MANUFACTURE OF NEW MULTI-STAGE MISSILES BY FOUR NEW BRANCHES OF THE ARTEM PLAN IN KIEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07S00452R000301010008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 31, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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FTIAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
Individual Items Of This Report Are
UNCLASSIFIED Unless Otherwise Indicated
This Is An Information Report, Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
COUNTRY: USSR (UR)
REPORT NO: 1 517 0016 86
TITLE: Manufacture of New Multi-stage Missiles by Four New Branches
of the Artem PlanT in Kiev (U)
DATE OF INFO: 720500
IVY MM DO)
ORI(INATOR:
REPORT DATE: 860131
IYY MM DO)
Det 21, AFSAC REQ REFERENCES: A-FSC-43240
A-FSC-42648, T-11X-43206
SOURCE: (C/NF/WN) WASH-3889. Source was a fifth, category fitter on a construction
brigade of the Plant i/n Artem in Kiev, Ukrainian SSR, from 1950 through May' 1972. He
worked on the construction of the main Artem plant, housing facilities for Artem
workers, and the branch plants at Zhulyany and Shchors.
SUMMARY: (C/NF) The Plant i/n Artem in Kiev began a high-priority, rapid, large-
scale expansion in 1968 or 1969 that coincided with very secret work on a large, 11-
meter-long, multi-stage missile (possible SAM or ABM). This was a departure from the
plant's traditional work on smaller air-to-air missiles. A number of characteristics
made this expansion curious. The expansion had high priority from the senior
leadership of the Artem plant and from leadership above that. This priority resulted
in overtime work by the construction brigades on holidays and normal days off to
rapidly complete the construction of the new branch plants. Four branch plants
( ilk iali) were constructed, one each at Zhulyany, Shchors, Vinnitsa (all less than 100
miles from Kiev), and an unidentified fourth location. At least at the Zhulyany branch
plant, and possibly at the other three, work was being accomplished on a large, multi-
stage missile. Work on this missile was very highly classified. Active concealment
efforts were incorporated into the Zhulyany branch plant, apparently designed to
prevent detection of work on this missile by US national technical means. This missile
was completely assembled, crated, and loaded onto railroad cars under the roof of a
single building. This report contains basic background information on the Artem Plant
and its branch plants. More extensive information is provided on the branch plant at
Ziulyany and the production of the multi-stage missile there beginning probably in the
Spring, of 1971, to include descriptions of the facility, buildings, the missile,
in
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assembly procedures, production data, crating, loading, an
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1. (C/NF) Artem Main Plant:
a. (C/NF) Designation: The Plant i/n Artem was designated P/YA (Pochtoyy
Yashchik) 50. its address was Ulitsa Glubochetsa Number 1, Kiev (5026N/03031E, NIS),
Ukrainian SSR, USSR. It employed approximately 18,000 personnel.
b. (C/NF) Mission: The mission of the Artem main plant was the design, testing,
and production of missiles (raketi) The Artem plant originally was involved in the
construction of air-to-air missiles. Sometime in the mid to late 1960s, the plant
began work on larger multi-stage missiles. (Originator's Comment: Source was unsure
of the purpose of these large missiles. He thought they were too small to be ballistic
missiles, but obviously too large- to be air-to-air missiles. There were very few
rumors about these large missiles, and the source never asked others about them because
the project was kept very secret.)
c. (C/NF) Branch Plants: There were four branch plants affiliated with the Artem
plant. They were located at Zhulyany, Shchors, Vinnitsa, and at an unidentified fourth
location.
(1) (C/NF) Zhulyany Branch Plant: Construction began on a branch plant in
the vicinity of Zhulyany (5024N/03026E, HIS), Ukrainian SSR, in 1968 or 1969. The
plant became operational sometime in early 1971. Construction of this plant was given
high priority by the Artem leadership, demonstrated by the frequent appearance at the
construction site of the Artpm Plant Director, Vasiliy Ivanovich VLASOV (died in 1978),
and (FNU) STUKACH, who was`\,the Chief Engineer and Head of the Design Bureau at the
Artem main plant and later the Director of the Zhulyany, plant., Workers continued plant
construction on normal days off and national holidays. The Zhulyany branch plant
employed even more than the 18,000 employed at the Artem main plant.
(2) (C/NF) Shchors Branch Plant: Construction began in the vicinity of
Shchors (5149N/03156E, NIS), Ukrainian SSR, USSR, on a second branch plant in 1971
after the completion of the plant at Zhulyany. As with the Zhulyany plant, the Artem
leadership placed a high priority on the rapid completion of this plant. (Originator's
Comment: Source believed the priority of the construction of these branch plants
originated at a level higher than?the Artem plant leadership. He did not know exactly
where this priority came from.) The Shchors plant was similar to the Zhulyany plant
but on a much larger scale. It occupied approximately 400 hectares (899.4 acres).
