SUPPORTING ALLIES UNDER INSURGENT CHALLENGE: THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Supporting Allies Under
Insurgent Challenge:
The Soviet,Experience
in Africa
A Research Paper
0
SOV 88-10008X
GI 88-10024X
February 1988
Copy 415
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Supporting Allies Under
Insurgent Challenge:
The Soviet Experience
in Africa
This paper was prepared b
Office of Global Issues, with
ffice of Soviet Analysis, and
contributions from analysts in the Office of Global
Issues. F__1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Theater Forces Division,
Regional Issues Group, SOV
Secret
SOV 88-10008X
GI 88-10024X
February 1988
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 November 1987
was used in this report.
in Africa
Supporting Allies Under
Insurgent Challenge:
The Soviet Experience
support for the insurgents will ensure the insurgents' defeat.
The USSR's assistance to its key African clients facing major insurgen-
cies-Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique-has failed to eliminate the
guerrilla threats but has succeeded in keeping the regimes in power. The
Soviets have not sought quick victory. They seem to expect that, in the long
run, consolidation of the client state's power and authority, expansion of
the domain physically controlled by the state, elimination of alternative
political forces, and persistent military pressure on and erosion of outside
Bloc.
General Secretary Gorbachev, like his predecessors, can be patient in
pursuing these objectives because the USSR does not face substantial
domestic opposition to its involvement in Africa, and the costs-to date an
estimated cumulative $13 billion in military aid alone-while an object of
concern, are tolerable. Moreover, Soviet economic aid has been paltry
compared with the needs of the African clients. Indeed, Western economic
aid to these states since 1975 has been about three times that of the Soviet
to gain a hearing.
A review of Soviet political, ideological, and military writings indicates the
Soviets have not formulated a distinct military doctrine of counterinsur-
gency warfare. In our judgment, this is probably because the persistence of
these insurgencies raises sensitive ideological questions, which Soviet
theorists may prefer to avoid, about the Soviet role in suppressing
movements with large popular followings. Moreover, the military establish-
ment's focus on NATO and China may,make it difficult for advocates of
small-unit concepts applicable to Third World counterguerrilla operations
Western theory for counterinsurgency warfare.
Soviet literature on these African situations indicates that the Soviets
extend no legitimacy to the insurgents and their demands and claim that
the rebels exist only because of foreign support. A few recent articles,
however, suggest there may be a move toward a more realistic picture of
the insurgency problem, perhaps reflecting Gorbachev's call for "new
thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. We did not, however, find parallels to
our research revealed common
patterns in Moscow's assistance to its African clients facing insurgencies.
The Soviets stress:
? Building up the client state's administrative, security, political, and
economic apparatus.
Secret
SOV 88-10008X
GI 88-10024X
February 1988
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? Large-scale material and advisory support for the ally's military forces
aimed at the creation of large conventional forces to be used to secure the
capital, key cities, and vital economic regions and to expand the areas
controlled by the state by gradually pushing the insurgents back.
? Consistent support for the client state in the international arena in order
to secure broad recognition of it and to delegitimize the claims of the in-
surgents.
Although administrative, economic, and political factors play an important
role in Moscow's advice to its African clients, the Soviets concentrate the
bulk of their assistance on the military. Nonetheless, the USSR does not
appear to believe that it must help its clients achieve decisive military
defeat of the insurgents in the near term. Contrary to the West's penchant
for quick solutions to such problems, the Soviets seem to emphasize
gradually helping their clients consolidate power. They expect their clients
to assume most of the burden of carrying out the "proper" methods with
coaching from Moscow
The Soviet military presence is significant in each country and, by the
early 1980s, had grown to about 1,700 advisers in Ethiopia, 1,200 in
Angola, and 800 in Mozambique-levels that have since remained steady.
The advisers have performed vital functions in organizing, training, and
equipping the armed forces. They are attached to staffs, sometimes down
to the battalion level, and are deeply involved in planning and monitoring
counterinsurgency operations. Soviet logisticians keep close track of sup-
plies, and transport aircraft-piloted by Soviets-ferry supplies throughout
the country to support combat operations.
repair sophisticated equipment such as aircraft and missile launchers, and
Soviet instructors teach at military academies. The Soviet political com-
missar system has been setup in all of the military services to oversee their
political reliability.
z
Soviet advisers are, as:.a rule, not
permitted to participate directly in combat.
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The Soviets also attempt to maintain a relatively low profile and rely, to
the extent possible, on surrogates to minimize negative regional perceptions
of Soviet intervention and dampen the impact of Moscow's counterinsur-
gency efforts on East-West relations. Cuba, in particular, plays an
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important role in furthering Soviet goals. For example, Cuban troops in
Angola and Ethiopia free government troops for combat operations, and
Cuban advisers play a key role in basic training for new recruits. East
German advisers are also key players, particularly in setting up and
directing the security and intelligence services.
The Soviets have trained and equipped their allies' forces according to the
Soviet model to meet a conventional, not an insurgent, threat. This reflects
Moscow's view of the predominant challenge facing each country: in
Ethiopia, the quiescent threat of another Somali invasion; in Angola and
Mozambique, the danger of South Africa.
Our limited picture of the substance of Soviet military advice to African
clients in combating the insurgents indicates that, on a broad scale, it
reflects the conservatism of Soviet military concepts. It emphasizes the
creation of secure enclaves around vital elements of the client state's
political and administrative base; major campaigns aimed at searching out
and destroying insurgent groups, disrupting their base areas, and hindering
their resupply; and the need for adequate preparation at all levels prior to a
major campaign-particularly in the areas of logistics, command and
control, reconnaissance, and intelligence on enemy forces. We see few signs
that the African commanders have developed distinct operational and
tactical approaches of their own.
The Soviets seem to have said little to their African clients about the social
and political aspects of counterinsurgency operations. Although Soviet
advisers can be found in some cases down to the battalion level and must be
aware of the impact of combat on local conditions, there are no indications
that they have advised their clients to institute any programs designed to
"win the hearts and minds" of the local population.
The Soviets have been most effective in helping their clients build
mechanisms of political control. These include a pervasive internal security
apparatus, press and propaganda programs, mass organizations, and
intensive political indoctrination. In the military arena, the buildup of
large, well-equipped conventional armies has helped to secure vital urban
and economic areas, but the continued emphasis on military campaigns
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better suited for engaging enemy forces in setpiece battles on the European
plains perpetuates a tactical rigidity that is not well suited to the fluid
nature of guerrilla wars. This inflexibility, coupled with the absence of a
formal doctrine for dealing with the varied aspects of insurgencies, will
continue to hamper counterinsurgency efforts.
We believe Moscow's approach to helping its African clients and its
position in those countries have a number of vulnerabilities. These include
its allies' failures to decisively defeat the insurgents, the African regimes'
lack of political legitimacy and poor economic performance, and the
relatively weak popular appeal of Marxism-Leninism. Nonetheless, we
believe the USSR is fairly satisfied with the results of its policies. They
promote what we believe are the Soviets' basic interests and objectives in
these countries: increasing their political role in southern Africa and the
Horn, establishing a military presence, gaining access to air and naval
facilities, and promoting leftist change in key regions. Also, while the
Soviets do not control the internal politics of these states, they have
amassed significant levels of political influence.
We believe that neither the Soviets nor the Cubans are planning to increase
their involvement beyond the level necessary to sustain their clients'
military position. Nonetheless, Soviet writings and leadership statements
under Gorbachev indicate that Moscow is committed to defending its gains
of the 1970s against insurgency and "imperialist interference," and, in the
face of a clear and present threat to the governments of Angola or
Ethiopia, the Soviets probably would respond, in the short term, with
increased arms deliveries, and the Cubans with more troops or advisers.
The Soviet commitment to supporting Mozambique, however, is less clear.
There are growing signs that Moscow is disenchanted with Maputo's weak
ideological commitment and with its active search for Western military
and economic aid. The Soviets might disengage rather than mount the
costly effort needed to reverse a serious turn of events there.
In the event of a rapid deterioration in the political and military situation
of one of its African clients, we believe Moscow would press the African
state to negotiate with the insurgents rather than escalate significantly
Soviet involvement. Moscow would probably push, however, for a settle-
ment that excluded any opposition leaders that it viewed as too powerful or
popular.
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z5ecrer
Counterinsurgency: East and West
The Soviet Approach: Consolidating the Client State
3
Organs of Defense and Security
4
Organs of Political Mobilization and Control
4
The Vanguard Workers' Party
6
Socialist Economic Development
6
Soviet Military Involvement
8
Role of Advisory Groups
11
Logistics and Maintenance
13
Paying for Soviet Military Aid
18
Soviet Military Advice
19
Participation
in Combat
23
The Role of Soviet Surrogates
23
The Cubans
23
Other Surrogates
26
Assessment and Outlook
26
Results as of Late 1987
26
Vulnerabilities
29
. Soviet Writings on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
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Figure 1
knsurgent Areas
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
M TPLF operating area
EPLF area of control
EPLF operating area
Scale accurate for subject
countries only.
