SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07S01968R000200450001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 21, 1976
• Content Type: NIE

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NCI FILES
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Secret
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
Li -
Soviet Military Policy
in the Third World
Secret
NIE 11-10-76
21 October 1976
Copy N.? 408
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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REL . . . ? This Information has been Authorized for
Release to . . .
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Sources and Methods Involved
Classified by 005827
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
NIE 11-10-76
SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
SECRET
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, Treasury, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community,
Vice Chairman
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administration
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the
Treasury
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS 1
I. INTRODUCTION 6
II. INSTRUMENTS OF POWER 8
A. Military Aid 8
Soviet Arms Exports
8
Air Delivery
11
Advisers
11
B. Aid to Insurgencies
15
C. Soviet Military Forces Deployed in Third World Areas
17
To Protect Maritime Interests
17
To Demonstrate Soviet Support to Third World Countries
17
To Inhibit Western Military Initiatives
17
To Strengthen Defenses of the USSR
18
D. Soviet Use of Naval and Air Facilities Overseas
19
Mediterranean
19
Indian Ocean
19
Atlantic
20
E. Merchant Marine and Fishing Fleet
20
F. Additional Soviet Forces Capable of Deployment to the Third World
in a Crisis
20
Air Defense
20
Airborne
21
Naval Infantry
21
Army Forces
21
Airlift Capabilities
21
Aeroflot
22
G. Other Limitations
22
Overflights and Staging
22
Capabilities Against Significant Opposition
22
III. THE USSR AND ITS THIRD WORLD CLIENTS
22
A. Middle East
22
Egypt
22
Syria
23
Palestine Liberation Organization
24
Libya
24
Algeria
25
III
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
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Morocco 25
Iraq 25
Iran 25
Arabian Peninsula 25
B. Africa 26
Angola
26
Mozambique
26
Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands
26
Tanzania
28
Somalia
28
Guinea
28
Mali
28
The Gambia and Senegal
28
Equatorial Guinea and Congo
29
Sudan
29
Uganda
29
Kenya
29
Nigeria
29
C. Asia
29
Collective Security
29
India
29
Afghanistan
31
Pakistan
31
Bangladesh
31
Southeast Asia
31
Vietnam
31
Laos
32
Singapore
32
Other Countries
32
Support for Liberation Groups
32
D. Latin America
32
Cuba
32
Other Countries
34
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
34
?A. Military Aid
35
B. Deployments, Force Developments, and Capabilities
35
Deployments
35
Force Trends
35
C. Geographic Emphasis
37
iv
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SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
KEY JUDGMENTS
A. The Soviets perceive the Third World as a primary arena for the
USSR's competition with the West and with China. Existing political
constellations and ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area
priorities;
?The Middle East will remain the major focus of Soviet military
activities in the Third World. As long as Soviet relations with
Egypt remain sour, Syria will continue to be the largest recipient
of Soviet military aid in the area. Moscow will probably
emphasize efforts in other Arab countries?Iraq, Libya, and
Algeria.
?Southern Africa is the area of greatest current potential for the
USSR. The Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to
exploit troubles there even though they will have little ability to
control or even predict developments.
?In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will continue to be the
focal points of Soviet military policy. Moscow apparently intends
to go on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not seem to
expect any major changes in Asia or Latin America in the
immediate future.
B. As they have been expanding their activities in the Third World,
the Soviets have seen a reduction in Western military presence and
influence there. The Soviets have given their highest priority to areas of
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strategic importance such as the Middle East but have also taken
advantage of opportunities to use their military activities to weaken the
West in areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola. While the Soviets
continue to support the spread of Communism, the ideology of
potential clients has not generally hampered the development of a
military relationship; pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet
guide in seeking new military relations.
C. There are a number of factors which inhibit growth of Soviet
military presence in the Third World:
?The intense nationalism of most Third World countries makes
them determined not to grant more than minimal use of facilities
for Soviet forces.
?Regional powers have emerged which are loath to see any outside
power play a dominant role.
?The Soviets are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the Third World
politics, changes in domestic regimes, and reversals in the
attitudes of local leaders.
?The Soviets have been able to make only limited advances in
competing with Western cultural, political, and economic
influence.
?The continued presence of US and other Western military forces
in the Third World remains an inhibition on Soviet military
activities.
D. Despite major setbacks in Indonesia, Egypt, and the Sudan, the
Soviets are convinced that their efforts in the Third World have
significantly 'increased Moscow's prestige and influence in world affairs
and have contributed to Soviet national security. The motivation of
Moscow's military activity is an aspect of its overall competition with
the West, expressed in the Third World in -efforts to weaken Western
military, economic, and political positions while strengthening those of
the USSR. Competition with China in this same arena reinforces this
motivation. Given Soviet persistence, it is extremely unlikely that any
future setbacks would cause the USSR to reverse course.
E. To achieve their objectives the Soviets use a variety of military
instruments in Third World countries. Military aid has been Moscow's
principal instrument, and its use is likely to increase. Over the last ten
years Moscow has signed some $15 billion worth of arms agreements,
and two thirds of that amount was negotiated in the last five years. The
Soviets have little interest in reaching agreements to restrain arms
deliveries. Their efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this
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instrument that they would regard restrictions on military aid as
drastically curtailing their opportunities.
F. In recent years, the Soviets have been exporting more of their
latest and best conventional equipment. Air defense missiles and
interceptors will continue to be among Moscow's best selling items.
Increasingly sophisticated weapons will require Third World clients to
rely more heavily on Moscow for spares, credits, and advisers to train
local personnel.
G. The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as instruments to
advance their position, and will support such groups as the PLO and
guerrilla movements in southern Africa. We believe that Moscow will
probably continue to act more boldly than in years past in support of
liberation movements. Moscow's confidence has been bolstered by its
current perception of Western disinclination to counter Soviet activities
in the Third World, its tested experience in supporting Cuban forces in
Africa, and its improved military capabilities. Soviet aid, often small in
absolute terms, can have a decisive effect in unstable situations such as
Angola. Soviet-Cuban cooperation in supporting a national liberation
movement there may be repeated if suitable opportunities arise, but
only when both countries judge such activity to be in their interest.
H. The Soviets deploy military forces to the Third World?primar-
ily naval and air?which share in potential wartime missions and
perform a variety of political and military roles by demonstrating Soviet
support to Third World countries. Barring serious long-term crises or
other unusual circumstances, Soviet general purpose naval deployments
will probably not increase greatly in numbers but will grow
significantly in capabilities. But Soviet air deployments to distant areas
will often require overflight and staging privileges which the USSR may
find difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain.
I. As Moscow's military presence in distant areas has increased,
Soviet needs for supporting facilities have risen. The Soviets will almost
certainly continue to seek access to facilities primarily in the
Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa and the Indian
Ocean.
?In the Mediterranean, we believe that Soviet prospects for
gaining access to facilities comparable to those they lost in Egypt
are dim.
?In the Atlantic, the Soviets probably hope to obtain port and air
facilities in Angola as a hedge against further troubles in Guinea.
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?Given the assets they have in Somalia, the Soviets have less
pressing requirements for additional facilities in the Indian
Ocean but will continue looking.
J. In Third World crises Soviet forces have been used to provide
assistance to the USSR's clients. The most extensive recent effort was in
Egypt in 1970 when the Soviets deployed, over a period of months,
aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet pilots and missile
crews operating under their own command and control network. The
Soviets have also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and provide
a visible symbol of Soviet support by interpositioning naval forces.
Nevertheless, Moscow will be careful to avoid actions which risk
precipitating a direct military confrontation with the US.
K. The Soviets have other military forces which could be employed
in the Third World. Although Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious
forces are designed primarily for operations near the USSR, their
training, coupled with the diversity and quality of their equipment,
gives them a capacity to act in crisis situations. The Soviets have never
conducted a military campaign in the Third World but, should they
decide to intervene rapidly on the ground, the Soviets could send
airborne units or small naval infantry contingents. Much larger ground
forces could be moved by the Soviet merchant marine if there were
enough time and no opposition.
L. Over the next decade, force improvements will continue to
enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients by supplementing local
defenses. The USSR will be able to make more credible demonstrations
of force and the Soviet navy will have better capabilities for
interposition. The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct
assault. But beyond the ramp of land-based air support, Soviet
capabilities will still be deficient to carry out an amphibious assault
against determined opposition by sizable armed forces. The Soviets will
face the same problems as today of limited air cover and assault lift and
vulnerable lines of communications.
M. Although Soviet capabilities for direct assault will remain
limited, that will not keep Moscow from continuing its efforts to
cultivate military relations with Third World countries and to support
insurgencies. Soviet involvement in conflicts in the Third World is
likely to take the form of interpositioning naval forces, participation of
advisers in combat, and the introduction of air defense units to assist a
client.
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Scope
This paper examines how the USSR uses military resources to
support Soviet policies in the Third World.' It assesses Soviet
propensities and capabilities for intervention and estimates future
trends.
1 The term -Third World- refers to free-world, less-developed countries, most of which are nonaligned.
We have included discussion of Soviet military relations with less developed Communist countries?Cuba,
North Korea, North Vietnam, and Laos?in cases where that was needed for a comprehensive view of
Soviet activities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Soviet leaders in their lifetime have seen an
impressive growth in Soviet military power and
influence in world affairs. They can remember vividly
the Soviet Union's weakness, isolation and insecurity
in the years before World War II. As their military
power grew in the postwar period, the Soviets began
to use their military resources not only for defense of
the USSR but also to seek positions of influence in the
Third World. In the mid-1950s the Soviets saw in
military as well as economic and diplomatic relations
with less developed countries a means of breaking the
"capitalist encirclement- of the USSR and of ending
Western monopoly of Third World resources. Despite
setbacks, the Soviets have continued to expand their
activities, which they believe have contributed to the
erosion of Western influence and power in the Third
World, and to the building up of their own.
2. At the same time as the Soviets have been
expanding their activities in the Third World they
have seen a reduction of the Western military presence
.overseas. Over the last 30 years Great Britain has
reduced what used to be a worldwide network of
colonies to a handful of military bases, the Portuguese
and the Dutch have dismantled their overseas
empires, and the French have yielded rule in most of
their former territories. The US has withdrawn from
Indochina and cut back its bases abroad and to a
lesser degree its commitments. Recently, the Soviets
saw their cooperation with Cuba in Angola succeed
without calling forth a military confrontation.
3. The decline in pro-Western attitudes in the Third
World over the past two decades has resulted in a
degree of receptivity to Soviet military initiatives.
Soviet support for the anti-colonial, anti-Western
positions of many Third World leaders has also
encouraged them to turn to the USSR for military
assistance. To exploit the opportunities created by
these trends the Soviets use military aid, advisers,
training, a deployed military presence, diplomatic
support, and aid to liberation movements:
?In support of liberation movements, we believe
that Moscow will probably continue to act more
boldly than in years past. Moscow's confidence
has been bolstered by its current perception of
Western disinclination to counter Soviet activities
in the Third World, its tested experiences in
supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and its
improved military capabilities.
?In local conflicts, the Soviets are also willing to
back their clients?even to the point of involving
limited numbers of Soviet personnel in the
fighting?but have been careful to avoid actions
which would risk precipitating direct military
confrontation with the US.
4. As a result of their efforts the Soviets have
expanded military relations in areas formerly tied to
the West and now use military facilities in Cuba,
Guinea, and Somalia. But the USSR has gained
substantial influence in only a handful of less-
developed countries. There are a number of factors
which inhibit an expanded Soviet presence in the
Third World:
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?The intense nationalism of most Third World
countries has made them determined not to grant
more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet
military forces, even in exchange for large
amounts of aid. The Soviets have been forced to
operate within the constraints imposed by re-
gimes sensitized, in part by the Soviets' own
propaganda, to any hints of foreign interference
or intervention in their affairs.
?Regional powers have emerged which are loath to
see any outside power play a dominant role.
These include such diverse countries as Iran,
India, and Vietnam. Moreover, regional associ-
.ations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin
America have discouraged member nations from
exclusive or even close ties with the Soviets.
?The Soviets have proven vulnerable to changes of
regime as in Indonesia and Ghana. They have
also proven unable to dissuade political leaders
who, for their own reasons, reversed their
previous dependence on Soviet support, as
President Sadat did in Egypt. Soviet efforts to
manipulate the internal politics of Third World
countries have often failed.
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?The Soviets have been able to make only limited
advances in competing with Western cultural,
political, and economic influence. Soviet markets
cannot absorb the bulk of Third World exports,
and these countries are well aware ,that Soviet
products are generally inferior. They have not
prevented the continued reliance of many coun-
tries on Western military support: Thus the
Soviets have often been unable to build on the
foothold created by their military activities and
aid to expand their influence in other fields.
?Finally, the continued presence of US and other
Western military forces in Third World areas
remains a curb on the activity of Soviet forces.
