INDIA AND THE SIKH CHALLENGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606740001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
India and the Sikh Challenge
A Research Paper
25X1
Secret
NESA 87-100/5
March 1987
Copy 2 6 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
India and the Sikh Challenge
Directorate of Operations.
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution by~Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coor mated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 87-10015
March /987
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India and the Sikh Challenge
Summary India is slowing the growth of an incipient Sikh insurgency in Punjab.
Information available Indian Government officials estimate that security forces have captured or
as 4f 10 February /987 killed one-third of the extremist leadership. Border security forces have"
was used in this report.
slowed Sikh infiltration from Pakistan. Despite several successful Sikh
attacks against Hindus, New Delhi has succeeded in preventin widespread
communal violence between Hindus and Sikhs. 25X1
iii Secret
NESA 87-/0015
March 1987
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Nonetheless, the extremists pose along-term terrorist threat that will prove
impossible for New Delhi to stamp out. Indian security officials believe at
least 200 Sikh extremists are active in Punjab. These extremists refuse to
compromise on their demand for an independent Sikh state. Despite their
limited numbers, the extremists enjoy widespread support and political
influence throughout Punjab. Contributions from Sikh temples, profits
from narcotics trafficking, and remittances from proextremist overseas
Sikhs will probably ensure enough financial support to enable the extrem-
ists to continue terrorist activity. 25X1
Sikh extremism threatens US interests i~n India, in part because the
extremists' primary target is Prime Minister Gandhi. Even if Sikh
extremist activity in Punjab should slow dramatically, the likelihood of
Gandhi's eventually falling victim to a Sikh assassin is about even. Delhi's
favorable response to US policy initiatives during the last two years has de-
pended heavily on Gandhi's remaining in power. No successor is likely to
be as motivated or have sufficient olitical standing to continue improving
ties to the United States. 25X1
Pakistan's limited support to Sikh extremists could also hurt prospects for
improved US-Indian relations. Prime Minister Gandhi's public accusations
of Pakistani training, support, and sanctuary to Sikh extremists have left
the United States vulnerable to Indian domestic suspicions of US aid to
Sikh extremists. Pakistan is most likely training small numbers of Sikh
extremists but is unlikely to increase its support unless hostilities were to
break out with India over other issues, such as Kashmir. Gandhi most
likely discounts allegations of US support to Sikh extremists, but pressure
from his Hindu constituency in the face of increased extremist activity
would probably force him to slow improvement in US-Indian relations.
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Sikh extremists will continue to rely on violence-in particular, assassina-
tion-as their principal tactic for gaining an independent Sikh state. By
fostering a climate of violence, the extremists seek to provoke Hindu
migration from Punjab and reprisals against Sikhs elsewhere in India.
They also want to topple the moderate Sikh state government and provoke
New Delhi's direct intervention. The extremists may turn to increasingly
spectacular terrorist acts such as mass killings of Hindus, assassinations of
senior Indian officials, and the bombing of Indian civilian airliners. Unless
the extremists can establish a unified command structure and maintain
long-term, continuous operations, however, their tactics will not force a
collapse of the state government and New Delhi's military intervention.
New Delhi will continue to pursue a twofold strategy of exerting pressure
on Sikh extremists and strengthening Sikh moderates. Cooperation with
the moderate Sikh political party-the Akali Dal-is vital to Indian efforts
to contain the spread of Sikh extremism in Punjab. The Akali Dal has en-
joyed strong support among Sikhs in Punjab, including the politically
powerful Sikh Temple Management Committee, which oversees collection
and disbursement of Sikh religious donations made throughout the state.
Gandhi will probably continue to provide support for the Akali Dal state
government via votes from Congress Party members of the Punjab
legislature and provision of paramilitary forces to counter Sikh extremists.
At the same time, Gandhi is likely to rely on increased police penetration of
extremist groups and capture of Sikh extremists entering Punjab from
Pakistan to weaken extremist capabilities.
Gandhi will be reluctant to deploy Army troops to Punjab and dismiss the
moderate Sikh state government unless violence escalates dramatically.
Until the 1987 elections in states across northern India are complete and
the danger of a backlash by Hindu voters lessened, Gandhi will most likely
rely on Punjab state security forces to maintain order and will not make
further concessions to Sikhs.
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Summary
iii
Sikhs in Indian Society
1
Sikh Goals
3
Moderates
4
Dissidents
4
Sikh Extremists
5
Size, Organization, and Support
6
Funding
Objectives and Strategy
7
New Delhi's Strategy
9
Indian Stakes in Punjab
9
Political Tactics: Strengthening the Moderates
10
Security Tactics: Using a Heavy Hand Against the Extremists
10
Outlook
12
Alternative Scenarios
12
Implications for the United States
13
A. Sikh Chronology
B. India's Most Important Sikhs
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Figure 1
Proposed Territorial Transfers Between Pugjab and Haryana in Northern India
~~ Extent of Sikh kingdom in the early
1800s
-~- State or union territory boundary
(India); province-level
boundary (Pak.)
0 150 Kilometers
i t ~1~1
p 150 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Approximate areas-"-""
AQ~nf Punjab that .~
~/
~ t, 1"~Bry~P13
The union territory of
Chandigarh, joint capital
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India and the Sikh Challenge
frontier opposite Pakistan in constant turmoil.
More than two years after Indian Army troops occu-
pied the state of Punjab in a bid to contain Sikh
extremist violence, Sikhs are still deeply suspicious of
New Delhi and tensions between Hindus and Sikhs
remain high throughout India. Negotiations between
New Delhi and moderate Sikhs are stalled, but
security forces have made gains against Sikh extrem-
ists and the extremist leadership remains deeply divid-
ed. The violence has resulted in more than 4,000-
mostly Sikh-deaths and placed India's strategic
ment in the late 1970s.
Sikhs in Indian Society
Faced with an overwhelming Hindu majority, India's
Sikhs have long sought to assert their linguistic,
religious, and political identity in India. After Indian
independence from Great Britain in 1947, the Sikh
movement, while remaining mostly nonviolent, won
major concessions from New Delhi, including the
establishment in 1966 of a Sikh majority state-
Punjab. But, according to British and Indian scholars,
the emergence of charismatic Sikh leaders and an
increasingly youthful Sikh population, combined with
frustrations with slow economic growth in Punjab,
helped fuel the development of a radical Sikh move-
Sikhs are a small minority but hold prominent posi-
tions throughout Indian society. On the basis of 1981
census data, we estimate that Sikhs currently number
about 14.5 million, approximately 2 percent of India's
population. More than 60 percent of India's Sikhs live
in Punjab, where they constitute a majority of about
60 percent. The rest are widely distributed, with large
numbers in New Delhi and the states of Haryana and
Jammu and Kashmir. Another 2 million Sikhs live in
more than 20 other countries, with large communities
in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.
