TALKING POINTS FOR ACTING DDI HPSCI MEETING 02 AUGUST 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380034-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 2, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Talking Points For Acting DDI HPSCI Meeting
02 August 1988
King Hussein's announced intention to sever Jordan's legal and
administrative ties with the West Bank is a calculated challenge to the PLO
and a politically popular gesture to his own bedouin constituency,.
--Amman will likely move slowly in implementing the King's decision.
The government will have to decide whether to continue paying the
salaries of 13,000 workers in the West Bank and allowing nearly 1
million West Bank Palestinians holding Jordanian citizenship to
retain their Jordanian passports.
--More drastic decisions--apparently not yet taken--would include
closing bridge crossing points, severing economic ties, or reversing
Jordan's 1950 annexation of the West Bank.
--The pullback puts the burden on the PLO to produce political gains
in the peace process and helps shield Hussein from PLO accusations
of collusion with Israel. The move also appeals to Jordan's
traditionalist bedouins--the backbone of Hussein's army and security
services--who are skeptical of the King's activist foreign solic
and prefer he address mounting domestic economic problems.
The PLO lacks sufficient funds to assume Jordan's $47.5 million annual
outlays to the West Bank and Gaza. PLO internal divisions and unfulfilled
pledges of support from Arab donors are likely to limit the organization's
ability to benefit from Hussein's retrenchment in the near-term.
--Arafat's key spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, has already called for
the UN to assume Jordan's financial and administrative role in the
West Bank, and PLO radio has criticized Hussein for moving too
quickly.
--West Bank municipal leaders have so far kept a low profile in
reacting to the King's action, while expressing hope that Jordan
will not cut its financial ties to the territory.
Israeli reaction to Hussein's moves has split predictably along party
lines.
--Foreign Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin--the Labor Party's
two senior leaders--say they will seek to revitalize the Jordanian
option if Labor wins the Knesset election on November 1 by offering
an international peace conference with a Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation.
--Prime Minister Shamir, on the other hand, seems optimistic that
Hussein's move will lessen pressure for Israeli participation in an
international conference.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380034-9
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