(Originator's Comment: Source worked on the construction of this plant for less than
one year. He retired in May 1972, and at this point there was little more than
foundation work completed. The rumors among co-workers.were that this plant was tq be
used for the production of large missiles, not the smaller air-to-air type that earlier
had been the mainstay of Artem production.)
(3) (C/NP) Vinnitsa Branch Plants In about 1972, prior to the completion o
the Shchors plant, construction began on two additional branch plants. One of these
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WNINTEL LIR 1 517 0016 86
DETAILS: (U)
was in the vicinity of Vinnitsa (4914N/02829E, NIS)//, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.
(Originator's Comment: Source could not remember the location of the fourth branch
plant, but he knew one was built. He was never present at either the Vinnitsa or
fourth branch plant construction sites.) The Vinnitsa branch plant was on the same
scale as the Shchors plant, and rumors were it also was to be used to produce large
missiles. As with the Zhulyany and Shchors plants, there was a high priority on the
rapid completion of these plants.
Time Line of Branch Plant Construction
Branch Plant + 1968 + 1969 + 1970 + 1971 + 1972 + 1973 +
Zhulyany ?++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Shchors ++++++++++++++++++++??
Vinnitsa Constructed simultaneously ?++++++++++++
4th Filial ?+++++++++++++
d. (C/NF) Testin : Bench testing of missiles was conducted at the Artem plant in
special soundproof rooms. These rooms were constructed of a special thickness of
concrete to ensure that someone standing outside the plant on the street could not hear
or detect that a missile engine was being tested. Once, in about 1966, an air-to-air
missile exploded while being tested at Artem. A number of personnel were killed and
others, were injured. (Originator's Comment: Source knew about this because he had
been called in to cleanup and repair the facility.)
e. (C/NF) Shippings Missiles produced at the Artem plant were packaged in
hermetically sealed wooden crates (yash chki) to ensure no moisture could damage the
sealed, and given a stamp/seal (pechat) by the
was inspected
t
h
,
e
cra
missiles. Eac
military representative. The crates never had any markings referring to their origin
at Artem or Kiev. In fact,, the crates normally weremarked;with a false location of
origin indicating some other city. Yaroslav often was written on the crates as the
point of origin. After the crates were sealed, they were loaded onto trucks and driven
to the Kiev train station where they were loaded onto train cars. The train cars,
which were guarded by Artem plant security personnel, usually were taken to some
location in Kasakstan, USSR. (Originator's Comments Source's information on the
destination of these air-to-air missiles was very sketchy and based upon casual
ith of the Artem plant personnel who accompanied the train cars to
m
e - 9
conversations w sa
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c. (C/NF) missile:
wit
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IIR.1 517 0016 86
DLTAILS: (U)
Kazakstan. These personnel would be gone for a week or so, and if asked where they had
been when they returned, they usually would say something unspecific, like to
Kazakstan." Source remembered Alma-Ata (4315N/07657E, NIS) being mentioned once, but
did not know if this was the final destination or merely a stopover point. In at least
one conversation, he recalled hearing that some of these missiles were sent to an
underground military depot located somewhere in Kazakatan. (NFI)
}
shipping crates.
(2) (C/NF) Building 3 and 4: These two buildings were responsible for the
production of the various missile components. Some of these components might have been
assembled into larger parts, but complete assembly of the missile was performed only in
June 1971. This was the only me
On side-A (See Figure 2) of the railroad tracks, there were a number of tables and
boxes containing missile parts. On side B of the tracks, there were an assembled ~.V
missile, an "operator" station, and at least one but possibly a number of missile
2. (C/NF) Zhulyany Branch Plant:
a. Mission: The mission of the Zhulyany branch plant was the production of a
large, multi-staged missile. (Originator's Comment: See section 2., c.) This missile
was of the most recent technology and'the production of it had a very high priority.
b. Description: The Zhulyany branch plant was located along the railroad line
that ran southwest out of Kiev, and was accessed by a spur of this line. The spur made
a complete loop and returned to the elekrichka main line. (Originator's Comment: See
Figure 1: Facility Sketch - Zhulyany Branch Plant, for a more complete diagram. The
buildings marked 2, 3, and 4 are treated in more detail below.)