Sikhs have long been leaders in Indian military,
commercial, and political life. Since the 19th century,
Sikhs have enjoyed a privileged position in the Indian
corps and 11 percent of enlisted men
Sikhs serve in 15 exclusive-
ly Sikh battalions and in several ethnically mixed 25X1
units. The President of India is a Sikh, several Indian
corporations are headed by Sikhs, and Sikhs are well
represented in the Indian civil service. 25x1
India's Sikhs are divided into four major castes. The
Rajput caste is a relatively high caste and is well
represented in India's military and business elites.
The more lowly Jat caste of rural, landowning peasant
farmers is politically most important and represents
approximately one-third of all Sikhs in Punjab. The
Baniya caste comprises merchants and is more urban
and mobile than the Jats, who are tied to the land.
Scheduled castes or "untouchables" represent the
lowest caste of Sikhs. The bulk of Sikhs in Indian
areas outside Punjab and overseas belong to non-Jat
castes.
Caste distinctions play an important role in Sikh
politics. According to Indian press and scholarly
sources, the Sikh political leadership is drawn almost
exclusively from the Jat caste. As a result, Sikh
political demands since the early 1970s have focused
primarily on agricultural concerns-such as water
and land rights and farm subsidies-reinforcin caste
differences between urban and rural Sikhs.l 25x1
Sikh religious institutions are a major source of
political power in Punjab. The Golden Temple at
Amritsar is Sikhism's holiest place, enshrining the
Sikh scriptures and the Akal Takht-a throne repre-
senting Sikh spiritual and temporal authority. Indian
press reporting indicates control of the Akal Takht is
considered by many Sikhs to be a prerequisite for
political power in Punjab. The Golden Temple re-
ceives funds donated from a continuous flow of Sikh
pilgrims and imposes taxes on other Sikh temples
throughout Punjab. These funds are controlled by the
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Sikh Religion and Culture
Sikhism is positioned geographically and doctrinally
between Islam and Hinduism. The majority of
India's Sikhs live in the fertile plains of Punjab,
wedged between the Muslims of Pakistan and India's
Hindus. The just Sikhs were followers of Guru
Nanak (1469-1539), a mystic who rejected both the
clerical dominance of Islam in the Mughal court and
the caste system and elaborate rituals of Hinduism.
Guru Nanak absorbed into his teachings basic doc-
trines of Hinduism including the transmigration of
the soul and the role of karma. He also drew heavily
from the radical monotheism of Islam to establish
the basic tenet of Sikhism: God is eternal, one, and
never incarnate like the gods of the Hindu pantheon.
'Sikh " is derived from the Sanskrit "shiksha, "
meaning disciple. Guru Nanak was the.first of 10
Gurus to lead the new religion of the Sikhs. The jif'th
Guru, Arjan (1581-1606), compiled an authoritative
version of the teachings of the Gurus and built the
Golden Temple at Amritsar, where the Sikh scrip-
tures are enshrined today. These e~`orts to give
structure and permanence to the Sikh faith led to his
death at the hands of the Mughals. His death
established the Sikh tradition of reverence for mar-
tyrs and led to the militarization of the Sikh faith.
In 1699, the 10th Guru, Gobind Singh, turned Sikh-
ism into an army of the faithful. Threatened by
Muslim persecution and determined to avoid reab-
sorption by Hinduism, the 10th Guru commanded his
followers to c~trm a distinct identity and to arm
themselves. He gave the name Khalsa-`pure
ones'=to his new order and commanded all Sikh
males to adopt the name Singh, meaning lion. To set
his community further apart, he ordered his disciples
not to cut their hair or shave their beards, to carry a
comb, to wear a bracelet and breeches, and to carry a
dagger. Sikh extremists today have substituted a war
against Hindus for their traditional conflict with
Muslims.
The Sikhs succeeded briefly in establishing an inde-
pendent state. A Sikh chieftain, Ranjit Singh, popu-
larly known as the "Lion of Punjab, "took advantage
of inconclusive warring between Mughal and Afghan
armies in the late 18th century to establish a Sikh
kingdom in 1799 at Lahore. As Maharajah of Punjab
until his death in 1839, Ranjit Singh ruled an area
comprising much of present-day Pakistan and Jam-
mu and Kashmir. His expansion to the east was
halted at the Sutlej River by the British, who in 1849
reconquered Punjab. This golden age of Sikh rule
serves as a model for present-day extremists, and one
terrorist group has even appropriated the name of the
19th century Sikh army-the Dal Khalsa, meaning
"army of the pure. "
The most important leader of the Sikh extremist
movement in the early 1980s was Sant Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale (1947-84J. Educated at the Damdami
Taksal seminary, Bhindranwale traveled throughout
Punjab, exhorting Sikhs to assert their rights and
denouncing a rival Sikh sect. According to Indian
scholars, his preaching had a strong impact among
young Sikhs, especially those from poor farming
families, and by 1981 Bhindranwale had developed a
large following. With the support of the All India
Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), Bhindranwale
orchestrated a series of assassinations of moderate
Sikhs and Hindus, seized control of the Golden
Temple, and fortified it. His death during the Indian
Army assault on the Golden Temple in June 1984
elevated him to the status of a Sikh martyr, revered
by all Sikh extremists-especially the leaders of the
AISSF.
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25X1
Sikhs in the Indian Military
The Sikh community is well represented in the Indian
military. Two hundred years ojintermittent Mughal
and Afghan persecution developed a strong warrior
tradition among Sikhs. After proving their loyalty to
Britain during the mutiny of 1857, Sikhs established
a reputation for professionalism and discipline in the
Indian military. Since independence in 1947, Indian
leaders have relied heavily on Sikh battalions-
especially during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war-to
buttress Indian military strength.
units and attempted to return to Punjab,
The Indian Army assault on the Golden Temple in
1984 and rumors ojArmy atrocities against Sikhs in
Punjab provoked widespread mutinies among Sikh
regiments. Most ojthe 2,733 mutineers deserted their
Sixty-seven were
tary units.
killed, 30 are still missing, and the remainder were
arrested. Most ojthose apprehended were charged,
convicted, and either sentenced to imprisonment, dis-
charged, or rehabilitated and transferred to paramili-
cased the colors ojthe 9th Sikh Battalion.