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Supporting Allies Under
Insurgent Challenge:
The Soviet Experience
in Africa
During the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union developed a
growing sense of optimism about the prospects for
promoting favorable change and expanding Soviet
influence in the Third World. This optimism paral-
leled the emergence of a number of new opportunities
in Africa, on which the Soviets were quick to capital-
ize. In Angola, Moscow helped a self-proclaimed
Marxist-Leninist regime attain power in a post-
colonial civil war and subsequently backed the re-
gime's efforts to consolidate its rule. In Mozambique
and Ethiopia, Moscow moved to support radical re-
gimes already in power and assisted their efforts to
build Marxist-Leninist societies.
These opportunities, however, also led to an unfore-
seen deep involvement in combating insurgencies.
Since taking power, each of these governments has
been faced with armed resistance from groups con-
testing, for various reasons and to various degrees,
their claim to a monopoly of state power (see figure 1).
The Soviets have been the primary source of advisory
support and military aid for these Marxist-Leninist
regimes, but in spite of extensive Soviet backing, none
of the three has been able to defeat its insurgency.
Moscow's involvement in counterinsurgency warfare
in Africa led us to examine whether such activities are
guided by an identifiable political and military doc-
trine and whether the Soviets have emulated Western
approaches to such warfare. We examined their ef-
forts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in search
of common elements in their approach. We also
studied the influence of factors such as the economic
situation, regional political strategies, and East/West
issues. Finally, we evaluated the effectiveness of
Soviet counterinsurgency efforts and the vulnerabili-
ties that may have emerged in Moscow's position in
Africa as a result of these commitments.
Counterinsurgency: East and West
A comprehensive search of two and a half decades of
Soviet political, ideological, and military writings
indicates that the USSR apparently has not yet
formulated a distinct doctrine of "socialist" counter-
insurgency (see appendix on Soviet writings). There is
no discussion of counterinsurgency as a political-
military problem demanding a unique Marxist "scien-
tifically determined" response. These writings do re-
veal that the Soviets extend no legitimacy to the
insurgents and their claims and that they blame the
persistence of these insurgencies on outside interfer-
ence. A growing number of military articles since
1980-clearly oriented toward Afghanistan-focus 25X1
on tactical problems related to fighting guerrillas but
do not address the broader problems of counterinsur-
gency warfare.
Soviet military advice often includes some of the
elements tried in Western counterinsurgency cam-
paigns (see inset outlining Western strategy), but
Moscow's overall military and political approach di-
verges considerably from Western theory and prac-
tice. For example, Western counterinsurgency doc-
trine emphasizes political action in rebel-contested
areas as a key to winning "hearts and minds" at the 25X1
local level. The Soviets, by contrast, apparently have
placed little emphasis on the need for political action
in the war zone. On the military side, Soviet advisers
have consistently advocated large combined-arms
sweep operations-reminiscent of battle plans for
Europe-instead of the small-unit tactics recommend-
ed by Western theory.
An important element of Western views regarding
combating insurgencies are efforts designed to win the
support of the population. Judging by the paucity of 25X1
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Western Counterinsurgency Strategy
In-depth analysis of Western counterinsurgency cam-
paigns reveals that these programs traditionally com-
bine tactics intended to promote social ameliora-
tion-such as civic action programs, land reform, and
economic development-and offensive military ac-
tion, including the use of highly mobile forces and
local defense units. Recognizing that virtually all
factors in a counterinsurgency program ultimately
influence popular support for the government, West-
ern strategy strives to blend intense persuasion and
precise coercion techniques. For example, government
efforts to improve a village's education or sanitation
systems may be employed in tandem with highly
controlled, specific military operations to weed out
guerrillas in the immediate area. On the basis of
British, French, American, and other countries' expe-
riences in combating insurgencies, experts generally
agree that certain identifiable factors have been
prominent in successful Western counterinsurgency
strategies. They include:
? Maintaining a 10-to-1 ratio of government-to-insur-
gent troops. It is commonly perceived that such a
ratio allows for unit patrolling and ensuring rural
security, as well as maintaining static defenses.
? Employing unconventional tactics and strategies-
particularly small-unit tactics that deemphasize
the concentration of forces and firepower and em-
phasize constant patrolling by many small, lightly
armed units supported by larger backup forces.
This includes the use of air operations in a support
role to provide careful and controlled fire support,
as well as reconnaissance, supply, transport, and
medical evacuation.
? Developing professional troop behavior and disci-
pline. In order to ensure the active support of the
populace, the military is trained to respect and
assist the local population when possible.
? Creating a popular militia. The government usually
prospers when it establishes a popular militia to
assist regular forces in maintaining security and to
keep the populace engaged in the counterinsurgency
effort.
? Promoting the government's efforts through psycho-
logical operations. There are usually three main
targets of these operations: the public, including the
international public; the government's combat
forces; and the insurgents.
? Exploiting quality intelligence on guerrilla person-
nel, modus operandi, and locations, in addition to
insurgent order of battle. Such an effort requires
developing a sophisticated intelligence apparatus
and overcoming institutional rivalries that restrict
the flow of information.
? Developing police operations. The police forces in a
country can play an important role in maintaining
law and order, reestablishing a government pres-
ence in the countryside, and implementing popula-
tion- and resource-control programs.
? Establishing a unified management for counterin-
surgency. The government must be capable of coor-
dinating a coherent counterinsurgency campaign,
which requires establishing an organizational infra-
structure that maintains command and control and
blends civilian authority and military goals.
? Improving rural administration and environment.
This includes government efforts to implement pro-
grams and reforms necessary to gain popular acqui-
escence and maintain its legitimacy
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open source discussion ~ on
the topic, the Soviets apparently have had little to say
to their African clients about the social and political
aspects of counterinsurgency operations in rebel-
The Theoretical Foundation:
The State of Socialist Orientation
controlled territory.
Soviet pilots have flown transport planes
in support of Ethiopia's resettlement program that
moved peasants from northern, insurgent-threatened
areas to the south of the country. However, the
program appears to have been an Ethiopian initiative,
and we have no indication that the Soviets are
advocating similar efforts elsewhere.
The seeming lack of Soviet attention to the political
and social side of counterinsurgency warfare in the
field probably has several explanations:
the Soviets may have found it
difficult to advise local military commanders on the
treatment of insurgents and civilians in the battlefield
area, given the probable insistence of the commanders
that they are more familiar with the situation and
better qualified to deal with the local population.
Finally, the Soviet advisers may simply not see the
political situation in the war zone as a decisive
consideration in fighting the war, emphasizing instead
the balance of military forces.
The Soviet Approach: Consolidating' the Client State
We believe that the Soviets view the consolidation of
the client state as the long-term key to defeating the
insurgents and that Moscow's military involvement on
behalf of its allies must be seen in the context of these
broader state-building efforts (see inset).
The Soviets categorize Angola, Ethiopia, and Mo-
zambique, along with most of their other Third 25X1
World allies, as "revolutionary democratic states of
socialist orientation. "a Although there is consider-
able debate in the Soviet literature over the attributes
that place a country in this category, the agreed
features are:
? Leaders committed to Marxism-Leninism and the
transformation of their countries through the.in- 25X1
strument of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist political
party.
? Emerging, though not yet fully formed, "socialist"
administrative, political, and economic institutions.
? Close foreign policy ties to the USSR and a
`progressive" international orientation.
This formulation recognizes that a variety of factors
make the transition to a more genuine and reliable
socialism a long and difficult process. These factors 25X1
include the absence of a significant working class, the 25X1
potential unreliability of military and intellectual
leaders, the weakness of the economic base, and the
persistence of "traditional" religious, ethnic, and
tribal beliefs. Indeed, some Soviet observers have 25X1
acknowledged that outright reversals are possible if
counterrevolutionary forces are strong enough, and
the USSR has clearly indicated the limits to its
ability to underwrite the economic development of
these countries. However, a wide range of Soviet.
writings suggests that, reservations notwithstanding,
the USSR sees the revolutionary democratic states of
socialist orientation, in addition to the full-fledged
socialist states-Cuba and Vietnam-as most likely, 25X1
over the long run, to provide firm foundations for
Soviet influence in the Third World.
a Cuba and Vietnam are the only Third World states the USSR
recognizes as fully "socialist." The other states in the "revolution-
ary democratic socialist-oriented "category usually include Laos,
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Organs of Defense and Security
The first priority of the USSR in assisting "socialist-
oriented" states has been support of their military and
security apparatus. The Soviets presumably believe
that any other benefits of the leftist transformation of
these countries will be transitory unless the countries
are protected from outside attack or internal
subversion.
The Armed Forces. Soviet assistance to and involve-
ment with the armed forces in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique has been extensive, reflecting both the
advantage the USSR has in using military aid as
opposed to other policy instruments, and the priority
the Soviets attach to the functions the armed forces
perform on behalf of socialist-oriented regimes (see
figure 2). The military defends the country against
external threat and protects the new regime against
internal challenges and coups. In some cases, it has
the capability to act as a base for the development of a
national administrative structure where no such
structure has previously existed.
Several Soviet authors have noted that, while the
armed forces perform several functions essential to
the survival of the client state, they cannot serve as a
solid long-term base for the development of Marxist-
Leninist institutions. Consequently, the Soviets have
pressured socialist-oriented regimes dominated by the
armed forces, such as that of Chairman Haile-
Mariam Mengistu in Ethiopia, not to neglect the tasks
of creating broader administrative and political
mechanisms.
