THE MANUFACTURE OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES AT THE MACHINE-BUILDING PLANT I/N ARTEM IN KIEV, UKSSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07S00452R000301010020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 30, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY: uSSR (UR) REPORT NO: 1 517 0432 85
TITLE: The Manufacture of Anti-Ballistic Missiles at the Machine-Building
Plant i/n Artem in Kiev, UkSSR (U)
DATE OF INFO: 670000-710000
IVY MM 001
REPORT DATE:
IVY MM DD1
SUMS The Mac ne-Building Plant i/n Artem in Kiev normally
es
manufacture the 5V61 anti-ballistic missile (ABM). This missile was
designed by the Grushin Design Bureau, was transportable on a large
truck, had an effective altitude of about 190 kilometers, and had
terminal homing guidance. The plant planned to manufacture about 40
missiles a year, but because of manufacturing problems, only finished
four or five during 1967-69. Shortly after 1969, the plant expected to
begin manufacturing a modified model with the designation 5V63 and with
an altitude of 200-220 kilometers. In about 1971, the plant received
directions from higher authorities to permanently cease manufacture of
ABMs. However, six months later the plant received countermanding
instructions and resumed full production. Source believes this
six-month halt in production is somehow associated with the SALT-1
negotiations. This report also describes procedures for modifying
missile blueprints and includes several drawings: 1) the location,
layout, and organizational struc.ture'of the main Artem plant, 2) the
location and layout of the branch plant in Zhulyany, and 3) sketches of
the 5V61 missile.
tablished a new branch in the nearby village of Zhulyany to
ufactured air-to-air missiles (AAM), but in about late 1967 it
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CONFIDENTIAL
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
Organizational Relationships
1. (C) Design Bureau and Leading Plant: The Separate Design Bureau of
General Designer Petr GRUSHIN (Otdelnoye konstruktorskoye byuro
gen-konstruktora Petra Grushina--"Grushin's QKB") was headquartered
somewhere near the Khimki Water Reservoir in Moscow and designed
various AAM and ABM systems for the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The
OKB worked very closely with a plant that was called something like the
Mechanical Plant (Mekhanicheskiy zavod) and that was located near the
Sokol Metro Station in Moscow. This plant was considered to be
Grushin's leading plant (golovnoy zavod), because it was equipped and
manned exceptionally well and because it normally began the series
production of Grushin's newest missiles. Whenever Grushin developed an
even newer missile, the Mechanical Plant would transfer production of
the missile it was manufacturing to one of several other plants and
would then begin to.manufacture the newer missile. However, the
Mechanical Plant would keep the original blueprints of the transferred
missiles, and the other plant that assumed the manufacture could not
officially modify its copies of the blueprints until the Mechanical
Plant modified the original blueprint. The Mechanical Plant, in turn,
had to obtain the permission of the Grushin OKB to make any important
"functional" changes. In this relationship of modification authority,
the Mechanical Plant had a formal status of being the "blueprint
holder" (kalkoderzhatel). However, when?employees of the other plants
discussed these.'modifications among. themselves, they usually said that
"Grushin" had approved or disapproved a, modification, without knowing'
for sure whether Grushin's OKB or-the.Mechanical Plant had been
primarily responsible for the?actualdecsion.
2. (C) Knowledge Limitations: Source's information is limited on the
following points:
a. (C) Source emphasized, on his own initiative, that the "0" in the
acronym OKB stood for "Otdelnoye" (Separate), not the usual "Opytnoye"
(Experimental). He could not explain the significance of this
distinction.
'b. (C) Source was never at the Grushin Design Bureau and did not
know where it was located in relationship to the Khimki Water
Reservoir. We did not have a map of Moscow during the interview, and
without one, Source did not have the. slightest idea where Khimki Water
Reservoir was located in Moscow.
c. (C) Source was unsure about the name "Mechanical Plant," because
he-and his colleagues usually-referred just to "Grushin," although they
understood that this was not really correct. This report will use the
name Mechanical Plant for the sake of convenience. but it may be
erroneous.
d. (C) Source was at the Mechanical Plant twice in about late 1967,
for about three days each time, and he remembers only that it was about
two bus stops from the Sokol Metro Station. Source did not think he
would be able to locate the plant, even with a good map of Moscow that
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IIR 1 517 0432
o map, which
e. (C) The interviewer subsequently obtained n a a metro map, whchds
shows that the Sokol Station is the last stop
through northwest Moscow, toward the Khimki Reservoir (see Figure 1 on n page 4). Apparently, the Grushin Design Buremuyandethe Mechanical
Plant were in the same section of Mosvn be place, but Source had the definite impression that they were at two
separate places.
f. (C) Source did not know to which did he ministtheerianamel
the OKB or Plant were subordinate, Grushin.
personalities in them, except
Artem Plant: The Machine-Building Plant i/n Artem lants to
( (C)
Mashinostroitelnyy zavod imeni Artema) was one of several p
which the Mechanical Plant transfered the manufactureaofu rUBhintiles,
missiles. Before World War Two, this plant
but after the war it changed to theman~ecture of aircraft components head the and then later changed again to AAMS.
