SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S NEW THINKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07C00121R001000290001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
11
Intelligence
n
New Thinking
Sino-Soviet Relations:
Impact. of Gorbachev's
SOV 88-10050X
EA 88-10030X
July 1988
Copy 5 4 8
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A Intelligence
Sino-Soviet Relations:
Impact of Gorbachev's
New Thinking
This paper was prepared by Office
of Soviet Analysis, and Office of East
Asian Anal sis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division,
SOVA~
Secret
SOV 88-10050X
EA 88-10030X
July 1988
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Summary
Information available
as of 8 July 1988
was used in this report.
New Thinking
Sino-Soviet Relations:
Impact of Gorbachev's
relationship.
In his speech at Vladivostok in July 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev
made it clear that Moscow intends to increase its influence in Asia and ex-
ert itself as an Asian political and economic actor rather than just as a mil-
itary power. The chief target of Soviet courtship in Asia is China.
Although efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations began under General
Secretary Brezhnev, a watershed was reached in 1986 when Moscow
agreed to discuss Beijing's "three obstacles" to improved relations-the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow's support for Vietnam's occupa-
tion of Cambodia, and the Soviet military buildup in Mongolia and along
the Sino-Soviet border. Since then, there has been steady progress in the
ministers, premiers, or presidents.
The range and level of political contacts between Soviet and Chinese
officials have grown, and cultural and other nonpolitical contacts are now
almost daily occurrences. Border tensions have been reduced, progress has
been made on the border demarcation issue, and each side has begun to
portray publicly the other's experience in economic reform in a positive
light. Although Beijing continues to resist Moscow's calls for a summit and
resumption of party-to-party ties, there is an increased likelihood of a high-
level visit to one capital or the other within the next year by foreign
military contact.
Both sides seek a stable, nonconfrontational environment in order to
concentrate on domestic reforms and modernization. They also seek to use
improved relations to increase their leverage with Washington and other-
wise improve their respective ability to maneuver within the Sino-Soviet-
US strategic triangle. The Soviets may still have some hope of bringing the
Chinese back into the "socialist" fold, but for now and the foreseeable
future they would settle for a China that follows a middle course between
the United States and the USSR. In the near term, Moscow would like the
array of Sino-Soviet contacts to match China's existing relationships with
the United States-including regular high-level visits and some form of
Moscow is probably pleased with the progress in relations to date and is un-
likely to try to force the current pace by making a characteristic "grand
gesture." Domestic constraints and the risk of damaging relations with
third-country allies limit the areas in which Gorbachev can even make such
a gesture. For example, he would face opposition from the military to
Secret
SOV 88-10050X
EA 88-10030X
July 1988
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,ecret
making significant unilateral troop cuts along the border and would be
unlikely to wage such a domestic battle for an uncertain Chinese re-
sponse-although constraints are not as great to additional drawdowns
from the relatively small number of Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia.
The Soviets, in our view, are also not prepared to withhold economic or mil-
itary support to Hanoi in an effort to prod the Vietnamese out of
Cambodia; Moscow does not want to damage its overall relationship with
Vietnam and is especially reluctant to risk losing access to Cam Ranh Bay.
Beijing, for its part, is not prepared to respond with a grand gesture of its
own and would resent Moscow's efforts to force relations forward in this
way. The Soviets, therefore, are likely to continue to nudge the Chinese to
upgrade relations by making small unilateral gestures to ensure that
progress continues toward eventual rapprochement. These could include
concessions on the border dispute, more movement on a Cambodian
settlement, or a small withdrawal from the border.
Although Moscow would probably not offer militarily significant unilateral
troop cuts along the Sino-Soviet border as a concession, several factors
could persuade it to consider and implement smaller cuts if the political cli-
mate were right for such a gesture. Even with small cuts, the Soviets could
retain an overall advantage in air and ground forces along the border. The
political leadership, already pressuring the Soviet military to reduce and
conserve resources, may conclude that reducing tensions along the Sino-
Soviet frontier is one of the conditions necessary to allow the reallocation of
some resources from the military to the civilian sector.
In our view, a resolution of the territorial dispute along the border is a pre-
requisite to any significant troop cuts in the region but would not
necessarily block additional troop cuts in Mongolia. Gorbachev could face
opposition from within the leadership, however, to making more conces-
sions on troop withdrawals or on the territorial issues. He is unlikely to
make any bold moves on the disputed islands and "throw away" what could
be an important bargaining chip in the future for an uncertain Chinese
response. Gorbachev would probably first need tangible evidence of
Chinese willingness to agree to a mutually acceptable border accord and
assurances that the Chinese would be willing to seriously discuss mutual
force reductions along the border.
Beijing appears to have decided that Gorbachev is sincerely striving to
reduce Sino-Soviet tensions as part of his'effort to create a more peaceful
international environment in which to pursue domestic reform. Chinese
Kremlin-watchers, however, continue to debate the extent of Gorbachev's
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flexibility and his staying power in the face of continued opposition at
home. Beijing may also be concerned that warming US-Soviet relations
will lessen its leverage in the strategic triangle, and it therefore may be
more receptive to Soviet efforts to move the Sino-Soviet relationship
forward. China uses the three obstacles as a tool to control the pace of pro-
gress in political relations with Moscow. By reserving the right to
determine whether Soviet actions on the obstacles are significant, Beijing
can raise or lower the price to Moscow of improved relations. The Chinese
thus are capable of declaring at any time that Moscow has sufficiently met
Beijing's concerns on the obstacles to warrant an upgrading of political
relations.
We can identify no strong pro-Soviet constituency in the Chinese leader-
ship, and fear of imperiling crucial trade, technology, and other ties
between China and the West inhibits even those who would like to see Chi-
na follow a middle road between the superpowers. Some leaders support
treating the two superpowers as more or less equivalent, but their
statements suggest that they are not so much pro-Soviet as suspicious of
the West.
Perhaps the most important impediment to full normalization of Sino-
Soviet relations is the firm opposition of China's top leader, Deng
Xiaoping. Deng is deeply distrustful of the Soviets and skeptical that
greatly improved relations with the USSR would yield significant benefits
for China. We believe he has already achieved his main goal-relaxation of
tensions on the border. Deng tightly controls Chinese policy toward the
Soviets, and, while some other senior leaders favor a less restrictive policy,
they have been unable to influence this issue much. After Deng's death, we
expect some softening on the Chinese side. For pragmatic reasons-trade
advantage, cheaper goods, increased leverage in the strategic triangle-
Deng's successors will probably accelerate China's gradual policy of
relaxation.
The Chinese belief that the Soviet Union will remain the principal threat to
China over the long term and recognition that Soviet and Chinese
aspirations in Asia will continue to be at odds will prevent a return to the
alliance relationship of the 1950s. The Chinese are sensitive about their
sovereignty and position within the socialist community, and, despite Soviet
assurances that Moscow wants a relationship based on equality, Beijing
will remain skeptical of Soviet overtures. Both countries need Western
technology and capital for their respective modernization drives, and
China, in particular, would be careful not to jeopardize its access to the
West by entering into an alliance with the Soviets.
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Although a closer relationship may lead Moscow and Beijing to be tougher
in their bargaining positions with the United. States-especially if both see
their leverage in the strategic triangle as enhanced by closer relations-
better Sino-Soviet relations would not necessarily have a negative impact
on US interests across the board. Should the Soviets and Chinese, for
example, begin to cooperate on such issues as jointly restraining North
Korea or pressing Vietnam and the resistance toward a Cambodian
settlement, this cooperation could have positive implications for stability in
East Asia.
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Political Contacts Growing, Moscow Pushing for
Party and Military Contacts To Follow
2
Steady Progress in Other Areas
Cambodia
7
Afghanistan
9
The Military Buildup Along the Border
10
Progress in the Border Talks
11
Domestic Constraints on Gorbachev
11
The Chinese Domestic Equation
14
Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations Since 21 December 1984
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Sino-Soviet Relations:
Impact of Gorbachev's
New Thinking
In his speech at Vladivostok in July 1986, General
Secretary Gorbachev made it clear that Moscow
intends to increase its influence in Asia and exert
itself as an Asian political and economic actor rather
than just as a military power. The chief target of
Soviet courtship in Asia is China. Both the USSR and
China seek a stable and nonconfrontational relation-
ship-especially along their border-to concentrate
on domestic reforms and modernization. Both sides
also seek to use their improving relations to increase
their leverage with Washington and their respective
ability to maneuver within the Sino-Soviet-US strate-
gic triangle.
Moscow seeks a normalization of relations with China
marked by the resumption of party-to-party ties. It
has repeatedly called for a summit and would proba-
bly view one between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping
as a major step toward the resumption of party ties
even though Deng is not the leader of the party. The
Soviets may still have some hope of eventually bring-
ing the Chinese back into the "socialist" fold but for
now and the foreseeable future would gladly settle for
a China that follows a middle course between the
United States and the USSR. To this end, Moscow
would like the array of Sino-Soviet contacts eventual-
ly to match China's existing relationships with the
United States-including regular high-level visits and
some form of military contact. In addition, Moscow
may want to codify the relationship with a statement
of principles-similar to the declaration on "basic
principles of relations" signed by the United States
and USSR in 1972-that would include some form of
nonaggression clause.