The Security Organs. The persistence and scale of the
efforts of the USSR and its Cuban and East Europe-
an allies in aiding and advising the security organs of
all three African clients are indications of the impor-
tance the Soviets attach to this sector:
? Soviet and East German advisers played a major
role in the creation of Angola's police and intelli-
gence forces.
the Soviets,
Cubans, and East Germans have trained, equipped,
and advised the Mozambican security service since
the mid-1970s.
? Through 1984, the Ethiopian Ministry of National
and Public Security (MPNS) received training and
technical assistance from the USSR, Bulgaria, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The MPNS seems
to have guarded its institutional independence care-
fully and limited substantive cooperation with East-
ern Bloc services.
Eastern Bloc and Cuban assistance has substantially
improved the capabilities of the African services to
discover and suppress domestic opposition and moni-
tor the activities of foreigners. Only Angola has faced
a serious coup attempt-the 1977 Nito Alves coup-
and this was successfully put down.
Organs of Political Mobilization and Control
Mass Organizations. On the basis of coverage in the
Soviet media and specialized journals, we believe
Moscow sees the building of "mass organizations" as
a vital part of the process of consolidating "socialist-
oriented" states (see figure 3). Soviet literature
abounds with favorable references to institutions such
as trade unions, local "citizens' committees," and
peasant, youth, women's, and various professional
organizations. These institutions perform several im-
portant functions for the new Marxist-Leninist lead-
ership. They:
? Provide a mechanism for penetration and control of
various social and professional sectors.
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training trade union officials in all three states, and
the mass organizations of all three take part in Soviet-
sponsored international forums and exchanges.
Press and Educational Institutions. The Soviets have
long seen the creation of centrally controlled press and
educational institutions as an essential part of the
development of any socialist state. Such institutions
help promote identification with the regimes and
Marxism-Leninism, the "correct" understanding of
internal and external events, and the development of
the technical and professional skills required by the
new state.
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? Co-opt the political activity of various groups, in-
cluding those that may favor change but not Marx-
ist-Leninist revolution, and direct it into controlla-
ble channels.
? Foster national consciousness over tribalism, region-
alism, and other forms of local identity.
? Indoctrinate participants in the virtues of the revo-
lution and Marxism-Leninism.
? Identify and recruit cadres.
? Act as a base for the subsequent development of
Communist parties.
Levels of direct Soviet and Bloc participation in the
creation and operation of these organizations in Ango-
la, Ethiopia, and Mozambique vary. In Angola, the
Soviet Bloc directly aided the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola in the creation of its national
youth and worker's organizations. Ethiopia, however,
appears to have developed its mass institutions on its
own during the years before large-scale Soviet in-
volvement, although European-educated Marxist ad-
visers to the ruling Military Council may have helped
shape such institutions during the early years of
military rule.
the eagerness of the Machel regime in the mid-
1970s to move Mozambique toward a Marxist-
Leninist society suggests that it was receptive to Bloc
assistance in the creation of its mass institutions.
Eastern Bloc states have played a major part in
In all three of the African countries this longstanding
emphasis is reflected in the extensive Soviet Bloc
involvement in their press and educational sectors (see
figure 4). Soviets, East Europeans, and Cubans train
journalists and provide international "news services"
for their clients, all of whom have a closed, centrally
controlled press. In the educational area,' Bloc states
run a wide variety of programs providing academic
scholarships for extended study in the USSR and
Eastern Europe, specialized technical and professional
training in a wide variety of fields, education in Cuba
for secondary school students, and instructors for
positions in local universities.
For example,
Soviet Bloc educational programs have had rather
limited success in ideological indoctrination and
Soviet technical training is often considered inferior to
that available in the West. However, all these regimes
have the press and educational system solidly under
state control. Whatever their long-term success in
promoting genuine belief in Marxism-Leninism, these
institutions are not likely to serve as a source of
political challenge.
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11i'l:;%.pt t"i'Hfl I$TR4HU1J
The Soviets believe that correct development of the
VWP and its apparatus should institutionalize
Marxism-Leninism and Soviet influence by broaden-
ing the bases of what have been narrow, personally
dominated regimes. Moscow's object is to make the
Soviet position less vulnerable to personal and institu-
tional rivalries or leadership changes. Ideally, the
VWP ultimately will become the sole source of "legi-
timate" political power in the state of socialist orien-
tation-a transition that Soviet theorists acknowledge
The Vanguard Workers' Party
During the 1960s, several Soviet attempts to build
influence in the Third World by cultivating leaders
apparently committed to "socialism" ended in disap-
pointment or outright failure. One conclusion that
Soviet theorists drew over the next decade was that
reliance on the revolutionary commitment of particu-
lar leaders was an inadequate base for the develop-
ment of a Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet version of
socialism over the long term. A stronger political-
institutional framework was needed to lead the revo-
lution through the difficulties it would inevitably
encounter.
The concept of the "vanguard workers' party" (VWP)
was developed in the late 1970s to deal with the
problem of what this framework could be in countries
that almost invariably had no working class of any
size or political importance.' The VWP, which should
operate according to the principles of "democratic
centralism," is intended to guide the development of
the state and economic apparatus, mobilize popular
energies for the revolution, and ensure that the state
follows a "progressive" and pro-Soviet foreign policy
line.
' From a Soviet theoretical standpoint, the concept of a Third
World "vanguard workers' party" must not be confused with that
of a "proletarian vanguard party." The latter category describes
full-fledged Communist parties such as that of the Soviet Union,
while the VWP refers to the looser, multiclass grouping that must
will take a long time.
Self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist parties in all three
African cases-the Popular Movement for the Liber-
ation of Angola-Workers' Party (MPLA-PT),
FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
in Mozambique, and the Workers' Party of Ethio-
pia-fit, in theory at least, the Soviet definition of a
VWP. The USSR has provided training, financial
support, and "approved" status to all of these groups
and appears to see them as moving in a positive
direction over the long term. Nonetheless, the Soviets
have devoted considerable attention to the problems
these parties have in carrying out the transition to
socialism. Moscow's persistent criticism, which has at
times provoked resentment from the Africans, sug-
gests the Soviets believe that the leaders of Angola,
Ethiopia, and especially Mozambique still have a long
way to go in establishing what the Soviets would
consider to be reliable Marxist-Leninist institutions.
Socialist Economic Development
Economic Strategy. There is no authoritative Soviet
formula for dealing with the complex problems of
economic development in very poor African states.
Nonetheless, there are wide areas of agreement in
Soviet specialized literature on the general lines that
the economic development of these states should take.
The essentials of the Soviet economic prescription
include a high level of state involvement in the
economy, state-sponsored agrarian reform, toleration
of some private capitalist activity in "traditional"
sectors-such as retail trade and local services-
improvement of key government-provided social wel-
fare services, orientation of external trade toward the
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Figure 6
Western Versus Soviet Bloc Economic Aid
Disbursements to Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique, 1975-85
2,000
1,600
1,200
800
400
socialist countries, and the restriction of Western -
multinational activity. The USSR's own relatively
sparse economic involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique has primarily been in the form of
project-oriented financial aid and advisory support for'
the state sector (see figure 5).
In recent years, the Soviets have become increasingly
unhappy with the economic failure of their African
allies, including oil-exporting Angola. The Soviets
have consistently blamed their allies' problems on the
domestic environment-backwardness, poor infra-
structure, tribalism, insurgent "banditry"-and the
"hostile," capitalist-dominated, international econom-
ic context in which they are entwined. Over the past
few years, however, Soviet writers have also criticized
-what they see as excessive, radical, and inappropriate
policies on the part of African Marxist-Leninist lead-
ers. Moscow has emphasized the need to make effi-
cient use of both domestic and Soviet-supplied eco-
nomic resources. This suggests that Moscow for the
moment sees economic performance rather than ideo- 25X1
logical purity as the key criterion of client economic
policy.
Soviet Aid and Western Investment. The Soviets have
not been generous suppliers of economic assistance to
Third World states over the past decade, and their
economic aid to Marxist-Leninist African states,
while rather generous by Soviet standards, falls far
short of their massive needs (see figure 6). Moreover,
the Kremlin has made it clear on several occasions
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that socialist orientation does not carry with it an
automatic claim to the wealth of the Soviet Bloc and
that Third World Marxist-Leninist states will have to
depend first and foremost on their own resources. This
probably reflects a Soviet belief that economic aid
yields a lower political payoff than does military
assistance and Soviet perceptions of the limits to
Moscow's own economic resources.
Both Angola and Mozambique have turned to the
West for economic aid, and Ethiopia has accepted
massive Western economic and famine aid.
Moscow does not object to most
Western investments and, at times, encourages its
allies to look for aid where they can get it. The
Soviets, however, are wary of Western aid being
translated into political influence and warn their
clients about Western motives.
