THE SOVIET ROLE IN DEVELOPING AND IMPROVING THE DEFENSE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000100030107-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 107
• Publication Date: June 28, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/10: CIA-RDP06TO1849R000100030107-4
SECRET
The Soviet Role in Developing and Improving the
Defense of Cuba
A comparison of the pattern of Soviet military de-
liveries to Warsaw Pact and Third World nations indi-
cates that, until recently, Cuba has generally lagged
behind other beneficiaries of Soviet aid in the receipt
of the more sophisticated weapons systems. Moreover,
until 1976 the supply of military equipment was tailored
to fit Cuba's defensive posture against the threat of a
US or US-supported force. The delays experienced by
Havana over the years in the receipt of new weapons and
the purely defensive character of the weapons probably
result primarily from Soviet awareness of US sensitiv-
ities.
The accompanying table shows the delivery dates of
certain Soviet weapon systems to Cuba, three Warsaw Pact
nations, and five Third World nations in Asia, Latin
America, and the Middle East. Before 1976, Cuba usually
received new Soviet weapons several years after most
other military aid clients.* For example, of the five
nations listed in the table as having received the MIG-23,
only Romania obtained the aircraft after Cuba. Similarly,
Cuba received the SA-3 after six other nations and has
yet to be provided the SA-6 system or the Scud tactical
missile. The USSR also was tardy in sending T-62 tanks,
ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft artillery, and 0sa-I guided missile
patrol boats. The delay in the flow of new weapons prior
to 1976 could also reflect the arms levels stockpiled
in the early and mid-to-late 1960s as well as sharply
reduced manpower levels in the Cuban military.
After 1975, however, the situation began to change
as a staged modernization of the Cuban military became
evident. The timing of the Soviet decision and the. mix
*The only notable exception occurred in 1966 and 1967 when Cuba
received FROG tactical rockets before Egypt, Libya, and perhaps
25X1
25X1
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Dates of Initial Receipt of Selected Soviet Weapons Systems
Country
MIG-21
Fighter
MIG-21
Model D
MIG-21
Model F
MIG-21 MIG-21
Model H Model J
MIG-21 MIG-21
Model K Model L
MIG-23
Interceptor/
Fighter-
Bomber
MIG-25
Reconnais-
sance/
Interceptor
TU-22
Super-
sonic
Bomber
SA-3
SA-6
East
1973
Not
confirmed
Germany
Before 1966
-
1966
1964
1969
1973
1973
1978
-
-
1970
1976
Poland
Before 1966
-
1968
1970
1969
-
1974
-
-
-
1970
1975
Romania
Before 1966
-
-
1973
1970
-
1977
1979
-
-
-
1971-72
Egypt
Before 1966
-
Between
-
-
-
-
1975
-
-
1970
1972
1965 & 1968
Libya
1977
-
1976
-
-
-
1977
1975
1978
1975
1974
1974
India
Before 1966
1964
1965
-
1973
-
1976
-
-
-
1975
1977
Indonesia
Before 1966
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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---
Dates of Initial Receipt of Selected Soviet Weapons SystemsF
] (Continued)
Country
T-62 Tank
FROG
ZSU 23-4
OSA I Guided
OSA II Guided
Nanuchka Guided
Turya
Conventional
SCUD
Tactical
Missile Patrol
Missile Patrol
Missile Patrol
Hydrofoil
Attack Sub-
Rockets
Boat
Boat
Boat
Patrol Boat
marine
Cuba
1976
1966 or 1967
1976
1972
1976
-
1979
1979'
-
w
Peru
-
-
1975
-
-
-
-
-
-
East Germany
1972
NA
1966
1966
-
-
-
-
Before 1966
Poland
1966
NA
1966
1966
-
-
-
1966'
Before 1966
tv
Romania
3
NA
-
-
1966
-
-
-
Before 1966
Co
Egypt
1972
1970
1966
1966
-
-
-
1966'
1973
Libya
1974
1978
1971
-
1976
-
-
1976'
-
(D
India
-
-
1974
1966
1976
1977
-
1968'
-
F-'
Indonesia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
19662
-
v
kD
NA - Not available.
' F-class submarine.
' W-class submarine.
' Received the T-72 in 1978; no record of a T-62.
' W-class and R-class submarine.
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of weapons made available may reflect in part compensa-
tion for the Cuban role in Angola and Ethiopia, but the
available evidence indicates that the general decision
to upgrade the Cuban military was made before the Cuban
involvement in Angola had become a major intervention.
The timing also suggests that Moscow's perceptions of
the United States had changed and that the USSR did not
feel as constrained by fear of US reactions in the after-
math of the Vietnam conflict and in the course of a con-
stitutional crisis in Washington.
Cuba's current military modernization program was
probably discussed initially by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro,
and Brezhnev during Soviet leader Brezhnev's visit to
Cuba in January 1974. Full agreement apparently was
not reached, however, as Raul Castro traveled to Moscow
for extended discussions with Soviet officials immedi-
ately after Brezhnev returned home. Because no further
meetings between the top leaders of the two countries
occurred until after the beginning of the 1976 to 1980
Five-Year Plan, it seems probable that the general pol-
icy decisions to upgrade the Cuban military were made
at this time and that their implementation was left to
Cuban and Soviet negotiators during 1974 and early 1975.*
It seems likely that the draft agreement between Cuba
and the USSR was completed b Februar 1975
Fidel Castro's speech at the First Congress of the
Cuban Communist Party in December 1975 also indicated
that the major features of the military modernization
had been agreed upon. He stated:
In the next five-year period, the armed forces
will be supplied with a considerable volume
of even more modern weapons, with higher fire-
power, maneuverability, and automation of
components.
*Fidel Castro traveled to Moscow for the 25th Congress of the So-
viet party (23 February - 6 March 1976). Raul Castro went there
for Marshal Grechko's funeral in April 1976. The delivery of the
first new weapon system (an Osa-II guided missile patrol boat) of
the current modernization program occurred in February 1976.
28 June 1979
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The pattern of top-level meetings, the timing of Cas-
tro's statements in December 1975, and the subsequent
arrival of the new equipment during the period 1976-79
are all indications that the major features of the mod-
ernization program were agreed upon before January 1976.
Nevertheless, Moscow's willingness to supply some weapon
systems may have increased as a result of Cuba's actions
in Angola and Ethiopia.
28 June 1979
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Cuba: Growing Hardships
Living conditions in Havana have continued to de-
teriorate in the past year, and other areas on the island
are probably suffering the same decline in living stand-
ards. Food is strictly rationed and the quality con-
tinues to fall. Gasoline for private vehicles is not
available, while the public transportation system con-
tinues to disintegrate. Petty crime is on the rise.
The austere living conditions experienced by Havana's
residents are certain to cause resentment when viewed
alongside Castro's considerable--and expensive--prepara-
tions for the nonaligned movement's summit meeting in
Havana in September.
The food supply on the island has tightened consid-
erably in recent months. Beef has not been available
since the beginning of the year. Eggs, which used to
be freely offered in the marketplace, are now rationed.
Such staples of the Cuban diet as black and kidney beans
are not available. While pork is almost never offered
in stores, an entire pig reportedly can be obtained in
the countryside in exchange for an electric fan. Chicken
and fish have been the only meat offered to the population
since January. The available fish is unpalatable and
unfamiliar, since most of the popular varieties caught
by the Cuban fishing fleet are sold abroad for hard cur-
rency.
28 June 1979
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