EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9 X1
Directorate of
Intelligence
Egypt After Mubarak:
The Succession Question
NESA 87-10009
LDA 87-10728
February 1987
Conv 7 r.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06TO0412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9 5X1
Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Egypt After Mubarak:
The Succession Question
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
and Office of Leadership
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli
This paper was prepared by
Division, NESA~
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 87-10009
LDA 87-10728
February 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9 >X1
Secret
Egypt After Mubarak:
The Succession Question
Key Judgments Egyptians are starting to ask whether President Mubarak will run for
Information available reelection when his term expires in October 1987. Although he is healthy
as of 2 January 1987 and appears unlikely to step down before then, the burdens of office weigh
was used in this report.
heavily on Mubarak and his family, and he may be looking for a graceful
way to exit. In addition, there is always the possibility of accidental death
or assassination, and mounting social and economic pressures could, with
little warning, provoke a crisis capable of forcing Mubarak from office.
25X1
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala is the most likely candidate to succeed
President Mubarak. Abu Ghazala is highly popular with the armed forces
for his aggressive championing of military interests, and he is generally
respected for displaying leadership qualities that many Egyptians believe
Mubarak lacks. His decisive suppression of the police mutiny in 1986
enhanced his political standing. 25X1
In the near term, Mubarak is unlikely to name Abu Ghazala vice president
and de facto heir apparent. Abu Ghazala almost certainly would refuse the
vice-presidency unless he were allowed to keep his defense portfolio-the
foundation of his power. Mubarak probably fears this would concentrate
too much power in Abu Ghazala's hands and detract from his own stature
as president. In any case, Abu Ghazala is well positioned to assume the
presidency whether he is named vice president or not 25X1
The longer Mubarak remains in office, however, the less are Abu
Ghazala's chances of succeeding him. Abu Ghazala could fall from power
before Mubarak-who is healthy and virtually the same age-leaves
office. Although the two men have a generally good working relationship,
past strains between them could recur. The Defense Minister's military
support is likely to erode if he becomes increasingly unable to protect the
standard of living of the officer corps from the effects of economic reform.
In addition, his
close ties to the United States could also hurt him, especially if US-
Egyptian relations cool.
25X6
25X1
Should Abu Ghazala stumble, new contenders almost certainly would
emerge from the senior military ranks. In general, Egyptians are not ready
to accept a civilian as president, and none of the prominent civilians in the
Secret
NESA 87-10009
LDA 87-10728
February 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
regime possess the requisite support or national stature to spark enthusi-
asm. Deputy Prime Minister Wally is a possible long-shot civilian contend-
er. A more likely alternative, however, would be the general serving as
Armed Forces Chief of Staff-either Lieutenant General Oraby, the
incumbent, or his most likely successor, Lieutenant General Salah.
Whoever the leading contenders are, the Egyptian military will play a key
role in selecting the next president. In most circumstances, senior officers
will in effect choose Mubarak's successor by informally conveying their
preferences to members of the government and the ruling party.
Close relations with the United States will remain a cornerstone of
Egyptian foreign policy under any likely successor, but only to the extent
these ties serve Egyptian interests. Although leading contenders recognize
Cairo's continuing need for US aid, ties could loosen if the new president
were obliged to put distance between himself and Mubarak's policies to
protect his own position. Relations with Moscow are likely to improve
slowly and without fanfare or dramatic breakthroughs. Egyptian ties to the
Arab states also will expand, and the peace treaty with Israel-despite
lingering mistrust-will remain intact.
Neither the Islamic right nor the secular left has much chance of taking
power except as the result of a severe domestic crisis or a military coup.