Moscow is taking advantage of warming Soviet-US
relations in the wake of the INF agreement and the
Soviet-US summits in Washington and Moscow to
encourage China to respond to Soviet initiatives to
improve bilateral relations. Gorbachev's call for a
summit in his interview published in January 1988 in
the Chinese international relations journal, Liaowang,
was the first Chinese interview with a Soviet leader in
more than two decades. It was clearly intended to
capitalize on any nervousness in Beijing created by
the Soviet-US summit in Washington to encourage
the Chinese to upgrade the level of the Sino-Soviet
political dialogue. Although the Chinese told the US
Embassy in Beijing that Liaowang did not have prior
Ministry of Foreign Affairs permission for the inter-
view and Chinese press accounts of the interview
omitted Gorbachev's call for a summit, we suspect
Beijing may have intended to prepare educated Chi-
nese readers for-and remind the West of-the possi- 25X1
bility of an eventual breakthrough in Sino-Soviet
political contacts.
Moscow, for its part, probably is convinced the publi-
cation of the interview is proof that Soviet efforts to
address Beijing's "three obstacles" ' to normalization
are not being dismissed as merely rhetoric. A Soviet
Foreign Ministry official told US Embassy officials in
Moscow in February 1988 that the interview could
not be interpreted as anything but a "calculated
political move" by Beijing. Moscow also lost little
time in highlighting the Moscow summit-which
occurred two weeks before the 12th round of Sino-
Soviet normalization talks was scheduled to begin-to
prod the Chinese to move relations forward.
The recent warming of US-Soviet relations has, in
fact, apparently left Beijing wondering about the
implications for China. Chinese officials and scholars
have expressed concern to US researchers that Wash-
ington may devalue its relations with Beijing as
warmer US-Soviet ties develop and may be less
receptive to Chinese positions on a range of bilateral 25X1
' The "three obstacles" are the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Moscow's support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and the
Soviet military buildup in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet
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issues, such as technology transfer and Taiwan. The
Soviet-US summit in Washington and the INF agree-
ment also coincided with a period of Sino-US tensions
over Tibet, human rights, family planning, and Wash-
ington's decision in October 1987 to suspend a
planned liberalization of sensitive high-technology
exports to China because of Chinese Silkworm missile
sales to Iran. Although the United States lifted its
freeze on further liberalization of technology exports
to China in March 1988, China may still conclude
that progress in its relations with the USSR might
make the United States more responsive to Chinese
concerns on other issues.
Political Contacts Growing, Moscow Pushing
for Party and Military Contacts To Follow
Under Gorbachev the range and level of political
contacts have grown, although both sides acknowl-
edge that such contacts are still limited. Moscow
began briefing the Chinese after Soviet-US arms
control talks in Geneva and sent Deputy Foreign
Minister Rogachev to Beijing after the Reagan-
Gorbachev summits in Washington and Moscow,
according to press reports. Moscow and Beijing also
publicized that they have begun to exchange views on
regional issues such as Latin America.
The Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers meet regu-
larly under UN auspices at the opening of the General
Assembly each year, but China has refused to sched-
ule the exchange of foreign ministers' visits to each
other's capitals agreed to in 1985. Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze and the new Chinese Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen-previously Vice Foreign Minister and
chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet normalization and
border talks-met in June 1988 at the Third UN
General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament.
This represented an additional venue for a meeting,
although still within the auspices of the United Na-
tions. Because of Qian's focus and expertise on Soviet
affairs, Moscow may believe that the promotion in
April 1988 of Qian Qichen to Foreign Minister is a
sign that the USSR will play a prominent role in
Chinese foreign policy and that an exchange of visits
by the foreign ministers within the next year has
become more likely. In fact, a Soviet diplomat told
US Embassy officials in Beijing in early July 1988
that the Chinese proposed a special vice ministerial
meeting later in the month to discuss Cambodia and
that a successful meeting could lead to a meeting of
foreign ministers in September. It is not clear whether
such a meeting would be at the United Nations or
whether it would be a separate meeting in either
Moscow or Beijing.
Chinese leaders believe that Gorbachev sincerely de-
sires better relations and are more receptive to Soviet
political overtures, although they are still careful to
avoid any appearance of party-to-party relations. The
distinction between party and state is often murky,
and many of the delegates visiting each country serve
in both a governmental and party capacity. In practi-
cal terms, the resumption of party-to-party connec-
tions would probably not accomplish much more than
transactions through existing government channels,
but it would be of great symbolic significance. Beijing
is sensitive about its sovereignty and position within
the socialist community, and, despite Soviet assur-
ances that Moscow wants a relationship based on
equality, Beijing is not ready to move as close to
Moscow as restored party ties would bring it. Moscow
tends to handle contacts with the Chinese in party
channels to ease the way for the formal resumption of
party ties, while China handles them only in govern-
mental and nonofficial channels, reiterating that it is
not ready to restore party ties.
Soviet press coverage of the Chinese party congress
and Chinese media treatment of the 70th anniversary
of the Bolshevik Revolution in the fall of 1987
illustrate Soviet courting of China through party
channels and China's positive but cautious response
through nonparty channels. The Soviets publicized
Gorbachev's message of congratulations to Zhao
Ziyang on his election as General Secretary of
China's Communist party-congratulations never ac-
knowledged in the Chinese press-and Party Secre-
tary Dobrynin received the head of the Chinese
Friendship Association delegation attending the Bol-
shevik Revolution anniversary. For the anniversary,
Zhao Ziyang-using his nonparty title of Premier of
the State Council-as well as others sent greetings to
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President Gromyko and Premier Ryzhkov. The Chi-
nese also hosted a reception in the Great Hall of the
People and had Vice Premier and Politburo member
Wan Li-identified in Chinese media only in his
governmental position-attend a reception at the So-
viet Embassy.
At a reception in February 1988 marking the 70th
anniversary of the founding of the Soviet army, Soviet
Defense Minister Yazov-in a speech subsequently
cited without comment in the Chinese press-extend-
ed Soviet courting of China to the military sphere by
putting a positive gloss on Soviet actions in East Asia
and stressing positive changes in the military situation
along the Sino-Soviet border. He noted that the
elimination of SS-20s in Asia under the INF Treaty
highlighted Soviet efforts toward military detente in
Asia and claimed that the Soviets had reduced the
number of their troops along the Sino-Soviet border in
addition to the partial withdrawal from Mongolia in
1987. Yazov also sent greetings marking the 60th
anniversary of the Chinese Army and congratulated
Qin Jiwei on his appointment as Defense Minister
after the Chinese National People's Congress-nei-
ther message was reported in the Chinese media.
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, senior
Chinese and Soviet military officers reportedly met in
April 1988 as part of the working group on the Sino-
Soviet border. These military contacts may have
begun during boundary talks in August 1987 and
marked the first formal military contacts in a decade.
stage for movement in political relations.
The range and level of economic, cultural, and scien-
tific exchanges have steadily expanded since a sports
agreement was signed in 1981. The Chinese have been
more receptive to Soviet overtures under Gorbachev
for expanding nonpolitical contacts, and exchanges of
visits to the respective capitals and even to local areas
have become almost daily occurrences. Moscow sees
the trend in exchanges in these areas as setting the
Bilateral trade increased dramatically, from US $300
million in 1982 to US $2.6 billion in 1986 (see figure
1). Although trade declined by roughly 20 percent in
1987, the Soviets expect it to rise by 25 percent in
1988-a realistic expectation in our view-bringing it
back roughly to 1986 levels. A number of factors
contributed to the decline in 1987:
? Tight domestic grain supplies constrained Beijing's
ability to meet export commitments.
? Chinese dissatisfaction with the quality and techni-
cal level of Soviet industrial equipment postponed
many of the 24 industrial cooperation projects slated
to take place under the five-year accord signed in
July 1985.
? Trade reform and decentralization in both countries
have made it more difficult for Beijing and Moscow
to ensure that individual factories and trade corpo-
rations adhere to trade commitments made at the
central level.
According to the US Embassy in Moscow, a Soviet
official predicted in February 1988 that trade will
return to the 1986 level but will not go beyond that in
the near future, even if the countries iron out some of
the specific problems that arose in 1987. Temporary
disruptions resulting from the recent reorganization of
Soviet foreign trade mechanisms, lack of quality
products to trade, and lack of real experience in
modern economics all pose growth constraints on
trade in the near term. In the long term, both the
USSR and China consider their access to Western
technology and trade to be more valuable than their 25X1
economic ties to one another and will probably contin-
ue to export their better quality goods to the West
instead of to each other. Disputes over product quality
have already surfaced.
In 1987, Soviet exports consisted primarily of machin-
ery, transport equipment, and industrial inputs. The
rise in Chinese exports to the USSR resulted primari-
ly from large increases in food deliveries and large
quantities of clothing and basic textile products (see
figure 2). Beijing is also particularly interested in
Soviet technology in the energy and heavy-industry
sectors and could benefit from Soviet assistance in 25X1
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Figure 1
Sino-Soviet Trade, 1946-87
a Thirty-year treaty signed; USSR advances $300 million in long-
term credits.
b Khrushchev launches de-Stalinization campaign.
Moscow withdraws Soviet experts and cancels trade agreements in
wake of Sino-Soviet border clashes.
d China adopts policy emphasizing consumption over investment-
leads to decrease in capital goods imports.
e Beijing declares Open-Door Policy and opens talks with Moscow.
r Five-year protocol for trade and economic cooperation signed.
areas where it has been unable to attract Western
investment, especially in the northwestern regions
bordering on Soviet Central Asia.
