INDIAN ARMY MODERNIZATION EFFORTS: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000504820001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
Indian Army Modernization
Efforts: Progress and Problems
MESA 85-10201
October 1985
Copy 2 9 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indian Army Modernization
Efforts: Progress and Problems
Operations.
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 85-10201
October 1985
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Indian Army Modernization
Efforts: Progress and Problems
Key Judgments The Indian Army has made slow but steady progress in the last 10 years to-
Information available ward its goal of becoming a modern mechanized force. Six new divisions-
as of 25 September 1985 including India's first mechanized infantry division-have been created
was used in this report.
during that time, and India has begun to receive advanced Soviet arms
such as the T-72M tank, which it also plans to assemble along with the
BMP-2 infantry combat vehicle.
The Indian Army is fully capable of performing its two essential missions:
defending the country against external aggression and helping local police
and paramilitary forces maintain internal order. It probably could defeat
attempts by Pakistani or Chinese forces stationed on the border to seize a
significant amount of Indian-held territory. The Army has a less-than-even
chance of successfully launching mechanized thrusts that would defeat
Pakistan in less than two weeks-the time we believe Islamabad would
need to muster international support for a cease-fire. India's advantage
over Pakistan's ground forces is likely to increase in the next few years, and
New Delhi could easily match any quantitative increase in Pakistani
ground forces. The Army is also capable of occupying either Bangladesh or
Sri Lanka if its forces are not tied down elsewhere.
Army modernization efforts will continue at the same pace over the next
five years. Islamabad's nuclear weapons program, however, could slow
them. If New Delhi activates its own nuclear weapons program, the Indian
Army will suffer from budgetary cutbacks and some loss of influence.
Internal security problems are more likely to drain off personnel and funds
in the near term. The recent agreement with Sikh moderates leading to
state elections in Punjab will not reduce the Army's liabilities there any
time soon.
The Army has become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for the
majority of its advanced weaponry, but New Delhi has made selected
purchases of Western ground forces equipment. It is negotiating with
several West European suppliers and the United States for light armored
vehicles and self-propelled artillery. Indian purchases of US defense
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material will not be significant in dollar or military terms, but they could
improve Indian capabilities in selected areas such as artillery and
communications.
The Army's most serious problem is a shortage of personnel. The Army has
had difficulty attracting an adequate number of technically trained
individuals and has had to reduce the number of officers and men in active
units. The crisis with India's Sikh community over the last three years has
also deprived the Army of an important source of its finest officers and en-
listed men.
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Key Judgments
Equipment
Western Arms
4
Local Efforts
4
Recruiting
6
Army Recommendations
6
Ethnic Problems
7
Capabilities
7
Strengths
10
Numerical Superiority
10
Superior Weapons
10
Strategic Depth
10
Training
11
Weaknesses
11
Internal Security Problems
11
Poor Leadership
11
Diversity of Equipment
12
Communications
12
Lack of Combat Experience
12
Interservice Cooperation
12
13
13
13
Internal Security Duties
13
14
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Figure 1
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(India)
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Secret Vi
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China
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0 300 Kilometers
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ANDAMAN
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(India) p
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Indian Army Modernization
Efforts: Progress and Problems
The Indian Army, at an authorized strength of
1,092,000, is the fourth largest in the world. Over the
last decade, Indian political and military leaders have
been attempting to transform their "foot soldier"
Army into a modern mechanized force. Army spokes-
men have publicly identified the specific goals of the
modernization effort as:
? Increasing the firepower and mobility of infantry,
armor, and artillery units.
? Enhancing capabilities for fighting at night.
? Establishing a larger air assault capability through
the creation of an Army aviation corps.
? Increasing the "teeth-to-tail" ratio of combat to
support units.
? Improving command-control-communications and
intelligence assets.
? Fielding larger numbers of indigenously produced
weapons.
In pursuing these goals, the Army has received twice
as large a share of the defense budget as the Air Force
and Navy combined over the last 10 years.' It has
purchased a large quantity of new materiel and has
added over 200,000 men to its ranks-a 25-percent
increase.