Foreign Policy Support
Isolating the Insurgents. A key element of Moscow's
political approach to the problems of its African allies
is the use of a variety of foreign policy instruments,
including conventional diplomacy, propaganda, activi-
ty in international organizations, and active measures,
to try to isolate the insurgents from outside materiel
and diplomatic support (see inset). The Soviets have
played on the established predisposition of many
Third World countries-and virtually all African
states-to be wary of Western "neocolonialist" inter-
ference and of groups fighting for change in existing
political arrangements or state boundaries. The Sovi-
ets and their Bloc allies have consistently sought to
portray groups fighting the regimes in Angola, Mo-
zambique, and Ethiopia as the creations of outside
powers interfering in the internal affairs of the coun-
tries. In addition, they have sought to exploit wide-
spread Third World and Western opposition to South
African apartheid to ostracize UNITA (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and
RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) for
their connections with Pretoria. The USSR probably
expects that, over the long run, this persistent cam-
paign will help reduce the willingness of various
countries to champion the cause of the insurgents and
to supply them with material aid.
The Soviets and Negotiations. The Soviet attitude
toward negotiations involving their African allies, the
insurgents, and, in some situations, third parties has
been equivocal. In the Ethiopian case, the Soviets
have supported and in some cases even sponsored
meetings between representatives of the Mengistu
regime and the insurgents. On occasion, Soviet offi-
cials have indicated their willingness to discuss south-
ern African issues with the United States. On the
other hand, the Soviets have consistently opposed US-
sponsored negotiations on Namibia and on Cuban
troop withdrawal from Angola-talks that dealt indi-
rectly with the future of UNITA and the MPLA
regime. Moscow has also warned Angola and Mozam-
bique of the futility of trying to obtain relief from the
insurgencies by cutting deals with South Africa, as
both did in 1984.
The two key variables that shape Moscow's attitudes
toward any given negotiating process are, as might be
expected, the degree to which the USSR is involved in
the process and the potential the negotiations have for
increasing the influence of other parties at Soviet
expense. In the Ethiopian case, the Soviets had direct
or indirect connections to the rebels that enabled them
to play a central role in facilitating the talks, while the
West did not have enough credibility with Addis
Ababa to allow it to play a mediating role. By
contrast, apparently neither Luanda nor Maputo con-
sulted the Soviets prior to signing separate pacts with
Pretoria, and the Soviets read the US-backed regional
negotiations as a direct attempt to cut them out of a
regional settlement.
Military aid is key to Soviet influence-building in the
Third World. Moscow's involvement with the armed
forces of its three African clients has been extensive-
the Soviets have played a decisive role in structuring,
equipping, training, and advising them. We believe
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Soviet Measures To Disrupt Zaire's
Support to the Angolan Insurgents
The Soviets have aggressively attempted to increase
their influence in Zaire-with diplomacy, active mea-
sures, press propaganda, and economic proposals.
Their primary goals have been to ease real or poten-
tial pressure from Zaire on the Angolan regime,
forestall Zaire's support for UNITA, increase Soviet
involvement in Zaire, and weaken Zaire's longstand-
ing ties to the United States. This campaign demon-
strates the USSR's efforts to capitalize on a political
opportunity-namely a cooling of US-Zairian rela-
tions and a desire by President Mobutu Sese Seko to
project a nonaligned image-in an effort to build
influence and to temper Zairian support for the
Angolan insurgents.
We believe Moscow, in pursuing these objectives, is
behind a variety of covert influence operations:
? A forged letter-allegedly from the US Ambassa-
dor to Congo to the US Ambassador to Zaire-was
delivered in late March 1987 to the Zairian Am-
bassador to Congo. The forgery described alleged
US meddling in Zaire's domestic politics and sug-
gested US involvement with the opposition. Al-
though the origin of the letter is unknown, past
practice suggests it was a KGB plant intended to
embarrass the United States.
? Moscow and Luanda probably were behind a rumor
campaign in Zaire warning that "dangerous" US-
Zairian military exercise activity threatened neigh-
boring states, especially Angola. The Soviets and
Angolans augmented the rumors-intended to stir
up opposition pressure on Mobutu to reduce US
involvement-with press and radio charges that the
United States is turning Zaire into a center for
subversion, including using the country to test the
AIDS virus for biological weapons.
? The 28 April 1987 edition of the Nigerian news-
magazine African Concord ran a story about an
alleged US plot to use Zairian airbases as a
springboard for destabilization activities in south-
ern Africa. The report quoted extensively from an
alleged memorandum of the Zairian national intel-
ligence service that we believe could have been
forged by the Soviets. Similar charges of US
machinations have appeared in Angola and else-
where in the region.
We believe the Soviets will try to increase such
operations. Given the Kinshasa media's positive treat-
ment of Soviet views, Moscow may step up efforts to
bribe or recruit local journalists. In February, for
example, the city's largest daily newspaper, Elima,
presented a slick, five page interview with Supreme
Soviet President Tolkunov, which overshadowed a
US-authored item on arms control issues. The Sovi-
ets may also be setting the stage for additional covert
operations designed to embarrass Mobutu beyond
Zaire's borders. For example, the US Embassy in
Brazzaville suspects the Soviets may have surfaced a
story in March 1987 in Congo alleging that Mobutu
intended to use the CIA to assassinate President
Sassou-Nguesso.
To persuade Mobutu to withdraw support for
UNITA, Moscow would have to convince him that
UNITA's operations pose a threat to Zaire's domes-
tic stability for example, in the border areas-and
that his support for UNITA-especially with its
"apartheid connection" jeopardizes his ability to
play a political and economic role in the region. We
have doubts that Moscow currently has the resources
in the region to be successful in these efforts. More-
over, in targeting Mobutu, the Soviets run a major
risk: should the Soviet efforts be too heavyhanded or
transparent (such as disinformation operations that
are exposed as Soviet activities), Moscow could pro-
voke the always-suspicious leader to ignore the
USSR's diplomatic and economic overtures or even
increase support to UNITA.
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Figure 7
Soviet Bloc Military Advisers in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
r
0
,Ethiopia 12,000
111,600
1,200
800
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Figure 8
Soviet Military Deliveries to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
2,500
2,000
I Mozambique
the primary objectives of Moscow's military assis-
tance programs have been:
? Obtaining access to air and naval facilities.
? Establishing a long-term Soviet political and mili-
tary presence.
? Helping its allies build up conventional forces suffi-
cient to deal with both internal and external threats.
The bulk of Moscow's objectives are clearly self-
serving. This does not mean, of course, that the
Soviets have ignored the insurgent challenge. Indeed,
the threat posed by insurgent activities has contribut-
ed significantly to the large Soviet Bloc presence in
each country and has led to massive arms deliveries
(see figures 7 and 8).
Role of Advisory Groups
The 10th Main Directorate of the Soviet General
Staff in Moscow is responsible for administering
Soviet military relationships with all Third World
countries. Military Advisory Groups (MAGs) are its
key instrument in countries with a large Soviet mili-
tary presence. The MAGs in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique are each headed by a general, and they
perform a variety of functions. They:
? Structure and train the host country armed forces.
? Help each country plan and direct military opera-
tions (see figure 9). .
? Coordinate Soviet Bloc and Cuban military
assistance.
? Perform maintenance on sophisticated military
equipment.
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Soviet military personnel are found throughout the
military structure of the host country. They maintain
advisory links at the national, regional, and local
levels. In the national capital, Soviet advisers are
located at ministry of defense headquarters. The
advisers are also present with major military com-
mands and combat units normally down to bri ade
level, but sometimes also at the battalion level
Expansion and Structure of African Forces
Expansion. The armed forces of Angola and Ethiopia
have expanded dramatically since Soviet advisers
arrived. Ethiopia's forces have grown from 40,000
troops before the revolution to 220,000 troops today.
Angola's forces now number about 100,000 troops
and, in Mozambique FRELIMO's army has grown
from a mere 5,000 at independence to some 35,000
today.
Despite the overall expanded size of these armed
forces, none of them enjoys a decisive numerical
advantage over the insurgents. A Western rule of
thumb is that government forces need up to a 10-to-1
advantage over the guerrillas. Ethiopia, with the
largest army, enjoys a 5.5-to-1 advantage; Angola and
Mozambique both possess about a 1.6-to-1 superiority
in numbers. Each, however, holds a significant advan-
tage in quantity and quality of military equipment.
Military Structure. Soviet military advisers have
been instrumental in structuring local military forces
along Soviet lines. In Angola and Mozambique, this
was relatively easy to accomplish. These countries did
not have a coherent military arm in place when the
Soviets arrived on the scene. Moscow helped form the
preindependence guerrilla forces into conventional
forces. The Soviet orientation toward large-scale com-
bat in Central Europe is visible in the emphasis on
combined arms formations capable of coordinated use
of armor, aviation, artillery, and motorized infantry to
defeat enemy forces. The maintenance of a relatively
large standing army based on a professional officer
corps and draftees also reflects Soviet concepts. In
both countries, Soviet advisers are heavily involved in
efforts to recruit soldiers for the army.
of military duty, as does the Soviet system.