Border trade has increased in importance now that
local regions on both sides are allowed to engage in
direct trade, and interior provinces are also permitted
to trade goods through the border provinces. The
USSR wants to accelerate economic development in
its far eastern regions and seeks Chinese food and
consumer goods to increase incentives for Soviet
workers in the region. In addition, Moscow may see
the huge, capital-starved Chinese economy as an ideal
market in its drive to increase the share of machinery
and equipment sales in total exports. China views the
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Figure 2
USSR-China: Composition of Trade
Soviet Exports to China
1982
Machinery and
transport equipment 9.1
Manufactured
industrial
inputs 14.7
Raw materials
26.2
Chinese Exports to the Soviet Union
1982
Raw materials
51.2
Other 2.4
Machinery and
transport equipment
2.3
Manufactured
industrial
inputs 39.2
Food and live
animals 38.5
317810 7-88 25X1
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Calculating Sino-Soviet Trade Figures
As with trade among most other socialist countries,
the USSR and China exchange goods on a clearing-
account basis. This practice is tantamount to a barter
system since it provides for the exchange of goods for
other goods with no currency changing hands. Tem-
porary imbalances may occur but are expected to be
settled over the course of future trade patterns. The
Sino-Soviet clearing account is not valued in "trans-
ferable rubles"-an artificial, nonconvertible unit of
account tied weakly to world prices-but Swiss
francs in order to use a neutral currency.
When converted to dollars, Sino-Soviet trade has
increased at a rate even faster than called for in
bilateral trade protocols because of the depreciation
of the dollar in recent years. Dollar figures for trade
during the past three years have somewhat overstated
the expansion of Sino-Soviet exchanges, while figures
for the early 1980s are probably too low because the
dollar was appreciating. Therefore, what appears to
be only a 4 -percent decrease in trade from 1986 to
1987, when calculated in dollars, actually represents
a roughly 20 percent decrease when calculated in
Swiss francs.
USSR as a good source for low-cost imports in the
energy and heavy-industry sectors, where Soviet ma-
chinery and equipment, while not on a par with that
found in the West, are sufficient for many of China's
present needs. Sino-Soviet border trade also directly
helps the depressed economies of border regions that
cannot compete with the exports of the major populat-
ed areas and represents trade over and above that
controlled by the annual bilateral agreements.
Both sides are cooperating to develop the infrastruc-
ture to accommodate increased border trade, includ-
ing a railway link between the capital of Xinjiang
Autonomous Region in China and the Sino-Soviet
border through the Dzungarian Gate, which is expect-
ed to become operational in 1991. According to press
reports, the USSR plans to provide a loan worth US
$80 million to help China complete the railway link.
According to Chinese media, Beijing issued a docu-
ment in March 1988 designed to facilitate develop-
ment of Xinjiang's export-oriented economy. Growth
in border trade, however, is constrained in the near
term by the limited size of the Soviet East Asian
market and the limited variety of products manufac-
tured on both sides of the border.
Scientific, cultural, and academic exchanges occur
almost daily in the outlying areas as well as in Beijing
and Moscow. In May 1988, Soviet Minister of Cul-
ture Zakharov visited China to sign an intergovern-
mental plan for cultural cooperation for the period
1988-90 to further develop these contacts, and Pravda
editor Viktor Afanasyev led a delegation of journal-
ists. Exchange visits of youth, trade union, media,
medical, and Academy of Sciences' delegations have
also become commonplace. Friendship delegations
have exchanged visits, and scholars have visited to
learn about the other country's economic reform
program. Student exchanges resumed in 1983, and
contacts between Soviet and Chinese think tanks are
growing.
These academic and think-tank exchanges have coin-
cided with an increase in discussions and commentar-
ies on the parallel nature of Soviet and Chinese
reforms. Although each side realizes the limited appli-
cability of the other's reforms, the fact that Soviet and
Chinese media over the last two years have portrayed
them in a positive light is a reversal of the critical
nature of past commentaries. The Soviets are no
longer presenting the Soviet model of socialism as
superior and one to be copied by all socialist countries,
and the Chinese no longer publicly belittle Soviet
reform efforts as too little, too late. Soviet media
portray the parallel interest in economic reform as an
important area of common ground that can form the
basis for closer bilateral relations across the board.
The publication of Deng Xiaoping's selected works in
the USSR and the publication of Gorbachev's book in
China further underscore the growing interest in
learning about one another's experiences with reform.
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, Soviet
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diplomats have said that Abel Aganbeg'yan, a promi-
nent Soviet reform economist, is scheduled to visit
China in the near future.
Movement on the Obstacles
At the ninth round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks
in October 1986, Moscow altered its approach to
Beijing's three obstacles to normalized relations by
publicly abandoning its original position that these
were "third-country" issues that Moscow was not
empowered to discuss. Although efforts to improve
Sino-Soviet relations. began under General Secretary
Brezhnev, the agreement in 1986 to discuss the three
obstacles-not just listen to what the Chinese had to
say about them-was a watershed and paved the way
for the steady progress in the relationship to date.
Since that time, the Soviets have withdrawn some
troops from Mongolia and are withdrawing troops
from Afghanistan.
Beijing seems to use the three obstacles as a tool to
control the pace of progress in political relations. By
reserving the right to determine whether Soviet ac-
tions on the obstacles are significant, Beijing can raise
or lower the price to Moscow of improved relations.
Beijing thus is capable of declaring at anytime that
Moscow has sufficiently met China's concerns on the
obstacles to warrant an upgrading of political rela-
Evolution of the "Three Obstacles"
In 1982, China first formally enunciated its concerns
over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia, and Soviet troops in Mongolia
and along the border as obstacles to improved rela-
tions. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials told US
Embassy officers in June 1982 that the three issues
precluded a warming in relations. At the first round
of Sino-Soviet normalization talks in October 1982,
the Chinese cited these issues as the three main
"obstacles" to improved relations. The Soviets
agreed to listen to what the Chinese had to say but
contended that these were not appropriate subjects
for the talks because they involved the internal
affairs of third countries.
From 1982 to early 1986, Moscow and Beijing talked
past each other on the obstacles, and Moscow tried to
improve relations with Beijing without directly ad-
dressing them. The Soviets contended that the obsta-
cles were artificial barriers that the Chinese would
ignore when it suited them. The Chinese, however,
remained skeptical of Soviet overtures and continued
to cite the three obstacles as a statement of their
concerns, as a way to reassure Washington that they
remain wary of the Soviets, and as a means of letting
the Chinese domestic audience know that they have
not acquiesced to the Soviets.
tions, possibly to include a summit.
Cambodia
The USSR wants an eventual political solution in
Cambodia, but
Moscow's immediate objective is to convince the
Chinese that it is trying to address their concerns. To
this end, the Soviets have stepped up the level of their
involvement in the search for a negotiated settlement.
They have not yet, however, appeared willing to strain
relations with Hanoi by publicly adopting positions
that could undercut Vietnamese interests or by pri-
vately threatening Hanoi with reduced military or
economic aid. Moscow is reluctant to jeopardize its
own position in Vietnam and risk losing access to Cam
Ranh Bay-the largest Soviet overseas military facili-
ty outside the Warsaw Pact-especially if the United
States retains its bases in the Philippines. Instead,
Moscow clearly hopes that its highly visible public
efforts to promote negotiations will be enough to
convince Beijing of its sincerity:
? The Soviets publicly supported the talks in France
in December 1987 and January 1988 between resis-
tance leader Prince Sihanouk and Cambodian
Prime Minister Hun Sen
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? A Soviet Embassy official in Beijing has confirmed
to US Embassy officials that the Soviets themselves,
as reported in a Western press story, are willing to
? Moscow also publicly supported the Cambodian
Government's five-point peace proposal of October
1987, which calls for, among other things, a coali-
tion government that would include the three resis-
tance factions and a senior government post for
Sihanouk.
The Soviets may also be resorting to indirect public
pressure on Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia. A
report in the Western press in February 1988 quoted
an unnamed Soviet diplomat in Beijing as saying that
Vietnam would withdraw by 1990 because the burden
of its presence in Cambodia was "intolerable"-
leaving it ambiguous whether the burden was intoler-
able to Hanoi or to Moscow. A Soviet Embassy
official in Beijing told the US Embassy that the
article was meant as a hint to Vietnam of Moscow's
dissatisfaction with the Cambodian situation. Despite
the official's claim that the interview was aimed at
Hanoi, however, the choice of a diplomat in Beijing to
give the interview to the Western press suggests that
the article was intended at least as much to impress
China and the West as to prod Hanoi. In any case, the
story was the first public statement by the Soviets
about the financial burden of Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia.
Moscow may also be moving in private to go a step
further toward satisfying China's demands that the
USSR "urge" Vietnam to withdraw.