New Delhi has rejected appeals by the moderate
Akali leadership to pardon the mutineers, claiming
the mutiny is an exclusively military issue. Since the
mutiny, the Army has reduced three Sikh battalions
to cadre status, dispersed men to other units, and
moderates and Sikh extremists.
and the SGPC a primary objective of both Sikh
Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee
(SGPC), an elected Sikh body with close ties to the
Akali Dal. The symbolism and wealth of the Golden
Temple have made control of its numerous buildings
Fears and resentment of the Indian Government and
its predominantly Hindu constituency have grown
rapidly throughout the Sikh community since 1984.
The military assault ordered by Indira Gandhi in
June 1984 on the Golden Temple, then occupied by
Sikh extremists, resulted in at least 1,000 Sikh deaths
and widespread destruction. The attack provoked
deep resentment even among secular Sikhs overseas
and elsewhere in India. Anti-Sikh riots in November
1984 following the assassination of Indira Gandhi by
a Sikh led to an additiona12,000 deaths, mostly Sikh.
The failure of Indian police and Army units to restore
order and protect Sikhs in riot-torn areas in northern
India left many Sikhs deeply suspicious of the govern-
ment and fearful of additional Hindu reprisals. 2 5x 1
Most Sikhs view New Delhi and Hindu dominance as
a threat to their religion and culture. According to
Indian press and scholarly sources, Sikhs believe New
Delhi acquiesces in Hindu violence against Sikhs, uses
Indian security forces to execute innocent Sikhs, and
practices political and economic discrimination
against them. The US Embassy in New Delhi reports
Sikhs in Punjab are unanimous in condemning ran-
dom police executions of Sikh youth, and Indian press
reports indicate Sikhs in northern India fear Hindu
violence against Sikh homes and businesses.
Sikh Goals
Sikh political organizations in Punjab break down
roughly into three major groups, each with its own
demands:
? Moderates in the Akali Dal who are primarily
interested in economic reforms and are led by
Punjab Chief Minister Barnala.
? Dissidents in the Akali Dal who are dissatisfied with
Barnala's leadership, seek more stringent limits on
New Delhi's control of agricultural policy in Pun-
jab, and want greater political autonomy for
Punjab.
? Extremists-mainly students-who want an inde-
pendent Sikh state and support terrorism.
According to surveys by Indian scholars and journal-
ists, most Sikhs do not support the demand for an
independent state. Barnala's victory in the Punjab
state election in September 1985 demonstrated broad
Sikh support for negotiations with New Delhi on
issues of concern to them. Despite this widespread
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moderation, lingering fear and communal passion
stirred by Sikh militants have made a majority of
Sikhs determined to win at least some concessions
from New Delhi.
Moderates. The Shiromani Akali Dal is the main
Sikh political party in India. Established in 1921 by
members of the Jat caste to protect Sikh interests
during the Indian independence movement, the Akali
Dal now leads the Punjab state government and
represents moderate Sikh demands. Indian press re-
ports indicate New Delhi views the Akali Dal as the
only legitimate Sikh political organization, and the
government of Punjab Chief Minister Surjit Singh
Barnala has become closely identified with New Delhi
and its efforts to contain Sikh extremism.
Sikh moderates-most of whom are farmers-are
concerned about land and water issues. Barnala and
his supporters demand implementation of the 1985
Punjab accord between the Akali Dal and Gandhi.
The accord culminated six months of direct negotia-
tions and was strongly supported by a majority of
Sikhs in Punjab. The agreement grants Punjab's
predominantly Sikh farmers a constant water supply
from the Ravi-Beas river system. So far a tribunal has
failed to determine the volume of additional water
Punjab may divert at the expense of the neighboring
states of Haryana and Rajasthan. The agreement also
establishes Chandigarh-now the capital for both
Punjab and Haryana-as the capital of Punjab, but
conflict with Haryana over compensation has delayed
formal transfer of the capital. According to the US
Embassy in New Delhi, Barnala also wants New
Delhi to pardon and rehabilitate the small number of
Sikh soldiers still in prison for deserting their units
during the 1984 assault on the Golden Temple.
Dissidents. The dissidents within Barnala's Akali Dal
want significantly greater concessions from New Del-
hi. According to Indian press reports, the dissidents-
led by former Punjab Chief Minister Prakash Singh
Badal and SGPC head Gurcharan Singh Tohra-
want to restrict New Delhi's powers in Punjab to
defense, foreign relations, currency, and communica-
tions. Under these conditions, New Delhi would have
to surrender its right to impose direct rule in Punjab
and dismiss the Punjab state assembly. This would
give Punjab exclusive jurisdiction over key economic
issues including water rights to rivers flowing through
Punjab and neighboring states. The dissidents agree
with Barnala on the need to pardon Army deserters
and have used the issue to fuel Sikh hostility toward
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eventually take control of the state government.
New Delhi. The dissidents probably hope their hard-
line demands will discredit Barnala and expand their
own support among Sikhs in Punjab so they can
and Barnala's government. According to
the pure). They campaign against both New Delhi
Sikh Extremists
Several Sikh organizations in Punjab want an inde-
pendent Sikh state, which they call Khalistan (land of
press reports, the most important extremist
groinet All India Sikh Students Federation
(AISSF), representing at least 2,000 Sikh students in
Punjab-demands the release of Sikhs held in jail
without trial, an end to "random" police shootings of
Sikh youth, and an end to discrimination against
Sikhs in university admissions. The group has publicly
threatened to assassinate moderate Sikh and Hindu
leaders. Other groups such as the United Akali Dal-
now allied with some dissidents-and the Damdami
Taksal-Punjab's preeminent Sikh seminary-orga-
nize rallies throughout Punjab calling for Sikhs to
protect themselves from New Delhi's "oppression."
The most hardline Sikh separatists operate as an
underground terrorist network in Punjab. According
to press reports, the Khalistan Commando Force, the
Dashmesh Regiment, and the Dal Khalsa are three of
the most active radical groups.
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On 24 July 1985, Prime Minister Gandhi and Har-
chand Singh Longowal, president of the Akali Dal,
signed a memorandum of settlement addressing a
broad range of Sikh demands. The main features of
the agreement are:
? Compensation to innocent persons killed in the
1984 anti-Sikh riots.
? Army recruitment on the basis of merit.