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that Ethio-
pia did not establish a system for mandatory national
military service until 1983. It requires a two-year tour
The Political Commissar System. A vital organiza-
tional element that the Soviets have imprinted on the
armed forces of Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique is
the political commissar system. The Soviets helped set
up such a system in all of the military services to
oversee their political reliability, deter coup plotting,
and reinforce Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviets
and East Germans have provided political training
both locally and in Europe for virtually all political
officers. This effort has been important because the
armed forces have served as an essential part of the
power base of the new Marxist-Leninist leaders.
the politi-
cal commissar system has also had several negative
consequences for military morale and performance. In
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Ethiopia, for example, competition between unit com-
manders and senior political officers hampered mili-
tary effectiveness during and after the Ogaden War of
1977-78. Although this problem has eased in recent
years with the restoration of the power of the com-
manding officers, there continues to be considerable
resentment of the political commissar system in all of
these African states in both the officer corps and
enlisted ranks. The imposition of political training
requirements and the emphasis on political credentials
as a basis for promotion suggests that there may be
some price paid in the overall standards of officer
competence. In spite of these difficulties, however, the
commissar system has been successful in that no
serious challenge has emerged from the military to
either the political leaders or the primacy of Marxist-
Leninist ideology.
Military Equipment
The quantity and type of military equipment sent by
Moscow reflect not only the Soviet General Staff's
doctrinal emphasis on large conventional forces, but
also its perception of the primary military threat
facing these regimes. The immediate challenge con-
fronting Ethiopia in 1977 was the invasion of the
Ogaden by Somali conventional forces, and Moscow
supplied arms in this period that were designed to
improve the capability of Ethiopian forces to deal with
this conventional threat. Since the Ogaden war, Eth-
iopia's security focus has shifted to the northern
insurgencies, though building forces capable of deter-
ring any future Somali military moves has also been
an important objective. The mix of Soviet equipment
deliveries has remained generally consistent over the
years.
In Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets from the
beginning viewed the possibility of a South African
invasion with grave concern. The types of systems
delivered to all three countries gradually improved
from essentially post-World War II combat equip-
ment in the beginning to, more recently, more modern
MIG fighters, tanks, and surface-to-air missiles, along
with large numbers of armored personnel carriers,
trucks, and support vehicles (see figure 10 and table).
some recent equipment deliveries, par-
ticularly to Mozambique, continue to include World
War II-vintage models.
Since independence in 1975 and particularly since the
early 1980s, the threat posed to the Angolan regime
by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA has grown considerably.
Nonetheless, the Soviets apparently continue to per-
ceive South Africa as the primary threat to Luanda.
Although the Soviets are attempting to upgrade An-
gola's ability to fight the insurgents, Moscow's signifi-
cant investment in improving Angola's air defenses
along its southern border reflects an overriding con-
cern with the South African threat.
Mozambique did not have to worry about an insur-
gent threat when it became independent in 1975.
Since the early 1980s, however, it has been faced with
the fastest growing insurgency in Africa. Soviet arms
deliveries immediately following independence and
recent deliveries of air defense equipment have been 25X1
designed to help build a conventional force to meet
the South African threat. Deliveries to Mozambique
have been far fewer than the levels provided to
Ethiopia and Angola, particularly since March 1984,
when former President Samora Machel signed the
Nkomati accord with South Africa.
Moscow seems unwilling to finance the massive effort
necessary to overcome RENAMO and is skeptical
about the Mozambican Armed Forces' ability to
exploit expanded arms deliveries. Moscow undoubted-
ly sees Mozambique as less important than either
Angola or Ethiopia, which have better economic
prospects, important regional roles, and more firmly
established Marxist-Leninist institutions. Moscow,
however, seems willing to continue to supply arms and
advisers to maintain the FRELIMO regime, to check
Western influence in Mozambique, and to ensure 25X1
continued access to Mozambican ports. 25X1
the USSR also appears LDA1
willing to support Zimbabwean and Tanzanian forces
operating in Mozambique against the insurgents.
Logistics and Maintenance
The Soviets have assumed a leading role in establish-
ing and directing logistic operations in support of the
counterinsurgency efforts. They have provided the
three beleaguered African states with an abundance 25X1
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Figure 10
Typical Military Equipment Sent by the Soviet Union
to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
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Major Combat Equipment Deliveries From the Soviet Union
Angola
11
6
14
19
3
70
4
137
Ethiopia
48
26
2
21
17
19
133
Mozambique
16
30
2
48
Mozambique
8
5
13
Tanks (PT-76, T-34,
T-54/55)
Angola
185
84
17
12
20
46
24
388
Ethiopia
232
253
149
5
25
40
60
34
281
1,079
Mozambique
3
67
79
70
30
65
49
19
2
384
Angola
28
40
65
10
138
58
7
702
Ethiopia
95
544
34
43
42
52
101
14
18
943
Mozambique
56
92
2
6
62
66
27
38
42
391
Artillery
Ethiopia
698
804
29
61
16
180
57
54
60
4
1,963
Mozambique
200
266
22
24
26
56
34
12
16
42
698
of transport equipment, including aircraft, helicop-
ters, and trucks, and have deployed a Soviet Military
Aviation (VTA) contingent to each of these countries
to aid internal resupply efforts (see figure 11).
Each of these countries is almost totally dependent on
the USSR for maintenance as well as logistic support,
reflecting their lack of experience with relatively
advanced systems and the Soviets' insistence on per-
forming the complex maintenance tasks themselves.P
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The MI-25 Helicopter Gunship
Although most of the equipment delivered thus far to Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique is primarily suited for conventional warfare, the Soviets have
delivered one system that is useful for counterinsurgency operations-the MI-25
attack helicopter. The Soviets have told their clients that the MI-25 can be used
in practically any situation involving confrontation with small units. The Soviets'
high evaluation of the MI-25 may be based on its successful employment under
similar conditions in Afghanistan. Not all their clients agree, however. The
Ethiopians have found the MI-25 unsuited for many vital counterinsurgency
missions, especially in the mountainous terrain of Eritrea. They claim the MI-25,
when fully laden with fuel and ordnance, has limited vertical lift capability and is
unable to hover and direct fire. These problems frequently render it useless in
support of Ethiopian units pursuing rebels in the mountains.
more than 20 helicopters, including several MI-25s, have been
lost in Angola. We expect the Soviets will improve the capability of the MI-25 in
Africa, especially through the incorporation of systems to counter shoulder-fired
SAMs and improvement of its reconnaissance capabilities.
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armed forces are frequently dissatisfied with Soviet
performance in these areas. For example,
the Ethiopian Air Force
has been unhappy with the Soviet requirement that
MIG engines be overhauled in the USSR.
Each of these African states has looked elsewhere,
with little or no success, for military aid. As early as
such efforts, but appears unwilling to make significant
changes in its overall system of maintenance and
support.
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Soviet Bloc military training for Third World clients' 25X1
personnel takes place primarily in the USSR and
Eastern Europe, with some of the simpler training
taking place within the host country. Soviet efforts are
concentrated primarily on staff training for senior 25X1
officers and on more sophisticated and technical 25X1
disciplines such as flight and air defense training 25X1
taff 25X1
quick to use its leverage-based on the heavy depen-
dence of these countries on the USSR-to discourage
training has concentrated on the same conventional 25X1
combined-arms operational concepts taught to Soviet
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officers. Upon returning from the USSR, these senior
officers assume the best assignments and commands,
including the leadership of some elite units that act as
"palace guards" for the pro-Soviet heads of state.
The Cubans, meanwhile, apparently are responsible
for the bulk of basic training for junior officers and
enlisted personnel. Most of this training takes place
locally. Some specialized training takes place in Cuba
and focuses on areas such as counterintelligence,
interrogation and the study of enemy subversive
actions
eventually be repaid.
Paying for Soviet Military Aid
The Soviets have provided military equipment to their
clients on favorable repayment terms and, in some
cases, at no
cost. We estimate that up to 40 to 50 percent of the
military aid is provided on a grant basis. Nonetheless,
the Soviets expect that the credit they provide will
Mozambique currently does not have the resources to
pay for Soviet military equipment, but the Soviets
continue to provide some aid on concessionary terms.
Angolan debt to the USSR also has increased rapidly,
from about $2.1 billion at the end of 1985 to nearly
$3.5 billion in December 1986
pay for its military aid
The dramatic fall in
oil prices during 1986 made it harder for Luanda to
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The National Level
Angola. Moscow has been directing a political-mili-
'the Soviet promises of nonmilitary aid have vanished,
and almost all of their assistance is in the form of
military equipment or advisers.
Financial problems notwithstanding, the Soviets have
been quick to supply large quantities of military
equipment when these countries have been faced with
a deteriorating military situation. Major military
airlifts have given the impression of a Soviet policy
that calls for sending the arms quickly and worrying
about the repayment details later.
Although the USSR continues to pressure Angola,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique to pay off their obliga-
tions, it will probably continue to defer repayment for
the foreseeable future on the basis of the following
considerations:
? The Soviets probably realize that the grave econom-
ic situation in these countries-particularly Ethio-
pia and Mozambique-makes significant repay-
ment virtually impossible at the moment. Pressure
for repayment under these circumstances would
almost certainly lead to a major confrontation,
which the Soviets would prefer to avoid.
? Moscow probably calculates that the political bene-
fits of having relatively loyal Marxist allies in the
Horn and southern Africa are worth the costs.
? The debt issue reinforces the allies' already deep
military dependence on the Soviets, and may enable
Moscow to extract future political or military
concessions.
tary strategy apparently intended ultimately to defeat
the insurgents in a protracted conflict. The strategy
has been aimed at containing UNITA and keeping 25X1
the rebels off balance while being careful not to
provoke South Africa. Angola's Soviet-style conven-
tional campaign, however, has been for the most part
unsuccessful. Despite the current military stalemate,
the Soviets have counseled Luanda against any politi-
cal accommodation with UNITA that ;would bring
Jonas Savimbi into a ruling coalition. They apparently
believe the charismatic Savimbi's political skills and
popularity would give him an edge in a coalition
government.