Western forces are generally more powerful, more
diversified, and more capable of rapid reinforce-
ment than those of the Soviets in these areas.
5. Another important factor in Soviet policy toward
the Third World is competition with China, primarily
in southern Africa and Southeast Asia. The Soviets feel
a continuing need to assert their leadership of the
international Communist movement and they believe
they should protect their interests in almost every area
in which the Chinese have or are expected to have
influence. The Soviets have supported more liberation
movements, provided more arms, and have deployed
more military forces to Third World areas than the
Chinese. China's inability to provide large amounts of
military aid or to deploy forces to distant areas has
given the Soviets an advantage. The disruptions of the
Cultural Revolution also weakened the Chinese
military aid program. Nonetheless, the Chinese have
successfully competed with the Soviets in a few
countries, such as Tanzania, and they will remain a
source of concern to Soviet leaders.
6. Moscow's search for wider influence in world
politics has been highly opportunistic:
?While the Soviets continue to support the spread
of Communism, the ideology of potential clients
has not generally hampered the development of a
military relationship. The basis of Moscow's
policy in the Third World since the mid-1950s
has been toleration of nonalignment. The test for
a potential client has been willingness to cooper-
ate with the USSR and not Marxist orthodoxy.
Indeed, Moscow has more than once courted
Third World leaders who believed that the best
place for local communists was in jail. To be sure,
once the Soviets establish a relationship with a
client country they generally encourage it to
adopt Soviet views and Soviet style institutions.
?Geographically, the Soviets have given their
highest priority to clients in areas of strategic
importance to the USSR such as the Middle East
and South Asia. Moscow has not, however,
confined its efforts to any particular area and the
USSR has taken advantage of opportunities in far
flung locations from Cuba to Angola. The level
of Soviet investment may not always be an
indication of expected payoffs. The Soviets
probably anticipate a higher rate of return from a
much smaller investment in southern Africa than
they do from their continued heavy spending in
Arab countries.
?Hope of economic gain has not been the primary
driving force in Soviet expansionism. After World
War II the Soviets did not go into the Third
World specifically in search of resources or trade,
nor did they expect their ventures to show
economic profits per se. On the contrary, Moscow
has spent heavily in its efforts to buy influence.
Nevertheless, the Soviets are becoming more
interested in some resources of Third World areas
and in earning hard currency in arms sales.
7. The Soviets will continue their efforts to support
their forces and protect their interests in distant areas.
In order to guarantee their air and sea lines of
communication, to protect vital imports and their
fishing fleet, and to improve the support of their
military forces?not only for peacetime operations but
also in the event of war?the Soviets will continue to
seek relationships with client states for access to ports
and airfields, overflight and staging rights, and other
privileges.
8. In sum, the motivation of Moscow's military
activity is an aspect of its overall competition with the
West, expressed in the Third World in efforts to
weaken Western military, economic and political
positions while strengthening those of the USSR.
Competition with China in this same arena reinforces
this motivation.
9. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force, believes that the
interpretation presented in paragraphs I through 8
minimizes both the increased propensity of the Soviet
Union to take international risks and the growing
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Soviet confidence in its ability to project military
power in the Third World. The statements and actions
of the Soviet leaders reflect their belief that the
international "correlation of forces- clearly favors the
interests and the objectives of the USSR. Soviet
behavior since the October 1973 Middle East war
demonstrates that Moscow is willing to select from an
ever expanding choice of conflict options. The Soviet
concept of "imperialism" views Western economic
relationships with the Third World as becoming
increasingly vulnerable. The growth in Soviet conven-
tional and strategic capabilities offers the USSR an
opportunity to manipulate those vulnerabilities to its
own advantage.
II. INSTRUMENTS OF POWER
10. The USSR has a variety of military resources it
can use to support its policies in the Third World:
?The most extensive use of Soviet military assets in
the Third World has been in the provision of
military assistance. Soviet aid includes equip-
ment, technicians and advisers, and training of
military personnel in the USSR. The Soviets
provide assistance to guerrilla movements as well
as to governments.
?Soviet naval presence in distant areas has been
used to demonstrate Soviet support for client
countries and to discourage outside intervention.
At the same time, Soviet military use of facilities
in Third World countries?often obtained follow-
ing Soviet military assistance?can improve So-
viet capabilities against the US.
?Finally, the Soviets have forces in the USSR
which could be used to intervene in a local
conflict.
A. Military Aid
11. Military assistance has played some role in most
of the relationships which the USSR has established
with less developed countries and has been a crucial
element in Moscow's most, important links to the
Third World. Over the last ten years, Soviet arms
agreements with all Third World countries have
totaled around $15.3 billion (see Table I). Of this
amount, over twice as much has been with non-
communist Third World countries ($11.2 billion) as
with Communist ones ($4.2 billion). Moreover, Soviet
arms agreements during the first half of this decade
($10.1 billion) were almost twice the level of the late
1960s ($5.2 billion). Deliveries have also increased
sharply, running about $8.4 billion during 1971-1975
as opposed to $5.3 billion in the previous five year
period (see Table II). More than half of the arms
deliveries in the last five years have been to the
Middle East.'
12. As these figures suggest, there is normally a time
lag between conclusion of an agreement and comple-
tion of deliveries. Moreover, some recipients have
canceled contracts or simply not drawn down the
agreed amount within the time specified in the
agreement, often complaining of delayed deliveries,
inadequate supply of spare parts, etc. In other cases,
the Soviets themselves have canceled the arrangement
for political reasons.
13. Normally credits for Soviet military aid have
been extended on lenient terms, typically at 2 or 2?
percent annual interest with eight to ten years to
repay. Despite the leniency of the repayment terms,
the Soviet leadership has shown a preference for
extending the grace period or rescheduling the debt of
hard-pressed clients, rather than excusing the debts
outright. In a few cases cash down payments have
been required. Increasingly, the Soviet leadership has
required cash payment for military goods.
14. Soviet Arms Exports. In recent years, the Soviets
have been exporting more of their latest and best
equipment; at times the most favored of Moscow's
Third World clientele compete with Warsaw Pact
countries and even with Soviet forces for the
distribution of some of the world's most modern
conventional armaments. A variety of factors have
contributed to the change:
?the military needs of Third World customers such
as the Arab countries have risen sharply;
?some clients want sophisticated gear for the
prestige it affords, even though their forces
cannot absorb it;
The estimated values for Soviet agreements and deliveries cited
in this Estimate and its accompanying tables and annexes are
minimum figures derived by using the aggregate values (at Soviet
trade prices) of agreements known, or by pricing the materiel
delivered through analogous prices noted in the arms agreements
between the USSR and Third World countries. Soviet trade prices
do not represent either production costs in the USSR or value in the
US market.
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TABLE I
SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD
1960-75
(Million US Dollars)
1966-75
1966-70
1971-75
Total
$15,333
$5,231
$10,102
Middle East
7,660
1,980
5,880
Egypt
2,260
975
1,285
Iran
826
325
501
Iraq
1,485
371
1,114
Lebanon
4
Negl.
4
Libya
855
35
820
Syria
2,239
240
1,999
Yemen (Aden)
137
17
120
Yemen (Sana)
54
17
37
South Asia
1,782
679
1,103
Afghanistan
357
88
269
Bangladesh
35
?
35
Burma
Negl.
Negl.
--
India
1,307
525
782
Pakistan
70
66
4
Sri Lanka
13
?
13
Pacific
3,880
2,259
1,621
Cambodia
8
8
?
Indonesia
10
10
Negl.
Laos
1
?
1
North Korea
, 883
376
507
North Vietnam
2,978
1,865
1,113
Africa
1,369
193
1,176
Algeria
600
50
550
Angola
131
?
131
Burundi
Negl.
Negl,
Negl.
Cameroon
Negl.
Negl.
?
Central African Republic
8
2
6
Chad
2
?
2
Congo
32
12
20
Equitorial Guinea
6
2
4
Ethiopia
3
2
1
Gambia
Negl.
?
Negl.
Guinea
40
Negl.
40
Guinea-Bissau
Negl.
?
Negl.
Malagasy Republic
1
?
1
Mali
17
?
17
Morocco
63
2
61
Mozambique
16
?
16
Nigeria
75
25
50
Sierra Leone
Negl.
?
Negl.
Somalia
150
11
139
Sudan
87
85
2
Tanzania
76
2
74
Uganda
50
?
50
Zambia
12
?
12
Latin America
442
120
322
Cuba
309
120
189
Peru
133
133
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TABLE II
SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD
1966-75
(Million US Dollars)
Total
Middle East
1966-75
1966-70
1971-75
$13,662
$5,297
$8,365
6,879
1,830
5,049
Egypt
2,475
1,100
1,375
Iran
555
193
362
Iraq
1,357
291
1,066
Lebanon
4
Negl.
4
Libya
398
35
363
Syria
1,951
186
1,765
Yemen (Aden)
114
8
106
Yemen (Sana)
25
17
8
South Asia
1,754
822
932
Afghanistan
305
160
145
Bangladesh
35
?
35
Burma
Negl.
- ?
Negl.
India
1,375
641
734
Pakistan
26
21
5
Sri Lanka
13
?
13
Pacific
3,876
2,255
1,621
Cambodia
10
10
?
Indonesia
4
4
?
Laos
1
?
1
North Korea
883
376
507
North Vietnam
2,978
1,865
1,113
Africa
760
270
490
Algeria
245
152
93
Angola
56
?
56
Burundi
Negl.
Negl.
?
Cameroon
Negl.
Negl.
Central African Republic
3
?
3
Chad
2
?
2
Congo
7
3
4
Equatorial Guinea
6
Negl.
6
Ethiopia
3
2
1
Gambia
Negl.
?
Negl.
Guinea
40
4
36
Guinea-Bissau
Negl.
?
Negl.
Mali
14
2
12
Morocco
16
2
14
Mozambique
12
?
12
Nigeria
64
25
39
Sierra Leone
Negl.
?
Negl.
Somalia
140
21
119
Sudan
82
51
31
Tanzania
7
2
5
Uganda
54
6
48
Zambia
9
?
9
Latin America
393
120
273
Cuba
309
120
189
Peru
84
84
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?in some areas the Soviets must compete with the
technology available in Western markets;
?the Soviets have welcomed the chance to test new
equipment on the battlefield, e.g., the SA-6 in
Egypt and Syria.
15. Interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles
have been among the military hardware most sought
after by Third World clients. Because of their
complexity, these systems require more training than
most other weapons. This has provided the Soviets
with an opportunity to send large numbers of advisers
abroad and for training Third World military person-
nel in the USSR. Air defense systems have been sent,
for example, to Afghanistan;Algeria, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, North Vietnam,
Somalia, and Syria, and most of them have had their
air defense personnel trained in the USSR. Export of
air defense systems has brought the USSR into the
closest relations with clients involved in local con-
flicts; Soviet personnel associated with air defenses
have engaged in combat activity in North Vietnam,
North Korea, North Yemen, Syria, and Egypt.
16. Arms deliveries to Third World clients thus far
have covered a wide range of non-nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the USSR exported jet fighters as early as
1950, and was the first exporter of supersonic jet
fighters (1959), surface-to-air missiles (1961), missile
patrol boats (1961), and self-propelled radar-con-
trolled antiaircraft guns (1970). In recent years
FROGs and Scud missiles?almost certainly equipped
with conventional warheads?have been delivered to
Middle East countries. However, in order to keep
some of their most sophisticated electronics from
Western hands, the Soviets often ship weapons
systems with less than their best electronics. Because
the Soviets draw upon an arsenal of weapons created
in the first instance for Soviet forces, changes in that
arsenal are reflected in Soviet exports. Perhaps the
greatest improvement in Soviet exports has been in
tactical fighters which now have capabilities for
ground attack of a quality heretofore lacking in Soviet
aircraft.
17. Air Delivery. When Soviet policy requires, the
aid process can be rapid. During the past ten years the
Soviets have shown an increasing propensity to use
airlift as a means of getting high-priority military
assistance to clients quickly, thus demonstrating their
willingness and ability to help when needed.
18. Over the past ten years, the Soviets have gained
increased experience in overseas airlift. The most
notable of these operations included:
?After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets made
350 flights in four weeks to resupply Arab forces.
?The Soviets airlifted supplies to Nigeria in the
late 1960s to support that government in its civil
war against Biafra.
?During the 1970 -War of Attrition,- Military
Transport Aviation (VTA) was instrumental in
the buildup and support of Soviet and Egyptian
air defense units. In addition to personnel,
ammunition, and SAMs, the Soviets probably
also transported fighters and missile launchers.
?In 1970 the Soviets attempted to stage an airlift
to Peru to provide disaster relief. It arrived late
and suffered the loss of an AN-22 Cock.
?Prior to the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, the
Soviets conducted a small airlift to India (via
Egypt and South Yemen).