not adied
missilehexpert
when it was a textile factory Z?ch re
VLAtSOV,w who until
mid-1970'x--was Vasiliy Ivanovi sale before
by education. During the years 1967-1969 and for
t several y of whefo i none ch
and after, the plant manufactured thartoCUlarly modern or
were considered at that time to be p
sophisticated:
a. (C) A semi-active guided AAM designated URS (expansion
forgotten), which had an acquisition.-range zakhvat) of 16 kilometers
and a striking range (dalnost) o
A modified URSe with an acquipition range of 32 kilometers and
b. (C)
a striking range of 15 kilometers.
ion
c. (C) An unguided aircraft rocket
forgotten; perhaps followed by the number
of a cannister that hung from the wing of fighter aircraft and shot
about eight unguided rockets.
d. (C) A modified RS that shot 12 rockets.
e. (C) A variety of consumer-goods that included toy guns,
salt-and-pepper shakers, and souveniers.
Fi ures: Starting on page 5, see Figure 2 for the location,
4. (C) g and. Figures 4-5 for an organizational chart of
Figure 3 for a layout, Figures 2-5
the Artem Plant. The information in paragraph 3 arerann,d in which Figutyres be
lant s' new branch p Figures will
does.' not include the Artem Plant's I
described'separatelyf'`etnrting in?-paragraph 6 below. 4-5
contain all the names of people that Source could remember duringthe?-
interview. Source rioted the following:
a. (C) Source did not know the number or names of any of the,other
plants, but was certain that there were others.
CONFIDENTIAL
(text continues on page 81
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Figure 3, Layout of
Machine-Building Plant
i/n Artem (U)
Central. Design
Bureau
Experimental ?
Design Bureau'
Fence'
with
gate
ulitsa Glubochitskaya
7-story-
building
* Entrance Control
(vkhodno kontrol)
f
o
CONFIDENTIAL components received rom other
'ants--antennas, engines, sensors,
batteries, radio cmmnonpnra. nrr.
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1.1
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Medical Clinic on
0 First.Floor
GONFIPENTJAL
Mechanical workshops
(details unknown)
Testing :(i_ .p L lnvv) workshop 117
(conducts shock, climatic,'and
static tests of missiles).
'4
{0
bci , U ,
q N 1
'a ?rl U)
r-4 1-1 (1 N
r1 O r-1 54 .
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5w P.
0- 0
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In
1 0 A
Plant administration on
first two stories. 'Other'
stories unknown
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
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COF1UEWTPL
Figure 4, Organization of the Machine-
Building Plant i/n Artem in Kiev (U)
Militar Re resentative
Col fnu VYATCHIN
(actually subordinate to the
rayon military representative,
who has the rank of colonel)
Chief Engineer
Workshops manufacturing
Workshops manufacturing
RS and URS missiles.
Organizational details
300-350 employees of
this design bureau,
which does modifications
of the plant's produuct8s.
See Figure 5 on p g
a separate organizational)
chart.
Department of Technical
Control (Otdel tekhnicheskogo
kontrolya--OT1C)
Testin Workshop #17
(Ispytatelnyy tsekh 17)
Conducts shock, climatic,
and other and missiles
O erational-Maintenance
Department Ekspoatatsionno-
otdels see Para 16)
.remontnyy
GOWF1DENT1L
c
the plant. A El
Page 7 of 23 pages
IIR 1 517 0432 85
Plant Administration
(The only name recalled
is Boris GERMAN, the
Chief of the Department of
Labor and Pay (Otdel truda
i zarplata)
fnu) .Yomurf '
(Source comment: Rose up through the ranks at
k old man by 1969.)
i
Entrance control'
(Vkhodnoy kontrol)
Checks quality of
components sent to
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Figure 5, organization of the Artem
Plant's Central Design Bureau .
Chief
Anatomy Levchenko
(about 300 employees)
Deputy
Boris Sergeyevich KUPRIN
Section 1
KB-1
(75 people
(KB-2
(50 people)
Section 3
KB-3
(50 people)
KB-4
50 people)
`(KB-i modified the missiles... themselves
J:See bottom 'of page for specializations
,of other sections.)
Page 8 of 23 pages
IIR 1.517 0423 85
Deputy
(name forgotten
(KB-5
15 people)
Support
Units
(20 people)
Electrical
Bri ade brigada)
V tal y ABRASHKO,
Chief
25 people
Radio-Electronics
Brigade
(no'names recalled)
25 people 25 people
(each of these three brigades does modifications
of its particular parts of the missiles)
Specializations of other sections of the design bureau:
KB-2:,Modifies auxiliary (vspomogatelnoye) equipment of missiles.
Section chief is Yuriy TVERDOKHLEBOV
KB-3: Writes documentation for all equipment associated with the
missile systems.
KB-4: Modifies all equipment for mobilization and field conditions
dlya polevykh usloviy) of the missile systems.
KB-5: Designs the consumer products of the plant. Designers were
normally assigned to this section while waiting for their security
clearances.