(1) Korpus Number 1: The building marked as 2 in Figure 1 was known as Korpus
No 1 (Building Number 1) or Glavnyy Korpus (Main Building). It was in this building
that the missile described in section 2., c. was assembled. (Originator's Comment:
See Figure 2: Building Layout - Rorpus No 1.) The building was approximately 200
meters by 25 meters, with a single story, but a very high ceiling. Installed along the
ceiling was a crane (portovoy Iran) that had full three-dimensional capability. There
were no windows on the exterior of the building, but there were two skylights on the
roof to provide light to the building. There were two large gates at opposite ends of
the building that allowed access to the railroad spur. In fact, as shown in Figures 1
and 2, the spur ran right through Korpus No 1. With both gates closed, a railroad
engine and four flatcars could fit inside the building. (Originator's Comment: For
details on the loading and shipping of the missile, see section 2., c., 3. Description
of the missile, loading of the missile, and the interior layout and arrangement of the
Korpus No 1 is based upon source's presence in this building for 15 minutes in May. or
ti source saw the missile described in section 2., c.)
Korpus No I.
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W NINTEL
DETAILS: (U)
(1) (C/NF) Description: (Originator's Comment: See Figure 3: Missile
Sketch.) The missile produced at the Zhulyany branch plant was. approximately 11 meters
long and two-and-one-half meters wide, with multiple stages. (Originator's Comment:
Source could not remember how many stages there were or where the breaks in the stages
were.) It had two sets of major fins. One set of four fins was located at the tale of
the missile. Another set of four fins was located halfway up the length of the
missile. The missile also had two sets of minor fins. One set was located between the
(fins
two sets of major fins: the other set was located just above the set of major
not
located halfway up the length of the missile. The warhead was sharply pointed rounded) and was red in color. The rest of the missile was olive drab/green in color.
(Originator's Comments Figure 3 is a reproduction of the drawing the collector
produced with the source. Source was unable to draw because of a problem with one of
the fingers on his right hand. As a result, the collector drew this depiction as he
walked the source through the missile from top to bottom, asking about fins, stages,
the warhead, and color. Source was comfortable with the proportions in the drawing
the -collector produced. This is mentioned because the proportions in the drawing
(Figure 3) do'not agree with the measurements given by the source (i.e. 11 meters long
and two-and-one-half meters wide). Other factors to consider are that the source only
saw this missile once (for 15 minutes in the Spring of 1971 - 15 years ago) and that
while being debriefed, source was not wearing the glasses he requires to read (a fact
the collector only realized at the conclusion of the debriefing.) The collector will
attempt to obtain a more thorough and accurate description during the next debrief, but
thinks source's memory is the greatest factor limiting probable success.)
(2) (C/NF) Assembly Procedures: Assembly `of the finished missile was
accomplished only in Korpus No 1. Parts were produced in the buildings marked 3 and 4
on Figure 1, but final assembly was done in Korpus No 1. The missiles were assembled
by a "special brigade for the assembly of missiles" (Spetsialnaya brigade po sborke
raket). This brigade was composed'of only five men, and they worked only two to three
hours a day. These brigade members were among the best and most experienced workers at
t and received very high salaries. They wore special all white smocks and
l
1
h
an
e p
t
pants.
(3) (C/NF) Production Data: Series production of this missile probably began
in May or June 1971. (Originator's Comment: This was source's best estimate based
upon the time it took to build the plant, his observation of traffic at the plant, and
his viewing of the missile sometime during this two-month period. He thought the
missile he saw was one of the first produced. Determination of the production rate and
the number of missiles produced was very problematic. When first asked how many were
produced, he said, very enthusiastically, "ago, mnoQOl" (Many, manyl). Tying him
down to specifics, however, was much more difficult. At one point in the debriefing,
source reported that some number less than 100 (one hundred) missiles were produced
each quarter. He then agreed that this meant some number less than 400 were produced
each year.. Later in the debrief, however,, when the collector again brought up the
"No, not that many." Also problematic was that
aid definitively
c
,
e s
number 400, sour
source had no firm basis for these numbers. He left Zhulyany by the early summer of
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IIR 1 517 0016 86
DETAILS: (U)
1571 and began work at Shchors. He ;Could not report on the number of crates observed,
other than the three or four he saw during the 15-minute period' in Spring 1971, and he
could not provide any firm number of trains that passed- through Korpus No 1. His
numbers were based on his general :impression of the production rate. It was his
impression that a large number were produced, but he never asked anyone, including
friends, because the missile was a1.very highly guarded secret. Only a very select
group ever saw the completely assembled missiles. Source could not provide concrete
data on production of this missile after his retirement in 1972 because, once again,
this was not a project one asked', even his friends about. Source was under the
'
impression, however, that production continued.)
(4) (C/NF) Loading of -Missiles: Once the missiles were assembled, they were
crated, loaded onto railroad flat care, and covered with tarpaulin, completely within
Rorpus No 1.
Missiles: Missiles were loaded into their crates
C/NF) Crating of
.
