ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: LOOKING AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606390001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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NESA 86-10049
December 1986
Copy 19 2
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Looking Ahead
Islamic Fundamentalism in the
Middle East and South Asia:
A Research Paper
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Looking Ahead
Islamic Fundamentalism in the
Middle East and South Asia:
A Research Paper
Operations.
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Division, NESAJ
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications
Secret
NESA 86-10049
no .?h- InQ.c
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Islamic Fundamentalism in the
Middle East and South Asia:
Looking Ahead
Summary Into the next decade fundamentalist groups in the Middle East and South
Information available Asia will be able to exploit an array of political, economic, and social
as of 1 October 1986 problems-such as declining oil revenues, the unresolved Palestinian issue,
was used in this report. ,
and the disruptive impact of Western values on Muslim culture-to gain
followers, exert pressure on governments, and influence policy. The most
serious challenge will come from more moderate fundamentalists, who
outnumber the extremists and seek to establish Islamic states through legal
means in countries such as Egypt and Jordan. The imposition of Islamic or-
thodoxy would probably increase persecution of religious minorities
throughout the Middle East and South Asia.
The threat of an Islamic revolution on the Iranian Shia model has declined.
Sunni Muslims have grown wary of the revolution's excesses, and govern-
ments in the region have stepped up their surveillance of Islamic militants.
Islamic fundamentalism appeals primarily to young, urban, well-educated
Muslims from middle-class backgrounds because they are most affected by
social and economic dislocation. Given rapid population growth, continued
urbanization, and increasing emphasis on education in Muslim countries,
the audience most responsive to fundamentalist ideals will probably grow.
The lower classes are likely to remain an untapped pool of potential
fundamentalists unless they are galvanized into action by a charismatic
leader or a major blunder by an area regime
Key countries in the region will face varying degrees of threat from
fundamentalism:
? Egypt and Jordan run a high risk of serious fundamentalist unrest in the
next few years. Radical fundamentalism will probably gain strength in
both countries because of their seemingly intractable economic and social
problems, particularly the dim employment prospects for increasing
numbers of university graduates and workers returning from jobs in the
Persian Gulf. The moderate Muslim Brotherhood will probably use its
influence in business, education, and social services to press the Mubarak
government for such measures as the adoption of Islamic law.
iii Secret
NESA 86-10049
n--h- IORK
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? Saudi Arabia is likely to face growing pressure from young university
graduates and clerics to limit the spread of Western culture. There is no
immediate fundamentalist threat to the already conservative regime, but
a continuing economic slump could heighten the appeal of religious
radicalism. An Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war would escalate
sectarian militancy in the predominantly Shia Eastern Province, provid-
ing a potential base for antiregime activities.
? The rising appeal of fundamentalism on the West Bank will be a growing
irritant to the Israeli Government. The Israelis thus far have allowed
fundamentalism to flourish because they see it as weakening Palestinian
nationalism. This policy is risky because Jewish settlement in the West
Bank and attempts by Jewish zealots to seize control of Muslim holy
places in Jerusalem are radicalizing West Bank fundamentalists.
? Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria must deal with the growing appeal of
fundamentalism among young people who view it as an alternative to
regimes that seem to offer no alternative to dim employment prospects
and deteriorating social conditions. Of the three, Tunisia will probably
have the most difficulty containing the expansion of fundamentalism
because ailing President Bourguiba is losing control of the government.
? Radical fundamentalism is unlikely to gain a strong foothold in Syria
despite severe economic problems. Most Syrians have benefited from
President Assad's rule, and intense ethnic, class, and sectarian loyalties
inhibit the development of a popular religious opposition movement.
Moreover, Assad's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 is a
brutal reminder of the risk involved in any challenge to his authority.
? In Pakistan-a self-proclaimed Islamic state-political, social, and eco-
nomic realities will eventually force the government to become less
rigidly Islamic. The regime's imposition of one interpretation of Islam on
a religiously and ethnically diverse population has been a continual
source of domestic unrest. Shias-sometimes with Iranian support-and
other Muslim minority sects will continue to protest that the govern-
ment's Sunni Islamic ideology has made them second-class citizens. The
country's Islamic system has complicated the tax structure as well as
Pakistan's international finance.
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The diversity of Islamic fundamentalism reduces the chance of widespread
cooperation across borders. Despite contacts between branches of the
Muslim Brotherhood, between Shia groups in the Gulf, and between Shias
in Iran and Lebanon, there is little organized cooperation among radical Is-
lamic groups. This diversity reduces the likelihood that a single leader will
emerge to unite fundamentalists into a powerful political force.
Governments in the region are attempting, with only limited success, to
curb fundamentalism through a combination of co-optation, suppression,
and acceptance of some fundamentalist demands. In the long term,
fundamentalism's revolutionary appeal will be blunted only by the emer-
gence of leaders inclined to deal realistically with the region's many
economic, political, and social problems. Tackling these problems will be
risky because some solutions may involve unpopular measures such as
family planning programs or reduced food subsidies. So far, leaders have
been reluctant to institute such measures for fear of giving fundamentalist
opposition groups even more ammunition to attack the government.
Fundamentalists of all stripes resent the United States because of its
identification with Western culture and its support for Israel. They usually
view US assistance and economic development projects as attempts to
spread Western culture at the expense of Islamic traditions.
The growth of Islamic fundamentalism will probably increase the tendency
toward nonalignment among Muslim Middle Eastern and South Asian
nations. The fundamentalist threat will make regional governments even
more wary of increased political or military cooperation with the United
States. The Soviet Union is unlikely to benefit directly from fundamental-
ism-which is anti-Communist-but Moscow will be able to exploit the
political instability of moderate regimes through its support of radical
Arab states. Moscow will also gain because the United States and the
West-with their heavy security, economic, and political commitments in
the region-have more to lose by a general cooling of relations with the Is-
v Secret
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Contents
Summary
Unemployment and Unfulfilled Expectations
1
Impact of the Iranian Revolution
3
Fundamentalism's Drawing Power
5
Governmental Responses
5
Co-opting the Religious Leaders
6
Indirect Threat
9
Implications for the United States
10
A. Prospects for Key Countries and Regions
B. The Development of Religious Movements
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Figure 1
Near East-South Asia
await
Babrain
(later
Saudi I U.A.E.
Arabia
Y, R. P. D. R.Y'
P.D.R.Y.
Yemey) (S. Yemen)
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Maldives
Indian
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Islamic Fundamentalism in the
Middle East and South Asia:
Looking Ahead
boom and bust in oil revenues.
The rise and fall of Islamic fundamentalist influence
continues to be a recurring feature of Middle Eastern
and South Asian history. Fundamentalist movements
have become politically important during times of
social turmoil and economic uncertainty and often
have a lasting impact. Saudi Arabia's strict interpre-
tation of Islam, for instance, is largely the outgrowth
of an 18th-century fundamentalist movement. Most
scholars agree that fundamentalism today is driven by
the long-term reactions to the Arab defeat by Israel in
1967, the failure of secular ideologies to address
political problems adequately, and the social and
economic dislocations that have accompanied the
social justice.
Economic Contraction
The current economic downturn in the Middle East is
providing fertile ground for the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism. Falling oil revenues are contributing
to unemployment and to deteriorating social services
in such diverse countries as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and Algeria. Fundamentalist rhetoric is espe-
cially appealing to many of the educated youth. They
have come to expect increasing prosperity and a rising
standard of living but are also committed to ideals of
Unemployment and Unfulfilled Expectations. Declin-
ing economic opportunities, especially in the Middle
East, are frustrating university students and gradu-
ates, who have been the mainstays of radical funda-
mentalist groups in the past. In Saudi Arabia, for
example, educated youth are finding job opportunities
shrinking. This contrasts with the boom years of the
1970s and early 1980s, when nearly all youth with a
secondary education could find a well-paying job. In
Egypt the downturn is undermining the widely held
notion that education is the key to a better life.' Good
' Despite the bleak job prospects, Egyptians persistently pursue
higher education. Even poor Egyptians pay tutors up to $4 per hour
to enhance their children's education and to compensate for
overcrowded facilities and poor teaching, according to the US
Embassy in Cairo. University medical students pay as much as
Islamic Fundamentalism Defined
We define Islamic fundamentalism as a religiously
motivated movement that attempts to rebuild society
according to what the fundamentalists regard as a
divine plan. Typically, fundamentalists accept scrip-
ture, mythology, and traditions as literal truth with-
out consideration of their historic or symbolic con-
text. Adherents are committed to a world view in
which all events have religious significance. This
definition encompasses a wide range of Islamic
groups, including the relatively moderate Muslim
Brotherhood and radical groups such as Egypt's al- 25X1
Jihad. 25X1
Both radicals and conservatives advocate rule by
Islamic law and the elimination of all Western
influences, but they differ greatly on tactics to
achieve their goals. Radical groups strive for an
Islamic revolution on the Iranian model in which the
political, social, and economic organization of the
country is dramatically altered to conform to Islamic
tenets. Such groups have been responsible for the
assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981,
the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, 25X1
and recent clashes with police in Egypt, Jordan,
Tunisia, and Pakistan. Radical groups are generally
small, with most probably numbering fewer than 500
members.