?While the October 1973 war in the Middle East
was in progress, the Soviets mounted about 800
flights, followed by some 120 more flights during
the remainder of the month. The 1973 operation
demonstrated VTA's ability to act quickly and
effectively in a crisis situation near the USSR.
While this airlift was the most extensive ever
attempted by the Soviets, it used only half of
VTA's aircraft and virtually none of Aeroflot's,
the Soviet national airline.
19. The most recent demonstration of Soviet
overseas airlift capabilities has been in Angola. From
late October 1975 through February 1976, more than
35 VTA aircraft conducted nearly 70 round trip flights
to deliver weapons and supplies to MPLA forces in
Angola. Fifty-five of the flights were made by AN-22s
and the remainder by AN-12s. The latter staged
through Hungary, Algeria, Mali, and Guinea and
ultimately unloaded either at Brazzaville in Congo or
Luanda itself, while the AN-22s usually made two
enroute stops. Moreover, concurrently with the Ango-
lan airlift, VTA also flew 15 round trip missions to
South Yemen.
20. Advisers. Soviet personnel accompany most
deliveries of military equipment (see Table III). They
assemble and set up equipment, train local personnel,
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TABLE III
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN THIRD
WORLD COUNTRIES
1970-75'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Total
13,125
12,450
12,660
9,020
9,780
10,090 3
Middle East
EgyPt
6,500
5,500
5,500 4
520 5
200
215
Iran
30
30
30
60
75
70
Iraq
320
400
500
785
1,035
1,035
Libya
?
20
20
10
145
345
Morocco
20
?
?
10
?
10
Syria
750
800
1,140
1,780
2,150
3,050
Yemen (Aden)
120
180
210
225
260
260
Yerrien (Sana)
100
100
100
130
120
120
South Asia
Afghanistan.
160
160
. 200
425
425
350
Bangladesh
?
?
?
100
50
35
India
150
150
220
300
300
300
Pakistan
10
?
?
.?
?
Sri Lanka
?
85
5
?
15
Southeast Asia
Lao S
?
?
?
?
?
300-500
Vietnam
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A. ,
400-500
Africa
Algeria
1,000
1,000
1,000
650
650
650
Central African
Republic
?
?
?
?
10
Chad
?
?
?
?
?
5
Congo
15
30
30
30
30
306
Equatorial Guinea
?
10
10
10
10
30
Guinea
65
80
110
110
110
110
Guinea-Bissau
?
?
?
. ?
?
65
Mali
30
15
10
45
15
35
Mozambique
?
?
?
?
?
25
Nigeria
50
70
70
70
60
45
Somalia
250
300
400
700
1,000
1,000
Sudan
500
500
100
20
90
80
Tanzania
10
10
?
?
5
55
Uganda
45
10
5
25
30
100
Zambia
?
?
?
?
?
10
Latin America
Peru
?
?
?
15
20
35
Cuba
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
2,000
East European technicians are estimated to account for about 10 percent of the total and, more often
than not, are salaried under Soviet account.
2 Minimum estimates of persons present for a period of one month or more. Soviet technicians in North
Korea are not included.
3 Excluding Southeast Asia.
4 By the end of 1972, only about 100 Soviet technicians remained in the country.
5 Most of these arrived with equipment supplied after the outbreak of the October war.
6 300 additional Soviet military technicians were in Congo associated with arms deliveries to Angola. The
Soviet technicians in Angola are excluded because it was not an established government.
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Soviet Arms Deliveries to the Third World, 1966- e *if
SECRET
A tiqq0(..-e fkk,
Greenland
(Den.)
Soviet Union
Canada
Ir
Poland
C.
U.S. t),
Andorra
Monac
Vatica
United States
Portugal
? G e
. Malta
unisia
rocco
Cyprus,Leaib
Israe
Mexico
?k) ik
LPCCOPIkf'
ri over $1,000 million
I ii $500-$1,000 million
$100-$500 million
Less than $100 million
I
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Guate
El Salvador
The Bahamas
?1
Cuba 5. ' \
?i,:.... ^
. .- Dominican Republic
c::,,aitZE:
c, ?
Belize(U.K.) Jamaica
HdiTduras
Costa Rica
t..
aragua
Pa am
Canal Zone
(U.S.)
Cif
:Barbados
? Grenada
n'Trinidad and Tobago
uyana
S rinam
.)q ch Guiana (Fr.)
Brazil
West
Sa
Cape Verde.: ? Se
The Gambia
Guinea--
Bissau
Sierra
Leone
Liberia
Algeria
Egypt
Mauritania
Kuwait
Saudi U.A.E.
Arabia
Oman
Guinea
Uru uay
per
Volta
Ivory
oast
Gao
nin
Nigeria
Togo
Sao Tome and Principe
k4imaik
ul*
(0. C:Ati
Sudan
Equatorial
Guinea
Gabon
Vsi.ri;ixen
(Aden)
Ethiopia
Ug a
Kenya
nda
urundi
Tanzania
Cong. Zaire
IF
Somalia
Maldivqs
Sri Lanka
Thaila
ong Kong (U.K.)
itnamN?Macao (Port)
.
Vietnam
a
jphilippines
Angola
..Comoros
?
000.,;f=.7?;
Japan
Zambia
(I
uth-West
Africa
I. Terr.
otswan
outhe
hode
U.K.
South
Africa
ascar
,Mauritius
Mozambique
waziland
bitho
Australia
C.A.R. ?Central African Republic
F.R.G. ?Federal Republic of Germany
F.T.A.I. ?French Territory of the Afars and Issas
G.D.R. ?German Democratic Republic
U.A.E. ?United Arab Emirates
Mc/A-4/k
Lii-tca/%14
a(fa,,qck
? ???ii
?
.Nauru?
b5,
?
Western
Samoa,?
?Fiji
_Tonga
New t?/9
Zealand
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NOFORN
571120 10-76 CIA
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and generally work closely with and attempt to
influence the military of the host country.
21. The results of the Soviet advisory effort have not
always been successful. While the military personnel
of client states probably realize that the training and
expertise offered by the Soviets, especially in ad-
vanced weaponry, are indispensable, there have been
frictions. Some Third World military personnel have
charged that Soviet advisers often are arrogant or
indifferent, have involved themselves in local political
activities, or have been slow in providing the full
range of training required for the most sophisticated
equipment.
22. The total number of Soviet and East European
advisers in the Third World has declined over the past
five years because of withdrawals from North Vietnam
and the expulsion from Egypt. Elsewhere they have
increased. The countries that show the most, signifi-
cant increases are Iraq, Somalia, Libya, and Syria.
23. Soviet training of Third World military person-
nel in the USSR is also increasing. Since 1971, the
number of countries sending personnel to the USSR
has about trebled, and the number of personnel being
trained there has also shown a large increase to almost
4,000 (see Table IV). Much of the training in the
USSR is on advanced weaponry. However, these
training periods also enable the Soviets to emphasize
Soviet military doctrine and to promote some affinity
with the potential leaders of Third World countries-
-many of which have military regimes. While there
are frictions connected with some of this training, in
part related to the austerity, cultural barriers, and
other rigors of life in the USSR, the Soviets do feel that
these programs provide important opportunities to
make their influence felt in the Third World.
B. Aid to Insurgencies
24. The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as
instruments to advance their position in the Third
World. Over the past 20 years, however, the USSR has
developed extensive relations with established govern-
ments which can do more for the Soviet Union than
insurgents whose prospects for power are uncertain.
Nevertheless, the importance of Soviet assistance to
revolutionary movements in unstable areas has been
underscored by the civil war in Angola and the
prospects for further trouble in sub-Saharan Africa.
While their assistance to Angola was small in absolute
terms, it had a decisive impact in an unstable
situation.
25. In its relations with the West, the Soviet Union
has sought to separate its support for insurgencies in
the Third World from its policy of seeking East-West
detente. The Soviets argue there is no contradiction
between the two, and seek to dampen or minimize
Western reaction to their actions. In its dealings with
the Third World Moscow has benefited from its
assertion that national liberation struggle is a form of
-just war- and from its identification of Soviet
communism with anticolonialism.
26. While the Soviets prefer to support left-leaning
radical movements, they do not follow any rigorous
ideological standards in granting aid to insurgents.
Instead, pragmatism and opportunism prevail. The
Soviets do not insist on total control of the guerrilla
movements they support. They consider it sufficient
that the insurgents share a common interest with them
in weakening the position of a local government and
diluting Western or Chinese influence and presence.
Broad Soviet objectives are thus often served with only
marginal control or participation in a movement.
27. Moscow's initial investments in guerrilla move-
ments tend to be small and spread rather widely.
Minimal at inception, such aid may develop at a pace
and scope conditioned by a broad range of consider-
ations, the most important of which has been the
USSR's assessment of a movement's chances for
success.
28. The characteristic Soviet pattern of arms
support for a guerrilla movement is first indirect and
then direct. The Soviets have usually chosen to try to
conceal their direct involvement during the early
stages of an insurgency by supplying the guerrillas
through third countries. If a movement subsequently
demonstrates cohesiveness and shows promise, Mos-
cow may risk increasing its visibility and become
directly involved.
29. During the advanced stages of an insurgency,
Soviet shipments of military equipment are routed
directly to guerrillas. These shipments are typically
delivered to the ports of sympathetic third countries
and picked up at dockside by guerrilla representatives.
For example, Soviet aid for the insurgent movements
in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola was
initially routed through the governments of Guinea
and Tanzania. By 1973, shipments of increasingly
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TABLE IV
MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN
THE USSR
1955-75
1955-75
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Total
37,4951
660
2,320
2,155
3,400
3,965*
Middle East
Egypt
5,665
300
220
100
?
Iran
280
?
25
15
35
35
Iraq
2,950
40
145
350
700
250
Libya
900
?
?
300
600
Syria
3,325
50
530
700
530
300
Yemen (Aden)
735
25
120
65
180
180
Yemen (Sana)
1,055
?
?
15
75
100
South Asia
Afghanistan
3,305
150
200
355
410
300
Bangladesh
395
?
250
65
65
15
India
2,085
170
115
305
100
Pakistan
45
?
?
5
?
Sri Lanka
5
?
?.5
Pacific
Cambodia
30
?
?
Indonesia
7,560
?
5
?
Africa
Algeria
1,970
?
?
50
Burundi
75
?
?
40
35
Congo
335
15
?
?
?
Equatorial Guinea
200
?
?
200
Ghana
180
?
?
?
?
Guinea
840
185
70
15
70
Guinea-Bissau
100 '
?
?
?
100
Mali
200
50
Morocco
75
?
75
Mozambique
210
?
?
?
210
Nigeria
465
20
?
75
175
100
Somalia
2,375
60
450
?
150
500
Sudan
310
?
?
?
?
Tanzania
885
?
145
400
Uganda
665
?
190
200
100
Zambia
35
25
?
10
?
Latin America
Peru
250
100
100
* Data refer to the estimated minimum number of persons departing for training, and includes some that
were still undergoing training as of the end of 1975. Figures for Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and
Laos are unavailable.
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sophisticated equiprhent were delivered to ports in
Guinea and Tanzania by Soviet ships, and picked up
there by guerrilla representatives.
C. Soviet Military Forces Deployed in
Third World Areas
30. Soviet military forces?primarily naval and
air?complement military aid in the pursuit of Soviet
policy objectives .in the Third World. These forces
contribute to the defense of the USSR, and perform a
variety of political and military roles, such as showing
off Soviet military might through port visits, asserting
Soviet rights on the high seas, protecting maritime
interests, demonstrating support of their Third World
clients, and inhibiting Western military initiatives.'
31. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the
Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department
of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe
that the Soviets' deployed naval forces also provide
them with the capability to threaten shipping to
Western countries which are highly dependent on
imports of Third World resources such as oil and other
critical materials. The Soviets are unlikely to use force
to interdict trade in peacetime?since to do so would
invite retaliation and risk of war?but the very
existence of a Soviet capability could be a psychologi-
cal factor in crisis situations, even if the Soviets make
no direct threat.
32. The Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency believe that, in the absence of a
direct Soviet threat, any implicit risk to Western
shipping posed by Soviet naval forces in Third World
areas would not significantly affect Western responses
to a crisis. During the 1973-74 energy crisis, for
example, developed countries heavily dependent on
overseas resources were far more responsive to the
policies of Third World producers than to Soviet
actions. Although Western countries would take
Soviet forces into account in a future crisis, they
probably would regard the Soviets as deterred from
active interference with their shipping both by the
presence of sizable Western naval forces and by the
danger of escalation.
3 NIE 11-15-74,"Soviet Naval Policy and Programs," discusses
Soviet naval activities in support of foreign policy objectives.
33. To Protect Maritime Interests. Soviet merchant
vessels and fishing ships have from time to time
violated other countries' territorial waters, and there
have been incidents between Soviet crews and foreign
nationals in ports. These incidents are rare and have
generally been resolved through diplomatic channels.
