EGYPT: PROBLEMS FOR MUBARAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 January 1986
EGYPT: Problems for Mubarak
Summary
We do not believe that opposition to
President Mubarak is strong enough to topple him,
but it is growing and causing him serious
concern. The intensified criticism of the
president stems largely from his dealings with
Israel and the US, whose actions against
terrorists since October have troubled many
Egyptians. More demonstrations have erupted in
the past four months than in as many years,
opposition politicians on the left and right are
more vocal, and government infighting has
sharpened.
Mubarak has lost considerable standing, and
his position may erode further. Economic
conditions, a key cause of domestic grumbling,
will almost certainly grow worse in the next six
months, particularly in the wake of the
precipitous decline in world oil prices. The
president will face debt rescheduling and subsidy
reform decisions that could lead to an upsurge of
street violence. At the same time, his popularity
will remain hostage to any Israeli and US actions
perceived in Egypt as anti-Arab.
Foreign policy crises--Israel's bombing of the PLO
headquarters in Tunis, the US diversion of an Egyptian plane, the
hijacking of an Egyptian aircraft to Malta, and border tension
This memorandum was prepared by
the Egypt Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was requested by Ambassador
Robert Pelletreau. Information as of 30 January 1986 was used in
its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
SC ^ T
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
with Libya--have cost Mubarak much public support in recent
months. When students demonstrated against government policy
toward Israel and the US in early October, official opposition
groups backed the regime in a show of national unity. When,
however, the Egyptian commando attack on the hijacked airliner
ended in 60 deaths--after Cairo had praised the operation as
successful-- responsible opposition leaders publicly challenged
the government moves. Mubarak's failure to retaliate against
Libya--after he publicly blamed Qadhafi for the hijacking and
moved troops to the border--probably reinforced an image of
government indecisiveness and incompetence.
The apparent suicide of Sulayman Khatir, the Egyptian
security guard imprisoned for killing seven Israeli tourists in
the Sinai, has worsened Mubarak's problems. Since the guard
purportedly hanged himself in early January, Egyptians have
demonstrated in his home province and in Cairo. A US Embassy
source says that the cynical Egyptian public suspects the
government arranged his murder with Israeli help and US
encouragement. Right-of-center Wafdists and leftist parties had
opposed Khatir's trial and are exploiting this emotional issue at
Mubarak's expense. Cairo's attempts to block a court-ordered
independent autopsy have heightened the public's suspicions.
The Consequences
The several crises have put the regime on the defensive and
generated governmental infighting. For the first time in years,
the military--Mubarak's most important constituency--has been
criticized. The Egyptian leader moved quickly to squelch
opposition demands for the resignation of Defense Minister Abu
Ghazalah and for an investigation of the bungled operation at the
Malta airport, but the aftermath has left strains among top
military officials and between themselves and the president. US
Embassy sources say the Defense and Interior Ministries have
recently accused each other of poor performance in the Khatir
affair--the military with negligence and the Interior Ministry
for mishandling the protest demonstrations. Opposition
newspapers claim the Prime Minister, frustrated by the internal
squabbles, has threatened to resign.
Domestic criticism has also crippled Mubarak's flexibility
with Israel, forcing him to slow the pace of normalization with
Tel Aviv. He had referred enthusiastically to a summit with
Prime Minister Peres once Israel had agreed to arbitration of the
Taba dispute. We believe Mubarak now fears that holding a summit
soon would intensify public sentiment against him.
Short Term Outlook
We believe Mubarak will find it increasingly difficult to
maintain public confidence and support through the summer. The
credibility of his regime hinges largely on its economic
-2-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
SECRET
performance, and Egypt's economy is steadily worsening. At the
same time, his popularity remains hostage to any Israeli and US
actions perceived as anti-Arab, while his opportunities to score
foreign policy successes are diminishing.
The Economy. Even before the recent decline in world oil
prices, Egypt's capacity to meet its external financial
obligations was deteriorating. A drop in world oil prices to the
$20 per barrel level will, for example, result in a $650 million
loss of Egyptian government revenue in 1986--an almost 30 percent
reduction in hard currency oil earnings from the previous year.
For a country already in trouble over arrears to international
creditors, revenue losses of this magnitude will worsen debt
repayment problems and push forward the likely date for a
An IMF-supervised adjustment program and the specter of
foreigners dictating Egyptian economic policies would give
opposition groups a potent issue. An accelerated level of
economic reforms, including subsidy reductions and price
increases, would fuel discontent within Egypt's lower and middle
classses and possibly lead to an explosive political situation.
