SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE: OBJECTIVES, PACE, AND EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07S01968R000100140001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP07501968R000100140001-7
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Intelligence
Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives,
Pace, and Effectiveness
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders
N! JIM IIM 81-10001D
July 1981
Copy 293
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SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE: OBJECTIVES,
PACE, AND EFFECTIVENESS
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CONTENTS
KEY FINDINGS 1
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KEY FINDINGS
1. Scope. Soviet civil defense is a nationwide program under mili-
tary control. It is viewed by the Soviet leadership as part of the USSR's
military strategy and strategic posture. Its objectives are to protect
people?the leadership, the work force of key economic facilities, 1 and
the general population, in that order; facilitate the continuity of eco-
nomic activity in wartime; and enhance the capability for recovery
from the effects of war.
2. Pace. It is difficult to measure the pace of the many prepara-
tions called for under the Soviet civil defense program.
The
creation of military civil defense units, begun in 1966, reached a peak in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. We have not identified any units estab-
lished after 1976. Some aspects of civil defense activity have been
marked by bureaucratic difficulties and public apathy, which appear to
have resulted in uneven implementation of stated goals. On the whole,
however, there has been a general trend of improvement in almost all
facets of the civil defense program over the past decade.
3. Cost. Total civil defense costs are unknown, but cost estimates
have been made of four major elements of the Soviet program?pay
and allowances of about 115,000 full-time civil defense personnel, oper-
ation of specialized military civil, defense units, construction and
maintenance of facilities at these units, and blast shelter construction.
We estimate that in 1979 the ruble cost of these elements was about 9
percent of the cost for Soviet strategic defense forces, or less than 1
percent of the total Soviet defense expenditures. If these elements were
to have been duplicated in the United States, they would have cost
about $2.3 billion with about three-fourths representing manpower
costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations be-
cause they are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative data on
civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)
'Economic facilities include industrial installations and military production plants.
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4. Protection of the Economy. Plans for protecting the Soviet
economy include wartime sheltering, evacuation and dispersal of the
work force, emergency relocation of the essential equipment of certain
installations, geographic dispersal of new installations, hardening, and
rapid shutdown of equipment. We have evidence that a small number
of high-priority installations plan to relocate equipment to low-risk
areas, where production will resume. However, among the various mea-
sures to protect the economy, the Soviets have focused primarily on
sheltering, evacuation, and dispersal of the work force. Those installa-
tions located in what the Soviets consider probable risk areas and
considered by them to be of low priority to wartime production will
cease operations and the work force will be evacuated to low-risk areas
during the crisis. Installations whose continued operation is essential to
support the war effort and to enhance the Soviet capability for
postattack recovery will disperse their off-duty work force to close-in
exurban areas. From there these workers will commute to their urban
installations to continue work around the clock.
5. Protection of the Leadership. We assess the leadership in the
USSR to include the top national leaders, party and government officials
from national and republic levels down to urban rayon levels, managers of
key economic installations, and members of civil defense staffs?about
110,000 people in all. There are extensive facilities in the Moscow area for
protection of the top national military and civilian leaders in wartime, that
are provided independently of the civil defense program. Preparations to
protect the remainder of the civilian leadership are the responsibility of
Soviet civil defense officials. We estimate that the Soviets have sufficient
shelter space for virtually all leadership elements.
6. Protection of the Population. On the basis of our new evalu-
ation of occupancy factors and available shelter space, we estimate that
about 11 percent of the total population in urban areas could be accom-
modated in blast shelters. This figure would rise to about 13 percent by
1988, assuming a continuation of the present rate of shelter construction
and taking into account expected population growth in urban areas.
Thus, large-scale evacuation away from target areas is the key to a
marked reduction in the number of casualties from a nuclear attack on
the USSR. Our study also shows that, in general, large cities can shelter a
higher percentage of their populations than small cities?about 22
percent as compared to 6 percent.
7. The location of civil defense shelters indicates a Soviet emphasis
on protection of the industrial work force.