Nor do these fringe elements possess the strength and credibility to have
much impact on the presidential selection process. A government of either
extreme would probably substantially reduce Egypt's reliance on the
United States. Relations with Israel would almost certainly worsen,
although probably not to the point of war
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9 ~1
Secret
The Setting
Mubarak and the Vacant Vice-Presidency
1
Succession Politics: Choosing a New President
2
Abu Ghazala: Strengths and Weaknesses
3
Handicaps
5
The Military Succession
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-95X1
Egypt After Mubarak:
The Succession Question
The Setting
President Hosni Mubarak is in good health at 58 and
appears unlikely to leave office before the end of his
term in October 1987. Nonetheless, there is always a
possibility of accidental death or assassination. Islam-
ic fundamentalism is spreading in Egypt, and Muslim
extremists like those who murdered Anwar Sadat
have been contained but not eliminated by Egyptian
security forces. Moreover, mounting social and eco-
nomic pressures could, with little warning, generate a
political crisis capable of forcing Mubarak from
office.
With the presidential election less than a year away,
Egyptians are starting to ask whether Mubarak will
seek a second term. The burdens of office and frustra-
tions of wrestling with Egypt's worst economic crisis
in modern times appear to weigh heavily on Mubarak
and his family. In recent months he has publicly
hinted that he has withstood enough pressure, and he
may be looking for a graceful way to exit. His refusal
to anoint a successor has only added to growing
uncertainty about his intentions.
Mubarak and the Vacant Vice-Presidency
Mubarak's appointment of a vice president before the
election could indicate his intention to step down, but
he is unlikely to do either. In any case, he almost
certainly will not decide his future course for at least
several months. Rumors and reports have circulated
for years that Mubarak was about to name a vice
president, and virtually all of them identified Defense
Minister Mohamed Abu Ghazala as the most likely
choice. Mubarak, however, has consistently denied
these rumors, and we believe several factors would
weigh against such a selection in the near term.
ubarak
may plan to wait until economic reform measures are
in place to avoid associating a potential successor with
an unpopular belt-tightening program. He probably
would prefer that his successor be chosen by constitu-
tional means, although he is under no illusions about
Abu Ghazala's strong support in the military.
25X1
The strength of Abu Ghazala's potential candidacy
poses a dilemma for Mubarak and also may underlie
his reluctance to appoint a vice president. We believe
Abu Ghazala is too influential either to be appointed
vice president-and thus gain even more power as 25X1
"heir apparent"-or to be passed over by Mubarak's
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
appointing someone else. Mubarak almost certainly
values Abu Ghazala's support for the popularity he
enjoys within the military. Making him vice president
as well as Defense Minister, however, would concen-
trate too much power in Abu Ghazala's hands and
would detract from Mubarak's stature as the leader of
Egypt.
Abu Ghazala, for his part, is highly unlikely to accept
the vice-presidency if it means a relegation to figure-
head status.
=he would accept the appointment only if he were
allowed to keep his defense portfolio and direct con-
trol over the military, where his power and personal
In any case, in the event of Mubarak's demise, Abu
Ghazala's ability to assume control and accomplish a
smooth transition would not require the title of vice
president. His dual position as Defense Minister and
deputy prime minister places him after the President
in the military chain of command, guaranteeing him a
central role in any crisis.
Succession Politics: Choosing a New President
The military-the backbone of any regime in Egypt-
will have a major say in selecting the next president.
Although it has no formal constitutional role in the
succession, the military functions as the omnipresent,
behind-the-scenes power broker-a role reinforced in
the public mind by the Army's rapid suppression of
the police mutiny in February 1986. We believe
civilian politicians would stand little chance of elect-
ing their own candidate in the face of military
opposition
If Mubarak leaves the scene without formally desig-
nating a successor, we expect senior officers to let the
constitutional succession run its course, but the suc-
cessor approved by this process will be their choice. If
date of vacancy.
Under the Egyptian Constitution, a new president
must be nominated by a two-thirds vote of the
People's Assembly one week before the incumbent
president's term expires. The nominee must then be
approved by a majority of the electorate. If the
presidency becomes vacant in midterm, its powers are
assumed temporarily by the speaker of the People's
Assembly-currently Rifaat El-Mahgoub-or, if the
Assembly has been dissolved, by the head of the
Supreme Constitutional Court. The temporary presi-
dent, who is ineligible for a full term, oversees the
nomination and election of a new president-a pro-
cess that can take no longer than 60 days from the
As for the vice-presidency, the Constitution stipulates
that the president "may appoint one or more vice
presidents and may determine their powers and re-
lieve them of their posts. ".The only formal duties
assigned to the vice president-if there is one-are to
assume the presidency temporarily should the presi-
dent be indicted or become unable to perform his
duties.