When Soviet merchant vessels were detained by local
authorities?for example, in Ghana in 1969 and in
Libya in early 1974?Soviet naval ships supplemented
diplomatic initiatives by taking up positions offshore.
34. To Demonstrate Soviet Support to Third World
Countries. The Soviet navy has been used in low-risk
situations to show support to client states:
?In the spring of 1970, the Soviets made prolonged
port calls at Mogadiscio to demonstrate support
to the Somali regime, then under threat of being
overthrown.
?In December 1970, the Soviets established a
naval presence off the coast of Guinea to
demonstrate backing for President Sekou Toure
against an attack on Conakry. In the ensuing
years, the Soviet naval presence there took on a
permanent character.
35. On the other hand, the Soviets are aware that
the presence of their naval units in the Third World
can expose Moscow to undesirable risks at times of
crisis. Thus, on October 5, 1973, Soviet ships in Port
Said and Mersa Matruh in Egypt put out to sea,
presumably to avoid becoming involved in the then
imminent hostilities between Egypt and Israel.
36. To Inhibit Western Military Initiatives. In
periods of tension the Soviets have endeavored to
deter possible US action against a Soviet client and to
provide a visible symbol of Soviet concern by
interpositioning naval forces.
?During the May/June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the
Soviets increased the number of missile-launch-
ing surface ships in the Mediterranean from two
to five and used them to trail one British and two
US carriers.
17
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?During the Jordanian crisis in September-October
1970, Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean
increased, and their ships took up positions in
close proximity to those of the US.
?In December 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani
war, the US and USSR deployed additional naval
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Operations of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces
Outside Home Waters, 1965-75?
Ship-daysi5
35,000
25.000
15.000
5.000
7 N
Indian Ocean
Caribbean
Sea
Pacific Ocean
West African
__Waters
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea
1965 66 67 68 69 70
71 72 73 74 75
Mine clearing activity in the Gulf of Suez
Harbor clearing activity in Bangladesh
'Excludes ecOVides of belhitic mbsil e subminines and oceerongraphic and vasCe swport ships
571132 1876 CIA
forces to the Indian Ocean. Following the arrival
of the USS Enterprise, four Soviet cruise-missile-
equipped units reached the scene. The Soviets
maintained surveillance of both US and British
naval forces.
?During the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the
Soviets doubled their forces in the Mediterranean
and increased surveillance of the US Sixth Fleet.
In effect, this gave notice that the risks attending
a direct US intervention in support of Israel had
risen. Soviet warships also could have provided
protection to Soviet merchant ships sailing to
Egyptian and Syrian ports.
?To back up the Cuban intervention in Angola in
late 1975 and early 1976, the Soviets augmented
their naval combatants off the west coast of
Africa. This augmentation included a guided
missile cruiser supported by increased ocean
surveillance from satellites and TU-95s flying
from Conakry and Havana.
37. Soviet capabilities to interposition naval forces
depend upon availability of ships in nearby waters
and the time required for reinforcement:
?In the Mediterranean, the Soviets now maintain
about 11 major surface combatants and ten
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submarines. In the Indian Ocean they usually
have three or four major surface combatants and
one submarine. Elsewhere, one or two warships
are on patrol off West Africa, and a varying
number of warships and submarines are normally
underway in the Atlantic and Pacific in transit.
?Surface ships in the Mediterranean can be
quickly reinforced from the Black Sea (the Soviets
file contingency declarations in accordance with
the Montreux Convention to pass the Turkish
Straits). Submarine reinforcement from the
Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean takes
substantially longer?some ten days at a mini-
mum. Movements from the Pacific Fleet to the
northern Indian Ocean take even more time.
38. To Strengthen Defenses of the USSR. Military
involvement in the Third World also contributes to
the USSR's efforts to strengthen its overall military
position. Since the 1950s the Soviet navy has extended
its operations from nearby coastal waters into ocean
areas. This facilitates their anticarrier and antisubmar-
ine (ASW) missions.4
The platforms and tactics developed by the Soviets to oppose
Western naval forces and carriers in particular are treated in NIE
11-15-74, pp. 20-23.
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39. Since 1968, the Soviets have sought to operate
their ASW, reconnaissance, and?in one instance?
strike aircraft from Third World countries. In recent
years, they have conducted only reconnaissance
missions. Primary targets of Soviet surveillance are US
aircraft carriers in their transit lanes to and from
operating areas. US carriers are also reconnoitered by
aircraft flying from the USSR and by ocean surveil-
lance satellites. Despite the improvements in satellite
capabilities, the Soviets probably consider the flexibil-
ity and timeliness of forward-based reconnaissance
aircraft to be valuable in monitoring US naval
operations. We expect that they will continue to
attempt to expand air operations from Third World
facilities.
D. Soviet Use of Naval and Air
Facilities Overseas
40. As their presence in distant areas and their needs
for support have risen, the Soviets have sought access
to foreign shore facilities for logistics purposes, major
repairs, communications, and support of, aircraft
deployments. The Soviets use communications facili-
ties in the Middle East, Cuba, and Somalia. These
facilities supplement improvements in command and
control the Soviets have made through communica-
tions satellites, airborne command posts, and com-
mand and control ships. The Soviet navy's moves
toward greater use of foreign facilities have been
cautious, and at this time Soviet surface ship
deployments probably could be sustained essentially
at current levels without access to foreign facilities.
41. Mediterranean, The Soviets established a
submarine base in Albania in 1958 but were expelled
in 1961. A campaign to obtain access to facilities in
Egypt bore fruit as a result of Soviet aid during the
1967 Arab-Israeli war. In 1968 Nasser granted the
Soviets exclusive use and control of portions of
facilities in Egyptian ports for major ship repairs and
replenishment, and in Egyptian airfields to station
and operate naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft.
The Soviets also stationed missile strike aircraft in
Egypt, but these were never operated over the
Mediterranean and were eventually turned over to the
Egyptians. In 1972 Sadat terminated these opera-
tional air activities and restricted Soviet use of
Egyptian naval facilities. By April 1976 he ended all
Soviet use of Egyptian ports and anchorages. Cur-
rently the Soviets can only use Egyptian airfields for
airlifts to Egypt and other countries.
42. Operating under various limitations Soviet
naval units currently use ports in Syria and Yugosla-
via. Since 1972 Moscow has maintained two or three
reconnaissance-configured Cub aircraft in Syria which
have been used solely in support of the Syrians against
Israel.
43. The Soviets are seeking greater access to naval
facilities throughout the Mediterranean. For the near
term, we believe that Soviet prospects for the kind of
controlled access to MediterraneanIshore facilities that
they desire for substantial repairs and sustained
replenishment are dim except in Yugoslavia, where
Moscow's prospects are marginally better but still
problematic. Syria may be the next best bet, but, like
Yugoslavia, Syria continues to insist on restricting
Soviet use of and access to its limited port facilities.
Moreover, Syrian-Soviet relations continue to deterio-
rate over Lebanon.'
44. Indian Ocean. Soviet naval units routinely
receive logistic support at Berbera in Somalia, and to a
lesser degree at Umm Qasr and Basra in Iraq and at
Aden in South Yemen. Only in Somalia have the
Soviets constructed facilities for their own use. At
Berbera they have built barracks and a communica-
tions relay facility for their exclusive use. They have
built a missile-handling and support facility which
apparently will service Styx missiles for the Somali
navy but in the future is expected to handle more
modern cruise missiles for the Soviet navy. The facility
could also service and stock surface-to-air and air-to-
surface missiles as well as other types of naval
ordnance. They have brought in a floating drydock
which substantially increases Soviet naval repair
capabilities. Finally they could have access to the
POL storage facility at Berbera whose capacity the
Soviets have doubled.
45. The Soviets are building, albeit slowly, an
airstrip at Berbera which, when completed, will be
capable of supporting all types of Soviet aircraft. The
Soviets are also improving several other fields in
Somalia which their aircraft could use. The Soviets
have occasionally used Somali airfields at Hargeisa
and Mogadiscio and the airfield at Aden in South
Yemen to operate IL-38 ASW and AN-12 reconnais-
sance aircraft over the Indian Ocean. In October
1976, the Soviets began deploying TU-95 Bear
5 See JIM -Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean
Shore Facilities,- August 2, 1976, for further details.
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reconnaissance aircraft to Somalia. These aircraft can
cover all shipping lanes from the Cape of Good Hope
to the Straits of Malacca.
46. The Soviets may increase the frequency and
regularity of such deployments if they do not
encounter difficulties in obtaining overflight clear-
ances. They could also deploy naval strike aircraft to
Somalia after the airfield at Berbera is completed.
Currently, the Soviets could send such aircraft to
Somalia during a crisis to operate from the fields near
Mogadiscio and Chisimaio.
47. The Soviets are aware of the desire of some
littoral countries to curtail great power presence, and
Brezhnev has publicly denied that the USSR has or
wants to have any base in the Indian Ocean. While
the Soviets have given sympathetic public treatment
of the idea of an Indian Ocean -Peace Zone,- there is
no indication that Moscow will abandon its facility in
Berbera or yield on the principle of freedom of
navigation in the Indian Ocean.
48. Atlantic. The Soviet use of port and air facilities
in the Atlantic has centered on Cuba and Guinea.
Periodic and often simultaneous reconnaissance flights
by TU-95 Bear aircraft from Havana and Conakry
permit the Soviets to monitor some shipping as well as
Western naval operations, particularly in US carrier
transit lanes.
49. In 1970 the Cubans built for the Soviets a
housing and recreation area on an island in Cien-
fuegos Bay. The Soviets installed submarine nets and
brought in a rescue tug and two special-purpose
barges of a type that is used in servicing nuclear
submarines at naval bases and shipyards in the USSR.
Apparently the Soviets intended to use Cienfuegos for
regular support of Soviet nuclear-powered sub-
marines?including SSBNs?deployed to the Atlantic
but were deterred by Washington's sharp reaction. To
date no Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have used
the support facilities or barges at Cienfuegos, al-
though nuclear-powered attack submarines have
called at Cienfuegos as well as other Cuban ports. The
barges have been recently moved to Havana, possibly
for repairs and return to Cienfuegos, or possibly in
preparation for being shipped back to the USSR.
50. Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea
and occasionally some units en route to the Indian
Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope reprovision at
Conakry. However, so far as is known, combatants
have not refueled at Conakry.
51. We foresee a continued Soviet military presence
in West Africa. Through September 1976 the Soviets
had made 17 deployments of TU-95 Bear aircraft to
Conakry for reconnaissance operations. The Guineans
halted Soviet air operations at Conakry in July 1976
but the flights resumed in September. The Soviets
would wish to hedge against the permanent loss of
access to Guinean facilities. Thus, we expect that they
will seek to improve relations with other central West
African states that might give them access to
additional shOre facilities.
E. Merchant Marine and Fishing Fleet
52. The Soviets have used their merchant fleet to
deliver military aid as well as to provide logistic
support for forces in distant areas. It could also be
used to carry ground forces to a friendly port. The
merchant fleet has over 1,700 ships of 1,000 dead-
weight tons or more. The USSR has just begun to
acquire a fleet of roll-on/roll-off vessels whose ability
to load and discharge wheeled and tracked vehicles
rapidly make them particularly useful for military
support.
53. The large Soviet fishing fleet does not routinely
conduct reconnaissance or make contact reports. It
could, however, be used in a crisis to assist Soviet
naval intelligence reporting. Soviet fishing support
vessels have replenished Soviet intelligence ships
operating off the coast of the US.
F. Additional Soviet Forces Capable of
Deployment to the Third World in
a Crisis
54. In addition to the navy, the Soviets have other
military forces which have been or could be used in
crisis in distant areas. Soviet ground, airborne, and
amphibious forces are designed to operate primarily in
the contiguous areas of the Eurasian land mass.
Although the Soviets have not developed assault
forces comparable to a US Marine Amphibious Force,
Soviet training (under a wide variety of climatic
conditions), coupled with the diversity and quality of
their equipment, gives them a capacity to send forces
to distant areas in crisis situations.
55. Air Defense. Air defense units manned by Soviet
forces have been the mainstay of Soviet direct military
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involvement abroad; they were sent to North Korea
(1950), Cuba (1962), North Vietnam (1965), Egypt
(1970), and Syria (1973). The most extensive recent
effort was in Egypt during the 1970 -War of
Attrition,- when the Soviets deployed, over a period
of months, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned
by Soviet pilots and missile crews operating under
their own command and control network. This form
of assistance has proven to be highly responsive to
client needs.
56. Soviet capabilities to respond quickly with air
defense units in an overseas crisis heretofore have been
limited by the Soviet practice of transporting their
fighter aircraft by ship or airlift. The advent of longer-
range fighters gives the Soviets a capability to ferry
fighter aircraft to distant areas. However, the Soviets
have never flown fighter aircraft long distances over
open water.