Moderates, who seek to establish Islamic states
through legal means, offer a more complex challenge.
Moderates are usually older and more established in
business and the professions. They seek to gain wider
followings through their support of social welfare
programs and education. Thus, the Sunni Islamic
Call Party, a hitherto nonpolitical religious educa-
tion society based in India and with more than 1
million members worldwide, recently has been calling
attention to its branches in the Gulf states by adopt-
ing goals similar to those of other fundamentalist
groups.
25X1
25X1
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Economic Expansion and Islamic Fundamentalism
Ironically, Islamic fundamentalism seems to grow
during periods of both economic growth and decline.
Even if the Middle East rebounds soon from its
current recession, governments threatened by funda-
mentalist movements will not be able to relax their
guard. The rapid social and cultural changes that
accompanied the economic boom in the Middle East
in the 1970s and 1980s also created an environment
for the growth of radical religious movements:
? Migration of the rural lower classes to major cities
exaggerated the disparity in living conditions be-
tween the cities' poor and wealthy. Conservative
migrants were dismayed by the un-Islamic values
of the urban, Westernized elite.
? Expanding educational opportunities and the media
exposed the masses to foreign ideas and culture.
Many Middle Easterners who studied or traveled in
the West became disillusioned with Western cul-
ture.
jobs are increasingly scarce, and salaries even for
educated Egyptians are usually low.
Social tensions are increasing as contracting econo-
mies in the Arab oil-producing states are forcing
workers from other Arab countries to return home at
the same time that universities in their home countries
are turning out increasing numbers of jobseekers. In
Jordan, for instance, engineers and doctors, who have
been prominent in the Islamic fundamentalist move-
ment, are being hit hard by the return of overseas
workers. Approximately 30 percent of Jordan's 16,000
engineers are unemployed, according to the US Em-
bassy in Amman. The increasing job shortage will
probably most affect recent graduates who must
compete with experienced workers returning from the
Gulf. Physicians in Amman told the Embassy that as
many as one-third of Jordan's 3,000 doctors are
unemployed. In Algeria, a population growth rate of
more than 3 percent per year-one of the highest in
the world-is outstripping the sagging economy's
ability to create jobs.
Strained Social Services. We believe the appeal of
fundamentalism is further enhanced by widespread
perceptions that Arab societies are disintegrating. In
Egypt and Algeria, for instance, falling government
revenues are making it impossible to meet the increas-
ing demand for housing, education, and other social
services:
? The US Embassy in Cairo reports that low-cost
rent-controlled apartments in Cairo and Alexandria
are scarce. The price of a new apartment, which
ranges from $6,000 in a poor neighborhood to
$30,000 in a middle-class area, makes purchases
unaffordable to all but the wealthiest young people.'
? Untreated sewage flowed in the streets and backed
up in homes and factories in Alexandria last sum-
mer because the rickety municipal waste treatment
system could not handle the burden of extra visitors
during the Ramadan holidays. Demonstrators in
Alexandria protested the sewage problem by over-
turning government buses and stopping trains until
security forces quelled the disturbances, according
to the US Consulate in Alexandria.
? In Algiers, the continued deterioration of the over-
crowded Casbah-the historic residential district
where a building's collapse in 1985 produced major
antigovernment demonstrations- characterizes the
severity of the housing shortage, according to the
US Embassy. The government determined that
4,000 families in the Casbah needed to relocate
because their homes were in danger of collapsing.
Thus far, fewer than half of these families have
found alternative housing.
? Limited space has forced Algerian universities to
use rigorous examinations for admission. Last year
fewer than one-fourth of the nearly 150,000 stu-
dents who took the exams passed, according to
2 An Egyptian primary school teacher may earn as little as $60 per
month, and a university graduate with a degree in business can
expect to earn about $180 per month in a public-sector corporation.
25X1
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diplomatic reporting. The nation's vocational
schools can absorb only about 10 percent of the
youth who do not attend a university.
The Effects of Modernization'
Governments in Muslim countries face the dilemma
of trying to use modern Western technology to expand
their economies while attempting to appease funda-
mentalists by limiting penetration of Western ideas
and values. Although fundamentalists throughout the
region denounce what they perceive as the moral
decay caused by modernization, we believe this dilem-
ma will be most acute in Saudi Arabia, which re-
mained isolated from Western influences longer than
most Muslim countries and whose wealth has sparked
particularly rapid expansion of education and indus-
try.
Although Saudi Arabia has been remarkably stable
for the past 20 years, this expansion probably will
increase tension between modern and traditional ele-
ments of Saudi society. Increasing higher education in
Saudi Arabia-35 years ago Saudi higher education
consisted only of two high schools-is exposing thou-
sands of Saudis from rural as well as urban back-
grounds to new ideas that are often perceived as
inconsistent with traditional Islamic values. More
than 57,000 Saudis attend universities in the king-
dom, and the number will grow to nearly 100,000 by
1990, according to the US Embassy in Riyadh. In
addition, thousands of other Saudi youths are receiv-
ing university educations in Western countries.F_
Impact of the Iranian Revolution
We believe the appeal of the Iranian revolution has
diminished over the past few years because of the poor
economic performance of the Tehran regime and such
excesses as mass arrests, torture, and executions. The
Iran-Iraq war also is reawakening traditional Arab
enmity toward Persians. Even among Iraqi Shias this
ethnic antipathy is proving stronger than the religious
beliefs they share with the Iranians. In addition,
' We define modernization as growth in the capacity to apply
science to industrial, commercial, and human endeavors. It implies
a cultural and psychological willingness to search continually for
knowledge as well as tolerance for abstraction and uncertainty.
Fundamentalists criticize modernization because it is based on
secular scientific knowledge rather than revealed religious truth.F-
Sunni fundamentalists reject rule by the clergy, mys-
ticism, the concept of sainthood, and the cult of
martyrdom, all of which are central to Khomeini's 25X1
Shia fundamentalism. 25X1
Despite the dark side of the Iranian revolution, Mus-
lim fundamentalists have drawn inspiration from
Khomeini's ability to topple an unpopular, pro-
Western regime. Khomeini's model is still attractive
to Shias in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, many
of whom are of Iranian extraction and have been
treated as second-class citizens. Some Sunni funda-
mentalists probably believe the performance of other
Islamic regimes would be better than that of the
Iranian clerics.
Who Are the Fundamentalists?
Fundamentalists generally are young, well educated,
and from lower middle- or middle-class backgrounds,
although there are variations from country to country.
Many fundamentalist leaders received their educa-
tions in Europe and North America,
' Most moved from country to city
and became committed fundamentalists while living
in large, depersonalized urban areas such as Cairo or
Casablanca. We believe fundamentalism does not
have widespread appeal among the more numerous,
religiously conservative lower classes and rural popu-
lations of the Middle East and South Asia. The lower
classes are a pool of potential fundamentalist support,
but they are unlikely to join middle-class fundamen-
talists in great numbers unless they are motivated by 25X1
a charismatic leader or galvanized into action by a
major political blunder by a regime. Historically, the 25X1
emergence of a charismatic leader who could gain
such broad-based support is uncommon.
the profile of Egyptian fundamentalists derived from
' In contrast to the close security monitoring at universities in most
Middle Eastern and South Asian states, Western institutions
provide Muslim students freedom of association and thought, which
could nurture antiregime movements such as fundamentalism.
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Sunni and Shia: Islam's Major Divisions
Islam has undergone numerous splits, rivalries, and
conflicts over the intepretation of the Koran and
Muhammad 's messages on social and religious be-
havior among believers. The major division is be-
tween the Sunni and Shia branches. Numerous sects
and schools of interpretation are included in these
two basic divisions.
Sunni
More than 80 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis.
They are followers of the Sunnah, the way of the
Prophet, and recognize the first four caliphs (succes-
sors to Muhammad) as temporal leaders of Islam.
Within two centuries after Muhammad 's death, how-
ever, no central authority remained to interpret Is-
lamic religious law. Instead, four schools of interpre-
tation evolved, based on the individuals who first
espoused a doctrinal version of the hadiths (traditions
of the Prophet). These schools-Hanbali, Hanafi,
Shafli, and Maliki-are considered equally valid,
and a Sunni Muslim may follow any one of them.
Although Sunni Muslims have religious scholars and
clerics, they place greater stress on community con-
sensus than on the pronouncements of religious el-
ders. The religious establishments in Sunni states
interviews and trial records in that country is repre-
sentative of Islamic activists in many parts of the
region:
? Ninety percent of the members of radical groups
were in their twenties or thirties.
? Eighty percent were either university students or
graduates. Usually they were the first in their
families to receive higher education.
? Sixty percent were students or graduates in science,
engineering, and medicine-subjects in which ad-
missions standards are toughest and in which stu-
dents are confronted squarely with the inconsisten-
cies between traditional religious beliefs and
modern science.
have rarely posed a political threat to the regime, as
they accept a secular leader's right to rule the state.
They have often legitimized authoritarian rule
through their support while moderating the leader's
secular policies.