? An extension of the investigation of the November
riots to include a~"ected areas outside Delhi.
? A pledge by the government to rehabilitate and
provide gainful employment to Sikhs discharged
from the Army after their desertion in June 1984.
? Chandigarh, the capital city jor the neighboring
states ojPunjab and Haryana, will become the
exclusive capital c~f'Punjab. A commission will be
constituted to determine the specific Hindi-speak-
ing areas ojPunjab to be transferred to Haryana in
lieu of Chandigarh.
? A separate commission will consider claims and
counterclaims jor readjustment of the existing
Punjab-Haryana boundaries.
? Farmers ojPunjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan will
continue to receive water from the Ravi-Seas river
system according to levels ojconsumption in July
1985. A tribunal headed by a Supreme Court judge
will adjudicate claims by Punjab and Haryana to
additional waters.
? The central government will take steps to promote
the Punjabi language.
Size, Organization, and Support. Hardcore Sikh ex-
tremists are relatively few in number. Indian security
officials estimate about 200 are active in Punjab.
approximately 12
in 1985.1 (some of these gangs
operate under the guise of Sikh extremism but are
committed only to criminal activity. The US Embassy
in New Delhi reports that the ranks of Sikh extremists
grow quickly after police shootings of Sikh youth. We
believe the number of Sikh extremists operating in
Punjab also varies according to the rate of cross-
border infiltration of Sikhs using Pakistan for
sanctuary.
Despite their limited numbers and the opposition of
most Sikhs to an independent state, the extremists
have expanded their influence in Punjab by threaten-
ing Sikh and Hindu politicians. According to press
reports, even some members of Barnala's Cabinet
support Sikh extremism. Embassy reports indicate
that dissident members of the Akali Dal frequently
attend public memorial services for Sikh youth killed
in confrontations with the police and use extremist
rhetoric in denouncing both New Delhi and the
moderate state government. The dissidents praised the
extremists for the assassination last August of the
retired Indian Army Chief of Staff who led the
assault on the Golden Temple.
Sikh extremists draw their strongest support from the
AISSF and Damdami Taksal.
most of the hardcore extremists in Punjab are
students, suggesting the AISSF may provide them
sanctuary in homes and in AISSF offices and may
supply funds for terrorist operations. We believe some
AISSF members also belong to underground terrorist
groups. According to the US Embassy in New Delhi,
the Damdami Taksal claims to have assisted Sikh
extremists by sending them to Pakistan for training.
Funding. We believe that Sikh extremists are well
funded and well armed.
extremist groups in Punjab receive funding
and material support from Sikh gurudwaras-tem-
ples serving as the center of Sikh religious and
political life. We believe the gurudwaras are the
primary source of funding for the extremists. Press
and Embassy reports indicate the extremists also rob
instigated the majority of violent incidents in Punjab 25X1
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4f Canada-based Sikh extremists.
The presence abroad of more than 2 million Sikhs
has given Sikh extremism an international dimen-
sion. Nearly one-third of these expatriate Sikhs are
in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States. According to~mmigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INSJ reporting, Sikh extremists
frequently travel between these three countries and
probably maintain contact with extremists in India.
Some Sikhs apprehended in the United States on
immigration charges have admitted plans to recruit
Khalistan sympathizers and to set up scdehouses for
Sikh militants wanted for crimes committed in India.
According to the INS, The Bahamas, Mexico, Thai-
land, and West Germany serve as way stations for
illegal Sikh immigration to the United States. The
explosion that downed an Air India 747 flying from
Canada to India was probably executed with the help
Sikh extremists have developed an extensive overseas
25X1 network. The Khalistan National Organization based
in London is one of the most politically active
overseas Sikh extremist organizations. The group's
leader, Dr. Jaglit Singh Chauhan-a former Punjab
banks and steal government weapons and ordnance
stocks. A police raid last summer of a Khalistan
Commando Force hideout uncovered revolvers, light
machineguns, rifles, and ammunition stolen from
Indian Army stocks. Press reports indicate extremists
stole $100,000 in a single bank robbery last Novem-
ber. Police have also discovered at least one arms
25X1
Diplomatic reporting indi-
.finance minister who emigrated to the United King-
dom in 1971, has declared himself the leader of the
'Republic of Khalistan." The International Sikh
Youth Federation, the international wing of the All
India Sikh Students Federation, is especially active
in Canada and the United Kingdom. Press reports
indicate other Sikh groups, such as the World Sikh
Organization based in Washington, lobby democratic
countries for support for an independent Sikh state.
Cates Sikh extremists abroad have used heroin as
payment for terrorist attacks, and members of Sikh
extremist organizations have been arrested in posses-
sion of heroin. Sikh extremists have probably used
traditional smuggling channels across the Indo-
Pakistani border to facilitate narcotics and arms
25X1
We believe narcotics trafficking provides only a small
25X1 fraction of fundin for the extremists.
smuggling.
Objectives and Strategy. Sikh extremists are religious
fundamentalists. They are trying to reverse decades of
secularization among Sikhs and to halt the assimila-
tion of Sikhs into modern, Hindu-dominated India,
which they maintain is hostile to Sikh religion and
culture. The extremists' campaign of violence is de-
signed to force India to release Punjab from the
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Indian federal system. They are also trying to force
secular, moderate Sikhs to adopt a Sikh communal
identity and practice Sikh communal politics.
A key element of the extremist strategy is to force
Hindus to leave Punjab. The extremists also want
Sikhs to return to Punjab from elsewhere in India and
appear to welcome Hindu reprisals against Sikhs as
evidence of Hindu enmity and as an inducement to
Sikhs to flee to Punjab. Reporting from press and
Embassy sources suggests the extremists seek to
destabilize the moderate Sikh-run state government
and assert their leadership over the Sikh community
through assassinations of moderate Sikh and Hindu
politicians.
25X1
Extremist attacks are unlikely to rovoke wides read
Hindu mi ration from Punjab.
only about
7,000 Hindus-approximately 1,500 families-have
left Punjab since lasts rip .Some 7 million Hindus
remain. some Hindu
businessmen are withdrawing investments and closing
factories in Punjab, but the US Embassy in New
Delhi reports industrial production in Punjab is rising.
Extremist attacks have also failed to provoke wide-
spread Hindu reprisals against Sikhs elsewhere in
India. We believe that the threat of widespread Hindu
reprisals against Sikhs remains high but that many
Sikhs are prepared to fight instead of fleeing to
Punjab. According to the US Embassy in New Delhi,
most Sikhs outside Punjab are of the Baniya mer-
chant caste and do not want to accept Jat dominance
by taking refuge in Punjab.