Ethiopia. The situation in Ethiopia is somewhat dif-
ferent in that most of the insurgent groups there are
not attempting to overthrow the regime or gain a
share of power in the central government, but are
fighting for autonomy or independence. As in Angola,
Soviet military advice has called for large sweep
campaigns supported by airpower. These campaigns,
however, have been largely unsuccessful in dealing
with the insurgencies.
There has been a duality in the Soviet approach over
the past several years to the Ethiopian strategy to-
ward the northern insurgencies.
Moscow favors Ethiopian consideration of a
political solution to the conflict on the basis of some
form of limited autonomy for the northern provinces.
On the other hand, the Soviets appear to have con-
cluded that applying pressure on Mengistu to make a
political settlement could backfire by arousing his
ty for Communism and dependence on the USSR.
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Mozambique. Despite the grim security situation in
Mozambique, the Soviets appear to believe that their
basic goal-maintaining a generally pro-Soviet "so-
cialist" regime in Maputo-is secure for at least the
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near term. Moscow continues to counsel Maputo to ? The need for adequate preparation at all levels prior
defend key cities against the insurgents and is supply-
ing some military assistance, but has not made the
major commitment of aid that would be needed to
defeat RENAMO.
to a major campaign.
Soviet advice is unclear.
The extent to which client operations directly reflect ;
The Operational Level
On a broad scale, the Soviets' operational advice to
their clients reflects their basic military concepts-
centralized control, massive troop strength, heavy
concentrations of armor and firepower, and operations
designed to achieve victory in a relatively short period
against large conventional forces. Their rigid ap-
proach and lack of a formal counterinsurgency con-
cept reflect their focus on Europe, where the forces
and terrain bear little resemblance to conditions in
Africa.
? The creation of secure enclaves around the vital
elements of the client state's political and adminis-
trative base-the, capital, other major cities, key
economic areas, and main lines of communication.
? The use of major campaigns aimed at searching out
and destroying insurgent groups, disrupting insur-
gent base areas, and hindering resupply of insurgent
groups.
? Large-scale multidivisional combined arms assaults
on rebel-held areas and sweep operations intended
to open major roadways.
Soviet advisers in Angola have the final say in
determining the planning of major combat operations.
planning major campaigns.
Government forces have had some success in using
large-scale combined-arms attacks on rebel-held
towns when their advantage in numbers has been
substantial, as occurred in both Ethiopia and Angola
in 1985, and have been able to open up key roads for
daytime travel by heavily armed convoys. However,
they have rarely been able to destroy major insurgent
concentrations or control large areas of the country-
side.
Whatever the substance of their recommendations,
Soviet advisers frequently have difficulty getting Afri-
can field commanders to act on their advice. For
example
Soviet advice is often heeded by a small
but influential group of senior Ethiopian officers at
defense headquarters at Addis Ababa, but that most
senior field commanders are opposed to Soviet recom-
mendations. In Mozambique,
military commanders now tend to
look more toward Zimbabwe for advice because they
believe their Soviet advisers are serving no useful
purpose.
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There has been a perceptible change since 1980 in the
number, detail, and orientation of Soviet unclassified
articles about particular tactical problems related to
fighting guerrillas. Coverage has increased on night
combat, mountain warfare, ambushes, and jungle
warfare. These articles have been expanded over
earlier writings-which were few and sketchy-to
include more details and analysis. They reveal a
change in the perception of certain tactics, including a
more balanced view of the role of helicopters in
mountain and jungle conditions as well as praise for
certain tactics that had been attributed to the "ban-
dits"; foremost among these is the use and impor-
tance of surprise. Numerous articles discuss the need
to use scouting parties, the problems of landing
helicopters, and the difficulty in judging targets and
positioning to fire in mountains. In general, they give
more attention to the conditions under which such
operations should be carried out, by whom, and for
what purpose. They also stress the need for reliable
communications as well as the use of local residents
to discover counterrevolutionary hideouts.
The increased attention in Soviet writings to counter-
insurgency operations suggests the Soviets are in the
process of reevaluating the requirements for this
demanding mission. Many of these articles have used
the US experience in Vietnam as a point of departure,
but it is clear that the vast majority of them relate
directly to the Afghan situation. Although many also
have potential applications to the situations in Ango-
la, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, we have seen no
articles specifically applying the concepts developed
in this Afghan-oriented literature to African counter-
insurgency operations.
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allowing Moscow to introduce Cuban troops without
the negative repercussions that undoubtedly would
accompany the intervention of Soviet Bloc troops.
Soviet
advisers are, as a rule, not permitted to participate
directly in combat. Moscow apparently wants to avoid
casualties and the political consequences of direct,
nondeniable involvement in what are essentially civil
wars.
The Role of Soviet Surrogates
The Cubans
The Soviets rely heavily on Cuban support to Angola,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique (see figure 13). Cuban
troops were vital in establishing and consolidating
pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and
Ethiopia. Indeed, the introduction of Cuban troops
was probably the determining factor in deciding the
outcome in these two countries during the early stages
of Soviet Bloc involvement. These joint Soviet-Cuban
interventions transformed Cuba from an essentially
passive recipient of military largess into an active and
valuable military ally of the Soviet Union. Havana's
nonaligned credentials are particularly valuable,
Angola. Following Angolan independence in 1975,
Cuba gradually increased its longstanding low level of
involvement with the MPLA by sending advisers and
military support personnel to assist the Marxist-
Leninist group. This group of Cubans has steadily
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personnel. Of these, some 29,500 are combat troops
assigned to air, air defense, and ground combat units,
while the remaining 8,000 Cubans are specialists,
technicians, and advisers assisting the Angolan armed
perts, and economic advisers.
In addition to their military presence, in Angola the
Cubans have an estimated 6,000 civilian advisers
providing medical and economic assistance. Accord-
ing to diplomatic sources, they work in all parts of the
Angolan Government, performing both advisory and
.functional tasks. Cuban civilians also serve as teach-
ers, doctors, construction workers, agricultural ex-
Ethiopia. The relationship between Cuba and Ethio-
pia started to develop in early 1977, when Mengistu
became chairman of the Military Council after a
bloody power struggle. The first 75 Cuban military
advisers arrived that year, and, following Somalia's
attack on Ethiopia in 1977, the number grew to some
16,000 to 17,000. This included Cuban troops who
were organized into combat brigades and played a key
role in defeating the Somalis.
Since the Ogaden War ended in 1978, the Cuban
military presence has steadily declined. The Cubans
have not been willing to get involved in operations
against the insurgents, probably because Fidel Castro
was unwilling to turn on the Eritreans, whom Cuba
had trained and supported before Mengistu's rise to
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Transferring the Lessons of Afghanistan?
After more than seven years of experience in fighting
the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the Soviets have made
some adjustments-both political and military-to
their approach to the insurgency there. A close
scrutiny of Soviet activity, however, suggests their
experience in Afghanistan has not led to a unique
approach to counterinsurgency warfare that they
might use in support of their African allies.
Soviet troops are gaining valuable experience fighting
have served in Afghanistan, and a number of senior
officers, including Sokolov, have been closely associ-
ated with the war.
Infighting the Mujahedin, the Soviets have increased
their use of special-purpose forces and air assault
units, improved their intelligence, and deployed spe-
cialized .security units. The bulk of their forces,
however, remain traditional mechanized infantry
whose main responsibility is protecting fixed installa-
tions and guarding lines of communication. Soviet
guidance to their African clients about structuring
their armed forces appears to follow these patterns.
In Afghanistan, the Soviets have employed some of
their most advanced equipment and have modified
older equipment as a result of combat experience.
The Soviets have provided their Afghan and African
clients with some of the same types of equipment, but
not the latest models probably because the clients
cannot afford them and would have difficulty operat-
ing them. In 1986 the Soviets significantly increased
the number of heavy artillery pieces, automatic mor-
tars, and helicopters assigned to their own troops in
Afghanistan. Recently, the Afghan military received
more advanced artillery and infantry fighting vehi-
cles. Angola also received a significant number of
artillery and mortar pieces in 1986. We expect more
helicopters, artillery, and armored vehicles will be
sent to Moscow's African clients who are fighting
insurgents.
African countries.
The Soviets and the Afghan Government have had
little success implementing economic, political, or
social programs to win the allegiance of the populace,
primarily because of their lack of control outside of
Kabul and other major cities. Indeed, the bitter
hostility of almost the entire population to the Soviet
presence has made it impossible for Soviet-run efforts
to win acceptance. The Soviets have encouraged the
regime to establish political organizations to co-opt
local leaders and tribal groups. These suggestions
have sometimes been accompanied by economic in-
centives. These efforts have had limited and usually
only temporary success. Widespread efforts have been
made to win over insurgent groups, local leaders, and
refugees during the "national reconciliation" cam-
paign that began in December 1986, but most regime
overtures have been rejected. Similar Soviet efforts to
win the support of the populace are not evident in the
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Figure 13
Cuban Military Presence in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
? Angola
Number of military personnel
Ethiopia ? Mozambique
30,000
25,000
20,000
10,000 r
1975 76 77 78 79 80
85
r
87
power. This reticence, and reduced fears of a Somali
invasion, are the likely reasons behind the reduction of
Cuban forces to about 3,000 to 4,000. About half of
this total are military advisers and half are combat
troops. The advisers provide technical assistance, but
do not have the extensive operational roles that they
do in Angola and Mozambique. The combat troops
provide an ostensible deterrent against a Somali inva-
sion but have played no role in combating the north-
ern insurgency. In addition, there are some 1,100
civilian advisers and technicians in Ethiopia.