Shia
Shia Islam is based on the belief that the legitimate
leadership of the Islamic community rests exclusively
among the descendants of Ali, Muhammad's son-in-
law. Shias ascribe supernatural qualities to these
descendants and believe they are the rightful leaders
of the Muslim community. Over time the line of
succession came into dispute, with Shia Islam divid-
ing into several sects, usually over the interpretation
of when a messianic Imam would appear to rule
mankind.
Shias accept literally the doctrine of indivisibility of
religion and politics. They view all secular rule as
illegitimate but tolerate it until the return of the last
Imam. Having disappeared in 873, this so-called
Hidden Imam is believed to be living and will
reappear at the Day of Judgment. Iranian leader
Khomeini altered this view by introducing the concept
that clerics should rule the state in the absence of the
Imam.
? Most came from lower middle-class backgrounds.
Many of their fathers were teachers or middle-level
civil servants.
The profile of moderate fundamentalists generally
differs from that of the radicals only in age, according
to academic studies. The moderates are usually at
least 20 years older; their tactics have been tempered
by time, experience, and expediency. For example,
leaders of the relatively moderate Muslim Brother-
hood, who are now in their sixties and seventies,
espoused violence when they were much younger.
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Exporting the Iranian Revolution
Exporting the revolution is a central tenet of the
clerical regime in Iran. Khomeini believes his mes-
sage is valid for all Muslims and supports extensive
efforts to promote the revolution throughout the
Islamic world. Iran's goal is to establish an organiza-
tional and ideological base for the creation of Islamic
republics. Its efforts are most intense in the Gulf
states with large Shia populations-Bahrain, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. Iran has recently increased its
efforts to export the revolution to Muslims in South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Iran recruits directly from the large pool of devout
Shia youth in the Gulf states. Shia youth who show
fervent support for Khomeini are taken to Iran for
training and returned to recruit like-minded youth
into fundamentalist organizations, according to dip-
lomatic reporting. For instance, the Islamic Call
Party of Bahrain (Dawa) draws recruits from among
those attending meetings of the Islamic Enlighten-
ment Society, and the screening can take up to two
years as background information is gathered on
potential members.
this process has been effective in preventing
Bahraini security infiltration of Dawa.
Fundamentalism's Drawing Power
We believe Islamic fundamentalism will continue to
appeal to Muslims because it transforms political,
economic, and social problems into moral absolutes
that are drawn from their own religious traditions.
Fundamentalism provides simplistic answers to com-
plex problems by asserting that:
? Islam as outlined in the Koran and practiced by the
early Islamic community provides the only legiti-
mate model for Muslim life.
? Society is disintegrating and the economy is worsen-
ing because some Muslims are imitating un-Islamic
Western models.
? Israel, the United States, un-Islamic Arab regimes,
and Western culture are responsible for the recent
decline in oil revenues.
? Crime, drug abuse, sexual permissiveness, and spiri-
tual malaise are caused by the infatuation of politi-
cal elites with Western culture and political ideas.
Both Sunni and Shia fundamentalists have well-
developed radical theologies that provide appealing
alternatives to such "failed" secular ideologies as
nationalism, Marxist socialism, and Western capital-
ism. The theologies also articulate the frustrations
faced by many Muslims:
? Radical Sunni theology blames modernity and
Western civilization for the Muslim world's decline 25X1
into a state of "barbarism" (jahiliyya). A true
Muslim, in this view, must rebel against modernity
as well as governments that allow modern values to
penetrate Muslim society. These true believers will
form the leadership for the new just society.
? Shia Islam has a long history of political involve-
ment by activist clerics, who have argued for the
establishment of a theocratic state. To these older
traditions, Khomeini added the concepts of direct
clerical rule as well as immediate spiritual redemp-
tion through political action.
Governmental Responses
A regime's response to the fundamentalist challenge
depends on the degree of its legitimacy, wealth, self-
confidence, coercive potential, and perception of the
fundamentalist threat. Although some regimes have
stressed suppression, most have resorted to a combina-
tion of appeasement and coercion.
Public Devotion. Many government leaders increase
their public religious practices in hopes of strengthen-
ing their Islamic legitimacy. Even secularists such as
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Syrian President
Assad resort to displays of devotion'to undercut
claims by fundamentalists that they are not believers.
We believe these ploys only increase the fundamenta-
lists' conviction that these secular leaders are trying to
manipulate religion for political benefit.
LOA1
25X1
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Figure 2
Youth Population Projection, 1970-2000a
1970 1985 2000 0
2000 0 1970 1985
2000 0
Regimes are turning to other techniques to prove their
Islamic credentials:
? Before the downturn in the oil market, almost all
Muslim governments generously funded their reli-
gious affairs ministries. Large new mosques sprang
up in capital cities, and existing structures were
upgraded to meet the needs of growing populations.
? Many countries, particularly in the Maghreb and
Persian Gulf, use the government-controlled media
for extensive religious programing and messages.
Almost all regimes have paid renewed attention to the
restrictions of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fast-
ing, partly by readjusting work and school hours.
Saddam Husayn's regime, for instance, surprised
many hard-drinking Iraqis this year by announcing a
ban on alcoholic beverages and the closure of all
nightclubs during Ramadan, according to the US
Embassy in Baghdad.
Co-opting the Religious Leaders. Co-opting the cleri-
cal establishment as well as opposition fundamentalist
leaders has been one of the most effective policies in
blunting fundamentalism. In most Muslim countries a
Ministry of Religion or Islamic Affairs or a religious
consultative body such as council of religious elders
(ulema) functions to spread the state-controlled ver-
sion of Islam. The most powerful tools for govern-
ments include control of the salaries of mosque
preachers as well as the mosques themselves. Close
association with the regimes, however, can discredit
the ulema and cause them to become a target of
fundamentalist opposition.
Some ulema use their official positions to challenge
the regime and preach the fundamentalist line
the deputy director
of the Jordanian military chaplaincy, Ali al-Fakir,
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Figure 2 (continued)
1970 1985 2000 0
1970 1985 2000 0
1970 1985 2000 0
took advantage of King Hussein's liberal policies in
late 1985 to criticize the King for not promoting
Islam. He also described the King's advisers as infi-
dels, and Americans and Westerners as enemies.
Fakir's popularity
is growing.
in the military,
The Egyptian Government gained the cooperation of
the moderate Muslim Brotherhood to suppress Islam-
ic radicals at universities in late 1985. The govern-
ment allowed the Brotherhood to mount and finance a
victorious campaign by moderate Islamic students for
the powerful university student council positions that
had been dominated by radicals,
The Brotherhood and the Mubarak government each
use this marriage of convenience for its own aims. The
Brotherhood believes the alliance will recoup some of
its waning popularity among younger fundamentalists
by demonstrating that its access to the Egyptian
establishment gives it more influence than the Islamic
radicals, Cairo, in our 25X1
view, sees the alliance as an opportunity to undermine
the radicals without requiring the government to play
a direct role in doing so. The government may also 25X1
believe that better relations with the Brotherhood 25X1
improve the ability of the security forces to monitor
the organization's activities.
Applying Islamic Law. Governments in most Muslim 25X1
countries have increased the application of sharia
(Islamic law) in recent years. Most have striven for a
middle ground to balance fundamentalist demands for
a vigorous application of sharia-including amputa- 25X1
tion, stoning, and interest-free banking-and the 25X1
wishes of Islamic moderates and secular elites. Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, and Pakistan attempt to enforce
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Within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimin) is the most prominent Sunni
fundamentalist Islamic organization. Founded in
1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a visionary Egyptian
schoolteacher, it became an important political group
in Egypt in the 1940s. After World War II it spread
to other Arab states through Arab students who had
studied in Egypt and through Egyptian exiles who
sought haven in other Arab countries such as Syria,
Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states.
Many Egyptian Brothers remain as teachers in neigh-
boring states, conveying their philosophy along with
their academic knowledge to their students.
During its sometimes tempestuous history, the Broth-
erhood has adapted to regimes' suspicions of it by a
mixture of cooperation with governments, infiltration
of security services, co-optation of student organiza-
tions, and propaganda campaigns. We believe that
these tactics and the clandestine nature of its meth-
ods have given it a more sinister reputation than it
deserves. Only in Syria is the Brotherhood a declared
revolutionary force determined to overthrow the re-
gime.
A common set of objectives underlies Brotherhood
activities in all countries:
? Substitution of sharia (Islamic law) for Western
legal systems.
? An economy based on Koranic principles, including
the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax
codes by the traditional zakat (alms tax) to help the
poor.
? The relegation of women to the home to fulfill their
divinely ordered function of bearing and raising
children.
sharia in all sectors of personal, criminal, and com-
mercial activities. But many countries that inherited
Western legal codes from colonial powers are at-
tempting to apply sharia only in areas relating to
personal behavior, such as marriage, divorce, and
inheritance. Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, the
United Arab Emirates, and North Yemen have made
concessions to the sharia interpretations of personal
law to soften criticism of their "Western standards."
