GORBACHEV VISIT REFLECTS CONTINUING BILATERAL TENSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000200150030-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 12, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS TRENDS
12 April 1989
Cuba-USSR
Gorbachev Visit Reflects Continuing Bilateral Tension
Although Moscow and Havana sought to portray their relationship
as being on an even keel during President Gorbachev's recent visit to
Cuba, the visit failed to ease tensions stemming from the two sides'
divergent approaches to economic reform and pointed up Moscow's
growing impatience with Cuba's poor economic performance and
inefficient use of Soviet aid. In line with his professed interest in
promoting political solutions to regional issues, Gorbachev endorsed
the peace agreement signed two months ago by Central American
leaders, but he offered no new initiatives tofurther the peace process
in the region.
Gorbachev's 2-5 April "official, friendly" visit to Cuba-the first by a top
Soviet leader since Brezhnev traveled there in 1974-was marked by
disagreement, but both sides tried to portray it in as positive a light as possible.
Thus, a number of reports described the exchanges between the two leaders as
"frank"-a term denoting disagreement-but also as basically harmonious. A
Moscow radio report on 6 April, for example, described Gorbachev's talks
with President Castro as "a dialogue of two friends-frank, democratic, and
free of pitfalls." Castro also sought to play down his differences with the
Soviet leader by likening his "warm, affectionate, and frank" discussions with
him to "a conversation with one's own family" (Prensa Latina, 5 April). For
his part, Gorbachev, at a press conference reported by Moscow radio on the
5th, said he and Castro had arrived at "complete mutual understanding"
during "a very lively exchange and comparison of points of view" and added
that he was "satisfied" with the outcome of the visit. Judging by a TASS
report on the 4th, however, the views of the two leaders "coincided" only on
"world events."
Both Castro and Gorbachev, albeit to varying degrees, sought to dispel the
notion that their differing approaches to economic reform have led to a
deterioration in bilateral relations. In a press conference in Havana on the 3d,
Gorbachev noted that the relationship has "sometimes passed through
complicated periods," but he went on to describe it as "strong, sincere, and
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12 April 1989
time-tested" (TASS, 3 April). Unlike Castro, however, he did not deny that
the more orthodox socialist economic policies pursued by Cuba-policies that
run counter to current Soviet reforms-are a source of bilateral friction.
Broaching this subject in his 5 April press conference, Gorbachev went no
further than to reject as "mere fabrication" Western media claims that he and
Castro met as "enemies" and not "as old friends." Implying that his professed
policy of tolerance for diversity within the communist bloc extends to Cuba as
well, Gorbachev reaffirmed the right of each country to solve the task of
"socialist transformation" according to its own conditions, level of
development, and political experience.
Differences Over Despite expressions of mutual respect for the economic
Reform reform policies under way in their respective countries,
both leaders conveyed the belief that the other is
following a mistaken course. In an apparent allusion to the market-oriented
economic reforms that are being implemented in the Soviet Union, Castro, in
introducing Gorbachev, at the Cuban National Assembly on 4 April, said that
"if a socialist country wants to build capitalism," Cuba will "accept" such a
decision, but he stressed that Cuba will rot adopt these kinds of reforms.
Justifying his stance, he noted pointedly that Havana did not make the kinds
of "errors" that were made in the Soviet Union "during the Stalin era" and
does not have "ethnic problems." To underscore his rejection of such reforms,
he went on to say that it would be "absurd and crazy" to expect Cuba to copy
Moscow's "formulas for restructuring socialism." Soviet media gave only
selective treatment to Castro's remarks, omitting his implicit criticism of
Soviet "errors."
Gorbachev, in turn, seemed to imply that the more orthodox socialist economic
policies that Castro is promoting as part of his economic "rectification"
program are outmoded and will further weaken the country's economy. He
reminded his audience that "success will come to those who keep pace with the
times and draw appropriate conclusions from the changes in today's world."