The government might be able to deflect some criticism from
itself and assign blame to the IMF and the United States. This
would require, however, a rare combination of political resolve,
skillfully crafted economic policies, and deft public relations
handling for the Mubarak regime to emerge unscathed. We doubt
The Rising Costs of Camp David. The odds are at least even
that Mubarak's standing at home will continue to decline over the
next six months because of his identification with Israeli and US
policies. A growing number of Egyptians seem to believe that US
aid does not outweigh the affront to Egypt's prestige brought on
by spectacular Israeli attacks against Arabs and by perceived US
support of them. Israel's killing of some 70 Palestinian
combatants and Tunisian noncombatants in retaliation for the
earlier death of three Israelis in Cyprus has revived Egyptian
hatred of Tel Aviv's reprisal policy. But Israel is unlikely to
change its long standing policy of meeting Arab attacks with
counter or preemptive force. President Mubarak is therefore
likely to suffer politically for any dramatic show of Israeli
Even Tel Aviv's non-military actions could inflame anti-
Israel sentiments among Egyptians and heighten disenchangment
with Mubarak's regime. For example, the issue of ownership of
Taba has gradually assumed symbolic proportions, and the longer
Mubarak fails to retrieve it, the greater domestic anger at him
and at Israel might grow.
Diminishing Foreign Policy Opportunities. The diplomatic
recognition of Egypt by other Arab states would reduce domestic
criticism of Mubarak, but the chances of such developments are
-3-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
slim. Arab governments ideologically opposed to Egypt's peace
with Israel--Libya and Syria--will give no quarter. Other Arab
states--including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Algeria--stilt see no
direct gains in recognizing Egypt that would outweigh the
political cost
f
s o
breaking with the Arab consensus.
Indeed, Mubarak's enemies could weaken his regime through
economic warfare. Recent incidents of terrorism have already
hurt Egypt's tourist industry, which last year earned some $400
million, and outbreaks of demonstrations in Cairo almost
certainl
y would reduce Egypt's income further.
A dramatic breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process
would quiet some of Mubarak's domestic critics, but this appears
unlikely in the next several months. Key parties--the PLO,
Israel, and Jordan, for example--are still reluctant to make
concessions that would ease mutual distrust and
ive th
g
e peace
talks a hnnGt _
Limited Options. Mubarak feels belea
uer
d
d
g
e
an
a victim of
circumstances beyond his control. Recent events--beginning with
his suppression of Muslim fundamentalist demonstrators last
summer--have encouraged opposition from most segments of Egyptian
society. 3ut the president i
s unlikely to step down
l
vo
untarily
25X1
because he belie ves
no successor can do a better
]05?
25X1
Mubarak may be increasingly tempted to take a tougher line
against his critics. But a heavy-handed policy, reminiscent of
former President Sadat's mass arrests in 1991, almost certainly
would turn public opinion solidly a ai ' h'
radicals g ns it, and encourage
particularl
Mu
li
y
s
m extremists, to attack him. 25X1
The Pre
infighting a
however,
sident may also reshuffle the Egyptian Cabinet if
mong his advisers persists. Such a cosmetic move,
id not resolve th
e problems the regime confronts. 25X1
Meanwhile, Mubarak is likely to distance himself from any US
policies that might be viewed in Egypt as anti-Arab. ?rivately,
Cairo will maintain close ties with Washington; publicly,
however, it will remain silent or perhaps even criticize US moves
that have any chance
f f
o
ueling domestic anger. 25X1
What if Mubarak leaves office?
Elections in 1981 made President Mubarak head of state until
1987. If he were to die or resign before then, the Constitution
stipulates the Speaker of the People's Assembly, Rif'aat Mahgoub,
would become the interim president in the absence of a vice
president. Mahgoub, who was hand-picked by Mubarak, would play a
major role in brokering the succession. Prime Minister Lutfi has
neither the power nor the support of political heavyweights to
contend seriously for the presidency. Defense Minister Abu
-4-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
Ghazala would be most likely to assert himself, but he could be
challenged by the opposition for corruption and his pro-US
An orderly succession would be likely, but a contentious one
is possible. If Ghazala and other aspirants were unable to
strike a deal in the back rooms of the high command, the military
could become divided and opposition groups might try to exploit
the situation. Following a probably brief period of uncertainty,
political turmoil, and perhaps some violence, it is very likely a
current or former military leader would become President.
Indicators of this more contentious succession include:
Two or more leaders contend for the presidency.
Factionalism and indecision in the military over which
contender to back leads to a temporary power vacuum.
The Cabinet and ruling National Democratic Party dissolve
into rival groupings in support of different candidates.
Political rivalries are translated into popular activism;
strikes, demonstrations, and riots ensue.
The factionalized military quells the unrest but is itself
badly shaken.
Leftwing and Islamic fundamentalist groups openly
challenge the regime and further organize and inflame toe
anti-regime unrest.
A candidate with military ties gains power, but the new
government lacks the consensus enjoyed by its
In either case, if Mubarak left office in an atmosphere of
failure and recrimination, any successor would try to distinguish
his own policies from Mubarak's. This could mean some loosening
of ties to the US because Mubarak has relied heavily on this
relationship for economic development, military security, and
achievement of a Middle East peace settlement. Mubarak's failure
in these areas would make the TJS connection appear less an asset
-5-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000505080001-2
I,I,I~< Iii gl