The Mubarak government has put off fundamentalist
demands for implementation of sharia by embarking
on a drawn-out process of examining every Egyptian
law for its adherence to the letter and spirit of sharia.
Coercion. Several regimes use coercion against funda-
mentalists. Over the short term this is generally
effective, but draconian measures have a high poten-
tial to backfire. Egyptian President Sadat, for exam-
ple, was assassinated by Islamic extremists shortly
after he ordered a crackdown on them. Earlier,
President Nasir had been unable to stop the growth of
antigovernment Islamic activities, despite jailing
Muslim Brotherhood leaders and executing prominent
Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb, whose writings
are a guide for Islamic radicals. In Syria, President
Assad all but annihilated the Muslim Brotherhood in
1982 after uncovering a plot against him. The US
Embassy estimates that 20,000 soldiers, civilians, and
Muslim Brothers were killed in the siege of the
Brothers' headquarters. Even so, surviving members
continue to plot against Assad,
Some Arab governments that had tolerated limited
fundamentalist agitation have recently turned to
harsher measures. As part of King Hussein's new
policy to curb religious excesses, the Jordanian parlia-
ment last year approved a measure to license and
regulate Islamic preachers. Those who do not follow
the government's guidance will be imprisoned and
fined. The government is also beefing up security at
universities to monitor fundamentalist activities and
prevent a recurrence of the antigovernment demon-
strations at Yarmuk University in May 1986 that left
three students dead and 18 policemen injured. Last
summer Egypt nationalized all private mosques that
were considered centers of radical, antigovernment
Islamic activities.
Other governments, including those of Tunisia and
Kuwait, have increased their surveillance of funda-
mentalists
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Outlook
We believe Islamic fundamentalism will remain a
major force in the Middle East and South Asia into
the next decade because governments will be unable
to solve their complex social, economic, and political
problems or isolate their citizens from the negative
impact of Western culture. Fundamentalism will re-
main attractive to frustrated Muslims because it
offers solutions to seemingly intractable problems.
Fundamentalism poses both indirect and direct
threats to the political stability of the region.
Indirect Threat. The most likely impact of Islamic
fundamentalism into the next decade will be a gradu-
al shift toward a more conservative Islamic culture of
the kind advocated by moderate fundamentalists in
the Middle East and South Asia. Increasing pride in
the region's Islamic heritage and the hope for a
brighter future offered by fundamentalist ideology
will draw more individuals toward moderate funda-
mentalism. Governments will contribute to this shift
through their efforts to deflect fundamentalist pres-
sure by restricting Western movies, textbooks, birth
control programs, and alcoholic beverages. Evidence
of this kind of shift already exists. Interest-free
banking and enforcement of Islamic punishments are
widely practiced or advocated today. The secular
government in Algeria is adding Islamic tenets to its
constitution, and Jordan is changing some of its
Western-style educational institutions to include tra-
ditional Islamic instruction.
We believe this cultural evolution will be politically
destabilizing because of its tendency to divide society.
The imposition of an orthodoxy on Islam's diverse
practices would be difficult to enforce. It would also
probably result in the persecution of religious minor-
ities. Increasing numbers of Christians, Jews, Bahais,
conform to the rising tide of Islamic orthodoxy.
and Islamic sects, such as the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan,
would come under pressure-sometimes violent-to
We believe that Pakistan's experience with an Islamic 25X1
government illustrates the pitfalls that will face coun-
tries officially adopting more orthodox tenets:
? Islamization has highlighted the theological differ- 25X1
ences between Sunnis and Shias, between Sunni
sects, and between Pakistani ethnic groups.
? Pakistan has had difficulty coordinating an Islamic
interest-free banking system with international fi-
nancial networks.
? The reinstitution of Islamic punishments (flogging,
amputations, and stoning) has drawn strong criti-
cism from human rights activists in Pakistan and
throughout the world
Direct Threats. We judge that the violent overthrow 25X1
of existing governments on the model of the Iranian
revolution will be a declining threat in most of the
region. In recent years large-scale rioting, such as the 25X1
police riots in Egypt in February 1986, have not been
inspired by fundamentalist issues, although such dis-
turbances will give radical fundamentalists opportuni-
ties to exploit. Direct threats will be diminished by
increasing government vigilance toward fundamental-
ist activities and self-styled religious leaders. Never-
theless, some clandestine groups are bound to go
unnoticed and are likely to become sources of militant
agitation and perhaps assassination plots against "un-
Islamic" leaders.
Although radical fundamentalist movements will con-
tinue to agitate for the creation of Islamic regimes
based on sharia, we believe they will fail to develop a
clear picture of how such a state would be governed or
provide workable solutions for economic and social
problems. Paradoxically, failure to find workable
solutions will intensify the fervor of some fundamen-
talists who will blame the failure on "impure" appli-
cations of Islamic law. Some of these Islamic radicals 25X1
probably will turn to international terrorism to dra-
matize their demands.
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In our view, evolutionary shifts will continue to
dominate the Islamic political scene in the absence of
a dramatic development such as the economic collapse
of a major oil-producing state or the seizure of or
damage to Muslim holy places in the West Bank by
Jewish extremists. If such events were to occur, we
believe that the resulting turmoil would become par-
ticularly acute if a radical fundamentalist leader with
the popular appeal of a Khomeini were to emerge and
give religious significance to the crisis.
Without such a crisis, we believe radical fundamen-
talist groups will gradually weaken politically, with
some members adopting a more moderate outlook.
Failures of their utopian theology to adequately ad-
dress modern political, economic, and social problems
will probably cause fundamentalist groups to break
into competing factions. Although true believers will
continue to preach that only strict adherence to
fundamentalist Islam will solve these problems, other
members will adopt conventional political and eco-
nomic tactics. Pragmatic groups such as Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood might acquire a greater stake in
stability and push for Islamic measures in a more
restrained fashion. The remaining radicals, such as
the Brotherhood splinter group Takfir wa Hijra,
would continue to oppose the moderate fundamental-
ists as well as the government.
A clear victory by Iran in the Iran-Iraq war would be
likely to arouse enthusiasm for fundamentalism
among Shia Muslims in the Gulf states. We believe
that governments in the Gulf and throughout the
region will redouble their efforts to contain funda-
mentalist movements by any means if Iran wins the
war. Although radical Sunni fundamentalists will
probably interpret an Iranian victory as another mes-
sage that God is on their side in the battle against
"un-Islamic" leaders, more moderate Sunnis are not
likely to be inspired by an Iranian victory because of
their increasingly critical view of radical Shia doc-
trines
Implications for the United States
As they adopt a more fundamentalist outlook, increas-
ing numbers of Muslims will find the culture of the
United States repugnant because of what they per-
ceive as a lack of morality, a breakdown in family life,
and materialism. As fundamentalism gains strength,
the belief that the United States is a sworn enemy of
Islam will grow. The more that fundamentalists can
propagate this negative image of the United States,
the more it will contribute to:
? The denunciation of the Camp David accords and
other US peace initiatives.
? Increasing wariness on the part of even moderate
Muslim governments of close association with the
United States. Military cooperation such as the
periodic US-Egyptian exercises will become diffi-
cult to carry out in the face of fundamentalist
objections.
? Criticism of the United States by Muslim govern-
ments in such international forums as the United
Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and the Islam-
ic Conference on issues significant to the Muslim
world. The incidents on Jerusalem's Temple Mount
in January 1986, for example, ended with a denun-
ciation by the Islamic Conference of the United
States for vetoing a UN Security Council resolution
condemning the actions of some Israelis.
Physical danger to US personnel and interests gradu-
ally will increase in countries where a fundamentalist
evolution is taking place. US personnel will find
themselves required to keep a lower profile as these
countries pay stricter attention to conservative Islamic
decorum.
We expect the climate for US business to depend
more on local economic conditions, such as the
strength of the oil market, than on fundamentalist
fortunes. Governments at any point on the fundamen-
talist spectrum will be interested in improving the
standard of living of their citizens, an area in which
the United States and other Western nations will be
well positioned to help. Projects with quick and visible
payoffs, such as low-income housing, will have a
greater chance to benefit friendly regimes than more
grandiose schemes.
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The US loss will not necessarily mean the Soviet
Union's gain because fundamentalism is ideologically
even more inconsistent with atheistic Soviet Commu-
nism than with Western capitalism. The United
States, however, comes in for more fundamentalist
criticism because of the conspicuous US economic and
cultural presence throughout the Muslim world. The
Soviet presence is almost exclusively confined to
military assistance
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and meddling
in the internal affairs of states such as South Yemen
have used up much of the political capital Moscow
had in the Muslim world. Some fundamentalist
groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, train volun-
teers to fight with the Muslim insurgents in Afghani-
stan. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have provid-
ed considerable financial assistance to the Afghan
resistance. Even if the USSR were to withdraw from
Afghanistan, we do not believe Soviet stock among
fundamentalists would rise quickly or significantly.
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Appendix A
Prospects for Key Countries
and Regions
Saudi Arabia
We expect the influence of moderate Islamic funda-
mentalism in Saudi Arabia to increase over the next
few years in reaction to the economic downturn and
modernization. Slow economic growth probably will
also provide opportunities for religious radicals, but
fundamentalism poses no immediate threat to the
regime, which maintains strong conservative Islamic
credentials.
