SUDAN: THE GENERAL STAFF'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PRIME MINISTER SADIQ AL-MAHDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606700001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Sudan: The General Staff's Relationship with Prime Minister
Sadiq al-Mahdi
1 - Colonel Jeffrey Levy, USAF (Pentagon)
1 - Dr. Walter Barrows (Pentagon)
1 - Mr. Glen Larzarus (Pentagon)
1 - Colonel Robert H. Sholly (Pentagon)
1 - Mr.. John L.. Moore (Pentagon)
1 - Captain Cheryl McGraw, USAF (Pentagon)
1 - Mr. David J. Fischer (State Department)
1 - Mr. Eric Madison (State Department)
1 - Mr. George S. Harris (State Department)
1 - Mr. Harlan D. Robinson (State Department)
1 - The Honorable Herman J. Cohen (Old EOB)
DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
DDI
ADDI
NIO/AF
NIO/NESA
C/PES
CPAS/ILS
CPAS/IMC/CB
NID Staff
PDB Staff
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS/NESA
PPS/NESA
NESA/IA
NESA/PG
NESA/SO
NESA/AI
NESA/AI/E!
DDI/NESA/AI/E/
/March 1987
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 March 1987
Sudan: The General Staff's Relationship
with Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi
Summary
The Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) General
Staff appears content for now to concentrate its
attention on military affairs, but friction between the
General Staff and Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi is
increasing. The General Staff shares Sadiq's
determination to seize the military initiative against
the southern insurgents, but will be more inclined than
the Prime Minister to pursue a negotiated settlement if
the return of the rainy season in April brings
significant military losses. The General Staff is
likely to push for stronger relations with Egypt and
the United States in hope of obtaining military
assistance, even to the detriment of relations with
Libya--which Sadiq may be less willing to risk.
Barring major civil disorders that might impel the 25X1
military to take power, we do not see indications of a
coup. Civil-military relations are likely to be
This memorandum was prepared at the request of the Sudan desk
JL1Y
CoL
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and
Ofice
Leadership Analysis. Information as or 15 March 1987 wa
sfusedoin
its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
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Civil-Military Strains
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in September 1986 dismissed the
Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) General Staff's five
officers and appointed replacements, but the move did not give
him full control over the organization. Sadiq's nominees for the
positions had to be approved by the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP)--Sadiq's Umma Party coalition partner in the government and
the political arm of the Khatmiyyah sect, the traditional rival
of Sadiq's Ansar sect. As a result of DUP bargaining, the
Commander-in-Chief and his principal subordinates are not Sadiq
loyalists, although the US Attache in Khartoum reports that the
General Staff impressed him as essentially nonpolitical, focused
on itary affairs and supportive of a civilian government.
Decisions by the Prime Minister which the military considers
to be encroachments into its affairs will erode the General
Staff-Sadiq relationship. It probably deteriorated with Sadiq's
decision to request the removal of pre positioned US equipment from Port Sudan.
/ The General Staff was irritate y t e
unilateral civilian decision at a time when the military wants
greater cooperation with the United States. 25X1
In our judgment, Sadiq also has aggravated his relationship
with the General Staff by attempting to increase his monitorina the military. 25X1
--Sadiq reassigned a younger brother to monitor the
politically strategic armored unit at al-Shagara. He
also aroused General Staff ill-feelings by arranging
for the brother to attend the Jordanian military
academy. The Staff felt the opportunity should have
been given on a competitive basis.
--Sadiq's use of the Umma Party security organization
to monitor the military is apparently causing
dissension among officers.
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Sadiq's likely future use of the Umma Party's security apparatus
to monitor the military and continuing attempts to place
loyalists in key positions are certain to irritate the General
St
f f F- I
a
Differences Over the Southern Insurgency
We believe the General Staff shares Sadiq's determination to
seize the military initiative against the southern insurgents in
dry season operations, but there is good evidence that they are
skeptical that there can be a military solution to the southern 25X1
conflict. Lieutenant General al-Sir, for example, has argued
that insurgent leader Colonel John Garang has to be challenged 25X1
militarily before he would be ready for serious negotiations,
according to the US Embassy in Khartoum, but has conceded that
onl a olitical solution could bring peace.