Soviets have begun to prod the
Vietnamese more energetically to seek a political
settlement. Moscow is asking Hanoi to "retreat some-
what from its maximum demands" concerning Cam-
bodia, and is talking directly
to Hanoi's client regime in Phnom Penh about a
are emphasizing to Vietnam their growing impatience
with the stalemate in Cambodia and the economic
burden on Moscow of Vietnam's occupation.
the Chinese
believe the Soviets are becoming more forthcoming on
the Cambodian issue. They told Under Secretary of
State Armacost in November 1987 that the Soviets
were somewhat more flexible during the discussions in
Beijing in October 1987. Moscow agreed for the first
time that Cambodia should emerge as a neutral
country and offered to help bring about a political
settlement. In June 1988 a Chinese Foreign Ministry
official told US Embassy officials that Moscow ap-
parently had exerted pressure on Vietnam to encour-
age a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Cambodia-referring to Vietnam's announcement
that it will withdraw 50,000 troops from Cambodia in
1988-therefore giving Moscow credit for influencing
Hanoi's decision.
Beijing has altered its position on the obstacles some-
what, from demanding resolution of all obstacles to
singling out Cambodia as a prerequisite for a summit.
The Chinese have also changed their rhetoric on the
Cambodian obstacle, from calling on Moscow to force
Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia to calling on
Moscow to "urge" Vietnam to withdraw
China continues to cite the
Cambodian obstacle in order to counter Soviet claims
of progress in relations. Nevertheless, the fact that
China has singled out Cambodia as the main obsta-
cle-and links it alone to a Sino-Soviet summit-
raises the possibility that progress on this issue could
create an opening for a breakthrough in political
relations.
Beijing has also adjusted its position in the past few
months to demonstrate a willingness to compromise.
China's press offered support for Sihanouk's efforts in
settlement
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his negotiations with Hun Sen in January 1988,
despite reservations by Pol Pot's faction, the Khmer
Rouge, which is the most powerful resistance group
no longer support the Khmer Rouge as the "main
body" in a future government, although they. do want
the group to be represented. Although Beijing worries
that Sihanouk might negotiate an agreement it cannot
live with, it apparently recognizes that Moscow, by
pressuring Hanoi and Phnom Penh to negotiate with
Sihanouk, has taken a step toward accommodating
Chinese interests.
Beijing is probably concerned about the increase in
diplomatic activity on Cambodia in the past few
months-including Vietnam's latest withdrawal an-
nouncement and media reports of Vietnam's willing-
ness to participate in informal talks between the
Khmer parties and some representatives of the Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Beijing
probably prefers to see a continued stalemate in
Cambodia-an impasse that isolates Hanoi and sus-
tains Beijing's improved ties to ASEAN-but it does
not want to be seen as the stumblingblock to a
settlement. Although reluctant to get directly involved
in the process, Beijing wants to ensure that its inter-
ests are protected in any talks on a settlement.
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, after the
US-Soviet summit in Moscow, Chinese Foreign Min-
istry and think-tank officials expressed concern that
the United States and the USSR were negotiating
behind China's back on the Cambodian issue. Beijing
apparently was concerned that it was not kept suffi-
ciently informed on the Afghan negotiations and
therefore may be sensitive to the increased diplomatic
activity on Cambodia.
In early July 1988 the Chinese appeared to be taking
a more activist approach to Cambodia. Beijing an-
nounced a four-point proposal on Cambodia, repre-
senting a departure from its practice of initiating
proposals through the Cambodian resistance. The
proposed special meeting on Cambodia between vice
foreign ministers also took Soviet diplomats in Beijing
by surprise since the Chinese had taken a very hard
line on Cambodia at the normalization talks in mid-
June, according to US Embassy reporting. Mean-
while, in addition to the four-point proposal, Chinese
diplomats in Bangkok are claiming that China will
cut off material supplies to the Khmer Rouge after a
complete Vietnamese withdrawal. This offer, howev-
er, is probably contingent on an end to Hanoi's
support to People's Republic of Kampuchea forces as
part of a "freeze" on forces alluded to in China's four-
point proposal.
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Afghanistan
Chinese officials have stated that 25X1
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan does not threaten
China, and Afghanistan has clearly been the least
important of the obstacles to the Chinese. Neverthe- 25X1
less, Beijing has reacted positively to Moscow's agree-
ment to withdraw..Even before this agreement, China
softened its usual media criticism on the anniversary
of the Soviet invasion in December 1987, and Chinese
commentaries have highlighted Soviet efforts to cre-
ate an acceptable environment for withdrawal. A few
days after Gorbachev's troop withdrawal statement on
8 February 1988, China's acting defense attache in
London told the US Army attache that Beijing would
be willing to cooperate in moving a settlement for-
ward, perhaps by participating in an observer force to
monitor the Soviet withdrawal.
The Chinese continue to debate Gorbachev's "sinceri-
ty," but, in the longer term, we believe Soviet adher-
ence to the Geneva accords will have an impact on
China's assessment of Moscow. Thus far, however,
China has given no public signal that it is reevaluating
its relationship with Moscow because of the Geneva
accords. In the near term, Beijing apparently is
employing its traditional strategy of asking for more
once its original conditions have been met. A 16 May
1988 Chinese news agency report noted that "the
Soviet troop withdrawal does not mean the final 25X1
settlement of the Afghanistan question" and called
for Moscow to undertake "its unshirkable responsibil-
ity of restoring Afghanistan's peaceful and neutral
status." According to the US Embassy in Beijing, as
of late April 1988, China's Foreign Ministry was
debating whether it would require more than the
withdrawal of Soviet troops to declare that the Af-
ghanistan obstacle had been overcome.
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The Military Buildup Along the Border
The Soviets withdrew one of their five divisions from
Mongolia last year, playing it up as one more unilat-
eral gesture to reduce military tensions with China.
They have given considerable play to the INF agree-
ment in their propaganda aimed at China, presum-
ably because the Chinese have included the SS-20s in
the Soviet Far East as part of the buildup of Soviet
forces along the border. Defense Minister Yazov
claimed in his speech in February 1988 that the
USSR has not added to its ground forces in Asia for a
number of years and has not increased the size or
scope of military exercises in the region. In fact,
although the Soviets have kept the size of their
exercises constant, they continue to gradually mod-
ernize their ground, air, and naval forces in the
region.
rights before the first flight in December 1984.
Apparently in return, Moscow promised to provide
P'yongyang with advanced Soviet weapons.
Moscow has proposed confidence-building measures
along the border, such as notification of troop move-
ments and mobilization and invitations to observe
military exercises, but Beijing continues to insist that
Moscow first reduce its forces along China's northern
perimeter. Moscow probably would not offer signifi-
cant troop cuts as a unilateral concession, despite its
overall advantage in air and ground forces along the
border (see figure 3). Instead, Moscow would probably
consider such a move only as part of a broader
political agreement involving some form of Chinese
reciprocity-either a mutual force reduction agree-
ment or assurances to move the political relationship
forward. The Soviets, however, could withdraw two or
Soviet withdrawal of
one division as a concession, China, for its part,
minimized the gesture in its media and public com-
ments. The Chinese media called for the withdrawal
of all divisions from Mongolia, and, in Beijing's view,
the Soviet military presence in Mongolia is only one
part of the problem of the Soviet military buildup
along China's northern border
along the Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Soviet borders
over the past four or five years. In fact, the Chinese
media reported in May 1988 that China is exporting
workers to a small Soviet farm venture across the
border from the Chinese city of Suifenhe. Beijing was
previously reluctant to send workers to parts of the
Soviet Far East that were once under Chinese rule.
Both sides played down a border incident in July
1986. The Chinese ignored a wayward Soviet missile
that apparently landed on,the Sino-Soviet border in
September 1986 and they continue to ignore occasion-
al Soviet aircraft intrusions into Chinese airspace. On
the negative side, the Chinese do take exception to the
Soviet reconnaissance flights over the sensitive Yellow
and East China Seas, where Beijing conducts missile
tests. The reconnaissance missions involve overflights
of North Korea, which granted the Soviets overflight
three more divisions from Mongolia.
Several domestic factors could persuade Moscow to
consider and implement substantial military draw-
downs when bilateral relations progress to a point
where the Chinese are more receptive to such moves:
? The political leadership, already pressuring the So-
viet military to reduce and conserve resources,
concludes that cuts along the Sino-Soviet frontier
are necessary to allow the reallocation of some
resources from the military sector to the civilian.
? The warming of relations and increased economic
ties, including border trade, generally lower tensions
along the border and reduce threat perceptions.
? Soviet technological superiority and the ability to
monitor Chinese activity along the border reduce
the element of surprise and therefore enable Soviet
forces to pull back somewhat from the border
without substantially lowering defense capabilities.
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? Organizational and structural changes in Mongo-
lia's four divisions might enable it to protect Soviet
security interests to a greater extent in the future.
The ongoing redeployment of Mongolian Army
assets to the primary avenues of approach may be
an indication of Soviet intentions to eventually shift
more of the defense burden to indigenous forces.
Although the border demarcation issue is not one of
the three obstacles, the Soviets, in our view, regard a
solution to this dispute as a prerequisite to any
significant troop cuts along the Sino-Soviet border. A
breakthrough on the border issue could set the stage
for progress on other issues as well. Soviet concessions
on the border to date already signal to the Chinese
that Moscow is no longer treating Beijing as an
unequal partner-a primary source of continual ten-
sion.