Support Units: These include the blueprint copying office, the
archives (where unclassified correspondence was filed), and the secure
library (which had about five.employees).
CONFIDENTIAL
Fuselage and Casing
Brigade
(no names recalled)
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CONFIUEWTIPL
Page 9 of 23 pages
IIR 1 517 0432 85
called post Office Box
the plant was c The plant chose to
the mid-1960'x, a normal name. Street.
b. (C) Before to choose located on Artem
then required the it was thought the
50, but was plant because but Source number was
be called the Artant was Artem 50, the street
The address of the em plant revolutionary
street is and named after to do with Artem
the Post Office The number
has nothing
hero, similarity a coi ncidence. probably j
hero, and the n
Mikoyan, the aircraft designer. the telephone or telex number or
could not remember
c. (C) Source the plant. missiles mark of modifications of the?planned for the years after 1969.
the plant manufactured per
d. (C) Source had nhaveebeenap ut any
or rockets that might missile or rockets h any of their
tey or 4,000 not know how many cost ,000 tubles.
or month. He did not know how much these missile
year s and
except that one uRS missih le 4, ecially of the
components cost, drew a roug s, esp
(Originator's Comment: Source these system does not obviously
more detailed sketch sketch of the URS
could draw a Source but it looks m
electrical subsystems. ore like the
silhouettes, but drawing
AAM
and more supporting resemble anY standard Soviet A better
next interview.)
AA-6a ACRID than anything else,
be obtained in the
separate design bureaus were
details will b Two Sep territory of
Artem Plant on page 6) on the
5 and
(C) Desi building sat see Figure. interact
one occupied one half ?taffs did not the lg
located In Each bureau but the two s
the Artem Plant. ual in sizes
seemed to be roughly eq
tnoye konstruktorskoye
in any systematic manner,
Experimental Design Bureau (OPY
The Exp was subordinate directly to
of the tly t Plant.
a. (C) headed by (fnu) to VIGMAN, dministration o equipment that Artem
byuro--OKB), not to the a arently
GrushinIs oKB in MOSCOW, that people made and fthiseOKB aen
Judging from various card ins front of the buil fosgS the-to-auseful
launchers race a
was Sometimes in the y,
some, kind of aid.) ? .
designed?nd developed Source couldinot the provide
(Originator's be saw
missiles. tion of theequipment
drawing or descrip a konstruktorsko plant
n Bureau (Tsentralnoy he Artem
Central Desig the administration of t 'he Plant
(C) The to
b? wad" subordinate modifications
TsKB) tg of, modifications of the theseles that .byuro _ ue pr ..in . rd inate OKB
$ s
re area;bl TsKB ,_had'to - coo
Plant inanu' SCtur'a This respons b.w more
uthorities of the'Arecowl nt' and 'als ribed in
with various a and will be desc
M
and with the Mechanical? Plrathi 1, above
described briefly in parag P
detail in paragraphs 16-20, below..
'CONFIDENTIAL
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
The 5V61 and 5V63 Anti-Ballistic Missiles:
6 (C)'Pre-1968 Historyi Grushin's:OKB'designed and developed,the 5V61
ABM probably in the early 1960' s, andthe4Mechan~ical..Plant.in Moscow ...
began to serially produce it sometime:in the mid-1960's. By-late 1967,
e Ministry of Aviation Induat-r. Eth d to build a new plant in
a-small.town on the south-west
outskirts of Kiev'to take over'.the manufacturing responsibility from
the Mechanical Plant.? Since the Artem-_Plant-had-employed practically
all the experienced missile manufacturing specialists in the Kiev area,
the Ministry also decided to make the new plant a branch of the Artem
Plant, rather than to make it an independent plant, although there had
been serious discussion of the latter possibility. The Artem Plant
could not manufacture the ABMs itself, because it had to keep'
manufacturing its AAMs and because it did not have room to expand.
(Originator's Comment: Seepages Figures 6 and 7 on pages 11 and 12
for the location and layout of the branch plant in Zhulyany. Source
did not know why the new plant tad to be built-at Kiev instead of
somewhere else.)
7. (C) Branch Head:',.The probable head of the new branch was (fnu)
SuKACH, who had been a deputy of Vlasov at the Artem Plant. Since
Sukach was much more expert than Vlasov in missile technology, Vlasov
viewed him as a professional threat and managed to get rid of him ins
about 1967. Vlasov was without work -for about six months, but the
timing was very fortunate for.him, because he was the natural candidate
to head the new branch when the decision was made to build it. He was
therefore appointed to that position, and he probably took over the
entire Artem Plant after Vlasov died in the mid-1970'x. (Originator's
Comment: Source was not certain about the truth of this story or even
that Sukach headed the branch. Source credited Vlasov's authority to
the fact that Vlasov was the brother-in-law of P.V. DEMENTYEV, the
Minister of Aviation Industry.
8. (C} Transfer of Personnel from Artem: At the end of 1967 or the
beginning of 1968, the Artem Plant administration asked for volunteers
from the plant's work force to transfer to the new Zhulyany branch.