Table I
Indian Army Growth, 1975 and 1984
Divisions
Infantry 14
19
5
Mountain 10
10
0
Armored 2
2
0
Mechanized 0
I
I
Total 26
32
6
Brigades
Infantry 52
69
17
Mountain 32
33
I
Mechanized 2
3
1
Armored 7
12
5
Artillery 36
47
II
Air Defense 4
6
2
Engineer 3
4
1
Parachute 2
1
- I
Total 138
175
37
We believe New Delhi embarked on this moderniza-
tion program because it wants the Army to have the
capability to defeat Pakistan quickly in a short war.
We believe Indian military planners calculate that
any major Indo-Pakistani war would be brought to a
halt by international diplomacy within a few weeks,
and they want to avoid another inconclusive engage-
ment like the 1965 war and the 1971 war on their
western front. The superpower confrontation in the
1973 Arab-Israeli war, in our judgment, reinforced
Indian attitudes because it demonstrated that a
war between US and Soviet clients lasting more than
two weeks invited outside intervention.
The Army has been partly successful in meeting its
goals of raising new combat units. Six new divisions
have been raised in the last decade three short of the
goal set in 1976. Although five of these new divisions
have been infantry, India's first mechanized infantry
division has been formed. Moreover, the creation of
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The Indian Army has been heavily preoccupied with
internal security operations in the last 12 months.
Clements from 11 divisions and several independent
brigades were used in Punjab State in June 1984 in
the opening phase of Operation Bluestar. These
forces, estimated at over 50,000 men, were charged
with sealing the border with Pakistan and suppress-
ing the Sikh rebellion. Army forces permanently
stationed in Punjab State were left free from internal
security operations to deter any attempt by Pakistan
to intervene.
Almost a year later, elements from three Indian
divisions continue to operate as internal security
forces in Punjab State. Numerous press reports and
government announcements have signaled their with-
drawal, indicate that
these units are still in Punjab State. The government,
however, has begun to form new paramilitary units
assigned to the national police to replace the Army.
Increasing insurgent activity has forced the Army to
devote additional resources to the northeast. A joint
paramilitary-Army study last fall recommended the
creation of a new corps to coordinate counterinsur-
gency operations in Assam, Mizoram, Manipur, Na-
galand, and Tripura. The new 3rd Corps, which
began operations in August, will control two moun-
tain divisions already deployed in the area. It has
such a high priority that completion of the 6th Corps
22 new armored, air defense, engineer, and mecha-
nized infantry brigades since 1975 has greatly en-
headquarters along the southern flank of the Indo-
Pakistani border has been delayed. The new com-
mand has not been publicly announced, ostensibly to
prevent Punjabi insurgents from taking advantage of
the internal two-front situation. The government is
also raising 10 more battalions of Assam Rifles, a
paramilitary force under Army command, to
strengthen forces in the region.
tors to be the chief reasons.
The Army has been increasingly involved in quelling
urban communal violence. Troops were called out
after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in late 1984
to restore order in at least 15 major Indian cities.
Eight infantry brigades, a mechanized regiment, and
other forces were deployed in New Delhi alone. Army
units were mobilized after the toxic gas release in
Bhopal in November and during communal rioting in
Gujarat State last spring. The concentration of para-
military forces in Punjab State and the unwillingness
of local police to expose themselves and their families
to popular retribution are said by Indian commenta-
The Army appears to develop a "we-they" syndrome
quickly in situations where it is used to combat civil
disturbances.
trickle of reports on atrocities committed-by Army
troops performing internal security duties. These
reports suggest that discipline is breaking down and
that some atrocities are sanctioned by Army commis-
sioned and noncommissioned officers.
divisions, including one or two armored and mecha-
nized divisions and a mountain infantry division.
hanced the Army's offensive capability.
We believe that several additional armored and mech-
anized divisions will be formed in the next five years.
