THE LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM: OPTIONS FOR US INFLUENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: November 17, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

/
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2
25X1
Talking Points for the DCI
17 November 1988
The Libyan Chemical Weapons Program: Options for US Influence
In our judgment, Libya will resist strongly US political initiatives to
undermine its chemical warfare (CW) program and would react violently to a '
military strike aimed at neutralizing it. Libyan leader Qadhafi has denied
publicly that the Rabta Technology Center produces chemical warfare
agents--claiming it is a pharmaceutical plant--but has asserted Libya's
right to possess any type of weapon it chooses.
--Tripoli views a CW capability as essential to keep pace with
regional powers also possessing chemical weapons including
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and especially Israel.
--As in the past, Qadhafi almost certainly will reject US
accusations regarding Libya's CW capability by pointing to US
and Israeli chemical and nuclear programs.
We believe a US effort to prevent Libyan use of chemical weapons--as
opposed to their possession--has a greater likelihood of success:
--Washington could quietly but strongly warn Tripoli--perhaps
through a senior emissary--that it will not tolerate Libyan use
of chemical weapons or their transfer to third parties and that
such Libyan actions would have grave consequences. A similar
warning from one or more NATO allies would reinforce the
message.
Libya is dependent on foreign firms to sustain production at Rabta and
Washington could urge foreign governments, especially West Germany, France,
Italy, and Japan, to prevent their companies from continuing to support the
Libyan program.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2
25X1
Reaction to US Attack
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on
Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks
against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military
units also are possible.
--Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu
Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount
terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand.
--Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units
that could mount covert attacks against US targets along the
Mediterranean littoral. Navy commandos, for example, could
attack US ships in port with limpet mines, or mine sea lanes.
--Either Libyan response would be accompanied by a vigorous
diplomatic effort to obtain nnndpmnatinn nf thia United States
in international fora.
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1