The extremists are able to strike at will. In 1986 they
assassinated eight moderate Sikh and Hindu politi-
cians, six members of the Congress Party, a member
of the Communist Party of India, and at least one
member of the Akali Dal. They also threatened to kill
Punjab Chief Minister Barnala. The extremists fired
on the Punjab head of state security forces and killed
61 policemen. Press reports indicate Sikh extremists
killed several prosecutors, judges, and witnesses par-
ticipating in trials of extremists, contributing to a
Sikh terrorists in Punjab are capable oJelaborate
and sophisticated attacks. The attempted assassina-
tion ojPunjab's Director General oj"Police, Julio
Ribeiro, demonstrates Sikh terrorist ability to pene-
trate state security forces and recruit policemen for
terrorist operations. According to the Indian press,
confessions oj'a policeman involved in the conspiracy
against Ribeiro indicate Sikh terrorists spent three
months preparing for the attack and gained lull
knowledge oj" the fortified police compound where
Ribeiro lives and coordinates security operations.
The terrorists recruited and placed afour-member
cell ojPunjab policemen within the compound, prey-
ing upon dissati.F1action among overworked Sikh
policemen to recruit their cell.
The attack against Ribeiro took place on 3 October
1986 within the police compound and resulted in
injury to Ribeiro's wife, the death of a loyal police-
man, injury to several other policemen, but no injury
to Ribeiro. The assassins, dressed as policemen,
entered the compound unchallenged and confronted
Ribeiro during his early morning walk. Despite the
failure oj'the assassination plan, the terrorists ap-
peared to make the most oj'their effort by sending
letters oJresignation signed by the jour police con-
spirators to two Indian journalists. In the letters, the
policemen accused Ribeiro of wanting "tojinish the
sons oJGuru Gobind Singh,"a re,1erence to the
militant 10th Sikh Guru, and declared their intention
to join the Khalistan Commando Force.
the Indian Army is missing
sop isticate weaponry from its stocks. Press reports
indicate these weapons include surface-to-air missiles.
If the Sikhs have such weapons, they might target
civilian airliners.
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and Kashmir, Sikkim, and now Punjab.
New Delhi's Strategy
Indian Stakes in Punjab. We believe New Delhi's
main equities in Punjab are securing its strategic
frontier with Pakistan, maintaining access to Jammu
and Kashmir, and preventing an eruption of commu-
nal violence. Since independence, Indian governments
have given high priority to maintaining control of
strategic border states and territories such as Jammu
against Pakistani or Chinese attack
Indian-held territory there virtually indefensible
India's defense strategy against Pakistan and China is
heavily dependent on full military access to Punjab.
We estimate India deploys four infantry divisions, one
mountain infantry division, one armored division, and
two independent armored brigades in Punjab compris-
ing approximately 100,000 men and 675 tanks. The
loss of Punjab to Sikh separatists would push India's
forward defense line to within 125 kilometers of New
Delhi, greatly diminish the ability of the Indian Air
Force to operate over northern Pakistan, and cut
Jammu and Kashmir's ground supply route, making
t:? restore order.
Sikh extremist violence poses a serious internal securi-
ty problem for Prime Minister Gandhi personally and
for New Delhi in general. Since his election in
December 1984, Gandhi has been under constant
threat of assassination by Sikh extremists. A Sikh
gunman fired several shots at the Prime Minister last
October. Despite quick and widespread deployment of
Army troops to maintain order, communal violence in
New Delhi and elsewhere in northern India has flared
since July 1986 after two large-scale Sikh attacks
against Hindus. A sustained Sikh offensive that re-
sulted in large numbers of Hindu deaths would
probably force New Delhi to deploy troops to Punjab
India also has important economic stakes in Punjab.
The agricultural growth spurred by the Green Revo-
lution-the introduction of high-yield grains-has
made Punjab India's richest state with a per capita
income nearly twice the national average and an
important contributor to the country's agricultural
sector. According to Indian agricultural statistics,
Punjab supplies 22 percent of India's wheat crop and
8 percent of its rice. Punjab's farmers raise about half
of all foodgrains supplied to the nation's public food
stocks controlled by New Delhi. Although the state
does not possess any heavy industry, agroprocessing
and textile industries in Punjab account for 13 percent
of India's jute, cotton, and textile production.
We believe Gandhi is vulnerable to charges of appeas-
ing Sikh moderates at the ex ense of farmers-
especially Hindus.
e 'm assy in New Delhi reports Gandhi and
his party need to win state elections in the spring of
1987 in the predominantly Hindu state of Haryana,
which borders Punjab, and other states in northern
India to maintain traditional Con ress Party strength
throughout the region
New Delhi will probably use all means-including
full deployment of the Indian armed forces if neces-
sary-to prevent the establishment of an independent
Sikh state and to ensure that a negotiated settlement
on Sikh autonomy will remain strictly within the
limits of Indian federalism. India's political cohesion
has been strained frequently since independence by a
variety of separatist movements. An extremist victory
in Punjab, in our view, would put New Delhi on the
defensive against separatists throughout India, possi-
bly provoking a rash of attempted secessions in other
Indian states-especially in predominantly Muslim
Jammu and Kashmir.
Since March 1985, Gandhi has pursued a combined
political and military strategy designed to prevent
growth of extremist capabilities and popular support.
He has made significant political concessions to Sikhs,
strengthened Sikh moderates, and appointed commis-
sions to address moderate Sikh demands. At the same
time, he has sought to improve security in Punjab and
keep the militants off balance by buttressing local
police with paramilitary troops, slowing infiltration of
Sikh extremists from Pakistan, and preventing the
establishment of a unified Sikh extremist leadership.
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Political Tactics: Strengthening the Moderates.
Gandhi's political strategy hinges on the moderate
Akali Dal. In our judgment, New Delhi would like to
ensure that moderate Sikhs remain a viable force in
Punjab so that it can avoid having to choose between
accommodation with Sikh extremists or imposing
direct rule.