57. Airborne. Should the Soviets decide to intervene
rapidly on the ground in the Third World, selected
units from any of the seven operational airborne
divisions would be the most likely forces to be
employed initially. These divisions are maintained at
a high state of readiness and, because of their small
size and lightweight equipment, have relatively good
strategic mobility. They are also receiving new air-
droppable amphibious combat vehicles and increased
numbers of artillery, shoulder-fired surface-to-air-
missiles, and antitank missiles. These will considerably
increase their tactical mobility and firepower, includ-
ing their antitank capabilities. Nevertheless, the
capabilities of Soviet (like other) airborne divisions to
stand up to major opposition are limited. Compared
with modern tank and mechanized forces, they still
have extremely limited firepower, armor protection,
and tactical mobility.
58. Naval Infantry. Soviet naval infantry now
numbers about 12,000 men, of which 9,000 are assault
elements dispersed among the four fleets. Although
lightly armed, a Soviet naval infantry unit would
compare favorably with most Third World ground
units of similar size. Soviet naval infantry lacks
organic air support and in a Eurasian operation would
be supported by Soviet tactical aviation. In a Third
World intervention, the use of naval infantry forces
probably would be limited, most likely as a demon-
stration of force or as a shore party to protect
evacuation of Soviet personnel. For example, it would
take at least five days for the Soviets to sealift the
Black Sea naval infantry regiment of 1,900 men to a
Syrian port. Small contingents are usually deployed
on Soviet amphibious ships in the Mediterranean and
at times in the Atlantic and Indian oceans; any naval
infantry at sea in the eastern Mediterranean could
reach Syria or Egypt in a day or two.
59. Army Forces. A Soviet decision to send
substantial ground forces to a Third World area would
involve a major sealift operation. For example, for the
Soviets to send motorized rifle or tank divisions to the
Middle East would require a minimum of two weeks
for the first division to be assembled, moved to Black
Sea ports, loaded, transited to the Mediterranean, and
offloaded in a Syrian port. Deployment of larger
forces?e.g., the equivalent of two combined arms
armies totaling at least 120,000 men?would require
two to three months. The USSR could divert sufficient
merchant shipping to accomplish this task.6
60. Airlift Capabilities. The Soviets have increas-
ingly used Military Transport Aviation to delivery
high-priority items of military equipment and emer-
gency resupplies to client forces. The VTA can also
deploy limited combat forces overseas.
61. VTA currently has over 600 AN-12 Cub
transport aircraft in its inventory. Prior to the
introduction of the AN-22 Cock in late 1960s, the
Soviets had no capabilities for long-range strategic lift.
Since then, VTA has received around 50 AN-22s and
about 40 IL-76 Candid aircraft. Over the last five
years, VTA's capacity has been raised by 5,500 tons to
a total of 19,000 tons. The rise in numbers of Candids
(which are comparable to the American C-141s) will
significantly enhance VTA's capability to carry large
cargoes and increased numbers of troops over long
distances. The AN-22 is the only Soviet aircraft which
can carry outsized equipment?such as medium
tanks. Production of this aircraft has stopped and
Soviet heavy lift capacity will be limited unless a
follow-on is produced.
62. By diverting all of their military airlift capacity,
the Soviets could airlift only the assault elements of
two airborne divisions (or one division with all its
combat equipment) in a single lift and transport
them, say, to Syria within three to five days. Such a
6 See also NIE 35/36-1-76:- Middle East Military Balance (1976-
1981),- Section 4, for further details of Soviet capability to
intervene in the Middle East.
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rapid deployment could preclude VTA from airlifting
other forces or supplies. A deployment could also be
made to Southeast Asia or Africa with refueling stops.
For example, the Soviets could ferry forces to southern
Africa by staging through Algiers and Conakry. The
assault elements of an airborne division could be
deployed to Angola in a few days, but would arrive
with only the most basic supplies of ammunition,
medical supplies, and food.
63. Aeroflot. Aeroflot constitutes a substantial
reserve which potentially triples the Soviet capability
to airlift troops. Aeroflot could augment VTA's cargo
capacity by 25 percent, but Aeroflot planes cannot
carry outsized cargo. While Aeroflot is not subordi-
nated to VTA, the Minister of Civil Aviation, who
directs Aeroflot, has the rank of Marshal of Aviation,
most air crews are air force reservists, and the fleet
could be quickly militarized. During the semiannual
rotations of Soviet conscripts in Eastern Europe,
Aeroflot has made more than 1,000 flights over a 17-
day period without any apparent disruption of its
normal services. These flights could have carried more
than 100,000 men in each direction. Beginning in
January 1976, Aeroflot IL-62s flown by Soviet crews
airlifted Cuban troops and materiel to Angola. These
flights have continued and now appear to be used for
returning sick and wounded Cuban troops and
possibly for troop rotations.
G. Other Limitations
64. Overflights and Staging. The need to obtain
overflight or staging privileges complicates airlift
operations. Although the Soviets regularly overfly
neighboring countries on a variety of military-related
missions, permission to overfly key countries, such as
Iran, Turkey, and even Yugoslavia, is neither auto-
matic nor assured. Permission to stage military flights
through a third country, which implies support of
Soviet action, is even more uncertain.
65. Capabilities Against Significant Opposition.
Beyond the range of Soviet land-based air or of air
support from a local ally, Soviet intervention forces
are vulnerable to interdiction either in the air or at
sea. Their capabilities to directly intervene ashore
against well-armed Third World countries, such as
Algeria or South Africa, suffer from lack of air defense,
close air support, and amphibious forces capable of
establishing and holding a large beachhead. The
V/STOL aircraft carried aboard the Soviet Kiev-class
ASW aircraft carrier, which became operational this
year, could provide limited seaborne air support.
Evidence on this subsonic aircraft is sparse, but it is
apparently designed for air defense and antiship
missions. Only a small number of aircraft would be
carried?some 12-15 in a mix with helicopters (with a
theoretical maximum of 36 if only V/STOLs were
aboard). Available in limited numbers, these aircraft
would be only marginally effective in support of
ground operations.
III. THE USSR AND ITS THIRD WORLD
CLIENTS
66. Moscow's primary instrument of military policy
in the Third World has been military assistance. Over
the past 20 years Moscow has delivered military
equipment to a total of some 50 less developed
countries. However, only a few have been willing to
rely heavily on the USSR, and the lion's share?some
70 percent?of the deliveries has been to six countries:
Egypt, Syria. India, Iraq, Cuba, and North Vietnam.
67. Moscow's heaviest investment has been in the
Middle East. Despite their mistrust of Moscow, Arab
countries proved eager to have Soviet weapons
because of their confrontations with Israel and each
other. The largest flow of Soviet weapons continues to
be to the Middle East despite the cut-off of supplies to
Egypt.
68. Sub-Saharan Africa is the area which has the
greatest potential for new Soviet gains. Here, Soviet
support of national liberation movements will be
especially important.
69. India and Cuba continue to be major recipients
of Soviet military assistance, but we do not expect
Moscow will find major new clients in either Asia or
Latin America in the next five years.
A. Middle East
70. Despite recent setbacks, the USSR possesses a
substantial potential to affect the military balance
and thus to influence the level of regional tension.
The USSR is providing large quantities of military
equipment to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria. Military
aid and the USSR's capability to project military
power into the area strengthens Moscow's credentials
as an Arab ally and counterweight to US influence.
71. Egypt. The deep military involvement which
developed between the Soviet Union and Egypt in
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Middle East
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
Beirut*
Tripoli LEBANON!
ISRAEL,
Aviv-Yato,a
Cairo ?
SYRIA
Dame
*Tehran
IRAQ
Baghdad ?
ALGERIA
Neutral lone
an See. Au.)
EGYPT
BAHRAIN ?
QAT A
ig
*Riyadh CENDED'AR':r< Muscat
SAUDI ARABIA
EMIRATES
l'EVEN
(SARA)*
YEMEN
(ADEN)
571146 0-76
1967-1972 had elements of a pattern which could be
repeated in Soviet relations with other clients. Nasser
mistrusted both Soviet and Egyptian communists, but
he badly needed Soviet weapons?especially to
replace equipment lost in the 1967 war and in 1970,
when he needed air defense equipment and personnel
against Israeli deep penetration raids.
?From Moscow's standpoint, Egypt was vulner-
able enough so that Nasser was willing to pay for
Soviet equipment in terms of military facilities;
at the same time, Egypt was not so weak as to be
beyond help and was thus a viable partner.
?While Egypt was an expensive client, Egyptian
needs were ones which the Soviets could meet.
This was especially true in 1970 when Egypt
needed air defense?a field which the Soviets had
long emphasized in their own military programs.
Moreover, in Egypt as in Vietnam, provision of
air defense had the political virtue of putting
Moscow in the position of helping to defend a
client country.
?The Soviets gradually developed a substantial
presence in Egypt to conduct three major
missions. With Soviet equipment came Soviet
advisers and technicians whose function was to
help the Egyptians improve their forces. Soviet
personnel operated SAMs for the Egyptians and
Soviet pilots flew air defense and reconnaissance
missions. The Soviets also used Egyptian ports
-0 Socotre
ffemen?Al
_
and airfields to support their naval ships and
aircraft, which operated against NATO forces in
the Mediterranean.
72. As the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship
developed, Egypt became increasingly dependent
upon the USSR not only for new equipment but for
the spares and replacements necessary to keep its
previously acquired equipment usable. Sadat's deci-
sions to expel the bulk of Soviet military personnel in
1972 and his final closure of Egyptian ports to Soviet
use this year were difficult decisions: he had to be
prepared to accept a weakening of Egypt's military
forces as the price of getting rid of the Soviets. The
Soviets probably hope that Sadat will fall and
relations with Egypt will improve, but they probably
do not expect to regain their former military facilities
in Egypt.
73. Syria. Since the souring of Soviet-Egyptian
relations in 1972, Syria has been the largest recipient
of Soviet military aid. The $1.2 billion of arms the
Soviets delivered from the end of the 1973 war
through 1975 not only replaced Syria's war losses but
also enabled it to expand and upgrade its air and
ground forces. There are about 3,000 Soviet military
advisers in the country, and President Asad is pressing
for a continuing supply of sophisticated weapon
systems. Syria, however, has persistently refused to
sign a friendship pact with the USSR and differs with
Moscow over the proper approach to a Middle East
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peace agreement. Serious differences over Syrian
actions against the Palestine Liberation Organization
in Lebanon have reportedly led Moscow to threaten
to withhold new arms agreements, although ship-
ments under existing agreements have continued.
74. Since the decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations in
1972, the Soviets have made increasing use of Syrian
ports, particularly Tartus, where they replenish sub-
marines and minor combatants alongside auxiliary
ships. Syrian ports lack the facilities found in Egypt
and are not a substitute for the use of Alexandria. The
Soviets, however, are playing a major role in the
construction of several new commercial docking and
warehouse facilities in Latakia aimed at doubling the
port's limited berthing capacity. Syria's internal
transport system (rail, roads, and air) is also undergo-
ing major improvements with Soviet assistance.
75. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The
Soviets have trained Palestinians in the USSR and
provided the PLO with limited quantities of small
arms, funneled primarily through Syria. In November
1974 the Soviets reportedly reassured Arafat that they
would supply the weapons and equipment necessary
to continue and expand commando operations inside
Israeli territory.
76. Direct shipments apparently were instituted,
but we do not know the amount of arms involved. In
addition to small arms the PLO has machineguns,
mortars, 75-mm antitank guns, and some BTR-152
armored personnel carriers. Most of these weapons are
of Soviet manufacture, but the majority of them were
supplied through third countries, principally Syria
(until late 1975) and more recently through Iraq,
Egypt, and Libya.
77. The Soviets are clearly distressed by the plight
of the Palestinians in Lebanon. While they have
maintained a fairly steady public stand in favor of the
PLO and criticized Syrian intervention, the Soviets
have done nothing that might seriously jeopardize
their relations with Damascus.
78. The Soviets are distrustful of Arafat, doubtful
about the PLO's organizational discipline, and have
urged moderation in the conflict in Lebanon. None-
theless they regard the PLO as a likely entre into the
Arab-Israeli settlement process. They probably envi-
sion any future Palestinian state, squeezed between a
hostile Israel and a suspicious Jordan, as a logical
future recipient of Soviet assistance?and possibly a
useful client in the area.
79. Libya. The Soviet-Libyan relationship is
marked by suspicion on both sides, and it is unlikely
that the Soviets are counting on rapid progress toward
a close coordination of policies. Nevertheless, they
signed an agreement for more than $700 million worth
of arms in 1974. Libya has received TU-22 Blinders,
MIG-23 Floggers, Scud missiles, and the first of
several Osa II missile patrol boats. The Soviets have
increased the number of advisers there to around 600;
they are training Libyan personnel in aircraft and
SAM operations and maintenance but these advisers
are not and probably will not be integrated into
ground force tactical units.