He added that it is "essential to engage in a creative rethinking of reality" and
to "shape policies that are consistent with the imperatives of the times." In a
clear allusion to Cuba, he argued that "the old, much traveled road" will only
bring "greater stagnation" and "hinder economic, social, and political
progress." Gorbachev went on to give an upbeat assessment of the reform
process in the Soviet Union, saying that "a great deal has changed" there and
that the Soviet people now feel "much freer."
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12 April 1989
Troubled Economic While Gorbachev alluded to continuing problems in
Ties Soviet-Cuban economic cooperation in his speech to
the National Assembly, he did not dwell on the topic.
Without spelling out the nature of the problem, he bluntly informed his hosts
that bilateral economic cooperation "should be more dynamic and effective"
so as to bring "greater returns" for both countries. However, in a clear
allusion to Havana's continuing difficulty in fulfilling its deliveries to the
Soviet Union-primarily sugar, citrus products, and minerals-he
admonished that it is "absolutely essential to increase strictness and discipline
in order to ensure that mutual commitments are fulfilled on time and in an
adequate manner." Over the past 18 months, Moscow has signaled its growing
impatience with the Cubans' continuing failure to improve their economic
performance and Cuba's heavy reliance on the Soviet Union; Moscow has
aired a number of grievances, including Cuba's low productivity, heavy
defense spending, and poor use of Soviet economic aid.'
Judging by remarks by a Soviet trade official on the eve of the visit, Havana
has been slow to embrace new forms of cooperation, particularly the
establishment of direct ties with Soviet enterprises-one of the key steps called
for by Gorbachev to improve bilateral cooperation within CEMA, but a
change that would clash with the importance Castro has placed on the
centralization of state economic decisions. The official noted that direct ties
with Cuban enterprises are "not yet fully developed," and he complained that
since last May, when the agreement to begin such ties was signed, only "16
pairs of partners" have begun to work. He described this number as
"extremely small" since the "strategy of cooperation should focus on these
direct ties." The official also indicated that Havana is reluctant to establish
joint enterprises, saying it has been "rather cautious about this as yet
unfamiliar proposition" (Izvestiya, 29 March).
Friendship Treaty In an action seemingly designed to underline the
normality of Soviet-Cuban relations, the two sides
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. However, both the tone and
substance of the treaty-the first such document signed by the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev's leadership-breaks significantly with those that Moscow
concluded with Third World client states in the past, reflecting Gorbachev's
"new thinking" on international relations as outlined in his UN address of
7 December 1988. Thus, the treaty with Cuba is oriented toward detente and
does not include an article on military cooperation; it makes no
'See the Trends of 26 October 1988, pages 8-10, and 28 October 1987, pages 21-24.
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12 April 1989
provision for bilateral consultations or for the coordination of positions in case
of an attack, features that are included in almost all Soviet treaties with other
Third World countries.
Given that such treaties often serve the concrete function of delineating the
terms of Moscow's relationship with the other party, the uniqueness of the
treaty with Cuba may reflect an effort to redefine or redirect the two
countries' relations. Suggesting such an effort, the treaty, instead of dwelling
on military relations, explicitly calls for rechanneling resources that would be
spent for military purposes "to meet the economic and social development of
the countries, particularly those that suffer from underdevelopment."
Disagreement on military cooperation has been evident for some time. A New
Times article in October 1987, for example, questioned Cuba's need for high
defense spending and depicted it as a "heavy burden" and as a "loss to the
economy." The article went on to question Cuba's longstanding justification of
such expenditures, saying that there are "different views" as to whether the
United States "intends to attack Cuba." Castro may have been trying to
bolster his case in his introduction of Gorbachev to the Cuban National
Assembly on 4 April. Reiterating his apparent misgivings about detente, he
reminded the Soviet leader that a "peaceful world" does not yet exist because
there is "no proof" that the "imperialists" interpret peaceful coexistence the
same way as the Soviet Union. Suggesting that detente and Havana's
preoccupation with defense may have been one of the areas of disagreement
during the visit, Castro claimed that there has been "absolutely no change" in
U.S. "hostility" toward Cuba, which, he added, "obliges" Cuba to "make
enormous efforts to defend" itself. Pressing his argument, he further noted
that Cuba "would not have the security" it has today and would not have been
able to "defend" the revolution without Soviet military aid.