Barnala's government in Punjab has not only survived
extremist pressures but has also mounted a counterof-
fensive and won strong public backing from Gandhi as
recently as February 1987. Barnala has used antiter-
rorism laws to jail political foes such as Prakash Singh
Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra and has refused to
allow Sikh extremists to reestablish a foothold in the
Golden Temple. Despite defections to Badal's camp in
May 1986, Barnala has not hesitated to dismiss
members of his Cabinet expressing sympathy for the
extremists or providing aid to Badal or Tohra
Lacking an alternative, New Delhi has a high stake in
keeping the moderate Barnala in power. We believe
his status as a Jat Sikh and his strong electoral
mandate in the 1985 Punjab state election have made
him a critical bridge between New Delhi and the Sikh
community in Punjab.
Gandhi probably calculates he must fight Sikh ex-
tremists using Barnala as a proxy rather than risk
further Sikh alienation by intervening directly in
Punjab. Press reports indicate that Gandhi is careful
in public to dissociate New Delhi from police opera-
tions in Punjab and that he will not speculate on
possible deployment of regular Army troops.
Barnala's commitment to improve security in Punjab
helps New Delhi define the unrest as a problem of law
and order for Punjab and not as widespread Sikh
nationalism. Barnala has imposed curfews, closed
schools, and given police chief Ribeiro broad latitude
in~the use of Punjab police and paramilitary forces.
According to the US Embassy, 70 Sikh youths have
accepted Barnala's offer of amnesty to those involved
in extremist activities.
We believe that factionalism within the Akali Dal
poses a serious threat to New Delhi's strategy of
putting all of its eggs in the Akali Dal basket.
According to Embassy sources, Akali Dal leaders
routinely place personal ambition ahead of coopera-
tion. The defections of former Punjab Chief Minister
Badal and SGPC head Tohra in the spring of 1986
were followed by the establishment of a dissident
Akali Dal party, which reduced Barnala's control of
the 117-member state assembly from 77 to 46 and
made him dependent on the support of 31 Congress
Party legislators to govern.
We believe that further defections from Barnala's
camp to the dissidents could make Barnala unable to
govern. Under these circumstances New Delhi would
probably appoint a new chief minister from the
dissidents' camp, but any new chief minister, in our
view, would still face difficulties in bringing unity to
the Akali Dal.
Security Tactics: Using a Heavy Hand Against the
Extremists. A unified command and increased de-
ployment of paramilitary forces are the core of the
government's military campaign against the extrem-
ists. New Delhi decided in June 1986 to place units of
the Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police
Force-the central government's paramilitary
forces-under the direct command of Punjab's Direc-
tor General for Police, J. F. Ribeiro.
Ribeiro, popularly known as India's
supercop, as made Punjab's state police force
more cohesive and has purged incompetent officers.'
' Ribeiro earned his reputation as a "supercop" by successfully
combating organized crime in Bombay before his assignment to
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Press reports also indicate New Delhi has moved
quickly to meet Punjab state government requests for
additional troops, deploying as many as 19,000 para-
military forces for joint operations with police forces
against the extremists. Killings by Sikh extremists in
1986 dropped from a high of 105 in March to 16 in
September but rose to 70 in November.
India has tightened security along the Pakistani bor-
der to block the infiltration of Sikh extremists into
Punjab. ibeiro has
significantly reduced such infiltration as well as the
movement of arms and funds into Punjab from Paki-
stan. Between April and September 1986, Border
Security Forces killed 198 infiltrators-including
some Pakistani nationals and smugglers. We have no
reliable information on the number of Sikh extremists
using Pakistan as a sanctuary, but New Delhi's
conviction that Islamabad is actively aiding Sikh
extremists suggests border security will remain a key
element in New Delhi's strategy.
Figure 2
India: Sikh Extremist Killings
of Hindus and Sikh Moderates, 1980-86
1985 n 63
e Does not include 3,000 Sikh deaths due to Hindu rioting and
Indian Army assault on Golden Temple in 1984.
b Does not include the 86 killed in Sikh extremist bombing
campaign in New Delhi or the 329 people killed in Air India
bombing.
Ribeiro has prevented the establishment of a unified
Sikh extremist leadership by applying heavy pressure
inside Punjab against extremist organizations. Ac-
cording to Indian press reports, state security forces
have captured approximately one-third of the Sikh
extremist leadership. Expanded police powers under
existing antiterrorism legislation have led to more
frequent arrests and detentions of suspected extrem-
ists. Rivalries among the extremists have made them
vulnerable to penetration and capture by security
forces. Police penetration of extremist groups, confes-
sions from captured extremists, and protection of Sikh
temples-especially the Golden Temple-against
Sikh extremist control have forced key extremist
leaders to remain in hiding. Indian press reports
intelligence information.
indicate the security forces have successfully exploited
personal rivalries among the extremists to obtain
Despite these accomplishments, the security crack-
down is creating new problems for New Delhi and the
state government. According to the US Embassy,
Sikhs and some Hindus believe that the Punjab police
arrest and execute Sikh youth on the basis of uncon-
firmed suspicions of terrorist activity. Embassy
sources claim these killings have a profoundly nega-
tive impact on the Sikh population, creating many
new Sikh extremists for every Sikh youth believed to
be falsely charged or randomly executed
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The heavy pressure from the security forces, in our
view, is forcing the extremists to resort to more
spectacular acts of terrorism to demonstrate their
viability. Press reports indicate that since last summer
the extremists have executed their most deadly at-
tacks in Punjab, killing 14 and 22 Hindu bus passen-
gers in separate bus attacks, assassinating a retired
Indian Army general, and firing on Ribeiro.
Outlook
We believe that India faces along-term terrorist
threat from Sikh extremists that the government
probably cannot eradicate. We expect resentment of
New Delhi and fears of Hindu domination to linger
among a majority of Sikhs, allowing the extremists to
retain at least some popular support. The enduring
differences between India and Pakistan suggest
Islamabad will continue to provide sanctuary and
limited aid to Sikh extremists
We believe Pakistan would significantly increase its
support to Sikh extremists only if hostilities were
breaking out with India over other issues, such as
Kashmir. In this case, Pakistan would see Sikhs as a
potential fifth column that would carry out terrorist
activities in India and interfere with Indian military
efforts.
Sikh extremists will remain capable-without outside
support-of significantly increasing terrorist opera-
tions in Punjab, elsewhere in India, and overseas. We
believe contributions from Sikh temples, profits from
narcotics trafficking, and remittances from proextre-
mist Sikhs overseas will ensure enough financial
support to enable the extremists to continue terrorist
activity. Mass slayings, such as those in last summer's
bus attacks, are likely to recur as extremists try to
provoke Hindu flight from Punjab. Indian officials
overseas will remain a prime target of Sikhs, especial-
ly in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.