The Army also appears on the brink of creating an
aviation corps, a move that reflects Indian observa-
tions of Iraqi doctrine in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as
indicate that the Indians are assembling three divi-
sions, possibly including a second mechanized divi-
says that the Army's Seventh Five-Year an
(1986-90) calls for the creation of three to five more
porting. ecently
reported that the Army has received permission to
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Table 2
Indian Army Arms Purchases, 1980-85
Value
(million US $)
Total
2,276
1980
USSR
160
200
D-30 howitzers
279
300
T-72 tanks
41
140
BMP-1 armored personnel carriers
99
65
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
20
NA
130-mm guns
104
1
SA-6 Air Defense Group
1981
France
38
300
Milan antitank guided-missile launchers,
1,800 missiles, and licensed production
1982
USSR
420
450
T-72 tanks
86
300
BMP-I armored personnel carriers
1983
USSR
99
60
ZSU-23/4 air defense guns
1984
USSR
218
24
SA-8 vehicles, launchers, and missiles
1985
USSR
Various
625
T-72 and BMP coproduction agreement
Other purchases
take control in July 1986 of all Air Force assets that
support Army operations and logistics. As a result, the
Army hopes to gain control of:
? Air operations aircraft flown by Army pilots, princi-
pally seven helicopter squadrons. This amounts to
some 70 aircraft divided into 23 units known as
Aerial Observation Posts.
? Rotary-wing aircraft used for troop lift and resup-
ply-including India's only MI-25 Hind attack heli-
copter squadron.
? Fixed-wing transport aircraft that support Army
resupply, possibly including air transports used for
paratroop operations.
say that the government has
approve the Army's plans, in part to reward the
Army for its repeated use in internal security opera-
tions. There has been no formal announcement, how-
Significant quantities of new arms have enhanced the
Army's firepower and mobility. Most of this equip-
ment has been purchased from the USSR, but New
Delhi is keeping its options open by making selected
purchases of Western systems and pursuing indige-
nous research and development efforts.
Soviet Arms
The Army has become increasingly dependent on the
Soviet Union for most of its advanced weaponry.
India signed large arms agreements with the USSR in
1980 and 1982, laying the basis for Army moderniza-
tion and expansion efforts. New Delhi has purchased
over 800 T-72 tanks, 400 BMP-1 armored personnel
carriers, 200 howitzers, 65 BM-21 multiple rocket
launchers, and 60 ZSU-23/4 air defense guns mostly
debate.
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on concessionary terms with low interest rates and
to begin licensed production of the T-72-series tanks
and BMP-series armored personnel carriers in the
? A letter of intent to purchase at least 160 Swedish
IKV-91 light tanks.
tanks with more capable engines and sensors,
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next two years.
The Army is satisfied with its Soviet equipment,
Western firms are also heavily involved in programs
to improve the Army's existing tank force and to
develop a new indigenous main battle tank by the end
of the decade. US, British, and West German firms
are competing to refit India's almost 2,000 Vijayanta
unhappy with the first T-72 tanks they received
because they were reconditioned and lacked advanced
fire-control systems,
Western Arms
In our judgment, Moscow will remain the principal
supplier of Indian Army equipment, but we believe
New Delhi will continue to make selected purchases
from the West to obtain systems unavailable from the
USSR, to improve its bargaining position with Mos-
cow, and to demonstrate its nonaligned status. India
began turning to the West for major arms purchases
in 1980 and so far has signed contracts worth $2.5
billion, as opposed to $7.5 billion for Soviet arms for
all of its armed services over the same period. Accord-
ing to the
most notable Indian Army purchases and negotiations
with Western suppliers have been:
? Purchase from France in 1981 of 300 Milan anti-
tank guided-missile launchers and 1,800 missiles,
plus licensed production rights for 15 years.
? Procurement of up to 20,000 man-portable radios
produced under US license.
say that a plan to refit India's 500 T-55 tanks with
Western engines has also been resurrected. The West
German manufacturer of the Leopard series of tanks,
Krauss Maffei, is the principal engineering consultant
for the nominally Indian-designed Arjun main battle
tank, which has a West German diesel engine and a
British 120-mm gun. Plans call for building 40 pre-
production models next year.
Local Efforts
In our judgment, Indian defense industries have been
notably inefficient in the design of major weapon
systems for the Indian Army, although they have
successfully produced tanks, trucks, small arms, and
munitions under license. The only indigenously de-
signed major weapon to have been deployed in quanti-
ty with the Army is the 105-mm towed howitzer.