80. The Libyans have received more equipment
then they can absorb. For example, they have
stockpiled around 1,500 Soviet tanks. President
Qadhafi probably hopes that possession of weapons
such as these will give him visible trappings of power
and leverage in Arab politics. He probably wants to
build up an -arsenal of arms- for other Arab countries
in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war. However, if the
equipment is not properly maintained, in a few years
it will begin to deteriorate. Qadhafi uses Soviet-
supplied small arms to support terrorist and guerrilla
groups in a number of countries and maintains
training camps for them in Libya.
81. We have examined the question of whether the
Soviets might use equipment in Libyan stockpiles in
the event of a Soviet intervention to support Arab
countries against the Israelis. How the volatile
Qadhafi would view such a proposal is a moot point.
Whatever his reaction, the Soviets would face serious
problems:
?The equipment is not likely to be maintained at
Soviet standards.
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?There would be major gaps in the inventory of
crucial support equipment?including prime
movers, tank transporters, artillery, engineer,
communications equipment?necessary to sup-
port Soviet ground divisions.
?Storage sites near Tripoli are about 1,200 miles
from the Suez Canal, and forces starting even
from Benghazi would have to cover some 700
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having few facilities for logistical support and
vulnerable to interdiction.
?The use of airlift to move supplies from Libya
would degrade Soviet capabilities to resupply the
Arabs from the USSR in a crisis.
In view of these problems, we believe it highly
unlikely that the present Soviet-Libyan arms arrange-
ments represent a Soviet prepositioning of material for
their own forces.'
82. Algeria. In 1975 Algeria sought new Soviet
armaments as it headed toward a confrontation with
Morocco. Moscow apparently welcomed the opportu-
nity to improve its relations with Algiers, which had
been cooling. Moscow signed a $500 million military
aid agreement with Algeria. In order to get weapons
to Algeria quickly, Moscow persuaded Libya to send
material from its inventory by promising to replace
what the Libyans gave the Algerians. By the end of
that year the Soviets had the additional incentive of
guaranteeing Algerian cooperation in allowing the
Soviet airlift to Angola to stage through Algerian
airfields.
83. The Soviets almost certainly understand that
Algeria is using some Soviet-supplied arms to equip
the Polisario Front guerrillas in the former Spanish
Sahara. Moscow has publicly favored Algeria's posi-
tion of self-determination in the dispute, but the
Soviets have not officially endorsed the Front. We
have no confirmation of Moroccan-inspired reports of
Soviet personnel in Spanish Sahara or of Soviet arms
shipments directly to the Polisario.
84. Morocco. The Soviets maintain a modest
military sales and training program with Morocco.
7 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
Air Force notes that large stockpiles of war materiel now established
in Syria and Iraq, as well as Libya, are greatly in excess of local
requirements or the ability of Arab Forces to employ. These
resources would presumably be available to Soviet troops and
fighter or air defense elements in the event of their insertion into
renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities. Also such prestockage appears
consistent with sensitive source data regarding the desirability of
establishing reserves of materiel outside of Warsaw Pact areas as a
prerequisite for military operations. The use of this equipment in
conjunction with airlifted Soviet antitank and self-propelled
artillery units and mobile BMP regiments could have a decisive
impact on the outcome of hostilities. Further, given the growing will
and enhanced operational capability of the Soviets to directly
intervene, a variety of military options are available which would
not entail excessive airlift support nor the classical commitment of
heavy armor as a precondition to success.
Soviet diplomats, largely because of Moscow's interest
in obtaining Moroccan phosphates and fishing rights,
have tried to prevent further deterioration in relations
by privately stressing Moscow's neutrality in the
Sahara conflict and describing Morocco's takeover of
the Spanish Sahara as a fait accompli that Algeria will
have to accept. This has not, however, allayed Rabat's
suspicions.
85. Iraq. Despite frictions in Soviet-Iraqi relations
and Baghdad's attempts to diversify its sources of arms
supply, Soviet deliveries to Iraq have run about $300
million annually in the past two years and substantial
deliveries are likely to continue. Moscow has sent
some of its most advanced equipment?Scuds, TU-22
Blinders, MIG-23 Floggers, and SA-6s. Unlike Syria,
however, Iraq has turned increasingly to Western
suppliers, thus reducing its dependence on the USSR.
Iraq's largest purchases in the past two years have
been from France and West Germany.
86. The Soviets have intermittently stationed a
repair ship in Basrah which has serviced Soviet naval
vessels in addition to training Iraqis in ship repairs.
The Soviets are unlikely to increase their use of Iraqi
ports in the confines of the Persian Gulf as long as
they can rely on Berbera, Somalia?a port whose
approaches are less restricted.
87. Iran. Although Tehran relies on the West for all
of its sophisticated weapons, it has purchased almost
$850 million worth of Soviet arms and support
equipment, such as trucks, armored personnel carriers,
engineer vehicles and equipment, and artillery for its
ground forces since 1967. Despite these agreements,
Iran is working to eliminate any Soviet naval presence
from the Persian Gulf, is committed to the defeat of
leftist insurgencies in the area, and is building up its
armed forces in an effort to become the dominant
regional power.
88. Arabian Peninsula. As a result of the Soviets'
increased use of their complex of support facilities in
Berbera, they will push less to increase their use of
facilities in Iraq and South Yemen (PDRY) over the
near term.
89. The Soviets are trying to legitimize their
relationships with Persian Gulf states. In the face of
Saudi Arabia's increasingly active foreign policy in the
region, Moscow is continuing to give military aid and
offer agreements, especially to Kuwait and the two
Yemens. While the Soviets would welcome?and may
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have been attempting to encourage?insurgencies,
there is little chance for the moment that a
revolutionary government sympathetic to Moscow
will emerge in the area.
90. The USSR has provided 85 percent of Aden's
total arms imports since 1968. Despite this Soviet
military aid, the PDRY has not granted Moscow
expanded use of the port of Aden. So far the main
benefit of that port to the Soviets has been the supply
of water, although ship reprovisioning and some
refueling are known to have occurred. Aden has served
also as a staging base for Soviet airlifts of military
supplies to India, Somalia, and East Africa. In late
1975 Moscow mounted an airlift to Aden, evidently to
support Yemeni forces helping the Dhofar rebels.
While there is little reliable information on the
subject, we believe that the USSR was the principal
source of arms, through the PDRY, for the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman.
91. North Yemen's relations with the USSR are not
as close as they once were, and the government would
prefer to limit its involvement with Moscow. Now
that the Saudi military aid program appears to be
under way, it seems unlikely that Sana will take up
any Soviet offers.
B. Africa
92. In absolute terms, Soviet military aid. to sub-
Saharan Africa is quite small. Total Soviet military
deliveries to all of the area for the past 20 years
amount to about $700 million?less than the USSR
gave Indonesia in Sukarno's heyday. But because
military forces in the underdeveloped countries of sub-
Saharan Africa are small and poorly equipped, limited
amounts of Soviet military assistance can have a
significant impact. Soviet military assistance helped
bring to power Soviet-supported factions in some of
the former Portuguese colonies and has helped to
obtain a Soviet military complex in Somalia and the
use of facilities in Guinea. Because the military is
frequently the most important element in African
politics, Soviet military aid has helped the USSR to
compete with both the West and China for influence
in Africa.
93. Angola. Moscow's assistance to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and -
the National Liberation Front of Angola dates back to
the early 1960s. When the MPLA suffered setbacks in
October 1975, the Soviets initiated an air and sealift
from the USSR to help its client and in January 1976
began providing an airlift for Cuban forces between
Cuba and Angola.
94. The Soviets evidently believe that the victory of
a Soviet-supported national liberation movement has
increased Soviet prestige in the Third World. The
Soviets probably hope that Angola?where a substan-
tial Cuban presence will probably remain for some
time?may also assist the USSR in providing Soviets
an entree to other national liberation movements in
southern Africa?such as SWAPO. In October 1976
the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship and coopera-
tion to consolidate their political position. In addition,
they may hope to obtain access to port and air
facilities as an alternative to those in Guinea.
95. Mozambique. Although not as extensive as that
of the Chinese, Soviet aid in the form of military
equipment, training, and funds assisted the Mozam-
bique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) to come to
power when Mozambique achieved independence in
June 1975. FRELIMO will probably continue to
receive substantial financial and military aid both
from the USSR and the PRC. Mozambique provides
training and base areas for guerrilla operations against
the white minority government of Rhodesia, an
activity to which the Soviets have given both military
and political support. President Machel kept the
Soviets at arm's length immediately after independ-
ence but has been friendlier to them recently.
Agreements have been reached to train Mozambique
officers in the USSR possibly in preparation for
deliveries of military equipment.
96. Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands.
Prior to the independence of these territories in July
1975, Moscow gave strong backing to their current
ruling party, the African Party for the Independence
of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands
(PAIGC), provided arms and training through
Guinea, and stationed a permanent naval presence off
Conakry to discourage Portuguese intervention
against rebel sanctuaries in Guinea. Cubans collabo-
rated with the Soviets in supporting the PAIGC, and
this aid was instrumental in assisting guerrillas to
come to power.
97. Currently Moscow is the major source of
weapons and military training and has provided some
economic aid to these impoverished countries as well.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Nonakch'IL
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
THE G ABA171uit
GUINEA-RISSAYL
NIGER
..Bamako
Khartoum
SUDAN
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Freetown
SIERRA I:EONE
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GUINEA
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Bangui
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GABON CONGO
Bra aville
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Walvis Bay,
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MOZAMBIQUE
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AFRICA
Pretoria
Pababan
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YAZBAND
Tananarive
MADAGASCAR
571143 10-76
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There have been unconfirmed reports that Moscow
has asked for military privileges in Guinea-Bissau and
the Cape Verde Islands, but neither government has
granted any and both have said that they do not
intend to allow foreign bases on their territories.
98. Tanzania. During the past two years Moscow
has expanded its ties with Dar es Salaam. New arms
agreements?the first since the mid-1960s?have put
the total value of Soviet military aid on a par with the
Chinese. Soviet interests in Tanzania are more than
mere rivalry with the PRC. Tanzania's proximity to
Mozambique and Rhodesia offers the Soviets channels
to anti-Rhodesian liberation groups that traditionally
have been based in Tanzania.
99. Tanzania was also the locus of the most
extensive PRC activity in Africa, notably the recently
completed TanZam railway project. Prior to 1974
China had been the principal supplier of military
assistance and will probably remain the major donor
of economic aid. During the past few years some
friction has developed between China and Tanzania
over China's military assistance. In this atmosphere
Moscow has significantly increased its military aid
and has established a military advisory mission there.
100. Somalia. Beset by economic troubles and
engaged in a traditional confrontation with Ethiopia,
the Siad government has welcomed Soviet economic
and military assistance and has afforded the Soviets a
high degree of military and political influence. To
support the construction and operation of their
facilities and the military aid program in Somalia, the
Soviets have tripled the size of their presence there
since 1973. There are now an estimated 1,000 Soviet
military technicians in the country, and this number
probably will increase further.
101. The Soviets will probably encourage Somalia
to avoid the risk of war with Ethiopia by confining
Somali actions in Eritrea to insurgency and subver-
sion. Moscow has not interfered with Somalia's
support of the insurgency in the French Territory of
the Afars and Issas, which Mogadiscio wants to annex
after the French depart. The Soviets may hope
eventually to gain access to the naval base at
Djibouti.8
8 For additional discussion, see SNIE 76-1-76 of March 1976,
-Prospects for and Implications of Conflict in the Horn of Africa
Over the Next Year or So.''
102. Guinea. Moscow's influence in Conakry has
been strong since Guinea's independence in 1958, but
the Soviets did not gain access to military facilities
there until after the abortive Portuguese attack in
1970. In recent years, the Soviets have maintained a
permanent naval presence off Conakry and used the
port. In addition they have used the airfield at
Conakry for TU-95 Bear deployments. Guinea has
received some $40 million in Soviet arms and
equipment over the last ten years as well as military
training and economic assistance.
103. Conakry served as the port of entry for Soviet
arms to insurgents in Guinea-Bissau before that
country won its independence from Portugal, and last
year Guinea, along with Algeria, served as a staging
area for Soviet airlifts to Angola.
104. In the past, the Guineans asked for So-
viet?and even Chinese?assistance to build a naval
facility on Tamara Island. For their part, the Soviets
reportedly sought control of portions of the base. The
Guineans eventually rejected the Soviet terms.
105. Mali. Mali's first President, Modibo Keita,
welcomed Soviet assistance in order to lessen Mali's
dependence on France and to enhance his credentials
as a radical socialist African leader. The regime which
overthrew him in 1968 improved relations with France
and other Western countries, but has continued to
seek military assistance from the USSR and the army
officers who are now Mali's political leaders are
almost totally dependent on the USSR for military
equipment and training.