Social Problems. Social instability in Saudi Arabia
has been more limited than in other Arab states, but it
is rising. Serious crime is on the upswing, and narcot-
ics abuse and drug dealing have risen dramatically
over the past year,
The government has tacitly admitted the extent of the
drug problem by requiring every public hospital to
open units for the treatment of addicts
Students. Fundamentalism is most pronounced on
Saudi university campuses, according to the US Em-
bassy in Riyadh. Attendance at mosques has in-
creased, and more students are adopting Islamic
dress. Fundamentalist students often accuse profes-
sors of failing to stress Islamic tenets in their classes,
and they frequently harass more secularized class-
mates. Professors of Islamic studies are monitoring
other disciplines to ensure that religion is being
included in classes, according to the Embassy.
Young Clerics. Zealous young Saudi clerics are in-
creasingly critical of government officials for allowing
a weakening of Islamic values in the face of modern-
ization, being corrupt and extravagant, and following
practices inconsistent with Islam, according to diplo-
matic reporting. They also criticize older Saudi ule-
ma, whom they believe-correctly, in our view-to be
an arm of the regime rather than independent-minded
protectors of Islamic values. These young clerics
criticize the government through innuendo to avoid
arrest, according to the US Embassy. Their criticism
has grown despite King Fahd's public commitment to
Islamic values and practices. Ironically, Fahd's efforts
have strengthened the legitimacy of the religious
conservatives.
Shias. Fundamentalism is increasing in the predomi-
nantly Shia Eastern Province, particularly among the
young, despite widespread recognition that govern-
ment efforts have improved economic conditions
there. An increasing number of pious young Shias are 25X1
going to Syria and Iran to study to become imams,
and virtually all of them are followers of Khomeini,
The influence of 25X1
several young radical imams from Al Qatif-includ-
ing Shaykh Hassan Musa al-Safar, who was a leader
of violent demonstrations in 1979 and 1980-is in- 25X1
creasing 25X1
We believe young Shias may become more outspoken 25X1
in their criticism of the regime if their economic
position erodes. Although no Shia opposition move-
ment has emerged to directly threaten the regime,
such a movement would be a major irritant for the
government and could provide a base for Iranian-
supported sabotage against key Saudi oil installations 25X1
and attacks on the 20,000 Americans associated with
Aramco who live in the province
Fundamentalist Groups. A puritanical Sunni group,
Jamiat al-Dawa (Societies of Propagation), which is
increasingly evident in science departments in at least
three Saudi universities, represents a new wave of
fundamentalist thinking,
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25X1
This group aims to become more conversant
25X1
with science and technology in order to use them
against the West The group
25X1
numbers about 500 of the student body of 4,000 at the
University of Minerals and Petroleum in Dhahran.
its influence reaches
25X1
far beyond its membership because the university
administration has caved in to such demands as
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Figure 3. The University of
Minerals and Petroleum in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
installing loudspeakers in each classroom to broadcast
the call to prayer, excusing pious students from
classes and examinations during prayer time, and
barring US and European films from campus.
The Tehran-supported Islamic Revolution Organiza-
tion of the Arabian Peninsula, founded by Saudi
dissidents in the mid-1970s, promotes the revolution-
ary change of governments in the region. The organi-
zation uses propaganda in European newspapers and
its own publications, such as Mecca Calling, to target
the Saudi Government, which it criticizes for moral
and material corruption and repression. The group
has not claimed responsibility for specific antigovern-
ment acts, but members of the organization probably
were involved in the siege of the Grand Mosque of
Mecca in 1979 and the disturbances in the Eastern
Province in 1979 and 1980,
Fundamentalism Versus Social Change. For the past
two years, the government has made limited attempts
to accommodate social change, but major issues of
concern to Islamic fundamentalists remain un-
touched. King Fahd has repeatedly called on the
ulema to use independent judgment (ijtihad) to deter-
mine correct Islamic methods to adopt new technol-
ogy. In a meeting in April the ulema approved such
narrow issues as the storage of the text of the Koran
in computers and the performance of autopsies on
females by male personnel but skirted the greater
social implications of technological change. By involv-
ing the religious establishment in the process of
cultural change, the King probably believes he can
neutralize future fundamentalist criticism as well as
appear to be responding to the demands of moderniz-
ing technocrats.
The government has tried to devise ways to deal with
the increasing number of educated Saudi women who
are trying to find satisfying roles in the male-dominat-
ed society. The Saudis have mounted a media cam-
paign aimed at finding jobs for educated women. The
campaign has been given considerable legitimacy by
featuring the wives of royal family members in news-
paper stories advancing women's education and em-
ployment. Although the effort to expand the role of
women is not an attempt to challenge the established
order, the US Embassy in Riyadh has speculated that
it is part of an effort to cope with new economic and
social realities in the kingdom. The government is
probably attempting to find additional opportunities
for families and individuals who are being forced to
seek new sources of income as government largess and
economic opportunities shrink.
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Figure 4. Muslim fundamentalists holding
copies of the Koran and shouting slogans in
Egypt
Protests and violent demonstrations in early 1986 by
Islamic groups reflect the growing militancy of Egyp-
tian fundamentalists, whose appeal is strengthened by
the government's poor economic performance. A pro-
longed surge in fundamentalist unrest would probably
strain any Egyptian government's ability to maintain
its measured-and thus far successful-response to
Islamic protests. Although Egyptian fundamentalist
groups are divided over their tactics to achieve an
Islamic state, we believe fundamentalists of all stripes
will remain a serious threat to government stability
into the next decade.
The stagnant economy, rapid population growth, and
migration to Cairo, Alexandria, and other burgeoning
urban areas are taxing social services and Egyptians'
legendary patience with their rulers. The lack of
housing, for example, is forcing many male Egyptian
university graduates to abandon their aspirations for
their own housing, which traditionally has been equat-
ed with high status and enabled a man to arrange for
a higher class marriage partner. Most graduates are
forced to accept one of several unpleasant-and, to
some, humiliating-options:
? Borrow money, if possible, from family or friends to
buy an apartment.
? Live with parents after marriage and hold several
jobs to save enough to buy an apartment.
? Postpone marriage and compete for the declining
number of jobs in the Gulf states.
Despite the fertile soil for the growth of fundamental-
ism, we believe Egyptian fundamentalists cannot
overcome their differences to pose an immediate
threat to Mubarak's government. The moderate Mus-
lim Brotherhood, which advocates evolutionary tactics
to achieve an Islamic state in Egypt, has the patience,
financial resources, and organization to remain a
powerful Islamic force over the long term. Small,
radical groups, such as al-Jihad, seek an Islamic
revolution to impose an Islamic state but lack the
organization, financial backing, and clear goals to
appeal to a wide spectrum of Egyptian society.
The Muslim Brotherhood. With as many as 500,000
members and sympathizers, the Brotherhood is work-
ing to assert its preeminence among Islamic funda-
mentalist groups and to create a stronger fundamen-
talist Islamic network in the country. To achieve these
goals, the Brotherhood is seeking to strengthen its
diverse-and profitable-business interests and to
infiltrate the education system, labor unions, profes-
sional associations, and the military.
We believe the Brotherhood's potentially most effec-
tive tactic is its infiltration of the Egyptian education-
al system. The Brotherhood targets, recruits, and
financially supports pious university students who
plan to be teachers, according to the US Embassy in
Cairo. The Brotherhood believes that as teachers they
will be well positioned to instill fundamentalist values
in their primary and secondary students.
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The Brotherhood is having some success penetrating
highly motivated and in many cases the most talented.
They were involved in a series of violent confronta-
tions with the government in early 1986. Although
they lack strong leadership and are split into compet-
ing groups such as al-Jihad and Takfir wa Hijra, their
significance lies in their ability to exploit the combi-
nation of increased religious devotion and a falling
standard of living. They stand the best chance of
focusing public outrage against the government
through the use of propaganda that brands unpopular
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professional organizations,
Brotherhood members are leaders of teachers'
and lawyers' unions, and they have gained influence
in the engineers' union and the press syndicate.
Despite heavy recruiting efforts, the Brotherhood has
had little success penetrating blue-collar labor unions,
which traditionally have been a leftist stronghold. We
believe the organization has members in the military
who meet clandestinely, but it probably cannot attract
a steady supply of recruits in the armed forces.
We do not believe the death of Brotherhood leader
Talmasani last May will lead to major tactical
changes by the organization. Hamid Abu Nasir, a
follower of Talmasani, has been elected Supreme
Guide, Abu Nasir is
aged and in frail health, and the day-to-day activities
of the Brotherhood are being run by Mustafa Mashur,
who we believe will prove more aggressive in pursuing
the Brotherhood's agenda than Talmasani or Abu
Nasir. At least for the time being, the Brotherhood
appears to be heeding the government's warning that
it will not tolerate increased Islamic militancy.F_
Radical Fundamentalists. Islamic radicals-estimat-
ed to number between 20,000 and
30,000-are gaining strength in Egyptian universities,
particularly among the students who are the most
government actions as unjust and un-Islamic.