Although the Constitution does not make the vice
president an automatic successor to a fallen presi-
dent, in both successions since 1952, the vice presi-
dent was quickly elected to the top job. Mubarak
himself was groomed by Sadat to be his successor,
and he acquired considerable power during his six
years as vice president. In contrast, Mubarak has
never appointed a vice president. He has claimed
publicly on several occasions that he is in no hurry
because he does not want to appear to choose a
successor in circumvention of constitutional and dem-
ocratic processes.
Mubarak loses power in a political or economic crisis,
the armed forces almost certainly would take a more
direct role in the selection process. In either case, Abu
Ghazala's undisputed control of the military would
permit him to engineer his own nomination through
the People's Assembly.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
'25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Neither the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)
nor the People's Assembly is likely to play a major
independent role in the selection. The NDP is a
creation of the president, not the reverse, and it is
subject to presidential domination. Although we
would expect the NDP to nominate a candidate, this
action would only formalize a decision already
reached through informal consultations outside party
councils. The People's Assembly, which has an over-
whelming NDP majority, is largely a rubberstamp.
Civilian Actors
The chances of a civilian president coming to power in
the near term are slim. Intellectuals and politicians
probably would grumble about the imposition of
another military president, but we believe most Egyp-
tians are not ready to accept a civilian. Embassy
reporting suggests public opinion tends to view civilian
politicians as corrupt and self-interested in contrast
with the popular respect for the military as self-
sacrificing defenders of the nation. Egyptians are even
more likely to feel comfortable with a military presi-
dent if they believe their country faces a troubled or
uncertain future.
In any case, there are virtually no civilians on the
current scene with stature comparable to Abu Ghaza-
la's who are capable of sparking enthusiasm.
Although
civilian members of Mubarak's Cabinet and inner
circle would play a part in the selection process, we
believe that in his absence their influence would be
uncertain. Prime Minister Sidqi and presidential ad-
viser Osama El-Baz, for example, are two of the most
important figures in formulating and executing Mu-
barak's policies, but neither has independent support.
Sidqi, moreover, is new to politics and is not known to
harbor presidential ambitions.
Egypt's Islamic extremists and secular opposition
parties lack the strength to have much impact on the
presidential selection process. The more conservative
and established Muslim Brotherhood, however, might
carry some weight in the choice of a president and
could attempt quietly to influence the selection by
deploying its considerable financial resources. We
believe the organization has members in the military
who meet clandestinely, although the Brotherhood
cannot attract a steady supply of recruits in the armed
forces. The Brotherhood is unlikely to gain legal
status as a political party in the near term. Even if it
did, we believe it would seek the same unofficial
tolerance from the new leadership that it has enjoyed
under Mubarak in return for helping to undercut the
more radical Islamic groups. 25X1
Abu Ghazala: Strengths and Weaknesses
Despite the lack of an official designation, Abu 25X1
Ghazala is the most likely candidate to succeed
Mubarak
he is by far the strongest poten-25X1
tial contender, on the basis of his leadership of the
armed forces and his long and intimate involvement i25X1
policymaking at the highest levels. Since August 198.
he has been deputy prime minister and
has become one of Mubar-
ak's two most trusted advisers, with responsibilities 25X1
that extend well beyond his defense portfolio. In our25X1
view, Mubarak considers the Defense Minister to be
his de facto political heir. 25X1 1
Abu Ghazala's main support lies in his immense
popularity in the officer corps.