Programs to build indigenously designed armored
personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, and anti-
tank guided missiles have all been abandoned in favor
of foreign imports. Plans to field a locally designed
and produced 130-mm self-propelled gun, called the
Catapult, have apparently run into trouble.
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Manpower problems have hindered the Army's rapid
Existing divisions have been temporarily reduced to 25X1
85 to 95 percent of full strength to help man newly
raised formations. Press reports suggest that the
Army is several tens of thousands of men below its
authorized strength of 1,092,000 men, largely because
of recruiting problems. 25X1
expansion program. 25X1
the Army has attempted to fill new combat units 25X1
by eliminating and consolidating Army farms, as well
as veterinary, supply, and other support elements.
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India's all-volunteer Army is maintained through a
recruiting system that assigns quotas to Indian
states. If one state does not meet its annual quota,
another may fill in the vacancies. National shortages
are reflected in larger quotas for the next year.
Successful applicants sign up for at least a 10-year
tour of duty. A new recruit usually is not considered
a useful member of his regiment until he has been in
service for three years.
Recruiting
The Army has had trouble meeting its annual recruit-
ment goals for the last few years
Applicants outnumber vacancies by-
30 to but most are rejected on medical and
educational grounds. In 1984 the Army could find
only 85 percent of the 120,000 recruits it needed. In
addition, the widespread payment of bribes to recruit-
ing officers allowed many unqualified individuals to
filter in before the Army instituted reforms in 1984.
The Army has also had problems attracting an ade-
quate number of officers. As of March 1985, the
Army was short almost 9,000 officers. According to
this shortage has forced the
Army to reduce from 21 to 14 the number of officers
assigned to infantry battalions. The two schools that
supply two-thirds of the Army's officer corps have
both had relatively small enrollments in recent years.
One, the Indian Military Academy, has had an
annual shortfall of 18 percent in the last decade, with
a 75-percent shortage of applicants in technical fields,
such as electronics and communications. The other,
the Officer Training School in Madras, has had even
less success, suffering a 35-percent shortage of stu-
dents in the last 10 years.
Fewer officer candidates in either school are choosing
combat arms as their field of preference, according to
Infantry and artillery
On the other hand, twice as many officer candidates
as needed applied for positions in the Army Service
Corps and Ordnance Corps, where they can gain
civilian-related experience in managing truck fleets,
machine workshops, and supply depots
suggest that more attractive
jobs in the civilian economy are the principal reason
why qualified individuals are not joining the Army in
adequate numbers. Traditionally, joining the Army
was seen as a lifelong career, but new recruits increas-
ingly look to the Army for training in marketable
skills that can promise them upward mobility in the
civilian work force. According to Army statistics, 95
percent of all enlisted men retire before they reach 35
with an average of about 15 years of service.
There is also a small, but growing tendency for
officers to spend less time in the service, according to
Early retirements are up from
for careers in the private sector.
85 in 1975 to 295 in 1983, although the officer corps
grew only slightly over the period. Unlike their prede-
cessors, newer officers entering the service are unwill-
ing to wait for enough promotions to afford expensive
consumer goods and are, instead, increasingly leaving
Army Recommendations. The Army has gone public
in lobbying for additional incentives that it believes it
must offer potential recruits. A well-publicized Army
memorandum in January recommended:
? Divorcing the military pay structure from that of
the civil service and increasing it to compensate for
the negative features of military life.
? Instituting a special financial bonus for Army
service.
? Granting tax exemptions to military personnel.
? Establishing preferences for military personnel in
the allotment of new cars and residences.
? Giving military officers a higher protocol ranking.
? Upgrading Army commands and certain senior staff
positions to increase their status.
? Creating a separate committee to review military
pay biennally.
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The Army has tried similar solutions in the past, and
we doubt that the proposed incentives will allay key
personnel shortages. The 1984 government personnel
review increased pay and privileges and in addition
reduced promotion times; allowed earlier retirements
for enlisted men; increased by 25 percent the number
of billets for majors, colonels, and lieutenant generals;
and enhanced travel and ration allowances for some
officers. Despite these efforts, civilian competition for
individuals with technical skills has increased. We
believe additional attempts by the Army to attract
and retain valuable personnel will increase costs,
possibly at the expense of weapons procurement. The
Army has used a significant portion of the average 7-
percent annual defense budget increases over the last
five years to cover rising personnel costs. Pay and
allowances that took up about a quarter of the Army's
budget 10 years ago now account for over a third,
according to Indian Government estimates.
