resisting Czarist
jrussia. bell aware that the Afghans would acquiesce very
reluctantly to the boundary award, Goldsmid inserted the provision
regarding water supply to prevent the Afghans from cutting off
the flow of water to Sistan and thereby making the rrea a
desert,
In 1905 a slight change in the course of the Helmand
necessitated a second British mission, this time under Sir Henry
MacMahon, which made slight adjustments in the Irano-,afghan
Boundary. Since 1872, however, the problem of the Helmand River
waters has been extremely important between Iran and Afghanistan
because this river, the largest between the Tigris and the Indus,
flows almost its entire length in Afghanistan but empties into
and irrigates the most fertile section of southeastern Iran.
From that situation arises the present problem, for whatever
Afghanistan does that in any way affects the upper waters of
the Helmand Effects Iranian Sistan also. Both the Goldsmid
and the MacMahon awards are particularly important to this
study in that they establish not only Iran's right to a
requisite amount of water (the Goldsmid award) but define that
amount as "one third of the water which now reaches Sistan at
Bandar-i-=Kamal Khan" 1
(the D~iaelVZahon award). However, although
I the Goldsmid award was accepted by both countries the MaMMahon
award was accepted only by Afghanistan; Iran, while never
definitely rejecting it, did not accept it,
Between 1905 and the middle 1930's the question of the
Sistan water supply was settled by the two countries by the
appointment of a joint commission which, when drought made it
necessary, measured the Helmand water flow at Bandar--i-Karial Than
1, D-'114, Kabul, august 8, 1946, SECRET.,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000100130020-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7
SECI ET 9
and made the decision regarding the diversion of such waterol
On several occasions the afghan Goverment suggested to Iran that
a definite agreement be reached on the division of water and in
1933 the late i adir Shah of Afghanistan offered Iran a one-
half share of the Helmand River water reaching B?ndar-i-Kamal
Khan in place of the one-third shore recommended in the HOW=
cwerd. Negotiations which began in 1933 resulted in the joint
protocol of 19362 which incorporated Nadir Shah's offer and was
used as a basis for a temporary agreement signed in 1937,3
By December, 1938 a permanent agreement was drawl; up, signed
by the Upon IU is inter of Foreign nffai rs and the Iranian
Ambassador, and submitted to the two governmcnts for ratifi.cati.on?4
Difficulties arose over a deelaroticn annexed to the
Lgrocment by the Iranian ?m:b :ssador to t%c effect that the
lfghnns would not interfere with the requisite supply of water
for Sistan, The Afghan Foreign Minister urged the afghan
National assembly to accept the annex but the latter considered
it superfluous as the same provision was contained in the
hgreeme nt itself and, therefore, refused to accept it.5 The
l.greement with its annex was ratified by Iran but when that
country learned of the Afghan rejection of the annex the Majlis
in return rejected the Agreement::
1, Ao information is available regarding the basis on which
the water division was mcado at these t mes although the Iranian
Minister of Agriculture admitted recently that between 1900 and
1938 about four-fifth s- of the Helmend water was ueec by Iran
"because _fghnnistan had no use for itl D-485, Tehran,
September 5, 1947, UNCI. .:SSIFIE'D.
2, D-114, Kabul, august 8, 1946, SECRET, Enc. 1, See
Appendix C,
3, Ibid, Enc, 1, See Appendix D,
4,1 Ibid : , Lno. 2, See Appendix E