Prime Minister Gandhi and his family will also
remain primary and vulnerable targets.
Although we expect the extremists to continue terror-
ist operations, they are unlikely to be able to wage an
organized, long-term insurgency. The preponderance
of Jat Sikhs among the extremists will prevent the
development of broad Sikh support for an extremist-
led independent Sikh state. Despite lobbying by an
articulate and wealthy overseas community, the ex-
tremists have failed to win significant international
backing for an independent Sikh stat
Alternative Scenarios. In the unlikely event of a sharp
and sustained escalation in the Sikh terrorist cam-
paign in Punjab, we believe Gandhi would choose
military intervention to secure India's strategic fron-
tier with Pakistan, to maintain access to Jammu and
Kashmir, and to prevent an eruption of communal
violence. Military intervention-most likely following
a collapse of the Barnala government and the reimpo-
sition of New Delhi's direct rule in Punjab-would
severely set back Gandhi's attempts to restore Hindu-
Sikh relations and Sikh confidence in the central
government. We believe further concessions-such as
granting additional water rights to Punjab-would
fuel the ire of Hindu voters in state elections this
spring, costing Gandhi and his Congress Party vital
support.
In a more likely scenario, extremist activity would
continue at its current level or even decline gradually,
allowing New Delhi to minimize its involvement in
Punjab. Sustained security measures against the ex-
tremists, the lack of a charismatic extremist leader,
and continued interdiction of Sikh infiltrators from
Pakistan would give security forces an edge. As a
result, Barnala could solidify his position in the Akali
Dal and resume nesotiations with Gandhi on moder-
ate Sikh demands.
We believe that during the next year New Delhi will
adhere to its two-track policy of reconciliation with
Sikh moderates and cracking down on the extremists.
New Delhi's main political challenge will be ensuring
the viability of a moderate Akali Dal in the face of a
large dissident Akali faction and Sikh extremist assas-
sination threats against Barnala and other moderate
Sikh leaders. Stringent security measures by
Barnala-including protection of Sikh temples from
extremist control-are likely to win New Delhi's
support but will do little to ease divisions within
Barnala's own party. As a result, New Delhi will have
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alternative candidate for the role.
tain his position as chief minister or orevare an
to either gamble on Barnala's political skills to main-
victim to a Sikh assassin would be about even.
autonomy would be unlikely. Even under the best
scenario, the likelihood of Gandhi eventually falling
In the absence of stepped-up extremist activity in
Punjab, Gandhi would probably renew efforts to
address moderate Sikh demands after the 1987 elec-
tions. In our view, Gandhi would try to fulfill-at
least partly-the terms of his agreement with the
Akali Dal to bolster New Delhi's limited credibility
with moderate Sikhs. Gandhi might also choose to
release Sikh detainees and offer agricultural subsidies
to supplement the accord's provisions. Concessions on
Implications for the United States
India views US policy toward Sikh extremists in the
United States as a major element in bilateral rela-
tions. The presence in the United States of 150,000
Sikhs-some who send funds to extremist organiza-
tions in India-has made New Delhi eager to see the
United States act against Sikh extremist activity
within its borders. Senior Indian officials-including
Prime Minister Gandhi~redit Washington for the
arrest of several Sikhs in the United States on con-
spiracy charges and welcome repeated US statements
su ortin Indian unit accordin to the US Embas-
sy.
On the negative side, the government's accusations of
Pakistani support for Sikh extremists have fueled
Indian press and parliamentary speculation of US
complicity. We believe Soviet disinformation has rein-
forced such suspicions. A significant increase in ex-
tremist activity would prompt fresh accusations of
foreign intervention in Punjab to deflect domestic
criticism. Even if Gandhi discounted allegations of
US involvement, pressure from his Hindu constituen-
cy, in the face of increased extremist activity, would
probably force him to slow improvement in Indo-US
relations. Unless Pakistani aid to Sikh extremists
increases significantly, New Delhi is unlikely to seek
Washington's aid in pressing Islamabad.
The continued high risk of a Sikh assassination of
Gandhi also poses a threat to US interests in India.
Gandhi's survival is key to continuing improvement in
US-Indian relations, and we doubt any successor
would be as committed to improving ties to Washing-
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Appendix A
Sikh Chronology
1708 Guru Gobind Singh, 10th and last Guru dies. Sikh scriptures serve as religious
authority.
1799-1839 Ranjit Singh establishes Sikh kingdom in Lahore including territory in present-
day Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir.
British reconquer Punjab.
First Sikh political organization, "Chief Khalsa Diwan," founded.
States Reorganization Commission established. Rejects Akali Dal demand for
Punjabi-speaking state.
Indira Gandhi establishes Punjabi-speaking state in response to Akali agitation.
Akali Dal lists demands for increased Sikh autonomy.
1981 Sant Bhindranwale attracts radical Sikh following in Punjab.
Operation Blue Star: Army takes over Golden Temple. Sant Bhindranwale killed
along with an estimated 1,000 Sikhs.
6 July, Sikh extremists hijack Indian airliners to Pakistan. Pakistani authorities arrest
24 August 1984 hijackers.
31 October 1984 Indian Prime Minister Gandhi assassinated by her Sikh bodyguard.
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November 1984 Hindus riot against Sikhs. Approximately 2,000 dead in New Delhi.
23 June 1985 Air India 747 explodes west of Ireland, killing 329 passengers and crew. Khalistan
Commando Force, All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), and Dashmesh
Regiment claim responsibility.
Sikh extremists claim responsibility for bomb explosion at Narita Airport, Japan
killing two.
June 1985 Arrest of US Sikhs for conspiring to kill Rajiv Gandhi.
24 July 1985 Prime Minister Gandhi and Akali Dal head Harchand Singh Longowal sign
accord addressing Sikh demands.
20 August 1985 Sikh extremists assassinate Longowal.
January 1986 Damdami Taksal and AISSF activists reoccupy Golden Temple.
March 1986 Punjab state security forces recapture Golden Temple with little resistance.
25 July 1986 Fourteen bus passengers killed by four Sikh extremists in Muktsar, Punjab.
10 August 1986 Sikh extremists assassinate General A. S. Vaidya, Chief of Indian Army Staff
during the 1984 Army assault on the Golden Temple.
2 October 1986 Sikh gunman fires several shots at Prime Minister Gandhi.
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Appendix B
India's Most Important Sikhs
Gurdial Singh Dhillon
Minister of Agriculture
? His long tenure as a Congress Party elder statesman.