Ethnic Problems
The three-year-old Sikh conflict has complicated the
Army's manpower shortages.
that after the Army stormed t o Sikhs' o en
Temple in June 1984 there was a significant drop in
enlistments by Sikhs, who make up 24 percent of the
officer corps and 14 percent of the enlisted ranks.
Obviously worried about the loss of an important
source of manpower, the Army conducted a three-
week recruiting drive in Punjab State last March, but
it met with poor results. Concerns about the recruit-
ment and retention of Sikhs have probably contribut-
ed to the Army's decision last spring to give lenient
sentences to the 2,000 Sikhs who mutinied over the
Golden Temple incident.
In our judgment, the Army's higher priority of enforc-
ing military justice and avoiding such incidents in the
future will perpetuate recruiting and morale problems
with the Sikhs. The recent agreement with Sikh
moderates did not address the demand that Sikh
mutineers be pardoned, and the government explicitly
stated that the Army would continue to decide the
disposition of these cases. The decision to disband one
Sikh battalion and redistribute the troops of three
others involved in the mutinies will be seen as an
unnecessary insult to Sikh soldiers
Widespread knowledge that the
Army is considering breaking up all exclusively Sikh
battalions by mixing Sikh companies with other eth-
nic or integrated units will add to Sikh doubts about
their place in the Army.' Defense Minister Rao
announced in April that new regiments would be
raised on an all-caste basis without regard to state,
region, or religion, although Gurkha units will proba-
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its recruiting efforts among Gurkhas in Nepal, which
Sikhs will probably interpret as showing lack of trust
in them.
The Indian Army is capable of performing its two
essential missions: defending the country against ex-
ternal aggression and helping local and paramilitary
forces maintain internal order. The Indian Army
could probably defeat any attempt by Islamabad to
seize a significant portion of Indian territory and is
capable of conductin offensive operations against
Pakistan
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The Army also probably could successfully defend
against a conventional attack by Chinese forces now
along the border. Despite frequent troop rotations,
inadequate helicopter assets, and antiquated contin-
gency plans, the Indian Army has some of the finest
mountain infantry forces in the world and has made 25X1
substantial improvements since the 1962 war, includ-
ing stockpiling adequate supplies and munitions.
Moreover, we doubt that Beijing would fully engage
Indian forces in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war,
confining itself instead to initiating small border
skirmishes to demonstrate its concern.
' The Army has integrated all but its artillery and infantry units.
Officers commanding the latter types of units have argued that
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Organization of Major Indian Army Formations/ Units
The Indian Army is divided into five regional com-
mands that control 10 corps. Each corps contains two
or more of India's two armored, one mechanized, 19
infantry, and 10 mountain infantry divisions. Some
divisions, brigades, and smaller units are controlled
directly by regional commands.
The Indian Army is modeled on the British regimen-
tal system with infantry battalions and artillery
Authorized Personnel
(approximate)
Brigade/independent brigade
Infantry
2,500/4,500
Armored
2,000/5,500
Armored (regiment)
630
Mechanized (regiment)
830
Company
140 to 180
Platoon
40 to 50
regiments drawn from particular localities. All other
units have been integrated. There is, nevertheless, a
high degree of ethnic diversity in the Army. Sikhs (11
percent), Jats (9 percent), Dogras (8 percent), Rajputs
(7 percent), Gurkhas (6 percent), and Marathas (5
percent) make up the largest ethnic groups. Individ-
uals from scheduled (untouchable) castes dispersed
throughout the Army make up 16 percent.
Contains two or more divisions depending on
mission.
Includes one artillery brigade, two to five infantry
brigades, and support units.
Includes one artillery brigade, two to three armored
brigades, and support units.
Elements of one artillery brigade are equipped with
pack howitzers, vehicles are smaller, and 500 or
more animals are assigned (horses, mules, yaks, and
others).
Includes one self-propelled artillery brigade, two
mechanized brigades, armored brigade, and support
units.