Mozambique. Cuba moved quickly to establish diplo-
matic relations with Maputo shortly after Mozam-
bique gained independence from Portugal in 1975.
Cuba initiated economic relations with Maputo in
1977 and sent civilian advisers to rebuild Mozam-
bique's deteriorating sugar industry. There are cur-
rently some 900 civilian technicians in Mozambique.
In 1977 Cuba began sending military advisers to help
train and organize Mozambique's Army. The estimat-
ed 800 Cuban military advisers and technicians cur-
rently in Mozambique are attached to some Army
units, principally motorized infantry and artillery 25X1
units, at battalion level and above.
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aggressive and experienced in counterinsurgency op-
erations than their Eastern Bloc counterparts and are
more forthcoming.
the Cubans' primary function is
basic training for new troops. The Cubans also play a
key role in running the security service.
Other Surrogates
Other Soviet Bloc countries, particularly East Germa-
ny, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, also play a key role
in assisting Soviet efforts. The East German presence
is primarily evident in the internal security and
intelligence apparatuses in these countries.
instructors-noted for their expertise in guerrilla war-
fare tactics-teach basic military skills such as recon-
naissance, jungle combat, and ambush tactics.
Although we did not find a unified Soviet doctrine for
counterinsurgency warfare in the Third World or
parallels to Western theory in the Soviet approach,
our research has revealed a pattern in Moscow's aid to
its African.clients facing insurgencies
elements of the overall Soviet approach:
? A strong emphasis on building up the client state's
administrative, security, political, and economic ap-
paratus to establish its power and ensure compliance
in areas under its control.'
' It should be noted that this prescription is not unique to states
confronting insurgencies. Virtually all of its elements apply to
fledgling Marxist-Leninist regimes that are not torn by overt civil
strife but which-in the Soviet view-are still vulnerable to
? Large-scale materiel and advisory support for the
African ally's military forces aimed at the creation
of large conventional forces.
? Use of these forces to secure the client's capital, key
cities, and vital economic regions against conven-
tional and insurgent threats and to expand the areas
controlled by the state by gradually pushing the
insurgents back.
? Consistent support for the Marxist-Leninist client
state in the international arena in order to secure
broad recognition of it and to delegitimize the
claims of the insurgents.
The Soviets seem to expect that, in the long run,
consolidation of the state's power and authority,
expansion of the domain physically controlled by the
state, elimination of alternative political forces, and
withering of the insurgency as a result of persistent
military pressure and erosion of outside support will
ensure the defeat of the insurgent challenge.
The important role administrative, economic, and
political factors play in Moscow's advice to its African
clients does not mean the Soviets attach a low priority
to the military dimension of their clients' difficulties.
Indeed, they concentrate the bulk of their assistance
in this area. Nonetheless, Moscow does not appear to
believe that it must help its clients achieve decisive
military defeat of the insurgents in the near term. It
seems to treat the insurgency threat as a very impor-
tant, but still subordinate, part of the long-term
challenge of helping its Marxist-Leninist allies con-
solidate power.
Results as of Late 1987
Moscow has enjoyed mixed results in implementing
its overall approach to building these African states
and helping them deal with insurgency.
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Building the State. In Ethiopia the state apparatus is
relatively strong. Through a mixture of terror and
intimidation directed at opponents and rewards for
supporters, Chairman Mengistu has created-with
Soviet Bloc help-a state structure responsive to his
dictates, a reasonably loyal military, and a security
mechanism capable of maintaining tight political
control. Ethiopia's economic performance has been
poor by any standard, but this has not led to meaning-
Cabinda oilfields. Finally, while the Soviets undoubt-
edly regard the military situation in Mozambique as a
serious problem, they do
not see RENAMO as a threat to Maputo in the near
term. Moreover, Zimbabwean military intervention
on FRELIMO's behalf has slowed insurgent momen-
tum and relieved the Soviets of having to deal with
such a threat over the near term.
ful political opposition.
The regime in Angola has had moderate success in
developing the state structure, especially in those
areas of the country that form the main ethnic base of
the MPLA. It has had difficulties consolidating its
hold in other regions. The armed forces still require
extensive Soviet and Cuban advisory support, and the
security of the regime itself would be doubtful without
the 37,500 Cuban combat troops and military advis-
ers. Angolan economic performance has been un-
even-oil and mineral revenues have somewhat offset
the poor performance of other industrial and agricul-
The government in Mozambique has had little success
in creating a viable state apparatus, and the perfor-
mance of its armed forces has been dismal-a result
of incompetence and ethnic and tribal differences. As
a consequence, the insurgents have gained in recent
years. The economy is in disarray, with little prospect
for improvement.
Combating the Insurgencies. Despite the lack of,
success in defeating the. insurgencies, the military
situation in these three countries, from Moscow's
long-term perspective, probably does not appear to be
irretrievable or, in the Ethiopian case, particularly
serious. The Ethiopian insurgents have been effective-
ly confined to the northern regions and do not pose a
major threat to Addis Ababa. In Angola, UNITA
enjoys wider geographical scope than the Ethiopian
rebels, but, in the wake of government offensive
operations since 1985, is not in a position to threaten
the capital or the regime's main source of revenue, the
Vanguard Workers'Parties. The Workers' Party of 25X1
Ethiopia, from a Soviet standpoint, appears to be the
most developed of the African Vanguard Workers'
Parties. The party, however, is still heavily dominated
by Mengistu and his military supporters and is far
from the civilian-controlled party the Soviets have
advocated. Soviet assessments of the Angolan
MPLA-PT note that it has made some progress
toward becoming a national party of reliable commit-
ment to Marxism-Leninism. However, the MPLA-PT
has not been able to transcend ethnic and racial
barriers and has been prone to factionalism. Mozam-
bique's FRELIMO is suspect in Soviet eyes-it has
been ineffective in carrying out virtually any of the 25X1
tasks of the "national democratic revolution," and in
recent years its leaders have been less vocal in. their
commitment both to "scientific socialism" and Soviet
foreign policy positions. The problems these parties
have had in these and other states of "socialist
orientation" have fueled an ongoing debate in Soviet
academic and policy writings on the "correct"-role of
the VWP in Third World countries.
Outside Support. None of the insurgent groups has
obtained meaningful external diplomatic recognition,
though this is primarily due to regional political
circumstances rather than to Soviet diplomacy, active
measures, or propaganda. In particular, African oppo-
sition to Eritrean attempts to redraw existing bound-
aries and UNITA and RENAMO association with
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South Africa have been inhibiting factors. Moscow
probably believes, however, that persistent campaign-
ing on these themes and championing of its client
regimes' causes in the international arena serve to
reinforce the Third World diplomatic consensus
against the insurgents, to build political support for
the three governments, and to complicate Western
efforts to aid the insurgents.
The Soviets have not had much impact on the insur-
gents' material support. Ethiopia's northern insur-
gents have consistently obtained arms, money, and
supplies from the Arab world and front groups
throughout Europe. RENAMO probably still receives
modest support from South Africa, and UNITA gets
South African and US military aid. In all three cases,
the insurgencies have also shown themselves capable
of capturing arms and supplies from government
forces and would be able to sustain themselves, albeit
at reduced levels, even if outside support were cut off.
Figure 14
Soviet Military and Economic Aid
Deliveries, 1975-85
Moscow will probably continue willingness to discuss
southern Africa with the United States in bilateral
exchanges on regional issues and may amplify its
presently vague proposals for an international confer-
ence on the area. The Soviets are probably more
interested, however, in using these talks as a means of
obtaining information on US policy and intentions
than they are in establishing any kind of meaningful
negotiating forum.
Costs to the USSR. We estimate the total cost of
Moscow's economic and military support for its Afri-
can clients since the mid-1970s to be about $13.4
billion (see figure 14). The Kremlin did not anticipate
this large economic burden when it first moved to
support its African allies, and Moscow has frequently
stressed that its aid is not open-ended. A variety of
open source writings and recent Soviet efforts to
tighten the terms of client military debt payments
suggest the USSR intends to keep the costs of its
involvement with these Marxist allies under tighter
control.
Nonetheless, Moscow's expenditures on its African
clients represent a small part of overall Soviet military
and economic outlays. We do not believe cost
considerations will significantly affect Moscow's un-
derlying commitment to its African allies. At present,
the Soviets probably see the political and military
benefits as outweighing the economic burden.