? His home state, Punjab, is India's largest grain producer.
Although Dhillon, 71, has some experience in agriculture, he probably received his
post for other reasons:
? His appointment added another Sikh to the Union Cabinet.
post in June 1986.
Dhillon was speaker of Parliament during 1969-75 and Minister of Shipping and
Transport (1975-77) under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He served as High
Commissioner to Canada during 1980-82. Dhillon was appointed to his current
Buta Singh
Minister of Home Affairs
Buta Singh, 52,
mcreasmg y active role in overseeing the Home Ministry and internal security
matters. During his six months in office, he has visited both Punjab and Madras
(the home of most Tamil insurgent leaders) and dealt with contentious ethnic
groups in West Bengal and Mizoram states. Buta Singh has also taken a hard line
against Sikh extremists, delivering anti-Khalistan speeches in Parliament and
strongly supporting the Punjab accord. He was excommunicated by Sikh high
priests for his role in helping the Indian Government rebuild Sikhism's holiest
shrine, the Golden Temple, after Army troops stormed the temple in June 1984.
Buta Singh has been a Congress Party member for two decades and has held
ministerial posts under both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.
The 70-year-old Zail Singh, India's seventh president, assumed office in 1982
under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He is a figurehead, performs mostly
ceremonial functions, and, according to US Embassy officers, does not enjoy the
confidence of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The press has long reported a rift
between the two. (Although the Constitution accords the president significant
power, India has been governed by its prime ministers since independence in 1947.1
n e was excommunicate y i priests for not condemning the Army's
assault on the Golden Temple.
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Punjab Political Figures
Surjit Singh Barnala
Leader, Akali Dal
Chief Minister, Punjab State
during 1977-79.
Barnala, 61, is the first Akali Dal party president to serve concurrently as chief
minister of Punjab. A moderate, Barnala has tried to preserve his position in
Punjab by balancing close ties to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with his
constituency's demands for an independent chief minister. His criticism of the
central government is probably an effort to appease his critics in Punjab, where
warm relations with New Delhi are anathema. In April 1986, Barnala provoked
the wrath,of Sikh militants and dissident members of his party for condoning an
Army operation to clear out extremists using the Golden Temple as a haven. He
later atoned for his role in that sweep by spending swell-publicized week cleaning
shoes at Sikh temples. He nevertheless remains near the top of the extremists' hit
list. Barnala started his career as a lawyer and in 1967 won election to the Punjab
state assembly, where he served for the next 10 years. He held a seat in Parliament
Gurcharan Singh Tohra
Sikh political leader
Badal's dissident Akali Dal faction.
Tohra, 62; is a political opportunist who probably hopes to become Punjab chief
minister. He was president of the Sikh Temple Management Committee for 13
years. He resigned his post in March 1986 to oppose the Akali Dal's support for
the Indian Army's spring 1986 roundup of extremists from the Golden Temple. He
was reelected in November 1986 to head the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak
Committee (SGPC) but was imprisoned immediately after his election on charges
of supporting terrorism. Tohra, who has a strong following in the state legislature,
was an opponent of former Punjab Chief Minister Badal but now works with
Prakash Singh Badal
Leader, Akali Dal (Badal)
the Golden Temple and released in April 1985
Badal, 58; is working to advance his personal political fortunes by heading his own
Akali Dal dissident party and siding with Sikh extremists against the state
government. Twice chief minister of Punjab (1970-71 and 1977), Badal continues
to try to position himself as a future candidate for that post. He has, however, lost
some of his credibility with the central government after he split the Akali Dal in
July 1986 and began paying lipservice to some of the extremists' demands and tac-
tics. His Akali Dal (Badal) faction controls about a quarter of the seats in the Pun-
jab state assembly. After serving 19 months in prison when Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi imposed a nationwide state of emergency during 1975-77, Badal was
Minister of Agriculture in Prime Minister Morarji Desai's government. He
returned to Punjab the same year (1977) to become chief minister and later led the
Akalis in the Punjab assembly. Badal was arrested followine the Army's assault on
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Joginder Singh
Leader, United Akali Dal
In June 1985 octogenarian Joginder Singh established the United Akali Dal as a
militant splinter group of the mainstream Sikh political party, the Akali Dal. Sikh
extremists respect him because he is the father of Sikh martyr Bhindranwale.
Since he founded the party in 1985, however, he has quickly earned a reputation as
a front man for young extremists. Joginder Singh has argued fora "restoration of
Sikh honor," the reinstatement of Sikh soldiers who deserted rather than
participate in the Army's storming of the Golden Temple in 1984, and the release
of Sikh prisoners taken durin that o eration. Singh is usually addressed with the
hnnnrifir titlc+ i?Roho ~ 25X1
Mohkam Singh
De facto leader, Damdami Taksal
Firebrand Mohkam Singh is the official spokesman of the Damdami Taksal, a
Sikh religious seminary with ties to Sikh extremists. He was de facto leader of
young Taksal militants before his arrest in the spring of 1986 on sedition charges.
Harinder Singh Kahlon
Leader, All India Sikh Students Federation (Kahlon faction)
Kahlon leads a powerful faction of the militant All India Sikh Students
Federation. He was jailed in July 1986 on sedition charges after publicly rejecting
the Punjab accord and espousing violence as a means of attaining a separate Sikh
state. Kahlon, a former schoolteacher, is the son of a farmer. He is about 32 25x1
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 :CIA-RDP06T00412R000606740001-7
Thakur Singh
Leader, Damdami Taksal
Thakur Singh is an elderly, traditional leader of the Damdami Taksal. He is
usually addressed with the honorific title "Baba." 2 5x 1
Secret 20
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!05111 :CIA-RDP06T00412R000606740001-7
Figure 3
Coantries Most Sasceptible to Sikh Violence and Possible Sikh Havens Outside of India
? Country most susceptible to Sikh violence
[] Possible haven far Sikh proseparatist
extremists
0 No Sikh proseparatist extremist
activity
oiled
wdom
Finlen
Y~ l ~
Why Sikh haven:
- Strong proseparatist sentiments
in Sikh communities
- Proximity to countries most
susceptible to extremist acts
Meleysi~a
Why no Sikh extremist activity:
- Smaller Sikh populations
- Sikhs successfully assimilated
into indigenous populations
-Little proseparatist support in Sikh
communities
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Why Sikh violence:
- Largest expatriate Sikh populations
outside of India
- Most active Sikh proseparatist
extremists
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Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 :CIA-RDP06T00412R000606740001-7