Includes three battalions of four companies each.
Ratio of armored to mechanized battalions is usual-
ly 2 to 1.
Includes two mechanized battalions and one to two
armored regiments.
Includes four infantry companies plus two support
units.
Called armored regiment, it holds 45 tanks.
Includes three rifle companies and afew tanks, as
needed.
Holds three firing batteries with six guns per battery;
formation varies according to mission.
Includes up to three infantry platoons.
Includes three sections.
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The Army probably would have difficulty dealing
with major conflicts on two or more of its borders at
one time
military planners worry that Bangladesh might take
advantage of an Indo-Pakistani conflict to settle
outstanding disputes by force. We believe the Army is
fully capable of occupying either Bangladesh or Sri
Lanka in a short period of time if its assets are not
directed toward China or Pakistan.
Strengths
Numerical Superiority. The Indian Army enjoys a
quantitative advantage over Pakistan in troop
strength, weapons, and equipment. Although deploy-
ments along the border are roughly equal, the Indian
Army has many more combat units in reserve and still
others that can be mobilized. We estimate that two-
thirds of the Army's arsenal of tanks, armored person-
nel carriers, artillery, and other weapons are deployed
in field units, which leaves a large stockpile for
wartime replacements.
The Indian Army also enjoys a margin of superiority
along its border with China. India has six mountain
divisions, two infantry divisions, and one reinforced
mountain infantry brigade in the border region, com-
pared with China's three infantry divisions, an artil-
lery regiment, and scattered border forces. China
could move another seven divisions to the border
within a month, while India has five divisions ear-
marked as reserves.
Superior Weapons. India's weapons are, for the most
part, more modern than those of its neighbors. The
T-72M1 tanks now entering service, for example,
have better armor and firepower than Pakistan's US
M-48A5s and less capable Chinese-built Type 59s.
India's Soviet-supplied BMP-1 infantry combat vehi-
cles also carry more firepower than Pakistan's M- 113
armored personnel carriers. Pakistan has a slight edge
in having a small number of self-propelled 155-mm
howitzers, but this will disappear when similar artil-
lery pieces enter the Indian inventory later in the
decade.
Strategic Depth. In a large-scale conflict with Paki-
stan, the Indian Army could afford to retreat tempo-
rarily without losing a substantial portion of the
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country's urban centers or industrial capability. Only
in rugged Kashmir do the Army's lines of communi-
cation lie exposed along the cease-fire line. Pakistan,
on the other hand, cannot afford to allow an Indian
breakthrough anywhere along its border because of its
lack of strategic depth. The Indian Army would
quickly occupy important lines of communication and
population and industrial centers if it achieved a
breakthrough.
Training. Indian Army training gives it a significant
advantage over the Pakistani Army, which would
have to respond to changes in Indian tactics and
doctrine to defend Pakistani territory successfully. In
our judgment, the Indian Army has increasingly
oriented its training facilities and exercises toward
offensive operations against Pakistan in the last few
Indian preparations for contingencies elsewhere are
far less extensive.
border restudy the
1962 Sino-Indian war and prepare for the same
setpiece battles-which may not take place if the
Chinese change their line of march. Press reports
indicate that exercises also have been conducted by
the Army's Eastern Command near the border with
Bangladesh, but on a much smaller scale than those
Weaknesses
Internal Security Problems. Internal security prob-
lems are taking a larger portion of the Army's
attention and resources, in our judgment, to the
detriment of its war-fighting capabilities. Indian offi-
cials say that the Army has been called out 95 times
in the last 12 months to restore domestic order an
estimate that is probably low. This growing entangle-
ment in internal security operations has disrupted
training schedules and reduced combat readiness.
