ISRAELI MANAGEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707990001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 June 1988
Israeli Management of the Palestinian Uprising
Summary
Despite optimistic public statements from Israeli
leaders that the Palestinian uprising is subsiding, the
Intifada is persisting in the form of selected, but
increasingly more violent and destructive incidents in the
occupied territories and_within pre-1967 Israel. I
fewer mass street demonstrations have occurred recently, but
incidents involving Molotov cocktails have increased
six-fold and arson fires are causing unprecedented damage to
valuable forested land in Israel proper. Most Israelis have
consistently supported the harsh measures employed by
security forces to quell the disturbances--some criticize
the government for failing to crack down eveitinore severely
on the Palestinian population.
When the Palestinian uprising began in December, Israeli
troops met the spontaneous and widespread mass
demonstrations with force--increasing troop presence,
beating demonstrators, and imposing prolonged curfews in
particularly troubled areas. Force failed to quell the
groundswell of Palestinian support for the youthful
demonstrators, however, and violence continued. After three
months, Israeli civil administrators began instituting
measures--electricity and telephone disruptions, strictly
enforced tax collections, and limitations on the amount of
money brought into the occupied territories--aimed at
subduing the Palestinian population as a whole Most
recently, Defense Minister Rabin has endorsed shooting at
Palestinians seen throwing or holding firebombs, punishing
individuals and their families with heavy jail sentences and
This memorandum was prepared by Arab-Israeli
Division, Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and should be addnesse_d_tn_th_a_r_hief, Arab-Israeli
Division
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fines, and house demolitions. Mass street demonstrations
generally have declined but young, hard-core radicals
continue to protest against Israeli occupation with violent
acts aimed at specific targets. Israeli troops are likely
to employ even harsher security and punitive measures to
reem t these attacks and discourage popular support.
* * *
Riot Control: Reactive Measures
Standard army rules of engagement for riot control in the occupied
territories stress that authority be reestablished using minimum force
if possible. During mass street demonstrations, the army first tries
to disperse them with traditional crowd control procedure--normally
firing tear gas into the crowd to disperse it. Several instances
recounted in the media and in US diplomatic reporting say that tear
gas cannisters often land inside enclosed buildings, such as homes and
schools. It remains unclear from conflicting eyewitness reports from
Palestinians and army spokesmen whether the tear gas is aimed into
buildings or whether it is shot randomly and enters open windows or
doors. In either case, such gas within confined, enclosed spaces has
occasionally proven fatal to Palestinians. When tear gas has no
effect on demonstrators or is thrown back, Israeli troops use rubber
bullets to deter rioters. Failing these tactics or when soldiers run
low on tear gas and rubber bullets, they resort to live fire.
According to US Embassy reporting, troops are instructed not to
escalate to the use of lethal fire unless they believe their lives are
in danger and only after first making use of rubber bullets.
Faced with what they consider life threatening circumstances--a
judgment open to wide interpretation--Israeli soldiers are allowed to
use live fire; first as warning shots above the heads of the
demonstrators, then at their feet and legs, and finally at vital
pooints on their upper bodies. During the first few months of the
Palestinian uprising, troops were allowed initially to fire into
rioting crowds, but Palestinian casualties mounted quickly sparking
intense, widespread international condemnation and forced adjustments
in rules for the use of live fire.
In late February, soldiers first were instructed to shoot at
individual Palestinians holding Molotov cocktails--considered a lethal
weapon--or at individuals seen inciting demonstrations. This order to
shoot Molotov cocktail-throwers still stands. A recent draftee into
the army recounted that new recruits are instructed to uselive fire in
two additional circumstances--when the soldier's life is threatened
and when an attempt is made to steal his weapon. Rabin told the
Israeli Cabinet in early June that he would allow Israeli civilians or
settlers to shoot Palestinians seen throwing or preparing to throw
Molotov cocktails. Troops are instructed not to fire at rock-throwers
or when verbally abused by Palestinian demonstrators.
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Beatings
On 4 January 1988, Defense Minister Rabin authorized troops to
beat individual demonstrators. Instead of using live ammunition which
brought about heavy casualties, Rabin instructed troops to charge the
demonstrators and beat and detain demonstration leaders. According to
Israeli press, some Palestinians who were beaten were released rather
than arrested to serve as examples of what happens to rioters. United
Nations Relief and Welfare Association officials have complained to US
diplomats that entire neighborhoods in Palestinian refugee camps or
towns have been cordoned off at night and that many male residents
were taken to secluded locations and interrogated or beaten.
