EGYPT: THREATS TO THE REGIME AND TO THE FOREIGN PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26 :
CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
40
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26:
CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 May 1988
EGYPT: THREATS TO THE REGIME AND TO THE
,FOREIGN PRESENCE
Summary
J.
The political climate in Egypt is stable as President Mubarak
continues his slow process of liberalization. This stability, however, is
threatened by deteriorating economic conditions, the resurgence of
Islamic fundamentalism, and the impact of turmoil elsewhere in the
region. In addition, Mubarak and other senior Egyptian leaders, as
well as US and Israeli personnel and facilities, are vulnerable to
violent acts by small, disciplined and well financed groups from either
the Islamic fundamentalist right or the radical left.
Mubarak's flexible approach toward dissidents is proving
moderately successful, but the dangers to the regime have not been
eliminated. Although the government appears to have succeeded in
co-opting the? more moderate opposition elements, repression of
violence-prone radicals risks prompting a political backlash that could
strengthen popular support for extremists' goals. While Egyptian
security forces are adept at forcefully suppressing public disturbances,
we believe that they remain largely incapable of detecting or
preventing isolated attacks by extremist groups.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries.are welcome and should be addressed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division
NESA M# 88-20049
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
' ?
Declassified in Pari - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-R5P06T00412R000707900001-7
J
25X1
The Political Climate
Political stability in Egypt has been
reinforced during the past year by a string of
domestic and foreign policy successes that
have boosted President Mubarak's confidence
and strengthened the government's legitimacy.
Mubarak was reelected last October by a
popular referendum to serve a second six-year
term. Mubarak's National Democratic Party
retained a large majority in the People's
Assembly after national elections last spring.
At the same time, the opposition presence in
the Assembly almost doubled, enabling the
President to claim a step toward more
representative government. In addition, nine
Arab states unilaterally restored full diplomatic
relations with Cairo after the Arab Summit in
November 1987 on essentially Egyptian terms.
These states had severed formal ties in 1979
after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel.
Political liberalization remains a stated
priority of the Egyptian Government, and we
believe the political climate in Egypt is freer
today than at any time since the 1952
revolution. In his drive to liberalize the
political system, Mubarak can point to a
number of accomplishments that are largely
alien to Egypt's long tradition of authoritarian
rule, including:
--A strengthened judiciary.
Under Mubarak, the judiciary
has enjoyed unprecedented
independence, and public
respect for the courts appears
to be increasing. Rulings are
taken seriously from the
President on down, in contrast
to earlier eras when the
national leadership routinely
ignored them.
--A more representative
People's Assembly. Mubarak
has welcomed the opposition's
increased presence in the
national legislature, and he
encourages their participation
in debates on national issues.
Although he tolerates an
increased presence of Muslim
2
Brotherhood members in the
Assembly--about 36 deputies--
he and his security advisers
remain suspicious of their
professed desire to work
within the system.
--Increased Press Freedom.
Under Mubarak, the Egyptian
press enjoys significant
freedom. Overt censorship--
the rule under Nasir and
Sadat--no longer exists. The
opposition papers regularly
publish scathing attacks on
the government with apparent
impunity, although criticism
of the President is cautious
and far less intense.
Major Areas of Concern
Economic Problems. Economic
grievances, in our view, continue to hold more
potential for generating domestic unrest than
any political issue. Over the past three
decades, Egyptians have come to regard the
government's generous system of subsidies on
food and other necessities as a right. To
secure a standby arrangement from the IMF
last spring, however, Mubarak had to commit
himself to significant economic reforms that
are likely to erode the government's ability to
provide these benefits. We expect Mubarak
will continue to shy away from reform
measures that he and his advisers believe to be
politically and socially destabilizing , but
public complaints about such issues as
inflation are already mounting rapidly.
Islamic Resurgence. Cairo's concerns
about the economy are intensified by the
Islamic resurgence in Egypt. Although the
Islamic fundamentalist movement in Egypt is
diverse and lacks widely accepted leadership,
individual groups tend to be disciplined, well
organized, well financed, and eager to exploit
popular grievances as a weapon against the
government. Moreover, in more general
- terms, resentment over worsening economic
conditions is feeding a broad popular shift
toward more conservative Islamic thought and
values. The US Embassy in Cairo reports
evidence of a reversion to Islamic lifestyles:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Pali - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
alcohol consumption is down, criticism of
sexually explicit Western media is up, and
more women are wearing the veil. Embassy
officials say that attendance at mosques is
rising. According to an Egyptian scholar,
mosques have recaptured a central role in
Egyptian Muslim communities that had been
lost in recent years.