106. About 50 Soviet advisers provide armor,
. artillery, and parachute training and all Mali's pilots
are Soviet-trained. Soviet personnel maintain Mali's
civilian as well as military aircraft and all depend
entirely on the USSR for spare parts. The Soviets have
improved Mali's air force base at Mopti and are now
surveying other Malian airfields. Moscow has signed
military agreements with Mali totaling $21 million
since 1960. The Soviets occasionally used Malian
airfields to stage arms supply flights during the Angola
crisis, and Mali would probably grant Moscow transit
privileges for the support of other southern African
liberation groups.
107. The Gambia and Senegal. After responding to
a Gambian request for small arms shipments, the
Soviets demonstrated some interest in expanding
military cooperation. But the Gambia turned down a
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Soviet offer of military advisers. President Senghor of
neighboring Senegal deeply distrusts Soviet intentions
toward West Africa, and Soviet involvement in
Angola has nourished his suspicions.
108. Equatorial Guinea and Congo. The Soviets
have reportedly sought?but failed to get?use of
naval facilities in both countries. Moscow delivered
three patrol craft to Equatorial Guinea in 1975 and
probably will increase the number of advisers there.
Brazzaville is reported to be discontented with the
way Soviet aid projects are being implemented and
the amount of Soviet assistance given in contrast with
that given by the Chinese. Some Congolese students
returning home after training in the USSR are
disillusioned, and Soviet fishing off the Congo rankles
that country. Nonetheless, Brazzaville allowed the
Soviets to use Pointe Noire to channel supplies to
African liberation groups in Angola and southern
Africa.
109. Sudan. The Soviet Union began supplying
arms in 1960 and concluded a major armaments
agreement in 1967 after the Six-Day War. The
Numayri government has returned to a more balanced
policy in East-West relations following the defeat of
the communist coup in 1971. Since then Soviet
influence has declined, especially after the abortive
coup of July 1976. Nearly 100 advisers are still
present, and the Soviets recently delivered some old jet
fighters as a gift. Nevertheless, Khartoum has turned
once more to the UK and to Egypt for most of its
assistance. The PRC, while keeping a low profile, is
also furnishing assistance in both military and
economic fields.
? 110. Uganda. In 1973 the Soviets began sending
advanced military equipment to Uganda, including
tanks and a squadron of MIG-21 fighters, and Soviet
instructors. Despite Soviet wariness toward President
Amin and a temporary break in relations in late 1975,
the Soviets apparently still see Uganda as a target of
opportunity, and there have been reports that they are
negotiating a new military assistance agreement.
111. Kenya. Neither the USSR nor the PRC has
much current influence in Kenya. The Soviets have
offered arms and made approaches in connection with
repair of their fishing vessels. Nairobi, however,
continues to address its arms requests to the UK and
the US and maintains a policy by which the US Navy
has access to Mombasa for replenishment and
recreational purposes.
112. Nigeria. Soviet relations with Nigeria reached
a high point during the Biafran rebellion, but the
Nigerians evidently declined to help the USSR stage
its airlift to Angola. Nevertheless, the USSR continues
to supply some military aid to Nigeria.
C. Asia
113. In South Asia the USSR has devoted most of its
attention to India because of its location, size, and
population and because the Soviets regard it as a
counterweight to China. In Bangladesh, however,
they received a setback in 1975 with the change in
leadership to a regime less sympathetic to Moscow.
114. Moscow sees the communist victory in
Indochina as a victory for Soviet interests, as well as a
setback for the US. Nevertheless the USSR has not
achieved a stable or leading position there.
115. Collective Security. The USSR has persisted in
proposing an Asian collective security system without
specifically defining it. In mid-1975 the Soviets made
low-level demarches to generate support for a security
conference, suggesting that it might be analogous to
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. The results of these efforts to convene a
conference were uniformly negative, as the Soviets
undoubtedly anticipated. Nevertheless, they will
probably continue to plug for Asian collective security
in order to assert their credentials as an Asian power
and because it is a useful device for testing Asian
attitudes toward the USSR. Moreover, despite Soviet
protestations to the contrary, the proposal is an anti-
Chinese device, designed to force Peking either to
accept a leading Soviet role in Asia or to appear
ambitious and bellicose. At the same time, the
generalized pledges of national independence and
regional cooperation that are part of the Soviet
proposal provide a propaganda counter to Chinese
charges that Moscow seeks hegemony over Asia.
116. India. Over the years the Soviets have become
increasingly interested in India. The mutual interests
of the two countries underlay the 1971 treaty and led
the Soviets to give strong support to New Delhi?in-
cluding the deployment of major combatants to the
Indian Ocean?at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war
in 1971. Although India has been the recipient of
large amounts of Soviet military aid, this assistance
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Asia
(
Kabul.
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
PAKISTAN
Naw
acca
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Rano
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(A.11.1
571145 10-76
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has not been as central to its relationship with the
USSR as was the case in Syria and Egypt. Moreover,
India has been determined to protect its independence
from Moscow and has effectively turned back Soviet
overtures for regular access to Indian air and naval
facilities.
117. Since 1965 India has imported almost $1.4
billion worth of arms from the Soviet Union, and
Moscow has become India's primary source of high-
performance jet aircraft, submarines, destroyer escorts,
landing ships, and guided-missile patrol boats. Mos-
cow also has provided over $200 million in plants,
machinery, and raw materials to help expand India's
arms industry. The bulk has been used to develop
facilities to produce military equipment under Soviet
license, including MIG-21 jet fighters and Atoll air-to-
air missiles, and to build naval facilities at Vishakha-
patnam.
118. The USSR has provided a substantial amount
of technical assistance to supplement its arms-supply
program. Since 1961, more than 2,000 Indian military
personnel, mostly from the navy and air force, have
undergone training in the USSR, but the Indians have
sought to hold down the number of people involved.
About 300 Soviet military technicians were in India
during 1975. Soviet military technicians generally are
employed to assemble Soviet equipment shipped to
India and to train Indian personnel in its use and
maintenance. In recent years New Delhi has required
that most of the training be conducted in India,
ostensibly to reduce the cost of sending personnel to
the USSR, which was estimated to have been more
than $1 million annually during the late 1960s.
119. India aspires to self-sufficiency in arms
production but is likely to remain dependent on
foreign suppliers for sophisticated equipment. The
USSR almost certainly will remain one of India's
major foreign suppliers of sophisticated arms through
the 1970s. Despite the delays India has had in
acquiring spare parts from the Soviet Union, New
Delhi feels that the West has proven to be an
unreliable source in time of crisis and that it has not
offered payment terms as liberal as those of the
Soviets.
120. Afghanistan. Kabul has relied almost exclu-
sively on Soviet sources for its armaments over the past
19 years and has received $450 million worth of
military assistance. Kabul also has about 350 Soviet
military advisers and technicians to instruct Afghan
personnel in maintenance of equipment.
121. A number of unconfirmed Pakistani and
Iranian reports have suggested Soviet involvement in
aiding Afghanistan in the training and equipping of
Pakistani tribal guerrillas. There is no evidence to
support these reports and some are known to be
fabricated.
122. Pakistan. In the mid-1960s the USSR signed
arms contracts worth $65 million with Pakistan.
Moscow believed that an arms aid program might
eventually undercut Chinese and Western influence
and lessen Islamabad's hostility toward India. How-
ever, New Delhi objected. In mid-1969 Moscow
bowed to Indian pressure and stopped arms shipments
after delivering only $22 million worth of equipment.
Moscow sold some $2 million worth of MI-8
helicopter spare parts in 1974, but it is not expected to
resume significant shipments of arms.
123. Bangladesh. When the state of Bangladesh was
formed in late 1971, the USSR was quick to offer
assistance in establishing an air force, providing 10
MIG-21s as well as several helicopters and transport
aircraft. The Soviet navy undertook the clearing of
mines and wrecks from the port of Chittagong. About
400 Bengalis have gone to the USSR for training since
1972.
124. The overthrow of the Mujib government in
August 1975, followed by additional coups in Novem-
ber, jarred Moscow. Moscow felt that Mujib offered
the best prospect for ensuring a stable government
that was friendly to both India and the USSR.
Moscow is worried that the political instability and
anti-Soviet attitude of the new leaders might give
Peking opportunities to enhance its influence, and is
trying to stay on good terms with General Zia's
regime.
125. Southeast Asia. The USSR has persistently
tried to improve its position in Southeast Asia. The
general Soviet approach has been to promote normal
state-to-state relations, to expand its economic pres-
ence, and to fan suspicions of Peking. The Soviets
have at one time or another approached nearly every
country in the area with specific suggestions for
strengthening bilateral ties.
126. Vietnam. It has been Hanoi's policy to balance
its relations with Moscow and Peking. The USSR was
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quick to provide the Vietnamese and Laotian commu-
nists with economic assistance needed to begin
reconstruction following their recent victories. At the
same time, Hanoi has had problems with Peking,
including conflicting territorial claims and possible
rivalry for regional influence. The Soviets appear to
enjoy better relations with Hanoi than do the Chinese,
but this will not buy them much because Vietnam
cannot afford to go too far in provoking Peking and
will seek to preserve its freedom of maneuver. Soviet
military assistance has declined, but it continues to be
important to Hanoi since there is no indigenous
industry capable of producing major items of equip-
ment.
127. There is no reliable evidence that the Soviets
have sought military facilities in Vietnam. Further-
more, the Vietnamese are concerned with China's
reaction and determined to avoid the establishment of
any foreign military presence on their territory. We
believe they would reject any Soviet overtures for
regular military use of air and port facilities.
128. Laos. The Soviet presence in Laos has been
steadily increasing since the departure of most
Americans in late May 1975. The Soviets have been
careful not to reveal the size of their presence, but it is
estimated at about 500 people, a substantial increase
from the fewer than 100 present before the US exodus.
In December 1975 the Soviets mounted an airlift from
Hanoi and Bangkok to Vientiane to help make up for
goods shortages in Laos caused by the closure of the
land border with Thailand.
129. Vientiane's decision to permit an increase in
the Soviet presence may reflect a desire to strengthen
Moscow's position vis-a-vis Peking as well as its need
for technical assistance. The Lao continue to maintain
intimate relations with the Vietnamese?some 27,000-
30,000 Vietnamese troops are stationed in Laos?and
any shift toward the Soviets would probably reflect
Hanoi's approval. The Vietnamese consider that they
have a proprietary interest in Laos and therefore
would probably not want either a Chinese or Soviet
challenge to their position.
130. Singapore. The Soviet Union's relationships
with Singapore are essentially commercial in nature.
Since 1968 Soviet naval auxiliaries and naval-
associated ships have stopped at Singapore's Keppel
Shipyard for replenishment while transiting to and
from the Indian Ocean. The shipyard has handled
repair work on a growing number of Soviet naval
support ships and commercial vessels; it is not used,
however, for repairing these ships in mid-deployment.
Repair of Soviet vessels in Singapore relieves pressure
on the busy facilities on the USSR's Pacific Coast.
Recently, Singapore has also granted Soviet noncom-
batants access to the Sembawang Shipyard which is
also used by US warships.
131. Other Countries. The Soviets have no military
agreements with Cambodia, Thailand or Burma, and
the Indonesians have shown no interest in cooperating
with Soviet schemes to stem PRC influence in
Southeast Asia. While Philippine President Marcos
desires to balance his relations with Peking and
Moscow, he continues to believe that the USSR needs
him more than he needs it. The small independent
island nations of the southwest Pacific have been the
focus of some recent Soviet diplomatic initiatives. So
far, these efforts have been directed at the acquisition
of facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet, but in the
longer term efforts may be made to include Soviet
naval visits.
132. Support for Liberation Groups. Moscow may
be sympathetic to further revolutionary changes in
Southeast Asia, but will probably have few opportuni-
ties to play a meaningful role. The Chinese will
continue to take advantage of their proximity to
influence guerrilla movements and the Vietnamese
have such a surfeit of weapons that they would have
little need of Soviet assistance to supply such
activities.
D. Latin America
133. Latin America does not now rank high in the
scheme of Soviet foreign policy priorities. To be sure,
the Soviets seek greater influence in the affairs of the
region, but they are realistic about their prospects, and
current Soviet policies for the region represent a
pragmatic and opportunistic approach that does not
anticipate early dramatic gains. The Soviet goals in
the near term are to weaken links between Latin
America and the US by encouraging anti-imperialism
and nonalignment.
134. Cuba. Cuba must be counted as the USSR's
major success in the region. After the 1962 missile
crisis, the Soviets continued their military aid and
their support of the economy to achieve a close
relationship with the Cuban government.