he is admired by all services as a decorated 25X1
hero and an able administrator, but his popularity 25X1
rests primarily on his aggressive championing of 25X1
military interests within the government. He has
given top priority to improving pay and fringe benefits
for servicemen and focused on maintaining a high
level of spending on the military to protect it from the
effects of austerity. 25X1
25X1
The Defense Minister's reputation for forceful and
decisive leadership enhances his political standing. In
this, he benefits by comparison with popular impres-
sions of Mubarak as an honest 0leader 25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Youssef Wally: A Potential Civilian President
Youssef Wally-who serves concurrently as deputy prime minister, Agriculture
Minister, and secretary general of the NDP-might in time muster enough
military and political support to become the first serious civilian contender for the
presidency. One of Egypt's fastest rising political stars, Wally has become one of
President Mubarak's most trusted advisers in recent years. Despite some political
setbacks, we believe he has used his NDP position effectively to build a network of
contacts and supporters by dispensing patronage, and he has close ties to several
while making him vulnerable to dismissal as a scapegoat for government failures.
is influence
recognized that the prime ministership would do little to increase riff
25X1
25X1
25X1
Wally initially met Mubarak and entered the governing elite in January 1982,
when he was appointed Minister of State for Agriculture and Food Security (then
the highest ranking position in the Ministry). He impressed Mubarak with his
hard work and effectiveness in both the Agriculture Ministry and National
Democratic Party and won promotions to Minister and NDP assistant secretary
general in 1984, and deputy prime minister and NDP secretary general in 1985.
fields of agricultural research and trade.
US Embassy officials say that Wally is favorably disposed toward the United
States, and has worked constructively with them on a wide range of bilateral
issues. They also note that since joining the Cabinet he has been one of the
staunchest government proponents of cooperation with Israel, especially in the
adviser to the Agriculture Ministry.
Wally, who is about 57, holds a doctorate from the Faculty of Agriculture of Cai-
ro University. Before entering the government, he was a professor and served as an
who is incapable of managing the country or solving
its problems. Embassy and
suggests that Egyptians from all walks of life believe
Abu Ghazala would make a far better president than
Mubarak because he displays those qualities of
shrewdness, strength, and imagination that Egyptians
have come to expect in their leaders
We believe Abu Ghazala's power has increased signif-
icantly during the past year. His central role in
putting down the police riots reemphasized the critical
importance of Army support for the regime and
earned him the gratitude of a frightened populace. He
has exploited public concerns about the faltering
economy by expanding the military's role in economic
activities, including land reclamation, road and bridge
construction, and food production.
We believe e
25X1
25X1;1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
25X1
25X1
Handicaps
Despite these advantages, several factors could under-
cut a presidential bid, and, in our view, the longer
Mubarak stays in power, the less Abu Ghazala's
chances are of succeeding him. Abu Ghazala's mili-
tary support is likely to erode if, as we expect, officers
begin to believe he can no longer protect their stan-
dard of living against the pressures of economic
reform. military
personnel of all ranks are feeling the pinch, and
complaints are mounting. Junior and noncommis-
sioned officers have been especially hard hit and are
forced increasingly to take illegal second jobs to make
ends meet. Although military officers generally recog-
from Washington.
Abu Ghazala's association with the United States-25X6
dating from his years as an attache-also may be-
come a liability, particularly if US-Egyptian relations
cool. Last year, for example, he was accused by the
opposition press of complicity in the US interception
of the Egyptian plane carrying the Achille Lauro
hijackers. Such stories play on Egyptian sensitivities
about overly close ties to Washington. Abu Ghazala's
stature has been enhanced in the past by his ability t125X1
secure military aid and high-technology hardware
military officers increasingly resent 25X1
their overwhelming dependence on the United Stat125X1
for arms aid and advice. We believe this dependence
will increase as the Egyptian defense budget shrinks.
Finally, Abu Ghazala could lose his front-runner's 25X1
position by having a falling-out with Mubarak before
the President leaves office. Although we believe their
working relationship is generally good,
3 trains between them have often circulated in the
past.
25X1 nize the need for austerity
Defense Minister
Mubarak's handling of the Achille Lauro hijacking in
they believe military programs and perquisites
should be exempted from severe spending cuts and
look to Abu Ghazala for support.