Gorbachev broke the impasse on the border issue at
Vladivostok when he publicly announced Soviet
agreement with the long-held Chinese position that
the eastern border passes along the main channel of
the Amur River, in effect acknowledging Chinese
claims that the disputed islands in the river are on
China's side of the border. (This position has been
privately accepted by Soviet border negotiators since
the 1960s, but, even so, the Soviets always excluded
the main islands opposite the Soviet city of Khaba-
rovsk.) Two months later, in September 1986, Foreign
Minsters Wu and Shevardnadze announced that both
sides had agreed to resume border talks at the deputy
minister level after a nine-year suspension. Beijing
and Moscow conducted a joint survey of the Amur
River during the summer of 1987 and signed an
agreement in November on the use of border water
resources. The working group agreed in February
1988 to conduct joint aerial photography of the
eastern sector. The last meeting of the experts group
was in early April and focused on the technical
aspects of organizing joint aerial photography, which
began in May. The Soviets are certainly aware that
aerial photography will show that the islands are on
the Chinese side of the main channel.
Border talks on the eastern sector, focusing on the
riverine boundary, are steadily progressing. Talks,
however, will most likely be protracted because a
comprehensive border accord would also have to
include an agreement on the disputed Pamir Knot
region in the west, which will be addressed after
negotiations on the east (see figure 4). We believe
that, although Moscow is prepared eventually to
return the more than 700 smaller river islands to
Beijing, the main sticking point in negotiations will
probably be the fate of the Tarabarovskiy and Bol'-
shoy Ussuriyskiy islands (jointly known as Heixiazi
Dao) located directly across from Khabarovsk. The
Soviets may eventually be willing to acknowledge
Chinese ownership of those islands but will probably
withhold such a concession until China seems more
willing to make compromises in return, such as
abandoning its claim to the Pamir Knot region or on
some other issue. Gorbachev is unlikely to "throw
away" what could be an important bargaining chip in
the future for an uncertain Chinese response. Moscow
may even be exaggerating the value of the islands as a
negotiating tactic to elicit greater concessions from
China in the future. The Soviets will also probably be
careful to claim that the natural flow of the river has
changed the border in order to avoid setting a prece-
dent that could apply to the Northern Territories
claimed by Japan or to any other disputed territories
along the USSR's borders.
Gorbachev could face opposition within the leadership
to making concessions to the Chinese on troop with-
drawals from Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border or
on the territorial issues. If so, the sharpest criticism
would probably come from the military and key
leaders sympathetic to military concerns, such as
KGB Chief Chebrikov and "Second Secretary" Liga-
chev. The military probably would oppose a return of
the islands opposite Khabarovsk and would almost
certainly disapprove of any Soviet proposal to unilat-
erally withdraw troops from the border area that
could upset the current configuration of forces. Gor-
bachev would probably need tangible evidence of
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Mongolia has a deep historical fear of Chinese
expansionism and has looked to Moscow for security
as well as economic assistance. Ulaanbaatar was
concerned about the implications of withdrawing one
Soviet division last year, even though the withdrawal
made little impact on the military balance. Mongo-
lia's leadership is probably concerned that future
Soviet initiatives designed to nudge Beijing toward
Sino-Soviet rapprochement-such as further troop
withdrawals-may be made at Mongolia's expense.
Ulaanbaatar has been reticent to move Sino-Mongo-
lian relations forward but may be fearful of falling
too far behind the Soviets. For its part, Moscow may
also be encouraging Ulaanbaatar to expand contacts
with Beijing-including economic contacts-to facili-
tate its own efforts toward China.
Sino-Mongolian relations, therefore, have improved
in tandem-albeit on a much smaller scale and with
reluctance on the Mongolian side-with the improve-
ment in Sino-Soviet relations. The exchange of stu-
dents resumed in 1987, and the possibility of initiat-
ing town-to-town trade along the border is under
discussion. Both sides also agreed in July 1987 to
resume scientific and technological cooperation after
a 20 year suspension, according to the US Embassy
in Beijing. Progress in Sino-Mongolian relations may
lessen Mongolian resistance to further Soviet troop
withdrawals. The following is a chronology of Mon-
golian-Chinese relations since 1985:i ,
29 August 1985. Mongolian leader Batmonh, at a
dinner hosted by Gorbachev, notes that Mongolians
have been paying close attention to the process of
normalizing Sino-Soviet relations-hinting at a
Mongolian intent to respond more positively to recent
Chinese gestures aimed at improving Sino-Mongolian
ties.
8 August 1986. China and Mongolia sign a consular
treaty in Ulaanbaatar, probably related to Beijing's
interest in protecting overseas Chinese following the
expulsion of 1,800 Chinese from Mongolia in 1983.
9 March 1987. China and Mongolia sign a border
trade agreement and railway transport protocol in
Hohhot, China.
29 April 1987. The Soviets begin a limited withdraw-
al of troops from Mongolia in a gesture to improve
relations with China.
7 June 1987. China and Mongolia sign a border
treaty in Ulaanbaatar.
18-25 June 1987. Visit of Chinese parliamentary
delegation headed by National People's Congress
Vice.Chairman Peng Chong.
8 December 1987. Mongolia and China sign a trade
protocol in Beijing.
28 January-5 February 1988. First round of Sino-
Mongolian border trade talks held in Ulaanbaatar.
1 March 1988. Mongolia, North Korea, China, and
the USSR sign a railway protocol in Ulaanbaatar.
11 April 1988. Chairman of the Mongolian Council
of Ministers sends congratulations to Li Peng on his
appointment as Premier of China's State Council.
2 May 1988. The Mongolian Civil Aviation Board
begins direct air service between Ulaanbaatar and
Beijing.
Secret
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0
(Ostrov
Tarabarovskiy)
Heixiazi
Dao
Pamir rv
Knot
In -
dispute
BEIJING'
> In
dispute
Area of
main map
Figure 4
Sino-Soviet Disputed Areas
China
The Soviet Union regards the disputed area
as two islands named Bol'shoy Ussuriyskiy
and Tarabarovskiy while the Chinese regard
the area as one, Heixiazi.
Soviet Union
Chinese willingness to agree to a mutually acceptable
border accord in exchange for Soviet concessions on
the river islands in the east. He may also need
assurances that the Chinese would be willing to
seriously discuss mutual force reductions along the
border, which he could probably sell at home as a way
to channel savings into the domestic economy.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Soviet Union
We can identify no strong pro-Soviet constituency in
the Chinese leadership, and fear of imperiling crucial
trade, technology, and other ties between China and -
the West inhibits even those who would like to see
China follow a middle road between the two super-
powers. Many in the party have little interest in
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sharply improved relations with the Soviets. They see
China's interests as best served by expanded contact
with the more technologically advanced-and wealth-
ier-West. Some leaders, especially those in their
fifties and sixties-many of whom are Soviet
trained-support treating the two superpowers as
more or less equivalent. Their statements suggest that
they are not so much pro-Soviet as suspicious of the
West. Some, such as .Premier Li Peng, also have
indicated that they believe greater economic ties to
the Soviet Union would be advantageous to China. In
particular, trade with the Soviets would preserve
scarce foreign currency holdings.
Perhaps the most important impediment to full nor-
malization of Sino-Soviet relations is the firm opposi-
tion of China's top leader; Deng Xiaoping. Deng is
deeply distrustful of the Soviets and skeptical that
greatly improved relations with the USSR would yield
significant benefits for China. We believe he has
already achieved his main goal-relaxation of ten-
sions on the border. Deng tightly controls Chinese
policy toward the Soviets, and, although some other
senior leaders favor a less restrictive policy, they have
been unable to influence this issue much.
Deng has the support of senior military leaders, who
tend to follow his lead in foreign policy. Moreover, .
many of them share Deng's suspicions, remembering
Soviet failure to support the Communists during the
Chinese civil war and the experiences of the 1960s.
However, many in the second tier of the military
leadership, which includes a number of Soviet-trained
generals, are in favor of a middle course between the
United States and the USSR.
We expect some softening on the Chinese side after
Deng's death; although the successor generation is not
enthusiastic about the Soviets, most of them probably
lack Deng's almost visceral dislike. For pragmatic
reasons-trade advantage, cheaper goods, Soviet con-
cessions, possible increased leverage in the strategic
triangle-they will probably accelerate China's grad-
ual policy of relaxation. We doubt, however, that
Deng's successors will soon take the step the Soviets
want-party-to-party relations. It remains an unpopu-
lar and potentially politically risky move with few
apparent gains for China.
Moscow and Beijing appear to be moving toward an
eventual rapprochement-albeit far short of the close
relationship of the 1950s. Beijing is giving Moscow
positive signals while carefully controlling the pace.
We expect the Soviets will continue to try to nudge
the Chinese to upgrade political contacts by making
more unilateral gestures, perhaps including a with-
drawal of a small number of troops from the border,
more explicit public commentary on a Cambodian
settlement, or concessions on the border dispute.
Moscow may also attempt to elicit Beijing's public 25X1
support in areas where parallel sentiments already
exist such as on US policy toward Central America,
the Strategic Defense Initiative, and concerns about
Japanese defense policy, as well as to probe for new
areas of possible convergence.
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Although unlikely, we cannot altogether rule out a
characteristic "grand gesture" by Gorbachev to push
the Chinese further. Moscow is probably pleased with
the progress in relations to date and is unlikely to try
to force the current pace. Domestic constraints and
the risk of damaging relations with third-country
allies limit the?areas in which Gorbachev can even
make such a gesture. For example, Gorbachev would 25X1
face opposition from the military-and probably key
opponents in the Politburo-to making significant
unilateral troop cuts along the border and would be
unlikely to wage such a domestic battle for an uncer-
tain Chinese response. The Soviets, in our view, are
also not prepared to withhold economic or military
support to Hanoi in an effort to prod the Vietnamese
out of Cambodia; Moscow does not want to damage
its overall relationship with Vietnam and is especially
reluctant to risk losing access to Cam Ranh Bay.