Mubarak'c Response. The Mubarak government will
probably adhere to its flexible policy toward funda-
mentalism. Mubarak has been conciliatory to the
moderate Muslim Brotherhood but has not hesitated
to crack down on radical demonstrations before they
got out of hand. Despite his success in containing
fundamentalism, Mubarak is highly vulnerable to
criticism from all opposition elements because of
Egypt's severe and chronic economic problems, all of
which need politically unpalatable cures.
Jordan
In our view, the Islamic movement in Jordan does not
threaten the regime, but the moderate fundamentalist
movement is gaining momentum and serious confron-
tation will be more likely in the near future. Young
people in particular are seeking solace in Islam from
the frustrations of unemployment and the stress of
rapid social change. Moderate fundamentalists his-
torically have operated openly and have secured pow-
erful positions in education and government, but King
Hussein's increasingly tough stand against fundamen-
talist influence is likely to radicalize some fundamen-
talist elements.
Fundamentalist Influence. The Muslim Brotherhood,
which operates legally in Jordan, has gained influence
in key government ministries. Supporters of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood are particularly numerous in the
Ministries of Education, Youth, Interior, and Islamic
Affairs, The
Brotherhood considers the Ministry of Education to
be its most important stronghold because Brotherhood
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members can help like-minded individuals obtain jobs
throughout the Jordanian educational system.
We believe the fundamentalists' role in the education-
al system is raising the Islamic awareness of Jordani-
an youth. Proselytizing has become intense. The US
Embassy in Amman reports that children are pressed
by teachers and other children to join Koran study
groups, and girls are admonished if they do not wear
Islamic dress. Nearly half of the female students at
the University of Jordan wear the head scarf and long
garments associated with fundamentalists, according
to the US Embassy. Fundamentalist students demand
that the government conform with Islamic law and
reduce Western influence in the curriculum.
Fundamentalists gained a psychological victory last
year by reducing foreign influences at the troubled
Yarmuk University. Fundamentalists in Jordan's par-
liament appealed to Jordanian nationalism to achieve
a change in the university charter to restrict the use of
English as the primary language of instruction and
rely on Islamic revelation rather than scientific inqui-
ry as the ultimate source of knowledge, according to
the Embassy.
Social Services. The Muslim Brotherhood is expand-
ing its influence in Jordan by providing educational,
medical, and welfare services to the needy. The
Brotherhood's Islamic Beneficent Center, which was
established in the early 1970s, operates a hospital, the
Islamic Society College, primary schools, and reli-
gious publishing houses, and it is planning to build an
Islamic university near Zarga,
The Beneficent Center provides free health
care to about 1,000 patients a month and distributes
approximately $100,000 yearly in food and welfare
payments to the poor.
Governmental Response. King Hussein's attempts to
reduce fundamentalist influence in government and
education probably will have only a temporary impact
because fundamentalists are entrenched in the coun-
try's bureaucracy. Late last year the government
arrested, transferred, and demoted fundamentalists in
a number of ministries and schools. Five ranking
Brotherhood members in the Ministry of Education
were fired, as were several university professors.
Parliament passed legislation that requires imams to 25X1
register with the government and forbids them to
preach on political issues. Another measure allows the
government to draw electoral district lines to limit the
number of fundamentalists elected to the parliament.
25X1
West Bank
We believe the failure of secular Palestinian national-
ism to achieve self-determination, fears that Jewish
settlers are taking control of the best farm lands and
urban neighborhoods, and attempts by Jewish zealots
to assert sovereignty over Muslim holy places in
Jerusalem are increasing the appeal of fundamental- 25X1
ism among the 750,000 Muslims on the West Bank.
Because the West Bank fundamentalists are weak-
ened by disunity, we believe the Israeli Government
sees fundamentalism as a divisive force it can use,
particularly on campuses, to weaken Palestinian na-
tionalism. Israeli authorities have sometimes refused
to interfere in campus disturbances even when univer-
sity authorities appealed to the military government
for help, according to the US Consulate General in
Jerusalem
Fundamentalism and Nationalism. The West Bank
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is promoting
fundamentalism among youth as an alternative to
secular Palestinian nationalism, according to the Con-
sulate General. Brotherhood activities such as operat-
ing recreation facilities, granting university scholar-
ships to pious village youths, and supporting Islamic-
oriented organizations on university campuses are 25X1
yielding significant results. For example, the Consul- 25X1
ate General estimates that about one-third of the
schoolgirls in East Jerusalem and one-third of the
female students at An Naiah University in Nablus 25X1
wear Islamic garb. 25X1
The growth of fundamentalism on university campus-
es is challenging the dominance of the PLO and
Palestinian nationalism, according to the Consulate
General. In the past, the fundamentalists usually
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supported pro-Arafat students against more leftist
forces, but fundamentalists are now attacking all
secular nationalists. Fundamentalists constitute 20 to
25 percent of the student population and dominate the
departments of science, Arabic, English, and Islamic
studies, according to the Consulate General. A profes-
sor at An Najah estimates that as many as 60 percent
of the students support fundamentalist goals, accord-
ing to the press.
Jewish Settlement and the Holy Places. We believe
that increased Jewish settlement as well as the threats
to the sanctity of the Temple Mount, one of Islam's
holiest sites, are contributing to increased fundamen-
talist activity.' Muslim West Bankers probably fear
the accession of Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir to the
prime ministership will lead to increased settlement
activity by such Jewish ultranationalist groups as the
' The Dome of the Rock, from which Muslims claim the Prophet
Muhammad ascended to heaven, and the al-Aqsa mosque are on
the site where the temples of Solomon and Herod once stood.
Jewish zealots believe that the Muslim sites must be destroyed and
the Jewish temple rebuilt before the messiah will appear. Last
January a series of confrontations occurred between Jews and
Muslims when a group of Israelis, including some Knesset mem-
bers, attempted to raise the Israeli flag and take photographs in
restricted areas on the Temple Mount. The incidents led to a UN
Security Council debate and condemnation of Israel throughout the
Gush Emunim. About 64,000 Jews live in the occu-
pied territories-an increase of 20 percent since 1984,
according to the US Consulate General.
Even with Shamir in power, the Israeli Government
will have only limited resources to spend on settle-
ments, according to the Consulate General. Ironically,
however, the failure of the Israeli Government to
expand settlements on the West Bank might signifi-
cantly increase ultranationalist Jewish militancy,
which in turn will escalate fears among Muslims that
the West Bank will be absorbed permanently into the
Jewish state.
We expect Islamic fundamentalism to be more a
source for tension within the Palestinian community
than a catalyst for violent anti-Israeli protests in the
short term. Continued attempts by Jewish ultrana-
tionalists to assert control over holy places in Jerusa-
lem and at other sites such as the tomb of Abraham in
Hebron, which are revered by Muslims and Jews
alike, would probably cause many Palestinians to
respond to calls for action from militant fundamental-
ists. Under such conditions, Tel Aviv would probably
drop its permissive policy toward fundamentalist ac-
tivities.
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Morocco
We believe King Hassan recognizes that he is losing
some of the traditional Islamic legitimacy he has
derived from his descent from the Prophet Muham-
mad. He is shifting to a more flexible security policy
in hopes of better controlling radical fundamentalist
activity. The fundamentalists' lack of central leader-
ship and a unified political organization, however, will
prevent them from posing a serious challenge to the
King in the next few years.
Fundamentalist Players. The leading role that well-
placed, educated professionals play in the fundamen-
talist movement in Morocco increases fundamentalist
influence there. Over a quarter of the doctors at the
central hospital in Rabat, for instance, espouse radical
fundamentalist beliefs, according to the US Embassy
in Rabat. fundamental-
ist beliefs are strongest among professors and students
of science and mathematics, who spread their views
through their students and colleagues.
These educated fundamentalists are idealists who are
dissatisfied with what they perceive as social and
economic injustice, corruption, and favoritism, ac-
cording to the US Embassy. The fundamentalists,
who number as many as several thousand, believe that
the path of reform is strict adherence to the Koran.
They differ from most fundamentalists in the Middle
East in that they do not subscribe to the widespread
fundamentalist belief that Western culture must be
rejected, according to the Embassy. They believe that
some modern elements-such as Western medical
technology, computers, and communications sys-
tems-can be incorporated into Moroccan society
without disturbing Muslim values.
Fundamentalism is also gaining support among the
urban unemployed and underemployed, who believe
they have been unjustly denied opportunities to ad-
vance in Moroccan society, according to the Embassy.
Moroccan scholars argue that youths who have either
dropped out or failed in universities are potential
fundamentalists, and that the country's rapid popula-
tion growth-nearly 3 percent annually-would pre-
vent prosperity among this group even if the declining
economy made a dramatic turnaround. The US Em-
bassy reports that members of this underclass-which
probably number in the thousands-lack an intellec-
tual appreciation of fundamentalist tenets but are
comforted by the panaceas offered by fundamental-
ism.