The administration did not offer more money to these volunteers, but
did explain that the volunteers would have opportunities to fill higher
supervisory positions in the new departments and workshops that would
be organized. Most of the employees decided not to transfer, at least
then, because the new branch was not as conveniently located and did
not yet offer complete facilities--such as sidewalks, indoor toilets,
or a cafeteria. Of the 25 employees in Source's TsKB brigade, for
example, only about four agreed to transfer. In fact, those four
employees continued to work at the same desks and on many of the same
projects, because the new branch still did not have enough offices and
work for a complete transfer. When these "transfered employees" did
need to actually go to the branch plant to examine some piece of
equipment, they would take the train there, conduct their business, and
then return to the Artem Plant. Because of this situation, the
administration did not presssure many employees to transfer who did not
want to.
rRFIRrNTIAI (text continues on page 13)
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GONFIUEIITIAL
Figure 7, Layout of Zhulyany Branch Page:12,of 23 pages
Plant in 1969 (U) IIR 1 517 0432 85'
F Outhouse (no indoor toilet)
m
n
m
4
0
Fh
H.
0
m
Mechanical
Workshop
(still under
construction)
Many large building
foundations "were
being laid in these
directions
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Page 13 of 23 pages
IIR 1 517 0432 85
ofAofabout
9. (C) Transfer of Blueprints from maMoscow:
abouttfiveadesignersthe
end of 1967 or beginning-of
(including Source) from the new Zhulyany Plant on
two trips of about three days each time to pick up a
t. The blueprinta of the 5V61 owereeboxesaandaboxesnof them bandpalltofwthem
extremely numerous--there train to
had to be inventoried by this team before they were shipped by
;:Zhulyany. This transfer of blueprints was significant, because with
this act, the Mechanical ~ea~Mceased
=esponsibilitynthatsthesMechanicalr
the
,,future modifications of
Plant did retain for the AAMs that the Artem Plant manufactured.
(Originator's Comments See agraph 17foria descriptioonnof the role)
that the Mechanical Plant continua play
The Zhulyany Plant, as the blueprint holder for the ABMs, would now
.play an analogous role, but the Grushin OKB would have to grant final
approval for modifications. The blueprints were initially sent to the Plan t:Artem Plant because the facilities of
usedtateZhulyany.
-incomplete, but would eventually be
10. (C) Security: The plant administration did not provide its
employees with an explanation of what the 5V61 was and never even used
the word "missile"--just the word "product "(izdeliye). For example,
,,the.workers who were manufacturing."Product 5V61 could conclude that
this :was a missile and pot a wgetNonother terminologyfwaseusedwfor
observations:,and shared comments.,
(Originator'sComment: Source had never heard the words
~, the,: missile.
"Avoz" or "Aldad" used in relationsl}'ip to any missiles.) All plant
.employees had security clearances--about 50% had third form, about 40%
Most employees--
had second form, and about 10% had first,form.
eB, but teSource)
were econd
peoplecwho had a need
(including
materials s and information to use them. The secure library would check out a blueprint of a
component only to an employee who was assigned to work on that
component. For example, an employee in the TsKB electrical brigade
could. normally check out only 4blueprints that started with the letters
(e.g. E1-l325),which`,designated~an electrical component, and not which d
s b y pX'it started ti~,,Rtheeelectrical and radioebrigades worked
raaio~componenomponent. In In addi
in separate rooms controlled by separate combination-locks. Each
employee had to write all his notes in a special notebook with
pre-numbered pages and had ' to "turn s in Y'his" notebook to-ithe:, secure
,library at the,end of every work day. However, security was not
:,.
ohsitously attic"ter for: the 5V61 than it was for'the AAMs.
'CONFIDENTIAL
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11. (C) Missile Description: Source-visited the Zhulyany branch plant
several timeso examine,the electrical section of the 5V61 missile as
the missile lay in the final assembly area and also had several
opportunities to glance at technical manuale;:that briefly described the
system as a whole. From those experieri es, he'Mwas able to draw the
system (see below)::
.
a. The missile was about.
meters wide at the bottom 12 meters long and about 1.8
(not counting the fins), (Originator's
Comment: The' dimensions that, Source'previously told another
interviewer, who'wrote the knowledgeability brief, were 11,meters long
and 1.6 meters wide.) A small, hollow tube
the nose protruding from the tip of
(apparently a Pitot-static tube) was called the "entry part of
air pressure" (priyemnaya chast vozdushnogo eniya). antennas
a
built into the top set of fins were covered with a canvas material.
(Originator's Comment: 'As far as Source knew, there was no additional
booster stage for the missile.)
Probable Pitot-static tube.and antennas _
(see-page 15, Figure 10*:for elope-up) -
Figure 8
,
5V61 Missile
Radio-equipment (Radio-obox'udovani e)
U
with
se
d
ti
i
.