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Because the Soviets have already begun withdrawing
their forces from Afghanistan, the only remaining
area for a grand gesture would be the border demar-
cation dispute. Gorbachev could, for example, unilat-
erally announce that Moscow has decided to give
China the disputed islands opposite Khabarovsk. He
is, however, unlikely to "throw away" what could be
an important bargaining chip in the future for an
uncertain Chinese response.
The Soviets have had less success eliciting a positive
Chinese response when they have pushed hard in
public for a leap forward in relations-the Chinese
were slow to respond, for example, to the Vladivostok
speech-and Gorbachev is unlikely to risk destroying
the current momentum by putting the Chinese on the
spot. Beijing is not now prepared to respond with a
grand gesture of its own, such as reestablishing full
party-to-party ties, and would resent Moscow's effort
to force the issue in this way.
Short of an all-out push for a full normalization of
relations-which probably would include occasional
summit meetings, periodic high-level meetings, and
the restoration of formal party-to-party ties-the way
seems clear for an exchange of visits by foreign
ministers, premiers, or presidents within the next
year. Both sides agreed in principle to a foreign
ministers' meeting apart from the meeting held each
fall at the UN General Assembly, but they have never
followed through. This agreement could be reactivat-
ed, and a meeting could be set in either Beijing or
Moscow, possibly in conjunction with the border talks
or normalization discussions. A resumption of some
form of military contacts would also be a sign of
significant progress in the relationship.
Historical animosities, reciprocal perceptions of
threat, and Beijing's reticence to upgrade relations
will probably prevent a return to the alliance relation-
ship of the 1950s. The Chinese are sensitive about
their sovereignty and position within the socialist
community, and, despite Soviet assurances that Mos-
cow wants a relationship based on equality, Beijing
will remain skeptical of Soviet overtures. Beijing also
seeks to maintain an independent stance vis-a-vis
Moscow and Washington and will avoid an alliance to
maintain leverage within the triangle. Both China and
the USSR need Western technology and capital for
their respective modernization drives, and China in
particular would be careful not to jeopardize its access
by entering into an alliance with the Soviets.
Although a closer relationship may lead Moscow and
Beijing to be tougher in their bargaining positions
with Washington-especially if both see their lever-
age in the strategic triangle as enhanced by closer
relations-better Sino-Soviet relations would not nec-
essarily have a negative impact on US interests across
the board. Should the Soviets and Chinese; for exam-
ple, begin to cooperate on such issues as jointly
restraining North Korea or pressing Vietnam and the
resistance toward a Cambodian settlement, this coop-
eration could have positive implications for stability in
East Asia. At the same time, however, the Soviets and
Chinese will continue to compete for influence else-
where in the region, especially in Southeast Asia and
eventually in South Korea.
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Appendix
Chronology of Sino-Soviet
Relations Since
21 December 1984
This chronology begins with First Deputy Premier
Arkhipov's visit to China because it marked a break-
through in Sino-Soviet contacts.
21 December 1984
Arkhipov arrives on a highly publicized visit to China;
he is the highest ranking Soviet visitor since the
1960s. Three agreements are signed, calling for bilat-
eral economic and technical cooperation; bilateral
scientific and technical cooperation; and the establish-
ment of a commission on economic, trade, and scien-
tific and technical cooperation.
28 December 1984
Bilateral agreement to increase the volume of trade
from approximately $1.3 billion in 1984 to $1.7 billion
in 1985.
15 January 1985
Chinese Ambassador to Burma, after only one month
in the country, hosts a private dinner for high-ranking
officers of the Soviet Embassy; the Ambassador
claims the dinner was possible because of improving
relations between the two countries.
3-14 March 1985
Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) delegation
visits Moscow, the first parliamentary exchange in
two decades. Politburo candidate member Kuznetsov
is the top Soviet official to receive the Chinese group.
10 March 1985
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko dies, Mikhail
Gorbachev is named his successor.
11 March 1985
General Secretary Gorbachev states in his acceptance
speech that the Soviets desire a serious improvement
in relations with China, given reciprocity in the talks.
12 March 1985
While signing a condolences book at the Soviet
Embassy, NPC Standing Committee Chairman Peng
Zhen congratulates Gorbachev, calling him
"comrade."
14 March 1985
Vice Premier Li Peng, head of the delegation to
Chernenko's funeral, meets Gorbachev, the highest
ranking meeting between the two countries in
20 years. Li conveys General Secretary Hu Yaobang's
congratulatory message and calls the Soviet Union a
"socialist"" country. Li states China's hopes for an
improvement in "political relations."
21 March 1985
High-level economic delegation led by State Econom-
ic Commission Vice Minister Zhao Weichang meets
with Arkhipov to discuss bilateral transportation
issues.
26 March 1985
Chinese invite officials from Moscow's Institute of the
Far East, once renowned as a hotbed of anti-Chinese
propaganda, to a reception in Moscow.
30 March 1985
Soviets brief the Chinese on Shultz-Gromyko meet-
ings in Geneva; Soviets state hopes for reciprocity in
these talks.
4-5 April 1985
Soviet friendship delegation arrives in China and on
5 April signs plan for 1985 program.
5 April 1985
Bilateral protocol is signed in Beijing calling for the
exchange of 200 students and trainees during the
1985/86 academic year.
9-22 April 1985
Sixth round of Sino-Soviet Political Talks in Moscow.
On 22 April, TASS carries a joint statement identify-
ing, among other areas, "political relations" as an
issue for improvement.
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at:uict
23 April 1985
In a speech celebrating the 115th anniversary of
Lenin's birth, Geydar Aliyev, First Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, states that the Soviet
Union is striving seriously for an improvement of
relations with China based on reciprocity.
4 June 1985
Protocol signed for a short-term exchange of TASS
and Xinhua staff members.
13 June 1985
Talks on consular affairs end in Beijing, and the two
sides reportedly agree to simplify visa procedures and
to reopen consulates in Shanghai and Leningrad.
26 June 1985
Gorbachev speech in Dnepropetrovsk notes that the
USSR intends to make an active effort to overcome
the "negative patch" in Sino-Soviet relations.
1 July 1985
Gromyko replaced as Foreign Minister by Shevard-
nadze-a development that several Soviet officials
portray as a sign Gorbachev wants a new Asian
policy.
16 July 1985
Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin concludes week-long
visit to the USSR, during which the two sides sign
agreements on bilateral trade covering 1986-90 and
economic cooperation. Yao Yilin is received by Pre-
mier Tikhonov on 11 July, but Gorbachev is unavail-
able, having gone to Minsk for a conference with
Soviet military leaders.
8-16 August 1985
Soviet trade union delegation visits China, first such
visit in 20 years.
9-16 August 1985
Soviet Foreign Ministry officials visit Beijing for
consultations on disarmament issues.
3 September 1985
Politburo member Aliyev attends a reception at the
Chinese Embassy in Moscow marking 40th anniversa-
ry of victory over Japan-first Politburo member to
attend such an event in many years.
26 September 1985
Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Wu have second
annual meeting at United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA), brief each other on party developments, and
agree to exchange visits in 1986.
10-25 October 1985
Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute, visits
Beijing for talks with Chinese academics on world
issues, Chinese economic reforms, Soviet domestic
developments, Soviet views of Soviet-US relations,
and prospects for the Geneva meeting.
Late October-Early November 1985
Mikhail Titarenko, Director of the USSR's Institute
of the Far East, visits China for talks with Chinese
academics on party matters and domestic reforms.
11-25 November 1985
Second round of talks on consular matters held in
Moscow. Two sides initial new accord and examine
steps they might take to expand contacts in that area.
15 November 1985
Politburo members Peng Zhen and Li Peng visit the
Soviet exhibit at Asia-Pacific trade fair in Beijing.
25 November 1985
Chinese First Deputy Premier Song Ping stops off in
Moscow, en route home from visits to Bulgaria and
Poland, for talks and dinner with Soviet First Deputy
Premier Nikolay Talyzin, Chairman of USSR's State
Planning Committee.
27 November 1985
Gorbachev, in address to USSR Supreme Soviet,
welcomes China's position in opposing the militariza-
tion of space and its statement of intent to refrain
from first use of nuclear weapons-underscoring par-
allel interests on key arms control issues.
5 December 1985
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa arrives in
Beijing for discussions on Foreign Minister visits, the
international situation, and-if the Chinese desire-
the "military relationship" between the sides.
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19 December 1985
A Soviet civil airliner is hijacked to China. On
25 December the aircraft, passengers, and crew are
returned to the USSR.
22-23 December 1985
Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng visits Moscow and
meets with General Secretary Gorbachev. .
16-23 January 1986 _
First. Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Zhuravlev heads
a Soviet trade and transport delegation to Beijing and
meets with Vice Minister of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions and Trade Wang Pinqing. Protocols on transport
of foreign trade through 1990 and goods exchange
and payments are signed.
18 January 1986
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman states that,
contrary to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's
statements, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian
will not visit Moscow in May 1986, nor will China
conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.
18 March 1986
First meeting of.S.ino-Soviet commission on economic,
trade, and scientific and technological cooperation.
