QADHAFI'S CONTINUING PROGRAM OF SUBVERSION IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 29, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380006-0
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Talking Points for the NIO/Africa
29 February 1988
QADHAFI'S CONTINUING PROGRAM OF SUBVERSION IN AFRICA
There is compelling evidence that Libyan leader
Mu'ammar Qadhafi is actively pursuing a two-track policy in
Africa of diplomacy and continued support for terrorism and
subversion.
Qadhafi is interested in repairing relations with
some moderate African countries, including Ivory
Coast, Niger, and Togo.
--Qadhafi has sent personal envoys to these
countries four different times in the past year.
These envoys were All Hudayri, the Libyan
Ambassador in Paris; Savid Hafiana, Deputy Foreign
Secretary; and Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, head of
the Libyan Islamic Call Society; and Colonel Yusuf
Dibri, a senior Military Intelligence officer.
--The dispatch of a senior officer on a diplomatic
assignment to Niger last November was particularly
interesting. Colonel Dibri's discussions in Niger
were unusual, in that they may have involved
Libyan offers of military assistance to the new
regime there. The Nigeriens have not accepted
such offers, however.
--Libya's hosting of the Foreign Minister of Sierra
Leone in late January fits this pattern.
Libyan overtures to African moderates supplement
Qadhafi's continued courtship of governments in Benin,
Burkina Faso, and Ghana.
Tripoli has provided arms to Benin and
Burkina Faso and financial assistance to
Burkinabe.
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--The Libyans have long worked to build ties to the
Rawlings regime in Ghana. There were over a half
dozen meetings between senior officials or
delegations of both countries in 1987.
--Libyan relations with Ghana were highlighted by
President Rawlings' visit to Tripoli for the 1
September ceremonies commemorating the 19th
anniversary of Qadhafi's coup and a joint economic
commission meeting in November.
Qadhafi also is interested in improving relations with
Tanzania and developing Libyan influence in Uganda.
--Qadhafi sent one of his African affairs advisors--
Bashir Salah Bashir--to Dar es Salaam last
September to test Tanzania's interest in improving
relations.
--The Libyans are providing Uganda with arms,
ammunition, military and intelligence training and
advisory support, and economic assistance in a
long-term effort to gain leverage over President
Musaveni.
Qadhafi's initiatives are intended to keep moderate
Africans, France, and the United States off balance.
Qadhafi's regional objectives remain unchanged--he continues
to seek the establishment of Libyan political leadership and
the eradication of the French, US, and Israeli presence in
Africa.
--These objectives are based on a mixture of
ideological, political, religious, and territorial
motivations that inspire Qadhafi to use any means
to enhance his influence in the region.
--Above all, Qadhafi's Africa policy is driven by
his vision of his unique role in the evolution of
society as a whole.
--He sees himself as a leader and agent of historic
forces that will reorder both Libyan society and
Third World politics. These ideas are codified in
his "Green Book" of revolutionary thoughts.
--Qadhafi's "Green Book" provides both a motive and
a rationale for providing military and financial
aid to radical regimes and for undermining
moderate governments by supporting--or creating--
subversive groups and abetting international
terrorism.
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--Qadhafi is not the madman he is often branded, but
his behavior tends to be erratic, and his
decisions are heavily influenced by his felt need
to be recognized as a major actor on the world
scene.
Qadhafi's principal enemies in Africa are Zaire and
Chad. However, in both cases, his plans for removing the
current leadership have failed.
--Over the past year, Libyan activities have focused
on protecting Libyan-claimed territory in northern
Chad and removing Chadian President Habre.
--Qadhafi probably regards a pro-Libyan regime in
N'Djamena as essential to achieving his aim of
spreading Libyan political hegemony farther south
in Africa.
--Chadian victories on the battlefield have only
reinforced Qadhafi's resolve to remove President
Habre.
Zaire's strategic location, its friendship with France,
the US, and Israel, and its steadfast resistance to Libya,
including its support for Chad, have made President Mobutu a
similar high priority target of Libyan subversion.
--Like President Habre, Zaire faces a significant
subversive and intelligence threat from Libya.
--Libyan agents are in contact with Zairian
dissidents in Brazzaville, Dar es Salaam, Kampala,
and, to a lesser extent, in Bujumbura.
--In addition, Tripoli is training Zairian
dissidents at various camps in Libya. Although we
do not have a count of these Zairois, we believe
they number several hundred.
--Training provided these dissidents starts with
classroom instruction on Qadhafi's revolutionary
philosophy as written in his "Green Book."
--More worrisome is that they are also trained in
the use of small arms and explosives.
Much of the classroom instruction and the weapons
orientation is conducted at the "7 April Camp" in Tripoli.
--The facility, a converted golf course, allows
plenty of room for firing AK-47s, rocket propelled
grenades, hand grenades, and heavy maching guns.
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--Because of the number of African, Arab, Latin
American, and Asian groups receiving such training
has increased over the last few years, the Libyans
have also opened up a new facility not far from
the "7 April Camp."
--The same basic training is conducted here, but we
have not yet been able to confirm whether Zairois
have been among the trainees.
Those dissidents identified by the Libyans as being the
most radical or having advanced technical skills often go on
to receive more advanced training.
--At the Commando Training Facility in Banghazi,
they receive commando training.
--This involves a much more rigorous course of
military training than is offered at "7 April,"
including unit tactics for commando raids, a large
variety of weapons orientation, and possible
terrorist techniques.
