EGYPT: PROMOTING THE PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000708090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washin,lon. I). C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 July 1988
Egypt: Promoting the Peace Process
Summary
Over the past year, President Mubarak has taken advantage of
political gains at home and Cairo's renewed diplomatic influence
in the Middle East to lend support to US efforts to revive the
peace process. Egyptian officials believe the violence in the
occupied territories has provided the best--if still highly
uncertain--chance in recent years to advance peace prospects.
They also no doubt hope that their support of the peace process
will reduce the tensions that might otherwise develop from Cairo's
relationship with Tel Aviv during a time of increased Palestinian
struggle with Israel.
Senior Egyptian officials regard several factors as critical
to the evolution of the peace process. Stepped-up US efforts
almost certainly are the most important from Cairo's perspective,
largely because of Washington's perceived influence with Tel Aviv.
The Egyptians are well aware of the formidable gap between Israeli
and Arab positions on the issues as well as the immediate question
of the election outcome in Israel. But, in our view, Cairo will
want to talk about ways to encourage a unified moderate Arab
approach as well as questions such as the shape of a final
settlement. Above all, the Egyptians will seek to keep the US
engaged and the peace process in motion. Prolonged inactivity and
stalemate would heighten friction in Egyptian-Israeli relations
and contribute to doubts about the long-term durability of the
US-Egyptian tie.
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This paper was prepared by the Egypt-Sudan 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Arab-Isaeli Division, NESA 25X1
NES A M# 88-20070
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The Context
Following the Arab League summit meeting in Amman last November, Egypt
emerged from the long period of diplomatic isolation it entered when the
late President Sadat signed a separate peace agreement with Israel in 1979.
Most Arab countries restored diplomatic relations in the weeks after the
Amman summit. The passage of time, Iran's apparent upper hand in the
Iraq-Iran war at that time, and the precedent established by the moderate
Arab states that already enjoyed nearly normal relations with Egypt
encouraged them to restore ties. Egypt's near total reintegration into the
Arab fold has been especially gratifying to President Mubarak because he has
advanced this goal largely on Cairo's own terms--continued diplomatic
relations with Tel Aviv. The President climaxed his recent diplomatic
successes by going on tour early this year and meeting with 17 leaders of
the Arab and Western world, including President Reagan.
Mubarak's stronger political position at home also enabled him to act
more boldly diplomatically. Parliamentary elections last year renewed his
National Democractic Party's (NDP) large majority. A popular referendum in
October elected him to a second six-year term. Moreover, while still under
heavy pressure to undertake politically risky economic reforms, Mubarak
could regard the prospect with marginally greater confidence than in 1986
when Egypt found all of its sources of hard currency in decline at once.
The Palestinian unrest in the occupied territories starting in
December--together with Mubarak's apparent desire to come to Washington with
a new proposal in hand--were critical factors shaping the recent Egyptian
approach to the peace process.
--Mubarak probably believed the uprising served to increase Israel's
sense of vulnerability. He hoped that the Israelis would look on the
uprising as he did--as a turning point from which Tel Aviv could
never go back again.
--Mubarak's interest in that outcome has been especially strong because
the West Bank/Gaza violence has underscored Egypt's singular
diplomatic relationship with Israel and has strained ties between
Cairo and Tel Aviv.
--He may even fear that escalation of the uprising might increase the
risk of a conflict with Israel and led to a cut-off of US aid to
Egypt.
In short, the unrest has provided Mubarak with strong incentives to promote
the peace process at the same time that his enhanced standing at home and
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abroad has increased his self-confidence and ability to undertake such
Initiatives.
The Egyptian Proposal
Mubarak's peace initiative announced in January called for a six-month
moratorium on violence, repression, and the building of Jewish settlements
in the occupied territories; international guarantees for the protection of
Palestinian rights; and preparatory steps for an international peace
conference. According to the US Embassy in Cairo, the proposal was intended
to serve as a catalyst, renewing international awareness of the need to
address the Palestinian question. The Egyptian regime has not argued that
It has a blueprint for resolving the crisis. Indeed, Mubarak included no
new initiatives on key peace process issues.
Mubarak's principal hope for his January peace proposal appeared to be
that the plan would encourage Washington to press Israel to adopt a more
flexible attitude toward the peace process. He clearly recognized that
neither he nor his country, alone could overcome the substantial obstacles to
a Mideast peace settlement--such as the Israeli's Likud bloc's firm
opposition to exchanging territory for peace and view of an international
conference as a prescription for territorial concessions; or the PLO's
belief that unconditional acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which
refer to a settlement of the "refugee" problem, would scuttle chances for a
Palestinian state. He probably even calculated that Shamir and other
hardline Israelis initially would dismiss his intiative out of hand,
possibly with the further calculation that such a reaction might stiffen US
resolve to apply pressure on its Israeli ally.