..
c
o
-
oppler term na
-eu ance ra ar
CONFIDENTIAL Page 14 of
TTn . 23 pages
-- ' mod cnast.) see page 17,
paragraph llg, Figure _____ ,
'Electrical equipment '(elektrichesko e-
oborudovani e) section, see pages 16 -1T
paragrap , Figure 12 for details
Second radio-equipment section (no details)
Antennas, covered with canvas material
Powder-rocket en
ine''(P
g
orokhovo raketn
dvigatpl l .,.,...... '~
paragrap
Figure 1
for%mo
d
s
,
re
'
etail
Lattice of bolts that explode to separate
liquid and powder fuel-stages.--Dark .areas on
close-up of bolt show explosive charges
Liquid-fuel engine
Worm's-eye view of missile
Main nozzle
Vernier nozzles
5
Z?
In-takes for pressurized air'
to control vernier engines
PfNFIARTFIA1
Close-up
of bolt
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b. (C) Deployment: The missile was
to be transported in a cannister on
the back of a large truck which was
Page 15 of 23 pages
IIR 1 517 0432 85
cleslgnea w
missile. (Originator's Comment:
QD _10-0
Source only saw a picture of this truck Fi 9 , Source'ts Concept
and cannister, never the actual items.
The interviewer didn't clarify whether of 5V61 5V61 Transpor-Erector (~
the truck.erected the missile onto the
ground for launching or whether the truck actually launched the
missile.)
c. () acrac_After the missile took off, a ground-based guidance
radar system tracked and guided the missile most of the way to the
target. The optimum interception altitude was 180-200 system in ers.
During the final part of the flight, a doppler eta and pinvthed
missile's nose cone turned on, illuminated thettarge ananns were
terminal self guidance (samonavedeniye).
e Fig
e
(
)
s
built onto the nose of the missile
Tube
ure 8)
and about four onto the upper
ce fins
never (see
' saw the ground-
F
Sour
t
:
(Originators Commen
based radar and knew no additional details about it.
The interviewer asked Source to elaborate on the
member
/
terminal guidance, but Source could not re
any details except that the system used the doppler
d without any prodding.
id
e
method, a detail he prov
The interviewer carefully and repeatedly asked
whether Source was sure that the missile had a
terminal guidance system, and he answered that
was. The interviewer did not clarify d tails about
FigurelO, Tube
and Five Antennas
on Nose Cone (U)
had learned or guessed each of these e
the missile's altitude and guidance, but intends to do so during the
next interview.)
d.- (C) Guidance: The bottom fins te misaddsileithadion,dothentrobotl
that'guided the missile in the atmosphere.
stage of the missile was equipped with four vv ernier enginessthataguided
the missile above the atmosphere.
there was no apparent method of steering the missile, so Source
concluded that the termiThe interviewersdid notndetermineowhether?the
(Originator's Comment:
bottom stage had four fins 90 degrees apart or three fins120tdegrees
apart. Source did not draw any control flaps on the upper of fins
that remained after thebottomhsstage sseseparated, soiit is not clear
whether these fins might have e. (C) Propulsion: The propulsion system consisted of aliquid-fuel
bottom stage and a solid-fuel top stage. the most difficult
problems that the Zhulyany branch plant. had in manufacturinnggethe 5V61
was to properly weld the seams. of the liquid-fuel tanks.
Mechanical Plant in Moscow had been able to weld them, but the welders
in Zhulyany did not have the right equipment and skill to achieve the
CONE! DENIL/IL
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
same results. The top stage consisted of about 16 parallel powder'
charges (porokhovyye zaryady), each of which was a.cylinder about two
mete
s l
r
ong and 10 centimeters thick.
The two propulsion stages were connected
by a metal lattice that exploded to sepa-
rate the bottom, liquid-fuel stage. Then,
the solid-fuel stage ignited to propel
the missile the final distance to the
target. (Originator's Comment: Source
was not asked to explain why a'solid-fuel
stage would be placed above a liquid-fuel Figure 11, stage, and there may be some confusion on oo.r) Side
tto (Inte-
stage,
this point. The knowledgeablility brief of Powder Bottom Views
on this Source, which was written by Powder dif- Per tzees in
Rocket Engine (O)
ferent interviewer, says that there were eight
"powder charges," each about 1.2 meters long
and .25 meters thick, in the missile's warhead. However, the
knowledgeability brief also said that the top propulsion stage was
formally called the "powder rocket engine" (porokhovoy raketnyy
dvigatel--PRD), and the sketch that Source drew for the interviewer who
wrote this report clearly shows the powder charges right above the
liquid-fuel engine and three sections below the warhead (see Figures 8
and 11). Source also mentioned to this interviewer that the powder
charges were similar to a propulsion device he remembered seeing on the
SA-2 (Sistema 75) when he worked with that system while on active .'
military duty in the early 1960's. Finally, it may be of interest to
mention that Source said to the other interviewer that the liquid-fuel
engine had two fuel tanks, a detail he did not mention to this
interviewer.)
