MOSCOW, HAVANA DEBUNK IDEA OF SOVIET COMBAT UNITS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000200100008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 12, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
CoNmoffffikk- FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1979
USSR - CUBA - U, S.
MOSCOW, HAVANA DEBUNK IDEA OF SOVIET COMBAT UNITS IN CUBA
A measured but firmly worded PRAVDA editorial article,
released by TASS on the heels of Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin's 10 September meeting with Secretary Vance,
has provided Moscow's first authoritative comment on
recent statements by U.S. Administration officials and
Congressional leaders on the issue of a Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba. The editorial article--paralleling
in striking fashion an official TASS statement in
October 1970 which rejected U.S. charges that the USSR
was building a submarine base in Cuba--denied that
there are Soviet combat. units in Cuba and defended USSR-
Cuban defense cooperation as an "inalienable right" of
two sovereign states. Complaining that U.S. officials
have not helped calm the situation but on the contrary
have made matters worse, PRAVDA in effect has urged
the Administration to, handle the domestic political
complications but has off erect no insight into Soviet
approaches to a diplomatic resolution. At the same
time, the close parallels between the similarly
unyielding 1970 TASS statement and PRAVDA's current
response suggest the possibility of a similar approach
to a solution. Moscow's avowal of resolute support
for a close ally is to be expected in any case.
Like earlier Soviet and Cuban commentary, PRAVDA suggested that the
primary motive of the campaign was a desire to embarrass Cuba as host
of the nonalined summit conference in Havana. Only secondarily did
the paper bring up the matter of Senate SALT ratification proceedings--
which Moscow previously had played in low key--by professing to see
efforts by SALT opponents to use the issue to prevent, or at least
complicate, the ratification process.
Building up to the PRAVDA response, Moscow pointedly called attention
to the "global scale" of U.S. military deployment, decrying the
presence of the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo as well as Western bases
ringing the communist countries, and ventilating hackneyed charges of
Pentagon plans to create "quick-reaction" forces for intervention
abroad.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06T01849R000200100008-5
FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1979
PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE, The 11 September PRAVDA editorial article,
1970 TASS STATEMENT which came a week after Moscow first
acknowledged the renewed U.S. debate on
the issue, was remarkably similar in format to the 1970 TASS state-
ment,* with one important distinction in the treatment of the U.S.
Administration. The circumspection shown now by PRAVDA--in contrast
to TASS' more direct criticism of U.S. official spokesmen in 1970--
suggests a desire to avoid further exacerbation of Soviet-U.S.
relations over the current issue, a desire that may also have been
reflected in the choice of an editorial article rather than an
authorized TASS statement for what otherwise closely followed the
1970 format. By switching to a PRAVDA editorial article Moscow chose
the most authoritative form of media commentary but one that is not
formally an official expression of views.**
+ Both PRAVDA now and TASSin 1970 complained of a propaganda
campaign in American media echoed by members of Congress. TASS at
that time addressed the substance of statements by official Pentagon
and White House spokesmen which, it said, "opened" the campaign.
PRAVDA by contrast maintained the discretion Moscow has displayed
thus far in its treatment of statements by President Carter and
Secretary Vance. It would seem, PRAVDA said, that the U.S. Govern-
ment, "which of course knows the facts well," should have given the
necessary explanations; regrettably," however, "official represen-
tatives of the U.S. Government have followed a different course."
Without explaining what the unidentified officials said, PRAVDA added
that their statements "actually, so to speak, only add fuel to the
fire."
+ PRAVDA then proceeded, as TASS had done, to rebut the U.S. charges.
For 17 years, PRAVDA said, Soviet military personnel have been
training Cuban servicemen at a center in Cuba, and the number and
function of the Soviet personnel have not changed. Rejecting as
groundless "all contentions about the arrival of 'organized Soviet
combat units"' in Cuba, PRAVDA insisted that Soviet personnel in
Cuba "do not and cannot present any threat" to the United States,
whether by size or by functions.