Soviet delegation led by Deputy Premier Arkhipov
meets with Zhao Ziyang and Vice Premiers Li Peng
and Wan Li.
7-15 April 1986
Eighth round of Sino-Soviet Political Talks in Mos-
cow between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev
and China's Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen; Qian
meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
China rejects Soviet proposals for a summit and a
mutual nonaggression pact.
16 April 1986
During a news conference with US journalists, Vice
Premier Li Peng says, "We are ready to normalize
state relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of
the removal of obstacles. We hope that China and the
Soviet Union will become neighbors living in friend-
ship and accord, but they cannot enter into an
alliance."
25 April 1986
Sino-Soviet protocols on foreign trade goods and
cargo transport techniques signed in Moscow.
29 April 1986
Oleg Troyanovsky, a highly regarded Soviet diplomat,
arrives in Beijing to take up the post of Soviet
Ambassador.
26 May 1986
Sino-Soviet cultural cooperation agreement is signed
in Beijing.
6 June 1986
Sino-Soviet consulate agreement is signed in Beijing.
18 June 1986
Soviet-Chinese Friendship Association cooperation
plan is-signed in Moscow.
26 June 1986
Chinese and Soviet Academies of Science sign a five-
year agreement on scientific cooperation.
3 July 1986
A Soviet USSR-China Friendship Society delegation
led by Yevgeniy Ivanov, Deputy Chairman of the
Presidium of the USSR Union of Friendship Societ-
ies,.arrives in Beijing for a one-week visit.
12 July 1986
A firefight breaks out between Soviet and Chinese
border guards in Zhaosu County of the Xinjiang
Autonomous Region, reportedly producing two casu-
alties. Both sides lodge diplomatic protests over the
incident.
28 July 1986
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev makes a
dramatic speech in Vladivostok aimed at convincing
China that the Soviet Union seriously wants improved
relations.
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CMICL
Late July-Late August 1986
Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov makes a.
private visit to Beijing, arriving on 27 July
to reinforce Gorba-
chev's Vladivostok message. During his stay he meets
with Chinese Vice Premiers Yao Yilin, Wan Li,
Li Peng, and Qiao Shi.
6 August 1986
Raisa Gorbachev visits a Chinese trade fair in Mos-
cow-the first such exhibit in 33 years-underscoring
the Soviet leader's personal interest in better relations
with China.
17-31 August 1986
Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong visits Moscow.
2 September 1986
During a television interview with "60 Minutes,"
Deng Xiaoping says that if the "main obstacle" to
Sino-Soviet relations-namely, the Vietnamese-Cam-
bodian issue-can be removed, he is willing to meet
General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.
8-15 September 1986
Candidate Politburo member Nikolay Talyzin heads
a Soviet delegation to Beijing, the first visit of a
Soviet Politburo member since Kosygin in 1969.
Talyzin and Vice Premier Yao Yilin discuss ways to
broaden Sino-Soviet economic and technical coopera-
tion; Talyzin later holds talks with Zhao Ziyang.
During the visit, Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev
and Vice Foreign Minister Qian sign a revised consul-
ar treaty.
12 September 1986
An errant Soviet SS-N-8 submarine-launched ballis-
tic missile, launched from the Barents Sea, lands in
China. The Chinese do not publicly comment on the
incident.
24 September 1986
Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian meets with
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York
at the opening of the UNGA. The two agree to hold
border talks in 1987.
28-30 September 1986
Polish General Secretary Jaruzelski makes a working
visit to China and establishes the first party-to-party
ties between China and a Bloc country, other than
Romania, in over 25 years.
6-14 October 1986
The ninth round of Sino-Soviet Political Talks on the
normalization of relations takes place in Beijing be-
tween Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev and
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian. Moscow agrees
for the first time to discuss the removal of the three
major obstacles to normalization.
11 October 1986
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev travels to
Beijing to brief Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xue-
qian on the forthcoming Reykjavik summit.
20-26 October 1986
East German General Secretary Honecker makes the
first official friendship visit by a party leader from a
Bloc country in over 25 years.
19 November 1986
China rejects a Soviet proposal for an Asian security
conference on regional issues, suggesting that, if the
USSR is genuinely concerned, it should first cut the
number of missiles deployed in Asia.
Zhao Ziyang says that many areas of Sino
Soviet relations have improved, but that the three
obstacles continue to block the normalization of politi-
cal relations.
10 December 1986
Chinese Consulate in Leningrad opens.
12 December 1986
Soviet industry and trade exhibition opens in Beijing.
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3ecrer
15 December 1986
Soviet Consulate in Shanghai opens.
13 January 1987
Meeting of the Central Council of the Soviet-Chinese
Friendship Committee in Moscow.
26 March-10 April 1987
Chinese public health delegation visits Moscow, Kiev,
and Leningrad.
1 April 1987
China and the USSR sign a border trade agreement
in Hohhot, China.
26 January 1987 2 April 1987
The Supreme Soviet Presidium ratifies the consular Sino-Soviet Commodity Exchange and Payment Pro-
treaty with China that was signed in September 1986. tocol is signed in Beijing.
5 February 1987
Sino-Soviet freight car export contract is signed in
Beijing. Contract involves delivery of 7,500 freight
cars to China between 1987 and 1990.
6 February 1987
Soviet National Chamber Music Orchestra plays in
Beijing. National People's Congress Vice Chairman
Peng Chong and the Soviet Ambassador attend.
3 April 1987
During a press conference, Vice Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen says the Soviets recently agreed to
discuss the removal of the three obstacles to normal-
ization of relations.
14-20 April 1987
Tenth round.of Sino-Soviet Political Talks is held in
Moscow.
9-23 February 1987 .
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev and Chi-
nese Vice Foreign Minister Qian resume long-sus-
pended border talks in Moscow.
23 February 1987
Sino-Soviet sports protocol is signed in Moscow.
25 February 1987
General Secretary Gorbachev extends an invitation to
Zhao Ziyang to visit the USSR at the conclusion of
Zhao's East European tour in the summer of 1987.
2-16 March 1987
Joint Soviet-Chinese Boundary Rivers Navigation
Committee meets in Blagoveshchensk, USSR. Proto-
col is signed agreeing to make the rivers more
navigable.
7-16 March 1987
Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian visits Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland.
20 April 1987
Deng Xiaoping says in remarks during the visit of the
General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party to
Beijing, "We hope for the normalization of political
relations with the Soviet Union, but this requires
concrete actions on the Soviet side."
29 April 1987
The Soviets begin a limited withdrawal of troops from
Mongolia in a gesture to improve relations with
China.
30 April 1987
China and the Soviet Union sign an agreement in
Moscow to increase educational exchanges.
5-11 May 1987
Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Bulgarian
Communist Party, makes an official visit to Beijing.
11 March 1987
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says that
Zhao will not accept Gorbachev's invitation to visit
the USSR.
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Secret
6-13 May 1987
Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin heads Chinese dele-
gation visiting Moscow for the annual meeting of the
Sino-Soviet Commission for Economic, Trade, Scien-
tific, and Technical Cooperation. The Soviet host is
Planning Chief Nikolay Talyzin. A protocol is signed
to expand trade in the border areas and to continue
cooperation in trade transport and air services.
8 May 1987
A group of Soviet social scientists, under the auspices
of the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, begins a
visit to Beijing.
21 May 1987
Agreement on scientific cooperation through 1989 is
signed in Beijing.
23 May 1987
Radio and television cooperation agreement is signed
in Beijing.
4-21 June 1987
Acting Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang visits Poland,
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bul-
garia, completing full restoration of relations with all
five nations.
7 June 1987
China and Mongolia sign a border treaty in
Ulaanbaatar.
16 June 1987
Sino-Soviet tourism protocol is signed in Moscow.
17 June 1987
Agreement is signed in Shanghai to resume, after a
20-year suspension, Chinese repair of Soviet ships and
to expand shipping trade between the two countries.
22: June-6 July 1987
A delegation from the All-China Journalists Associa-
tion visits Moscow.
26 June 1987
Trade agreement is signed in Frunze, USSR, to
provide for border trade between Kirghiz Republic
and Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
July 1987
Soviet and Chinese parliamentary delegations ex-
change visits.
1 August 1987
Valentin Lozinskiy, head of the Directorate of Inter-
national Organizations of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and Li Daoyu, head of the Depart-
ment of International Organizations of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meet in Beijing to discuss
the agenda for the 42nd session of the UNGA.
7-21 August 1987
Second round of the Sino-Soviet border talks are held
in Beijing. Technical working groups are established
to work out the details of the eastern river boundary.
20 August 1987
China appoints Yu Hongliang, a specialist on Eastern
Europe, as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
August 1987
Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials meet in
Moscow to discuss the agenda of the 42nd session of
the UNGA.
14 September 1987
Sino-Soviet agreement to exchange bookfairs through
1989 is signed in Moscow.
20 September 1987
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Chinese
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian meet at the Soviet
mission in New York during the opening of the
UNGA and discuss a variety of issues; includes a
frank exchange on Cambodia.
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8-14 October 1987
Eleventh round of Sino-Soviet Political Talks is held
in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu tells Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev that the key to a
settlement of the Cambodian question lies in an early
and complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops.
Talks break off after only one week as both sides
remain unyielding on this issue.