In spite of the various problems the Soviets have
experienced in helping their African clients deal with
the insurgencies and consolidate power, they are
probably fairly satisfied with the results of their
approach. First, it has served to promote what we
believe are their basic interests and objectives in these
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able.
countries: increasing their political role in southern
Africa and the Horn, establishing a military presence,
gaining access to air and naval facilities, and promot-
ing leftist change in key regions. Also, while the
Soviets do not control the internal politics of these
states, they have amassed significant levels of political
influence. The Kremlin can afford to be patient in
pursuing these policies, since it does not face substan-
tial domestic opposition to its involvement in Africa,
and the costs-while an object of concern-are toler-
main unanswered.
Vulnerabilities
Although Moscow's approach to the insurgencies
against its African clients has, for the most part,
served its interests and objectives, we believe that its
approach and its position in these countries have
several vulnerabilities that could hamper its effective-
ness in the long run. Moscow appears to be aware of
and to have devised responses to some of these
vulnerabilities, while others raise questions that re-
gets, and, potentially, the regime itself.
Insurgent Persistence. At the very least, prolonged
insurgent military action means that Luanda, Ma-
puto, and Addis Ababa must devote substantial re-
sources to large military forces, which obstructs the
process of economic and political consolidation. More
serious from the regimes' standpoint, insurgent persis-
tence contributes to public passivity, and in some
cases, outright opposition as the futility of the govern-
ment's military efforts becomes increasingly evident.
Finally, if government forces are weak enough, as in
Mozambique, the insurgents may make military gains
sufficient to threaten key cities, vital economic tar-
All this increases the costs to the Soviets of supporting
their allies, contributes to friction between African
military leaders and their Soviet advisers, and, at
times, leads a client's political leadership to consider
alternatives to heavy reliance on the USSR and
Marxism-Leninism. Moscow has usually responded to
these problems by increasing arms shipments and
trying to improve its clients' military performance.
The absence of viable alternative sources of political
and military support has so far contained the political
fallout from the clients' poor military performance. In
the absence of a more successful approach to the
insurgencies, however, the Soviets will continue to
experience tension and difficulties in their relations
with these states.
Instability of Client Leadership. The Soviet position
in all three African states remains vulnerable to
sudden leadership change through assassination or
coup. None of the ruling parties has created a mecha-
nism for leadership change, and a leader or faction
less committed to Marxism-Leninism and the USSR 25X1
could emerge suddenly. Ethiopia appears the least
susceptible to a coup because of Mengistu's political
iron grip. The Angolan leadership also appears fairly
secure, at least by African standards, despite ethnic
and racial tensions within the top leadership. Mozam-
bique has the least stable political equation, and a
political move by military leaders willing to cut a deal
with the RENAMO insurgents cannot be ruled out.
The Soviets are presumably sensitive to these prob- 25X1
lems, having previously lost political ground in Africa
following coups in Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, and they
have several instruments they can use to protect their
position in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Their
extensive advisory presence in the administrative,
military, security, and political institutions allows'
them to monitor political developments and, possibly,
to try to promote a preemptive coup or countercoup by
party or military elements more loyal to the USSR.
Also, we assume that the Soviet and East European
services have cultivated independent networks of
sources and unilaterally penetrated host country secu-
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ters. Finally, should a coup occur, the Soviets would
probably have a fair degree of leverage over the
successor regime by virtue of its dependence on Soviet
arms and, in Angola, Cuban troops. While none of
these factors guarantees that a coup hostile to Soviet
interests will not take place, they provide some degree
of "insurance" against potentially harmful instability.
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Poor Economic Performance. All three of Moscow's
African clients have experienced serious economic
difficulties and none has a particularly encouraging
economic outlook, although Angola's situation will
improve if oil prices rise.
at least some officials in Maputo and Luanda
have come to see aspects of the Marxist-Leninist
economic model as part of their problem, and all three
countries have expressed dissatisfaction with what
they see as inadequate Soviet economic aid. These
difficulties have already led Mozambique and, to a
more limited degree, Angola to turn to the West for
economic aid.
The Soviets have not been opposed in principle to
their African clients' obtaining Western aid, but
various Soviet writings indicate
that Moscow is concerned about the possibility of
increased Western influence. Moscow will probably
rely on its clients' military dependence to guarantee
its long-term presence and influence. In view of the
Soviets' own economic woes as well as their past
record, we believe it is unlikely they will substantially
increase their economic aid.
Generational Change. In the next 10 to 20 years the
"revolutionary generation" in Angola, Mozambique,
and Ethiopia will give way to leaders who did not
experience either colonial rule or the period in which
Soviet military and political backing helped the re-
gimes consolidate power and defeat outside chal-
lenges. Their world view may be more directly affect-
ed by the postrevolutionary experiences of economic
decline, persistent insurgency, and dependence on a
foreign power. They may be less inclined to accept
military solutions to the insurgencies, Marxism-
Leninism, or close relations with Moscow as necessary
national policies, and more open to political and
economic pragmatism at home and genuine nonalign-
ment abroad.
The Soviets appear to see the development of the
Vanguard Workers' Party as the main answer to the
problem of generational change. They believe that an
institutionalized Marxist-Leninist VWP should even-
tually become the primary and, ultimately, the only
possible arena of leadership competition and advance-
ment. This would guarantee that future leadership
change would take place within a Marxist-Leninist
institutional framework and that future leaders will
remain loyal at least to the forms of Marxism-
Leninism. Moscow has had extensive experience with
self-professed Marxist parties that broke away from
Soviet-approved policies and presumably hopes to
ensure the loyalty of the African VWPs by education
and guidance in the "correct" methods of building the
party
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Appendix
Soviet Writings on Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency
In the past, Soviet military doctrine and political
theory have held that local wars and military conflicts
in the Third World are an outgrowth of Western
imperialism and its resistance to national liberation
movements in the Third World. Soviet theorists have
long described the "national liberation process" as a
positive and historically ordained trend and one in
which the Soviet role is to champion people oppressed
by colonial or foreign-dominated "neocolonial" re-
gimes. Over the years, the Soviets have gained much
expertise in dealing with a variety of anticolonial
guerrilla and insurgent movements by providing train-
ing, materiel, and advisory and political assistance to
such forces in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Today, however, Soviet ideologists and strategists are
faced with the problem of defining, analyzing, and
prescribing responses for situations in which antigov-
ernment insurgencies confront friendly Marxist-
Leninist regimes. A comprehensive review of two and
a half decades of Soviet political, ideological, and
military writings indicates that the Soviets have not
yet formulated a distinct doctrine of counterinsur-
gency. There is no discussion of counterinsurgency as
a unique political-military problem demanding a
unique response from the Soviet state. In our judg-
ment, there are several reasons for this somewhat
surprising omission:
? The persistence of these insurgencies raises sensitive
ideological questions that Soviet theorists may pre-
fer to avoid. Moscow's client regimes ostensibly rule
in the interest of the "worker and peasant masses."
Acknowledging that substantial opposition to
Marxist-Leninist governments persists among these
groups could call into question critical elements of
these regimes' claims to legitimacy and undercut
Soviet explanations of the "national liberation"
process.
? The inertia of military doctrine and the military
establishment's focus on massive combined opera-
tions against NATO and China may make it diffi-
cult for advocates of flexible, small-unit concepts
applicable to the Third World to gain a hearing.
? The Soviets may not view these Third World insur-
gencies as sufficiently common or threatening to
their security interests to require the formulation of
a separate military doctrine.
If the Soviets have secretly developed or are develop-
ing a doctrine applicable to counterinsurgency, it is
not evident in their writings or actions. The Soviet 25X1
literature does, however, provide some insight into
Soviet thinking on the question of anti-Marxist insur-
gency in the Third World.
Soviet observers have long noted that during the
revolutionary process, a variety of elements may rise
up in opposition, including counterrevolutionary class
forces and groups and individuals seeking personal
gain. According to the Soviets, antigovernment rebels
in the African cases are made up of two elements:
"internal reactionaries" and "bandits" (see figure 15).
Soviet literature explains the ability of these elements
to survive over several years almost exclusively as a
result of outside support from the "imperialist" world,
not because they attract significant internal support.
Indeed, Soviet accusations regarding intensified train-
ing and equipping of the counterrevolutionaries by the
United States and other nations have increased dra-
matically since the invasion of Afghanistan.
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Possible Reevaluation
Two recent articles, however, suggest there may be a
move toward a more realistic picture of the insurgen-
cy problem. Izvestiya political observer Aleksandr
Bovin noted in early 1986 that a variety of factors,
including economic backwardness, the strength of
tradition and religion, and the errors of revolutionary
leaders have fostered counterrevolution against social-
ist-oriented Third World states and pushed some
"workers and peasants"-the ostensible beneficiaries
of revolutionary change-into the camp of the opposi-
tion. An article in the February 1987 edition of
Moscow's Military History Journal discussing the
Muslim rebellion in Soviet Central Asia during the
1920s-often cited in Soviet writings alluding to
Afghanistan-also suggests the Soviets are taking a
more realistic view of the insurgency problem. In the
past, the guerrillas in this rebellion-called basma-
chi-were portrayed as lawless bands supported by
foreign imperialists and engaged. solely in banditry.
The February article, however, admits that the bas-
machi had certain legitimate grievances as well as
support from the local population..The appearance of
these articles in such authoritative publications sug-
gests there is high-level interest in the USSR in
taking a more balanced look at the insurgencies. Most
Soviet writing on the subject, however, continues to
stress the role of external meddling in sustaining the
rebels.
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Secret
Secret
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