(a) %
by remote control. An "operator," sitting at point 1 (See, Figure, 2) used a, microphone
and a control panel (pult) to control the movement of `the missile.. Through some
combination of talking into the microphone and using the control panel, the operator
was able to raise the missile about two meters of fthe ground, move it from point 2 to
point 3, and lower it into its crate-at point 3. The cover` then would be placed on the
crate and it would be sealed by the military representative. The crate for this
missile was approximately 12 miters long and had Cyrillic letters and numbers written
all over it. (Originator's Comment: Source reported that the missile raised, moved,
and lowered itself under its own power-. It was not raised by a crane or by a forklift.
ource during the movement of the missile was the sound
The only effect sensed by the source-
of a low hum. There was no change in-smell and no visible effects. Source detected no
spray of dust that might have been caused if - the ml,ssile relied upon small rocket
engines for its lift and movement. The collector asked the source about this a number
of times, but source insisted. this was in fact what he had seen. The collector
suggested that perhaps the crane was used or that the source hadn't been able to see
some type of lift vehicle being used. Source remained adamant, however, that the
missile elevated itself. Whether or not this was in fact true, the collector concluded
this was what the source indeed believed he saw. Source, however, observed this
procedure only once, and then only for a period of about 15 minutes. In fact, .the
source should not have been in the building at the time. Normally, everyone was
required to leave Korpus No 1 before a missile was crated. The only personnel
In this case,
entative
re
i
"
.
s
tary rep
and the mil
permitted to stay were the "operator
however, source had a work order to repair some type of problem somewhere on side A
(See Figure 2) of the building. He, observed this entire procedure from somewhere in.
the vicinity of point 5. It is possible the flatcars obscured his view of some type of
lift vehicle or that he was so surprised to see the missile that he did not notice
cables that might have been attached to the overhead crane.)
(b) (C/NF) Loading of the Missile Crates; After the military,
representative sealed the missile orate, Mrst, was raised by the crane onto one of
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I ` IIR 1 517 0016 86
DETAILS: (U) nt:
one crate
ce saw the railroad flatcars. (Originator a's Co?the fourhflatcars ttientinside sourthe buildingbeing
loaded was the first to be placed on Y of
Judging from the size of the crate and the size of the flatcars, sourcebelievd two
taalsol was ender tthe
crates (positioned side by side) were loaded onto each flatcar.
tmpression that each flatcar then was covered with some type
arrive.) of eight crated missiles, the train
four flatcars were loaded for
would probable
would depart and a new one one
(c) (C/NF) Shipping of the Missiles (Origintor's Comment: Unlike with
tie earlier air-to-air missiles, the source had never Hwaslkedar irect y to anyone whovhad
guarded these crates after they left Zhulyany.
Important to note is that
that these missiles also were sent somewhere in Kazakstan.
unlike with the earlier air-to-air
these
these
railroad station, the crates missiles were loaded directly onto railroad cars inside Korpus No 1 and th8tationreven though he lived not that fart.
frocra m it, )on railra
cars at the Kiev railroad
ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C/NF/WN) As is obvious from this report, source's memory was
far from crystal clear and hindered accurate, detailed reporting.
He is 70 years old, in his seven years in the
.S., he has retired 1972, and emigrated
linguist is absolutely necessary for Ufurther debrlearneiefingd
almost most no English. A Russian guist
He, worked on a construction brigade and possesses only a secondary eduecatti He
appears to be sincere, but age is taking its toll on his memory. He
problems because le
expressed a willingness to be;;debriefed further, but there may be p
reservations by his family m e. Further. debriefing is planned in the near more specific details on the branch plantsu
to at
to clarify production data, ed to obtain
Zhulyany and Shchors.
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IIR 1, 517 0016 86
Figure 1 (C/NF)`' Facility Sketch-Zhulyany Branch Plant
(Memory Sketch, not to scale and,not complete plant)
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2 (C/NF)' Building Layout - Korpus No 1
(Not to scale)
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UR 1 517 0016 86
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Figure 3 (C/NF)? Missile Sketch
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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT ~NTIAI ATIONALS
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ; .j", RLLEI SIiBLL i u FOREIGN
individual items Of This Report Are REPORT NO: 1 517 0016 86 WHINTE .
UNCLASSIFIED Unless Otherwise Indicated
PROJECT NO: 140410
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC MY ?N
PREPARED BY: AF-21-050
(name. remit Igrade. position)
APPROVED BY: (name, rank/grade. position, signature)
KENNETH J. ALLEN, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander
ENCLOSURE(S):
COLL MGMT CODES: XB
REQUEST EVALUATION: lXXY ON
Request Evaluation Releasable To: None
A-FSC-42648, A-FSC-43240, T-11X-43206
SUBJECT/LOCATION CODES
(For DIA Use Only)
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
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