25X1
Although the 25
25X1
:25X1
25X1
emains loyal to Mubarak, we 25X1
believe friction over the handling of any new crisis
could boil over and cause Abu Ghazala's dismissal.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
The Military Succession
If Abu Ghazala should stumble, another member of
the senior military would most likely become Mubar-
ak's successor. We believe the general serving as
Armed Forces Chief of Staff when Mubarak leaves
office would have the best chance of becoming the
new president. The present Chief of Staff and the
generals in line for his position are generally well
disposed toward the United States but less so than
Abu Ghazala.
Lt. Gen. Ibrahim El-Oraby, 55, has been the Armed
Forces Chief of Staff since 1983. A blunt, no-non-
sense workaholic, he owes his appointment as much to
his distant relationship with Defense Minister Abu
Ghazala as to his competence. The two men respect
each other professionally but do not get along. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, Mubarak appoint-
ed Oraby in order to prevent the development of a
Defense Minister-Chief of Staff coalition that could
threaten his position
Oraby has come to dominate the day-to-day manage-
ment of the military, with Abu Ghazala devoting
increasing attention to his duties as deputy prime
minister. Although respected for his military knowl-
edge, Oraby has been widely criticized within the
improve discipline, and association with unpopular
austerity measures. He has impressed US officials as
a forceful, competent, and confident officer.
Oraby is likely to retire within the next 18 months. In
early 1986 he told a US official that he would soon
have to step aside and make room for a new genera-
tion of younger generals. He also said he does not
aspire to any other government position because he
does not like working with civilians-"they don't take
orders." According to
Oraby strongly believes the Egyptian Army must stay
out of politics, although it should play a key role in
countering Islamic extremism.
Active involvement in the US-Egyptian military rela-
tionship has given Oraby considerable experience in
dealing with US officials, with whom he feels at ease.
Although he has expressed appreciation for US assis-
tance to Egypt and stressed his commitment to a long-
term strategic relationship with the United States, we
believe he harbors reservations about close military
ties to Washington. He can be blunt in disagreeing
with aspects of US policy. He believes US backing for
Israel is at the expense of Egyptian and Arab inter-
ests. He recently told senior US officials, however,
that Egypt's peace with Israel is "permanent," despite
lingering suspicions on both sides
Lt. Gen. Ahmad Salah Abdel Halim, 55, is close to
Oraby and favored to succeed him as Chief of Staff,
according to Embassy and
Salah, who is probably Mu ara s favorite among
Egyptian generals, was promoted to his current rank
and named special assistant to Abu Ghazala in June
1986 after serving three years as Chief of Operations.
We believe this promotion and reassignment were
calculated by Mubarak to position Salah for eventual
appointment as Chief of Staff. Such an appointment
would continue Mubarak's practice of placing his own
man in the military's number-two position to counter-
balance Abu Ghazala.
Salah is highly respected and supported by his fellow
officers, who regard him as Egypt's best Chief of
Operations since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. They also
prefer his low-key, diplomatic style to that of the more
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
225X1
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
After Salah, Maj. Gen. Mahfouz Abdel Hamid
Hamdy, 53, would be the most likely candidate for
Chief of Staff. Hamdy succeeded Salah as Chief of
Operations last summer. have
described him as well read, knowledgeable about
international affairs, and highly respected within the
military. Before assuming his current position, he
served three years as defense attache in Paris, where[
he was deeply involved
Egyptian armed forces.
to replace him.
In our judgment, only a general breakdown that
threatened prolonged disorder would prompt Abu
Ghazala and the other military commanders to mount
a coup against the Mubarak government. Although
such a collapse is not likely in the near term, the onset
of austerity is almost certain to spark at least some
domestic violence. If unrest led to a collapse of civilian
authority, the military would be left in de facto
control of the government, but Mubarak could remain
as a figurehead. If the public continued to blame
Mubarak personally for Egypt's policy failures, the
senior commanders probably would ask him to step
down and almost certainly would name Abu Ghazala
his power.