f. (C) Electrical Section: The electrical section included two
large power blocks (bloki pitaniya), two regulators (regulyatory), and
two sensor boxes (datchiki). Each of these were prepared products
(gotovyye izdeliya), manufactured at some other plant and delivered in
their casings. The Zhulyany Plant performed no internal modifications
Cables
Top of
Missile
'Regulator
Power Blocks
Regulator
Figure 12, Electrical Section (U)
rnMDinr-MITIAl
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A. rsalu treat the entire warhead v u U
section was about 1.2 meters long and only 45 centimeters 00t)
wide. See also paragraph 9d, above, for the KB's remarks
about internal powder charges.) Some of 000
id
instead of J sa
that it the warhead had been red (=then they ~
because suchraewarhead wou d wbeould have money, Figure
13
not clear
h
i
,
w
t wa
ether th
sese remarks were informed or ignorant. Grenade-like
12. (C) Initial Production: Warhead
.plan was to manufacture UThthre 9esda month
production
the beginning of 1969, despite the as
plant itself was
still being built. In fact, only twooofemany at pthe lanned
s wereists hid
been erected by the end of 1969, and many of the wall bu
simply canvas hangings. There were also many di f ficult manufacturin
problems, especially the problem of welding the liquid-fuel tanks. ,~
Therefore, the plant only completed four or five missiles during the
entire period of 1968-69, and those were all declared to be defective
by military representatives. However, in order for the plant to
receive money for at least some production, the Ministry of Defense
agreed to accept the defective missiles as training (uchebnyye)
models. When the first missile was complete, Petr Grushin and Petr
SHELEST, Politburo member and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Part
both came together to inspect the plant and missile and to y
in a congratulatory ceremony. participate
kedgali
inowlgault (Originator's Comment: According to the
missiles were manbri f, ource previously said that a total of six
certaint It will be necessary to establish Source's
y about this number in the next interview.
13. (C) 5V63 Modification: By developed and the Mechanical Plant had mn 1969, manufac the tu urred a d a odi had
the 5V61 called the 5V63. modification of
in loGO c___ _ A prOtotvncs qua]
mi
This launch was rumored to be a
administration of &-- .,,
ssile was test launched
"+jYa&ly branch nevertheless understood th
would eventually manuf
t
ac
at it
ure thidifi
s mocation.
altitude, 200-220 kilometers The 5V63 had a higher
(Originator's Comment: Source ahearddabout thisnfromlhis supervisors.
.who was trying to talk Source out of 'leaving P r,
job in 1969. The supervisor hoped toconvincehSourcetthattthe another
had a bright future and and that Source would have the o Plant
pportunity to
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
of these items, only external modifications such as different
placement, cable hook-ups, or replacement of the items. Orignator's
Comment: Although Source specialized in modifications of(tthisisection,
he had never seen the insides of any of these items and did not know,
for example, what characteristics the sensors measured.
g. (C) War= d: The warhead inside the warhead section was a green
cylinder about 1. 2 meters long and 80 centimetes wide anri .?~,..e..~a ..~ ~.
rows of bumps like a
rlItInnr ~T-ni
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IIR 1'517 0432 85
work with the most modern technology. Since Source's knowledge of this
'modification is based solely on this short conversation, he cannot
provide additional details on this subject.)
14. (C) Post-1969 Production: According to remarks made by employees
who continued to work at the Artem and Zhulyany plants, the problems in
manufacturing the ABM missiles were solved by 1970 or 1971, and
production was proceeding at a smooth rate. (Originator's Comment:
Source is fairly certain that, the Zhulyany Plant had begun to
manufacture the 5V63'modification by this time.) However, in about
1971 or 1972, a political decision was made to stop production
completely and forever. Even the construction of the plant, which was
almost finished, was halted. This news came as a shock to the
employees of the Zhulyany branch plant, many of whom had left
comfortable jobs elsewhere to transfer to this new plant in hopes of
career advancement. In fact, the plant had no alternate product at
all,-and the employees were worried that they would soon find
themselves without any income'., Since the Ministry of Aviation Industry
could not provide any sure information about the plant's future, the
plant administration took the initiative to look around itself for any
new products to manufacture instead of the tissiles. The
administration even went so far as to enter formal negotiations with a
plant in Vasilkov to help manufacture civilian refrigerators that that
plant produced. (Originator's Comment: Source said that Vasilkov is a
town about 40 kilometers from Kiev, but it is not listed in available
gazetteers.) However, about six months after the Zhulyany Plant
received its orders to cease production of the ABMs, it received new
orders that completely overturned the previous orders. Now, the plant
was supposed to finish construction of its facilities and resume the
previously planned production. According to subsequent remarks made by
plant employees, the plant finished its facilities, resumed production,
and continued to manufacture the missiles into the 1980's.
(Originator's Comment: The information in this paragraph is based on
casual conversations that Source had with his former colleagues at the
plant when he ran into them around Kiev. He did not question his
colleagues with much interest or in any detail about these
developments, so he considers his understanding of this subject to be
rather sketchy. He also had the impression that the Zhulyany branch
plant had grown to about twice the size of the parent Artem plant and
therefore must have had a labor force of about 10,000 workers.)