Qadhafi generally holds most of these trainees in Libya
until he views the time as ripe for an operation inside
Zaire.
Qadhafi has also recruited Zairois and other Africans
over the years to serve in his so-called "Islamic Legion."
Many Africans working in Libya are impressed into this
organization.
--The Libyans have used many of these units in Chad,
often sending them ahead of Libyan troops as
cannon fodder. Their combat skills and morale
have been so poor that they frequently have
deserted or quickly surrendered to the Chadian
Government troops.
Although Zaire faces a subversive threat from Libya
similar to that of Chad, it does not face a significant
Libyan military threat.
Qadhafi's only military asset that can reach Zaire from
Libya is the TU-22 bomber. Libya has seven of these
aircraft, but probably no more than four are operational.
TU-22s can reach Kinshasa (barely), but
the threat is minimized by the poor skills of
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their crews. They have shown us in Chad and Sudan
that their navigation ability and bombing accuracy
are poor. Such bombings can have political
impact, but they cause little military damage.
The key potential Libyan threat to Zaire derives from
increased Libyan influence in Uganda.
--Libya is providing arms, ammunition, training,
military and intelligence advisory assistance, and
economic aid to Uganda in an effort to gain
leverage over President Museveni.
--We believe that the Libyan program is designed to
gain unrestricted use of Kampala as a regional
center for subversion, most of which will be
directed against Zaire.
--The Libyans in Kampala already are supporting
infiltrations of Zairian dissidents across the
Uganda-Zaire border.
--Qadhafi may even hope eventually to gain access to
Uganda for his armed forces to threaten Zaire.
--The Libyan IL-76 at Entebbe is one of several that
have delivered such equipment as light aircraft, a
few armored vehicles, and some artillery to
Uganda.
--This equipment is supported by Libyan military
advisers, but their task currently is to support
Uganda's counterinsurgency rather than crossborder
operations into Zaire. Libyan contacts with
Zairian dissidents in Kampala are handled by
civilian components in the Libyan People's Bureau
there.
For now, any thought of moving major Libyan forces into
Uganda would be unrealistic.
--The Libyans' military capabilities are stretched
to the limit by the Chad war, where they remain
determined to secure the Aozou Strip.
--After their humiliation at the hands of Habre's
forces, the Libyans have become preoccupied with
their own defense. They have built elaborate
defenses to try to hold what they have left.
--They have not, however, moved in the troops or
transport that would be needed to recover their
old garrisons at Faya Largeau and Fada.
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--We anticipate further Libyan defeats in Chad and
it will be a long time before Qadhafi has the
luxury to consider sending his brigades as far
afield as Uganda.
Libyan frustrations in Chad and Zaire are prompting
Qadhafi to undertake subversive operations against other
moderate regimes in Africa.
--The apprehension of three Libyan terrorists in
Dakar several weeks ago reflects an attempt to
increase pressure on President Diouf and force him
to curtail Senegalese support for Chad as well as
the French and US presence in Senegal.
--Libyan-supported plots in Togo and possible Libyan
involvement in plotting in Gambia were designed to
achieve similar objectives, even if they failed in
their principal goal of removing the existing
leadership.
These and other Libyan plots are orchestrated by a
cadre of loyal subordinates; these advisors generally play a
behind-the-scenes role and are in the best position to
influence Qadhafi's decisionmaking on African affairs.
--Qadhafi's key advisers on African policies are:
*Musa Kusa, chief of the Third World Center for
Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Fascism,
Racism, and Reaction (or Anti-Imperialism
Center); The Anti-Imperialism Center has
operatives throughout Africa.
*Abdullah Sanussi, a senior intelligence officer
of Libya's External Security Organization;
Sanussi works on special projects of high
priority to Qadhafi.
*Abdullah al-Hijazi, a key official in Libyan
Military Intelligence, also is a special project
officer.
*Ibrahim al-Bishari, the chief of Libya's
External Security Organization, controls
intelligence collection and many recruitment
operations in Africa.
*Abdullah Hijazi, a senior officer of Libya's
Military Intelligence service, undertakes highly
focused, priority operations in Africa.
--Libyan Foreign Secretary Jadallah Talhi has access
to Qadhafi, but little influence over most Libyan
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foreign policies. His role usually is to present
a more respectable face to Libyan diplomacy,
particularly at international fora such as the
Organization of African Unity.
There is little prospect that Qadhafi's objectives will
change.
--Qadhafi remains free of domestic pressures in
pursuing his interventionist policies.
--Over the years, Qadhafi has largely weeded out his
less radical domestic political opponents and
surrounded himself with young sycophants having no
independent power base.
--Qadhafi's actions helped him establish himself as
the sole architect of Libya's Africa policy--a
fact that accounts for fluctuations in the
priority Africa receives in Tripoli and the
seeming incoherence in Libya's activities.
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foreign policies. His role usually is to present
a more respectable face to Libyan diplomacy,
particularly at international fora such as the
Organization of African Unity.
There is little prospect that Qadhafi's objectives will
change.
--Qadhafi remains free of domestic pressures in
pursuing his interventionist policies.
--Over the years, Qadhafi has largely weeded out his
less radical domestic political opponents and
surrounded himself with young sycophants having no
independent power base.
--Qadhafi's actions helped him establish himself as
the sole architect of Libya's Africa policy--a
fact that accounts for fluctuations in the
priority Africa receives in Tripoli and the
seeming incoherence in Libya's activities.
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Talking Points for the NIO/Africa
Internal Distribution:
4 - DIR/DCl/DDCl/Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/M
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