* The October 1970 TASS statement is the most recent official Soviet
statement relating to Cuba. After the 1962 missile crisis, TASS
statements in 1966 and 1967 had denounced "new provocations by U.S.
aggressive circles" with respect to an incident in the area of
Guantanamo and alleged U.S. efforts to use the Organization of American
States against Cuba.
** The editorial article--which was broadcast in foreign languages
including Spanish--was printed on the first page of PRAVDA, an unusual
if not unique position for this vehicle, which normally appears on
the inside pages.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06T01849R000200100008-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1979
4- PRAVDA conveyed a firm insistence that the presence of Soviet
troops in the context of Soviet-Cuban cooperation is an inalienable
right of two sovereign states and that any attempt to restrict this
right contradicts accepted international norms. Similarly, TASS in
1970 had maintained that Soviet port calls in Cuba were an inalienable
right of sovereign states, universally recognized and confirmed by
international practice.
4- Raising the question--as TASS had done--of the reason for the
campaign, PRAVDA claimed that the "outcry" was timed primarily to
coincide with the nonalined summit conference and "not by chance" is
being used to complicate the SALT ratification process.
-F PRAVDA cautioned in conclusion that "those who connive at" and
inspire the "hostile" campaign should be aware of the responsibility
they are assuming. TASS had warned in 1970 that "those who
deliberately or irresponsibly" spread such "falsifications play into
the hands of the foes of peace."
While noting that the United States had called into question Soviet
observance of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet understanding, the 1970 TASS
statement affirmed Soviet adherence to that agreement and "assumed"
that the United States would also abide-by it. While the under-
standing has not been at issue in the current dispute, Moscow raised
it indirectly for the first time, and responded to SALT critics as
well, in a broadcast to North America late on the 11th. Complaining
that the United States has failed to heed,the Soviet refutation, the
broadcast asserted that U.S. officials have no grounds to distrust
the Soviet Union's sincerity. "No one can reproach this country for
violating its accords with the United States," it said, adding that
"among other things," this pertains to the SALT I agreement. In other
followup commentary Moscow has portrayed growing distress in the U.S.
press and in political circles that the campaign may threaten the
interests of the United States itself by hindering the SALT II
ratification process.
EVOLUTION OF Moscow's customary sensitivity to its military
SOVIET RESPONSE activities in Cuba, as well as its circumspection
on issues that might affect the SALT treaty
ratification, had been underscored in its cautious, low-key treatment
of the troop question. The first mention of the issue for the Soviet
domestic audience came in an IZVESTIYA Washington correspondent's
dispatch on the 7th reporting that Senator Church, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had decided to "discontinue"
committee discussions of the SALT II treaty and convene instead a
special committee session on "the matter of the presence of Soviet
troops in Cuba." The report noted that many senators viewed the
decision as playing into the hands of treaty opponents. Earlier,
Moscow radio's world service and a broadcast to North America on the
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1979
5th had reported that Senator Church had "temporarily" postponed the
committee's SALT discussion after meeting with President Carter and
Secretary Vance.
Moscow's only reference to Secretary Vance's 5 September press
conference statement came in a TASS pickup on the 7th of an editorial
that day in the London DAILY TELEGRAPH. TASS cited the paper as
pointing out that the Secretary had created a "mystery" with his'
statement about the presence of a "Soviet combat brigade in Cuba,"
when he "admitted" that "combat troops numbering 2,000 to 3,000 had
been in Cuba for several years, possibly as many as 10 years." And
it quoted the paper as saying that none of the theories as to the
motive for his statement "seems entirely satisfactory." In briefly
reporting President Carter's 7 September remarks to editors, Moscow's
world service sidestepped. the troop question, noting only that the
President urged ratification of SALT II, which he said should be
based on its own merits, and that he added that to link the treaty
with "some action or inaction of the Soviets" would not be in the best
interest of the American people.