15. (C) ABM or SAM?: Source had never heard authoritatively that the
5V61/63 was an ABM--instead of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) primaril
for use against airplanes--but nevertheless reached this conclusion y
based on the following considerations:
a. (C) He had served as a career officer in a System 75 (SA-2)
battalion during the early 1960's and knew that this missile's altitude
on the order of 200 kilometers was much higher than that of ordinary
SAMs. At that time, he knew that the highest altitude SAM was the
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
System 200 (SA-5), which he had seen launched during a live-fire
exercise at Kapustin Yar. The 5V61 was much bigger than the missile of
the System 200 and was therefore a obviously in a different class.
b. (C) The fact that Shelest, a Politburo member, came to the plant
for the ceremony in honor of the first missile indicated that this
missile must have a national, strategic importance.
c. (C) The decision to halt the production of the missile was
definitely associated in time with the SALT-1 negotiations, although
the significance of this association was not clear. Source could not
remember for sure whether the production halt was just before, during,
or after the treaty, but he was certain that it was close to the same
time. He also could not remember what year the treaty was signed, but
he thought that the production halt was in about 1971 and that the
treaty was signed in about the same year. He speculated that the
Soviets halted production for six months after the treaty to fool the
US government but then resumed it as a secret violation of the treaty.
In fact, the treaty was signed in 1972, so it is not clear whether the
production halt was in 1971, before the treaty, or in 1972, after the
treaty.
Missile Modification Procedures
16. (C) Initiation of Modifications: The great majority of modifica-
tions for any AAMs in series production originated as suggestions or
complaints from military units using the missiles. The design bureau
or the manufacturing plant proposed a much smaller proportion of the
modifications, but often took credit for modifications originally
proposed by military units. About 10% of the modifications genuinely
originated at the plant. A military unit making a suggestion or
t would address it to the Operations Maintenance Department
i
l
a
n
comp
(Eksploatatsionno-remontnyy otdel--ERO) of the plant that had supplied
the missile. Although this department was subordinate to the plant, it
consisted primarily of active-duty military officers. They traveled
around to the military units using the missile and helped them with any
operations or maintenance problems that the units were having with the
missiles. (Source Comment: Although ERO duty was hardly considered a
hardship assignment, the ERO members of the Artem Plant took great
pride in their recent combat exploits. According to their story, a
couple of the ERO members had been working with Egyptian military units
when the 1967 War broke out. The Egyptians retreated in panic from the
Israeli attack and abandoned a lot of Soviet AAMs. However, the heroic
Soviet ERO members sneaked through the lines and managed to retrieve
the missiles before the Israelis could capture them.)
17. (C) Modification Authority: The ERO was subordinate to the plant's
chief engineer and would therefore refer the complaints or suggestions
to him. If the proposal involved a very, simple manufacturing change,
he might prepare the proposal in some technical detail, but most
proposals involved some operational functions that were beyond his
staff's competence to properly evaluate. Therefore, he usually sent
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the proposal in its rough form to the Mechanical Plant, which was the
minimal level of authority to approve any modification. If the
proposal involved a modification that did not change the operational
capability of the missile, the Mechanical Plant could approve the
modification itself, but any functional modification required the
approval of Grushin's OKB. Most proposals did go all the way to the
OKB. In either case, however, the Mechanical Plant and Grushin's OKB
were usually too busy with their current missile projects to actually
make the modification, so the approving authority would send the
approved proposal back down to the manufacturing plant's TsKB with a
deadline for accomplishing the modification. The head of the TsKB
would assign the modification down the chain of command to the
appropriate section (KB-l, 2, 3, or 4; see Figure 5), and the section
would assign it to the appropriate brigade, and the brigade head would
assign it to a specific designer (konstruktor), who then became
personally responsible for accomplishing the modification by the
deadline.
18. (C) Blueprint Change Sheets The designer usually received the
modification proposal in a very rough form. For example, it was common
to receive a simple piece of'paper that would say something like,
"replace the big box shown on blueprint E1-1325, sheet 2, with two
boxes, each half the size and weight of the large box, and maintain the
center of gravity." The purpose of the change was often neither
explained nor obvious. A typical deadline was about one month from the
time that the engineer had received his instructions. The designer
would then go to the secure library, check out the blueprint, and
perhaps then go to the workshop where that part of the missile was
assembled and look at the actual parts. Then, the designer would
decide how to make the change and would draw the new arrangement on a
special form called a Blueprint Change Sheet (Listok izmeneniya
chertezha--LICh). If several variants were possible, he might prepare
a separate LICh for each of them so that he could still meet the
deadline if his first proposal were rejected. This technical analysis
and drawing of the modification was usually the easiest part of the
process and typically took only about a week.
19. (C) Coordination: The most difficult and time-consuming part of
the modification process was to coordinate the modification with all
the appropriate authorities at the manufacturing plant. At the bottom
of the LICh, under a large blank space where the designer drew his
modification, was a large section of blocks where coordinating
authorities would sign their initials when they had approved the
change. At a minimum, the modification had to be coordinated with the
designer's brigade chief, section chief, the TsKB chief, and the Chief
Engineer. Depending on the modification, it might also have to be
coordinated with, for example, the chief of the supply section, the
chief of the stamping section, and the chief of the ERO. The designer
had to use his own good judgement in determining who the modification
should be coordinated with, and the Chief Engineer would not initial
the change if he himself didn't believe it had been coordinated with
all the necessary authorities. The main difficulty in coordinating
CO NrmFNTim
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with all these official was not to convince themofthat thetmodification
was a good one but simply to get a few
them the proposal and get them to initial the form. These officials
were out of their offices too much or toibusy to be vvery ytaccessible.