Rabin publicly defends the beating policy despite continuing
accusations that some soldiers have brutally abused Palestinians after
demonstrations end. In public comments, Rabin has stated that the
beating policy was implemented to reassert army authority in the
occupied territories, suppress disorder, and prevent the martyring of
Palestinians. Israeli army officials insist that nighttime round-ups
are directed against individuals who have generally been identified as
participants in or instigators of the demonstrations.
Despite Rabin's claims that beatings are only authorized to
disperse demonstrations, there are many eyewitness accounts, according
to US Embassy reporting, affirming that the policy also is used widely
for punishment and deterrence. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir conceded
candidly in a recent public remark that "Our task now is to recreate
the barriers of fear between Palestinians and the Israeli military,
and once again put the fear of death into the Arabs of the areas so as
to deter them from attacking us anymore." The Israeli army has
announced publicly that some soldiers have been disciplined or
transfered from their units after inflicting excessively brutal
beatings, but disciplinary actions have not been widespread or severe.
Most troops found guilty of using excessive force have been sentenced
to only a few months in jail.
Detentions
One out of every 40 adult male Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip is now incarcerated, according to Israeli press. Rabin
stated in a press interview that all the Palestinians detained since
the beginning of the intifada in December 1987 have organized
agitation or participated in violent activities in the territories.
In mid-March, approximately 3000 Palestinians had been jailed for
protest activity. In April, Rabin told Israeli reporters that about
4600 Palestinians were in custody, and in June the number of detainees
acknowledged to press had climbed to 6000. Approximately half of the
6000 Palestinians are awaiting trial on formal charges or are already
serving sentences. The other 2500-3000 are under administrative
detention for six months and have not been formally charged with a
crime.
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Administrative Measures: Subduing the Population
Israeli officials--aware that force alone does not control
Palestinian violence--have instituted a two-pronged approach involving
both the civil administration of the occupied territories and Israeli
security forces.
In January, Rabin authorized the liberal use of curfews to help
quiet the occupied territories. According to Israeli press, Rabin
gave the various local commanders in the territories broad authority
to impose curfews on the areas under their jurisdiction. As a result,
each incident of Palestinian violence deemed by the local officer in
charge to warrent curfew is reported to the Defense Ministry whose
approval is nearly automatic.
According to US Embassy reporting, Rabin allows only food
shipments from UNRWA and foreign countries into the camps during
curfewed periods--no private donations are allowed to minimize the
possible smuggling of weapons. UNRWA officials complain that during
prolonged curfew periods in many refugee camps, the Israelis have
allowed insufficient time to distribute food to camp residents.
Israeli authorities occasionally have targeted entire Palestinian
villages and cities by imposing strict curfews, intermittently cutting
off international telephone connections or connections between Israel
and certain parts of the occupied territories, and disrupting
electricity and water service for several consecutive days. According
to US Consulate reporting, Israeli authorities temporarily, cut
international telephone links to the occupied territories on the
grounds that they were being used to relay commands from PLO leaders.
Breaking Commercial Strikes
During the seven months of Palestinian violence, Israeli security
forces have compelled Palestinian merchants to remain open during the
hours when Palestinian pamphlets instructed them to close and shut
shops when merchants were directed to open. In early April, Israeli
troops sealed shut ten shops in Bethlehem and took the identity cards
of the shopkeepers because the owners had opened their shops during
the morning hours as prescribed by the ongoing commercial strike.
According to Israeli press, the defense establishment recently
stopped forcing its own hours of operation on Palestinian store
owners. Israeli officials claim that some Arab merchants have
encouraged the army to force their shops to open to relieve merchants
of the threat of revenge from young activists.
Tax Collection and Financial Restrictions
According to US Consular reporting, Palestinian residents on the
West Bank claim that tax officials escorted by Israeli soldiers have
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raided homes of local merchants and ordered them to pay outstandin
debts. Several cars have been impounded to guarantee payment.
In February 1988, Israeli officials began requiring Palestinians
to produce receipts for tax payments before obtaining travel permits
or commercial licenses. The Ministry of Defense Coordinator for the
occupied territories said the measure is designed to increase revenue
in the depleted civil administration treasury as well as to counter
the call by Palestinian leaders to provide financial support for the
uprising and refuse to pay taxes.
The civil administrator for the West Bank told US officials that
to undermine PLO attempts to send money to support the uprising,
Israeli officials have restricted the cash that can be carried across
the bridges to Jordan--any amount over the equivalent of $1200 is
confiscated. The civil administration also imposed restrictions on
movement of funds into the occupied territories. According to US
Consular reporting, each bank transfer over the equivalent of $1200
per individual now requires a permit to cash the check.