A Soviet counterattack began developing on the 7th as Moscow replayed
to foreign audiences, including Latin-listeners, the line taken by
Havana that there is no secret about Soviet assistance in training
the Cuban army. At the same time, Soviet commentary began to focus
on the U.S. military presence abroad. TASS New York correspondent
Reshetilov, for example, denounced the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo,
calling it of great "operational-tactical significance" for the
Pentagon, and charged that "official data" showed the United States
to maintain an "active military presence" in almost 30 countries. He
noted that "sober-minded politicians" in the United.States are
expressing oppositson to the "Pentagon's militaristic intrigues."
And IZVESTIYA's Matveyev charged on the 8th that the Pentagon in the
postwar years has permanently stationed from one-third to one-fourth
of all regular military forces in foreign territories, particularly
in West Europe and Asia--"on the approaches to the USSR and other
states of the socialist community." Pentagon plans to form special
forces for direct intervention abroad are not new, Matveyev said, but
this makes them "no less dangerous for the process of detente."
Moscow's initial reaction totthe current discussion, a commentary
by TASS political observer Bat3enko on the 5th, ridiculed Senator
Church, who, it said, "had 'discovered' 'approximately one brigade
of Soviet troops' on Cuba" without the benefit of any optical
devices. Moscow had taken a similarly derisory tack in July, when
the troop issue was first raised by Senator Stone. A Vasilyev
article in IZVESTIYA on 27 July indirectly associated the troop issue
with the SALT debate and alluded to the combat nature of the troops.
Claiming that Senator Stone suffered from nightmares about Cossacks
preparing to land in Florida, Vasilyev said the senator had informed
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5
FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1979
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then holding a hearing on
SALT, that the Soviet Union "has sent combat-ready troops" to Cuba.
Vasilyev indicated that the., matter had been laid to rest when Defense
Secretary Brown assured the committee there was no evidence of "any
significant increase in the Soviet military presence in Cuba in the
last few years."
Last fall's flurry over the supply of MIG-23's to Cuba had drawn a
response by the pseudonymous A. Petrov in an 18 November PRAVDA
article that evaded the issue of the plane's nuclear-delivery capa-
bility and attributed.the "rumpus" to efforts of "supporters of the
arms race" to arouse suspicion against the Soviet Union at a time
when the SALT talks "have entered a decisive phase."
CUBAN REACTION The first Cuban reaction came in a 6 September
PRENSA LATINA commentary that.scoffed at the U.S.
"campaign" about the "alleged presence of Soviet combat troops" and,
like Moscow, saw the American "accusation" as a maneuver directed
against both Cuba and the nonalined movement. PRENSA LATINA recalled
the earlier "sensational scandal" in connection with the MIG-23
"combat planes" (which President Fidel Castro at the time--in a
November 1978 press conference--had described as tactical planes,
"absolutely defensive in nature.")
PRENSA LATINA maintained that Moscow's "generous" military aid to
Havana and "Soviet advice to the Cuban army" were well known in
Washington, and it forthrightly acknowledged that Cuban soldiers are
"trained under the comradely aid of their Soviet brothers in modern
tactics and military strategy and in the use and operation of defense
arms of indisputable efficiency." Everything else, it said, is the
product of "the delirious mind of some Yankee congressmen," and it
assured U.S. senators that Soviet soldiers could never constitute a
threat to anyone.
The Havana reference to Soviet training assistance is not unique:
As far back as February 1970 a Cuban officer, speaking at a Havana
observance of Soviet armed forces day, mentioned Soviet "advisers"
and "specialists" who were helping "to increase the capabilities of
our cadres and combatants in the use of the most modern and complex
combat equipment."
Havana's only other available reference to the issue thus far came
in an international service broadcast on the 8th noting that
President Carter in a television statement repeated remarks made
earlier by Secretary Vance on the "alleged presence" of Soviet combat
troops. The broadcast gave no further details, adding merely that
"Washington political circles" believe there is a "close relation-
ship" between the troop issue and the Senate debate on the SALT treaty.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000200100008-5