Changing Response. Earlier this year the King began
changing his approach to fundamentalism by relying
less on his Islamic credentials and on repression and
more on accommodation and a flexible public line.
The King probably decided to appear more moderate 25X1
to offset fundamentalist charges that his repressive
tactics were evidence that his aura of holiness-
supposedly transmitted through the Prophet's descen-
dants-was fading. He set the tone for the policy
change when he remarked in a magazine interview
that he took into consideration the difference between
the few radicals and those fundamentalists who are
"reflective and self-disciplined."
The new public line, however, has not lessened the
regime's vigilance. The government-wary of the
continued influence of radical, Iranian-inspired fun-
damentalists on Moroccan emigrants in Western Eu-
rope-has increased the number of teams of religious
scholars it sends to Europe to reinforce Sunni ortho-
doxy.
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Algeria
Moderate fundamentalist sentiment will probably
continue to gain in popularity among young Algerians
faced with economic and social problems worsened by
the decline of oil revenues. University students, urban
unemployed, teachers, skilled tradesmen, and intellec-
tuals, in particular, are attracted to fundamentalism.
President Bendjedid's skillful carrot-and-stick tactics,
however, reduce much of the potential challenge, at 25X1
least in the short term. 25X1
Economic and Social Problems. Although unemploy-
ment has not yet led to major political problems, the
more than 2.5 million unemployed Algerian youth are
beginning to respond to fundamentalist themes. Some
youths, according to the US Embassy in Algiers, are
attracted to fundamentalism's promise of social jus-
tice and are criticizing modernization programs that
have brought US and French television shows, rock
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music, and materialism, which they believe erode the
Islamic principles of Algerian society.
Many Algerians-two-thirds of the population is un-
der 25-do not understand the sacrifices made by
their elders during the struggle for independence,
according to the US Embassy. To them, government
promises of a better life sound shopworn against the
backdrop of poor housing, bleak job prospects, and
austerity policies that restrict imports of consumer
Coping With Fundamentalism. Bendjedid has used a
combination of coercion, co-optation, and political
maneuvers such as insertion of Islamic tenets into the
National Charter to blunt the appeal of fundamental-
ism. Fundamentalists probably will point to these
attempts to exploit Islam as further evidence of the
spiritual bankruptcy of the regime, according to the
US Embassy. Bendjedid made a large show of force in
the failed attempt to apprehend the armory raiders
goods.
Fundamentalist Groups. The small Algerian Muslim
Brotherhood-led by Egyptian professor Muhammad
al-Ghazali-is taking advantage of popular dissatis-
faction with economic austerity to build support for
the organization. Relatively inactive in the past, the
Brotherhood early last summer was involved in anti-
government incidents
? In Algiers, Brotherhood activists shouted down the
government-appointed imam and denounced the
government, demanding adoption of an Islamic na-
tional charter and criticizing the lack of concern for
the poor.
? In Oran, police quelled a fight between Brotherhood
supporters and opponents when the Brotherhood
demanded that the government provide housing for
poorer workers and move to stop rumored layoffs in
local industries.
In our view, other fundamentalist groups are unorga-
nized and without leaders capable of rallying wide-
spread support. Mustafa Bouiali, a former member of
the guerrilla Algerian Liberation Army, advocates the
use of violence to establish an Islamic republic
Bouiali was sentenced in absentia to a life term for
raiding a police armory in which he and about 25
followers seized numerous weapons and fled into the
mountains. The group al-Qiyam, which was banned
by the government in 1968, now operates clandestine-
ly as al-Dawa but has not been implicated in recent
antigovernment activities. The US Embassy believes
other militant fundamentalist groups are springing
He is trying to rally Islamic senti-
ment against opposition Marxists who still hold sway
in the universities and in government-controlled trade
unions.
Tunisia
We believe moderate fundamentalism is a serious
threat to the government because of growing dissatis-
faction with the regime's secular modernization poli-
cies, rising unemployment, and the perception that
aged and ailing President Bourguiba is losing control
of the government. Bourguiba has bottled up normal
outlets for political opposition, leaving only religious
channels for popular dissent. For instance, in early
1986 the regime virtually dismantled the country's
main labor union and jailed the union's leader to
avoid independent union participation in the elections,
according to the US Embassy in Tunis.
Fundamentalist Activity. The moderate Islamic Ten-
dency Movement (MTI), which emerged as a potent
force in the late 1970s, is taking advantage of the
political turmoil to expand its influence in key opposi-
tion labor and student organizations. We believe that
the MTI has become more popular because its leaders
are not-like other opposition groups-tainted by
association with Bourguiba. It draws much of its
support from the growing ranks of Tunisian students
who are having trouble finding jobs. About two-thirds
of the population is under 25 and has no memory of
the 20 years of economic growth and prosperity that
followed independence in 1956.
Impatience with the MTI's moderate views probably
will lead more radical students and professors to adopt
militant tactics against the regime. Radicals are
up, but they appear to be small.
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already drifting away from the MTI into such shad-
owy groups as the Islamic Cooperative Movement, the
Islamic Liberation Party, and the Islamic Progressive
Movement, according to the Embassy.
The moderate Islamic Student Union, which was
created in late 1985 at Tunis University, received over
90 percent of the vote during student elections in 1985
in some of the university's departments. Government
and university authorities have refused to recognize
the organization, and its leaders have been followed,
arrested, and forcibly drafted for military service in
the southern Tunisian desert. The group is using the
police shooting of a fundamentalist student last April
to bolster its appeal among other students, according
to the Embassy. Members of the group were implicat-
ed in two bank robberies in May 1986 in Sfax,
Tunisia's second-largest city,
The Regime's Response. Although the government is
becoming more wary of fundamentalists, particularly
in the wake of the arrest of three military officers in
April 1986 for fundamentalist activities, it probably
will be unsuccessful in containing religious extremism
unless it directly addresses fundamentalist concerns.
issued guidance to local party leaders that they, rather
than mosque preachers, should organize 10-minute
evening religious services to prevent political
agitation.
Syria
Despite severe economic and political problems that
have contributed to strong fundamentalist movements
elsewhere in the Arab world, Syria probably will not
experience a ground swell of support for radical
fundamentalism. Syrians generally appreciate the po-
litical stability President Assad has given the country
since he came to power in 1970. He has maintained
tight control of the military and security services and
capitalized on Syrian fears of Israel.
Ba'thism, although a secular ideology, generally does
not conflict with Islamic values and culture. Many
Sunnis may be satisfied with the intrinsically Islamic
nature of Ba'thism while ignoring its secular dogma.
Nonetheless, in the absence of organized opposition
groups, the Muslim Brotherhood could become a focal
point for secular as well as Sunni opposition to the
minority Alawite regime.'
Barriers to Fundamentalism. Most Syrians' loyalties
rest with their families, clans, and sects, and the
concept of a popular religious movement that tran-
scends these boundaries is poorly developed. Ethnic
and sectarian divisions run deeply in the country,
according to the US Embassy in Damascus. More-
over, we believe divisions within Syria's majority
Sunni community will lessen the chance of the devel-
opment of a powerful fundamentalist movement. Sun-
nis, who are divided by enduring social and political
cleavages, fall into several groups,
? The Sunni landowning and business elite, who sur-
vived the early years of Assad's rule by taking on
Alawite partners. These Sunnis now have a stake in
stability and are unlikely to rise to a religious call
against the government.
? Sunni religious leaders who have retreated into
silent opposition or submitted to government restric-
tions on their activities.
? Sunnis who hold top-level positions in the govern-
ment, the Bath Party, and the military and security
services. Most of these Sunnis share the Alawites'
rural background and have risen to positions that
would have been beyond their reach in the days
before Assad.
Conditions Promoting Fundamentalism. We believe
that the prospects for the growth of fundamentalism
will remain poor in Syria as long as Assad remains in
the picture. The post-Assad period, however, is likely
to present fundamentalists with greater opportunities
to press their case. Fundamentalists may be able to
6 President Assad is a member of the minority Alawite sect, which
is regarded as heretical by orthodox Sunnis. Until Assad came to
power, Alawites were relegated to the lowest rung of Syrian society.
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exploit poor economic conditions, but ethnic and
sectarian cleavages will probably continue to prevent
the growth of a significant fundamentalist opposition.
Muslim Brotherhood. We believe the Muslim Broth-
erhood is the only significant organized opposition
group in Syria and may benefit from a power vacuum
in a post-Assad period. At present, however, it is
capable of only isolated attacks against the govern-
ment, such as the bombings of bridges and other
public facilities that occurred last summer. The bat-
tering the Brotherhood received at Hama in 1982 left
it in disarray and no longer capable of serious armed
resistance to Assad's regime.
The Brotherhood had been weakened by internal
divisions even before the crackdown in 1982, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. The organization split into
three opposing groups during the late 1970s and
remains divided today:
? The "Political Group" pursues the traditional
Brotherhood goal of establishing a state based on
Islamic law. During the 1970s this faction embraced
paramilitary operations to achieve its goal.
? The "Military Group" uses terrorist tactics to gain
political power. Composed of younger Brothers, this
faction rejects all Western ideas, compromise or
cooperation with secular political movements, and
any mercy for the Alawite sect. The current leader
of the group, Adrian Uqla, is in prison.