19 October 1987
During an aviation exhibition in Beijing, Chinese
aviation officials negotiate a contract with a Soviet
deputy minister of the Aviation Industry to purchase
10 TU-154M aircraft.
31 October 1987
China acknowledges receiving a message of congratu-
lations from the Soviet Communist Party to mark the
Chinese Communist Party's 13th Congress; first time
in 30 years that Beijing has mentioned such a
message.
October 1987
Soviets send a three-member press delegation to cover
China's Party Congress. Previous Soviet press cover-
age in China was limited to nonpolitical events such
as international sports.
October 1987
Yu Hongliang takes up post as Chinese Ambassador
to the Soviet Union and says in an interview with
Moskovskiye Novosti, "We sincerely hope that,
thanks to mutual efforts, the obstacles hindering the
normalization of relations between our two countries
will be eliminated as soon as possible."
1 November 1987
Xinhua reports on the publishing of General Secre-
tary Gorbachev's book, Perestroika,.quoting Gorba-
chev as saying that the USSR shares responsibility for
the mistakes within the socialist world and that the
USSR should learn from its breaches with China and
other socialist nations.
6 November 1987
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Com-
mittee Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin receives Zhang
Wenjin, Chinese People's Society for Friendship with
Foreign Countries Chairman, who heads a delegation
to the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great
October Socialist Revolution in Moscow. Visit marks
the first time since early 1960s that Chinese have
attended the celebrations.
16 November 1987
Deng Xiaoping says, during a meeting with Japanese
socialist leader Doi, "I can go anywhere in the Soviet
Union to meet Gorbachev if he can persuade Vietnam
to. withdraw its troops from Cambodia."
26 November 1987
Speaking at a press conference in New Delhi, Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev says that, while
Sino-Soviet trade and economic cooperation is recip-
rocal and beneficial to both countries, "We do not see
any dynamic effort on the party-to-party
relationship."
27 November 1987
During talks with Zambian President Kaunda, Gener-
al Secretary Gorbachev proposes a Sino-Soviet sum-
mit to discuss Cambodia and other issues. .A Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official reiterates China's
demand that the Cambodian issue must be resolved
before a summit.
28 November 1987
Sino-Soviet Water Resources Commission reaches
accord in Moscow on a report of reconnaissance of the
border section of the Amur River.
November 1987
Soviet press gives extensive, favorable coverage to
China's 13th Party Congress and Chinese economic
and political reforms.
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3 December 1987
Mongolia and China sign a trade protocol in Beijing.
3 December 1987
China and the USSR sign a protocol on economic,
trade, and scientific and technical cooperation in
Beijing.
8-10 December 1987
US-Soviet summit in Washington: the United States
and the USSR sign the INF Treaty, including the
dismantling of all Soviet SS-20s in the Soviet Far
East.
19 December 1987
Accord is reached in Khabarovsk to open new air
services between Khabarovsk and Harbin in 1988.
20 December 1987
The Soviets deliver to China the first of 100 high-
powered, two-section, electric locomotives to be pro-
vided under an existing contract.
21 December 1987
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev briefs Chi-
nese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on the US-
Soviet summit in Washington and the INF Treaty
with the United States.
24 December 1987
Talks conclude in Beijing regarding Sino-Soviet cul-
tural cooperation for the period 1988-90.
24 December 1987
A Sino-Soviet sports protocol, outlining centralized
exchanges and direct.athletic ties in the border areas,
is signed in Beijing.
27 December 1987
Sino-Soviet talks are held in Beijing to establish the
first joint industrial enterprise. It will be located in
the Uzbek Republic and will produce goods for
civilian use and expand Soviet technical aid to China.
28 December 1987
Chinese and Soviet officials sign a trade protocol
indicating a rise in trade volume for 1988.
28 December 1987
Sino-Soviet barter and payment agreement is signed
in Beijing.
December 1987
Sino-Soviet protocol on fisheries cooperation is signed.
December 1987
President Li Xiannian says that China welcomes the
signing of the INF Treaty, but notes that the accord
only involves a small portion of the nuclear arsenals of
the two countries.
3 January 1988
Chinese Liaowang weekly publishes an exclusive in-
terview with Gorbachev. Xinhua and Renmin Ribao
summaries of the interview omit Gorbachev's call for
a summit.
4-15 January 1988
A Soviet delegation takes part in the first conference
of the permanent working group of the Soviet-Chinese
Commission for Economic, Trade, and Scientific and
Technical Cooperation in Beijing.
15 January 1988
TASS reports the publishing of a Russian language
version of Deng Xiaoping's book Principal Issues
Concerning Present Day China.
19 January 1988
China announces the beginning of construction of a
railroad line in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region
extending from the region's capital at Urumqi to the
Soviet border at Alatau Pass.
20 January-1 February 1988
Sino-Soviet expert working groups hold technical
talks on eastern border in Moscow. Agree to continue
working-level talks in Beijing in April.
8 February 1988
Gorbachev announces he will begin withdrawing
troops from Afghanistan as early as May, depending
on progress on the Geneva accords.
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17 February 1988
According to Agence France-Presse, a Soviet diplo-
mat stated that the Soviets are willing to meet with
Prince Sihanouk at a "certain stage of the political
settlement if it is needed by the situation or desired by
Sihanouk."
22 February 1988
Soviet Defense Minister Yazov's speech marking the
70th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces claims.
that the USSR has not added to its ground forces in
Asia for a number of years, has reduced the number
of troops stationed along the border with China, has
withdrawn troops from Mongolia, and has not in-
creased the size or scope of military exercises. China
publishes the Asian section of his speech without
comment.
23 February 1988
Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese Army
attends a reception marking the 70th anniversary of
the Soviet army in Beijing. China, however, declines
an invitation to attend the Armed Forces Day celebra-
tions in Moscow.
1-2 March 1988
Soviet press marks the 90th anniversary of Chou
Enlai's birth.
25 March 1988
TASS issues its first official Soviet comment on Saudi
Arabia's purchase of Chinese CSS-2 missiles, terming
the weapons defensive and avoiding any criticism of
China.
31 March-8 April 1988
The Sino-Soviet joint working group on the border
holds talks in Beijing. According to press, the talks
focused on practical issues involved in organizing joint
aerial photography of the eastern sector.
13-16 April 1988
The Soviet Government sends congratulations to the
new Chinese state leaders elected at the National
People's Congress, addressing Premier Li Peng, Presi-
dent Yang Shangkun, and Wan Li each as "com-
rade." Soviet Defense Council sends congratulations
to Deng Xiaoping on his reelection to the post of
Chairman of the Central Military Council. Soviet
Defense Minister Yazov sends congratulations to Qin
Jiwei on his appointment as China's Defense
Minister.
28 April-13 May 1988
Delegation of Sinologists led by Titarenko-Director
of the Soviet Far East Institute-visits China.
4 May 1988
A cultural cooperation plan for the period 1988-90 is
signed in Beijing, including an agreement that the
Bolshoi Ballet will visit Beijing for the first time in 30
years.
14 May 1988
A delegation of Soviet journalists headed by Pravda
Editor Afanasyev visits Beijing. Chinese media avoid
all reference to his party title and the Chinese Foreign
Ministry forbids any official contact between Pravda
and the People's Daily.
19 May 1988
China Youth News reports that the Sino-Soviet bor-
der city of Suifenhe has sent laborers to the Soviet
Union to work on a state farm in Grodekovo-
particularly significant because Grodekovo was once
Chinese territory.
25 May 1988
First Vice Chairman of the Soviet State Planning
Committee praises China's agricultural contract and
leasing system, saying it could be borrowed and would
help solve the acute food shortage in his country
within two or three years.
29 May 1988
Moscow issues its third government statement on
Indochina since the Vietnam war, endorsing Hanoi's
announced plan to withdraw 50,000 troops from
Cambodia this year.
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1 June 1988
A Chinese Foreign Ministry official tells US Embassy
officials that Moscow apparently had exerted pressure
on Vietnam to encourage a partial withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Although the
Chinese responded to Vietnam's withdrawal an-
nouncement with skepticism, it is significant that the
Chinese Foreign Ministry gave Moscow credit for
influencing Hanoi.
3-8 June 1988
Yuriy Maslyukov leads a delegation to Beijing for the
third meeting.of the Soviet-Chinese Commission on
Economic, Trade, and Scientific and Technological
Cooperation. Two agreements are signed: one pro-
vides the framework for Sino=Soviet joint ventures,
and the.other paves the way for expanding border
trade between Chinese provinces and cities and Soviet
republics. Negotiators also set the 1988 level for
government-to-government trade and discussed pro-
gress at the halfway mark of a five-year agreement
outlining Soviet assistance to 24 renovation and con-
struction projects in China.
4 June 1988
Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev briefs his counter-
part, Tian Zengpei, in Beijing on the results of the
Soviet-US summit in Moscow.
8 June 1988
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and his Chi-
nese counterpart, Qian, meet in New York at the
Third UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. Rep-
resents additional venue for the meeting of Foreign
Ministers, although still under UN auspices.
13-20 June 1988
The 12th round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks are
scheduled to take place in Beijing. Vice Foreign.
Minister Tian Zenpei will head the Chinese delega-
tion for the first time-Qian Qichen was promoted to
Foreign Minister at the National People's Congress in
March/April 1988. The next round of border talks is
scheduled for October 1988 and the next round of
normalization talks for April/May 1989.
1 July 1988
Beijing unveils a four-point proposal on Cambodia.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000290001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000290001-7
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000290001-7