Influence of Outside Events. Events
outside the country--and beyond Mubarak's
control--may undermine or reinforce domestic
stability. The recent assassination of Abu
Jihad and Israeli intransigence on the peace
process in addition to the Palestinian uprising
in the occupied territories have once again
made relations with Tel Aviv a focus of
protest in Egypt, on campuses and in the
mosques as well as in the press. So far,
sympathetic disturbances have been easily
contained by security forces, but the
government is clearly worried that future
demonstrations might act as a catalyst for
more widespread unrest fueled by economic
grievances. On the other hand, steadily
improving ties between Egypt and the
moderate Arab states will boost Mubarak's
political confidence at home, particularly if
accompanied by financial aid.
The Threat from Radical Groups
Islamic Fundamentalists. Six years
have passed since the Mubarak government
hanged young Egyptians who, in the name of
Islam, were convicted of killing President
Sadat. The grievances that motivated the
assassins, however, still fester:
--Deterioration of Egyptian
living standards and the
regime's perceived inaction to
improve social and economic
conditions.
--Perceived Israeli and US
hostility toward Muslims and
the regime's acceptance of the
Camp David accords.
--The regime's harsh treatment
of Muslim dissidents.
3
Incidents of violence by radical
fundamentalists are increasing, indicating a
renewed militancy among Muslim activists:
--In recent months, violent
clashes have occurred in upper
Egypt etween Islamic radical
groups and the police and at
least two youths have died--
representing the first deaths
from political violence there
since late 1986. These clashes
have been directed against the
government's tough security
measures rather than the usual
target--the Coptic Christian
minority--and could encourage
widespread violence against
the authorities.
--Members of a small radical
Islamic group called
"Survivors of Hell" were put
on trial in early April for three
assassination attempts against
prominent Egyptians in spring
of 1987. Revenge appears to
have been the major motive:
two of the Egyptians were
former interior ministers who
had played a part in the
suppression of al-Jihad?the
Islamic group that killed
President Sadat--and the third
was a prominent editor with
known anti-fundamentalist
views.
Non-Islamic Extremists. To a lesser
extent, the Egyptian government faces a threat
from non-Islamic extremists?primarily leftists
and Nasserists with anti-Israeli and anti-US
ideologies. While these groups may
deliberately avoid attacking Egyptians, their '
targeting of foreigners constitutes a serious
security threat, and focuses public attention on
the negative aspects of the regime's
relationship with the United States and Israel.
A recent example of such a group is the self-
styled Nasserist terrorist groun "Egypt's
Revolution".
Egypt's Revolution claimed
responsibility for four attacks on Israeli and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
. .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
US targets between June 1984 and May 1987,
but in September 1987 Egyptian authorities--
acting on information provided by an
informant--arrested virtually the entire
membership. Subsequent investigation
revealed the group was led by Khalid Nasser,
the son of the late President, and that Libya
may have contributed money to the
organization's coffers. The Egyptian Public
Prosecutor announced on 18 February that 20
defendants linked to Egypt's Revolution had
been indicted and would stand trial on a
variety of charges including murder and
forming a secret organization. Authorities are
seeking the death penalty for 11 defendants,
including Khalid Nasser, and will ask for life at
hard labor for the remaining nine. Cairo
contacted Yugoslav authorities to request the
extradition of Nasser who currently resides in
Belgrade. No trial date has been announced
and the case continues to hold potential to
backfire on the government.
External Actors. Virtually all recent
terrorism in Egypt appears to be the work of
indigenous elements. The extent of the
international links, if any, of Egypt's
Revolution remains unclear, and we cannot
confirm suggestions from high-level Egyptian
officials that Libya was somehow involved. In
the past, Libya has attempted to infiltrate
terrorists into Egypt, but they have been
targeted almost exclusively against Libyan
dissidents resident there and have been
detected easily by Egyptian security elements.
Similarly, the ability of Iran and its
sympathizers to destabilize Egypt is minimal.
Egyptian authorities keep a close watch on
Iranians and their surrogates. Iran's sole
resident diplomat in Cairo was expelled in the
spring of 1987 for channeling funds to Islamic
extremists, and Cairo almost certainly will turn
down Iranian requests to send another. The
Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization is capable
of terrorist attacks in Egypt, but we have no
evidence of its involvement in any recent
incidents.
Regime Capabilities and Strategy
Ability to Maintain Public Order.