An even less likely possibility is that Abu Ghazala
would attempt to avoid the presidency. Knowledge-
able observers say he complains that his duties as
deputy prime minister take too much time from
military affairs. Had he hungered for Mubarak's job,
the serious police riots in 1986 would have given him
the opportunity to seize power, as many Egyptians
expected. If disorder forced Mubarak's removal, Abu
Ghazala might assume control of the government as a
caretaker but arrange his return to military duty once
order was restored and a new president chosen. As
Defense Minister and Commander of the Armed
Forces Abu Ghazala enjoys more real power and
prestige than anyone except Mubarak without having
to shoulder the President's burdens and endure public
criticism. He may also fear that as president he would
lose the close contact with the military that he
thoroughly enjoys and exploits as the major source of
Egyptian Policy Outlook and Implications for the
United States
A government led by Abu Ghazala would continue 25X1
the substance of Mubarak's policies, in our view, but
with a firmer, more results-oriented style. Abu
Ghazala appears to believe that a strong economy is
the key to peace and security and has often demon- 25X1
strated impatience with Egypt's slow economic 25X1
growth. If he took power, Abu Ghazala would search
for alternative policies that offered hope of stimulat-25X1
ing economic development, but we know of no specific
ideas he may have beyond applying a stronger hand at
the helm. Imposing economic austerity measures
without provoking popular protests will remain diffi-
cult, but the credibility and popular respect Abu
Ghazala enjoys probably would have an ameliorating
influence. 25X1
Abu Ghazala's well-known dislike of civilian politi-
cians probably would prompt him to increase military
representation in the government-at least initially-25X1
through Cabinet appointments and his own staff in
the office of the presidency,
Major figures in the Mubarak hierar25X1
chy, such as El-Baz, with whom Abu Ghazala has
25X1
crossed swords in the past, and Foreign Minister
Abdel Meguid, for whom
th25X1
Defense Minister has little respect, probably would be
replaced with trusted military aides
Foreign policies also would closely parallel those of 25X1
Mubarak. Abu Ghazala's frequent disparaging re-
marks about the Soviets suggest that, as with Mu-
barak, experience in Soviet military schools left him
with a negative attitude toward the USSR. Nonethe-
less, he is willing to do business with Moscow, includ-
ing purchasing Soviet-made arms. Abu Ghazala's
comments also reveal strong distrust of both Israel
and Libya. We do not believe, however, that his
accession to the presidency would increase the chance
of armed conflict with either of those powers. Peace
with Israel remains popular even within the military,
and Embassy reports, 25X1
and abrogation of the peace treaty would be highly
unlikely.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Close relations with the United States almost certain-
ly would remain a cornerstone of Egyptian foreign
policy under Abu Ghazala, whose pro-American repu-
tation generally is deserved. Nonetheless, he is first
and foremost a nationalist and would be unlikely to
support US policies that conflict with Egypt's inter-
ests or place his political position at risk.
he favors closer military
ties to Washington in order to benefit from Western
technology, and we believe he would expect continued
military and economic aid as the price of his support.
Public opinion, however, could force him to put
distance between himself and the United States.
If Abu Ghazala does not succeed Mubarak, the new
president almost certainly will be someone who re-
flects the preferences of the Egyptian military and
who generally adheres to current policy. Such a
successor could be expected to follow a generally
moderate foreign policy but with less of a pro-
American tilt than Abu Ghazala might be prepared to
accept. Any successor-except perhaps Wally-
would have less personal commitment than Mubarak
to the Camp David accords and less interest in
improving relations with Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, cor-
rect ties would be maintained, and the peace treaty
would remain intact. The steady improvement in
relations with the Arab states would continue, and ties
to Moscow probably would be strengthened, if only to
serve as a lever against the United States
The new president's policies would partly depend on
the circumstances under which he assumed power. If
Mubarak lost his office in an atmosphere of failure
and recrimination, we would expect the next president
to put distance between himself and Mubarak's poli-
cies. Relations with the United States could cool in
reaction to Mubarak's heavy reliance on Washington
for Egyptian military security and economic develop-
ment and for achieving a Middle East peace
settlement
Policy changes would be significantly greater if either
the Islamic right or the secular left took power.