ID Cards Confiscated
The Israeli army recently confiscated the identity cards of all
male Palestinians in the Gaza Strip over 16 years of age. In place of
the cards, the men were given papers requiring several Israeli
bureaucratic stamps proving they have paid their income taxes,
customs, and value added taxes as well as electricity and water bills.
Gazan males are allowed to leave the Strip for work in Israel only
after securing the necessary stamps.
House Demolitions
Israeli security forces have for many years sealed houses and
demolished homes in the occupied territories, but before April 1988
house demolitions were used mainly to retaliate against families of
individuals accused of carrying out acts of violence. On 5 April, the
Israeli army demolished three houses belonging to individuals
suspected of organizing and inciting violent disturbances, according
to Israeli press. This was the first time house demolitions were
expanded to include instigators of demonstrations rather than alleged
terrorists or those accused of throwing Molotov cocktails. In June,
the army also began demolishing buildings from which firebombs are
thrown. According to Israeli press, in one operation in mid-June,
Israeli authorities destroyed 14 homes and sealed off four others in
the territories in a 24-hour period.
Recently, Rabin publicly stated that when a Palestinian detained
for throwing a Molotov cocktail confesses, his house is routinely
demolished in an effort to make clear that the Israeli army intends to
punish severely everyone throwing firebombs. The civil administrator
in the Gaza Strip also has said that the army demolishes homes only
when the person admits throwing a Molotov cocktail. He also told US
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diplomats that the homes are not necessarily completely demolished;
rather some rooms are sealed off, leaving the family some room to
live.
Stiffer Court Penalties
Israeli authorities impose stiff penalties. Against Palestinians
caught in violent acts. In mid-June, a Palestinian youth convicted of
throwing stones at passing cars received a two year jail sentence and
a three year suspended sentence. The judge also fined the youth's
mother the equivalent of $3100 in accordance with Israeli laws for
punishing youthful offenders. In several recent cases, a military
court in Israel handed down heavy penalties--eight to ten years in
prison--to four residents of the territories who were convicted of
throwing Molotov cocktails. In the verdict the court noted that such
attacks should be viewed as assassination attempts--particularly when
aimed at civilians in vehicles.
Outlook
Several senior Israeli security officials--including
Chief-of-Staff Shomron and Shin Bet Director Peled--told Israeli
reporters recently that the number of largescale protests has declined
but that Palestinians have found new ways to express their frustration
with Israeli occupation.
According to Israeli press,
military officials are concerned that a trend toward use of lethal
weapons by Palestinian activists has begun in the West Bank where, in
May 1988, two improvised explosive charges were discovered and in
June, over 190 incidents involving weapons--mainly Molotov cocktails
but also improvised explosive charges and guns--occurred.
As a result, we expect that Israeli security forces will use even
harsher measures to deter Palestinian violence. In a 26 June meeting,
the Israeli army general staff implicitly criticized defense policies
as being reactive and failing to preempt Palestinian attacks.
According to Israeli press, army commanders want troops to show more
initiative in mounting preemptive operations against Palestinian
organizers and perpetrators of the disturbances.
Senior Israeli officials continue to endorse the liberal use of
lethal force and other harsh suppressive measures. Chief-of-Staff
Shomron has stated that Israeli troops will continue shooting at
Palestinians seen throwing Molotov cocktails just as troops would fire
at a person using any weapon. In public comments, Shomron claimed the
army will continue its policy to demolish buildings from which
firebombs are thrown and the homes of Molotov cocktail throwers. He
conceded that this punishment appears harsh but lauded it as
operationally effective.
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Israeli security forces also are likely to take severe action
against individuals caught perpetrating other acts of violence. Riot
control measures have proven less effective against the sporadic and
potentially more lethal Palestinian violence and troops are likely to
continue the use of live fire, allow Israeli settlers to use such
fire, and institute even harsher prison sentences and heavier fines.
To increase the cost of popular support for the uprising, Israeli
authorities will continue preemptive punitive measures against the
Palestinian population as a whole by imposing lengthy curfews,
extensive utility interruptions, and additional house demolitions.
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? -
, SUBJECT: Israeli Management of the Palestinian Uprising
DISTRIBUTION:
NESA m 88-20064
EXTERNAL
1 - John Holtzman, State
1 - William Fuller, AID
1 - Richard E. Bissell, AID
INTERNAL
2 - DIR/DCl/DDCI Exec Staff (1-Ea/DCI, 1-EA/DDCI)
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - NIC/Analytic Group
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS (1 cy to analyst for sourcing)
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 -C/NESA/A3,----
1 - C/NESA/tA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/AI/I
1 - NESA/AI/I/Chrono
DI/NESA/AI/I,
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