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the Army
the Army recently opened a new college of armored
and mechanized warfare at Ahmadnagar to facili-
tate combined-arms training and has begun to
introduce new tactics into its armored and mecha-
nized forces.
over any time in the near future.
and the government have agreed to beef up paramili-
tary forces to replace the Army in these missions, but
we doubt that these units will be capable of taking
The potential for continuing internal security prob-
lems in Punjab State is particularly worrisome for the
Army. In addition to being the key agricultural region
of the country, Punjab State is strategically located
for the defense of Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of
India. The Army, in our judgment, does not believe
that it can count on the loyalty and cooperation of the
Sikh population in a war with Pakistan, as it did in
1971. It is likely to remain concerned that Sikh
extremists would take advantage of a war to conduct
guerrilla operations against Indian Army garrisons
and lines of communication.
questions about the competence and professionalism
of Indian field officers. The average Indian Army
Poor Leadership. Recent
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officer is technically proficient but taught to solve
problems by the book. He takes a very conservative
approach, lacks imagination, and relies on his advan-
tage in manpower to take objectives
note that a high degree of sycop a~ a
crept into the officer corps, stifling initiative. More-
over, numerous reports of corruption and incompe-
tence involving high-ranking officers have been noted.
Two of the Army's 10 corps commanders retired this
year rather than face courts-martial on charges of
corruption and behavior unbecoming of high defense
officials. In Punjab State, several high-ranking offi-
cers have been punished for allowing and participat-
ing in acts of brutality and looting during Operation
Bluestar
Diversity of Equipment. Like other Indian military
services, the Army is plagued by a diversity of
equipment that complicates logistics and training.
The Army operates three different types of tanks, four
different armored personnel carriers, and eight kinds
of artillery. The fact that this equipment is of Soviet,
Western, and Indian manufacture is an added compli-
cation because of the differences in ammunition,
lubricants, spare parts, maintenance procedures,
training, and deployment.
Communications. The procurement of better commu-
nications and intelligence-gathering equipment does
not appear to have received a high priority, despite
rhetoric to the contrary. Only recently has the Army
begun to order and receive new equipment in this
category. The Army has approved a major project to
provide new radios down to the platoon level, but the
Indian manufacturer has run into redtape,
US frequency-hopping radios that would provide a
quantum iumn in the security of its communications
namese forces in the last several years.
Lack of Combat Experience. We believe the lack of
combat experience has reduced the Army's general
capabilities. The Army has not fought a conventional
war in almost 15 years, and, although many Indian
senior officers saw action in the 1971 war, most
younger officers and enlisted men have never seen
intense combat. Sporadic firefights along the Paki-
stani border and counterguerrilla operations in the
northeast have not provided the Army with the kind
of experience that would be useful in preparing for a
general war with Pakistan or China. The Pakistani
Army suffers equally from this deficiency, but it now
has a simpler defensive strategy to execute in case of
war.' Chinese forces presumably have gained from the
operational experience they have had against Viet-
Interservice Cooperation. The Army's working rela-
tionship with the Air Force, on which it depends for
close air support and air transport, is mixed. Accord-
ing to
appears to be well coordinated. Indian Army units
work directly with the specific Air Force combat
squadrons that will support them during combat.
Pilots from these squadrons are assigned as forward
air controllers and close air support advisers to bri-
gade headquarters.
Air transport, however, is a major problem. Army
heliborne assault training has amounted to only a few
intermittent exercises, and Air Force maintenance
practices are so bad that most machines are not
capable of normal peacetime operations. India's sole
parachute brigade probably has never dropped more
than 800 of its 4,600 men at any one time, although
new Soviet-made IL-76 Candid and AN-32 Cline
transports should remedy this situation.
Strategic cooperation and planning between the Army
and the Air Force is also a problem, in our judgment.
Indian political leaders since independence have
avoided creating a focal point for military authority or
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expertise, and India does not have unified regional
commands or a joint command staff. The resulting
lack of coordination at the top has reduced military
effectiveness despite public criticism by Indian retired
such as Pakistan's edge in attack helicopters and 155-
mm howitzers while pursuing their own procurement
programs for these weapons.
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military officers.
ports, the Air Force is preoccupied with Pakistan's
F-16s and assigns an even higher priority to counter-
air operations. As a result, the Army would have more
difficulty getting additional close air support in any
future conflict.
We expect the Indian Army to continue to modernize
over the next five years at about the same rate that it
has since 1980. Expected deliveries of Soviet weapons,
particularly tanks and armored personnel carriers,
will permit the raising of additional armored and
mechanized units. These developments, plus the refit-
ting of equipment already in inventory and additional
training exercises, will increase the Indian Army's
edge over Pakistani ground forces. By the early 1990s
the Indian Army will be able to execute large-scale
strategic mechanized offensives into Pakistan.