Reaction to the US Initiative
Mubarak believes he was vindicated when, after his visit to the United
States, Washington came out with its own proposal. Egyptian press reports
at the time echoed his confidence on this point. Privately the Egyptians
almost certainly welcome the key provisions of the US plan as steps in the
right direction--an international conference, bilateral negotiations based
on Resolutions 242 and 338, Palestinian representation within a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and negotiations between the Israeli
delegation and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to address the
Palestinian issue.
Publicly, the Egyptians are somewhat more reserved toward the US
proposal. Mubarak has supported the US initative generally, but he has been
careful not to identify specific US ideas on peace with his own plan. We
believe that he wants to be able to accept or reject particular points while
continuing to urge the peace process forward as a whole. Presidential
Advisor Osama el Baz, for example, reiterated last month at a meeting of a
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private foundation that Cairo strongly supports the US initiative but has
trouble with certain aspects of it. He stated that the initiative puts too
much emphasis on interim arrangements, is not sufficiently clear on
territory for peace, and that its muted references to the Palestinians
provide too little incentive for the PLO to cooperate.
Next Steps Seen From Cairo
President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials realize that there are
great stumbling blocks to peace. On the Israeli side, they know that
Tel Aviv is loathe to negotiate from weakness, and that the uprising has
stiffened the resolve of many conservative politicians and voters. They
also are aware that few Israelis believe they are in imminent danger of
losing control of the territories. Mubarak, moreover, has had considerable
problems dealing with Prime Minister Shamir and almost certainly is not
expecting any dramatic flexibility from him. In addition, Mubarak probably
recognizes that there will be no movement on the peace process before
Israeli and US elections late this year.
On the Arab side, Egyptian officials recognize that serious divisions
remain on how to approach the peace process. Movement on an international
conference is blocked by the failure of the Arabs to agree on operational
details--who should participate and how the Palestinians should be
represented. At the same time, Mubarak consults regularly with Jordan's
King Hussein and knows he will not repeat President Sadat's initiative and
hold separate negotiations with Israel in the foreseeable future. Syria
would move swiftly, aggressively, and probably successfully to scuttle talks
between Israel and Jordan or any other Arab-Israeli negotiations that
threatened to leave the Golan Heights under Israeli control.
Nevertheless, Mubarak will continue to push and support US efforts
on the peace process. He will do so, in part, because Egyptian leaders
believe the peace process is critical to reduce tension that might otherwise
grow over continuation of Egypt's relationship with Israel, particularly at
a time of increased Palestinian self-assertiveness and unrest. Mubarak also
will do so because he is likely to see violence in the occupied territories
as providing the best--if still quite uncertain--chance in recent years of
arranging an Arab settlement with Israel. He probably hopes that, if the
Israeli election brings a Labor-led government to power in Tel Aviv, it will
recognize that there is no lasting solution to the uprising apart from the
peace process.
Meanwhile, we believe that Mubarak will persist in his efforts to
encourage moderate Arab leaders to take the lead in fashioning a
unified Arab approach to the US initiative. Indeed, Egyptian leaders have
said publicly on several occasions that Arabs should join Egypt in
supporting the positive aspects of the US initiative and work to develop
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other points. Officially, Cairo has not spelled out ways to modify
Washington's plan, probably because Cairo continues to attach top priority
to engaging all parties in a dialogue over the peace process and does not
want to be dragged into a quarrel over details.
Unofficially, however, El Baz at the meeting of a private foundation
stated what a final settlement might look like. He said he personally
believes that the ultimate outcome of the peace process would have to be an
independent Palestinian state. This could not happen overnight and a
lengthy transitional period--ten or fifteen years--might be necessary.
During this period, the Palestinian state would evolve out of a
Jordanian-Palestinian federation. El Baz emphasized that this outcome would
only be possible with the consent of all parties, and that it would be
incumbent upon the Palestinians to demonstrate during the transition period
that they were responsible neighbors and posed no threat to Israel. El
Baz's remarks are generally consistent with statements by Mubarak that
negotiations with Israel on the West Bank must be coordinated by a joint
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, and that the PLO must prepare for a role
in the peace process by accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as
renouncing terrorism.
We believe that Egypt views the United States as holding the key to
movement on the peace process and Cairo has been frustrated by what it
perceives to be US unwillingness to become more active in peace-seeking
efforts. In particular, Mubarak looks to Washington to help break the
political stalemate in Israel on peace process issues. Reinforced pessimism
on that score would contribute to frictions in Egypt's relations with Israel
and heighten doubts in Mubarak's mind about the
durability of Egyptian-US relations.
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Egypt: Promoting the Peace Process
NESA M#: 88-20070
External Distribution:
1 - Ms. Teresita Schaffer, State/NEI/EGY
1 - Mr. William Burns, NSC
1 - Lt. Col. Mickey Baity, OSD/ISA/NESA
1 - Mr. Aaron Miller, State/S/SP
1 - Ms. Michell Durocher, State/INR
1 - William Fuller, AID
1 - Richard E. Bissell, AID
Internal Distribution:
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1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - DO/C/NE
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Staff (1 - EA/DCI, 1 - EA/DDCI)
(one copy to analyst for sourcing)
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