Treatment Qf Contrary to widespread speculation in the Western
Central America press, Gorbachev did not launch any new initiative to
help promote resolution of the Central American
conflict. Touching briefly on the subject in his speech to the Cuban National
Assembly, he went no further than to express support for a regional political
settlement "based on a balance of interests of all parties" and "without outside
interference"-an apparent allusion to the peace plan signed by Central
American presidents in February. The Soviet leader also took umbrage at the
U.S. statements calling for changes in Moscow's aid policies in the region,
saying "we cannot accept statements coming out of Washington that distort
the nature of our relations" with Cuba and Nicaragua.
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12 April 1989
While Gorbachev noted that Nicaragua "envisages a reduction" of its armed
forces under the terms of the Central American accord, he reiterated that the
Soviet Union will not take any unilateral steps to curtail its arms deliveries to
the Sandinistas. However, he renewed his offer, which he first made in
December 1986 during his summit with former President Reagan, to end
Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua if the United States discontinues arming
its allies in the region.
Outlook Bilateral tension will probably increase as Moscow
presses Havana to improve economic performance and
fulfill its commitments to the communist bloc and, in particular, to the Soviet
Union. For its part, Havana is not likely to succeed in overcoming its
straitened economic situation as long as Castro adheres to the more orthodox
socialist economic policies that underpin his "rectification" program and
stresses moral, as opposed to material, incentives as a way to spur worker
productivity. Nevertheless, as suggested by the veneer of cordiality applied to
Gorbachev's visit, Moscow and Havana will try to prevent the relationship
from sliding toward a serious rift.
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12 April 1989
Hungary-USSR
Moscow Shows Signs of Concern Amid Affirmations of Harmony
Party leader Grosz used his visit to Moscow to attempt to bolster
his position within the Hungarian leadership, while President
Gorbachev .used the occasion to reaffirm the Soviet commitment to
reform within the bloc and noninterference in the domestic affairs of
its allies. At the same time, the visit provided indications of
continuing Soviet concern over Hungary's political stability and the
implications of recent changes for Soviet policy.
As with Hungarian Premier Nemeth's trip to Moscow in early March,' both
Soviet and Hungarian reports portrayed General Secretary Grosz's
23-24 March working visit in glowing terms. After the nearly four-hour
meeting of the two leaders, Grosz told an international press conference that
there was "not a single issue" on which their views did not coincide, that "no
conflicts of interest" emerged during the visit, and that he was going home
"very satisfied" and full of "rich" experiences (Nepszabadsag, 25 March).
According to the authoritative TASS report, Grosz's visit was imbued with "a
spirit of mutual understanding and comradeship" and took place in a "cordial
atmosphere" (Pravda, 25 March). The communique of the Central Committee
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) similarly called the talks
"cordial, open, and friendly" (Nepszabadsag, 31 March). By contrast,
reporting on Grosz's July 1988 visit to Moscow had provided clear evidence of
friction over economic issues; even the joint communique issued by the
two sides had hinted at their differences, describing the atmosphere of that
visit in both positive-"cordial and friendly"-and negative-"comradely
frankness"-terms.Z
As in its reporting on the Nemeth visit, Budapest appeared to be particularly
gratified, and perhaps relieved, by Moscow's reiteration of its commitment to
noninterference in the domestic affairs of other communist states and, in
particular, its apparent acceptance of Hungarian moves toward pluralism. A
'See the Trends of 15 March 1989, pages 22-26.
'See the Trends of 20 July 1988, pages 23-26.
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