The wet season begins in April, and will limit government
mobility and restrict its forces to garrisons in the south; the
rebels will enjoy increased freedom of movement and are likely to
step up their operations. Heavier government casualties could 25X1
cause Army morale to plummet, perhaps leading to mutinies. Under
these circumstances, the General Staff would have increased
incentive to press Sadiq to pursue a negotiated settlement. F 25X1
Sadig's Approach to Neighboring States
The General Staff will continue to support Sadiq's hard line
toward Ethiopia, given Addis Ababa's support for the southern
Sudanese insurgents and periodic air attacks in Sudan.
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We expect the General Staff, however, to continue to be leery
of Sadiq's dealings toward Libya. Despite Tripoli's past
military assistance to Khartoum for its fight against the
insurgents, the General Staff is suspicious of Libyan intentions
assistance.
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--The General Staff strongly supported Sadiq's refusal
of the Libyan request in early January to use Sudanese
territory for an attack against Chad. The General
Staff argued, in part, that supporting Libya against 25X1
Chad would jeopardize military and economic assistance
fr~ypt, Saudi Arabia and the United States. 25X1
The sporadic and conditional nature of Libyan military 25X1
assistance probably has contributed to the General Staff's
incentive to look to Sudan's traditional allies for sustained
assistance. The officers are favorably disposed ties
with the United States and Egypt. 25X1
the military believes that a iq will not get meanin
ful
g
support from Iran, Iraq or the Soviet Union and that Sadiq's 25X1
solicitations for assistance from these countries jeopardizes
military support from the United States and Egypt. According to
the US Embassy in Cairo, Egypt has resumed military assistance
and training to maintain close ties with the Sudanese military. 25X1
The General Staff successfully persuaded Sadi
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to reaffi
q
rm
Sudan's commitment to the Sudanese-Egyptian Defense Treaty during
'
the Prime Minister
s recent visit to Cairo,
The General Staff argued that the trea
effective deterrent against Ethiopian aggression.
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General Staff, however, may have used the argument to exploit
Sadiq's animosity toward Ethiopia as an added incentive to the
Prime Minister to pursue increased Egyptian military assistance.
Sadiq probably will resist General Staff efforts to establish
strong military relationships with the United States and Egypt,
given his nonaligned foreign policy. Closer ties to Washington
and Cairo risk Libyan retaliation, including Tripoli's resumption
of support to the southern insurgency, the arming of tribes in
western Sudan, or the sponsorship of terrorist attacks in
Khartoum. The General Staff is more inclined than Sadiq to
believe that the benefits from closer relations with the United
Outlook
In our view, the General Staff supports Sadiq, and prefers to
concentrate its efforts on military affairs. We believe the
military probably will continue this support in the near term,
barring a major crisis sparked by civil disorder in which the
General Staff might decide it had a responsibility to intervene.
In the coming year, however, friction between the General
Staff and Sadiq al-Mahdi will build. Sadiq's efforts to gain a
tighter hold on the military and the likelihood of insurgent
gains in the rainy season will be key points of conflict.
Tensions may prompt Sadiq to try to replace members of the
General Staff to make it more responsive to his agenda, deepening
the rift-
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The General Staff
Gen. Fawzi Ahmad al-Fadl. Commander-in-Chief. Member Khatmiyyah
sect ...respect.ed by officers who consider him tough, decisive and
fair...served as military attache to Cairo (1976-7) during period
of close Sudanese-Egyptian ties ...reaards Libya and Soviet Union
as threats to Sudanese security.
Lt. Gen. Abd al-Azim Sadig Muhammad. Chief of Staff. Intelligent
and action oriented, but critics say he is deficient in overall
military knowledge...attended Infantry Officer course at Fort
Benning, Georgia in 1967.
Lt. Gen. al-Sir Muhammad Ahmad. Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations. Career intelligence officer who had tour as Director
of Military Intelligence (1982-3)...long considered by US
officials as one of Sudan's most capable officers...has
criticized United States for not granting more assistance to
Sudan... favored Sudan's past close relationship with EayDt and
regards Libya as a threat to Sudanese security.
Lt. Gen. Faysal Mansur Shawir. Deputy Chief of:Staff for
Administration. Has impressed US officials as knowledgeable and
shrewd... attended a six-month training course in the Soviet Union
(1969) and served as military attache to Moscow
(1978-80)...unpleasant experience in Soviet Union and Moscow's
refusal to supply Sudan with spare parts for its Soviet-built
equipment have left him anti-Soviet.
Lt. Gen. Muhatassim Sara' Ahmad. Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics. Very able officer who has been described as
interestp d in politics... believed to favor close ties with Egypt.
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