As a result, this part of the process t p Y t
20. (C) Final Approval: After everybody else had initialed the LICh,
the Chief Engineer would initial it and send itothe Mechinicalion on
Plant. Usually, the Mechanical Plant would approve the modf
its own authority, withouapprove rlthetmodificationheitrattachedBthelf
the Mechanical Plant did
modification to the original blueprint, and the modification became
assigned eadline. The in
official the day of the
deadline e came from the need
many places at once--at the Mechanical Plant, at the manufacturing
plant, and possibly for mtinyadunits vancewhere
that the changeewassimminent~e
ERO would notify these units
Miscellaneous Plant Information
21. (C) Plan Fulfillment: The Artem Plant (not counting the Zhulyany
branch in 1968-69) practically always fulfilled its production plan,
but did not always receive its deserved bonuses, because of overall
problems in the region's economy. For example, Kiev'thes
organizations would often fail
government would arbitrarily reallocate some of the bonus money from
plants like the Artem Plant to the retail organizations tom spread the
on
misery around a little more evenly. At least,
of most workers at the Artem Plant, and they therefore felt that they
were regularily cheated out of their due reward for fulfilling their
own plan. (Originator's Comment: Source was asked howththatothetplan
plan for the TsKB was expressed. He generally remembered
was expressed in several categories, like total modifications accom-
plished, self-initiated modifications accomplished, moneydsavedremember
percentage of deadlines met, and so on. However, he ou not
any detailed examples and considered this topic of discussion to be
unimportant. In his opinion, the production plan for the design bureau
was a paper exercise in which the bureau's administration could almost
always choose the most favorable criteria and interpret the numbers
willfully to always demonstrate that the plan had been fulfilled. He
also felt that the local government's ease in reallocating bonus money
was an indication that this attitude pervaded the entire Soviet
system.) o 22. (C) Work Load: The Artem Plant easily had enoughremcplloyees
of
handle the normal work load. For example, the the TsKB had about 25 designers to just do modifications of the
electrical systems of the four kinds of aircraft missiles that the
plant manufactured. Because of leaves and other assignments, probably
only about 20 of the designers were normally at work at any given time,
but even this was excessive. Five designers could have actually done
('I -IN IV-Iil1-M171 1i
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IIR 1 517 0432 85
this brigade's work if they worked efficiently. As a result of this
excess manning, the employees goofed off a lot and worked at an easy
pace.
23. (C) Pay: Basic pay for engineers (designers) was about 145 rubles a
month, for senior engineers about 180 rubles a month, and for workers
about 250-350 rubles a month. About ten months every.year, these basic
salaries were supplemented with a bonus of about 30% for fulfilling the
plan, although the plan was actually fullfilled practically every
month. Fringe benefits for employees included a medical clinic at the
plant and recreation center in the town of Pirnovo (coordinates not
listed in available gazetteers). In addition, the plant had an
apartment complex for employees, but the waiting list for an apartment
there was about seven years.
24. (C) Level of Technology: The level of technology at the Artem
Plant could be described as "high, modern, and adequate," but certainly
not-state-of-the-art. Another way to describe the technology was that
the technology of the product-the missiles--was definitely higher than
technology of the manufacturing process. The manufacturing
ehn gy was therefore the most important constraint in improving the
technology of the product. The most primitive manufacturing technology
was in the areas of the plant that did the primary shaping of
materials--such as the shops that forged or stamped metal or made
rubber linings. Some of these shops looked almost like garage
workshops, and the workers there did a lot of manual labor. However,
the workshops farther in the production or assembly process were
obviously more modern. There was no foreign equipment (remembered by
Source) except for an East German blueprint copier. The difference
between the manufacturing technology at the Artem Plant and its
Zhulyany branch plant was "like night and day." The new plant was much
more modern. Neither plant seemed to be directly associated with any
research institutes.- (Originator's Comment: Source can comment in more
detail on particular technologies associated with the missiles'
electrical sytems.)
25. (C) Missile Shipments: The aircraft missiles that the Artem Plant
manufactured were assembled in the top stories of a building (see
Figure 3 on page 6) and stored there in boxes until ready for
shipment. All these boxes were picked up and hauled away by trucks at
night. Sometimes, as the workers were leaving work in the evening,
they would see that an enormous pile of these boxes--piled higher than
a man could reach--had suddenly appeared in the courtyard in front of
the assembly building. When the workers returned to work early the
next morning, all of these boxes would be gone.
26. (C) Civil Defense: Civil defense training was
occasional games to compete in first-aid andchemical-protectionted to
drills. The plant did not seem to have a systematic instructional
program, nor an underground shelter. Source thought that the plant
must have some kind of wartime warehouses and an evacuation site, but
he had no ideas where these were.
CONF1flEpTji
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