Mubarak has ensured that considerable power
to maintain public order remains at his
disposal. The emergency law--promulgated
after Sadat's assassination in 1981 and
extended repeatedly since then--helps Mubarak
control Islamic and leftist extremists by
allowing him to suspend certain political
liberties and supersede normal arrest and
detention procedures in times of trouble. The
key component in implementing the law is the
state security apparatus, particularly the
security forces under the control of Interior
Minister Zaki Badr--an unpopular, ruthless
former policeman with a penchant for heavy
handedness. Although Zaki Badr follows the
government's hard line with considerable zeal,
his services have had serious difficulty tracking
down the perpetrators of recent attacks, and
they are hard-pressed to detect violent radical
groups before they strike in a crowded city like
Cairo.
Ultimately, the government relies on
the army as the guarantor of public security
and Mubarak's power. The Egyptian military
is the country's strongest institution and is the
only force that alone can replace the regime or
protect it against internal opposition groups.
Its history of loyalty to the presidency was
reaffirmed in February 1986 when it acted
quickly to suppress police riots in Cairo. Even
so, the government is especially watchful for
signs of politically motivated fundamentalism
in the armed forces. To minimize this risk,
Mubarak endeavors to protect the military
from economic hardship while service
commanders monitor their ranks for signs of
religiously inspired dissent.
Mubarak's Carrot and Stick Policy.
Mubarak has adopted a flexible, two-track
policy toward domestic dissidence that aims to
divide the opposition and appears to be
meeting with moderate success. Selective
repression of violence-prone religious
extremists has been balanced with
accommodation of more moderate oppostioh
elements:
--Accommodating the
Opposition. Mubarak and his
advisers have shown that they
are prepared to tolerate non-
violent dissent in the interest
of strengthening democracy
and avoiding the kind of
general crackdown that led to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
Sadat's assassination. Mild
forms of Islamic dress and
behavior are permitted as
expressions of personal piety,
for example, and the
government has used
establishment theologians to
engage the Islamic opposition
in open debates on religious
issues. In addition, Mubarak
allowed the technically illegal
Muslim Brotherhood to
participate in last year's
People's Assembly election in
alliance with two legal
opposition parties--hoping
that its fundamentalist views
would been seen as
unreasonable and its public
support would erode. The
Brotherhood has behaved
itself in the Assembly, but
Mubarak and senior security
officials appear to have
growing misgivings about its
political agenda and are
keeping a watchful eye on the
Brotherhood's activities.
--Targeting the Extremists. On
the other hand, the
government has not hesitated
to suppress forcefully political
extremism of both the right
and the left. The emergency
law--recently extended for an
unprecedented three year
period--was used to round up
and detain several thousand
Islamic fundamentalists after
the assassination attempts last
year. Security services also
turned out in force in response
to student demonstrations in
January 1988 in support of
the Palestinian uprising in the
occupied territories.
The Dangers Remain
None of the extremist groups from
either the radical left or the Islamic
fundamentalist right is capable of seizing
5
power, in our view. These groups lack
cohesion and widely accepted leadership and
represent the views of only a tiny minority of
Egyptians.
Nevertheless, in that they pose a threat
to the lives of prominent Egyptians,
Americans, and Israelis, radical fundamentalist
groups threaten the stability of the Mubarak
regime. There are probably hundreds of
fundamentalist cells in Egypt--even within the
military and security forces--and new ones
forming continually. Their membership varies
from a handful to several thousand, and most
are located in fundamentalist strongholds of
Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut. They are
disciplined and well financed, and some favor
using violence for political purposes. Their
secretive nature and cellular organization
severely hampers government attempts to
infiltrate and monitor their activities and
lowers the chances that assassination plotting
will be discovered and countered.
At the same time, growing popular
frustration with the regime and its policies
poses a significant danger of widespread unrest
and a climate potentially more supportive of
extremists. Economic crises such as food
shortages or dramatic price increases and
outside events such as the Palestinian uprising
will continue to concern Egyptian leaders
because of their potential to act as catalysts for
broad-based civil disorder. Continued
government stonewalling on Islamic reforms
also could lead to fundamentalist-inspired
demonstrations which might ignite sectarian
violence and spread through upper Egypt.
A heavy handed response by security
forces against such demonstrations could prove
counterproductive and prompt a popular
backlash. Government reliance on tough
tactics?mass arrests and interrogations--risks
radicalizing devout Muslims and encouraging
the formation of new groups bent upon anti-
government violence. The trend toward
harsher controls, if it continues, is likely to
encourage increased student unrest that could
spill over from the campuses. After two
relatively quiet years, support for
fundamentalism at Egyptian universities is
growing, Islamic radicals are combining forces
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
9X1
25X1
9X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Pari - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
"kepi 25X1
with campus leftists and Nasserists to
undermine the establishment, and campus
unrest is increasing.