? The third faction, the Brotherhood exile group,
which is headquartered in Aachen, West Germany,
has become increasingly irrelevant to the politics of
Syria. Its West German facilities, however, still
serve as a major planning center for Muslim Broth-
erhood groups from other Arab countries.
Assad has unsuccessfully sought to entice exiled
Brotherhood members-most of whom live in nearby
Arab countries such as Jordan and the Gulf states-
back to Syria. His offer in 1985 of a limited pardon
fell flat, a believe
additional attempts in early 1986 to lure Brotherhood
exiles back to Syria with promises of full pardon, job
reinstatement, and even backpayment of salaries will
not attract many members. Some Brotherhood exiles,
particularly those who fled to avoid false accusations
of antigovernment activity, have been tempted by
these offers, 3rother-
hood leaders, however, do not trust Assad and be-
lieve-correctly, in our view-that he is engaged in a
ploy to bring Brotherhood members back to Syria
where they can be closely watched.
Despite Jordanian King Hussein's claim in late 1985
that he would stop aiding the Syrian Brotherhood,
Jordan continues to be a haven for Syrian exiles.
Although some members of the military wing of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood have left Jordan for the
Arab Gulf states, other Brotherhood elements have
been assured by Jordanian officials that they can
remain in Jordan, according to the US Embassy in
Amman.
The Regime's Response to Fundamentalism. We be-
lieve the obstacles to the development of a politically
significant Islamic fundamentalist movement in Syria
outweigh the conditions that encourage its growth.
President Assad's tactics are largely responsible for
the lack of widespread fundamentalist activity. His
inducements have included:
? Placing many non-Alawites in the government, par-
ticularly those from the provinces who did not have
power or wealth before the rise of the Alawites.
? Improved living conditions, particularly in the coun-
tryside, where the regime enjoys its greatest
support.
Assad has coupled these moves with the ruthless use
of force and an extensive internal security network.
His regime nearly annihilated the Muslim Brother-
hood and destroyed the city of Hama in 1982 in
response to Brotherhood terrorist acts against the
government.
Pakistan
Although the Islamization program instituted by
Pakistan's President Zia in 1977 has been a divisive
force, we expect it to continue as long as Zia remains
in power. The probable passage of legislation to
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Figure 7. Pakistani Shia Mus-
lims flailing their bodies during
the Ashura religious celebra-
adopt sharia-based on Sunni doctrines-as the offi-
cial legal system is arousing fears among religious
minorities, particularly the Shias, that their beliefs
are being ignored. For their part, Sunni fundamental-
ists allied with the government fear that the return to
Pakistan of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto will lead
to Zia's overthrow and reinstitution of the secular and
socialist policies of her late father, Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
Escalating Sectarian Strife. The imposition of ethnic
Punjabi-Deobandi sect-interpretations of Islamic
law in Pakistan will renew sectarian strife in Pakistan,
according to the US Embassy in Islamabad:
? Shias, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the
population, are denouncing the bill as a vehicle for
establishing a Sunni theocracy.
? Application of the Deobandi view of Islamic law is
likely to arouse protests from members of the Sunni
Barelvi sect, who insist the legislation should show
more veneration of the Prophet Muhammad, and
Sufi mystics who worship saints.
? The Ahmadiyya, a sect numbering approximately
500,000 that orthodox Muslims regard as heretical,
fear that their religious and civil rights will be
further eroded. Anti-Ahmadi groups over the past
years have demanded-sometimes violently-that
the government remove all Ahmadis from sensitive
civil and military positions, require them to carry
identity cards, and forbid them to possess Korans or
to recite Islamic prayers.
Foreign Involvement. We believe Iran will continue to
exploit heightened sectarian tensions to foster Shia 25X1
extremism in Pakistan. Iranian President Khamenei,
during a visit to Pakistan in January 1986, aroused
anti-US sentiment among Pakistani Shias, according
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Substantial evidence points toward Iranian involve-
ment in violent incidents in Pakistan over the last few
years, according to diplomatic reporting:
? In Quetta last summer violent clashes between
Shias and authorities broke out after the Iranian
Consul General urged Shias to take to the streets.
The Pakistani Government claims to have intercept-
ed during the disturbances four truckloads of arms
on the road from Iran, according to the US
Embassy.
? Eight Iranians-three of whom were in Pakistan
illegally-were arrested for the bombing of Pan
American Airlines offices in Karachi in July 1985,
according to press reports.
? Several Iranians were arrested at the Karachi air-
port in December 1984 for smuggling weapons,
explosives, and foreign currency to Shia groups in
Pakistan, according to the press.
To counter Iranian influence among Pakistani Mus-
lims, the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad on occasion has
funded the radical Sunni organization, Sawad-e-
Azam, according to a Pakistani journalist. An Iraqi
diplomat confirmed to US officials that his govern-
ment bankrolled the Sunni organization in 1984.
Sawad demands the banning of such Shia practices as
the Muharram procession because it is un-Islamic.
The organization also has been involved in anti-Shia
disturbances in Karachi over the last few years
Islamic Banking. We believe Pakistan's experience
with interest-free Islamic banking continues to reveal
the difficulties of reconciling Islamic ideals and the
hard realities of modern international finance. To
secure loans from international lending institutions,
Pakistan must juggle its lending policies to conform
with both Islamic and international financing prac-
tices. To circumvent the Islamic prohibition on charg-
ing interest, some banks have instituted profit-and-
loss systems, while others pay or charge fees that tend
to be keyed to interest rates non-Islamic banks charge
for financial services
Outlook. Internal political problems stemming from
Zia's Islamization policy will increase as long as the
regime insists on imposing an ethnic Punjabi interpre-
tation of Islam on Pakistan's diverse population. This
policy inflames already serious ethnic tensions. The
majority Punjabis, who have held power since Pakis-
tan's creation, are distrusted by the other major
ethnic groups. These groups, including the Sindhis,
Pathans, and Baluch, see Islamization as yet another
method of extending Punjabi control over the nation.
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Appendix B
The Development of
Religious Movements
Scholarly study of religious movements in a variety of
cultures has revealed a recurrent pattern of develop-
ment. A religious movement typically arises when
individuals or groups believe the normal problem-
solving mechanisms of their culture cannot cope with
changing social, political, or economic challenges.
Under these circumstances, a prophetic individual
who has undergone an ecstatic revelation often arises
and leads a movement aimed at providing a new and
more effective culture
A movement usually passes through four stages, each
of which represents a different response to stress:
? Increasing individual stress. Rapid social, econom-
ic, or political change decreases a society's ability to
cope with problems. Increasing numbers of people
are placed under what is to them intolerable stress
by the failure of the system to accommodate their
needs. Anomie and disillusion become widespread as
the culture is perceived to be disorganized and
inadequate.
? Cultural distortion. Some members of the society
ineffectually attempt to restore personal equilibrium
by adopting antisocial behavior, such as crime, drug
abuse, or scapegoating. These reactions are likely to
lead to further social disorganization.
? Revitalization. This stage has five aspects:
Formulation of a code. An individual or group
adopts a utopian plan, such as total adoption of
sharia or re-creation of the Muslim community
at the time of Muhammad. The code or blue-
print is frequently formulated by one individual
in the course of a supernatural vision.
- Communication. The code is preached as a
salvation for those trapped in the evils of exist-
ing society. Benefits of the new code need not be
immediate or material. The basis of the code's
appeal is its simple organization. The change in
values renders pointless the promises of material
benefits made by advocates of the old system.
The code offers spiritual salvation, identifica-
tion with God, and elect status. Refusal to
accede to the code usually is believed to place
the nonbelievers in immediate spiritual peril.
Organization. As the group of converts expands,
it divides into two parts: disciples and mass
followers. The disciples become the executive
organization, responsible for administering the
evangelistic program, protecting the leader-
prophet, and combating heresy. The leader be-
comes regarded as a supernatural being or at
least an individual who has a source of wisdom
unavailable to the masses that justifies his claim
to the unquestioned belief and obedience of his
followers.
Adaptation. The new group is a revolutionary
organization because it threatens the interests
of any group that benefits from the status quo.
Because the religious group continually finds
new inadequacies in the existing culture and
because inconsistencies are found in the new
code, the formulators and disciples subtly re-
work the code and defend the movement by
political maneuver or force. The general tenden-
cy is for the code to harden gradually and for
the tone of the movement to become increasing-
ly militant, nativist, and hostile toward non-
believers, who ultimately are defined as enemies
of the movement.
- Cultural transformation. If the movement at-
tracts a large, stable following and achieves
economic self-sufficiency, the goals of the move-
ment can be implemented. Most radical Muslim
fundamentalist groups, however, do not reach
this stage of development because they are
continually weakened by factionalism.
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? Routinization. If the movement is successful, it
becomes conservative. It loses its dynamism and
eventually becomes an accepted sect or denomina-
tion in the religious establishment. The Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, whose businesses and other
financial endeavors benefit from social and political
stability, is nearing this phase in the development
cycle.
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