Future Pakistani Army Modernization Efforts
Future Pakistani Army modernization efforts will not
be enough to counter this increased Indian capability.
In the past, Islamabad has used most of its US
military credits to buy new aircraft and missiles for
the Air Force and has not given the Pakistani Army a
substantial share of US military aid. For the military
aid package now being negotiated, Islamabad has
presented a list of equipment that includes some
ground forces items such as Copperhead guided artil-
lery shells, additional artillery guns and radars, Mul-
tiple Launch Rocket Systems, and Stinger Post
surface-to-air missiles, but the Pakistanis have not yet
identified which systems they wish to purchase with
their limited credits.
New Delhi could easily match any quantitative in-
crease in the Pakistani inventory with equipment from
the Soviet Union or other suppliers, but it may not
respond immediately to every aspect of the Pakistani
Army modernization program. Indian defense offi-
cials have chosen to adjust to marginal asymmetries
Prime Minister Gandhi also voiced a more restrained
note toward the Indo-Pakistani military balance dur-
ing his visit to the United States when he drew
attention to the economic costs of the arms race
rather than to the security threat posed by Pakistani
arms purchases. Rising equipment and personnel costs
may have played a part in this change in attitude.
A Nuclear Race
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, in our judg-
ment, could have a significant impact on the Indian
Army's modernization plans. We believe that, if New
Delhi responds by activating its own nuclear weapons
program, the costs would absorb a significant portion
of the defense budget and give more bureaucratic and
political power to the Air Force. In all probability the
Army would suffer from cutbacks and some loss of
influence.
A nuclear arms race in South Asia would also force
the Army to rethink many of its strategic and opera-
tional plans. The current goal of building large ar-
mored and mechanized formations would probably
have to be substantially modified.
done little thinking along these lines. It also indicates
that the Army does not have even the most rudimen-
tary ability to fight in a nuclear environment.
Internal Security Duties
The Army's growing internal security duties will
probably have a greater impact than Pakistani mili-
tary developments on any advances the Army makes
in its war-fighting capabilities. The recent agreement
with Sikh moderates does not promise an immediate
reduction in the Army's role in Punjab State. Contin-
ued threats from Sikh extremists, who reject the
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agreement, will require an Army presence until ade-
quate paramilitary forces can be trained. Insurgencies
in the northeast and the periodic need to deploy Army
forces to suppress communal violence in major urban
areas-such as the civil strife in Gujarat this year-
also guarantee that the Army will be involved heavily
in maintaining civil order for the foreseeable future.
As noted above, the Army is particularly concerned
that its growing involvement in maintaining domestic
order is undermining its ability to fulfill its larger
military responsibilities. These operations are also
drawing off funds and personnel.
The recent creation of a new Army corps in the
northeast to direct counterinsurgency operations had
sufficient priority that it drew on command assets
along the Pakistani border.
The Indian Army's modernization plans could mean a
modest increase in Indian requests for US defense
material. Past Indian proposals to purchase small
arms, howitzers, and antitank missiles have failed,
reinforcing the Indian view of the United States as an
unreliable supplier. A Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MOU) with the United States on arms sales,
following the MOU on technology transfer concluded
this spring, could pave the way for Indian purchase of
ground forces weapons and production technology.
Indian officials have recently shown an interest in
attack helicopters, turrets for self-propelled artillery,
passive night vision devices, and production technol-
ogy for artillery ammunition.
USSR for additional military aid.
Indian purchases of US defense material, however,
will not be significant in dollar or military terms. At
best, they would improve Indian capabilities in select-
ed areas. We believe there is little chance that India
will do the kind of about-face that Egypt did and turn
to the United States for its security needs. New Delhi
does not believe that it needs the kind of US diplomat-
ic assistance Egypt got in negotiating with Israel in
order to deal with Pakistan. In addition, the Army
modernization program is too oriented to Soviet arms
to permit any major change in direction. Even so,
New Delhi can be expected to use its arms relation-
ship with the United States to put pressure on the
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