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8. During the past year we have acquired new information that
has given us a better understanding of Soviet planning for evacuation of
urban areas. Formerly we had postulated on the basis of limited
information that 75 percent of the population of all cities with more
than 25,000 people would evacuate?a total of about 100 million
evacuees from some 900 cities. On the basis of a recently completed
analysis of data on Soviet evacuation planning, we currently estimate
that about 90 percent of the population in some 300 cities would
evacuate?a total of about 85 million evacuees. There is an alternative
view that the evidence available is too tenuous to allow a confident
assessment of the number of cities the Soviets plan to evacuate. 2
9. We estimate that the evacuation and sheltering of the bulk of
the population from urban areas could be accomplished in two to three
days, with as much a's a week required for full evacuation of the largest
cities. These times could be extended and the evacuation process
complicated by shortages in transportation, adverse weather conditions,
or other problems.
10. Effects of Civil Defense. During the past year we reassessed
the effects of Soviet civil defense
The reassessment was based on up-
dated findings on the availability of civil defense shelters in urban areas
and more detailed simulations of Soviet evacuation plans.
Taking these several differences into account, we
conclude that the findings of our current analysis are consistent with our
previous assessment: the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense in reducing
casualties would depend primarily on the extent to which civil defense
measures were implemented; complete implementation of civil defense
plans could reduce Soviet casualties by some 80 million to 100 million;
and civil defense could not prevent massive damage to the economy.
Our current findings show, however, that Soviet casualties and fatalities
could be somewhat higher than our previous estimate.
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence
Officers of the military services.
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11. The key features of our reassessment of Soviet civil defense
are:
Three different levels of Soviet civil defense preparation were
assumed?little or no preparation; implementation of the shel-
ter program; and full implementation of civil defense plans for
protecting the population, including sheltering and evacuation
of urban areas.
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13. These findings were generally consistent with estimated Soviet
casualties and fatalities
indicated that casualties would be:
? About 150 million (including 100 million fatalities) in the case of
little or no implementation of civil defense plans.
? About 100 million (including 65 million fatalities), if urban blast
shelters and the best available protective structures were
occupied.
? About 50 million (including 27 million fatalities), if the Soviets
implemented both the shelter program and evacuation.
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15. Our assessment indicates that in 1988 a hypothetical retali-
atory attack by US forces on generated alert would result in an even
larger number of Soviet casualties among the general population than in
1979.
Expected improvements in Soviet civil defense prepara-
tions would, however, increase the likelihood of survival of a large
percentage of the leadership and essential personnel.
16. Full implementation of civil defense preparations would
greatly reduce the level of Soviet casualties that would result without
such preparations. We do not have high confidence, however, in the
absolute values shown by our analysis for the number of Soviet casual-
ties and fatalities resulting from the prompt effects and fallout from a
large-scale US nuclear attack on the USSR. We believe that Soviet civil
defenses would be most effective in coping with the effects of a limited
nuclear attack, such as an attack on Soviet military targets only. But we
are unable to assess the longer term effects of an attack involving many
thousands of nuclear weapons on the survival of the Soviet population or
on the prospects for Soviet economic recovery.
17. In view of their belief that all aspects of society contribute to a
nation's military capabilities, the Soviet leaders probably view civil de-
fense as contributing to their strength in the US-USSR strategic balance.
They probably expect civil defense to contribute to their ability to con-
duct military operations and to enhance the ability of the nation to
survive and recover from a nuclear exchange. However, in light of the
uncertainties they would have about their ability to implement civil
defense plans and about the immediate and longer term effects of a
massive nuclear exchange, the Soviet leaders cannot have confidence in
the degree of protection that their civil defenses would afford at present
or in the late 1980s. There are alternative views about the strategic
implications of the Soviet civil defense program:
? According to one view, it is doubtful that Soviet leaders would
have sufficient confidence in civil defense in a crisis for it to
contribute more than marginally to decisionmaking. New analy-
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VI
sis in this Memorandum on Soviet
civil defense shows the program to be less effective today than
shown in our estimate of three years ago: there would be fewer
people evacuated and greater numbers of casualties. The holder
of this view also notes that civil defense projections suggest that
current major shortcomings will not be overcome.
There is another view that the continuing Soviet investment of
major resources in the civil defense program clearly demon-
strates the confidence the Soviet leaders have in its value. This
confidence could contribute to Soviet resolve in a future crisis. 4
Our assessment of the impact of the Soviets' capabilities for strategic nu-
clear conflict, including civil defenses, on their policies and conduct
toward the United States is contained in National Intelligence
Estimates.
The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
' The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Senior Intelligence
Officers of the military services.
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