Neither type of regime-especially a leftist one-
appears likely in the near to medium term, but there
is a chance that an extremist group could gain power
either because of a severe domestic crisis or a military
coup. A government of either extreme would almost
certainly reduce Egypt's reliance on the United States
and downgrade ties to Tel Aviv, although not to the
point of war.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Appendix
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala
Field Marshal Mohamed Abu Ghazala is the most
dynamic member of President Hosni Mubarak's gov-
ernment. Hard-charging and self-assured, Abu
Ghazala gives the impression of a man who thorough-
ly enjoys his job. His public activities receive promi-
nent play in Cairo's newspapers, and he still enjoys
popular acclaim as a result of the Army's effective
suppression of police riots during February-March
1986. In recent years he has gained a wealth of
experience in nonmilitary matters as his duties as
deputy prime minister have come to absorb an ever
increasing amount of his attention. He recently com-
plained to a hat he has
little time to devote to his first love-the Army.
cratic infighting.
Abu Ghazala's reputation as an action-oriented deci-
sionmaker stands in sharp contrast with Mubarak's
popular image as well intentioned and decent but
ineffective. Such perceptions have fueled Cairo's ru-
mor mill, which for several years have reported
dissension between the two men. We concur with the
Embassy's judgment that Mubarak and Abu Gha-
zala, although occasionally differing over specific
issues, enjoy a fairly harmonious working relationship
born of mutual professional respect, a similar world
view, and a shared disdain for theorizing and bureau-
Although a staunch Egyptian nationalist, Abu Gha-
zala is closely identified with and intensely committed
to the US-Egyptian relationship. His forceful argu-
ments for bilateral cooperation clearly demonstrate
his belief that US assistance to Egypt is a sound
investment in Egypt's security. US diplomats say that
this American connection is a "double-edged sword"
for Abu Ghazala. On the one hand, he is credited,
especially within the military, with the ability to win
US approval for the sale of advanced military equip-
ment critical to Egypt's military modernization pro-
gram. On the other hand, he is criticized in the
opposition press because of the widespread perception
that US-Egyptian military cooperation infringes on
25X1
Egypt's sovereignty and increases its foreign debt. In
some circles he is disparagingly called the "American
Minister."
Abu Ghazala is comfortable with Americans. In
discussions with US officials, he often refers to his
tour in Washington as defense attache (1976-80) as
his "best four years." He is generally candid in
meetings with Americans-a trait he admires and
knows Americans also value. He has demonstrated
good faith in his dealings with US officials by sticking
to the agreements he makes, and, on those occasions
when he is required to reverse himself, he fully
explains the circumstances behind his changed posi- 25X1
tion. Although he likes to drive a hard bargain, he is
flexible and willing to compromise to obtain his
objective.
The blunt Defense Minister uses some of his harshest
invective when discussing the Soviet Union. He has
described the USSR as a "predatory state" and the
Soviets as "shiftless bastards." His intense dislike of
that country appears to date from his four years of
study there. Like many Egyptian officers of his
generation, he studied in the USSR at the Combined
Arms School for Division and Higher Commanders.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Since returning to Cairo he has be-
come more subdued out of concern for his public
image in Egypt. He is not known for strong religious
convictions. His wife, however, follows traditional
Islamic practices, and Abu Ghazala has made efforts
to be seen visiting mosques and meeting with religious
shaykhs. he lives in
an unostentatious apartment near his military head-
quarters.
Abu Ghazala graduated in 1949 from the Egyptian
Military Academy, where he and Mubarak were
classmates but apparently had little personal contact.
He is a veteran of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
wars and served as artillery commander of the 2nd
Field Army during the latter conflict. Following his
tour in Washington he was appointed Chief of Staff
and Commander of the Army. In 1981 Anwar Sadat
elevated him to Armed Forces Commander in Chief
and Defense Minister. He has twice been promoted by
Mubarak, who named him a field marshal in April
1982 and four months later appointed him deputy
prime minister. Abu Ghazala is 57.
Secret 10
' 25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP06T00412R000606630001-9