Implications for the United States
The roundup of a number of Egypt's
Revolution members appears to have reduced
the most immediate threat to US personnel
and installations in Egypt. Fundamentalist
violence to date has been almost exclusively
targeted at native Egyptians, not foreigners. A
future attack by Islamic radicals on Americans
in Egypt is certainly possible, however, given
the size and visibility of the US presence there,
US ties to Israel, and close US identification
with the Mubarak regime. Events seen as
evidence of Israeli (and by association, US)
hostility toward Muslims?such as alleged
Israeli responsibility for the Abu Jihad
assassination--will significantly increase the
likelihood of attacks on Americans. In
addition, the inability of the Egyptian security
services to monitor small groups means that
they may not be able to prevent such acts
against US personnel and facilities.
The forces working against Egyptian
stability also imply a more indirect threat to
US interests. Mubarak might be forced to put
distance between Egypt and the United States
under a number of different scenarios. The
United States could become a handy scapegoat
to blame for painful economic reforms--we
may be accused of not giving Egypt enough
aid or failing to use our influence with the
IMF to help Egypt. Widespread disorder, no
matter what the cause, would force the
government to clamp down and possibly
shelve the political liberalization process--a
setback for US interests in promoting stability
through democracy in the region.
Furthermore, any Israeli act seen as
humiliating Muslims or desecrating Jerusalem
would make it harder for Cairo to defend its
relations with Tel Aviv, increasing radical
pressure on the regime to abrogate the Camp
David accords. US support of Israeli moves
or US military intervention in the region
would focus fundamentalist pressure on US-
Egyptian ties.
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RbP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
ANNEX 1:
EGYPT'S COUNTERTERRORIST UNITS:
LIMITED CAPABILITIES
Cairo's efforts to develop
counterterrorist forces have intensified during
the past few years as a result of a series of
violent incidents like the hijacking of an
Egyptian aircraft in 1985 and the more recent
attacks on Egyptian officials and US Embassy
personnel in Cairo. Its progress in improving
them, however, has been slow and hindered by
economic constraints.
Egypt's intelligence and security
apparatus is one of the largest in the world and
part of its activities are directed at detecting
and preventing terrorism. In particular, the
Ministries of Defense and Interior have
designated counterterrorist units:
--Unit 777--a ranger unit under
the Ministry of Defense--is
tasked with protecting military
and government facilities and
personnel from terrorist
attacks and with performing
counterterrorist operations--on
airplanes, ships and against
buildings--outside Egypt.
--The Hostage Rescue Force
(HRF) is a counterterrorist
group established by the
Interior Ministry whose
mission is to respond to
domestic terrorist attacks in
which hostages have been
taken.
We believe Egypt's primary
counterterrorist units--Unit 777 and the HRP-
-remain largely incapable of fulfilling their
7
missions. Although Cairo has been attempting
to improve the rescue skills of its special units,
economic constraints continue to stymie
progress. Unit morale has suffered as
personnel have attempted to adjust to a tight
operational budget. Training remains
inadequate, despite help from Western
countries, including the United States. The
units have sufficient small arms, but often lack
ammunition for training and the sophisticated
equipment that would be needed for hostage
rescue attempts. In addition, the units lack
thorough contingency plans, and future
operations are likely to suffer from insufficient
standard operating procedures. Furthermore,
poor coordination between counterterrorist
forces and other security or military units
increases the chances of a mishap during a
crisis.
National pride will cause Cairo to
continue to rely on its own forces, although
improvements in Egyptian counterterrorist
units--without substantial foreign financial and
training assistance?will probably be slow and
sporadic. Rather than transfer responsibility
for rescue tasks to more capable foreign teams,
Egypt will more likely turn to other states,
including the United States, for advice and
equipment and will cooperate with them in
resolving international incidents. Even so,
weaknesses in its counterterrorist forces
probably will make Cairo more cautious in
deploying Unit 777 abroad or less likely to
authorize risky or bold action.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
4 Al ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
I
Egypt: Threats to the Regime and to the Foreign Presence
NESA M#:88-20049
External Distribution:
1 - Ambassador Bremer, State
1 - William Fuller, State
1 - Richard E. Bissell, State
Internal Distribution:
2- DCl/DDCI Exec Staff (1 - EA/DCI, 1 - EA/DDCI)
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - CPAS/II,S
1 - NIC/Analytic Group
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS (one copy to analyst for sourcing)
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/E/Chrono
1 - NESA/AI/E/ms
DI/NESA/AI/E/MS'
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707900001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1