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Latin America
-B`Pu7'
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
*NasTfau
Havana THE BAHAMAS
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135. A Soviet military mission of about 2,000 men is
permanently stationed in Cuba. Of these, 1,500 are
probably assigned to advise their Cuban counterparts
in operating and maintaining Soviet-supplied equip-
ment and in related training activities, concentrating
on those areas where the most advanced technology is
used, i.e., the air force, surface-to-air missile system,
radar networks, and certain naval units. Soviet
advisers also work closely with Cuba's intelligence
services, which were organized with extensive Soviet
guidance and training and which collaborate with the
Soviets in intelligence operations abroad.
136. In 1970 the Soviets acquired the facilities at
Cienfuegos but Soviet use of them has been con-
strained by the US-Soviet understanding regarding
Soviet basing. In addition, Soviet personnel operate
Soviet communications and intelligence collection
facilities in the Havana area, including SIGINT and
radar tracking of US military movements.
137. In years past Moscow was obviously discom-
fited by Cuba's effort to export revolution in Latin
America. Since the late 1960s Castro has pursued a
policy of restraint and selectivity in his support of
revolutionary groups in Latin America, but at the
same time he has been increasingly willing to
encourage and support promising national liberation
movements in other parts of the world. The Angolan
conflict afforded an occasion for close Soviet Cuban
cooperation in support of an insurgent movement,
with their goals in concert. This collaboration may be
repeated if suitable opportunities arise, but it will not
be automatic. Moscow and Havana will each want to
be sure that such an undertaking furthers its own
interests.
138. Other Countries. The virtual monopoly en-
joyed by the US as an arms supplier in the Western
Hemisphere after World War II has declined as a
result of restrictive US arms policies and deterioration
in political relations. But the bulk of Latin American
arms purchases from non-US suppliers has gone to
Western Europe; between 1970 and mid-1975 Latin
American countries had already received or contracted
for more than $3.2 billion worth of arms from
European countries.
139. The Soviets' efforts to get arms clients in Latin
America in addition to Cuba have had no success
except in Peru, although they have approached most
other South American countries. Between 1972 and
1975 the Soviets delivered or agreed to deliver over
$130 million worth of arms there?less than half of
Peru's total arms purchases in that period. To gain
entry to the Peruvian market as elsewhere, Moscow
provided quick delivery dates, generous credits at low
rates of interest, and discounted some items of
equipment at well below world market prices. Peru's
expected purchase of 36 SU-22 aircraft (probably the
export version of the SU-17 fighter-bomber) has a
price tag of $250 million.
140. Peruvian purchases do not necessarily set a
precedent for other Latin American buyers, and it
appears unlikely that the USSR will become a major
arms supplier in this hemisphere. Latin American
countries are used to dealing with the West and are
still unsure of both the quality and reliability of Soviet
equipment and spare parts arrangements. Moreover,
the Latins remain wary of Soviet political aims and
will be jealous of their own interests when deciding on
arms purchases. Nevertheless, the Soviets are expected
to be persistent in seeking arms customers in the
hemisphere. And the Latin Americans may accept
some offers or seek to use them to extract concessions
from the US.
141. Allende's failure to prevail in Chile reinforced
Moscow's cautious approach to the support of radical
change in Latin American governments. Nevertheless,
in concert with the Cubans the Soviets are continuing
their contacts with Latin American radical groups and
are urging them to form broad leftist fronts under
Communist guidance. The Soviets are also continuing
to train some Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare,
apparently hoping that, in time, changing conditions
will provide suitable opportunities for insurgency. In
the meantime, carefully cultivated state-to-state rela-
tions?including economic, commercial, and cul-
tural?will receive top priority in the Soviet policy for
Latin America,
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
142. The Soviets are evidently convinced that
efforts in the Third World over the past 20 years have
significantly increased Moscow's prestige and influ-
ence in world affairs and that this has contributed to
Soviet national security. The most compelling evi-
dence of determination to press on has been Soviet
persistence in the face of major setbacks, e.g., in
Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, and Sudan. Given this
persistence, it is extremely unlikely that any future
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setbacks would cause them to reverse course. In fact,
as opportunities for the use of military resources in the
Third World present themselves, the Soviets will
almost certainly respond.
A. Military Aid
143. The cutting edge of Soviet military involve-
ment in Third World countries will continue to be the
provision of military assistance. There is no evidence
that the Soviets are developing weapon systems
designed for the export trade only. Rather, the Soviets
seem likely to continue to export systems which were
developed for Soviet forces. The Soviets will have a
variety of weapons for export:
?For some recipients, older but still serviceable
Soviet equipment will be appropriate. In sub-
Saharan Africa, the T-54 tank is still a formidable
weapon.
?Soviet air defense systems will probably remain in
high demand. Clients who fear air attack can
obtain comprehensive, high-technology air de-
fense. Moreover, the defensive character of SAM
systems makes it easy to justify their purchase.
?Moscow's most favored clients are likely to get
more substantial offensive capabilities from such
weapons as newer models of tactical aircraft with
greater range and payload, self-propelled guns,
and FROGs and Scuds.
The clients who receive sophisticated and expensive
weapons will perforce find themselves in closer
relations with the USSR on three counts: debts will be
higher despite discounts and credit terms, more Soviet
technicians will be required, and reliance on the USSR
for spares will be greater.
144. In making policy on military aid, the Soviets
are only partly reactive to US and other countries'
military aid programs. In some areas they will, of
course, react to American sales to a country which is at
odds with a client of theirs. In other areas, the Soviets
will take advantage of situations in which the US
cannot or will not make sales. In still other cases they
will be alert to opportunities to break into new
markets, regardless of what the US does. In any case,
we believe that they will be little disposed to reach
agreements for mutual great-power restraint in mili-
tary assistance. Their efforts to expand their influence
rest so heavily on this instrument that they would
regard such restraints as drastically curtailing their
overall opportunities in the Third World,
B. Deployments, Force Developments, and
Capabilities
145. The USSR will continue to deploy air and
naval forces to the Third World, as well as to improve
the forces which might be used in distant operations.
146. Deployments. Following the rapid growth of
Soviet naval presence in Third World areas from 1964
to 1970, routine deployments of Soviet general-
purpose naval forces have reflected a trend toward
stabilization, Despite temporary increases in the
intervening years for unusual circumstances?harbor
clearing operations in Bangladesh, reaction to the
Arab-Israeli War, and minesweeping operations in the
Gulf of Suez?Soviet ship days for 1976 will probably
amount to only some 3 percent more than the total for
1970. Although the numbers of Soviet ships deployed
will probably not increase substantially, their quality
and combat capabilities will continue to improve.
147. Staging for long-range maritime reconnais-
sance aircraft promises to be the most important
benefit the Soviets receive from their overseas facili-
ties. Despite improvements in ocean reconnaissance
satellites, seagoing intelligence collectors, and ground
intercept capabilities in the USSR, the Soviets will rely
heavily on reconnaissance aircraft and will continue
to seek facilities from which ? to operate them. The
force of Soviet reconnaissance, patrol, and strike
aircraft will drop slightly in total numbers, but the
overall force will be qualitatively improved through
the addition of Backfire and other new models
projected over the next decade.
148. Force Trends. Moscow has never conducted an
assault operation in a distant area, and Soviet
involvement in crises and conflicts in the Third World
has taken the form of Soviet assistance to a client.
Nevertheless, modernization programs over the next
ten years will improve the forces which could be used
to intervene in distant areas, even though most of this
modernization is being carried out primarily for other
military purposes.
149. Airborne divisions will remain the same in
number?eight, including one training division. They
will gradually improve their fire power and mobility,
but will retain their present combat limitations. The
total number of Soviet transport aircraft will decline
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slightly through 1980 and remain relatively stable
through 1985. The total lift capability will rise during
the remainder of the 1970s with the continued
deployment of the IL-76 Candid.
150. New transport aircraft?for which there is no
present evidence of construction?could be in use in
the 1980s:
?Production of the AN-22 Cock stopped after only
50 were delivered to VTA and the Soviets may
have a requirement for a follow-on long range
heavy transport capable of carrying outsized
cargo. Such a follow-on could be in service in the
early 1980s, although there is no evidence that
such an aircraft is under construction.
?The mainstay of Soviet military transport avi-
ation is the AN-12 Cub, a medium assault
transport which entered service in the late 1950s.
While there is no evidence of a follow-on aircraft,
the Soviets could decide to develop one.
If these aircraft appear,- the Soviets would increase
their capability to lift airborne troops by about half
over the next ten years.
151. Actual and potential developments in naval
forces include improvements in underway replenish-
ment and amphibious lift capabilities:
?The Soviets are continuing to construct large
underway replenishment ships. Six of these ships
have become operational since 1970 and at least
two more are under construction.
?There is currently a large ship under construction
in Kaliningrad that appears to be an amphibious
unit of a new class. It has a ramp for roll-on/roll-
off cargo handling and clam-shell bow doors.
?Five Ropucha-class amphibious ships have been
built for the Soviet navy in Poland, and
construction of additional units is expected to
amount to at least two per year. The Ropucha is
smaller than its predecessor, the Alligator, but
unlike earlier Soviet amphibious ships, these units
appear to provide troop quarters adequate for
long periods at sea.
?The Soviets have been active in developing air
cushion vehicles for naval application. ACVs are
not now available for Soviet operations in distant
areas because there are no ships to carry them
into an assault. It is possible, however, that a
large ship now being built for the Soviet
merchant marine in Finland could be employed
to carry ACVs.
152. Potentially the most significant force improve-
ments would be in the development of carrier aviation
which might reduce the principal deficiency?the lack
of air support?in Soviet capabilities for combat in
distant areas:
?One Kiev-class carrier is in operation, another is
fitting out, and a third is under construction and
expected to be in service in the early 1980s.
?We expect there will be an improved V/STOL
aircraft for use on the Kiev in the early 1980s.
Such an aircraft would have greater ordnance-
carrying capability and greater in-flight perform-
ance than the YAK-36 Forger.
153. Within the next five to ten years, these
improvements will enable the Soviets to better assist
their allies and clients, particularly by supplementing
local defenses. Soviet ships will be able to make more
credible demonstrations of force and better their
capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also
improve their capabilities for direct assault. But
beyond the range of land-based air support, the
Soviets would be unable to carry out an amphibious
assault against determined opposition by sizable
armed forces.
154. A new class of aircraft carrier, with catapult
and arresting gear to handle larger numbers of high-
performance aircraft, would mark a fundamental
improvement in Soviet capabilities to support an
assault in a distant area. There is no evidence that the
Soviets are working on such a carrier. If the Soviets
were to build a carrier of this type, the first unit could
not be available before the mid-1980s. Even then, one
new carrier would be able to provide only a limited
amount of air cover, and problems of insufficient
assault lift and vulnerable lines of communication
would still remain.
155. Even though the Soviets' capabilities are
improving, we believe their active intervention in the
Third World is likely to continue to take the form of
military aid, interposition of naval forces, and
supplementing air defenses of selected clients with
whom they already have substantial military relation-
ships, rather than by direct armed assault. Nonethe-
less, the growth in Soviet capabilities will be noticed
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by Third World states and may enhance Soviet efforts
to influence events in distant areas.
C. Geographic Emphasis
156. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to
seek additional access to overseas facilities to support
their ships and aircraft. Moscow is likely to pursue its
quest for access in the fashion it has displayed in the
past?repeated and increasingly frequent visits of
ships or aircraft followed by acquisition of facilities for
exclusive Soviet use where possible. Strong efforts
along these lines will continue to be made in the
Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa
and the Indian Ocean,
157. Existing political constellations and ongoing
Soviet programs suggest the following area priorities:
?Sonthern Africa is the area of greatest current
potential for the USSR. The Soviets will doubtless
be alert to opportunities to exploit troubles even
though they will have little ability to control or
even predict developments. Moreover, the Soviets
are providing the arms and the training (with
Cuban assistance) to increase insurgent activities,
and they stand ready to react to developing
situations.
?The Middle East will nevertheless remain the
major focus of Soviet military activities in the
'Third World. As long as Soviet relations with
Egypt remain sour, Syria will remain the major
recipient of Soviet military aid, and Moscow will
probably emphasize military exports to other
Arab countries?Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.
?In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will
continue to be the focal points of Soviet military
policy. Moscow apparently intends to go on
looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not
seem to expect any major changes in Asia or
Latin America in the immediate future.
158. While Soviet interests in major areas are likely
to endure, present relations with individual countries
can change abruptly. The relationships the Soviets
have established are subject to the vicissitudes of
politics in the Third World, and Moscow has seen
substantial gains swept away overnight. Despite such
setbacks, the Soviets will remain persistent and highly
opportunistic in developing new clients. To the extent
that the Soviets have increased the use of airlift to
speed their assistance to clients in need, Moscow is
able to develop a new military relationship more
quickly now than in the past.
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2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be clas-
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